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The ANATOMY of an EQUIVALENT.
I. THE World hath of late years never been without some extraordinary Word to fur∣nish the Coffee-houses and fill the Pamphlets. Sometimes it is a new one invented, and sometimes an Old one revived. They are usually fitted to some present pur∣pose, with Intentions as differing as the various Designs several Parties may have, either to delude the people, or to expose their Adversaries: They are not of long continuance, but af∣ter they have passed a little while, and that they are grown Nauseous by being so often repea∣ted, they give place to something that is newer. Thus, after Whig, Tory, and Trimmer, have had their Time, now they are dead and forgotten, being supplanted by the word Equivalent, which reigneth in their stead.
The Birth of it is in short this: After many repeated Essays to dispose Men to the Repeal of Oaths and Tests, made for the security of the Protestant Religion, the general aversion to com∣ply in it was found to be so great, that it was thought adviseable to try another manner of at∣tempting it, and to see whether by putting the same thing into another Mould, and softning an harsh Proposition by a plausible Term, they might not have better success.
To this end, instead of an absolute quitting of these Laws, without any Condition, which was the first Proposal; Now it is put into gentler Language, and runneth thus; If you will take away the Oaths and Tests, you shall have as good a thing for them. This put into the fashi∣onable Word, is now called an Equivalent.
II. So much to the Word it self. I will now endeavour in short to Examine and Explain, in order to the having it fully understood,
First, What is the nature of a true Equivalent; and
In the next place, What things are not to be admired under that denomination.
I shall treat these as general Propositions; and tho I cannot undertake how far they may be convincing, I may safely do it, that they are Impartial; of which there can be no greater evidence than that I make neither Inference, nor Application, but leave that part intirely to the Reader, according as his own Thoughts shall direct and dispose him.
III. I will first take notice, that this Word, by the Application which hath been made of it in some modern instances, lieth under some Disadvantage, not to say some Scandal. It is transmitted hither from France; and if as in most other things that we take from them, we carry them beyond the Pattern, it should prove so in this, we should get into a more partial Sti••e than the Principles of English Justice will I hope ever allow us to be guilty of.
The French King's Equivalents in Flanders, are very extraordinary Bargains; his manner of proposing and obtaining them, is very differing from the usual methods of equal dealing. In a later Instance, Denmark, by the encouragement as well as by the example of France, hath propos'd things to the Duke of Holstein, which are called Equivalents, but that they are so, the World is not yet sufficiently convinc'd, and probably the Parties concern'd do not think them to be so, and consequently do not appear to be at all disposed to accept them. Princes enjoyn and prescribe such things when they have Strength and Power to supply the want of Arguments; and according to practice in these Cases, the weaker are never thought to have an ill Bargain, if they have any thing left them. So that the first Qualification of an Equivalent, must be, that the Appraisers be indifferent, else it is only a Sound, there can be nothing real in it: For, where the same party that proposeth a Bargain, claimeth a Right to set the Value; or which is worse: hath power too to make it good; the other may be forced to submit to the Conditions, but he can by no means ever be perswaded to treat upon them.
IV. The next thing to be considered is, that to make an Equivalent in reality an equal thing, in the Proposer, it must be a better thing than that which is required by him; just as good is sub∣ject to the Hazard of not being quite so good: It is not easie to have such an even Hand, as to make the Value exactly equal; besides, according to the Maxim in Law, Melior conditio possiden∣tis, the Offer is not fair, except the thing offered is better in Value than the Thing demanded. There must be Allowance for removing what is fixed, and there must be something that may be a Justification for Changing. The Value of things very often depende••h more upon other Cir∣cumstances, than upon what is meerly intrinsick to them; therefore the Calculation must be made upon that Foot, perhaps in most Cases; and particularly the Want which one of the Par∣ties may have of the Thing he requireth, maketh it more valuable to him than it is in it self. If the Party proposing doth not want the Thing he would have in Exchange, his requiring it is importinent: If he doth, his want of it m••st go into the Appraisement, and by consequence every Proposer of an Equivalent must offer a better Thing, or else he must not take it unkindly to be refused, except the other Party hath an equal Want of the same Thing, which is very improbi∣ble, since naturally he that wanteth most, will speak first.