The fourth Proposition. There shall alwayes be something in actuall being.

Proof.

THere is now, and ever hath been something, as is proved; if there∣fore it could ever happen that all things should cease to be; either something es∣sentially necessary (if there be any such being amongst all things) must cease to be, which is impossible; for if it be essen∣tially necessary, it cannot but be; for every thing must alwayes be what it is essentially: or if there be nothing essen∣tially necessary, all things contingent must cease to be; but that is impossible: for seeing every contingent thing must have its being from some cause really distinct from it, so long as that cause is apt, and able to conserve it in being; and that there is no other cause present, and en∣abled to destroy it, it must remain in its Page  7being: If therefore all things being con∣tingent cease to be, they must either lose their beings for want of a cause to con∣serve all things, or by reason of some cause which destroyes all things. Not the first, for nothing can cease to be for want of that which is wholly impossi∣ble, and so can confer nothing neither to its being, or not being. Now that it is impossible that any cause can give being to all things, is evident; for seeing that very cause is comprized within the num∣ber of all things; if it give being as a di∣stinct cause to all things, it must give be∣ing to it self, and so be distinct from it self, and be supposed to have a being before it is; for every cause, as is said, must be supposed to have an actual being, before it can be supposed to do any thing; for nothing can do nothing: and yet if it be its own cause primarily and absolutely, it cannot be supposed to be before it is produced; therefore it will be either sup∣posed to be before it is, or not to be when it is: it is therefore evident, that seeing Page  8there can be no cause of all things, all things which are, cannot cease to be, for want of a producing cause. Neither for the like reason can all things cease to be, by reason of some cause destroying all things; for such a cause is wholly impos∣sible: for if all things be destroyed, there can nothing remain in actual being; but that which destroyes all things, must be supposed to be whilst it destroyes all things; for to destroy any thing is to do something, and nothing can do nothing.

If it should be replied, that that which destroyes all other things distinct from it, may cease to be, after it has destroyed all those things, and so all things will lose their actual beings, and there will be nothing: I answer, If all things, as we now suppose, be contingent, then no∣thing can destroy all things, save it self: for every contingent thing must have a cause, as is proved; it cannot therefore be supposed to be, unless the cause of it be also supposed to be actually, therefore is cannot destroy all things, save it self, Page  9and remain it self in being; for then a contingent thing should be without a cause, which is impossible. And the same argument concludes, admitting, that all things were succeeding one an∣other by way of cause and effect, through inevitable necessity: For then every thing in actual being must suppose the being of its cause, and so could never destroy all things save it self, because it could not be, when its cause is destroy∣ed. Thus the fourth Proposition is made evident, that seeing there is some∣thing now, there must alwayes be some∣thing hereafter.