Thirteen books of natural philosophy viz. I. Of the principles, and common adjuncts of all natural bodies. II. Of the heavens, the world, and elements. III. Of action, passion, generation, and corruption. IV. Of meteors. V. Of minerals and metals. VI. Of the soul in general, and of things vegetable. VII. Of animals or living creatures. VIII. Of man. Unto which is added five books more of natural philosophy in several discourses. IX. Discourses [illegible] principles of natural things. X. Dis. 2. Concerning the occult and hidden qualities. XI. Dis. 3. Of atomes and mixture. XII. Dis 4. Of the generation of live things. XIII. Dis. 5. Concerning the spontaneous generation of live things. Written in Latin and English. By Daniel Sennert, doctor of physick. Nicholas Culpeper, physitian and astrologer. Abdiah Cole, doctor of physick, and the liberal arts.

NATURAL∣PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSES.

The INTRODUCTION.

IT hath been both by me and others elswhere at large declared, That there are two things which chiefly draw the minds of men from Truth, and hinder the growth of all Disciplines; viz. A Servile kind of Credulity, and a rash desire of Innovation. How much hurt both of these have done to other Disciplines, let those speak that are skilled in them. That I may speak of Natural Phi∣losophy and Physick which belong to my Profession; it cannot be demed but that much hurt hath been done to both these, especially to Natural Philosophy, whiles some Men little regarding Reason and Experience, have solely adhered to the Authority of other Men; others out of a desire of novelty have endeavored wholly to overthrow the foundations of ancient Discipline. From both these courses I freely profess my self to have been alwaies averse: For neither would I be of the number of those rash Innovators, whether Paracelsians or Chymists, or how ever otherwise called, who endeavor wholly to banish from the Schools the ancient Phi∣losophy, which is come to us chiefly from the Writings of Aristotle: nor yet would I be recko∣ned amongst them who are not ashamed in this Age of ours publickly to profess, that they had rather err with Aristotle and Galen, than speak the Truth with any later Author. The Innowators aforesaid I pass over at present. Touching these latter, I conceive Julius Caesar Scaliger hath well written in Exercit. 306. That those Wits are most unhappy which stifly maintain, That our Ancestors knew al things. I do not verily envy Aristotle those praises wherewith the same Scaliger every where adorns him. Let us grant that Aristotle is a man that hath deserved more than all mortal men besides, of all the parts of Humane Knowledg; that he is the Father and Captain of our Wisdom; that he is the chief Dicta∣tor of Learning, the Emperor of Philosophers; that he is the Eagle of the Philosophical Kingdom of Wisdom, and Literary praise; that he is the Hercules, the Prince, the Tri∣bunal of Truth; that he is the god of Philosophers; and in a word, greater than all praise, and above all Calumny: yet neither he nor any mortal Man can be made the Rule of Truth. Let it be counted a comely and a decent thing to cite the Testimonies of Aristotle as of a prime Philosopher for his Opinion, and to produce as many of them as may be: but if weighty reasons be not added, a mind defirous of the Truth will not be contented with these alone. Their Course therefore is by no means approvable, who taking no care for reasons, contend only with Authorities. Yet this is a fault common enough. For if we look into the Writings of some Men we see nothing brought to prove their Matter, but the Authorities of Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Galen, and oftentimes many interpretations are alleadged touching the sence of some one place, and all those rejected, and at last another substituted, perhaps no better than the former, and so in disputing thereabouts pro and con, so many Pages are taken up, that he must have abundance of leisure that would read them all. And which is a ridiculous thing, the contention is not so much about the mind of the

Author speaking in his own Language, as the Interpretation of a barbarous and faulty translation, which is obtruded for the mind of the Author; and so they play at Blind-mans Buff.

So much reverence ought indeed to be afforded Aristotle, that if any thing seems by him inconveniently expressed, it be softened with a fit Interpretation. But if the matter be plain, (only some opinion of Aristotle doth not agree with the truth) 'tis vain to labor to fix another sence upon Aristotle. And that which is the top of all the mischief, you shal find such opini∣ons given out every where for Aristotelean, which are no where extant in Aristotle, being the Inventions of School-men, whose custom hath been to delight themselves in disputing al things pro and con.

Which thing, as I said, doth not a little hinder the progress of al disciplne; whiles both our time is lavishly wasted, and consumed without prosit, of which we ought to be sparing Stewards, since life is short and Art is long; and we wander from the way of sinding the truth. For there are two Principles only of sinding out all truth, and Touch-stones of all opinions, Reason and Experience. He that follows these two doth not casily err: but they who neglecting these do fly to that external Argument, viz. Authority, and like Slaves swear to the sayings of one man, and of a Man make a kind of God, who cannot be deceived; they easily slip into sundry Errors. Hence (to speak nothing of Physick or o∣ther parts of Pinlosophy, but to keep me to natural Philosophy, for whose sake I speak all this) amongst the Expounders of Aristotle (whom all the Philosophers wel nigh of all Nations for some ages last past have believed so to have perfected this part of Philosophy, that there needs no further labor but to understand his writings) so many dissen∣tions and so many indissoluble objections, to and fro, have arisen, which in so many ages of years have not been ended, but that dayly they have divided into many sects, while disputing upon the suppositions of several sects, one man will maintain one way, another man another; this man being for Averrhoes, a second for Thomas Aquinas, a third for Scotus, a fourth for another; that you cannot tel whom to give credit to. And that is true of Euripides, One man sees not all things. And no man hath ever been found, that hath not erred and mistaken, or as Galen hath it: It is hard for him that is a Man not to offend in many things, viz. being quite ignorant of some, judging amiss of others, and negligently setting down other things in writing. And therefore when free and excellent wits, and prudent Men had observed, that the Authorities of the Ancients had bitherto more bindered than furthered the Advancement of Learning; and saw that thereby a Bridle was cast upon the Ʋnderstanding of Man, and upon many excellent wits; they en∣deavored to cast off this yoke of Bondage, and to seek the knowledg of things from the things themselves.

Yet they themselves also who have not followed only Authorities but weighed the Things themselves have not al happily touched the white of Truth. For seeing, as hath been said, Reason and Experience is the Rule of Truth in matters of Nature: Experience must of necessity precede, and when a thing is so found out, Reason is to prove the same: wherin ne∣vertheless many offend; for seeing many neglect Experience, and rely only upon Reasons, & give too much credit to their speculations, they must of necessity be very often deceived. Of which thing we have every where remarkable Documents; some of old trusting to certain sleight reasons denied there were Antipodes; amongst whom was Lactantius, who largely in∣veighs against those Philosophers who held there were Antipodes, in Divin. Institur. Lab. 3. cap. 24 & counts those men fools who beleeved there were such Antipodes who hung by their Legs, and whose Feet were higher than their Heads: and cals it folly & vanity to hold there were Men in the world who went with their Feet just against ours. And Augustine de Civi∣tate Dei Lib. 16. Cap. 9. counts it fabulous to beleeve, that there were men on the other side of the Earth, who went with their Feet against ours. Yea and Aventinus relates, that there was one Vigilius a learned Man, who could not avoid the thunder-bolt of Excommunication, for holding that Men lived about the Globe of the Earth and went with their Feet one against another. For Pope Zachary writ to Boniface, to drive Vigilius from the Church as an Heretick, and to deprive him of his Priesthoed, unless he would abandon his perverse Doctrine. So, in the foregoing ages some endeavored by sleight reasons to perswade that the torrid Zone was not inhabited; both which Experience and late Navigations have taught to be false. So some idle Monks and others of the last ages preceding, taught many things, trusting to their speculations, concerning the Body of Man, which Experi∣ence and Anatomy do shew to be false. Jacobus Z••barella a most learned Interpreter of Aristotle acknowledged this Error, who in Lib. 2. de proposit. necess. cap. 17. thus writes:

All these things are so true, that all men ought to know them by Inspectionof the things themselves, if in these daies we had Philosophers, who Philosophised by searching dili∣gently into the Natures of things; and did not onlyaddict themselves to the words of Ari∣stotle, and those many times misunderstood, to which they are wont to accommodate the things themselves; seeking nothing else but what Aristotle saith, and taking their Argu∣ments for the knowledg and proof of all things, only from his words. The Premises con∣sidered, not out of any desire to inveigh against and carp at Artistotle (whom I reverence as much as any man can) or any other Persons, but only out of desire to find out the Truth, I began more diligently to examin certain things referring to some Controverted Heads of natural Philosophy. For although somwhat above thirty yeers ago, I collected a certain Epitomy of natural Philosophy, and afterwards published the same: yet the rea∣ding of other Authors and especially of Physitians (who have handled natural Philosophy more diligently than other men, and are therefore called Physitians, that is to say, Na∣turalists) the Consideration of natural things, and exercise of chymical Operations, and in a word, Experience hath taught me many things; so that to use the words of the Co∣mick Poet, Such things as I thought I knew, I am ignorant of, and such things as I had an high conceit of, Experience teaches me to reject. I conceive indeed, that the most things If wrote in that smal Epitomy are agreeable to Nature; but yet I suppose there are some things which may be more rightly, or cleerly expressed. Whereof, I think I am not to be blamed for admo∣nishing my Reader; since very many most learned men have done the same before me, which therefore I thought fit briefly to comprize and joyn as an auxiliary Appendix to the foresaid Epitomy, and those things especially, which concern the Principles and Foundations of natural Philosophy, not only general, but special also. For the chief cause why natural Philosophy is so little improved, I conceive to be, that in the former Ages those who ac∣counted themselves the most acute, consumed the greatest part of their life in those general Questions, concerning the first Matter, Form, Privation, Motion, and such like, and wa∣sted the time in repeating those Disputations over and over again, after a most tedious manner; but things particular or the sorts of natural things (out of the Observation wher∣of they ought nevertheless to have constituted their principles) they never medled withall to any purpose. And hence it came to pass that so many Wainloads of Commentaries arose upon Aristotle's books of general natural Philosophy, filled for the most part with Questi∣ons rather Metaphysical than Natural, and many times with vain speculations. But few were found that would read or Comment upon Aristotle's books of Meteors, of the Hi∣story of living things, of the Parts of living things, of the Generation of living things, or of Plants; scarce so many in number,

As Gates of Thebes, or Heads of fruitful Nile.

And although I know, that by these my endeavors I shal lay my self open to the Calum∣nies of many, and that I shal be counted an Innovator and an Inventer of Paradoxes: yet. I have not thought fit therefore to forsake the study of truth. For Aristotle wel saies in 1. Ethicorum cap. 4. It is a good thing, yea and our Duty, for maintainance of Truth, to change and abolish out former Opinions and Tenets. Which things he taught not only by word and writing, but by Deed and Action. For although Aristotle heard Plato teach twenty yeers together; yet he suffered not himself to be brought into bondage by the Authority of his Master, but he freely enquired into the Tenets of him and al other Phi∣losophers before him, opposed them at pleasure and rejected them, substituting in their rooms such things as he thought most probable. And therefore we that follow, do ow no more Reverence to Aristotle than he did to his Predecessors; but we ought so to follow Aristotle, as that we do not love him better than the Truth. Galen boasts of himself that he was alwaies of a free spirit, and preferred Truth before the Doctrine of Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the wits of other Men. And are we all born Servants and Slaves to other Mens opinions? 'Tis excellently spoke by Seneca: They have done many things who are gone before us, but they have not done all. There remains yet much work behind, and much wil remain; nor shal any man born a thousand Ages since want occasion to add somwhat. And above all things this shall be my endeavor, that all my Discourses of Na∣tural Philosophy may tend to the honor and Glory of the most good and great God. Con∣cerning whom I am admonished by St. Paul, Rom. 2. verse 20. His invisible things are seen by the Creation of the World, being understood by the things which are made, viz. his E∣ternal Power and God-head, to the end they might be without excuse. And Mercurius Trismegistus: Man is made a Spectator of the works of God, and he hath wondred at them and acknowledged the Creator. And again in his Book do Pietate & Philosophia: there

can be no more true Godliness than to Understand the things that are, and glorifie the Crea∣tor for them: and presently after; Be Godly O Son; he that is Godly is a Philosopher in the highest degree. For it is impossible to be eminently Godly without Philosophy. But he that learns what things there are in the World, how disposed and by whom, and for whose sake, he wil give thanks to the Work-Master as to a good Father, tender Nurse, and faithful Steward: and he that gives thanks is Godly. And he that is Godly wil know where the Truth is, and what it is; and the more he knows the more Godly he wil be; viz. With such a kind of Godliness as may be attained from the Principles of Natural Philosophy, Theoretical and Practical. For who can choose but be Godly who truly discerns the im∣mense Omnipotency, Goodness, and Wisdom of God? For he is (as Austin saies) with∣out place, and in every place; invisible, and beholding all things; immutable and chan∣ging all things; alwaies working, and evermore quiet; he fills all things and is not shut up; minds all things, and is not troubled; is great without quantity, and therefore insi∣nite; good without quality, and therefore good in the highest degree.

THE FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Principles of Natural Things.

Chap. 1. That it is necessary for a Natural Philosopher to know the Creation of the VVorld.

HE that would treat of Natural Things must make it his chiefest care to handle the Principles of Nature; the Doctrine whereof being not rightly laid down, al things built thereupon must needs fal to ground. Now two kinds of Principles of Natural things must necessarily be considered and understood, * 1.1 viz. Those of their Original and first Creation, and those of their duration or continuance. The first kind of Principles must by any means be diligently considered, and he that enquires into the first Principles must necessarily enquire into God himself. * 1.2 For he is the First of all, and the Principle of al other Prin∣ciples, having created al things Natural, and preserving them when created; so that they re∣tain to this very day that Essence which he gave them at their first Creation. And herein chiefly most of al the Heathen Philosophers are deficient or very barren, and no mention at al (or but on the by) of God the first Author of Nature; and they so describe the whol Course of Nature as if al were performed without a first Cause, only by the action of second Causes, and indeed contrary Principles. Socrates raised his mind a little higher, when a little before his death, as Plato relates in his Phaedo, having heard out of a certain Book of Anaxagoras, that there was a certain Mind which disposes and rules al things, and is the Cause of all; he said he was much delighted with this Cause; adding moreover, that those men exceedingly erred who rested in the second Causes and neglected the first. And he cals the Mind, or God, the Cause indeed; as without which the other Causes termed second Causes, are no Causes.

As to what concerns these second Causes, * 1.3 or the Continuation and Conservation of things created; since some Natural Things keep their Essence entire, such as they were created at the beginning of the World without any mutation; but other things are preserved only in

their kinds, their particulars being subject to continual Corruption and Generation; we must also consider the latter kind of Principles, viz. The Principles of corruption and Ge∣neration.

As to the first kind of Principle, * 1.4 since al things (as al in their Wits grant) are governed by the Providence of God alone; they must also of necessity depend on him as their effici∣ent; and seeing before any Natural things were made, there could be nothing but the most good and great God, we must needs hold that he is the first Author of all Natural things; who, when there was nothing besides himself, and there was no matter for him to work upon, by his Infinite Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, he commanded those things that were nor; to be made. Which thing also the more sound Philosophers granted after their manner, al∣though they did not cleerly enough explain the matter it self. Not to speak of others, Plato t••uly approved of the Original of the World, although he with-held his assent from some things concerning the same. For he constantly affirms, That the World did not proceed from Nature, nor from Fortune, nor was made by Hap-hazard, but that it flowed from the Wil of God, not bound by any necessity. But whether from Eternity a certain Matter did pro∣ceed from God, and was al at once formed into this variety of things, or being at first un∣formed, after an infinite tract of Time, he did adorn it with so many Forms, or, which is the only thing that remains, he performed both in Time, he neither saies nor denies, and reasons in such a manner of the Original of the World, that which way soever you turn and wind al that Disputation which he makes thereof in his Timaeus, it wil seem to savor al these Opinions. Which also may be said of the Opinions of other Philosophers before Plato. And hence it came to pass that the Philosophers which came after Plato were of sundry Opinions hereabout. Aristotle truly, though he acknowledg God to be the Maker of the World, when in the 2. de Generat. & Corrupt. cap. 10. text. 19. he writes; God hath filled the Ʋniverse: and in the 30. Section of his Problems, the 5. Problem; God hath given us two Instruments in our selves, by help of which we might make use of external In∣struments: yet he endeavors considently and openly by divers Reasons to deny, That God made the World new and in time; and to overthrow the Opinions of the Ancients touching the Original of the World. And therefore though he acknowledg God the Author of the World, yet herein learned men conceive he contradicts himself, since Eternity is a durati∣on proper to God alone, nor can a Creature be co-eternal with the Creator; not can there be two Infinites, nor wil right Reason allow us to make the World equal to God. And hence a grievous controversie hath been raised amongst the Peripateticks concerning the mind of Aristotle in this point, nor have they as yet wel decided the Controversie. For there are two things principally which al Philosophers in a manner cannot understand, viz. How the World could be made of nothing, and how it could be made in time; for when they saw other Artificers make their Works by mixing some things, and taking away other things; they imagined that God also had thus made the World. And therefore though they gran∣ted God to be the Author of the World; yet they held there were before the Original of the World certain bodies, either floating up and down in the immense Space, or lying hid in a certain confused Chaos and Medley. But they were both ignorant who made those bodies: * 1.5 and if they grant God to be infinite, they might believe he could produce somthing even of nothing; especially since there was nothing before any matter imaginable, but he.

Another thing which offends them is, * 1.6 That they think it absurd that God should be so long a time idle before the Worlds Creation, and at last set himself upon a new work. But since in Eternity there is neither fore nor after, it could not be made before it was made, un∣less it should be made from Eternity. But to be made, and to be made from Eternity imply a contradiction. And if you ask why the World was made five thousand years ago, and not twenty thousand years ago? I ask again, Supposing it was created twenty thousand years ago, why not an hundred thousand years ago? and if an hundred thousand years ago, why not an hundred thousand thousand years, and so stil forwards, unless it had been made from Eternity, which cannot be? For Eternity is a point wherein there is no going before or co∣ming after. But the Philosophers could not by the reasons meerly of Nature and their own understandings, come to know the power of the most good and great God, who acts above the powers of Nature. But we may know these things very wel out of the holy Scriptures, * 1.7 the use whereof is by the goodness of God afforded unto us; and therefore those things in which the Philosophers are defective must be supplied from them. For though the holy Scrip∣tures are not written to interpret the things of Nature: yet inasmuch as those things which are written by Moses touching the Creation of the World, were dictated by Inspiration of the holy Ghost; we must needs think that al those things which we read in the History of

the Creation are most true: and that it is impious to suppose any thing there said to swerve an hairs breadth from the Truth. And suppose (which I do not now dispute) that every where in holy Scripture we meet with some things which are spoke according to the Opinion of Men, and either Tropically or otherwise Figuratively according to the Capacity of the common people: yet that cannot any waies be said of the Creation of the World, because God would have that made known to Men only as it is comprehended in this Writing of Moses, even to the end of the World. And although the primary scope of the holy Scrip∣ture is to propound the means to eternal Salvation: yet the History of the Creation of the World is not to be excluded from those means, as the Apostle teaches in the Romans, chap. 1. verse 20. seeing withal there are therein such Revelations of Natural things, as to which no sharpness of Humane Wit could ever be able to attain. An Example whereof the Creation of the World, and Aristotle himself, do afford. For let us suppose as Julius Caesar Scaliger conceits, that Nature hath in Aristotle made ostentation of al the Wit Hu∣mane Kind is capable of; yet he could never attain to know the Creation of the World, as the most learned Peripatericks confess. And therefore to depart from the evident sence of Scripture and to assent to Pagans, is neither Lawful nor Godly. And although it be indif∣ferent as to Eternal Life, what Opinion any Man holds in the things of Nature, and in this darkness of the minds of mortal men it can be no prejudice to a mans attainment of Eternal Life, if out of weakness of Understanding he err in this point: yet if any man does witting∣ly contradict the holy Scriptures, and esteems the Authority of an Heathen more than the holy Writ, I conceive that questionless he sins very grievously. Truly Galen cannot (nor ought he by any Christian Philosopher or Physitian) be excused who in his second Book of the difference of Pulses, chap. 4. carps at the School of Moses and of Christ, as delivering Laws not founded upon any Demonstration. And in his Book 11. de usu partium, where he disputes of the Hairs of the Eye-brows, he derides Moses, as if God the Creator had com∣manded these Hairs alone to keep alwaies an even size, and that they as fearing the power of the prescriber, or reverencing God himself that gave them that command, or being per∣swaded that it was best to do thus, they did as they were commanded. And afterwards he reprehends Moses for supposing that God could make all things, although he would make an Horse or an Ox of ashes; and he holds and determines that God himself never under∣takes any thing which Nature cannot effect, and affirms that the Hairs of the Eyelids would not have been such as they are if they had sprung out of the soft skin, though God should have willed and commanded the same a thousand times. Well therefore did that same fa∣mous Philosopher and Physitian Franciscus Vallesius, who in the Proeme of his Book de sacra Philosophia, is not ashamed ingenuously to confess, That when he was a yong man he wrote Matters Philosophical (viz. When he commented upon the Physicks of Aristo∣tle) according to Opinion (that is the Mind of Aristotle and his Interpreters) but that he writes these things according to the Truth, that is to say, agreeable to the History of the Creation in holy Scripture, seeing before he could have no certainty concerning the Princi∣ples of Natural things before he knew them by reading the holy Scripture, to the reading whereof he had consecrated his old Age. And I have been long of the mind, That he who not knowing, or neglecting the Creation of the World, shal undertake a Dispute of the things of Nature, he shalerr in many things; yea, and that many upon that occasion have fallen into most grievous Errors.

Now Moses hath described the History of the Creation in the first Chapter of Genesis; * 1.8 the Interpretation whereof to set down in this place, I count not worth the while; since there are many large Commentaries extant thereupon, and amongst the rest that of Fran∣ciscus Vallesius, which though it be short is none of the worst. Only I shal advise you of one thing; That there are many who affix a wrong Interpretation upon the Text of Moses, whiles they endeavor to expound Moses, not by Moses, but from the Writings of Heathen, an unhappy and intollerable design. For it is certain amongst al Christians, that al things delivered in the holy Scriptures are true, and those delivered by Moses (being plainly Histo∣rical) are to be understood according to the proper and genuine sense of the words, as they are commonly understood in the Holy Scriptures; and not to be explained according to pre-conceived Opinions sucked in by reading Heathenish Authors: nor is the holy Scrip∣tute to be wrested to such Opinions. And therefore Augustine gives a good warning in the beginning of his second Book upon Genesis, that we take heed lest we contend, not for the sence of the holy Scripture, but for our own Opinion, so that we would make that to be the Opinion of the Scripture which is our Opinion; whereas we should rather be willing to make that our Opinion which is found to be the sence of the Scripture. The History (truly)

of the Creation is not repugnant to Nature, but it is many times opposite to the falle Gen∣ceptions which Men have of Nature; concerning which the same Augustine in his seventh Epistle to Marcellus thus writes: If a reason be given contrary to the Authority of the holy Scriptures, be it never so acute, yet does it deceive by an appearance or similitude of Truth. For it cannot be true. Again, if a man does oppose the Authority (as it were) of the holy Scriptures against most manifest and certain Reason, he that does so understands not him∣self, and he does not object the sence of those Scriptures which he cannot dive into, but his own sence against the Truth; nor does he oppose what is in them, but what he sinds in him∣self in their stead as it were. And therefore although it seems hard to many to abandon some Hypotheses of Natural Philosophers, because they agree not with the History of the Creation of the World: yet is it altogether necessary so to do, seeing there are some things in Aristotle contrary to the History of the Creation of the World. For as Benedictus Pererius (an excellent Aristotelean) hath ingenuously written, de Com. Rerum Nat. princip. Lib. 5 cap. 7. nothing can be found out or imagined which is more contrary to the Doctrine of Aristotle, and which does more vehemently break al his Joynts and Nerves, than the Creation of the World. And a little before; When the Peripatericks perceived that a Creation being allowed, most grievous inconveniences would follow against their matter, they could by no means be induced to grant the same. And he who wil examme some Te∣nets of Aristotle shal easily perceive that Pererius was not mistaken when he so thought and wrote. And he shal see the same (not to speak now of the E••ernity of Motion, and of the World) who wil but consider the Doctrine of Aristotle concerning the Panciples of things Natural. But it is not my purpose to produce al the Tenets of Arisiotle which may be called into question, nor is it my design to subvert the Natural Philosophy of Aristotle, but rather to shew which way the same may be perfected. And therefore I shal only hint a few things concerning the same.

Chap 2. Whether the Principles of Natural things are contrary.

ARistotle in the first of his Physicks, chap. 6. * 1.9 presupposes this as a thing granted by all Men, That the Principles of Natural things ought to be contraries. Now he was perswaded to hold this Opinion, either because he beleeved that the generation of al Natural things was performed by the action of Contraries, and that when one contrary overcomes a∣nother, this thing perishes, and another is generated; or because he would insist in that Me∣thod by him pointed out in Lib. 1. Physicor. and proceed from things most known to us, to search out the Natures of things. But some Expositors of Aristotle have long since told us that this proposition is not universal, nor hath place in al Physical things. For since the World hath two sorts of Parts, some that have remained incorruptible and unchangable to this very day, viz. The Heaven and the Stars; some corruptible, whose Individuals are generated and corrupted, yet the kind is preserved by a continual succession of the said Indi∣viduals; it easily appears, how those principles belong to the Heaven and Stars. * 1.10 As for Matter, it belongs indeed to the Heaven, but not by a definite contrariety, but only affor∣ding Magnitude. For (which Aristotle wil not deny) the end of matter is to be the Recep∣tacle of Forms, both substantial and accidental; and therefore in 2. Phys. cap. 8. text. 81. he terms the Form the End of the Matter; and the same Matter gives corpulency and an in∣determinate magnitude to things, and hath an aptitude to receive Forms, and a determinate figure, and of it self is no waies the Cause of Generation and corruption, but receives those effects from some Agent, or as Scaliger writes in Exercitat. 61. Sect. 1. Matter was not given primarily and of it self, for to cause a transmutation to generation; so that where ever it is, there also Generation should be; but to be the subject of the form of Corporiety in a substance, and to receive Quantity and Figure: Quantity in regard of change of place; Figure, because every body must and ought to be finite. And a little after, For these Causes Matter (by a primary Councel of God) was created; but secondarily, and as to a less noble end, for Generation. And therefore although Matter belongs to al Natural things; yet, that the Principles of Natural things should be contrary does not belong to al; since in the Heavens and Stars (according to the Opinion of Aristotle himself) there is no Genera∣tion, and no contrariety, which might be the cause of Generation and Corruption. And therefore Principles with a definite and determinate Contrariety are not the most general, but do belong only to bodies subject to Generation and Corruption.

Moreover, they do not belong to al corruptible and mutable things neither, but to such alone as are made by the action of contraries, and not to such as are made of seed. And touching this very Contrariety of Principles, and concerning them how they are contrary, the Peripateticks themselves are at great variance; of which see their Commentaries. How∣beit, the most of them do not place a true Contrariety in the first Principles, but such an opposition as is between the Habit and Privation, as Zabarella writes in his first Book de materia prima, cap. 2. and thus of an Egg which is no Chick, a Chick; and of Wood which is no Statue, a Statue; and of Potters Clay a Pot they say is made, and that Generation is a passage from a Privative to a Positive Essence.

But in good deed, thus going to work they have not sufficiently explained the Doctrine of the Generation of things, nor have they sufficiently laid down the Causes of Generation. For in the first place those examples which they bring of Artificial things, as when a stool or statue is made of Wood, a Pot of Potters Clay, a Globe of Wax, and such like, are all to be rejected: seeing they are not produced by operation Natural, but are the works of Art. Moreover, although we should admit a Contrariety in things Natural, in regard of their forms, by which many actions and Sympathies and Antipathies are caused, as Water is contrary to Fire, and Plants are killed by the Cold; yet from that very Contrariety a Cause of the Generation of al things cannot be rendred, nor is that Generation which is pri∣marily intended, accomplished by the Action of Contraries; and therefore it cannot be granted that contrary Principles must be constituted for every Generation. For that a Sheep produces a Sheep, a Plum produces a Plum, does not proceed from the Action of Contraries.

And therefore although the Expositors of Aristotle having canvassed the matter to and fro concerning the Contrariety of Principles, do at last conclude, That one Contrary is not made of another, as of the term from whence, but that one Contrary is made after another; as for example, Cold after Hot; yet that term infers no causality, and affords nothing to the production of the thing, and therefore cannot be called a contrary Principle.

Chap. 3. Of the Form.

ANd therefore besides the Matter, * 1.11 our great Care must be to find out a Principle which is the efficient Cause and principal Agent in the Generation of al things. Verily (that I may not seem injurious to Aristotle) I must needs confess, that he in Lib. 4. de Ort. & Interit. cap. 9. text. 53. &c. as also in the end of the 4. of Meteors, reprehends the Anci∣ents, because they did teach the Generation of things to be caused by the first Qualities, too instrumentally, omitting the Cause taken from the Form, and doing just as if a man should attribute to the Saw, Hatchet, and such like Instruments, the things made by them. But I could wish that in the beginning of his Physicks he had made larger mention of that Cause, or at least that his Expositors had from other places of his Works explained what Aristotle taught in his Acroamaticks concerning the Principles of Natural things. For so doubtless they would have enquired thereinto, and would not have been so content with the action of contrary Principles, and taught that the Generations of things were so instrumentally per∣formed by them. Yea, and it were to be wished that Aristotle himself had been more solli∣citous about that Cause, or had more largely explained the same, and not extended too far the action of the first Qualities. At the end indeed of the 4. of his Meteors he plainly laies open his mind; where he attributes the Generation of similar parts in Animals to the action of the first Qualities, but the Generation of the dissimilar parts alone he attributes to a su∣perior Agent, while he thus writes: Such parts happen to be made by Heat and Cold and their motions; being compacted by the power of Heat and Cold. Now I mean those parts which are similar, as Flesh, Bones, Hairs, Nerves, and al that are like to these. For they are al diffinguished by those differences which we mentioned before, viz. Tension, Draw∣ing, Comminution, Hardness, Softness, and others of the same kind. For such parts I say are made by heat and cold and mixt motions. But no man can imagine that the dissimilar parts, as the Head, or Hand, or Foot, are constitured of them: but as the motion of Cold and Heat is the Cause why Brass or Silver are made, but not of the making of a Saw, Glafs∣bottle, or Box; but of these Art, of the other Nature, or some other Cause: and so it will be thought to be the cause that those things are made. But whether this Doctrine of Ari∣stotle be perfectly currant, I leave to the Reader to judg. Galen (truly) and other Physi∣tians

ascribe not only the Formation of the dissimilar parts to the Soul; but also they attri∣bute thereto a blood-making, flesh-making, bone-making, nerve-making Faculty; and doubtless they are therein in the right. And who can beleeve that Gold, Silver, Iron, are generated principally and solely by Heat and Cold; and that the efficiency of the Form is not added. Moreover, neither hath he sufficiently declared what that specifick cause is in the Generation of things, but neglecting the same he often runs to the Universal Cause. For in his Book de Generat. & Corrup. cap. 10. and the following Chapters, he makes no mention thereof, but after he hath rejected the Opinions of the Ancients, and would pro∣duce his own, he flies to the Motion of the Heaven; and after he hath taught that the Moti∣on of Heaven is perpetual, thence he concludes by way of Consequence, That rather that which is should be the Cause of that which is not, than that which is not the Cause of that which is; and that that which alwaies is, should make and produce that which is not and is generated. But at the beginning of the World, neither did the motion of Heaven make things Sublunary, nor now being only an universal Cause does it produce the sorts of things. For God in the first Creation gave to things their Forms, * 1.12 by which the Order of Generation is continued and perfected; and these Forms are justly held to be the Agent Principle, and as the Expositors of Aristotle themselves do hold, have a power to multiply themselves; and al the Generation of Natural things depends upon the multiplication and propagation of Souls, by reason of the Faculty which by the Almighty power of God was put into them at the first Creation, when God said, Gen. 1.11. Let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his kind, whose seed is in it self up∣on the Earth: and it was so. And the Earth brought forth Grass, and the Herb yielding seed after his kind, and the Tree yielding Fruit, whose seed was in it self, after its kind. And in verse 22. he said to the Fishes and Birds; Encrease and multiply, and fill the Wa∣ters in the Seas, and let Fowl multiply in the Earth. And God made the Beast of the Earth after his kind, and every thing that creepeth on the Earth after his kind: and God saw that it was good. And to Man-kind he said, verse 28. Encrease and multiply, and fill the Earth. Also in verse 29. Bebold I have given you every Herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the Earth, and every Tree in which is the fruit of a Tree yielding seed, But as to the manner of Generation; The generation of Plants and Animals does sufficient∣ly declare, that their Generation is not caused by the action of contraries one upon another, but by the communication of Souls, or by Seed which perfects the Fabrick of its own body, not primarily by the action of contraries, but by attraction of things friendly and of kin, and the expulsion of things having Enmity. For, that the body of some Plant or Animal is made, does not come to pass by the only concourse and fighting of the Elements. For ex∣cept, as J. Caesar Scaliger, in Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. rightly teaches, Those four Ele∣ments have a Governor, they will both toss and be tossed rashly without manner or mea∣sure. For what is that which mixes just so much Earth, and so much of the other Ele∣ments? But there ought to be in every motion one first mover. For they cannot move them∣selves to the Production of any work; but in Compounds they are moved by the more ex∣cellent Form to Generation, and in imperfect mixt Bodies by an external Principle they are moved to a mutual connexion. For instance, when the Seeds of Plants are cast into the ground, the Elements do not then begin to fight that they may make the Body of a Plant, but each particular seed draws out of the Earth such nourishment as is to its own Nature agree∣able, some that which is harsh, others that which is bitter, sweet, salt, as Hippocrates writes in his Book de Natura Humana: whence the whol Plant is formed, nourished, and attains to its growth.

Yea, and even Aristotle himself when he treats of Generation, * 1.13 cannot rest in the first Qualities, but is compelled to ad an higher Agent, viz. The Soul, even in the Generation of the similar parts, whiles in 2. de Generat. Animal. cap. 1. he writes: Even as we do not say that an Hatchet or other Instrument is made by the fire alone: So neither the Foot nor the Hand, no nor so much as the Flesh. For it also hath some office. Hardness therefore and softness, clamminess, stifness, and whatever other dispositions are in the parts animated, may be produced by heat and coldness: but that whereby it is Flesh or a Bone cannot: but it is so made by a motion proceeding from the Generator, which is actu∣ally that thing, which the thing whereof Generation is made is potentially or by way of aptitude; as we see it is also in things Artificial. For Iron is made bard or soft by cold or heat; but a Sword is made by the motion of Artificial Instruments, which motion hath in it the Nature of the Art. For Art is the Principle and Form of that which is effected, but in another. But the motion of Nature is in is self, proceeding from another Nature,

which hath the Form actually. And as was said but even now, in 2. de Generat. & Cor∣rupt. cap. 9. text. 53, 54, 55. he reckons Heat, Cold, and such like Qualities for Instru∣ments, and saies they generate after a very Instrumental manner; and he writes that such as attribute Generation to them, do just as if a man should make a Saw, Ax, or any other Instrument the Cause of all those things made thereby.

And just so it is with the Elements. * 1.14 For when God first created the Heaven and the Earth, he first separated the Elements, and distinguished the Earth from the Water, and so gave the Elements their forms. That therefore is false which Zabarella endeavors to teach out of Aristotle Lib. 1. de Element. cap. 8. 9. (where he pitifully beats his Brains and vexes himself, and yet cannot make it appear how the first Qualities which flow from their forms can be before them; nor doth he seek after Truth in the thing it self, but how he may find such an Opinion as the words of Aristotle can bear) that this Elementary world hath nothing of it self but Aptitude or Potentiality; and whatever it hath of act, it receives from the Heavens; and that the whol matter of this inferior world is potentially Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry; but is actually made such by Immobility the motion and of the Heavens; growing hot by the motion of Heaven, and cold by the want of that motion; and that after the first Qualities (which are the preparations for the eduction of Forms) the forms of the Elements do follow, and that so the Elements are made and continue such (according to the Opinion of Aristotle) from Eternity. The holy Scriptures, as hath been said, do teach us better that the Elements were created at the Beginning, and that all things have their mat∣ter and forms whereby they differ one from another, and whereby they are able to operate, from the first Creation, and preserve the same to this very day, by the good wil and pleasure of the good and great God.

From all which it appears, that God in the first Creation gave to all natural Bodies their matter and Form. To which if some would afford their Consideration, they would think otherwise than they do concerning the original of Forms. For it is an opinion sufficiently common, * 1.15 for which some plead as if their Life and Salvation lay on it, that forms are drawn out of the power or aptitude of the Matter, which is nevertheless built upon no sure Reasons, as I have shewed in my Epitomy of Natural Philosophy, Book 1. Chap. 3. and as I shal shew hereafter in my Fourth Discourse touching the Original of living things, chap. 4. Here I shal add nothing, but that this Opinion had its original from the Ignorance of the Creation of the world. For since they knew not whence all natural things should receive their forms, and that they had by command of the Creator a power to multiply themselves; they invented this original of them. Most indeed do give this out for an Aristotelick tenet, but with Bon-Amicus and others, Dr. Casper Hofmannus, a man excellently verl'd in Ari∣stotle, saies it is a tener of Averrboes, in Tract. de Origine Form. neer the end. Yet the said Hofmannus in the same place doth produce some texts out of Averrhoes, wherein he holds the efficient cause of Generation to be the form contained in the Seed: so that the fore∣said Tenet seems rather to have had its original from the Schoolmen. Aristotle is verily of another mind in this point, who though he admits the Heaven as an universal Cause, yet he adds an immediate Cause, when he writes, that the Sun and Man generate a man. And in 2. Phys. cap. 3. text 31. he hath these words expressly concerning Seed: The Seed and the Physitian, and the Consulter, and whatever, is Efficient, all these are the Causes whence the Beginning of Mutation, of Rest and Motion doth proceed. And Scaliger produces more such Places in Exercit. 6. sect. 2. of which also mention is made hereafter, where we shal speak of the Generation of Living things.

Now two things chiefly brought the School-men into this Opinion: * 1.16 the first it that they beleeved, as was said before from Zabarella, Lib. 1. de Element. Qualitat. cap. 9. and as they indeed suppose, according to the mind of Aristotle, Lib. 1. Meteor. cap. 4. that this Elementary world hath nothing of it self but aptitude or potentiality; and that what∣ever it hath of act, it receives from Heaven; and if at any time all the Elements were at first generated, and began to be what they are, they were generated by the Heavens; and because according to Aristotle Generation never began, that they are perpetually made and preserved such by the Heavens.

The other is because they endeavored to prove their natural Principles by examples drawn from the production of things natural (which kind of Examples though Aristotle hath used in his Physicks and Metaphysicks, yet we must think he intends thereby only to illustrate, not to prove that Doctrine:) for when they saw a Statue or Image made by the Carvers paring somwhat off, and adding if need were somwhat, and that when the Ar∣tificer had done his work at last, the very moment he leaves off the Form results from

al that hath been done: they thought after the same manner, that by the action of some exter∣nal Agent (yet what that Agent should be they have not cleerly enough explained, lurking under the general term of Nature, whereas a specifick cause ought to be rendred of every spe∣cifick Effect) some disposition was brought into the matter, upon the final perfection where∣of the form sprung up in a moment: and they said that it was drawn out of the power or ap∣titude of the matter. But they were herein in a very great Error: * 1.17 For when of Wood a Bench is made, or a Statue; or a Jug is made of Earth, a Globe of Wax, there is nothing induced but a certain Accident, Quality or Shape, and there is then no power of the matter save obediential. But here the Question is concerning the original of a Substance. Yet the Production of even artificial things might have brought them to the knowledg of the generation of natural things if they would have weighed the matter more accurately. For as artificial things are produced by an actual Agent, according to a determinate Idea in the mind of the Artificer, and so every thing is not made by every Artist, but a Carver makes one kind of work, a Box-maker makes another kind: a Carpenter makes another: so also to the generation of every natural thing a determinate and specificial Agent is requisite, and one that is an Agent actually which according to the Power given it by its Creator (as the Artist works according to the Idea or Pattern in his mind) makes a work like it self. Herein only is the difference, that the Artist in the artificial generation is without the matter: but in things natural, the Artist is in the matter, and diffused through the mat∣ter as Galen speaks, de Causis procat. & Causis pulsuum. Nor can any external thing, whatever they shal seign, be admitted for a determinate cause, since none is like unto and (as they say) univocal to the thing generated, or hath at least that similitude to the thing genera∣ted which the Pattern in the mind of the Artist hath to his work, be it Statue, Pot, Bench, or what ever. For indeed Nature is an intrinsecal Art; Art an extrinsecal Nature. Now Nature hath this Art from God, the foot-steps and Prints of whose wildom appear every where, in Men, in Bees, in Primites, in the leaves and flowers of Trees, and al natural things whatsoever upon which the Creator hath imprinted his Image when he gave them Forms. For every Form is a participation and Image (after its manner) of the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, and Love of God: and every Being or thing, by its form, hath a desire to be, a Knowledg how to be, and a Power to be. And all things natural have by their forms whatever they have, and from the form proceeds the whol Fabrick of the Body, and the or∣nament of Accidents; and many Qualities which are vulgarly ill attributed to the mixture of the Elements and the temper of tangible Qualities do flow from the Form, and all the furniture of the Body proceeds from the Form, as I shal hereafter shew more at large in the 4. and 6. Discourses of this work.

And although in the Forms of things we meet with many Particulars worthy of admirati∣on: * 1.18 yet forms have chiefly three Proprieties which are diligently to be observed: The first is, that the Form of it self hath no Quantity, not can it be divided; and the same can be as essentially entire and compleat in a smal Quantity, as in a great Bulk; and in the smallest Atome or indivisible Particle of Fire, or Water, is as perfect as in a great Quantity of either; and in a smal Seed of Poppy or Tobacco, as in a great Plant of either; or to avoid all oc∣casion of cavilling, in a little Sprig spouting from an Aco•••• set in the Ground, the form of an Oak is as perfect and compleat as in the tall and hard Oak afterwards: nor is the Soul which is in a small Seed or Shoot, lesser than that which is afterwards in a tall Tree: nor is that in an high Tree greater than that in a smal Seed or Branch.

Secondly, Yet is the form extended according to the extension of the Matter, or rather the form fils its whol Matter: For whereas, that I may demonstrate this by the Example of Plants, the whol Body of the Plant lives, is noutished, grows; the soul which was as first in a smal Twig, diffuses it self (its nature becoming no bigger) into the nourishment newly adjoyned; and where ever the Body is which lives, there the Soul is rightly said to be; and the plenitude (if I may so speak) or Replency of the Soul is just so great as the living body, and the dimensions thereof. For since no act is performed without some pri∣mary Agent; where ever there is nutrition, there of necessity the Soul must be. And be∣cause Augmentation is made, when the pre-existent Soul communicates it self to the afflu∣ent Aliment, whose Bulk reaches further than the Body which is nourished, and diffuses or sheds is self abroad thereinto; of necessity it must be present in every part of the whol Body. After the same manner the case stands in Animals. For since they are nourished, encreased, and endued with the guift of feeling; the soul which is but one, must of necessi∣ty be in all parts of the Body.

Thirdly, But although every form be of it self uncapable of being divided or parted, yet because it is coextended or stretched out together with a corporeal body, which hath Quan∣tity, by the division thereof it becomes capable of number, and is multiplied intomany In∣dividuals, and every form hath the Power of self-multiplication. Howbeit the manner of that multiplication is not one and the same. In some Plants in which the seminal mat∣ter is dispersed through their whol Bodies, the soul though of it self not subject to Quan∣tity, is divided after a manner peculiar to it self according to the division of the Matter, and being actually but one in number is manifold potentially, that it hath in it a fitness, power, or aptitude to become many and becomes actually manifold, when its Body is divided into many parts; of one Vine many Vines, and of one Willow or Withy many may be made. But in others this same Multiplication is caused by Seed: of which we shal speak more at large in our Discourse of the Generation of living Things.

Chap. 4. Of Privation.

I must here also ad somwhat concerning Privation, which is reckoned amongst the Prin∣ciples of natural things. * 1.19 Since the original of the form is such, as hath been explained just now, and shal be hereafter explained more at large; Privation unless the nature there∣of be rightly opened, is in vain reckoned amongst the Principles of things natural. The ve∣ry Expositors (truly) of Aristotle themselves do grant, that Privation is not a Principle, otherwise than by accident, if you regard the thing it self constituted: but if you consider the Generation thereof, it is of it self a Principle, viz. because it is as a Term from which, (since it is the absence of the form in the immediate Matter) which hath an aptitude to re∣ceive the same: Which opinions if they are to be allowed, they do stand altogether in need of a convenient explication. For that which is wont commonly to be said, that Privation though it belong not of it self to the Essence of things to be generated, yet it concurs of it self to natural Mutations, and from it all natural Generation proceeds, so that the form doth (as it were) arise thereout; that is false. The absence of the form helps nothing to the Generation; but besides the matter a disposition to receive the form is necessary. For eve∣ry Form and Soul, since from the divine Benediction it hath a faculty to multiply it self, it requires a matter wherein to be propagated, and it disposes and fits the same for it self. Plants (for example sake) produce Seeds or bulbous roots, and Eg-engendring Creatures produce Eggs, other living Creatures produce seed, by which they are able to multiply themselves and to communicate somwhat of their Essence. If they please to term this dispo∣sition Privation, they shal have my consent. But they do not cleerly enough explain how the Form follows Privation, and whence it proceeds. The Conimbricensian Collegiates do say indeed, Lib. 1. Phys. cap. 9. Quest. 9. art. 2. that the matter then only attains an immediate and compleat aptitude, when it is arrived to the Term and Fulness of all the Ac∣cidents wherewith it is disposed and fitted by the Agent, which term betides only in the ve∣ry moment it self of Generation. And very true (indeed) it is, that disposition of the matter whereby it is fit for the multiplcation of the form is made in time, and at last perfected in a moment, nor can the Seed of a Pear or an Apple be termed properly a Seed, til the accomplishment of the accidents is present. But the Form is not absent while these previous dispositions are made, so as to result, upon their accomplishment; but it is already present, and it self according to the nature of the Body whereof it is a form, fits the matter wherein it may multiply it self, and elaborates the same, and in this elaboration some space of time is spent, more or less according to the Nobleness or Baseness of the Forms: but when it hath introduced the utmost perfection and accomplishment into the matter, just then the Form which before had a power to multiply it self, doth mul∣tiply it self actually; as for example sake, in a Poppy look how many seeds are gene∣rated, so many times doth the form of the Poppy multiply it self, and so new Plants of Poppy are generated. The soul in an unripe seed is not different from that in the same seed when it is ripe; but herein lies the difference, that the seed unripe lives only with the soul of the Plant; and being separated from the Plant wherein it was bred it cannot exist of it self: but a perfect and ripe seed is so disposed, that though it may be separated from the Plant wherein it is produced, yet it hath the same soul in it self, and lives now by its own soul, so that it can exist by it self. Of which matter J. Caes. Scaliger saies rightly, Exercit. 6. sect. 10. A Tree (saith he) engenders, when it produceth seed. But the Tree is not then generated when it sprouts out of the seed; but then that which was formerly ingen∣dred

and imperfect, is perfected. But if any man wil thus explain the vulgar Doctrine of Privation, and say that after the matter hath received al its accomplishment of Accidents, then there is a Privation, and that then afterwards in a moment the Form is introduced by an ex∣ternal Agent, that man is very much out, as shal hereafter be largely declared in its place; and it is sufficiently proved by Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercit. 6. Sect. 5.

To be brief: In the first place, * 1.20 Privation (however it be explained) does not belong to al Natural things, but to such alone in which there is Generation, and therefore it cannot be numbred amongst the most general Principles of Natural things. For in the Heavens there is no Privation properly so called. For since it supposes a subject having aptitude to another Form, there is no such aptitude in Heaven.

Secondly, Privation (which also the Expositors of Aristotle themselves do teach, as may be seen in Tolet. Lib. 1. Phys. cap. 9. Quest. 21.) is not a Principle of Constitution, or which enters the thing generated, to help make it up, but of Generation.

Thirdly, Though it should be admitted for a Principle of Generation; yet they who main∣tain the Doctrine of the Eduction of Forms out of the aptitude of the matter, cannot con∣veniently shew what Privation is. But if we hold the multiplication and propagation of Forms, Privation may (not unfitly) be explained two manner of waies.

First of all, Since Forms are propagated not without Matter, but with it, and every Form requires a peculiar matter; that same last disposition to the reception and propagati∣on of the Form may (not altogether unfitly) be called Privation: and it may be thus defi∣ned. Privation is the absence of a Form in a Matter which is immediately fitted to receive the same. To explain the thing by Examples: In a Stone there is no aptitude to receive the form of an Apple, or of a Dog; and therefore we do not say there is the Privation of the form of an Apple or a Dog. So neither is the Soul of a Dog propagated with his Blood, nor the form of an Apple with the pulp or meat thereof, but with the seed. And seeing the seed is not generated in a moment; for examples sake: The seed in an Apple is first white, and then it becomes black and ripe, and apt to receive the Soul of an Apple into it, and also to re∣tain the same, being separated from the Tree: in the seed already ripe, and which hath alrea∣dy in it the soul of an Apple, Privation is not said to be because the Soul is already therein; but in that same seed which is just ready to ripen and is immediately fitted to receive the Soul, and to retain it, though it be separated from the Tree, Privation is said to be; and then Privation is that same ultimate disposition of the seed whereby it is fitted to receive and pro∣pagate the form of an Apple.

Secondly, Because nevertheless in that same ripe seed the Soul is present, at least in its first act, and because it wants Organs is not vulgarly called an Apple-tree, as an Egg is not called an Hen for the same Reason: If any man by reason of the absence of those Organs ne∣cessary to perform the actions of an Apple-tree or an Hen, shal cal that disposition which is in the animated seed and Egg, to receive the Organs, and exercise the actions by a second act, Privation; and hold that in the Eg there is the Privation of an Hen, because there is therein an immediate aptitude to become an Hen, consisting of a Soul and perfect Body, I wil not quarrel or contend with that man; provided he grant, that in such a Seed and Egg there is not simply a privation of the Soul, since it is there not the first act, but the Privation of a Soul surnished with bodily Organs necessary to perform its actions.

And truly, I see the most learned Aristoteleans when they perceive the Tenet of Aristotle cannot be otherwise explained or defended, they can find in their hearts to embrace this Opi∣nion. It is one and the same thing they say, which Aristotle names Privation, and which al∣so he names the Form, whose absence, after its manner, is Privation, viz. In a divers respect. Scaliger, Exercit. 6. Sect. 5. There is in the Seed the forming Soul, going before the Soul for which it prepartes that House; or as Zabarella, in his B. de facult. anim. cap. 11. speaks, the animated seed is a certain Matter cut off by the Animal it self which ingenders, retaining an active power able to generate a like Animal. For the seed of a Man hath an implanted force in it, whereby (as Aristotle saies, 2. Phys.) the Humane Nature is not as it were a Form, but as an Artificer, or immediate Agent. And therefore (in the former respect) it is an internal Principle of the thing to be formed; and although it do not inform that com∣pound which yet is not; yet it informs the Seed so as to give it the name of a Mans seed, a Dogs seed, an Horses seed, &c. And therefore Aristotle cals Privation the Form as it were 2 Phys. cap. 1. t. 15. in respect of the form considered after the latter manner, viz. of the Compound. Inasmuch therefore as it disposes the Matter, and is the Architect of the parts to be formed out of the seed, so far it is termed Privation. And it is in reality a substance, and it is only termed a Non Ers, or a Non-being, in respect of the Form which shal animate

the parts generated out of the seed. For it hath not yet the Office of a form. So that pas∣sage in Lib. 2. de Generat. animal. cap. 1. is to be understood with a grain of Salt, where Aristotle tels us, that the Soul is potentially in the seed. For as the parts of the Body are not actually in the seed: so neither is the Soul in the Seed as a Form, so as to give Essence to the parts of the compound, which are to be framed out of the Seed. Mean while it is actually in the Seed, as a principle of acting, that the living thing may be generated, as Aristotle pro∣fessedly discourses in the foresaid place. To which purpose also Julius Caesar Scaliger in Exercitat 6. Sect. 5. thus writes. Concerning this matter we are thus to think: That the Form is in the seed of a Dog, in the aptitude whereof it is said to be; because the Seed is able to give that Form which it hath in it self. Now it is reduced out of that remote aptitude which is the first act, to a neer aptitude which is the second act, viz. That the Form may be in the same Matter after such a manner as to need no helps to enjoy its end for which the whol Compound is ordained. It must therefore be declared after what manner it is brought forth by preparation; in case the Form it self be author of that preparation. For the Form does both alter the whol, and order the parts for its own accommodation. The Form therefore should draw it self forth. Therefore they said not well; That when it shal attain the greatest perfection of preparation, then also it shal arrive to the substantial Form. For the Form it self exists before that: therefore it does not arrive to it, but to the act thereof, whereby it may afterward enjoy the use and benefit thereof. After which manner i•• any man wil explain Privation, I willingly shal allow thereof. Yet this is cer∣tain, That the vulgar Doctrine of Education of Forms cannot stand with this Opinion.

Chap. 5. Of the Consent and Dissent of things Natural.

NOw as the Forms are the first Cause of al Actions; so in regard of their Forms there is a Consent and Dissent of al Natural Things, * 1.21 and some things have a friendly apperite one to another, and unite themselves; others are averse one to another, and fly one from another. For things like do exceedingly covet Ʋnion. For that which is not one is not at all. So, that which is separated from its like seems also to defraud the same, and that it is defrauded thereby of the compleatness (as it were) of its Essence; for I do not say they are two fires, but one divided: As Scaliger writes, Exercit. 310 Sect. 2. Seeing therefore every thing requires its own Conservation; it attains the same by shunning things contrary, by moving to things like, and by drawing like things unto it self. Hence Fire uni••es to Fire, but flies from Water; and Water unites to Water, but flies Fire. Hence Water sprinkled in the Air or on dust gathers it self into round drops like balls to defend it self from the Earth and Air. Hence a smal flame is most swiftly drawn to a greater, or a little flame does move it self to a greater. The same is done in the Air. Hence those Bubbles which are made on the Water do move one to another, and so much the faster by how much they are neerer. So (as Pliny writes, Lib. 2. cap. 105.) Naphtha is of great kin to Fire, and the Fire leaps to it if it come neer the same. So they report Medea burnt het Rival, her Garland taking Fire as she came to the Altar to Sacrifice. Hence we see that if Water be sprinkled into boyling Oyl or Tallow, or melted Lead or Antimony, the fire flies from the water as an Enemy, raises a flame and mounts aloft; so that somtimes water poured into boyling Oyl or Tallow, hath been the occasion of setting Houses on fire. And here Hiero∣nyinus Fracastorius is of a different mind, who in his Book de Sympath. & Antipath. cap. 5. dentes that one thing is moved to another by reason of similitude, so that it may be united hereto and preserved; because the part separated can neither by knowledg, nor by Nature, be moved to its like part. And that it knows not, he thinks it a cleer case. But without Reason. * 1.22 For as there is a certain Natural Appetite which they commonly cal In∣stinct Natural: so there is a certain natural knowledg distinct from sense and understanding. For nothing can seek after any thing as pleasing, or slie it as displeasing, unless it have some natural knowledg of the gratefulness & fitness of the one, and the ungratefulness & unfitness of the other. For nothing is desired that is not first known. By this kind of knowledg Plants do know such Nutriment as is fit for them, desire and draw the same to them; and what is unconvenient for them they let alone; and that which they have drawn, they turn some of it into Bark, other some into Fruit, other some into other parts. Of which Hippocrates, de Nat. humana, text. 31. Suco things as grow and are sown, when they come into the Earth, every one draws that which in the Earth is most familiar thereto, as there is bitter, sweet,

sowr, and all kinds. So in the Crisis of Diseases, by a Natural Knowledg Nature knows and expels a vitious humor, and retains the good and profitable. By this Natural Knowledg Nature many times seeks strange and hidden waies to expel humors. And amongst the prin∣ciples of the Nature of things Galen re••ckons this also from Hippocrates, 1. de facult. nat. cap. 12. That Nature performs al things artificially and justly, as being furnished with Fa∣culties whereby al the smal particles do draw convenient juyce to themselves, and when it is drawn they make it grow and stick to every part, and at last assimilate the same; and what in the mean while they have not been able to vanquish, and that which wil receive no altera∣tion, nor become any waies like the thing which is to be nourished; that they reject by ano∣ther faculty, viz. the separative. And in the same place, Lib. 3. cap. 13. he writes: That al the particles of the whol Body have a power to draw to themselves that which is agreeable and friendly to them, and to force back that which is burdensom and biting. And therefore Fracastorius labors in vain to shew how by a certain violence such things as are separated one from another may be again joyned together. Now although this Natural Consent and Dissent of things does spring primarily from their forms: yet because the Forms do act by Qualities; some things also consent or dissent by manifest Qualities, as Water and Fire, and others by occult or secret Qualities, of which we shall speak here∣after.

And from this Consent and Dissent of things Natural a reason may be given of many things which happen in Chymistry and Physick, and every where in the world. * 1.23 Salt things are mixed with salt, and dissolved by salt things; Oyls mingled with Oyly, Fat, and Sulphu∣teous things. For examples sake, Aqua fortis dissolves Metals, yet can it not dissolve Brimstone: contrarywise, Brimstone is dissolved in Oyl which cannot dissolve Metals. So Gums and Sulphureous fatty Tears of Plants are dissolved by Oyl; but such things as are of a warry substance are dissolved by Wine and Water, not by Oyls. 'Tis a common Pra∣ctice for a man that hath fouled his Hands with Pitch not to wash them in Water, but in Oyl or Grease, which wil dissolve the Pitch. And every where in the compostition of Me∣dicaments such things occur, especially in the making Plaisters, which if the Apothecary be ignorant of, he wil lose both his labor and materials. * 1.24 Also precipitations so called do af∣ford a rare document hereof; when Gold, Silver, Corals, Peatls, Crabs-Eyes, and such like, are dissolved and precipitated. To speak only of Corals and Pearls; for examples sake (for the same reason holds in al) these Bodies are dissolved by the Salt of distilled Vinegar, or the like sharp Liquor, whereunto that same Body in regard of affinity is so joyned and united by the most subtile Atomes, that it may be strained through a brown paper. To this Liquor (containing in it the Body of Corals and Pearls) if you drop in Oyl of Tartar made by deliquium, or Oyl of Vitriol, the Salt of Solvent Liquor unites it self to the Oyl of Tat∣tar or Vitriol by reason of affinity, and leaves the dissolved Body; which being so left unto it self, descends to the bottom by its Natural heaviness, which they cal precipitating. Also how great the force of Gunpouder is there is no man ignorant; and that proceeds only from the antipathy that is betwixt Brimstone and Salt-peeter. From the same proceed Light∣nings, Thunders, and Thunder-bolts. For if in the Globe of the Earth Sulphureous, Ni∣trous, and watry Vapors are at once raised aloft, in the lowermost Region (truly) of the Air, where it compasses us about, being dispersed into very smal atomes, they fight not together: but when in the Clouds the fiery atomes or particles are joyned with fiery, the sulphureous with sulphureous, the watry with watry, at last resuming Courage on both fides they fight furiously, and both fly from, and chase away their Enemy. Hence the Fire shunning the Water Lightens out of the Clouds. From this Fight rumblings and Thunder-cracks are raised, and that same Fiery and Sulphureous Spirit breaking out of the Clouds melts, burns, or throws down whatever it meets with. Also there is a vulgar example hereof in Quick-lime, upon which if Water be poured, the fiery atomes which lay hid therein flying the water as their Enemy do break forth. Whereupon being collected they have raised so great heat, that they have been known to set on fire some wood that was at hand. Also if you put Spirit of Nitre to Butter of Antimony, or Oyl of Vitriol to the filings of Steel or Iron, there arises a boyling and a noise, yea, and a flame too. Where nevertheless it is to be noted, That it is credible that this same boyling is not caused only by the fight of Contraries, but also by the sudden motion of like parts to like. Also from this Consent and Dissent of Natural things many Questions in Physick may be answered, * 1.25 and Controversies compo∣sed. That Burns are cured by burning things, viz. by holding ones burnt hand against the fire, or by smearing the burned parts with Linseed Oyl, or an Oyntment made of Onions; and parts nummed with cold, by rubbing them with Snow, or dipping them in cold water;

and that Apples or Eggs being frozen, are cured by putting them in cold Water: all these effects happen because hot things draw hot things to themselves, and cold things draw cold things. * 1.26 Also Physitians dispute about the temper of Camphire, while the Ancients say 'tis cold, and most late Writers hold that it is hot. Howbeit the tast and its aptness to burn do so manifestly convince it to be hot, that I wonder any man can doubt thereof. The on∣ly thing which perswaded others that it was cold, is because it does cool. But this it does, not of it self, but by accident, viz. Whiles it draws the fiery and sulphureous atomes, out of the Body unto it self, by reason of similitude: which the flowers and water of Elder do in the Rose or fiery Inflammation so called, as also Oyl mixed with Lye.

Chap. 6. Of the Matter of Natural Things.

NOw, as God created al the Forms, so he gave unto them Matter, such as was fitting for every Form; and that there might be an interchangable course of things, and alwaies fit matter for sundry Forms, God created the Heaven and the Elements. The Heavens, that by their Influence they might cherish and govern the Generations of inferior Bodies; and the Elements as simple Bodies, which by their actions might further the interchangable course of Generations and Corruptions, also might afford matter to living Bo∣dies.

But whether there are yet other simple Bodies besides the Elements, * 1.27 which may afford matter to living things, is made a Question, not without cause. With the Peripateticks indeed it is out of question, that there are in this sublunary World no simple Bodies but the Elements; and that of them al others are compounded. Howbeit, many have doubted hereof, and that not without cause. Johan. Francisc. Picus Mirandulanus, in his Book of Elements, chap. 3. writes: If there be any that will not content themselves with the Opi∣nion and Authority of the Philosophers, and will maintain that there are yet some other Elements mixed with those vulgarly known, which by a secret power of Nature concur to the constitution of sublunary things, they can hardly be substantially refuted. And Jaco∣bus Schegkius, in his Book of the Power and Efficacy of Heat, chap. 4. writes, That every Body is either an Element, or compounded of Elements, or hath some proportion and simi∣litude with the Bodies Coelestial. And that he had out of Aristotle, who in 2. de Generat. Animal. cap. 3. writes, That the heat in living things is neither fire, not hath its Original from fire, but is of analogy to the Heavenly Matter. But what the Body is, and whence it had its Original, cannot be explained without the Creation of the World. But from the Creation of the World all these things are clear. For God did not at first command the Elements to fight together, to make up mixt Bodies, of which afterwards Plants and living things were to be made; but as he gave to Plants and Animals their Forms and Souls, so he gave unto each of them their peculiar Bodies. Which although (for I wil not now dispute that point) they may be constituted of the Elements as to their matter: yet that there should be nothing in them but Elements, and that the forms of these Bodies are Elementary, and that the Souls of Living Creatures are received in a Body simply constituted of the Ele∣ments; and that so the Elements considered either as simples, or as mixt Bodies, should be the immediate subject of Souls, there is no firm demonstration to prove; not is it yet proved, That that which Aristotle saies holds proportion to the Element of the Stars is a meer com∣pound of the four Elements so called. For since more noble Forms do require a more noble Matter (as Aristotle also teaches) the Creator gave to every Form a convenient Body, each of which receives its nobility and activity from the Form, which (as Scaliger speaks, Exer∣citat. 307. Sect. 20.) is a fift Nature, far differing from the four Elements. And in very deed, that Spirit which is inbred in Animals and Plants is a wonderful thing, which first is in a smal quantity of feed, and afterwards by means of the Blood flowing in at the first for∣mation of the yong one, and then by the Aliments taken in it is encreased to a great bulk, and goes al over the whol body of an huge Animal, and warms and enlivens the same so long as the Creature lives. And although this Spirit be of its own Nature hot, yes, and heat it self, though the admixture of other things with it makes that it is not discerned, yet is it really in them; and it may be separated from them, as appears in Spirits made out of Plants. Where this is also to be noted, That as nothing is nourished but what hath life, as Aristotle teaches, 2. de animal cap. 4. text. 46. so nothing can properly nourish, unless is be a part, fruit, or effect of a thing animated or endued with a Soul; and therefore in al aliments there ought to be some of that Spirit which they vulgarly cal Calidum innanem, or inbred heat; and

their food does not only restore the moisture, but the heat also.

Nor do other Bodies which seem to be only mixed and not animated arise from the mu∣tual fight of the Elements. It is a point of smal discretion to beleeve that Wine, Oyl, Ho∣ney, Sugar, do arise from the mutual fight of the Elements. The truth is, God did not create those things at the Beginning. For there is no Wine before Vintage, nor Oyl til the Olives are gathered, bruised, and pressed; nor Honey before the Bees make it, nor Milk before living Creatures that bring forth live yong ones become with yong. But God created such things in their Principles, that is to say, he gave a power to the Vine to make such a Liquor as Wine out of the nutriment it draws out of the Earth, the Olive tree such a juyce as the Oyl, a Reed to breed such a juyce as we cal Sugar; and to the Bees he gave power to gather juyce out of Flowers, and thereof to make Honey; to the Dugs a faculty to make Milk.

And here the Chymists bring in their Principles, concerning which I have spoken largely in my Treatise of the Consent and Dissent of the Chymists with the Galenists and Aristote∣leans. That I may say a little of them in this place; first of al, those who do not simply allow them as Elements, do grant them to be the first mixt bodies. About which I wil contend with no man, if I may but obtain thus much, that in such a Sence they may be called Principles, because in the resolution or separation of mixt bodies Art can hardly proceed a∣ny further, yea, and perhaps Nature goes no further, which when she makes a mixt body does not immediately constitute the same of the last Principles, but rather of these first mixt bo∣dies: whereof I shal speak more hereafter in my Third Discourse concerning Mixture. And this is most of al manifest in the Nourishment of Living Creatures. For neither is the Chy∣lus made immediately of the Elements, but of Bread, Flesh, Fish, &c. Nor is Blood made of the Elements immediately, but of Chyle, as we shal shew more at large when we come to speak of Mixture.

Moreover, this also is worthy our Consideration, Whether those first mixt bodies do con∣sist of the Elements only? or whether they received from God in the first Creation a Form different from the Forms of the Elements, since God created not the first matter only, but also the second, and gave every Form its proper matter and subject, by which they preserve themselves, and remain entire in the sundry Vicissitudes of Generations, and being variously mixt do afford matter to other natural things. Truly as the Expositors of Aristotle are too long in their Disputations of Materia prima or the first matter, so are they over-sparing in the Consideration of the second Matter, whereas every Form does nevertheless require its peculiar matter or subject. For neither can every body be the proper matter and subject of every form, especially of Souls, but in living Creatures it must be so disposed of necessity as that it have an immediate aptitude to receive a Soul, and to be converted into the substance of a living body, and to be nourished by the nutritive faculty. Which disposition proceeds from the peculiar Forms. Now that there are in Plants and in living Creatures forms di∣stinct from the Soul, which belong to the proper Constitution of the Subject of Souls, is al∣so sufficiently manifested by the wonderful operations of dead Plants, and the parts of dead Creatures in Physick. For since every action flows primarily from the form, and these acti∣ons are more noble than that they can proceed from the forms of the Elements, * 1.28 either simple or mixed; of necessity there are other forms besides the forms of the Elements, from which these actions proceed; and I see no cause why I may not cal them with Scaliger, a fift Essence, and the Body wherein they are, with Aristotle and Schegkius, a thing answering to the Element of the Stars; And some of Aristotle's Interpreters (among whom Zimara especially) do hold, That not only Souls are super-added to the Forms of the Elements, but also that the form of mistion is a fift form really distinct from the forms of the four Elements, and super∣added to them.

Hence, Whereas they say, That some bodies are simple, others compound, and that some are more, others less compound; that does not come to pass by reason of the first matter and Elements, but in respect of the Forms. For since al mixt Bodies consist of the four Ele∣ments, in that respect one is not more compound than another. But because some forms do presuppose other some, and cannot perform their operations save in a subject after a certain manner disposed by other forms: such Bodies which contain divers forms besides the Ele∣ments are termed Compounds, such as are the Bodies of al living things. Hence that form is most perfect which hath most other forms under its Command.

THE SECOND DISCOURSE. Concerning the occult and hidden Qualities.

Chap. 1. VVhat hidden Qualities are.

SInce to Know is to understand a thing by its Cause, we must labor with all our might, that in the things of Nature also we may render the true and pre∣per Causes of all operations and effects. That there are indeed in nature four Elements, and that they work by their first qualities (so called) which are obvious to the Sense is a thing out of Question. But there are very many Effects in Nature which can no waies be referred to those Qualities. And therefore the most acute Julius Caesar Scaliger in Exercit. 218. sect. 8. ingenuously and free∣ly writes, that to reduce al Effects in nature to the first qualities is extream Impudence. And those who endeavor to do so, it happens to them as Galen writes of Epicurus and Asclepi∣ades, in Lib. 1. de natural. facultat. cap. 14. that either they alleadg foolish and ridiculous reasons, or deny those things which are confirmed even by Experience, and as Thomas E∣rastus de occultis medica. proprietat. writes, they get nothing but to be derided by all that are studious of the truth and knowing in the things of Nature. And therefore Galen Lib. 11. de simp. med. facultat. when he treats of the vertue of the ashes of River Crabs a∣gainst the biting of mad Dogs, acknowledges their said faculty proceeds altogether from their whol substance, and reprehends his Master Pelops because he boasted very ambitiously, that he knew the Causes of all such things; and promises that he would at one time or another write a Book concerning such things as act by the propriety of their whol substance. And if there were nothing else to perswade us how vainly and rashly many have endeavored to reduce all things to the first qualitites, Poysons at least and their remedies might teach us so much, as the same Scaliger tels us in the place fore-alleadged. I for my part do freely and boldly pronounce, that there is hardly any more pernicious opinion, and which hath more wearied even the best wits and worn them out with vain and fruitless labor, than that of those men who endeavor to assign causes of all things which happen in nature from the four Elements and natural Qualities. For whether you consider them as simples, or however mixed and remixed, and however you may suppose their Qualities to be tempe∣red, nothing can proceed from them but what is Elementary. And it is al one whether more or fewer come to sup without money, for they must all fast. But this error hath been hi∣thereto sufficiently common, nor hath it kept it self within the bounds of natural Philoso∣phy, but hath also crept into Physick, whiles many men have vainly endeavored to fetch the differences of all Diseases, their Causes and Symptoms, with the virtues of medicaments, from the first Qualities.

But in very deed, certain most experienced Physitians have long since acknowledged this Error and warned others thereof, * 1.29 amongst the rest Johannes Fernelius, a most excellent Physitian, who in two Books de Abditis rerum Causis, hath most learnedly demonstrated, that many things are, and are performed in Physick, whose causes 'tis vain to draw from the temper of the first Qualities. For which excellent pains nevertheless of his he hath gained nothing from some but reproach and back-biting. And no wonder; for the world is gover∣ned by opinions: and many think it not very honorable, yea and a foul disgrace too, to

lay down the Errors they have unwarily drunk in, and to admit and acknowledg the truth, though it dazle their Eyes with its most cleer brightness; and therefore whatever they are ignorant of they esteem as new and false. Mean while all more learned Philosophers and Physitians have undertook to defend the truth, and have constantly taught, that the Cau∣ses of many things in natural Philosophy and Physick do depend upon hidden Qualities, and that we are glad oftentimes to fly to the saving Sanctuary (as Scaliger Exercit. 218. sect. 8. names it) of an occult Propriety: which whiles it is called ignorance by some, * 1.30 they rather accuse the weakness of our understandings to dive into the secrets of Nature, then blame these hidden Qualities. For if the true Original of these qualities be sought into, (whereof few have taken care) the knowledg thereof wil produce as certain science as that of the first Qualities. For the natural Philosopher knows no more of Heat, but that it Heats, and that it flows from and depends upon the form of Fire: which form is to man as unknown as those forms from whence the hidden qualities arise. For as Scaliger Exercit. 307. sect. 29. saies, The Form is a divine thing, the perfect knowledg whereof is hidden from us, and therefore to search further is the part of an unquiet and over-busie mind. And there∣fore those who traduce these Qualities, by calling them the Sanctuary of Ignorance are long since worthily refuted by Avicenna, Lib. de virib. Cordis, tract. 1. cap. 10. when he thus writes: As he that knows fire warms by reason of the heat therein, truly knows and is not Ignorant: so he that knows the Load-stone draws Iron because it hath a virtue in it whose nature is to draw Iron, without doubt is knowing, and not Ignorant. And after∣wards: The Ignorance of the Causes of this Virtue in the Load-stone is no whit stranger than the Ignorance of the Causes disposing things be to red or yellow, or the Body to the Soul. But admiration ceases in things we are used to, and our mind neglects to enquire concerning them. But that which happens seldom stirs us up to admiration, and moves us to enquire and contemplate the causes thereof. And a little after: If that Fire were a thing hard to come by, and brought from far Countries, People would more admire the properties there∣of than the properties of other Bodies, and more enquire into the Causes of its proprieties than into the Causes of other Proprieties, because its proprieties are very wonderful. For the presence thereof brings the sight from aptitude to act, * 1.31 and it will not suffer it self to be touched; also it mounts upwards, and makes such things as it can master to ascend with it, and of a smal quantity thereof in the space of an hour a great quantity is bred; and it corrupts every thing i•• meets with, and changes it into its own substance; nor is it lessened though you take some from it. And these things are in truth more wonderful than the drawing of Iron by the Load-stone, or than other Proprieties. But because these are usual, and day∣ly seen, we cease to admire them, nor are careful to enquire into their Causes. But the action of the Loadstone, because it is rare and unusual, induces to admiration, and provokes men to enquire after its causes. And indeed if we enquire into the original of these hidden qualities, there may be had of them as certain knowledg as of those that are manifest. For in this darkness of humane understanding the form of the Fire is to us as unknown as that of the Loadstone, and as the Poet sings.

Nature's wont to hide many things with a Sacred cover: Nor is it fit that mortal men should come to the knowledg Of all things, since that many are more fit for a wonder. And so far the truth of things is set from our Eye sight, That we may hardly be said to know the things we do handle.

Now these Qualities are called Occult, Hidden, Abstruse, * 1.32 to difference them from the manifest qualities which are discernable by the external Senses, especially the Feeling; whereas contrariwise these are not perceivable by the Sense, although their operations are. So we see the attraction which is made by the Load stone; but we perceive not the qualities which causeth that motion of the Iron. So we perceive with out senses the evacuation caused by purgative medicaments; but we do not perceive that quality by which the purging medi∣caments do work that effect. After the same manner, we perceive with our Senses the symptoms which Poysons do stir up in our Bodies; but the qualities whereby they cause the said symptoms we perceive not by the sense. By our Senses (for example sake) we perceive Heat in the Fire, by means whereof it heats: but it is not so in those operations which are performed by occult qualities. We perceive the Actions but not the qualities whereby they are affected. Hence these qualities are termed hidden and specifical proprie∣ties, faculties proper to substance; and such Agents are by Galen called things acted by their whol substance, or by a propriety and familiarity of their whol substance, 6. Epidem. Com. 6. text. 5. 11. de simpl. med. facult. and elswhere.

Chap. 2. VVhether there are occult Qualities, and things that act by their whol Substance.

NOw that there are occult Qualities and actions proceeding from occult Qualities, * 1.33 is from two things chiefly apparent. The first is, That there are many actions in Na∣ture which totally differ from the actions of the Elements; The second is, That the way and manner of the actings of such things as work by occult Qualities, is far different from that of the Elements.

〈…〉〈…〉, * 1.34 What the actions of the Elements are, is known, viz. To heat, to cool, to 〈…〉〈…〉, and such as follow them, to rarefie, make compact &c. But there are 〈…〉〈…〉 different from these. The Load-stone draws Iron; a Cat (though shut up 〈…〉〈…〉 does so work upon some people that they are ready to fall into a swoun; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Quality of Opium stupifies a man and brings him into a dead sleep; what mischief the biting 〈…〉〈…〉 Vipe••, a mad Dog works in our Bodies, almen know; what strange symp 〈…〉〈…〉 of the Spider Tarantula cause; of which I have spoken in the 〈…〉〈…〉 my Practice, part. 2. cap. 17. And how great the force is of a little pestilen∣tial Infection, many know to their sorrow. And these Venoms are not cured by heaters, moist 〈◊〉〈◊〉 coolers, dryers, but only by such things as work by occult Qualities. And as was he•••••••• 〈…〉〈…〉 Scaliger, If nothing else could perswade how vainly and rashly many endeavor to reduce al effects to the first qualities; at least Poysons and their Reme∣dies might convince us. And a thousand such actions are every where met with in the course of Nature. Since therefore such actions are of a quite different kind from the actions of Ele∣mentary Qualities, and surpass their faculties, we do therefore justly distinguish these Qualities from those which are manifest to the Sense, and term them occult. Galen knew this, who writes in his 6. Epidemic. Com. 6. text. 5. and 3. de temperament. cap. 4. express∣ly, that poysons do not at al act after the self-same manner as fire and water, but by a con∣trariety of their whol Nature. And Lib. 5. de simplic. medicam. facult. cap. 1.18, 19. he writes, That there are some things contrary to us by their whol substance.

Again, * 1.35 The Elements have a much different manner of acting from that of those things which work by occult Qualities. For the Elements (to exercise their Faculties) require a sufficient bulk of Body, nor can they exercise their forces in a very smal quantity. For though fire be extreamly hot, and Snow extreamly cold; yet as Galen wel writes in his 1. de Temperamentis, cap. 4. a very smal quantity of either of these works no effect in our Bodies; yea, bodies so qualified do not kil a man though taken in a good quantity, whether hot of cold; as Snow, Pepper, cold Water. Again, they do not work such sudden muta∣tions in the Body. But some Poysons kil a man in the smallest quantity imaginable, or stir up most grievous Symptomes, and that in a moment. Of which Galen, Lib. 1. de Se∣mine, cap. 16. thus writes, The smallest portion of a deadly poyson being entred into a man or other Creature, does change it totally in a moment of time, and qualifie the same with a disp••sition like it self. Again in his 3. de locis affect is, cap. 7. he saies, Who would beleeve that from the stinging of a Scorpion, or of the Philangium (a Spider so called) the whol body should be so exceedingly and unusually changed, unless he had often seen the same with his Eyes, especially considering the sting of those Creatures is a very smal thing. And a little after: The sting of a Sea Turtle, as also of a Land Scorpion, does end with an exceeding smal point; where there is no hole through which the poyson might be cast in: yet we must needs suppose that there is some substance in the Nature of a spirit, or of a Liquor, which though very smal in bulk, yet is very great in activity. And Aelian in his 9. B. de Animal. cap. 7. relates, that the prints of the biting of an Asp are so exceeding smal that they can hardly be discerned by a sharp sight. And Jul. Caes. Scalig. in Exercit. 153. Sect. 11. and Mercurialis in his Book de Venenis. cap. 16. do write, that in Nubia, which is a part of Aethiopia beneath Egypt, there is poyson, the tenth part of a grain whereof wil kil a man, or one grain ten men, within a quarter of an hour: or if one man take one grain it kils him presently.

By which Reasons most learned men being moved, * 1.36 have acknowledged and taught, that there are very many Qualities in Nature, besides the Elementary. Galen (as we said before in the beginning of our first chapter of this Discourse) in his 11. de simpl med. facult. cap. 14. where he treats of the vertue of the Ashes of River Crabs against the biting of a mad Dog, re∣prehends his Master Pelops that he vain-gloriously boasted that he knew the causes of al such

things: and in his first de nat. facult. cap. 14. concerning Epicurus and Asclepiades he writes, That those who endeavor to bring manifest causes for al Diseases, it commonly fals out, that either they bring foolish and ridiculous reasons, or deny those things which even experience it self confirms. And in the third B. of the faculties of simple Medicaments, chap. 3. he writes; And truly it is by us in other Treatises demonstrated, that there are in all things certain Agreements and Repugnancies of Qualities, and that which is familiar is rea∣dily assimilated, but that which is contrary kils both Plants and Animals; also that these fa∣miliarities proceed from the propriety of the whol substance. And in B. 5. de simpl. med. facult. cap. 2. we have shewed (saies he) that Medicaments have a faculty to alter, either by one quality, viz. By heating or cooling, moistening or drying, or by some of the said qualities joyned together, or by their whol substance; as most deadly poysons, many An∣tidotes or amulets, and al Purgers. Which also he repeats in the same Book, chap. 17, 18, 19, 23. The same he teaches in the 6. 8. & 9. de simp. med. fac. the 1. de compos. med. secundum genera, cap. 16. the 8. de compos. med. secundum loca, cap. 8. the 13. de Metho∣do medendi, cap. 6. Alexander Aphrodisaeus writes in his Proceme to the Problems, that there are infinite things in Nature, which can be known only by experience, and are therefore by Physitians termed Hidden Properties; and he reproves those who endeavor to render the Causes of such things from the qualities of the Elements, and that they scurvily botch up cer∣tain solutions which are altogether unprofitable and improbable: whom Mesues and other Arabians do follow. But in the Age last past, Johannes Fernelius that most learned Phy∣sitian does largely and learnedly maintain these Qualities in his 2. Books de Abditis Re∣rum causis; who in the Preface to his second Book thus writes. Many indeed laugh at the Atomes of Democritus; but Democritus if he were to rise from the dead would much more (after his manner) laugh at these Elements we talk of, inasmuch as some endeavor to draw the causes of al things in Nature from them. The most acute Jul. Caesar Scaliger, in his 218. Exercit. Sect. 8. writes, That it is a point of extream Impudence to refer al things to manifest Qualities; and in Exercit. 101. Sect. 14. thus he bespeaks Cardan: What evil Alexandrean spirit hath so befotted thee that thou shouldest pitifully beleeve it possible that the Load-stone should draw Iron to it only by the mixture of the Elements? And in his first Book of Plants, treating of Tasts, he hath this passage: But if any man shal say, That Tast is made by a conspiration of the four first Qualities, let him tel me, Whether in any Element as an Element there is any Tast? There is truly none at al. But as neither life proceeds from the Elements, nor laughter, nor sense, nor understanding, nor voluntary mo∣tion, but from other forms besides the Elementary; even so does Tast also. And though there were no other thing to perswade us that there are other occult Qualities besides the Elementary; we might be satisfied only by the consideration of Poysons. The same Scaliger in Exercit. 218. Sect. 8. saies: Many of them have Proprieties different from the Elemen∣tary Qualities, which are concealed from temperate minds, and delude the curious. And Thomas Erastus in his 4. chap. of the Hidden properties of Medicaments (which place I alleadged in the first Chapter) saies, That they who would reduce al effects to manifest Qualities do gain nothing, but to be justly derided by al that are studious of the Truth, and skilful in the things of Nature. Also Johan. Francisc. Ʋlmus hath defended, explai∣ned, and by many examples proved the said occult Qualities, in Lib. 4. de occultis in re me∣dic. proprietat.

That which Galen saies happened to them that reduced al things to first Qualities, that either they brought foolish and ridiculous Reasons, or denied such things as were evident, that also happened to Sanctorius, who in his Lib. 8. Methodi Vitand. in Medicin. Error. endeavors to reduce hidden and occult properties to manifest qualities: Whose Discourse of that Subject I think sit briefly to propound and examine.

But at first, in cap. 3. by way of a Ground-work he premises that Question, * 1.37 Whether the Faculties of the Soul do essentially differ from the substance of the Soul? or Whether they are in the same predicament therewith, viz. in the Predicament of substance; and he con∣ceives the Fountain of that error concerning occult qualities to be, that those who hold there are qualities of the whol substance, do conceive that they belong to the predicament of sub∣stance. For suppose indeed that some there were who conceived the Faculties of the Soul differed not from the Essence thereof; yet they held an Error. And herein we willingly assent to Sanctorius when he holds the powers of the Soul are not substances; but that they differ from substances and are qualities. But if such things are somtimes by Authors attri∣buted to Faculties which are proper to substances, there is an equivocation in the word Potentia, power or Faculty, which somtimes (and that properly) is taken for a quality, but

somtimes (though improperly) for a substance, having a power or faculty to act. And such substances are not only Souls, but also other forms, as that of the Load-stone. For all forms are substances which have their powers of exercising certain actions, all which they do not perform by manifest, but some by Hidden Qualities. He labors therefore in vain chap. 6. * 1.38 while both by Authorities out of Galen, by reasons and experiments, he endeavors to prove, That hidden Qualities proceed not from the substance, but from the manifest Qua∣lities. For in the first place, that which he brings out of Galen, 12. Method. Medend, and other places, that occult qualities have their contraries, but substances have no contrary, is of no moment: for the occult Qualities are not substances, but qualities flowing from their forms. And if there be any other such arguments, they touch nor our Opinion, but that of Fernelius, who holds Diseases of the Form. Moreover, that which he brings out of Ga∣len, Lib. de Constit. Artis, cap. 8. and 4. de simpl. med. cap. 15. and 2. de locis affectis, cap. 8. dedu••ing unutterable proprieties from sundry alterations, all that we grant. But if on∣ly the first qualities be mixed, no occult qualities can arise from thence, but only a tempera∣ment of the first qualities; though the degree of the temper or mixture cannot alwaies be sufficiently explained. So, when he saies, that of bitterness, sweetness, harshness, and acri∣mony mingled there arises a quality, which because it cannot be expressed by one name, may be termed ineffable or unucterable, al that we grant; but yet no occult quality, such as is in the Load-stone, Poysons, and such like, does thence arise, but only a tast, being only a manifest quality perceivable by the Tongue. Of the same moment is that which he allead∣ges as an experiment, that our of divers colors mixed peculiar colors arise. For whatever colors are mixed, nothing arises therefrom but color; but no occult Quality. And although of an hundred other altered qualities the determinate degree cannot be known: yet the po∣wer of drawing Iron which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Load-stone cannot be made thereof as he falsly con∣ceives. Out of the first Qualities only temperaments of tangible Qualities are made, though the determinate degree is not alwaies known; out of colors colors, out of Tasts Tasts are made. But never out of the first qualities, or tasts, or colors, can be made the pow∣er of drawing Iron, or of purging, or of stupifying like Opium, or such as is in the Venom of the Pestilence. From al which it is manifest that Sanctorius hath not rightly formed the state of the Question, but dallied with the equivocation of the words Ineffable and Oc∣cult Quality, and was ignorant what that Occult Quality meant which is intended in the Question.

But whereas in the seventh chap. he labors to find out the differences of Occult Qualities, * 1.39 therein he does wel in that he labors to fetch them from the Subject; since the condition of al qualities depends upon the first Subjects. But when he endeavors to deduce them from the first manifest Qualities, and second, as Heat, Cold, Moisture, Driness, Rarity, Den∣fity, he makes himself a laughing stock. For whereas in the first place he conceives the pro∣per subjects whereby the Qualities may be defined may be taken from a substance considered as corporeal; he is exceedingly out. For from a Substance as Corporeal nothing proceeds but quantity and dimensions. But on Bodies not considered as Bodies, but as furnished with certain Forms, the occult qualities and all others depend. Moreover, whereas he makes the Principle of al Passion to be Density and Rarity, and deduces the qualities both first and second, hot, cold, moist, dry, hard, soft, stiff, crumbly, tough, smooth, thick, thin, from Rarity and Density, that therein he is in an error is so clear that it needs no proof. And let it be granted (truly) that those Qualities proceed from Density and Rarity: yet all these qualities are not occult, concerning which our question is, but tangible qualities. And that is yet more absurd, that he endeavors to bring al from Scituation, and saies that Scitu∣ation is the general kind of al: For from the Scituation of the parts of a Body proceeds Ra∣rity and Density, and from Rarity and Density hot and cold, moist and dry, also hard and soft, with the passions, and passive qualities.

And he becomes perfectly ridiculous when he writes chap. 10. * 1.40 That he saw in Hungaria an Italian Gentleman, who when he was near a Cat (though he saw it not) he presently swooned, and unless the Cat had been driven away would have been choaked; and he sup∣poses the cause hereof was Compactness and straitness. For that the Gentleman was narrow chested, and apt to a Tissick, and in the Cat there were three destructive things for those in the Tissick, viz. Its Brain, Breath, and Hair. Therefore he conceives it is no marvel if of these a new stopping quality was bred which might by the exhalation of the Cat be communica∣ted to a man, and by condensing choak him. But one absurdity being granted, a thousand follow. For I my self (and many others) have known such as could not endure the Presence of a Cat, yet are they not troubled with the Tissick. Moreover, if the destructive Faculty be

in the Brain, Breath, and Hairs, it is not Density. Thirdly, If Cats do this by their thickning breath, why do Cars shut up in a Chest work the same effect? Fourthly, Those that are troubled in this kind do not complain of the Asthma and shortness of breath, but only of fainting fits.

But the best thing in this Discourse of his is that which he hath in chap. 10. * 1.41 where being convinced by the Truth it self, he proves by many reasons and experiments, that there are Hidden qualities which do not arise from the first qualities, whereof I shal ad only some, viz. Those which directly prove that occult qualities do not flow from the first qua∣lities.

The first Experiment is of the Load-stone, which is notoriously known to draw Iron, which Faculty nevertheless cannot be reduced to any first quality.

Secondly, If Doronicum did kill Dogs by vertue of Heat or Cold, it could not cure Men.

Thirdly, If Scorpions did kil by Heat, the drinking of pure unmixt Wine would not cure their poyson.

If a dram of Opium kils by its coldness, why wil not an ounce of Ice (which is colder) do as much?

But the rest of the Experiments which he brings do not prove that occult qualities flow not from the first; yet against those who endeavor to derive al qualities from the first, they prove there are qualities which flow not from the first. For since alteration and the action proceeding from the first qualities is not effected in a moment, but gradually and in time; and that there are many mutations of qualities which happen in a moment, thence it appears that there are qualities which are not made by mutation of the first qualities. For if a red Glass be put before a blue Glass there arises therefrom in a moment a Violet color; if a blue Glass be put upon a yellowish Glass, there arises therefrom a green color; Water wherein Galls have boyled is clear, but if Water be poured thereinto wherein Vitriol hath been boyled, which is also clear, there arises a black color in a moment; and there are many such mixtures which produce a new quality in a moment.

Finally, Whereas in cap. 11. he writes, * 1.42 That the maintainers of occult qualities have been too credulous to beleeve the most vain reports; I confess indeed that many fabulous and superstitious tales go up and down; but in the mean time, al things are not fabulous which are spoken of the effects of occult qualities. Doubtless those reports of the Load∣stones Faculty to draw Iron, of the stupefactive faculty of Opium, of the Faculties of Poysons and Antidores, of the Antipathy betwixt some people and Cats, are al most true, and any one may dayly experiment the same. And whereas he accounts for fabulous al that is said of sundry things hung about the Neck, or tied to the Body, he does it without cause; since those things which are reported of Peony Root, the Elks Claw, the Nephritick Stone, and such like things, are known by Experience to be really true. So also, those things which are written of the Echeneis he can by no other reason confute save that it cannot produce such an effect by hearing, or cooling, or rarefying, or rendring compact, or the like qualities. Others there are who account the Natration concerning the Echeneis to be fabulous; but Pliny, Lib. 32 cap. 1. confirms it by Histories, thus writing: * 1.43 The Fish Echeneis or Re∣mora, held the Praetorian Ship of Antony in the Actian Sea. And a little after he saies: It stopped also in our Memory the Ship or Galley of Prince Caius as he was sailing from Astura to Antium. Nor was there long wondring at that stay, for presently the cause be∣ing known, when of the whol Fleet that Galley only did not stir, some leapt out into the wa∣ter to seek the cause, and they found the said Fish sticking to the Rudder, and shewed it to Caius, who stormed that so smal a thing should stop his course, and frustrate the endeavors of four hundred Rowers.

Therefore Franciscus Vallesius, Controvers. Med. & Philos. Lib. 8. cap. 5. saies, * 1.44 That it is a ridiculous thing to deny that which is manifest by Experience, because we cannot tel the reason thereof. As if it were impossible any thing might happen in Nature of whose cause we are ignorant. We are ignorant of most things. And therefore they that would in Natural Philosophy find out the Truth, and not fal into wild and sophistical Opinions, they must begin with things known to the Sense, and so proceed to the Causes, and having found them rejoyce in the Works of Nature; and not finding them, confess their own ignorance; but by no means deny things that are manifest. For it is less shameful having found out the effect to be ignorant of the Cause, which is frequently hid from the most expert Philosophers, than together with the cause to be ignorant of the effect, which when you deny, the common peo∣ple wil laugh at you, and prove it by experience.

Chap. 3. Of the Original of Occult Qualities.

NOw to find out the Original of Occult Qualities is a very hard thing, nor are all men of the same Opinion concerning their Rise. For in the first place, some there are who being moved with the evidence of the thing it self, dare not deny occult Qualities: but when they come to search out their Original, they fal back to the Elements and their Qualities, and endeavor vainly to derive the occult Qualities from their mixture and temperament: and conceive the hidden proprieties of things do proceed from a peculiar temper of the first Qua∣lities, which therefore they term Idiosyncrasia. It is not (truly) sufficiently apparent what Galen thought in this point, since that Book which in Lib. 11. de simp. med. fac. he pro∣mised to write of things which operate by their whol substance, and which he cites in the 6. Epidem. comm. 6. text. 5. is lost through the injury of time; yet he seems to encline to this Opinion, and to rest much in the first Qualities. For in the 1. de Element. cap. 7. he writes, That cur Bodies are altered only by being heated, cooled, dried, moistened; for that these Qualities only do totally change through their whol substance. And when in Lib. 3. de Temper. cap. 3. he had said that the four Faculties of the Body, Attractive, Retentive, Concoctive, and Expulsive, were in every Body effects of the whol substance; he adds, that the said whol substance consists of Hear, Cold, Moist and Dry, mingled together. And in Chap. 4. he teaches us to observe for a Principle, that every body hath a certain propriety of Temper, which is convenient to this Nature, disagreeing to that. And hence he gives the reason why several things are Food or Physick for several Creatures; as for instance, Hem∣lock is Food for the Starling, and Hellebore for the Quail, which are Medicaments for men; because the temper of the Starling and Quail can assimilate the Hemlock and the Hellebore, which Mans Temper cannot do. Most late Writers have been of the same Opinion, not be∣ing able to raise their Minds beyond the Elements.

But in very deed the Occult Qualities which act beyond the power of Elementary Qua∣lities cannot proceed from the Elements however mixed, * 1.45 nor from their Qualities how∣ever tempered. Nor can a hidden way of Mixture bring in new abilities, but which way soever the Elements be mixed and remixed, and however their qualities be tempered, no∣thing arises therefrom but what is Elementary. And the Proportion of manifest Qualities being unknown does not of manifest make them occult, but only breeds a temper wherein the proportion of the first Qualities is unknown to us. The Elementary Qualities are, and remain even under the unknown measure of a Temperament; and as in the Temper the Qualities do not change their Essence, so neither can they perform an action transcending their Vertue and activity. For that is a Rule infallibly true, That nothing acts beyond the powers of its own kind. And that Argument which Jul. Caes. Scaliger, Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. uses to prove, That the Soul does not arise from the Elements, is doubtless gene∣ral and of use here. That (saies he) is in the powers of the Soul which was never in the power of any Element. But there is nothing in any thing which was not actually in its Principles. For the Principles are the acts of those things whereof they are Principles. Now in the Soul there is a Faculty to move forward, backward, to the right hand, and to the left, which is not in any Element. There are also other more illustrious powers of the Soul, which are not in the Elements. For what Scaliger saies of the Faculties of the Soul, the same may we say of the Faculties of the Load-stone, of purging Medicaments, of Poysons, and other things. For nothing acts beyond the vertue of its own kind; and nothing can work as a Cause beyond its own adequate Act; since it fils the vertue of the Power. And though o∣ther vertues be in a mixture than are to be found in the simples singly considered: yet those Vertues are no other than Elementary, and which the several Elements joyned together have in them; and they are the first Qualities broken and allayed by their Contraries. For as I said before, if four or more come to sup together without every man his shot, they must of necessity al fast. For examples sake, If four colors be mixed, a color indeed different from each of the four arises, but nothing else save a color; not such a faculty as is in Scam∣mony, Opium, and the like. After the same manner, if you mix the first Qualities, and mix them again, other qualities indeed or temperaments wil arise different from simple Heat, Cold, Moisture, Driness; but no other Quality wil arise from thence, save an Ele∣mentary Quality or Temperament.

Nor let any man think to scape by saying, That the manifest Qualities and their Tempe∣rament do not indeed of themselves perform such noble actions, but as they are guided by a

more noble specifick Form. For no Instrument acts beyond the vertue of its kind, though it be directed by a superior Agent. And therefore as an Artist uses sundry Tools, as the Carver his Compass, Saw, Chizel, Scraper, every of which performs its use: so every Form uses its Qualities to sundry actions. And as a Saw when the Carpenter uses it does saw asunder, but does not hew or pare; even so Hotness where-ever it is does nothing but heat. Not does the Load-stone draw Iron, not Rhubarb purge by heat, but by an hidden Quality, peculiar to themselves.

Nor is it credible (since the Forms of the Elements have their Qualities) that those more noble Forms are barren, and produce no qualities, so as to stand in need of borrowing the service of the Elementary Qualities. In a word, as things differ in their Forms, so do they in their Operations and Instruments.

Nor do they bring any thing better or righter, who hold, * 1.46 That in every Mixture a new Form is drawn forth, and that there are alwaies new ones made, the degrees of the former remaining, and that with these there spring forth new Qualities, and that Nature first brings forth the Universal Forms, and by their help the particular ones, until at last she come to the forms of Individuals; and that from this contemperation of Qualities arising from divers Forms and mixture of Bodies, which saving their forms do put on the Nature of matter (as it were) or aptitude, there arises (they say) an unexpressible propriety of temper, which may rightly in some sort be termed an occult Quality. For, to pass over other Errors touching drawings out of Forms, degrees of Forms, and such like; these Men also savor nothing but Elements, and that which they had before rightly determined, viz. That an occult manner of mixture does introduce no new faculties, they themselves afterwards de∣stroy. For suppose that many mixtures are made, and that with these alwaies new Quali∣ties arise: yet because the first mixture is only of Elements, and no other temper arises from thence but of the first Qualities, though you remix things mixed before an hundred, yea, a thousand times, nothing but what is Elementary, and no Qualities but Elementary Quali∣ties can arise therefrom, and therefore nobler actions than those of the first Qualities cannot be by them produced. And if Natural things should be generated after this manner, and by the mediation of Forms (their degrees stil remaining) a progress should be made unto par∣ticular Forms, and at last to such as are individual; the forms of al things living, as wel living things as Plants, should be drawn out of the Elements. Indeed that same Innovator, * 1.47 who dares vent the Dreams hatched in his own Brain to day or yester-day for the Tenets of reve∣rend Antiquity, accounts it no absurdity; who holds that the Souls of living things, Plants, and Animals (excepting that of a Man only) are made of the matter of the Elements, and that Plants and Animals (both as to Matter and Form) were both at first produced out of the Elements, and at this day have no other Nature, and remain through al Generations Ele∣mentary Bodies in respect both of Matter and Form. But this gross and most absurd Opi∣nion can neither be by any reasons proved, nor can the invincible reasons of Julius Caesar Scaliger against the same be answered. Which when he perceived, and that he could not find any probable reason for his Opinion, no not to make a flourish with, he flies to the ho∣ly Scriptures mis-understood, and endeavors to set Moses against Scaliger, as if he had said, That al living and lifeless things were so produced out of the Elements as to consist of Ele∣mentary Materials, both in Matter and Form, and to arise therefrom at this day; because God said, Let the Earth bring forth, let the Water bring forth the living Creature; also, Encrease and multiply. But although God said, let the Earth produce, let the Water pro∣duce; yet by force of those words it no waies follows, That Plants and Bruits were made of the Elements both Body and Soul, and are generated of them at this day; since God then created perfect Plants and Animals in the Earth and Water, which as Fr. Junius writes up∣on this place, came out of the Earth and Water wherein they were created, as Children out of the Womb. Nor does the Hebrew word Hotzi signifie to give matter, but to make and suffer to go out; as in Gen. 14. ver. 18. Exod. 8. ver. 18. chap. 20. ver. 2. Numb. 17.8. Psalm 68.8. Psalm 104.14. and very many more places of Scripture, appears. Nor did God say to the Earth and Water, Encrease and multiply, but to living Creatures made by him, and having their seed in themselves; whereof we shal also speak hereafter in our Fourth Discourse, Chap. 4. Julius Caesar Scaliger saies much better in Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. Yea, and I tell them withal, That the form of every perfectly mixt Body, although it be no Soul (as that of the Diamond for instance) is a fift Nature, far differing from the four Elements. And in Exercit. 307. Sect. 12. If (saies he) as these Tormentors or Hang∣men of Souls contend, the Souls were made of the Forms of Elements, the Forms them∣selves corrupted could do more than they could when they were in their Integrity. But in

case they will have them remain entire in the Compound, of necessity they must be by another power different from themselves both mixed to certain ends and limited in certain bounds. For of them actually existing there cannot be made a thing simply one, save by a superior power, which Aristotle calls the Beginning of Living things. And al the Reasons which prove it, are most firm. For who is it that considers how in Plants, the Roots, Trunks, Leaves, Flowers, Boughs, are so wonderfully and vatiously shaped, according to the variety of sorts, in respect of magnitude, figure, Scituation, color, and with so much Art and con∣stant Symmetry, as that no Geometrician or Painter can express al that Art, wil beleeve that al these things are wrought by the Elementary matter? who wil beleeve that the most noble Fabrick, not only of Men, but of Bruits, is produced by an Elementary Nature? Who wil derive the Sagacity of Dogs, the Prudence (that I may so speak) of Elephants, the Craft of the Fox, the Magnanimity of the Lion, the wonderful works of Bees, Pismites, and other Creatures, from the Elementary Nature? And therefore from hence (as was said) Scaliger frames an invincible argument, Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. That is in the power of the Soul which was never in the power of any Element. But nothing is in any thing which was not actually in its Principles. For the Principles are the acts of those things whereof they are Principles. In the answering of which Argument, the foresaid Innovator takes pains to no purpose. For first, he doth seek to elude that same Axiome, That Principles are the Acts of those things where of they are Principles, by saying that Matter also is a Prin∣ciple, and yet is not the act of a thing. But who sees not that Scaliger speaks of the formal principle, the Cause of actions, and that the form is often termed the Principle by way of Eminence. Nor yet is it absurd to say, that even matter also in its way hath an act. Indeed it is not the act of the Compound which the Form affords, yet is it in the mean while a sub∣stance by it self; and as Scaliger in Exercit. 5. speaks, it is that which it is by an Essence proper to it self. And Exercit. 17. The Matter hath its quiddity whereby it is somwhat, and differs from other things. * 1.48 And the Matter gives Quantity to al things. But against that other Axiome, That there is nothing in any thing which was not actually in its Principles, he can bring no reason. Verily that which one hath not he cannot give to another Man, and unless the Earth were heavy, the Fire hot, no mixt Body would be heavy or hot. And doubtless, no affection can be in a Compound which may not be referred either to the Matter or the Form. Yet he endeavors to evade the same by some instances. And in the first place he objects the Heaven, how that it is al things in respect of its working power. But (which himself confesses) the Question is not concerning external efficient causes, but essential in∣ternal Principles; and the enquiry is, Whether there be any thing in the Compound which does not depend upon the internal essential Principles. Also the Heaven it self is an univer∣sal, and not a particular Cause. Moreover he objects life which is from the Soul, but not in the Soul. But he ought to have observed what very many of Aristotle's Expositors do note upon the 2. * 1.49 de Anima, cap. 1. that Life is taken two manner of waies: First for sub∣stantial Life, from which as a Fountain Vital actions proceed, which is in the Soul, which is the Root of al vital Powers and Actions, in which sence Aristotle himself takes Life, 2. de Anima, text. 37. when he writes, To live is the Essence of living things. Secondly, 'tis taken for the Vital Operation, or at least for the power of exercising those vital actions, whereof the foresaid substantial Life is the Principle; which being an accident, is by many called Vita accidentaria, accidentary Life. And therefore unless the Soul had life actual∣ly it could not communicate the same to living Creatures. Here indeed the Paradox-mon∣ger seeks an evasion to avoid this distinction by attributing this essential Life only to the Ra∣tional Soul, and the other accidentary to Bruit Beasts. But he brings no reason of this dif∣ference. Contrariwise, all the Expositors of Aristotle do attribute Life in both Sences to al Living things. And after the same manner, as there is in Man an Essential Life, from whence proceeds an accidental (for a Man hath not one Soul to make him a Man, and another to make him a Living thing) even so in Bruits also and Plants from the essential Life it self proceeds that accidentary Life. Yet there is this difference, That in Man by Death the acci∣dental Life is abolished, the essential remaining; but in Beasts, both essential and accidental Life do perish. Which things were necessary to be said in this place for defence of the Truth.

Moreover, If Occult Qualities did flow from the Elements, there should be no other sim∣ple qualities in Nature besides those first of the Elements, but al should be tempers of the first, and so compounded, which is false. For the occult Qualities are perfectly simple, and arise from their simple forms; since those last forms are not barren and idle, but produce cer∣tain peculiar Qualities. For as from the simple form of Fire flows heat; so from the form

of the Load-stone flows the Faculty of drawing Iron, which is a simple Quality; from the Form in Rhubarb flows the Quality and Power of Purging Choler, which is a simple qua∣lity; and the same holds in al other Occult qualities. For the most good and great God hath not drawn al Forms out of the power of the Matter, but created al things, and gave them their Forms; and those not idle and ineffectual, and void of Forces, but endued with their peculiar Qualities, Proprieties, and Activities.

Some also there are who conceive these Qualities are infused from the Heavens. * 1.50 But since they cannot deny, That al Qualities and Proprieties do flow from their Forms, they are forced to grant that these Qualities also though they come from Heaven, yet it is not without the assistance of their Forms. But we have elswhere proved, that the Forms come not from Heaven.

Al which Conceits therefore being false, it is most rightly determined and held, * 1.51 That as al other Faculties and Proprieties, so these also do flow from their Forms. But what those Forms are we must now enquire. Which that we may do more readily and Easily, we must first shew the differences of these Qualities according to their Subjects, or of the substances to which they belong, whereby it wil appear that they have not al one Original. Bodies are some Living, others Liseless; and of the Liseless some have had life, as Rhubarb, Worm∣wood; others neither have it, nor ever had. All which if they be distributed into their Ranks as they ought, six differences there will arise of Occult Qualities, in reference to their Original.

For in the first place there are certain hidden and wonderful Properties, * 1.52 which alwaies are found in some sorts of living Creatures. An example of these we have in the Echeners, Remora or Stop-ship, a Fish so called, whose strange force (as others, so) Pliny admires in lib. 32. cap. 1. Let winds blow (saies he) and the storms rage, a very little Fish masters their fury, and bridles all their strength, forcing the Ships to stand still in the Sea; which no Cables could do, no massie Anchors. It curbs the violence, and tames the rage of the wind without any pains to it self, not by holding the Ship, nor by any other way than sticking to the same. This little Creature is so powerful against all the strength of wind and Tide, as to stop the Ships in their way. But Armed Fleets have Towers built upon them that they might fight in the Sea as from a City wall. Alas for the vanity of Man-kind! when a little Fish half a foot long can arrest and hold in bondage their Men of War armed for the Fight with Brass and Iron. So far Pliny. And this is performed by the said Fish only when it is alive. Also 'cis wel known what force the Torpedo hath, viz. How it does not only benum those that touch is, but it stupefies the hands of Fisher-men through the Net it self. And some relate when it swims away alive, if a man stir the Water with his hand it nums his hand. And yet being dead the said Fish is Food for some People. How admira∣ble the forces of a live Basilisk are may be seen in our Epitomy of Natural Philosophy, Book 7. Chap. 10. yet being dead it may be handled without danger. Such Qualities are rightly derived from the Forms of Animals, concerning the Original whereof we have spoken elswhere more largely, viz. how at the first Creation they were all created with Plants and Animals, and are now multiplied in the generation of Plants and living things, and have their Faculties implanted by the Creator.

Secondly, There are some individual Proprieties in living Creatures. * 1.53 So some persons cannot abide Cheese, this or that Fish, or other meat or drink; and Authors every where observe sundry sympathies and Antipathies of sundry Creatures individual. These Proper∣ties (since they are not common to the whol kind, but proper to some Individuals) do not arise from the specifical form, nor do they belong to the Essential faculties which flow imme∣diately from the Form, and like the Form it self are immutable and incapable of degrees; such as is in Man the Faculty of Reasoning, Laughing, Seeing, Hearing, &c. But to Natural Powers and Impotencies they are to be referred, which flow from a peculiar disposition of the Body, or its parts. Which disposition since it is not essential to a Man, but variously muta∣ble, a Natural Power, and a Natural Impotency, may be changed one into another: for examples sake, It is the Property of a Man among other things, to desire, digest, and be a∣ble to turn meats good for his Body into nourishment. But in that some cannot away with Cheese, others with a Pike-fish, others with Wine, that springs from a Natural Impotency arising from a peculiar disposition of the stomach in this or that man: which being not al∣waies perpetual (but somtimes in progress of years, or for other causes it is changed) it many times fals out that he who in his Child-hood could not abide Cheese, nor to drink Wine, af∣terwards being grown up to mans estate he can away with both Wine and Cheese. Now whereas to Natural Impotencies do belong al those things which belong to any sickly consti∣tution;

those occult Qualities depend not upon distemper, or any Organink Disease, or of Solution of Unity, but upon an hidden an unexplicable disposition. Indeed for a Man not to be able to desire to eat, nor to concoct his meat, may proceed from a manifest distem∣per of the stomach: but that he who can eat and digest al other meats, only should not en∣dure Cheese, or Bread, or this or that sort of Flesh or Fish; this comes meerly from an Oc∣cult Quality. Now these dispositions are somtimes born with the party, and somtimes they happen afterwards. Of those which are born with the Party, some are Hereditary, which being before in the Parents, are derived into the Child with the Principles themselves of Generation: but others, though they were not in the Parents, yet are they imprinted on the Child by the imagination of the Mother; whence it comes to pass that Children cannot endure such meats as either their Mothers loathed when they were with Child, or which they longed for, and could not obtain. After Birth they are somtimes caused by loathing of some meat too often and too plentifully eaten. In which case the power of the Imagination commonly bears the greatest sway, of which I have treated in my Book of the Consent and Dissent of the Chymists and Galenists, &c. chap. 14.

The third kind of Occult Qualities is of things which do not live, * 1.54 but have neverthe∣less their specifick Forms, differing from the Forms of the Elements. So, by Reason of its Specifick Form the Load-stone draws Iron. And the several precious Stones, as also Metals and Minerals, have their Occult Properties and Faculties, which flow from their Specifick Forms; which Specifick Forms nevertheless (as al others) do be concealed from the know∣ledg of Man.

Fourthly, * 1.55 There are Occult Proprieties in Natural things which have formerly lived but now do not live any more. Such as are every where to be seen in Plants and Animals, which we use instead of Physick. For we use not ordinarily living Plants or Animals, but only such as are dead. So we use dried Toads to draw out Poyson: the ashes of River-crabs or Cray-fish cures the biting of a mad Dog: the Horns and Hoof of an Elk are good against the Falling-sickness: Harts-horn and the Bone taken out of an Harts Heart, are used against Poysons: Mans Skul cures the Falling-sickness: Rhubarb, Agarick, Mechoacan, white and black Hellebore, and other Plants, have a purging faculty: Peony Roots are good against the Falling-sickness: Scordium is good against Poyson: and there are very many more rare Vertues of Plants. And to this Tribe in a word belong the Vertues and Hidden Properties which are sought for in Plants and Animals after they are dead.

Now certain it is, * 1.56 That these Occult Properties do not flow immediately from the Soul and Specifick Form of Animals or Plants; since the Soul is no longer in those Medicaments. Nor can they proceed from the Mixture of the Elements simply, and the temper of the first Qualities; since their actions are of a quite different kind from them, and above their activi∣ties, nor are they directed by the Soul, as being no longer present. And since every Quali∣ty pre-supposes a Form, these Qualities must also of necessity flow from, and depend on some Form. Now that can be no other than that which was before the subject of the more noble perfect and specifick Form, after its manner, and as far as belonged thereto. I say, af∣ter its manner, lest any should have occasion to quarrel. For that Form with its matter does not quite make up the ultimate subject, which is corrupted with the Form it self, or at least does not constitute a perfect Organ; since in Animals there is also required an influent Heat, and in Plants somwhat which holds proportion thereto. For seeing the more noble Form requires the more noble Matter, and as Forms differ in nobility or baseness, so also those matters differ, and are proper to several sorts and forms of things: the difference and diversity of those matters cannot come but from different Forms which constitute the pro∣per subject of every Sp••cifick Form. Which Forms (truly) considered by themselves are al∣so true Forms, which do inform their Matters; but in respect of the Soul and Specifick Form they have the Nature of an immediate matter; and so one thing does not subsist by two substantial acts, but each hath one specifick Form. Now when the Specifick F••rm goes away, these Forms remain a while after, and perform the Office of Forms, and are the Authors of those Faculties which are found in many things after they are dead, but such as 'tis impossible they should proceed from the Qualities or Forms of the Ele∣ments.

Now what the Original of these Forms should be, * 1.57 is a Question hard enough, and few have enquired thereinto. And because I have spoke largely thereof in my Institutions of Physick, Book 5. part 1. Sect. 1. ch. 2. I wil but briefly touch the same in this place. The most wise Creator, as he gave in the first Creation to al things their specifick Forms, so also he gave them different matters, to each a proper one, and in that matter also certain Forms

proper to every Species; and that for two intents: * 1.58 First that the specifick Forms might have subjects wherein to be, subsist, and perform their actions. Secondly, That when the Soul or Specifick Form is gone, they might be useful to Man as Food or Physick. And as those Specifick Forms are multiplied and propagated; so also these subordinate Forms are propagated. Or at least (which I see is the Opinion of some others) the Souls of living things have an ability to produce such Forms as are necessary to constitute their subject place or Mansion house, which also may remain when they are gone.

And forasmuch as every Form requires its Subject and adequate Matter with which it is, * 1.59 and perishes therewith, it is worth our Labor to enquite of the Subject of these Forms. Now this in Plants and Animals seems to be no other than that same implanted Spirit and Radical Moisture which joyntly are called commonly Native Hear, and by late Writers (especially Chymists) Natural Balsam. For Experience it self teaches, That Plants and the parts of Animals, so long as they retain that Balsamick Substance, do preserve their vertues entire: but as soon as they lose the same, and become rotten or putrefied, they lose also their vertues, so that the remaining Body becomes unprofitable. Which the Operations of Chymists and Apothecaries do shew. For if by boyling or steeping that part of the substance be se∣parated and extracted, wherein is the Purgative Faculty, an useful Medicament is made; and the remaining Body becomes quite ineffectual.

Fiftly, * 1.60 There are occult o•• hidden Qualities in such things as are Naturally bred in Plants and Animals; such as are the Poyson of a Scorpion, an Asp, an Adder, the Spider Tarantu∣la, and other venemous Beasts; Bezoar stone, Musk, Civer, Castoreum, and whatever other things there are of like kind Naturally bred in Animals. Hither are to be referred the juy∣ces of Plants, their Tears and Gums, as Aloes, Scammony, Elaterium, Euphorbium, Gam∣bugia, Opium, juyce of Hemlock, and many more of this kind. All which though they are to Men in place of Medicament or Poyson, yet are they Natural and kindly to their respe∣ctive Plants and Animals. Now al such Qualities and their effects do not proceed imme∣diately from the Soul or Specifick Form of those living things, but from their own proper Form; since being separated from the living things, they have nevertheless their effects and operations. Now whence these Forms proceed, though it is not very easie to declare; yet it seems most safe to hold, That those things receive the said Forms from their own Souls, and that those Forms are some way included in the Souls, or at least proceed from them. For as the soul hath a power to make Chyle, to make bones, and to make skin; even so other Juyces are produced in other living things, as Oyl in the Olive Tree, Wine in the Vine; and after the same manner those Medicinal and venemous juyces aforesaid are produced by the Soul proper to their respective kind. And as Wine though no longer animated with the Soul of the Vine, yet retains many yeers that same form which it received from the Vine as a Body Natural; so the juyces lately mentioned do long retain their Forms and Ver∣tues entire; yea, and they have some affinity to, and correspondence (as it were) with the forms of that kind, and perform motions answerable to their motions. Whence it is that Wine in the Hogshead is wont to work when the Vines do blossom. For the reason of all such things lies concealed in the seed; because (as Aristotle, 5. de Gen. anim. cap. 7. saies) Principles of things though smal in Bulk, yet are exceeding great in faculty and power, which is especially true of the seed; and what Seneca said excellently, Lib. 3. quaest. nat. cap. 29. concerning Man, is true of al other living things. In the seed (saies he) is contained all the Nature of the future man; the Infant not born hath in it the Principles of a beard, and of Gray Hairs.

In the sixt place, are malignant Humors and Poysons, * 1.61 which are preternaturally bred in the bodies of Animals, and do al operate by hidden Qualities. Such are those Humors whence the Falling-sickness, Mother-sits, Malignant Dysenteries, Malignant and pestilential Feavers, yea, the Plague it self, the Scurvy, the Leprosie, are generated; also the poyson of a Mad Dog. Of the Generation whereof we have treated in out sixt Book of Practice, part the second.

Chap. 4. Of the Difference of Occult Qualities.

NOw Occult Qualities are not of one kind, * 1.62 and the first difference appears from what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter, by which it is manifest that there are six kinds of them in reference to their Original, touching which 'tis needless to add any more.

In the second place, There is another difference drawn from the manner of inhering. Vulgarly, as also it appears from Scaliger, Exercit. 71. they say some Qualities are real,

others intentional. The greenness on the Tree they say is a real Quality, the greenness cast by the Tree upon a wall, or on a mans cloaths, is an intentional Quality: the color of a Glass of Claret is a real Quality, the redness thereby caused upon the Table-cloath is an in∣tentional quality, the light shining through the Glass of Wine. Where the thing it self is truly declared, but the names are not convenient. For since that is properly termed inten∣tional which depends upon the operation of our mind, and is nothing without the same: after this manner these Occult Qualities cannot be termed intentional, nor are rightly oppo∣sed to real Qualities, since they themselves are also real, and are found in Nature when we think not of them, and have real effects. I conceive the color in the Tree, and the Wine in the Glass should be more rightly called material qualities, seeing they are not separated from the Matter; * 1.63 but the other Spiritual Species or representations. And there is no smal difference betwixt those material qualities, and these Spiritual Species. For the former are in their Subject, and are moved with it, and according to its motion, nor are separable therefrom, and are successively received in their Subject, nor are they divers differing in number in the same Subject, not confused but distinct. But those Spiritual Species are diffused from the Body whence they arise round about in a right line like Raies, nor are moved with the air wherein they are; in the same Subject they are many in number, not confused, as appears by the sundry shadows made by several Candles; also many of them pass through solid Bodies, as appears by sounds, and the vertue of the Load-stone. Nor are they ineffectual, but have in them the vertues of those things from which they flow; as Shine represents the Light; the Load-stone draws Iron, the shadow of the Eugh tree is hurtful. And although these Species are commonly reckoned only amongst Sensible Spe∣cies; yet doubtless there are many more of them than are discerned by Humane Senses. And by means of them many Sympathies and Antipathies of things do happen, and wonder∣ful actions and operations, which are by some termed Magnetical. Which very thing Jul. Caes. Scaliger acknowledgeth, who in Exercit. 344. Sect. 5. where he speaks of Sym∣pathy, at last concludes, That such things are done by Species, and that those Species are like a continual Ray promoted, which is propagated through and beyond the Body of the Glass.

But what these Spiritual Species are is not easie to say. * 1.64 They are commonly called Qualities; but this term likes not Fracastorius, Lib. de Sympath. & Antip. cap. 5. who holds that they are Substances, and of the same nature with those Forms whose Species they are, not differing from them save in their manner of subsisting. For so far he saies they are Material, because they are in the matter by a certain gross existence, and require certain li∣mits. And since it is the innate property of al Forms to propagate themselves, and these material Forms cannot propagate themselves after their own manner of existence, they pro∣duce a thin and Superficial part or degree of themselves, which they term Epipole, which by reason of its tenuity both hath no contrary, and is bred and propagated in a moment, as a kind of Brood. But hardly wil any man say, That the Light and Shine of the Sun are of the same Essence one with another, much less that they are of the same Nature with the Suns Form; or the color in a thing with that in its Image in a Looking-glass. But how (in case they are Qualities) they should be generated in a moment and propagated, not moved with the Air through which they are diffused, and that divers in number of the same sort should be in the same Air unconfounded or jumbled together, there is hardly any man can well tell.

For the same obscurity we meet with in the sensible Species of Nature, we find also in all other her Spiritual Species, which are many more than can be discerned by our Senses, or is commonly believed.

According to this Difference of Qualities Occult Qualities also differ. * 1.65 For first there are Occult Qualities which may be termed Material because they are alwaies propagated with the Matter and Subject wherein they are generated, and do not diffuse themselves without the same. And though they may seem to diffuse themselves into other bodies, and afar off; yet that is done by Atomes and their smallest Corporeal Particles, which differ from the Bo∣dies from whence they flow only in Magnitude, and have the same Essence, Qualities, and Faculties with them. Such are al those Occult Qualities by which contagious Diseases are conveighed into other persons, as is seen in the Venereal Disease, the Leprofie, Pestilential and Contagious Feavers, and the Plague it self. For in al such Diseases certain very smal particles flow from the sick body, which being received by other bodies they raise in them the same Disease; as I have shewed at large in the Second of my Institutions, part 2. cap. 12. and my Fourth Book of Feavers, Chap. 3. and my Sixt Book of Practice, p. 3.

cap. 3. For these are not Species carried right on as a Ray, but little Particles or smal Bodies which are themselves disorderly moved by the motion of the Air: nor is any man infected either with the Plague, Venereal Pox, or Leprosie, unless he receive into his Body some of those foresaid Particles or smal Bodies.

Again, There are Occult Qualities which are justly termed spiritual Species, * 1.66 because they pass from their Body like a Ray continually thrust forward, being circularly diffused, and have a certain Sphere of their activity, and some of them do also pierce through other Bodies. So a Load-stone draws Iron though a Board be betwixt them: a Cat shut up in a chest can affect a Man that hath an Antipathy against Cats; the Dog through the shut door by vertue of these Qualities knows his Master to be there; the Torpedo benums the Fisher∣mans hand through the staff of an Eel-spear. And Avicenna and the Conciliator in Lib. 1. de Venen. cap. 1. speak of a Serpent who intected and killed a Soldier through a Spear, with the end whereof he touched it. So the Basilisk or Cockatrice kils a Man by looking on him. Which things the foresaid Qualities adhering in the matter cannot do. Nor can a Man sick of a contagious Disease infect another through the door (being shut) since those smal bodies cannot pierce the boards.

Thirdly, * 1.67 There is yet another Difference of Occult Qualities observed as yet by very few, viz. There are some Spiritual Qualities which flow from other things, are received in some Bodies, and being received in them they have the same Faculty as the others. Such a like thing is observed in the Load-stone. For the Vertue thereof is received by Iron, whereupon the Iron also gains the faculty of drawing Iron, and moving to the Poles. Not is this only done by rubbing upon the Load-stone, and the communication of certain Atomes; seeing Iron shut up and covered wil receive vertue from the Load-stone, which I my self have observed. For having once an Ivory-cover'd Sun-Dial made with a touched Needle, in the same case or box with a greater Load-stone, the Needle of the Sun••dial quite changed its faculty of turning to the Poles, and was moved with a new kind of motion. So Dogs fol∣low their Masters, and they hunt the Beasts by the track of their feet, such species being doubtless printed upon the Earth and Grass which they perceive by their smelling faculty. For it must needs be some real thing that works upon their Smel, and yet not a material qua∣lity, which with its smal bodies hath no fixed mansion, but is inordinately moved with the motion of the Air. And I am confirmed in my Opinion by Nicolas Cabeus, in Lib. 3. of his Magnetick Philosophy, cap. 21. where he informs us, That Iron attains its verticity or a faculty of turning towards the Poles, not only by touching the Load-stone, but by being near the same also. Take (saies he) a Needle which hath never touched a Load-stone; and hang it up by a thred, then hold it towards the Load-stone, but so that it may move to∣wards the Load-stone, but not touch the same, nay, that it may be a pretty distance there∣from; I say, it will so come to pass, that the Needle shal receive vertue from the Load∣stone not only by touching it, but also by approaching the same without touching: yea, it would derive into it self the vertue of the Load-stone, although some other Body were in∣terposed betwixt the Needle and the Load-stone, as Wood, Stone, or any other. This ap∣pears first by experience. For if (as I said) the Needle be hung up so far off, that it aspires indeed to touch the Load-stone, but cannot do it, either because it is held afar off, or be∣cause some other Body is interposed betwixt it and the Load-stone; If afterward you take away the Load-stone the hanging Needle wil shew al the magnetical Effects most clearly, which before it did not shew, even as if it had touched the Load-stone. For ballanced it will turn to the Poles, its point looking alwaies to the North, according to the magnetick Laws, and it wil draw filed Iron; so that try it which way you will, it wil continually most clear∣ly evidence its magnetick Vertue, which did not appear before it had so made its approaches to the Load-stone. Therefore the Load-stone conveighs its Verticity and Vertue into the Iron not only by touching the same, but by its presence alone if it come but near the same. Moreover, this is also apparent by Reason. For the Loadstone hath not only in it self a Magnetical Vertue, and consequently a Faculty in it self to produce the same in Bo∣dies having affinity thereto, but it also sheds forth round about the said Vertue, and forms to it self a Sphere of activity. And many other such like Species there are (doubt∣less) which pierce as easily through the most solid Bodies, as through the thinnest Air. So far Cabeus.

Now such Qualities are received in any Body agreeable thereto. So the magnetick Quality is received in the most pure Iron. Also the same Cabeus writes, it is received in those Bricks which through vehement burning have gained the color of Iron, and are therefore either from their color or hardness called Iron Bricks. Lib. 2. Philosoph.

Magnet. Cap. 8. and if you take a bit of such a Brick, and touch it artificially up∣on a strong Load-stone, it receives (he saies) the Quality of turning to the two Poles of the World.

Fourthly, * 1.68 Occult Qualities are also distinguished in respect to their effects, in regard some cause Sympathy, others Antipathy, examples whereof are every where to be seen in Nature, and they are collected by Fracastorius in his Book de Sympathia & Antip. Marcellus Do∣natus, de Histor. Med. mirabil. Johan. Francisc. Ulmus, de Occult. in art. med. proprie∣tat. Andreus Libavius, part 2. singul. tr. 4. Johannes Schenckius, Lib. 7. Observ. in sine. which I think needless to repeat in this place.

Fiftly, * 1.69 There is a certain difference which Galen reckons up, 6. Epidem. com. 6. text. 6. where he divides things which work by Propriety of their whol substance into four kinds; Aliments, * 1.70 Medicaments, Poysons, and Antidotes, wherein are comprehended al things in Nature, Minerals, Stones, Plants, Living things. And as to Aliments or Foods, of neces∣sity some likeness there must be and sympathy between the Food and that which is nouri∣shed thereby; which consists not only in the first Qualities, and their Temperament, but also in the whol substance and occult qualities; which even hereby appears, in that there is not one Aliment of al living things, but sundry Aliments. For several Plants growing in the same Field do each draw its own proper Aliment, and as Hippocrates writes, Things that grow and are sown, when they come into the ground each draws that which it finds in the Earth suitable to its Nature. Now that is sowr, and bitter, and sweet, and salt, and all kinds of Juyces. And the same holds in Animals. For such things as are poyson to a Man are food to some Creatures; as Hellebore to the Quail, Hemlock to the Starling, Frogs, Snakes, Toads to the Storks. Yea, and some men delight in some kinds of Meats, and abhor other some.

Now it is a thing not to be doubted that most of the Vertues of Medicaments proceed from occult Qualities. * 1.71 Purgatives exercise their Operations by occult Qualities. And so do specifical Medicaments, and those which are proper to several parts of the Body; also Amulets, and al things that help or hurt the Body, externally applied. Hitherto pertain Smels, Fumigations, and those hidden steams which work upon Man and Beast; as it is very wel known how Dogs follow their Masters and wild beasts footing by the scent; and some cannot endure a Cat in the room though they see it nor, as was said before: not to speak now of such things as mutually work one upon another by seeing and hearing. Of al which Johannes Francisc. Ʋlmus brings many examples in his whol Third Book de Occult. in arte Medica Proprietat.

And touching Poysons, * 1.72 it is so manifest that they act by occult Qualities, that Julius Caesar Scaliger writes wel in Exercit. 218. Sect. 8. If nothing else could perswade us how vainly and rashly many endeavor to reduce al things to manifest Qualities, at least poysons and their Remedies might teach us so much.

And the same may be said of Antidotes, * 1.73 seeing they are opposed to Poysons, and there∣fore as Poysons are hurtful to our body, nor by manifest, but by Hidden Qualities; so are these also contrary to Poysons, not by manifest, but by Hidden Qualities.

And whoever shal observe what hath been here said in general of Occult Qualities, he may with little difficulty understand such things as he shal meet with in the Writings of Natural Philosophers and Physitians concerning the said Qualities.

THE THIRD DISCOURSE. Of Atomes and Mixture.

Chap. 1. Of Atomes.

NOT only Words (like Money) are current by use, but also Opi∣nions; and those Opinions of Philosophers which were in request in daies of old, have been by the springing up of other Opinions banish∣ed with the Writings of the said Philosophers. There were ancient∣ly (by the Testimony of al Antiquity) most wise men, Pythage∣ras, Empedocles, Democritus, Socrates, Anaxagoras, Parmeni∣des, and very many more, whose Opinions nevertheless are either altogether unknown, or such are attributed to them as seem more like old Wives Fables, than Opinions becoming a wise man, as Fr. Titelmannus speaks, Lib. 5. Philos. nat. cap. 15. which if they were by us rightly under∣stood, peradventure we should think them not altogether to be rejected; which neverthe∣less now at the first appearance, when they are not understood, are laughed at as absurdities, and rejected as unworthy of Philosophers. Truly Aristotle in his Works, every where re∣counts the Opinions of the Ancients, and sharply opposes the same; but Pererius ingenu∣ously confesses in Lib. Comment. de rer. natur. princip. cap. 16. That he cannot deny but that Aristotle in making Inquisition into, and judgment upon the Opinions of the Ancients, was too hard and severe a Judg and Arbitrator. And in the same place he relates the Opi∣nion of Simplicius, who conceived that those ancient Philosophers were accustomed to hide their Opinions under aenigmatical and allegorical obscurities: and therefore Plato and Ari∣stotle, fearing lest rude persons as were too dul-headed to understand their abstruse sence, understanding them according to the first appearance should fal into Error, did so handle their Opinions as that they might seem to common Readers to dislike and reprove the same. Not to speak of others, Democritus who lived when Hippocrates lived, * 1.74 as appears not only by the Epistles of Hippocrates, but also out of Diogenes Laertius, and Pliny, Lib. 30. cap. 1. was a man most studious of Philosophy, and diligently weighed the Opini∣ons, not only of Anaxagoras (whose junior he was by forty years, as is reported) but al∣so of the Outlandish Philosophers, and many years together (to attain Wisdom) he travel∣led strange Countries, Chaldaea, India, Persia, Aethiopia, Egypt, and heard and consul∣ted with the great and wise men of those places, as it is to be seen in Aelian, de varia Hi∣storia, Lib. 4. cap. 20 Diogenes Laertius in his Life, Clemens Alexandrinus, Lib. 1. stromat. and Eulebius, de praeparat. Evangel. Lib. 10. cap. 2. Pliny, Lib. 30. cap. 1. And during the long time of his L••e (for he died in the hundred and ninth year of his age) he diligently examined al things, and did so excel in Philosophy that he was called common∣ly Pentathlos, the Champion at five Games, viz. Because he was eminent in Natural, Mo∣ral, Mathematical, and other Disciplines; termed by Hippocrates in his Epistle to Dama∣getus, the Wisest of Men, the most Wise Man, and in his Epistle to Democritus, The most excellent Interpreter of Natu re and the World; and by Aristotle himself in 1. de general. & corrupt. cap. 2. text. 5. he is preferred before al other ancient Philosophers in the Science of Nature. And by the Senate and People of Abdera he was so highly esteemed, that

they write in their Epistle to Hippocrates, That they feared if Democritus should be sick the City of Abdera would become quite desolate; and in the same Epistle he is termed the Body of Wisdom. Yea, they called him Philosophy it self, as Aelian relates in the place fore-alleadged. And this alone argues his great care in the study of Nature, that Pliny writes Lib. 14. cap. 2. Whereas there are innumerable and almost infinite sorts of Vines, and almost as many as there are Fields, yet Democritus was the only man that conceived their kinds might be numbred, professing he knew al that grew in Greece. It is not there∣fore credible that so sagacious a Philosopher, a most wise man (as Hippocrates called him) one so useful to Humane Life (as Pliny cals him, Lib. 28. cap. 8.) should entertain such absurd Opinions as are at this day fathered upon him; nor is it (indeed) likely (to use the words of Pererius, Lib. 4. Phys. cap. 4.) that so discreet and wise a man, so many water commended by Aristotle, should beleeve and reach things so evidently false and absurd, not only secretly contrary to Reason, but likewise openly against the very Verdict of the Senses.

Now amongst other Opinions ascribed to Democritus, * 1.75 Empedocles, and other most no∣ble ancient Philosophers, is this; That they held Atomes or individual Bodikies to be the Principles of Natural things, from the various mixture whereof other Bodies have their Original. And this Opinion was a most ancient Opinion, and is now attributed to one Mochus a Phaenician, who is reputed to have flourished before the destruction of Troy; yea, and that it was the common Opinion of Philosophers before Aristotle, is apparent from the beginning of his Second Book de Generat. & Corrupt. Aristotle was the first that re∣linquished this Opinion, and held that those Atomes or smallest Bodikies were not only united in mixture, but also by mutual action and passion one upon another so altered and wrought upon that they ceased to be what they were before their mixture, and were chan∣ged into a Body so similar, that every smallest part imaginable could be no longer called Fire, * 1.76 Water, Air, or Earth, but a mixt Body. Of which we shal speak more largely when we come to speak of Mixture. And although the Doctrine of A••omes and Indivisible B••di∣kies be commonly set out after an odious manner; yet if rightly explained it seems not ab∣surd. Yea, the Reasons brought for this Opinion are not light or foolish, but strong and urging, and which can hardly be answered, as Aristotle himself confesse, Lib. 1. de Generat. & Corrupt. cap. 2. text. 6. and which he cannot certainly promise to answer, but he would try what he could do. And doubtless he knew he could not sollidly refute this Opinion, and therefore he used not proper and Physical Reasons as he ought to have done, but Mathema∣tical and extravagant ones.

Now I conceive the Doctrine of Atomes may be thus explained. * 1.77 In Natural things subject to Generation and Corruption, because there is a perpetual Interchange of Genera∣ting and corrupting, there must needs be certain simple bodies, each of a nature by itself, out of which the Compounds may be generated, and into which Compounds are again re∣solved. For Democritus seeing that Bodies Natural were neither made of nothing, not made of Points, he was forced to hold they were made of the smallest Bodikies. Where it is to be noted, That Democritus did not enquire, Whether there were an individual Mathe∣matical Magnitude; but whether there were Natural Bodikies of an indivisible smalness, out of a multitude of which gathered together a certain surt of natural Body does arise. These Bodikies are therefore termed the smallest particles in Nature, * 1.78 Atomes, Atoma corpuscula, indivisible Bodikies; because in the resolution of Natural Bodies-there is no further progress to be made beyond these into any thing smaller; and contrariwise Natural Bodies have their original from these. Which Bodikies are indeed really in Nature, but are so sm••l as they cannot be discerned by the Senses. Of them Plato in his Timaeus thus writes: Touching these so smal Bodikies we are thus to think, That if you take only one single one of a kind, there is none of them can be seen by us in regard of its smalness; but it many are collected together, their bulk and magnitude is discernable. For neither are those little Bodikies we see floating up and down in the Sun-beams such Atomes as we speak of, but compounded Bodies. * 1.79 Al the Learnedest Philosophers have acknowledged that there are such Atomes, not to speak of Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus, whole Doctrine is suspected, perhaps because it is not understood. And Galen makes mention of them 1. de Element. cap. 9. And indeed every where amongst Philosophers and Physicians both Ancient and Modern, mention is made of these little Bodikies or Atomes, that I wonder the Doctrine of Aromes should be traduced as a Novelty. That I may not speak of others besides those whom I have already praised, who may be suspected as Contemoers of the Ancient Philosophy, and desi∣rous of Novelties; Franciscus Aquilonius, Lib. 5. Opticae desin. 5. thus writes: Amongst

Elementary Qualities, the two which are termed passive are exceeding far from the Nature of Light. For neither does Humidity signifie a Quality, nor Humectation an alteration. For humidity in the substance of Water is the same thing that fattiness is in the substance of Oyl; and as fat makes Greasie by being smeared upon a thing, so moisture moistens on∣ly by sticking to a thing. Again driness is only the defect of moisture, and exsiccation the consumption of Humor. And among the active Qualities Cold sends forth no coldness out of it self: which though it may to some seem strange, yet is it agreeable to reason, and ex∣perience manifestly demonstrates the same. For the coldest body that is (to feel to) as Ice, does send forth no sense of coldness to ones hand that is neer it; but al cold things are percei∣ved to be so only by handling them. Which (to such as denied the same) I have often made appear by a pleasant experiment: for their eyes being blinded and their hand held forth, I would ask them if they felt the coldness of the Ice neer their hand. For somtimes they would say they felt somwhat when there was nothing near them; and otherwhiles they would say they felt nothing when the Ice was so neer their hand as it did almost touch the same. And a while after he saies; Heat seems to diffuse it self abroad like Light. More∣over, I account it (truly) most likely that from the kindled sewel a kindled vapor does flie abroad, which being secretly conveighed through the Air does heat every thing it touches, and also burns the same if it have any thickness. Hence it comes to pass that things set near a blazing fire are burned though they do not touch the visible fire it self, which is often seen in Paper and Tow; but much more apparently in Naphtha, Asphaltum, Amber, and such like, which draw the flame to them from afar. Hence also it comes to pass that the fire heats more strongly and fiercely aloft than beneath or on the sides, viz. Because the infla∣med vapor attenuited by Heat endeavors to mount upwards. Which truly does not pro∣perly agree to a quality, but to a substance. Nor can you rightly say Heat is Light, but that which is hot. For that being by the force of heat rarefied becomes lighter; as that is heavier which by condensation of the matter is brought into a narrower compass. Hence al∣so the true cause may be rendred, why in the Winter flames do blaze more lustily: for the surrounding cold hinders the heat from spreading it self abroad in the Air. And in the same Book, Proposit. 2. We must cal to mind what was said, definit. 5. of this Book, how that the Heat of the Fire is not carried along by a continual action, but is secretly conveighed through the Air, just as smels which breath out of odoriferous Bodies, and being received in the th••n Air, and founded in a secret exhalation, are carried this way and that way by hab∣nab. So (I say) the fiery heat being carried in a certain kindled Spirit is thrust strait along, as much as the power of the fire is able; very speedily upwards, but the more slowly by how much the more downwards. But being set at liberty it wanders more freely through the Air, and is driven any way by the lightest motion, and by its sticking to them things never grow warm, as those which are placed by odotiferous bodies do smel sweet only by exhalati∣ons sticking to them. Soldiers in their Camps find this by experience, when having cut down a great deal of Wood they pile it up and set it on fire in the middle of a field, and stand round about the same. For they that have the wind on their backs do feel hardly any heat although they stand close by the fire, the fiery spirits being thereby carried unto the opposite side; which the wind could not do if only a qu••••ty were carried through the Air; for that being no body would give the wind a free passage through the Air. Thus far Aquilonius.

But what need we Authorities when the matter is plain enough of it self? * 1.80 For if we con∣sult with Experience, which Aristotle so commended in Democritus, we shal find both the Generations and Corruptions of things to be made by Atomes, and that there are every where in Nature examples of the uniting and separating of Atomes. And since there is not only one kind of Atomes, but that they are various according to the variety of Bodies, I conceive it wil be best to consider them both in respect to the Elements so called, and in re∣spect to bodies compound.

For in the first place, The Elements themselves are resolved into such Bodies, and the soid Bodies joyning again do make up not only Compounds, but also the bulk it self of the Elements. Now these Atomes or indivisible Bodikies of the Elements do arise both out of the resolution and corruption of Compounds, and likewise out of the Terrene Globe (where in are al Elements) and are carried up into the Air; whence proceed sundry mutati∣ons of the Air, and Generations and Corruptions, which variously affect both Man and Beasts, and Plants. For it is very true of the first Atomes or indivisible Bodikies, that if we take but one Atome of a kind there are none of them visible: but if many of them be gathered together their magnitude and bulk is discernable, which (as hath been said) Plato also teaches us in his Timaus. Since therefore these Bodies are most smal and subtile,

they do both easily pierce into other Bodies, and afford matter also to others.

Torun through al kinds of Natural Bodies, * 1.81 and first as to Elements; Fire insinuates it self into Iron and Water. The same being insensibly in the Summer mixt with the Air makes soultry hot weather; yea, and (as Experience shews) hath burnt up Woods some∣times. It is variously mingled also with other things, and according to its vatious commix∣ture makes sundry sorts of things. Fire indeed of it self (as Jul. Caes. Scal. teaches) nei∣ther shines nor burns; but that it shines and burns it comes to pass by the admixtute of another Body, and the propinquity of the parts, by whose co-action in a smaller space the substance is greater, and therefore the force is greater. But being rarefied it burns not, nor does it shine. That smoak which ascends hath much fire in it. Nor yet hath it any burning Faculty, nor shines it at al with any light: and such things as are roasted on Spits are not touched by that fire which we see; yet are they so touched by fire, as that they are somtimes burnt to a Coal. Yet is not that fire visible which burns them. And the same Scaliger, Exercit. 325. Sect. 7. Fire is much more transparent than the Air, because it is thinner. The Fire which we use is yellow because of mixture. For there is fire in a vapor, in smoak, in burning coals, in a flame; and Aristotle cals a flame burning smoak, and that not amiss. For the flame seems to be no other thing than the meeting together and union of the particles of fire, the heterogeneal substances being separated. For whereas by reason of distance and commixture of Contraries the smal bodies of fire could not joyn together, the obstacle be∣ing taken away they begin to be united. Hence it happens that if the chamber where fire is kept be close shut the fire wil not flame, but as soon as the Air is let in, and those heteroge∣neal bodies are discussed, the flame breaks forth. Nor yet is flame absolutely pure, but con∣tains in it self some heterogeneal Matter, which the color alone does shew. But that fire which is above the flame is purer; and therefore is not seen. For by reason of the diffe∣rent concourse of the Atomes divers bodies seem to arise which yet are of one Nature. The Fire is but one thing, yet undergoes divers names, according to the different concourse of its smal bodikies. The Concourse of many homogeneal bodikies of fire is requisite to make fire in such a condition as to shine and burn; which two things though fire does not, yet is it fire stil.

Now Air is in al bodies almost. * 1.82 For since most Natural Bodies are porous, Air fils those empty spaces naturally. Not to speak of other things, some Metals are sounding, others not. And those which sound have Air in their pores, which is the subject of sound. So Woods are apt to admit sound, which happens only by means of the Air contained in them. And this is most frequent in dried Woods; because the watty moisture being consumed, which was unfit to receive sounds, Air comes into its place by its quality more fit to receive and advance sounds. And if a man touch a stick at one end, and put the other end to his ear, be shal hear a sound. Which comes to pass by means of the Air which is contained in them, seem they never so solid. And Soldiers are wont to try whether their Enemies are coming by clapping their Ears close to the Earth.

Water or moist Air (which is nothing but Air ful of the vapors of water) does so insinuate it self into wooden things that they wil even be thereby swollen in bulk. * 1.83 And therefore fol∣ding doors many times when the Air is moist, wil neither open nor shut. And tubs that leak being laid in water come to hold again, because the boards which were contracted and made chinks, are by the water distended.

Finally, * 1.84 The Earth though it be thick, yet it insinuates it self by its smal bodikies into other things, and is mixed with them. So we see in Baths, Icesickles, and stoney substances grow to the Channels, so that a man might wel wonder how such a body could lie so long con∣cealed in clear and transparent Water. If therefore Air and Water can so insinuate them∣selves into solid Bodies, and Earth can be so mingled in transparent Water as not to be dis∣cerned by the sight, why therefore may not fire do the fame which is much more subtile? So that there is now no need to dispute how red hot Iron burns, since really it contains in it the Atomes or smal bodies of fire, which vanishing away it returns to its Natural actual coldness. For the same cause also Metals are melted, and afterwards growing cold become hard again. Of which we shal speak anon.

Which if a man diligently consider, * 1.85 he shal observe, That alterations commonly so called are not mutations only in Qualities, but the participation of another Body: that the hea∣ting of water is it a participation of fiery Atomes, by means of which also it hath the power to burn, which vanishing the water returns to its ancient coldness. Which also may be known even by Experience; for hot water shut up in Peuter Pots wil retain its heat ten hours and longer in the Winter time; by which means Beds are warmed in the Winter, and Gentle∣women

travelling by Coach defend their feet from the Winters cold. For if the water had contracted only heat from the fire, that imprinted quality in a cold place, in a Vessel made of Metal, and in the cold air, could not continue so long a time. There are therefore (doubtless) fiery particles, which being shut up in a thick Metalline Vessel do for some time abide there∣in, before they can al leisurely creep out through the pores of a compact Body. So in the Summer time we are taught by this following Experiment, That Wine and Beer do not on∣ly contract an hot quality in the heated Air, but that they also receive into themselves fiery particles, viz. If two Vessels be filled at the same time with Wine or Beer, and both be plunged a good way into cold water, and then one be stopped, the other open, that Wine or Beer in the open mouthed Vessel is sooner cooled than that in the stopt vessel; which there∣fore happens because the fiery Atomes which did heat the Liquor being compelled by the force of contrary coldness do sooner exhale when they have a free passage than when by stopping the vessels mouth they are restrained. Yea, and it is not absurd to say the Air in our stoves is not only altered, but receives into it some of the substance of the fire. Nor is it impossible that the fire should pierce through the furnace, since air (not so subtile as fire) pierces both into Iron and stone Jugs. Yea, and the thing it self restifies thus much; for we see paper, cloaths, and other combustible things being held near the hot stove do oftentimes take flame. And if those supposed alterations are meerly such, how can heat and cold be in the same part of the water; and seeing no accident operates but by vertue of its form whence it flows, how can that heat springing from the fire act both upon the cold and up∣on other Bodies, the fire whence it came being now absent and quenched. Now whether is more absurd to hold that in water there is also fire, from whence as its proper subject heat flows? or to hold heat to be both in its own proper, and in a strange subject? And that this is true many most learned men have acknowledged, and amongst the rest Averrhoes, who in his B. de Anima, text. 115. writes: We must not think that water is heated remaining pure and meet water, nor that Air is cooled remaining meer and pure Air; but this happens by reason o•• hot or cold bodies being mixed with them. Also this is manifest in the cold air, which nips Plants less being stirred with winds than if it be stil and quiet. For the cold Atomes mixt with the air and sticking to the Plants do more hurt than when they are stir∣red. Julius Caesar Scaliger grants as much, when in Exercit. 12. Sect. 3. he saies that Brass becomes hot by the parts of the fire entring into the pores thereof. The same Scaliger, Exercitat. 14. teaches us, That boyling water is fiery, or hath in it fire and driness; and he writes that the fire exhales out of hot water: There is (saies he) fire and driness in hot Water, which in the steam ascending we perceive by our understanding, and by our sense also; for it burns. The heat which is in water is fire mingled with its contrary. Yea, and Galen taught this long ago, who in his 1. Book de Element. cap. 6. saies, I say that be who in the time of frost is warmed with the fire, does receive fire into his Body. And that the substance of fire and air does penetrate into other bodies, this also argues that the digestions which are performed in dung or hot water can never be exactly accomplished in the Embers, whatever degree of heat you shal use; and because in an hot and dry subject a thing is easily burned, but not in an hot and moist. Also the Cure of burns, and of parts nummed with cold, as also other things congealed with cold do shew, that alterations hither∣to so esteemed are not meer alterations, but the mixture of a certain kind of Atomes. For if a man shal put frozen Eggs or Apples into hot water (which should be done were it a meer alteration) they wil be spoiled: but if he plunge them in extream cold Water, the frost is drawn, and sticks like Ice upon the out side, and they are preserved. So those that travel in the Winter, as is wel known to the Inhabitants of Norway and other Northern Countries (nor is it altogether unknown to our people) and have their Members frozen as it were; if they come presently to the fire or into an hot room, they are very much hurt and exceedingly pained, ••••d many times the part becomes gangrenated, the cold parts (I do not say the coldness, but the cold parts or atomes) piercing inward, and extinguishing the natural heat. But if their Members are first rubbed with Snow, or are plunged into cold water, the water or Snow do draw unto themselves by reason of similitude those atomes and petty cold bodies which had gotten into the part. Contrariwise, when any Member is any waies burnt, if it be plunged into cold water (which the Law of alteration requires) it is most certainly en∣dangered. Contrarily 'twil be cured if it be put, not into cold but hot water, which may by similitude draw to it self those hot bodikies: and if the burning be not great, the Member may be held to the fire, or hot embers may be applied thereto. Of which Fernelius, 6. de Method. Medendi, cap. 20. As the fire, if a part which is burned be held neer the same, be∣comes a cure of the evil it self caused, and by drawing back the fire eases it of its pain; so

some things externally applied do by their hear draw out the heat of the fire, and so by cea∣sing the Inflammation they cure burnings. For fire and hot things do by similitude draw out the fiery Atomes. And for this very cause (as Aristotle writes in the 13. Probleme of the 24. Section) hot things are faster cooled in the Sun than in the shade, because the beams of the Sun draw out the fiery Atomes.

But that same Opinion of Thomas Fienus is altogether absurd, * 1.86 who in his Apology a∣gainst Sanctacruz, Page 50. saies, that this Fire of ours which we use (he cals it artificial and earthly, unfitly; since it is most natural and of the same substance with that Fire which is in other parts of the world, although it be in a thicker matter) is an Accident; and he con∣ceives that those things which are said to be Fired, or those substances which men are wont to call Fire, as Iron, Coals, Flame, are indeed Substances: but that which is in them more than their own substance, by reason of which they are called Fire, or are said to burn, he de∣nies to be a substance, and thinks that the fleriness adds nothing to the burning Iron, Wood, or Furnace, but an Accident, viz. a most intense Heat, and that he endeavors thus to prove.

First, He saies, a substance is not capable of more onless. That same firiness in the Iron, Wood, Furnace, admits of more and less. Ergo it is no substance.

Secondly, When the Iron is red hot or the smoak flames, the whol Iron is fired, and the fire is in all the parts thereof. If therefore the fire were a substance, in all the parts of the burning Iron there would be another substance, and consequently one substance should be in another, and so there would be a penetration of dimensions; which is absurd.

Thirdly, He saies: When the Iron becomes red hot, either the substance of the fire comes into the Iron from without, or it is generated in the pores thereof. he conceives neither of these can be: Not the first, because neither the Coal of the fire because it is thick, and stics not, but lies stil, nor the flame of the fire, because of its extream thinness and lightness, can enter into the hard substance of the Iron. Moreover, if the fire entred into the Substance of the Iron, when the Iron cools, the flame that went in should come out again: but no man (he saies) did ever see fire fly or go out of a cooling Iron. Also (he saies) the latter is impossi∣ble, because the substance of the Iron should be turned into the substance of the Fire; which is false, because the Iron remains Iron stil.

Fourthly, If the Iron became fire, it should lose its Heaviness, Hardness, and Consi∣stency.

Fiftly, A Substance is a Beeing subsisting by it self, not existing in another thing, nor inhering in any thing as its subject. But the fire by it self no where subsists, but is alwaies in some other thing, as in its subject, after the manner of accidents; and its subject taken away wherein it sticks, there is no such thing as Fire. Ergo it is an Accident.

Sixtly. Every Body of it self hath Quantity: for Quantity springs from matter, and the determination thereof from the form: But Fire hath neither it self any Quantity, nor hath it any determinate figure, but it hath only the Figure and Quantity of the subject wherein it inheres, as other accidents. Therefore it is no Body.

But this Error Julius Caesar Scaliger long since observed and resuted in Cardan, Exercit. 10. For nothing is accidentally in any thing, which is not essentially, primarily, and of it self in some other; since every accident flows from a certain substance. And therefore since Heat is accidentally in the Iron, of necessity there must be a substance wherein it is primarily, and by which the Iron becomes hot: But such there can be none but the Fire. And if fire be a Quality, its first and proper subject must be some substance. But those reasons where∣by Fienus was brought into that opinion are so slight, that I wonder so learned a man should thereby be moved so to hold.

For, in the first place, we deny that the firiness in the Wood, Iron, Furnace, Smoak, re∣ceives more and less. But that the fire somtimes burnes more, somtimes less, happens by reason of the application thereof to the Patient. For Virtue united is stronger, and ther∣fore Fire in a compact substance, as Iron, burnes more than in a thin substance, as Stubble or Straw.

To the second I answer: That Smiths can tell that Iron is porous; and therefore the fire can easily insinuate it self thereinto. And whereas Fienus denies the Iron to have pores; that is contrary to sense: for Smiths know how to distinguish the sorts of Iron, and discern Iron from Steel by the variety of the pores. Nor is that of any moment which he further ob∣jects, that if the fire were only in the pores of the Iron, the solid parts thereof should not burn, nor would the Iron be light all over, many parts thereof would be dark. For indeed

Fienus was ignorant of the nature of the small individual Bodikies or Atomes, nor did he consider what dayly happens in Nature. For if Water can so penetrate into all the smallest parts of Wood, that there shall be no part thereof which is not moistened; Why may not the moist subtile fire much more pierce the Iron? And therefore to his third Argument we Answer, That the substance of the Fire doth certainly enter the Iron from without. For al∣though the Coal it self stir not, and enter not into the Iron; yet the fire which is in the coal exhales in smal Atomes, and insinuates it self into the Iron. And the thinness of the flame does not hinder the same, but rather help it to enter the hard substance of the Iron. And when the Iron cools again, then the fire exhales out of it; which though it be not discerned by our bodily eyes (for who can see the pure Elements of Fire and Air?) yet Philosophers discern it sufficiently by the effect.

To the fourth I answer, the Iron is not made Fire, but it receives the same. Which while it does, it loses indeed its hardness and consistency, so that it may be bent and beaten by the Hammer, yea, and it may be melted.

To the fift I say; It is false that Fire no where exists by it self, but is alwaies in some other thing as a subject; which the sense teaches. And although fire be in the Iron; yet is it not there as an accident in its subject; just as when water is in a Vessel, it is not there as in a Subject.

To the sixt I answer; That the Elements of themselves have no determinate figure nor quantity, but they are determined and receive figure from the things which compass them about.

Contrariwise, Cold Atomes having no hot body mixed with them, * 1.87 being abundant in the Air in the Winter time, they cause extream cold, and congeal al bodies whereinto they insi∣nuate themselves.

Nor did the Ancients only teach, * 1.88 That these first Atomes of the Elements did variously spread themselves up and down, and penetrate into other bodies; but that of them also mixt Bodies were made; and they held them to be nevertheless immutable, and to retain their own Nature how ever they were mixed, and being separated from the things where∣with they were mixed they held their Nature entire as before. For thus Lucretus writes in his Second Book.

What came from Barth goes back to Earth again, And Heavenly parts do fly to Heav'n amain. Nor does grim Death consume our Bodies so As to destroy the Matter, but unsew The joyned Parts.

Most Meteors (truly) are no other than a mass of Elementary Atomes variously congre∣gated. For Exhalations and Vapors are not continued bodies, as is commonly thought, * 1.89 but crowds of infinite Atomes; which is manifest from the vapors arising from water which heats over the fire. For these though far off they seem to be a continued body, yet he which is neer at hand, or who walks on a Mountain top when the Air is misty, may even dis∣cern with his eyes that these vapors are not continued Bodies, but a throng of Atomes. A Cloud is nothing else but an infinite multitude of Atomes. * 1.90 For as when we see a smoak ascend from burning Pitch or any other thing, we think afar off that it is a continued united body; but if we come neeter and diligently look upon the smoak, we see that it is no conti∣nued, no nor contiguous body neither; and so it is with Clouds, which until the smal bodies are again joyned together (which happens in Rain and Snow) they are no continued bodies, but many millions of millions of petty Atomes or smallest bodies. And Clouds as they are of divers kinds, so when they grow together again divers things are bred of them, as Rain, Snow, Hail, Winds, Lightnings, and other Meteors so called. Somtimes nevertheless the Atomes of Bodies perfectly mixed are mingled amongst the Meteors.

For there are (in the second place) Atomes of another kind besides the Elementary (which if any man wil term first mixt bodies, * 1.91 he may do as he please) into which as similar parts other compound bodies are resolved. And indeed in the mixture of Natural things, or that which happens in lifeless things, these bodies of which the mixt things consist are so broken and divided into smal particles, as that none of them can be discerned and known by it self. Also in al fermentations and digestions and coctions, which are made by Nature or Art, nothing is done but to reduce things into their smallest parts, and unite them as neerly as may be. Contrariwise, the Resolution of Natural Bodies, both that which is done by Na∣ture, and that performed by Art, is nothing but the resolving of them into their smallest parts or Atomes.

But Chymical Resolutions do in a special manner discover that there are Atomes, * 1.92 and teach sufficiently what little bodies there are. So Spirit of Wine pierces through writing paper four times double into the Alembick; and in Distillations and Sublimations such Atomes are raised from Plants and Minerals into the Alembick or Recipient, many missions whereof nevertheless when they joyn together again do somtimes hardly make one drop or sensible quantity of Liquor. Nor let any man here perswade himself when he sets a vapor rise out of water or Spirit of wine, or a Smoak arise out of Pitch, Sulphur, or burning wood, that these bodies are changed into Air; but the water, spirit of wine, and other bodies, are resolved into the smallest Atomes, which when they joyn together again, they turn to water, spirit of wine, or some other body again; which the Alembicks of Chymists and their Reci∣pients do teach. Also whiles spirit of Vitriol and other Spirits are distilled, the Recipient Vessel is often ful of such smal, but not yet smallest bodies for two or three daies together, and every moment some millions of such bodies are present and follow one another. Yet a smal quantity of Liquor comes of them when they meet and are condensed; so that those Atomes which are present at the same moment, of which nevertheless there are some millions, do hardly constitute one drop. We see the same in other Resolutions. If a man set on sire a little bit of Pitch, and suppress the flame, an huge space of Air is filled with the smoak thereof, which is no one continued body, but a multitude of little Atomes or smal bodies. And what difference there is betwixt a body compact and resolved into Atomes, we may learn only by the putting out of a Candle. For if one blow out a burning Candle, the smoa∣king Snuf, which is hardly so big as a Pease, does presently send forth so great a quantity of Atomes that a great part of the Air is filled therewith. So flower of Brimstone melts into Brimstone; Mercury precipitate, or sublimate, or however resolved, does return again to li∣ving and running Quick-silver. So the water wherein Metal is dissolved, although it seem cleer water, and is so exactly mixed that it wil pass through a paper: yet the Metal preserves its own nature therein entire, and is easily precipitated to the bottom in form of a most very fine pouder, which is afterwards melted into a Metal again. So also if one Mass be made of Gold and Silver melted together, and they be so mingled in their smallest Atomes that no man would think them but one simple body; yet in the mean while in those smallest Atomes each Metal preserves its form and nature, and may be separated by Aqua fortis, and reduced into its former Nature. Hence the cause of many Chymical Operations and things done in Chymistry may be rendred. If to Lead any way calcined you pour distilled Vinegar, the Lead is indeed dissolved in the Vinegar, but the salt of the Vinegar unites its self to the Lead, so that if it be drawn off by distilling, it comes away quite without tast, the salt of the Vine∣gar remaining with the Lead, whence comes that same sweet mixt body which they cal Sac∣charum Saturni, * 1.93 or Sugar of Lead. So if Crabs-eyes, Corals, Pearls, be dissolved by Vi∣negar or other acid Liquors, and be reduced to pouder, so that they may be also strained through a paper, and the salt of those acid Liquors by reason of the similitude joyns it self with the bodies dissolved (so that if it be distilled it cannot be separated without much ado) yet if into the solution you drop Oyl of Tattar made by Deliquium, the salt of Tar∣tar does by similitude unite it self to the salt of Vinegar, and the dissolved Pearl or Coral is precipitated to the Bottom. So if to Quick-silver you pour Oyl of Vitriol or Sulphur, the Quick-silver is dissolved in them, but the salt which is in those Spirits is united to the Quick-silver, whence arises Mercury precipitate, which hath therefore such a corrosive fa∣culty. Of Quick-silver, Vitriol, Salt, is made Mercurius sublimatus. Of Mercury and Sulphur sublimed together, is made Cinnabaris. Thus Metals are reduced into pouder when being dissolved in corrosive Liquors they are precipitated to the bottom. Yet they return and are reduced into their former Nature, that Body or Salt being taken away which they borrowed from the Solvent, * 1.94 which Operation is called Reduction. Which may be performed divers waies. Mercury precipitate if it be rubbed in a Mortar with Oyl of Tartar or Salt of Tartar dissolved per deliquium, the Salt which cleaves to the Mercury is united to the Salt of Tartar, and forsakes the Mercury, whereupon it turns to Quick silver again. So, if Mercury sublimate be mixed with Quicklime, and put into a Retort, the Salt of Vitriol, and the common Salt which is in the sublimate, sticks to the live or unslak'd Lime, and so the Mercury returns to its former Nature, and becomes Quick-silver again. The Calces or Pouders of Metals are turned into molten Metals when the Salt mixed therewith is dissipa∣ted by a strong fire, yet it is done sooner if some of those Pouders they cal melting Pouders be mixed therewith. For the Salts of which those meking Pouders are made do draw to them the Salt which adheres to the calcined Metal; from which when they are freed, the Aromes of the Metal by reason of similitude unite themselves, and so ••••••urn into their a••••ent

Body and shape. And indeed, how many external forms Bodies natural being mixed with others may put on (their substantial form remaining safe and sound) even Mercury alone may teach us, which puts on so many external forms, * 1.95 that it may be wel called Many-shap'd Mercury. 'Tis changed into a clear water, into a Liquor like Butter; 'tis sublimated, pre∣cipitated, reduced into pouder, into Glass, the likeness of Lead, Gold, Silver, so that it may be wrought into Plates, and I know not how many forms besides; al which nevertheless it laies down, if that which is mingled with it be therefrom separated.

This Doctrine also of Atomes is manifestly confirmed by anointings with Mercury and Fumigations made thereof; wherein the Quick-silver being reduced into smal Atomes pene∣trates the whol Body to the very jaws and mouth where it may be received by pieces of Gold held in the same. Yea, and it hath been found that after nointings with Mercury, Quick∣silver hath been collected in the Cavities of the Veins and Bones.

Yea, There are Atomes not only of inanimate Bodies, but also of some animate bodies: * 1.96 and the Soul it self may somtimes luik and preserve it self in such smal bodies; as we shal hereafter shew when we treat of the Spontaneous Original of living things; and upon this Doctrine of Atorues the most learned Fortunius Licetus hath built in a manner al his Treatise of the Spontaneous Original of live things. Of which we shal speak in its place.

Plants (truly) do manifestly declare that there are Atomes. * 1.97 For who would beleeve that in cleer and transparent Wine there were a stony substance, unless it appeared by separa∣tion, whiles the Tartar separated from the Wine sticks to the sides of the Vessels? And matter unfit to nourish the body being thrust into the joynts stirs up arthritick pains, and there at length it grows into a kind of stoney substance. The Generation also of other dis∣eases shews the same: For seeing many superfluous things unfit to nourish are taken in with our meat, they though they are bitter, and sowr, and salt, and otherwise pomaint, strong and different; yet (as Hippocrates saies, de Prisca Medicina) being mixed and mutually tempered together they are neither perceived, nor do they hurt a man: but when any of them is separated and by it self, then it becomes apparent, and troubles a Man.

Also the Atomes of Purging Medicaments do make the Milk purging, * 1.98 as also Hippocrates saies in 6. Epidem. com. 5. text. 33. If a woman or a she Goat eat Elaterium or the wild Cucumer, their yong ones are purged. For although as we have also said in our tr. de Dissens. chymicor. cum Aristotelic. & Galen. a purging Plant eaten by a shee Goat is digested in her stomach, and mingled with the Chyle, that Chyle is turned to Blood, that Blood in the Goats Dugs becomes Milk, this Milk is drunk by the Nurse, and there are so many muta∣tions: yet in all these the Atomes of the purging Plants remain intire, and keep their Vertues.

Milk also it self, though it seem but one body, yet the Whey, Butter, and Cheese do shew being separated, that there were divers smal Bodies mingled together therein. So the Blood of Animals, although it seems to be one homogeneal Body, there are nevertheless therein not only divers parts which afford nourishment to different Members; but also if it be distilled, Volatile Salt which before did not shew it self sticks in great quantity to the Receiver. Which also happens if the Horns and Bones of Animals be distilled.

Yea, and the consideration of whol entire Animals may bring us to the knowledg of Atomes. Aristotle in the 5. Histor. Animal. cap. 3. writes that in old Wax and in Wood a certain Animal is bred (which is the least of al living things) called Acari. There are also a sort of Lice called Sirones, so smal that they cannot be seen but by a sharp sight, and in an augmen∣ting Glass. Yet these are Animals, ergo they have an animal, motive, nutritive, and sensi∣tive faculty in an Organical Body made up of very many Organs. They draw, concoct, as∣similate their nourishment, and are moved. They have therefore animal Spirits, and natu∣ral, which are themselves also bodies; they have Organs wherein they are generated, and wherein they are contained. And al these again if we divide them into their first and smallest Atomes or bodies, how many thousand parts wil they make? and if the little Creature Acari, or a smal Louse, be divided into so many thousand parts, how very exceeding little must those parts be?

And although those Atomes be so exceeding smal; * 1.99 yet the essential forms of things re∣main in them entire, as was lately said, and experience it self does witness. For if Gold and Silver be melted together, the Atomes of the Gold and Silver are so mingled in their smallest parts, that no sense can discern the one from the other. Yet both of them do retain their forms entire. Which appears hereby in that if you put Aqua fortis upon the said

Mass, the Silver melts and turns into the Liquor, but the Gold remains in form of a Pouder. If the dissolved Silver be precipitate it settles to the bottom in form of a most delicate fine Pouder. Each of these Pouders molten by themselves do return into their former shapes of Gold and Silver. So if Quick-silver be sublimed, pre∣cipitated, turned to water, and undergo other changes, according to the various mixture of the Atomes whereinto it is resolved with other things; yet it alwaies re∣tains its own essential form, is easily separated from the Bodies wherewith it is mix∣ed, and returns into its old shape of running Quick-silver. Nor does this betide in Metals only, but also in Vegetables or Plants. For when distilled Waters and Spirits are made by Chymists, insensible Atomes arise out of the Plants, so that in the Cucurbita they cannot any waies be discerned; but when they joyn together in the Alembick, and turn to Liquor, they again shew themselves in their likeness, whiles one is Spirit of Wine, another of Juniper, &c. And if a Goat be nourished with certain purgative Herbs, and a Nurse drink the Milk of the Goat, it wil purge the Infant which sucks that Nurses Milk; as was said before out of Hippocrates, 6. Epidem. com. 5. text. 33.

That most learned Peripatetick Jacobus Schegkius acknowledged the truth of this thing, when in Lib. 2. de Occult. Medic. facult. cap. 1. he thus wrote, The beating of a thing into a most fine pouder does not necessarily corrupt the substance thereof, seeing it is an accident of an accident for that which is continual to be divided into very smal bodies. And a little after; It does not follow that the substance is abolished, if a man shall say that Medicaments beaten into pouder are effectual in our bodies.

Howbeit, * 1.100 Atomes have their Laws from Nature, and doubtless the Atomes of Fire are more subtile than those of Earth, although we cannot difcern so much. For so the case stands with Natural things that the forms consist not save in a certain quantity; and as they diffuse not themselves beyond their Natural bounds; so they cannot be conserved save in a certain quantity. This also Franciscus Agui∣lonius observed, who in the 5. B. of his Opticks, Proposit. 8. declared this thing in the example of Light, when he wrote; Though there is not a smallest in quantity, yet Light hath a smallest in Nature, * 1.101 that is to say, so smal a Light that it cannot be smaller without perishing. After which manner there are also the smallest among Natural Bodies; which if they be any more divided they lose their form and essence. For as Bodies towards their natural subsistency do require some bulk of quantity, which is nothing but the measure of corporeal substance; even so Quali∣ties also (unless they be in some degree of excellency) they perish of their own accord. And in Propos. 15. We affirm that Light cannot of its own strength and by it self exist solitarily in any degree whatsoever, but that there is a certain limit of smalness, beyond which we cannot proceed by dividing without the destruction thereof, which therefore we may not unfitly cal the minimum naturale of Light: but if it be joyned to a greater Light, although it be smal, nothing hinders but by help thereof it may be sustained, provided both together do at least attain to the minimum naturale, or smallest natural quantity of Light. Moreover, this imbecilli∣ty of subsisting is not proper to these Qualities alone, which admit the diversity of greater and lesser, but also common to al Bodies which vary their magnitude. For as these without some bulk, so they without some degree of excellency cannot free themselves from destruction. For being attenuated beyond their strength they fal to nothing and perish, no contrary thing destroying them, but only through defect of that measure, which being an indispensable Law of Nature, is requisite to the pro∣per maintenance of each one. But what he saies of Qualities may be said much more of Forms from which the Qualities flow.

Now those disputes against Atomes concerning the infinite division of that which is continued of indivisible Lines, are disputed not from Natural but Mathematical Principles. For the Question is not here (as was said before) Whether a thing continued be perpetually divisible Mathematically? but, Whether or no Nature in her Generation and resolution of Bodies does not stop at some smallest Bodies, than which there are not, nor can be any smaller.

Chap. 2. Of Mixture.

SInce the Doctrine of Mixture is exceeding necessary rightly to understand the Generati∣on of al Natural Things, and the Foundation wel-neer of al Natural Philosophy; it is worth our Labor duly to explain the same. Which that we may the better do, we are to know in the first place that the term Mixture hath sundry acceptations. * 1.102 For (as Thomas Erastus, Disput. 2. Contra Paracels. part 2. p. 195. writes) somtimes it signifies an Heap and Mass of things blended together, as of Rye, Wheat, and other such like things which keep their surface and Integrity. Somtimes it signifies the composition of two or three, or more Bodies, so confused together, that though each retain its own Nature, and they may be separated again, yet one Body is made up of al. Such is Crama, which is made of Wine and Water mixed; which is not one in Form, but in continuation only. For although nei∣ther the Wine nor the Water be separable by their bounds, yet they are both so contained under their Natural Form as Gold is in Silver, which may be separated by Aqua fortis. Such a Body is Honey and Wine, Honey and Water, and infinite others compounded by Art. Thirdly, it is taken for a Body compounded of divers things, so that of all one thing is made, of a different Nature from al the Ingredients, and having a form quite different from their forms. And things so mixed are truly said to be mixt bodies. The first mannet (since there in no real mixture is made, but dry things are only blended together, which makes no difficulty in our minds) Julius Caesar Scaliger omits, and propounds other three, Exercitat. 101. Sect. 1. There are (saith he) three Manners, Degrees, or Sorts of Mixture. The first is of those things which after they are blended may again be separated; as a mix∣ture of water and wine. For Pliny reports they are separated with Vessels of Ivy as he had it from Cato; and we do it with a cloth. The other manner is as it happens in those bodies natural which we cal imperfectly mixed, of which there are two degrees: The other more weak, as of a Cloud, Rain, Wind, Hail, Snow, Dew, Hoar-froast, and such like. For they are exhalations mixt of divers Elements which may easily be dissolved. But they hang together more closely than those of the first sort. The other degree is of a firmer union; as in clods of Earth and stones. For the parts of these are not easily separated one from ano∣ther. Yet they cal them rather mixt Bodies than by any other nobler Appellation, because they seem to them to be things only begun. The third Mixture is of such things as some are pleased after a peculiar manner to term Mixt Bodies. Such are Vegetable and Sensitive things.

Now concerning these three Manners, the Question is, Whether they are in al mixt bodies made after one and the same manner. * 1.103 Which that we may rightly unfold we must know in the first place what Mixture is. Now Aristotle defines it to be the Union of things mix∣able after they are altered. And Scaliger in the place fore-alleadged; That it is the mo∣tion of Atomes or smallest Particles of Bodies to a mutual Contact, so as they may become one. And he further explains his meaning, and that rightly, how that every thing that is, i•• one, not only by continuation and privation of pure contiguity, but by act also, by vertue whereof it comes to pass that those parts become one body. Now by Act he means the Form, by which it comes to pass that those parts which by their own nature and aptitude might come together to an Union, are become actually one. And he concludes rightly, That those things which are not one Beeing formally, but by accident only (as an Heap of Beans and Oats blended is one) are not properly mixtbodies, nor ought so to be called, but things jumbled, as Wine and Water, Silver and Gold; since such things are not formally one, but so many things as there are parts within and without, and only one by accident; which though it be less manifest to the senses, yet is it not hid to the understanding of wise Men; seeing they may easily be separated, as Wine and Water by Ivy Vessels, and by cloaths; and Silver and Gold by Aqua fortis so called.

But by al that hath been said the difficulty is not quite removed, nor the Nature of Mixture sufficiently explained; but two knots do remain as yet to be untied, which being rightly un∣folded they bring great Light to Natural Philosophy and Physick. For although we must needs grant, that nothing is truly mixed but what is formally one; yet the question still remains: First, Whether it be necessary that the mixable bodies which are united by ver∣tue of oue Form, and grow together into one mixed Body, should lose their own Forms? or, Whether in the mixed body they may al under another form retain their own forms stil? Secondly, Whether the Elements only are mixable, and every resolution into the smallest

particles made in reference to Mixture does alwaies proceed so far as to the Elements? or whether other bodies more noble than the Elements may properly be said to be mixed? Both which Questions must be explained.

As to the first Question, * 1.104 That the same may be rightly explained, we wil only enquire concerning the Elements. For concerning them there is no doubt but that they are rightly mixed; but as touching other Bodies the matter is questionable. But whatsoever shal be said of the Elements, that hath also undoubtedly place in al other mixable bodies. Now there are chiefly two Opinions concerning Mixture; the one held by well-nigh al the Anci∣ents before Aristotle, as Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Hippocrates, yea, and by very many Philosophers since Aristotle, who al held that Generation and Corrup∣tion are made by the Conjunction and Separation of Atomes, and that the Bodies mixed do retain their forms entire in the thing made up of them. Which manifestly appears out of Hippocrates, Lib. 1. de Victus ratione, where he writes: What I mean by Generation and Corruption I must explain for the sakes of many, viz. To be mixed and separated. Now thus the matter stands: To be generated, and to be mingled are all one, and to be separated and corrupted are all one. According to whose mind, as I said before, Jul. Caesar Scali∣ger, Exercit. 101. defines Mixtion; That it is the motion of Atomes to the mutual contact one of another, that they may be united. The other is the Definition of Aristotle. For he only separated from the Ancients in this point. For thus in the 1. de Gener. & cor. cap. 10. he writes against Empedocles: We must not say, That such things as are mixed are mingled by their smal parts, which still retain their own nature. For that would be a composition, but not a temperature or mixture, nor would the part be of the same nature with the whol. We say, That if a thing be mixt the parts thereof are one like another, even as every part of water is water. But if mixture be a composition according to the smal parts, none of these things does happen, but that is only a mixture so appearing to the sense, and that which a dim-sighted man will account mixed, a quick sighted man will discern not to be mixed. He teaches the same in the 2. de generat. & corrupt. cap. 7. pag. 47. the sense of which place Toletus thus propounds: He reproves this manner of mixture (which Empedocles supposed) because one inconvenience follows, viz. That out of every part of the mixt body the four Elements could not be extracted, and so every part of the mixt body is not mixed: the Consequence is cleared, because as out of every part of a wall cannot be taken stones and bricks, because where the one is, the other is not: so truly it will be in a mixt body, which is made after the same manner of the Elements. And thus indeed Arisiotle opposes the Opinion of the Ancients; but he so propounded his own Opinion that hitherto for so many Ages there hath been Civil War amongst his Expositors, what his Opinion was, or how it is to be explained; whiles some (as Averrhoes) do hold that as wel the substantial Forms as the Qualities of the Elements do remain actually in the body mixed, only broken, allaied, and reduced to a mediocrity. Others (as Scotus) do teach that the forms and quali∣ties of the Elements do quite perish in the mixture, and that a new form of the mixt body is generated, and a new quality, which is the temperature of the mixt body. Others (as most of the Latins) do conceive, That the forms of the Elements are no waies preserved in the mixt body, neither entire nor broken, yet they hold the Qualities remain in the mixt body, but broken and reduced to a mediocrity. Whose contentions to set down in this place is no part of my business. They may be read in Zabarella his Book of Mixture, in Tolet. Lib. 1. de generat. et corrupt. cap. 10. and other Expositors of Aristotle every where.

There have been found in the mean while most learned men of no smal note, * 1.105 who being moved with the evidence of the thing it self, have embraced the Opinion of the Ancients, as Philoponus, Albertus, Aureolus, Zimara; and amongst Physitians Avicenna, Fernelius, and very many more, who so stoutly defend the Opinion of the Ancients that some of them write, Whoever read their Arguments (if he be not a Mil-stone) wil consent, and those that think otherwise play the Sophisters, abuse the Works of Nature, and destroy and defile the Splendor of the Ancient Discipline. And especially Avicenna comes up directly to the mind of the Ancients, and holds, That the Elements in mixt Bodies do retain their Forms perfect and entire, howbeit divided and cut into very smal parts, so that their particles composed and knit together in a certain order do mutually cohere one with another. Fer∣nelius follows Avicenna, who Lib. 2. Physiolog. cap. 6. cals the Opinion of those that hold the contrary, a childish and vain, nay, a monstrous Opinion; and he judges that those who so think have contemned the Philosophy of the Ancients. And they do indeed al of them wel, in that they adhere firmly to the Opinion of the Ancients, being moved thereto by most firm Reasons: but herein they take pains to no purpose, whiles they would make

this to have been the Opinion of Aristotle; since Aristotle in express words relinquishes the Ancients in their Opinion, as appears in that place lately alleadged. Yea, and very many others who differ from the Ancients saw this Truth, and nothing but the Authority of Aristotle hindred them from imbracing the same; and if the Authority of Aristotle be set aside, and the point debated only by reason, and no vain labor bestowed how to reconcile this Doctrine with Aristotle's words, that is, Truth with Falshood, the case is very plain. Yea, Aristotle himself comes to this Opinion against his wil, whiles at the end of his 1. Book de Ortu & Interitu, he defines Mixture to be the Union of things mixable, being alte∣red. For when he saies the Union of things altered, he intimates that the things mixed do not perish, but remain in the body mixed. For if they are altered and mixed they do not perith. Nor does the word Union oppose this Opinion, as Zabarella conceits in cap. 1. de Mist. but rather confirms the same. For Union is the Copulation of such things as have a real Being, but not of things that perish. And although of many things one be made: yet neither is it necessary that those simples should perish, nor is it a meer aggregation or blen∣ding, but the simples by a superior form are reduced into one body. And this Doctrine of the Ancients, viz. That the Elements and simple Bodies do keep their natures entire in the Compounds, is the key (in a manner) to al Natural Philosophy, and the greatest part of Chymistry and Physick.

Contrariwise, That only Opinion of Aristotle, That the Simples do not retain their Natures in mixt Bodies, hath cast the Expositors of Aristotle into Labyrinths and inextrica∣ble Controversies, and hath been brought into Natural Philosophy to the great dammage of Physick; which being rejected all things become plain and easie.

* 1.106 The ancient Philosophers, and late Authors which follow them, have been induced to im∣brace this Opinion by very strong reasons. For first of al, the Nature of Mixture shews as much, since ••••ings that perish cannot be said to be mixed: which Aristotle himself in the end of Lib. 1. de Ortu & Interitu acknowledges. Nor could he do otherwise. For since (as in Metaph. Lib. 5. text. 3.) he declares, That Elements are that of which existing things consist; it must needs be that these Elements (if they were Elements) must abide and exist in the mixt Body.

Moreover, Since Action presupposes Act, and in mixt bodies the actions of the Elements are apparent; of necessity they must be actually in them. Not to speak of others, Aristotle hunself, Lib. 1. de Caelo, writes, That a mixt Body is moved according to the sway of the prevailing Element.

Finally, The Resolution of mixt Bodies into their Elements shews the same. For mixt bodies are resolved into the Elements; and Aristotle himself in 1. de generat. & corrup∣text. 84. saies, That the things mixable may be separated again from the mixt body. And if so, then were they actually in the mixed body.

The force of which Argument is such, That those who have labored to answer the same, have shamefully foiled themselves. For the Conimbricensian Collegiates, while they deny that while Woods are burnt they are resolved into the four Elements, and deny that the water which drops out of the said wood, and distilled waters, are true water, they resist not only Aristotle himself, and other Peripateticks, but also their very Senses. For sup∣pose that Liquor which drops out of burning Wood, or from an Alembick, is not pure wa∣ter: yet our Senses, and the separation which is easily made, do witness that the greatest part thereof is water. And after this reckoning there should be no Element of Water in the whol World; since it is no where sound pure. But others lest they should go against their own Senses, do indeed grant that mixt bodies are resolved into the Elements, but they foo∣lishly hold, that not the same Elements in number, but only the same sort of Elements come out of the mixt body; which is founded upon no reason, but is only hatched to palliate an absurd Opinion, yea, and it is repugnant to Reason and Experience. For when they hold that Elements return out of the mixt body by reason of the action of a like Element, where∣by they recover what they lost in the mixture; how I pray you, in distillations and burnings can Water and Earth be excracted out of the Compound? since Fire by acting upon the mixt body introduces nothing that is watry or earthy, yea, the action of fire is adverse to water and earth, so far is it from augmenting or perfecting the same. The only agent in combustions is fire: and the force thereof equally affects al the parts of the mixt body, and yet nevertheless it brings out some bot, others cold, others moist, others dry, others bitter, others sweet, others other waies differing: which since they cannot proceed from one only action of fire, verily we must believe they were before in the mixt body.

And which way soever they turn themselves who hold the contrary Opinion, yet they can no waies dis-intangle themselves. For either the Form remains in the mixt body, or it does not remain. If it remain, it remains either entire, or broken.

He who holds they remain intire, consents with the Ancients. But Averrhoes and Za∣barella hold they remain broken. But what they bring concerning the Refraction or breaking of the Forms, is a meer figment; and their Opinion who hold the forms of the Ele∣ments are capable of more or less are sufficiently refuted from the Latins disputing against the Opinion of Averrhoes; nor have they ever brought any so much as a probable reason for their Opinion, but have only simply and barely affirmed, that Forms have certain de∣grees, some of which may be taken away, and the rest remain. For the whol Nature of the Form consists in that which cannot be divided, nor does any Form receive more or less, but where ever it is, either it is totally there, or not at al.

But they which hold the Forms do not remain in the Body mixed, and that nothing re∣mains but the matter, are very absurd and almost ridiculous. For what mixture is there where nothing remains? For since the Elements have no other matter than the first, and the first matter is common to al the Elements, I cannot say that one mixt body hath more fire than air. For whatsoever is, is by its form. And therefore if the Elements are not in the mixt body by their form, they are not there at al. And thus a mixt Body in respect of the Elements should be as simple as the Elements themselves; because although the matter be from the four Elements; yet because the Matter of Fire, Air, Water, Earth, does not differ, and the Form (according to their Opinion) of Fire, Air, Water, Earth, should be no longer present, the mixt body so called must needs be simple.

And that we may also consider what is wont to be objected to the contrary; if any shal ask, What were the Motives which caused Aristotle to forsake the Opinion of the Ancients commonly held in his time, we cannot find any of moment, save that which he chiefly pro∣pounds, in 1. de Generat. & Corrupt. cap. 7. and that is this: That he conceives from the Opinion of the Ancients this absurdity follows, That every part of a mixt body should not be mixed, and that out of every part of a mixt body the four Elements could not be extra∣cted. But the Ancients wil answer, That this ought not to be done, and that this is Ari∣stotle's Hypothesis, and that he laies that as a Foundation which is the matter in Contro∣versie. For this Assertion seems contrary to the nature of mixture. For if there be a mix∣ture, those things which are mingled must needs be simples. Nor is it necessary that those Simples should be mixed, but at last in the resolution we must of necessity come to Simples.

Others also do ad other Reasons. Scaliger, Exercit. 16. Sect. 3. The Forms remai∣ning (saies he) mixture (according to Aristotle) should be but an heap; as it is in dry bo∣dies. For the Natural Quantity of every smal part follows the existence thereof, but not continuation, for so should they be really the Atomes of Democritus. But Scaliger whiles he regards somtimes truth, other whiles Authority, contradicts himself, and answers this Argument, Exercit. 101. while he writes; That these parts retain their forms, but lose the prescription of their bounds, and so they are not a meer heap, but do make a mixt body. For that is false which some object, That things of different sorts cannot be continued. For whiles the Elements are united under the Dominion of one Form, they are really continu∣ed. Nor is it absurd (as the same Scaliger writes in the same place) to hold that there are many forms in one continued body. For these forms are every one the act of its own Mat∣ter. Which matters because they are by Nature ordained to a more labored composition, she hath provided that their forms as wel as themselves should be mixed. But the ultimate and most excellent forms, as of a man, since they are not ordained for any further work, they only are not mixed.

Moreover, Neither is this of any great moment which some object; If the Elements should remain perfect under the dominion of another Form, it would follow that the Form of the mixt Body should be an accident; since what is added to a perfect Being actually con∣stituted is an accident. For the answer is manifest from what hath been answered to the former Objection. For as Scaliger saies there, those less noble Elements and Mixables are made for the sake of the more noble, and therefore submit themselves to the Rule of the more noble form, which suparvening obtains the Office, not of an accident, but of a speci∣fick Form. But those things only which are added to those more noble bodies, which are not ordained for any further composition, are accidents.

Now that many have not been able to attain the truth in this point, * 1.107 and have erred in a matter plain enough, the chief cause is, That they knew not the true and principal Cause of

mixture, and thought that al sorts of Natural Bodies did proceed only from the mutual fight of the Elements, and their mutual action one upon another; and to use the words of Ari∣stotle himself, Lib. 2. de Generat. & Corrupt. Cap. 9. text. 54. they attributed powers and vertues to Bodies (by which they generate most instrumentally) neglecting the cause taken from the Form. But the fole concourse of Elements makes very few sorts of natural things, and none of those more perfect Bodies: and contrary to the mind of Aristotle, the Expositors father upon him, that he brings the Generation of Natural Bodies only from the Elements. For he expresly holds (as was said before, 2. de generat. & corrupt. text. 40.53. & sequent.) that the Qualities of the Elements are only Instruments, and the principal Cause is the specifick form of every thing. The same thing Scaliger teaches, Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. Unless (saies he) the four Elements have a Governor, they wil vainly toss and be tossed. For what is it that shal mix so much Earth with the rest? And there ought to be in every motion one first Mover. For they cannot move themselves to any work, but in Compounds they are moved to mutual connexion by a more excellent Form, in bodies im∣perfectly mixed by an external principle. Erastus was forced to acknowledg the same, * 1.108 who although in his Disputations against Paracelsus he writes, Parte altera, pag. 196. that there are no qualities in the whol world which can change whol Bodies applied to them, be∣sides heat and cold, moisture and driness (and that therefore these Qualities must necessari∣ly be held the Principle of Mixtures) yet compelled by the evidence of the thing it self he ads by and by: we do not say that they are principles in such a sense, as if we held them to be the principal Causes, but we say they are Instruments without which no form can make a mixture. But being further demanded, What that form is which is the worker of mixtures? he answers, It is the Divine Command whereby in the Creation God commanded the Ele∣ments that they should orderly meet together for the Generation of things; and that the Motion of the Heavens gives no smal assistance thereto. But this answer is partly from the purpose, partly false. For the Question is not about the first Cause of things, but the im∣mediate Cause. Nor is it yet proved that God gave this Command to the Elements, but it is the Office of the Form to marshal the Elements in a mixt body. And although God created al things, and these lower Bodies are subject to the motions and influx of the Hea∣vens; yet God hath given Nature, by which al things are generated, which is the form of every thing, and the Soul of things animate. It shapes it self its own body, * 1.109 and for the making thereof draws Elements and other Bodies, disposes, unites and governs them; whence it follows that they are now formally one, and being united under that which is actually one they become themselves actually one which before were many. And therefore the Elements do not concur of themselves, but are drawn by the Forms. Whereof Scaliger writes excellently in 1. de Plantis: The Soul (saies he) is Na∣ture to a living thing. She shapes for her self Hoofs, Teeth, Horns to defend life: * 1.110 and therefore she uses them, and knows how to use them, without any object or any phantasie. He that made the Soul gave certain precepts thereto, partly general, partly special. Those are such as pertain to her preserving her union with the Body: of which there was to be no outward Author. Careful therefore hereof she moves the Heart, concocts in the Stomach, concocts again in the Liver, perfects the nourishment in the Veins, digests in the Members, changes it into the substance of the Body, bears it, unites it, restores it, repairs it. Yea, he speaks Divinely in his 2. de Plantis: That (saies he) which is heavy, also ascends: For that work is performed by the distributing faculty, which also lifts the Earth up∣wards, and drives or draws the air downwards; being Lady of the Fire and Air, by the first Command of its Creator. For I doubt not but you hold that there was not one Spirit-maker of all things, and another the Preserver of them when made; nor that be which made all things of himself, and cannot be absent from himself, can be absent from the things he hath made. God, God, my good friends, neither idle, nor busied, * 1.111 neither in work nor out of work; but without work, the Head, Beginning, Middle, End, and all of the Work, and that I may in one word dispatch, compass in, and surmount all, He him∣self, who by his most simple and indivisible Ʋnderstanding of himself made the World; wherely all have attained their End and Order.

Zabarella also saw the same Truth in part; but he could not reach the whol, * 1.112 being hin∣dred by a pre-conceived Opinion, whiles in his 1. de mist. Generat. & Interitu, cap. 2. he distinguishes betwixt the generation of a mixt animated body and an inanimate, and saies rightly, That a living Creature is not generated by the Elementary Vertue, but by Vital Heat implanted in the seed, so that in the generation of a living thing al the Qualities of the Elements are instead of matter, and the immediate Agent is the Vital Heat implanted in the Seed, being proportionable to the Element of the Stars.

But whereas he saies that a mixt Body as such is generated by Elementary heat tempe∣red by cold as the prime Worker, working upon the two passive Qualities as Matter; that is liable to many difficulties. I say rather, hardly any perfectly mixt body is generated af∣ter that manner as Zabarella supposes, and that there is no such mixt thing in Nature. For what (as was lately alleadged out of Scaliger, Exercitat. 307. Sect. 20.) should thus col∣lect certain portions of Elements, and what should mingle so much Earth with so much Water? Nor is there any reason to fly to the fire in this case, whereof Scaliger speaks in his second de Plantis: If the Fire unites the three other Elements as parts, what shal unite it to the three? But most likely it is, that al perfectly mixt things are either parts of an animated Body, or sorts of Natural bodies made in the first Creation, which either yet re∣main such in the Individuals, or are continued by a new Generation; whereof Scaliger most rightly in the same Exercitet. saies, That every Form of every perfectly mixt body, although it be not a Soul, as that of an Adamant, is a sift Essence far different from the four Elements. For this form in Gold, Silver, and other Metals, in Jewels and Stones, aptly disposes the Elements and such matter as is sit for it self. From which it easily appears, that what is by Zabarella objected, de Mistione, cap. 9. is of no moment; where he writes, If in Mixture there were made a resolution into the smallest parts natural, there must alwaies be equal portions of the mixable Ingredients, or they must hold the same proportion one to another. For this is no waies necessary; but the Elements concur in an unequal and most divers proportion, according as the Constitution of the mixt body requires, or as the mix∣ture is directed by the superior Form. For a Gourd and a Cowcumber draw more Water and less Fire; and a Pitch-Tree, a Pine-Tree, and a Fir, draw more Fire and less Water.

Moreover, * 1.113 This also was no smal Cause (which yet agrees almost with the former) why many erred from the Truth, because they supposed that the Elements did no otherwise concur to Mixture than by their sighting one with another. For seeing mixt bodies consist of contraries, and contraries do mutually fly one another; that they may concur and friend∣ly agree to make up a mixt body, some have thought that this friendship and agreement could not be procured unless by sight foregoing they were reduced to a mediocrity. Which agreement of the Elements how it should be made they are at variance amongst themselves, whiles some hold that it is sufficient that their first qualities be abated, though the forms re∣main intire; others conceiving that both the forms and the qualities were remitted and bro∣ken. But there is simply no need of this fight; it is sufficient if they be reduced into Atomes. For then it is that things contrary do fight together and shun one another, when notable magnitudes and portions of them do concur. But when they are reduced into their smallest Particles or Atomes, there is either none at al, or no considerable Skirmish. Which thing is apparent by many experiments. When water is poured upon burning coals, a noise intailed by the fight of those Contraries; but not when the fiery Atomes are mingled with the Water, while the Water heats and is turned into vapors; where by the confession of al men the Atomes both of Water and Fire are contained in the Vapors, and keep the peace. So also, if water be gently heated, it receives the fiery Atomes without any fighting: but if the water grow exceeding hot, and the fiery Atomes come thronging into the Water, or particles of fire bigger than atomes, there is fighting, and great bubbling and boyling. But when the water is resolved into vapors and smallest atomes, although it be joyned with atomes of fire, yet no fight is observed. Oyl admits no Water, nor is mixed therewith, by reason of the contrariety of its Nature. Yet if Oyl be reduced into Atomes it wil admit Water. For examples sake, distilled Oyls do swim upon Wine and distilled Waters, and mix not therewith; but if those Oyls be first mixed with Sugar, and the Sugar afterwards dissolved in Wine or Water, the Water receives the Oyl being reduced into smal atomes, and thereby a Medicinal Wine or Water is made, having the smel, tast, and vertues of the said Oyl. After the same manner in the dissolving of Pearls, Corals, Metals, first there arises a bubbling and a noise, the bubbles ascend; but when the Connexion of these Bodies is loose∣ned, and they are divided into Atomes, al is quiet, nor do they act any more one upon ano∣ther, although each of these bodies remains under its own form, as Precipitation and redu∣ction teaches. So also in the preparation of Tartarum Vitriolatum, if Spirit of Vitriol be mingled with Oyl or Salt of Tartar, there arises a mighty battle, a noise, heat, and boyling. But when these two Fighters are duly mixed in their smallest parts, al the Quartel ceases, nor is there any more noise or boyling. Nor let any man object, That those smallest Atomes therefore fight not, because they are by their mutual action one upon another tem∣pered and reduced to moderation. For separation and reduction do shew the contrary,

which teach us, that those smallest Atomes do remain and subsist under their own proper Form, and are easily (being joyned together) reduced into their ancient body again. So the Spirit of Vitriol and Salt of Tartar do in their very mixture retain their Forms entire; which even distillation shews, by means whereof the Spirit of Vitriol is again separated from the Salt of Tartar, and being separated it subsists of it self with al its forces entire. Which if it be again poured upon the Salt of Tartar it raises a new combate, until these Combatants (being mingled in their smallest parts) come to a Friendly Agree∣ment.

From al which it appears, * 1.114 That although contrary Principles do concur in the Genera∣tion and Nutrition of mixed Bodies; yet for their uniting there is no prime necessity of a fight, but it suffices that they concur in their smallest Atomes. And this is that which Hip∣pocrates writes in Lib. de Prisca Medicina: In a Man there are bitter, and salt, and sweet, and sowr, and harsh, and tastless parts, and an hundred other sorts, which being mingled and mutually tempered together are neither discerned, nor do they trouble a man; that is to say, when they are reduced to their smallest Atomes, and so mingled together. But when they exist apart, that is, when many Atomes of the same kind being separated from the rest are joyned together, so that they become a conspicuous coagulated Body, then they exercise their Activity. And hereunto tend all the Digestions and Fermenta∣tions of the Chymists, viz. That Bodies which in a greater bulk were contraries may be reduced into their smallest Atomes, and afterward agree friendly together and be united.

Finally, It hath been also no smal Cause of Error in many, * 1.115 that same vain Fiction of the Eduction of Forms, which we have elsewhere rejected. For although herein (as was said before) Zabarella is in the right, when he holds that the Vital Heat is the Agent in the Ge∣neration of living things (though it be not the primary Agent which is the form, but its In∣strument) yet ever and anon he fals back into the common Opinion, and endeavors to reduce the Generation of living things also unto the Concourse and simple mixture of the Elements. For so (Lib. 1. de Misti Generat. & Interitu, cap. 3.) he writes, When five degrees of Heat, and six of Moisture concur, it is a convenient proportion for to educe the form of Oyl. Whereas sure it is, That Oyl is not generated by a simple concourse of Elements, but is pro∣duced by the Olive Tree. Now Olives are the Fruit of the Olive Tree, which the said Tree produces by its inbred Heat; out of them is pressed the Oyl after the same manner as out of Almonds, Nutmegs, Lin-seed, Poppy-seed, and Wine out of Grapes.

As to that other Question, Whether the Elements alone are mixed? * 1.116 or whether there are other smal Bodies or Atomes which may truly be mixed? The most (truly) of Aristo∣tle's Expositors do conclude also from that supposition of theirs whereby they hold, That al things are made by the mutual action of the Elements one upon another; that only the Elements also are mixed, and that there is no mixture in which there is not a resolution as far as to the Elements. But he that shal diligently consider what is dayly done in Nature, will observe that this is not alwaies necessary. The case (truly) is plain in those less perfect Mixtures; since Natural Bodies do retain their perfect Forms in them, as is cleer in Metals dissolved in Aqua fortis. Nor yet is it necessary in perfect Mistion. And I conceive that it is manifest in Plants and Animals. For neither are they nourished with pure Elements, but with other mixt bodies created for their sakes. A man is nourished with blood, and in that Nutrition which is a true Mixture and substantial mutation blood is not first turned into Elements, that of them flesh may be made, bones, &c. Blood is made of Chyle, Chyle of the meats we eat. In which mutations there is no resolution into Elements, but as the next matter of a Bone, Flesh, &c. is blood: so the matter of Blood is Chyle; the matter of Chyle is Bread, &c. And there are many Documents of this matter. For if in the stomach meat and drink were resolved into the Elements, no Form or Quality of things which are used in meat would remain; whereas nevertheless meats which have a purging faculty may turn to blood, and so to Milk having the like purging Faculty, which qualities could not re∣main in the simple Elements, if meats were resolved into them. And many Diseases arising from the use of naughty meats do more than sufficiently declare that there is no resolution as far as to the Elements in the corruption of Meat and generation of Nutriment. For al the more ignoble mixt bodies are matter for the more noble. Thus Hippocrates writes of Plants: Such things as grow out of the Earth and are sown in the Earth, when they come into the ground every one draws that which in the Earth is most suitable to its own nature. Now there is in the Earth both tart, and bitter, and sweet, and salt, and such like. First therefore it draws much thereout which is accommodate to its nature, and then also it draws other parts.

Most renowned Philosophers and Physitians consent with Hippocrates. Not to speak now of others, Thomas Erastus in defens. thes. de saporibus writes; Al Medicaments in a manner do not consist primarily of the Elements, but are compounded of things formerly mixed, and that many times. Galen shews that the body of Man is compounded, not of the four Elements, but of the four Humors, as the immediate matter of its Generation. Now it is again apparent that these Humors are made of the Meat and Drink, which are also them∣selves evidently made of the Juyces of the Earth. For Animals are nourished by Plants, Plants draw out of the Earth juyce familiar to them, as bitter, sweet, sowr, because of them the Nature of each properly exists. The Seeds (truly) sown in the ground while they draw to themselves profitable and convenient Nutriment they draw only such juyce as is compounded of the Elements.

And therefore those bodies also of which these are made, although they are termed the smallest bodies, yet are they not absolutely such, but the smallest of their kind, that is, such as to which those bodies when they are resolved do return, and consequently not into Elements, but into those things of which they immediately consist. Milk turns into Butter, Whey, and Cheese. So the same heat acting upon the homogeneal meat changes it into divers humors, according as it is disposed, nor does it of any Particle form every thing. Wine I conceive is rightly held to be not a thing blended and jumbled, but a perfectly mixt Body infused. But if it be put in a Stil and stilled, little Spirit that wil burn is drawn forth, much Water remains and a little Earth; because there is more Water than either Fire or Earth in Wine; which yet would not so come to pass if out of every smallest Particle, Fire, Air and Water might be drawn.

For indeed, * 1.117 as hardly any mixt body is composed immediately of the Elements; so also mixt bodies are rarely resolved into the Elements. Which is apparent by the corruption and resolution of things, both violent by fire and burning, and natural. That Plants and Animals when they are dead and putrifie are not resolved quite into the Elements, that smel and stink does sufficiently evince which belongs to no Element but is proper to mixt bodies. And as of things living some have one smel, and some another: so also is it with Plants and dead Carkasses. Yea, and the pestilence hath been frequently observed to arise from the putrefying Carkasses of dead Animals. The same happens in violent Resolutions which are made by Chymical Distillations and Sublimations. Zabarella indeed Lib. 2. de Mistor. Generat. & Interitu, cap. 2. writes, That Cumbustion is the mutation of a mixt body into one Element only, namely Fire, some part of Earth excepted. Also many others do imagine, that if they see a sume or vapor ascend out of any thing, that the said thing is resolved into the Elements. But the matter goes far otherwise; for the fire retains its own, and gives to others that which is theirs. Fire is used in Chymical Distillations and Sublimations, somtimes gentler, other whiles stronger; yet neither of them resolves things into the Elements. For although sumes and vapors ascend; yet if they be received in Alembicks and Receivers, it is apparent that the resolution is made only into Atomes of a pe∣culiar kind; and some flowers are gathered of Mercury, others of Sulphur, others of Sal Ammoniack. So in Distillations although one kind of vapor seem to arise; yet if it be collected in an Alembick, it appears to be Spirit of Wine, or Cherries, or Juniper, Aqua fortis, or some other Compound. Yea, although they may ascend insensibly, so as not to be discerned by the eyes, so as to pass through a thick paper four times doubled: yet are they not changed into Air, but into a spirit of its own kind. Yea, if Sulphur, or Pitch∣wood, or Pitch be set on fire, they turn not into Elements, but their proper Oyls are gather∣ed therefrom.

And from what hath been hitherto said, it is apparent that the primary efficient Cause of that mixture in Plants and Animals, yea, and al perfectly mixt bodies, as Stones, Jewels, Minerals, and Metals, to constitute their Bodies, is that same specifick form of a natural body, which draws matter fit for it self, and disposes the same after a certain manner.

But al other Mixtures which are not directed by a superior form, * 1.118 by what names soever called, proceed from the Consent and Dissent of Atomes, by means of which like are moved to like, and like are assimilated to like. For although this likeness and unlikeness of Bodies of a kind does not a little help towards the more convenient mixture which is made in Ani∣mals, and is governed by a more noble Form (as we see like meats are more easily digested than unlike) yet this mixture hath place chiefly in fermentations, either natural or artifi∣cial, and in the preparations of Medicaments, as also in those which are called fortuitous. And this similitude of the smallest Atomes of a kind as it is the foundation of many mix∣tures, so is it of al Solutions. After this manner the fermentation of Wine, Beer, and al

Juyces is made, viz. whiles such as are of the same Nature are united, and expel things different from them, and drive them out as dregs; which is chiefly effected by help of that same inbred spirit which penetrates into al parts; which also we see betide in the fermenta∣tion or leavening of Bread.

What we should think of white and red Wine mingled of Honey and Wine, * 1.119 of Medicinal Wines, Treacle, Mithridate, distilled and compounded Waters, and such like, whether they are true mixtures, or only things blended together, is a question amongst Authors. Some hold they are but things jumbled together. So Thomas Erastus, Disput. 2. contra Para∣cels. page 212. saies, white and red Wine mingled is but a jumbled thing, and adds this rea∣son, Because our Tast tels us, that the tast of either of them stil remains, and that neither Wine hath lost its own nature, and it cannot be the redness should possess any but its own proper subject. And concerning Treacle Zabarella writes, de Mist. cap. 13. That Trea∣cle hath no true mixture, or if it hath, that it is the mixture of the Elements, and not of the Ingredients of the Treacle. But these Opinions are founded upon a supposition not yet granted, viz. That nothing is mixed but the Elements, which we have before proved to be false. And therefore if otherwise it is sufficient to the Constitution of Natural Bodies that smallest Atomes of several kinds should meet and be united; of which because somtimes these, otherwhiles those are in greatest quantity, therefore the tast, smel, color, and other qualities somtimes of these, otherwhiles of those do abound, as otherwise in the mix∣ture of Elements, the Qualities of the predominant Element do excel the rest: verily I shal not deny, when such bodies are first blended, they may be termed things jumbled, but when after Fermentation, or frequently repeated distillations, they are united in their smal∣lest Particles, I see no cause why they may not be called bodies truly mixed. And if that cause were sufficient which Erastus brings to prove that white and red Wine blended are no truly mixt Body, most Wines should not be true mixtures; since most Wines are made of several sorts of Grapes, and therefore somtimes they tast like one sort of Wine, other∣whiles like another.

THE FOURTH DISCOURSE. Of the Generation of Live Things.

Chap. 1. Whether Souls are made?

SInce Plants and Animals do not last in their Individual or particular Beeings, but some die, and others spring up in their place, and so the kinds and sorts are preserved to the end of the World, and as long as it pleases God the the Creator: it is altogether worth our Enquiry how this Generation of Li∣ving things, and the preservation of their kinds by individuals continually succeeding one another, is brought to pass; especially since renowned Men have been carefully busied, * 1.120 and in doubt also concerning this matter. Now al living things consist of Soul and Body. Whence they have their Body is cleer enough; but whence they have their Souls is not so evident. We are therefore now resolved to make that our Enquiry. Which whiles we do, we shal consider the matter it self, and not contend only with Autho∣rities, nor shal we bring our selves into a Labyrinth and Maze, wherein many wander about and can never get our, whiles one while they follow Reason, another while Authority, and make it their business, alwaies to save the Authority of great Authors, and so vainly labor (oftentimes) to reconcile Truth and a Lye together.

And although there are divers sorts of Living things; yet since al of them have life from the Soul, we shal speak in general whence living things receive their Souls, and whence Souls have their Original.

In the first place, Some do here briefly quit themselves, and deny that forms (such as the Soul is) are made. For thus saies Toletus, Lib. 1. Phys. cap. 9. qu. 19. We wholly deny with Aristotle, that Forms are made or produced; but Compounds are made, not out of nothing, but of matter; but the Forms are consequently made and comproduced: whence they are not created, because Creation is an action whereby a thing is first made; but the Forms are not first made. And this is the power granted to Natural Agents, that they might produce a Compound, and also mediately the Forms withal, which is not to create, nor have we any other Philosophy from Aristotle, and it is an excellent one, and worthy to be noted. The same Author in the same place saies thus: The Form is not produced by it self, but it is comproduced upon the production of the Compound, that is to say, the action is determinated primarily upon the Compound it self, and consequently, and as it were by accident upon the Form. The Conimbricensian Collegiates in Lib. 1. Phys. cap. 9. quaest. 12. artic. 6. thus write: We answer, by saying in the first place, that no Form except a Mans is properly made; because making is not incident save to a thing subsisting of it self. And Ruvio Rodensis, Lib. 1. Phys. cap. 5. in quest. writes thus: We deny that the form is made of the matter, or of Privation. For according to the propriety of Nature the Form is neither generated nor made, but the Compound, as Aristotle expressly teacher, Lib. 1. Phys. text. 64. in these words: wherefore it is manifest from what hath been said, That whatever is made, is stil the Compound. And Thomas Aquinas in their Exposition. And this Reason proves: The making of a thing tends to the Beeing thereof. Therefore it belongs to that only to be made, which hath being: but the Form is not; but it is only said to be the cause of being to the Compound, which is properly said to be. Therefore the

form is not made, but the Compound. Which if it be not made; ergo it is not made of the Matter, nor of Privation, but the Compound is said to be made of both, by means of the Form from which it hath its being, and whose Principles are Matter, Form, and Pri∣vation. Now to be drawn out of the Power of the Matter is not to be made of it self, but to go into act, as the cause of the Compounds Being, which of it self is generated and made. So far Ruvio.

Others contrariwise do oppose this foresaid Opinion as false and absurd. For seeing to the Constitution of every Body, Matter, and especially Form which gives the specifical be∣ing, is requisite, and dayly some Individuals perish, and others are generated; of necessity the matter and form which before were not, must be made. But according to their reason which they propound without proof (viz. That neither the Matter not the Form is made, but the Compound) nothing should be made; since of the Matter and Form the Compound consists, and the Compound is nothing but the Matter and Form. Nor to the making of any thing is a compleat Being requisite, but any Being is sufficient; and that which now is what before it was not, is justly said to be made, whether it be an incompleat Being, or a com∣pleat and Compound. And those are words and founds without Sense, that Forms are not produced, but comproduced, and that they are not primarily made, but by accident as it were produced upon the production of the Compound. The Compound (truly) is prima∣rily intended in the whol Generation, but it cannot be accomplished unless al things are made which are required to its Essence and Constitution. Yea, they themselves who deny that Forms are made, forgetting themselves they say they are made, when they teach that such things as are drawn out of the power of the Matter do depend upon the matter in their being, making, and operation. Nor do they remove this doubt; but they are forced to ex∣plain whence Souls proceed; and at last they are forced to hold, That they are drawn out of the power of the Matter.

And therefore it cannot be simply denied, That Souls after their manner (for whether it be a proper manner of speaking, when Souls are said to be made, even the most learned Caspar Hofmannus, in tr. de formarum origine, at the beginning doubts) are made. * 1.121 Yet if we would speak more properly, they may rather be said to be multiplied than made, according to that vulgar Saying; Every Form hath a power to multiply it self. For those things are properly said to be made which are not at al before they be made. But that is said to be multiplied which whereas before it was one in one Individual, it now becomes manifold, and many in number. Of which I shal speak in Chap. 6.

Chap. 2. VVhether Souls come from God, or from Heaven?

AVicenna held, That the Souls of living things did not proceed from their Parents, * 1.122 but from a certain Intelligence the Giver or (as Scaliger, Exercit. 97. speaks) the Dis∣penser of Forms, which he terms Colcodea; and he teaches, That this Heavenly Intelligence uses the Seed as an Instrument to produce the Vegetative and Sensitive Soul, which when he hath produced in a man by help of the Seed, in process of time without the help of any In∣strument the Rational Soul is brought in, and into the Body informed with a Vegetative and sensitive Soul he pours in out of himself a Rational Soul, free from the commerce of Mat∣ter. And doubtless Avicenna drew this Opinion from Plato and the Platonists. For they (as may be seen out of Plato in Epimenide & Timaeo, Marsilius Ficinus super. Lib. Pla∣tonis de Sanctitate, and super Timaeum Platonis, cap. 37. And Alcinous, in Lib. de Doctrina Platonis, cap. 23.) do hold, That Rational Souls do come from the most good and great God, and the irrational Souls from the inferior gods, which are (according to them) either the Coelestial Bodies, or their Spirits, and moving Intelligences. But such things as are said of those Intelligences in Natural Philosophy, since they are said without any reason, they are worthily rejected by Philosophets. And if there are any Heavenly, Causes at al, which make towards the Generation of things, they are remote causes, and uni∣versal, as shal by and by be said concerning the Opinion of Fernelius. And if by that first Intelligence they mean the most good and great God, this Opinion is also false. * 1.123 For the Question is not here concerning the Creation, but the Generation of things. But God after he once ceased from Creation, does create nothing unless it be miraculously; but he hath or∣dained Nature which performs the Course of Generation and Corruption, and defends and observes the same. And now indeed, God concurs as the first and universal Cause in the Ge∣neration

of al things, but the things produced are the immediate effects of the second Causes: And God is said to be the Efficient Cause of al things, both because he first created them, and because he gave to the Second Causes the force and ability to produce their Effects. This indeed is true, That the second Causes cannot do any thing without the first, viz. Because from it al created Agents depend and have their Essence, and without the assistance whereof they could neither consist nor perform any operation; and unless the first Cause concur to the Act, the second cannot perform their operations. Yet the Second Causes do really act, and God acts in al, so as that they may work also; whence Scaliger in Theophrast. de Cau∣sis Plant. Lib. 5. cap. 1. writes, That Nature is the Power of God in second Causes, to which he hath prescribed certain Rules. And if the second Causes did nothing, why should there be so various a Fabrick in things created, and why are so many Vertues and activities bestowed upon them? and why cannot lifeless things perform the same Operation as living things? And therefore since in the generation of other things we do not look simply to God, but joyn also the second Causes; why should we reject them in the Generation of living things? And if Souls should proceed from God alone and immediately, like could no waies be said to generate its like, nor could that from whence the seed of a Plant or Animal is ta∣ken be termed the Parent of the new Plant or Animal, but God. And if they should say that God uses the seed as an Instrument: yet as an Instrument, viz. a Chizel cannot be cal∣led the Efficient Cause of an Image, nor the Image be said to be the effect of the Chizel: so neither can a living Creature be said to be the Off-spring or child of the seed. In a word, if any superior Cause whatsoever, by Plato and the Platonists, or by Avicenna, shal be held the Efficient Cause of Souls, there wil be after this reckoning no univocal Generation; where∣as nevertheless most certain it is, nor needs it any proof, That like begets its like, an Oak tree an Oak, a Horse an Horse, a Man a Man.

And what the Platonists say touching the inferior gods, if they are to be understood as the words intimate, any one may easily see that they are not only said without al reason, but void of Truth.

Fernelius differs not much from them, * 1.124 who Lib. 1. de abdit. rerum causis, in many places eagerly defends that every Soul comes from the Heaven, & that the Heaven sends every Soul into matter prepared and fitted. For thus (in chap. 5. towards the end) he writes; In the Ge∣neration of living Creatures the seed conceived is by the Vertue and benign warmth of the Womb stirred up to action, * 1.125 not that it might raise up out of it self a Soul, or the form of an Animal, but only that the power and faculty thereof being first stirred up and provoked, and afterwards augmented, might furnish its subject matter with all kind of preparation, that the substantial form may at last be received thereinto from without. He propounds the same Opinion at large, chap. 7. and afterwards, chap. 10. he ads: The Heaven (saies he) without any Seed brings forth many Plants and Animals; but Seed breeds nothing with∣out the Heaven. The Seed does only neatly and decently prepare the Matter, the Heaven sends the form into it when it is prepared, and the chief perfection, and stirs up life in all. And at last he concludes: Whatsoever things God made of old in Heaven or in Earth, he alone defends and governs them all, the Heavenly things indeed by himself immediately; but living things and Plants, and other mortal Creatures, by help and assistance of the Heavens on whom be hath imposed the Procreative and Conservative Laws of Nature. And therefore the only form of Heaven does potentially contain the forms of Live Crea∣tures, Plants, Stones, Metals, all that ever have been or can be; and it being big as it were with innumerable forms, engenders and pours all things out of it self: the only power and faculty thereof contains in it all the faculties of mortal things which ever have been, or shall be hereafter. And these Vertues the Soul of the World shed into the whol Ʋniverse from Heaven bestows upon all things, as also their form, and native, and vital beat, fit to generate and to conserve them. It contains all things, and cherishes al things with heat and life, so that there is not any where any thing not replenished with the fulness hereof. By the vertue and means hereof both all lifeless things are by themselves, and al animated things have such a Soul as belongs to their kind, some a nourishing, others a sensitive, and others a rational. So she accommodates her self to things, so subservient she is to the Na∣tures of each one, that she gives as much as the Nature and condition of every one desires, and as much as the preparation it self of the subject can bear. The Sun though exceeding far off; yet so bestow•• his light upon the bodies opposite unto him, that they are bright and shine with splendor: but Water after one manner, a Stone after another manner, Wood after another manner, Silver after another manner, Even so, much after the same man∣ner, that Vertue also which comes down from Heaven is vital, yet so that upon some things

it bestows only a Beeing, to others also a Soul, and that either nourishing, sensitive, or rational: for it is not received after one manner of all. But of this also I would lastly ad∣monish the Reader, That the said Coelestial Vertue it self is not alwaies alike, nor does bear it self alwaies alike to sublunary things, but differently at different times, according to the manifold posture of the Stars, whose commixtion and complexion does for the most part vary, although the Substance of the Soul of the World (or carrying spirit) is unchange∣ably one. It cannot therefore come to pass (as one man saies) that the Soul of the World so imparts life and state to all things as that it needs not the least help of the Stars. If this were so, why I pray you should it not alwaies generate like things, and after the same man∣ner, seeing it is alwaies alike present to things. So far Fernelius.

Now the chief Arguments whereby he endeavors to prove his Opinion are these: The first is, That of putrefying matter many Animals are bred, which since they come of no Seed, and from no Patent, he concludes their Soul comes from Heaven; and therefore since those more ignoble Animals receive their Souls from Heaven, he thinks the more nobler Crea∣tures, as a Man and a Lyon, should much rather receive their Souls from Heaven. Second∣ly, seeing Aristotle writ, That a Man and the Sun beget a Man, he conceives they do not both concur after the same manner to the generation of a Man, nor that the same thing is ef∣fected by both of them; but since two things are required, the Matter and the Form, that by Man as the more imperfect nature the Matter is prepared, and the Soul sent in from Hea∣ven. Thirdly, He disputes at large against the Eduction of Forms out of the power of the matter. Fourthly, He produces many things touching the nobility of the Heaven, and its action upon these lower bodies. Finally, Since the Soul is united to the Body by help of an Heavenly kind of heat and spirit, he holds the Soul it self must much rather be of a Coele∣stial Original.

But in good deed this Opinion is far from the truth. * 1.126 For seeing that living things which are generated are of the same sort with those by which they are generated, how can this be true if the Generator do only dispose the matter to receive the Form, and do not impart the Form it self? and al living things should rather be termed the Off-spring of Heaven, than of those things by which they are generated. And though there be a consent of the upper and lower bodies, and the Heaven as an universal Cause does further the Original of things; * 1.127 yet it does not follow, That the Heaven gives Forms to so many several sorts of things. And what need is there to derive the Souls of things from Heaven, since God the Creator in the first Creation gave to al living things the power to multiply themselves.

Nor are those Reasons which moved him to maintain this Opinion of any strength. For in the first place, That living things Generated of themselves have their cause here below shal be shewed hereafter. Nor if there be any thing noble here below must that needs be deduced from Heaven, but living things themselves have their degree of dignity; and man the most noble of al is nobler than the Heaven. Secondly, though Aristotle wrote that the Sun and Man generates a Man; yet is not that to be otherwise understood than that the Heaven as a remote and general Cause, and Man as the immediate Cause generates a Man. Nor (as was said) is Man more ignoble than the Heaven, so that he only should prepare the Matter, and the Heaven give the Form. Thirdly, He does rightly oppose the Eduction of Forms out of Matter, and we shal do the same hereafter: but it does not follow, If Forms are not educed out of the Matter, that therefore they are procreated by the Heavens. For we shal hereafter demonstrate another manner of their Original. And as in the fourth place we grant the Nobility of the Heaven, and its action upon these lower bodies; yet it no waies follows therefrom that it is the Author of al Forms. Finally, although it were granted that the innate heat and spirit, which the forms of living things use as their immediate Instru∣ment, and which may therefore be called the band of the Soul and Body, may after a sort be termed Coelestial; yet that only does thence follow, that the Souls themselves are more noble than that spirit and inbred heat, but not that they proceed from Heaven. In a word, as Thomas Erastus, de Occult. med. propriet. Lib. 1. cap. 17. does wel write: They that dare affirm the Forms of the sorts of things are infused by the Stars wil be laught at by Phi∣losophers; and by Christians also rightly judged execrable. The Forms have received their Original not from Heaven, but from the Creator, if they wil rather beleeve the History of the Creation than lying Fables. God commanded that every Species or sort of things should propagate it self by multiplication of Individuals endued with the same Faculties; he di•• not command the Stars either to imprint their forms or vertues on the things created.

Thus have we shewed how some without Reason have endeavored to draw the Origina•• of the Forms of Living things from the Heavens.

Chap. 3. Some other Opinions of the Original of Souls reckoned up, and a vulgar Error taxed.

SInce therefore the Soul proceeds not from the Heaven and superior Causes, many grant that like begets its like. Which yet most do understand only of univocal Generati∣on. * 1.128 For they hold a twofold Generation; one univocal, whereby like begets its like; the other Equivocal, where the Ingenderer is of a different nature from the thing ingendred; which they say happens in such things as are bred of themselves, and without Seed. But whether there be any such Equivocal Generation, and what the Nature of the Spontaneous Original of living things is, we shal shew hereafter in its place. It suffices in this place that in Univocal Generation so called, it is granted by most, and by al that do not draw the forms from Heaven or a superior Cause, * 1.129 that like engenders its like. Yet in good deed, although al agree herein; yet they differ much as touching the manner, and there are many and di∣vers Opinions of Authors hereabouts, al which may nevertheless be (I conceive) reduced to four Tribes. For first some hold the Seed to be inanimate; who are again divided into two companies; whiles some hold the Seed communicated by the Generator to be only instead of matter, out of the aptitude whereof the Soul is educed by an external Agent: some say there is a formative Vertue communicated to the Seed by the Generator, and they hold that it is the shaper of the Body of the living thing; or they conceive the Generator uses the Seed as an Instrument to beget its like. But others hold that the Seed is animated; yet they are of two opinions; for some hold there is in al Seed (even that of a Man) its proper Soul; but some conceive the Soul of Man (by reason of a singular prerogative) is to be exempted, and that it comes into the Body after it is formed from without; though they themselves differ about the time when the Soul comes: Touching al which Opinions we are now to speak severally.

Howbeit the Reader must first be warned of a vulgar Error. * 1.130 Since all living things are what they are chiefly by their Souls, and thereby they differ from lifeless things; therefore with good reason our enquiry touching the Original of Souls must be here so ordered that it may concern al living things in general. In which thing nevertheless I see many offend, who deliver what should be said of the original of the Soul, and formation of the Body of a living thing in general, concerning a Man only, and so they offend against the Law of De∣monstration, endeavoring to demonstrate the affections belonging to the whol kind of one sort only. I conceive it therefore more convenient to propound in general whatsoever may be said of the Original of living things, and of Souls in general; and afterwards to apply them particularly to Plants, Animals, and Man-kind; and what these sorts of living Creatures have peculiar, to set that down by it self.

Chap. 4. VVhether Souls are drawn out of the aptitude of the Matter.

IN the first place therefore, * 1.131 amongst those who hold the seed to be inanimate, it is a com∣mon opinion, that all forms and consequently all Souls, except the rational soul of a man are drawn out of the aptitude of the matter. But who was the first Author of this Opinion, is not so certain. Most do indeed father it upon Aristotle; but I doubt whether it can be demonstrated from his works. Some, and amongst them Franciscus Bonamicus, do at∣tribute to Averroes this Opinion; * 1.132 and some such words are found in his Books; but it many times happens, that Expositors patch many things of their own upon Authors. But whether he held what is vulgarly taught is a great question. For it is apparent, as from other places, so from 7. Metaphys. text. 31. That he held the Cause of the Genera∣tion of living things, or rather of the formation of a living Body, to be the form lurking in the Seed. For seeing there Aristotle compares Artificial things with Natural, and tou∣ching the Seed which is the Efficient, he saies, It makes, Averrhoes adds; the Seed gene∣ates by a power it hath like to an Artificer; because the form of the thing generated is po∣••ntially in the Seed, and that of which the Seed is agrees in name and nature with that which is any waies made of the Seed. And a little after: In the matter of things generated the is an aptitude that out of it may be bred a like thing by the power which is in the See.

But most of the Schoolmen and their followers have fiercely maintained this Opinion of the education of Souls out of the aptitude of the matter, and have handed it over to posterity without any cleer sence, which a mind desirous of truth might conceive; so that most of them seem rather to have transcribed the words of their Masters, than to have understood the thing it self. And how indeed could they understand where there was nothing to be under∣stood?

But whoever was the Author of this Opinion, and whatever Patrons it hath; it must by al means be weighed and considered, since many contend for it as if their life lay at the stake, and use it as an infallible Principle to decide many Controversies. Now, two things these Authors do: First, they set down the reasons moving them thus to think, or rather they oppose the Opinions of others: and in the next place they endeavor to explain and declare their said Opinion.

And in the first place (truly) as appears out of Fonseca, Comment. in 5. Met. cap. 2. quaest. 4. Suarez, 12. Metaphys. disput. Sect. 1, 2. Bonamicus, Ruvius, in 1. Phys. tract. 2. quaest. 1. and others, they bring hardly any evident reasons for their own Opinion, but on∣ly endeavor to bring those that think otherwise into some absurdity; which is a very suspi∣cious way of dealing. For it is the part of a good and Ingenuous Disputer first to prove his own Opinion with firm Reasons, afterwards to oppose the contrary. And nothing can be said so true and manifest which by contentious wits may not be called in question. I count it not worth the while to transcribe the places of Authors entire; seeing they are in the hands of al, and most of them bring nothing new, but repeat the same thing over and over again. But if any reasons may be gathered out of them, they are these:

* 1.133 In the first place therefore, They would prove that Forms are drawn out of the power of the Matter, because they depend upon the Matter in their making, their being, and operation. But this is to beg the Question, and there is no connexion of the major. For we grant in∣deed that those inseparable Forms cannot be made (or rather propagated) without the mat∣ter, and that they are, and work in, and with the matter: but it does not hence follow, that the Form is drawn out of the power of the Matter, and depends in its essence upon the mat∣ter, which is meerly passive. But the Question stil remains, Whence those Forms which can neither be made, nor be, nor operate without the matter, or out of the matter, have their Original.

Secondly, Unless we hold that Forms are drawn out of the aptitude of the matter, they conceive al Generation is taken away. Which argument whether it be a direct proof, or a deduction to an absurdity, I leave to others to judg. For either (say they) the Forms are somthing before Generation, or they are nothing. If they were before Generation, there can be no Generation; if they are nothing there wil be a Creation, and so Generation is again taken away. But this Dilemma is of no weight, nor is there any strength in either of its horns. For since they were al for the most part Divines who thus wrote, they ought to have considered what that text of Scripture imports, Encrease and multiply; yea, and how that axiome of Philosophers is to be understood, That every Form can multiply it self. For if they had understood that Souls can multiply themselves, * 1.134 they had understood withal that when any particular thing generates, a soul is not created anew, but multiplied; and that the Souls of the first Individuals of every sort, created by God at the beginning of the World, did and do suffice to propagate al the Souls of al the Individuals that ever have been, or ever shal be; and they had understood withal that when Souls which were before are mul∣tiplied, generation is not taken away, but rather established. For though the Soul were be∣fore, and only one in number; yet when it multiplies it self, and diffuses it self into more Individuals, Generation is rightly said to be made. * 1.135 Where notwithstanding we must pre∣sently observe when Generation is truly made. They indeed hold, when of a grain of Wheat there springs up a Wheat stalk and ear, or when a Chick comes out of an Eg, then generation is made. And it may indeed be granted, that after a sort Generation is then made. But if we would speak properly, since Generation is (as Aristotle teaches, de respiratione, cap. 18.) The first communication of the nutritive Soul together with the inbred Heat; that communica∣tion is then performed when Seed is bred and separated from the Generator: and then Plants, then Animals breed, when they communicate their Soul together with their native heat unto the Seed, and cast the same forth of themselves, but not when a Plant or Animal is produced of the Seed. Which is hereby apparent, in that when Plants spring up out of the seed the Plant that bred the seed may be destroyed, and when the Chick is hatched out of the Egg, the Cock and Hen whence that Egg came may be both dead, and so can neither communicate the Native Heat, nor the Soul. And therefore Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercit. 6. Sect. 10.

The Tree ingenders (saies he) when it produces Seed; but a Tree is not generated when it shoots up from the Seed; but then that which was generated and imperfect is perfected. So a Dog does not engender when the Whelps are brought forth, but when the Seed is bred.

But when they that hold Forms are drawn out of the power or aptitude of the Matter would explain their Opinion, * 1.136 they variously and miserably vex themselves and trouble their Brains to no purpose; as is usual when there is nothing at the bottom; and while they en∣deavor to explain the matter, they rather obscure and perplex the same, as may be seen out of the Authors fore-alleadged, also from Tolet. 1. Physic. cap. 9. qu. 19. and 1. de gene∣rat. & corrupt. cap. 3. qu. 2. Benedictus Pererius, Lib. 5. Phys. cap. 22. and others, whose words I think not fit to transcribe; and at last when they have turned this way and that way with much anxiety, at last they conclude with those words of Aquinas, Part. 1. Quest. 90. artic. 2. for the Form to be drawn out of the aptitude of the matter is nothing else but for a thing to become actually what it was before potentially. But whether this can satisfie a mind that hungers after Truth, I leave to the Reader to judg. Whence Tolet. 1. de Gener. & Corrupt. cap. 3. quest. 2. I confess (saies he) this is a wonderful Vertue which partakes of a creating power; but it is not a creating power because it alwaies works upon subjects. The Vertue also of the matter is wonderful, out of the aptitude whereof are brought things which are not actually. Where rather he should have admired at their stubborn headiness, who would needs have it to be brought out of the matter which is impossible, and is neither in the power of the Matter nor of the Agent, than at the won∣derful power of the Matter which is none at al. And Benedictus Pererius, Lib. 14. cap. 9. at the end, where he treats of the Original of Forms, and endeavors to answer some doubts, at last he concludes: Whether these Answers are true, and whether they quite take away the difficulties proposed, I leave to the judgment and consideration of learned men: they do not (truly) quite take away my scruple, nor perfectly satisfie my mind. For they involve certain things which seem either absolutely false, or more doubtful than that whereof we now doubt; such as is, that there is an ultimum or last of Quality, which may be brought in in an in∣stant. * 1.137 And indeed they can no waies answer the doubts that are brought against their Opi∣nion. For if you ask them, what it is to be brought out of the power of the matter? or what that power is? they answer, That it is the disposition of the matter to a certain form, that when the ordinary power of the Agent or efficient is added, a form grows and results therefrom. But when they themselves grant, that this disposition belongs to the second mat∣ter (not to the first, for that is indifferent to receive al forms, nor more determined to one than another. And if the first matter should contain al forms in its bosom, and the forms did owe their Original to the first matter, that matter were a more noble principle than the form) since one disposition is required to the form of an Oak, another to the form of a Chick, ano∣ther to draw out the form of a Horse; and the same Expounders of Aristotle determine, that the Matter wherein such specifick forms hang, is the Elements variously mixed and disposed: it is demanded (since they hold the form is made actually, which was there before potential∣ly) Whether it be made of nothing? or whether that same disposition and Qualities of the Matter, which are nothing but a certain temper of a mixed body, or the very form it self of the mixt Body or Elements, is changed into the form of an Oak, an Hen, or an Horse▪ None of which can be said without absurdity; since neither an accident can be changed into a substance, nor one form into another; nor can the forms of living things be compoun∣ded of the Elements. And which way soever that disposition to the form can be explained (since it is made successively by parts, and the last degree is of the same kind and perfection with the former) it cannot make up the act of a thing, nor give Essence to a Sub∣stance.

Moreover, Neither can they produce any thing of certainty concerning the immediate and principal Efficient of that Form which they say is drawn out of the power of the mat∣ter. The matter it self being a passive principle cannot be the Efficient cause; nor the Sun, or other Stars (since they are only remote and specifical, not universal causes, as was said before, Chap. 2.) Nor the external Heat of the Air, Womb, Hen-sitting, Furnace, or any external thing whatsoever. For so a substance should be produced by an accident. More∣over, there could not be assigned a specifical Cause of a special Effect; but the same special Effect should be produced by divers Causes: as we see Plants sprout out of the Seed both by the heat of the Sun and of a Stove, and the Chickens of one Bird hatched by another Bird not of the same, but a different kind; yea, and the seeds of Silkworms are hatched in the bo∣som of a Damsel, as Vida relates in his Poeme of the Silkworm. Moreover by the action of

one Agent most different Forms should be produced. For since in the same Garden most different Plants do grow, they cannot al proceed from the same Agent, viz. The external Heat. Moreover, according to this Opinion the things generated should not have their form from the Generator, but only a disposition to the form, which afterwards of its own accord upon the action of an external Agent (as Heat for example) should spring out of the power of the matter, the Agent communicating nothing thereunto. And so according to this Opini∣on it cannot be said that a living thing begets its like, not that every form does multiply it self: which yet al sound Philosophers do grant. For if the Generator should transfer no∣thing of its own Essence into the thing Generated, but should only determine the matter to such a like form, and afterward the Efficient (which is not of the same kind) should make it actually to break forth; how I pray you can the form be said to multiply it self? Verily, if some Plant in the Indies when it produces Seed gives nothing but the matter with a deter∣minate aptitude to receive a like form, out of which after a yeer, two, or three, the Plant it self being now burnt or putrefied, the form should break out by vertue of heat, not only of the Sun, but of the fire in a stove, as the Agent: that Plant cannot be said to have bred its like, nor that form to have multiplied it self. Nor is it enough to cause an univocal Genera∣tion, and the true production of a like Essence, to afford a matter with some proclivity and propension to receive the form. And after this reckoning the Agent heat (and that an accident) should confer more towards the Generation than the Generator it self, since it makes the form actually to arise which the Generator caused to be there only potentially. And thus it remains yet unexplained, whence the substantial and specifick form of a thing, or that more excellent, more divine and chief part of a thing hath its Original. Mean while we grant that the disposition of the matter is necessary to the Generation of living things, since every mat∣ter is not fit to receive every form, but a determinate matter a determinate form: but not that the form or soul should be made out of it; but that it may be propagated thereinto, and afterwards dwel therein, as shal be said hereafter.

Fortunius Licetus, de spont. vivent. ortu, Lib. 1. cap. 83. * 1.138 endeavors to explain the Edu∣ction of forms out of the power of the matter, after this manner: We say (quoth he) that the Eduction of the form out of the bosom of the matter is not the drawing out of that which lies hid into the open view, but the conversion of aptitude into act. For the form which is produced by the Agent only by the transmutation of the matter did potentially pre-exist therein, out of which it is brought into act. Moreover, we deny that the Form is made of nothing, and absolutely created, if it be granted that it is not made of the matter as a principle, nor out of that in which it did actually pre-exist. For in the first place, whatsoever things are truly created they are made simply of nothing, and of no subject at al; but al forms under the Soul of Man are made of nothing of their own, but not absolute∣ly of nothing, as those things which are created; since forms are made by the agent, by a transmutation made in such a determinate subject, on which therefore the forms depend in their Being, and by which added to their Essence they are defined according to Aristotle. Again, if it were not so accidents also should be made of nothing, and most properly crea∣ted: for no heat did pre-exist in the water which is made hot. But verily forms are not truly created, nor are they out of nothing of their own, but properly out of the bosom of the Matter they are drawn, and out of the aptitude thereof, because they are truly generated of some rudiment of themselves pre-existing in the matter, which rudiment of the form is perfected by the action of the Agent, and turns to a perfect Form. So far Licetus. But this is a vain put-off. For let Licetus teach us what that Rudiment of a Form is. Whether the substance of the matter it self, or some accident thereof. If the former, (to which he seems to incline when he writes that the forms are made by the agent, by a transmutation made in such a subject so determined) then the matter should be changed into Form: if the latter, an accident must be changed into a substance. Let him shew us also, that there is any rudiment and beginning of a form, since forms are indivisible, and have their Essence like numbers; and therefore where they are they are totally, or not at al. Nor does the same Fortunius Licetus explain this matter more happily, Lib. 4. de spont. vivent. ortu, cap. 15. where he defines the Beginning of Forms, and holds that in the matter there is pre-existing a rudiment of the future form, that the generical nature of that form remains under the oppo∣site privation, to which the efficient cause joyning the specifical difference of the form is said both to constitute the form, and to further the Generation, and at once to generate a sub∣stance compounded of matter and form. But that same pre-conceived Opinion touching the eduction of forms out of the power of the matter seduced that man, otherwise a most di∣ligent searcher into Nature. For no form is capable of more or less, but consists in an indi∣visible

point, nor can it be remitted, since remission is made by mixture of a contrary, nor is it possible that the form should first have a generical Nature, and receive the specifical diffe∣rence from the Efficient. And whereas Licetus denies those axiomes owned by al Philoso∣phers, and saies they hold true only in compound substances, but not in simple; this he does without Reason. For since compound substances become such by reason of the simple of which they consist, if the simple substances, matter, and form, may be remitted, also the compound might be remitted; and since the form gives being to the thing by reason of the form the compound also should be more or less such. Nor does Licetus agree with himself in this point, since in the same Book, chap. 2. he writes, That those things which are said to breed of themselves are not made by an external Agent, but by an Agent which lies hid in the matter of the thing to be made, which does not generate a new form different from it self, but exhibits it self thereto for a new form, that is to say, communicates it self. Nor is there in the Soul (which is a most simple Essence) any composition of sundry Essential parts, and in such a manner, that like a Genus it might be present without a specifical difference. The Soul is one most simple Essence, only furnished with sundry faculties. Nor can he shew how that remission is made. For whereas Licetus saies, that only an accidental remission or abatement is made by the mixture of a contrary, but not an essential, such as he holds to be in forms, is asserted without any reason; and it lies him in hand to prove, That (as he feigns) an essential remission may be made without admixture of a contrary. And which way soever he turns himself he fals into absurdities, and contradicts himself. For when he saies that that same rudiment of a form is no true form, but the generical Nature thereof, and that the kinds have an Essence really distinct from their sorts, he confounds Logical Conceptions with the Nature it self of things, * 1.139 or the Logical kind with the Natural. For the Logical kind is in the mind, and is by the mind abstracted from the sorts; but the Physical Genus signifies a common nature, which consists in the things themselves out of the Mind. And the Logical kind indeed may by the mind be separated from the sorts; but the Physical kind does not exist in Nature, save in its sorts, nor does the Animal exist any where save in a Man, a Lyon, a Horse, &c. And therefore it is a vain figment to say that the Generical Nature is the Ru∣diment of the Form, and as it were half the Form. And from this very Opinion it would follow, that like does not engender its like. For since the specifical Form gives to every thing its Nature, but not the Generical; if the Generator should only afford the matter wherein the Generical form is, or a rudiment of the Form, or an half form, as Licetus speaks; but the external agent as Heat should introduce the specifick difference; not the Genera∣tor which might die in the mean time before the external agent come should be the Parent and Author of the thing generated, but the external Agent; and that not univocal, but equi∣vocal. Also I wonder a man so exceeding learned should defend this Doctrine of the Edu∣ction of Forms, since he hath no need thereof to explain his Opinion, as holding in 1. de sponte vivent. ortu, cap. 125. That the seed is animated, and Lib. 4. cap. 32. that it is an imperfect Animal: and he holds that such things as are said to be generated of their own ac∣cord do not proceed from an external Agent, but from an Agent that lies hid within the matter, as was lately said.

But which way soever they turn themselves, the matter comes to the same pass, that they are fain to confess, that besides the disposition of the matter there is somwhat formal in the Seed, the cause of action, and that besides the disposition of the matter there needs somwhat else by which the thing may be brought into its perfect act. And that power of which they speak they are forced at last to explain to be meant not of a passive power, but an active, which makes that that which is in the first act come to be in the second act, or in an act simply; so that that Soul which was destitute of Instruments to operate by is now furnished there∣with, so that it is able to operate. Which very thing also Aristotle taught; when in 7. Metaphys. cap. 9. tit. 31. he writes: The Seed hath the Form potentially in it self, which after a sort hath the same name with that from whence it came. And 2. de Generat. cap. 1. It is all one whether you name the Seed, or that from whence it came. For the Sum of the business is, That that Power which Aristotle speaks of is formal, as later Writers phraze it, * 1.140 and differs not from the first act.

A certain late Writer (whose Understanding is capable of nothing but what is Elementary) when he saw he could not defend the Eduction of Forms out of the power of the Matter by any Philosophical reason, at last he flies to the Authority of the Holy Scriptures. But he endeavors to introduce his own mind and pre-conceived Opinion into the holy Scriptures, whiles he holds, that Moses, Gen. 1. when he brings in God saying; Let the Earth bring forth, let the Water bring forth the living Creature, does assert that the Souls of Plants

and Beasts were then by God produced, and do at this day arise from the Elementary mat∣ter. And thus therefore he explains it, that the specifical Forms are not made of the Ele∣ments, inasmuch as they are the matter of the mixtion, and the conven••ent subjects of Forms; or that they are not made by mixture and composition of the Elements, but that the Elements concur to the generation of corruptible things as they contain an universal matter so affected, under the matters of the Elements, that out of the aptitude thereof as out of a rich and unexhaustible Treasure might be drawn and propagated to the end of the World the sorts of al things, such and so many as the most good and great God would have to exist for the accomplishment and ornament of this lower World. For since the Ele∣ments contain no matter but the first, he must needs by that universal matter understand the first matter. But who I pray you, either Philosopher or Divine, did over so teach concer∣ning the first Matter, especially being considered without the Forms of the Elements? Did Aristotle (whose Opinion he conceives this of the Eduction of Forms to be) know any thing of that Divine Benediction given at the first Creation? And where do we read (I pray you) in the Scriptures that God so blessed that Universal Matter? This indeed we read in the first of Genesis, That God once commanded that the Earth and Waters should bring forth Animals created by him; and when they being created by God were come out of the Earth and Water like a Child out of the Womb, as Franciscus Junius speaks in his Ex∣plication, we do not read that God again commanded that the Earth and Water should pro∣duce Plants and Animals, and that he blessed them to that intent; but thus we read, That the Earth brought forth the green Herb bearing Seed, and the Tree bearing Fruit, and each thing having seed according to its kind; and that God blessed the Fishes and Birds being created, saying; Encrease and multiply, and fil the Waters of the Sea, and let Birds multiply upon the Earth.

Chap. 5. Of the Formative Principle, and the separated In∣strument.

VVHen other more solid Peripateticks saw these difficulties and encombrances of this Opinion, they held that the Soul indeed it self did proceed from the Generator, but not immediately. And therefore they denied that the Soul was in the Seed; yet they taught that there was a vertue therein communicated from the Generator, from whence came both the forming of the Body, and the Soul of the thing generated. * 1.141 Of this Opinion was Albertus Magnus, who taught that the Generator does indeed communicate Seed, but not the Soul with the Seed, but that it only gives a vertue to the seed, by means of which (though the Generator be dead) the Seed gives a Soul to the thing generated, so that the seed which hath not the Soul in it does yet generate a living and animated thing, not of it self, but in the vertue of the Generator. For as we ••ee in the motion of things hurled, that they are moved not by themselves, but by the force imprinted by the Thrower, although the Thrower and thing thrown are no longer together; and by the Hammer an artificial thing is made, not by its own faculty, but that of him that works with it: so by the Soul-less Seed a thing with a Soul is generated by a vertue imprinted therein by the Genera∣tor.

That most learned Philosopher Jacobus Schegkius seems to be almost of the same Opi∣nion, who in Lib. 1. de Plast. sem. facultat. attributes a Formative Principle to the Seed, * 1.142 and teaches, That he thereby understands a substantial Form, which could be perceived by no sense, but by the mind and understanding. Howbeit, he holds that the Seed and this sub∣stantial Form are not principal but instrumental Agents, and form the animated Bodies like the Hand of an Artificer. He saies, That it is a substantial Act, separable from the substance of the first Act, which hath for its proper subject the Spermatical Humor. And again, that the Seed is an Instrumental Cause, and a certain efficient Principle, but not an efficient Material, making or generating the animated Body, and not being it self animated, but a Medium in∣terposed betwixt that which is animated and that which is to be animated, without the infor∣mation of any matter able to effect as a certain second act or energie. But unless the Opinion of Schegkius be so explained, that this Formative Principle is the Soul it self by which the Seed is animated, and the Seed of such or such a Creature; and that the Formative Power is a proper adjunct of the Soul, which it hath when it is in the Seed, and exercises the same when an Animal is generated; but inasmuch as there is not in the Seed actually an Or∣ganical Body which the Soul may inform, in that respect the Form may be said to be ab∣sent:

then it cannot be admitted. For to hold a Formative Principle which is not the Soul, is rashly to multiply things more than needs. For since al the proprieties and operations of the Soul are found in, and attributed to this Formative Principle, why should it not be cal∣led the Soul? And seeing the Soul in the Seed is sufficient to perform al these operations which are attributed to the formative Principle, why should we hold that to be any other than the Soul? And Aristotle himself de generat. Animal. cap. 1. names this Principle a part of the Animal, which is forthwith in the Seed. And therefore we need not hold a For∣mative Principle as it were a second act of another first act, and the Vicar as it were of the Generator in the Seed, which when the motion of Generation is ceased, it self ceases. For to hold that that which made either all or some parts of the Body is perished, is an absurd thing. * 1.143 The same Opinion (in a manner) Antonius Ponce Sanctacruz, the King of Spain's Physitian, holds, in opere supra primam 1. Canon. Avicennae, & de Hippoc. Philosophia, as he is cited by Fienus in his Apology. For he holds the Seed to be only an Instrument. But when he easily perceived many absurdities would follow if the Seed should be counted simply as an Instrument, he distinguishes betwixt an Instrument conjoyned and separate. And he conceives that the necessity of this distinction is taken from the diversity of the perfe∣ction of Agents, and the Nature of the Order of things. For some operate with a Medium and without a Medium as living things; others of an inferior Rank have not so great perfe∣ction, and they work by themselves. He tels us therefore that separate Instruments do work by a permanent Vertue which they have received from the Agent; but the conjoyned Instruments do successively receive the Vertue of the Agent, and therefore operate with de∣pendance upon the first principal Agent. He explains the Nature of a separate Instrument by an Example political. For a King or some Potentate operates in far distant places as if he were present, by power derived from himself, which he confers upon the Laws and Jud∣ges: but private men that live only for themselves must operate by themselves. He brings afterward another example whereby he would prove his Opinion, viz. Of Watches, Clocks, and Engines wherein many Wheels are orderly moved in the absence of the Workman, yet by a vertue imprinted upon them by the first direction of the Artist. The Nature of con∣joyned Instruments he explains by the similitude of a Saw, which lying stil hath such a dis∣position that it may receive motion in order to cutting; yet is it not an acting Instrument til it receive guidance to motion and cutting from the Sawyer. That there is a separate In∣strument he also proves by the motion of hurling. For a stone hurled wil fly, though the thrower should presently fal down dead. And so he holds it is in the matter or Seed, how that Animals Generate their Seed being cast out of them, a derivative vertue continually re∣maining therein, that it can work, and does actually work without any actual Influx from the Generator.

But this Opinion however explained and palliated is false and far from truth. * 1.144 For Aristotle himself, 7. Metaphys. c. 9. t. 31. reckons the Seed amongst univocal Agents. But al univocal Agents are not instrumental but principal Causes. Again, al Instruments pro∣perly so called are joyned with the principal Agent, and as Schegkius himself speaks, an Instrument of it self hath no Efficacy, but only by the Use of the Principal Cause.

And those things which are brought by Antonius Ponce concerning a separate Instru∣ment (unless rightly explained) are false and feigned without reason, * 1.145 and therefore are not to be accounted a Metaphysical Principle, as he gives them out to be. Indeed the Seed might be called a separate Instrument, viz. Inasmuch as the Seed is not necessarily joyned with the Generator, but is subordinate thereunto, and hath received from the Generator the same power, yea, and the same Soul which the Generator it self hath. But while he denies the Soul to be in the Seed, he labors in vain when he cals the Seed a separate Instrument. For although while an Instrument is not imployed it may be really separated from the principal Agent, as a Pencil from a Painter, an Ax from a Carpenter, a Pen from a Writer: yet no Instrument can be named which in the action it self operates by a power within it self (for so it should be a principal Agent, not an Instrumental) but every Instrument in its operati∣on hath no power of it self, but it depends upon, and is directed in its action by the Princi∣pal Agent, and when it is separated it can no longer work by it self.

We must therefore distinguish betwixt the first and second act of an Instrument. * 1.146 That any thing may be an Instrument in the first act, it is sufficient that it be shaped and fitted as an Instrument for some particular action. An Iron Hammer in regard of its hardness, hea∣viness, and shape, is an Instrument fit to beat Gold and other Metals, and to figure and form them into some certain shape; but this is only in the first act. For an Hammer thus shaped

wil never of it self beat out any metal, but the presence and motion of the Artificer is necessary to dilate the same, and then the Hammer is an Instrument actu secundo, by the second act. So native heat is an Instrument whereby Nature digests Chyle, and forms Blood, Flesh, and Bones. But the heat cannot perform this, unless the soul which is the principal Instrument concur. And it is the nature of an Instrument to act above its own abilities, * 1.147 and to produce an effect more noble than it self, viz. inasmuch as it is directed and moved by the principal Cause: which while it so directs and moves does not imprint any virtue upon the Instrument, by which it may perform that Action which belongs to the principal Agent. For neither does the Artist necessarily make his Instruments, but he receives them made to his hand, either by Nature or Art, and he makes use of them being by Nature or Art fitted to his turn, as may be seen in the Saw used by the Joyner, which he had of the Smith, and in the Cole or Chalk which the Painter uses. And therefore that political example of a King working a great way off by Laws and Judges, as a moral Instance, does not square with things natural. And the subordinate Judges are rather Ministers than Instruments of the supream Judg, nor do they act by any Physical Virtue communicated. For neither do In∣struments properly so called perform the work of the principal cause as its Vicars or Substi∣tutes, so as to perform the same action with the principal Cause, though after a manner deri∣ved and communicated from the said principal Cause; but they are only Con-causes and Co∣workers, and unless the Artist did work they should do nothing; and when the motion of the principal Agent ceases, they also cease from their action.

As to the example about the motion and impulse of things hurled, * 1.148 it does not sufficiently prove the force impressed upon Instruments. For after what manner that motion of things hurled is caused, is not sufficiently manifest, and much controverted amongst Philosophers. It is most likely that this motion is made by the Air, or through means of the Air, and by the force of the throw. For no man could yet ever tel what that virtue is impressed by the Thrower, & how it can be imprinted by the local motion of the Arm, somtimes immediately, otherwhiles mediately as by a Sling where it sticks; how again it is so suddainly lost and de∣stroyed. And there are doubtless more absurdities which follow this Opinion, and there∣fore it cannot be allowed to confirm the received Virtue of a separated Instrument.

And as to those examples of artificial Engines, as Clocks, Watches, Water-works; these things are artificial, in which the motive faculty it self, which is wholly natural, is not com∣municated by Art to those Engines, as appears by the weights hung on by the spring: but that motion is directed by Wheels artificially made. But it is far otherwise with natural Agents.

Some do yet endeavor to declare the nature of a separate Instrument by the Example of a red hot Iron, which sets Tow on fire. For they say, the Heat of the Iron doth produce fire Instrumentally, by virtue of that fire which heated the Iron, and it acts now as its In∣strument, no longer conjoyned, but separate therefrom. For that fire which heated the Iron may now be extinguished and put out. But in good truth the hot Iron does not set the Tow on fire by a power communicated from the absent fire, but by the fire which is in the hot Iron having by its smal Atomes insinuated it self.

And therefore these are words under which no truth is contained, * 1.149 that the prin∣cipal Agent transmits its action by a virtue derived from it self: but the whol nature of an Instrument consists herein, as hath been said, that it produces an effect more noble than it self, and that not like it self, but the Artificer. And this is the common Condition of every Instrument. And therefore an Instrument cannot be divided into a conjoyned Instrument, which acts and operates by somthing participated in a successive being; and a separate In∣strument which acts by somwhat participated inherent therein. For it is the nature of every Instrument to operate by somwhat participated from the principal Agent in a successive being. And as soon as that successive Influx of the principal cause ceases, that whol instrumental action ceases also: but that which acts and operates by some participated vertue inherent in it self is not an Instrument, but operates now as a principal Agent; nor does it act above its own ability, which is essential for an Instrument to do. In a word, that Agent whose Effect answers and is equal to a virtue formally inherent in it self, is a principal, not an Instrumental Agent; nor is there any Agent in Nature which receives virtue from another thing perma∣nently inherent in it self after the manner of an Instrument, or which acts by a vertue com∣municated thereto, and permanently inherent in it self as an Agent wherewith; but every thing that so acts, acts as the Agent which, as the most learned Fienus rightly speaks to this point. And therefore the Seed also sent forth by a Plant or Animal, because by an implan∣ted Vertue though it be no longer governed by another thing it can shape the body of a

Plant or Animal, is no Instrumental Agent, because it acts not as an Instrument; but a principal Agent, because it acts as a principal Cause. Now that this Vertue cannot flow from any thing but the Soul implanted in the Seed shal be proved hereafter.

Chap. 6. That the Seed hath the Soul in it, and that the Soul in the seed shapes the Living Body.

ALL which things when the diligent Searchers of Nature had considered, * 1.150 and knew that al things which were made by Nature or Art were made by that which actually is, and that whatsoever moves ought to have an actual Being, nor were ignorant that a thing unani∣mated could not be the principal Cause of an animated Body, but that a thing animated was produced by that which is animated as the principal Cause, and that such noble acti∣ons they saw could not be attributed to an accident alone, not governed by the Soul, nor pre∣sent therewith: they concluded rightly that the Seed it self is animated, and hath a Soul in it. Nor is this Opinion first sprung up in this Age; and therefore it is falsly traduced and opposed by some as a new Opinion: * 1.151 but the most excellent Philosophers and Physitians of al Ages have maintained the same; Hippocrates, Lib. de Diaeta; Plato in his Timaeus; Aristotle, 2. de generat. animal. cap. 1. & 3. (save that he saies the Mind comes from with∣out) Galen, 1. de sem. cap. 7. & Lib. de marasmo, cap. 1. Themistius, 2. de Anima, text. 6. Philoponus, Zimara, 2. de Anima, text. 43. Jacobus Foroliviensis, 2. in Art. Medic. quest. 38. Jul. Caes. Scaliger, Exercitat. 6. Cardanus, 2. Contradict. tr. 6. Con∣trad. 17. Argenterius in Artem parvam, tit. de Temperam. Thomas a Vega, super Ar∣tem parvam, cap. 47. Christoph. a Vega, Art. med. Lib. 1. cap. 3. Volchetus Coiter, Lib. 2. controvers. cap. 9. Zabarella, de Animae facult. cap. 11. Mercatus, Lib. 1. part. 4. class 1. quaest. 98. Capivaccius, Lib. de foet. format. Joubertus, in cap. 5. Lib. 1. Ga∣leni de facult. natural. Archangelus Piccol••omineut, Lib. 1. Praelect. Anatom. praelect. 3. Fortumus Licetus every where in his Books de spontaneo Viventium ortu.

And although (as was said before, Chap. 3.) Authors are here of two Opinions, whiles some say the Souls of al Living things are communicated by the Generators in the Seed, and others except the Humane Soul: yet it wil be sufficient if it can be proved in general of Plants and Animals; but whether or no the same Reasons hold good in the generation of Man, and whether the Generation of Man have any thing peculiar, we shal consider in the last place.

And for out better proceeding we must first say somthing of the Nature of Seed, * 1.152 and that not as the common fashion is, of the Seed of Man, but in general of al Seed, inasmuch as Plants and Animals are propagated thereby. Touching the Nature indeed of Seed there are divers Opinions of Authors, and most hold that it is an Excrement. For they say that Seed being a thing according to Nature, is either a part of the Body, or an Aliment, or an Ex∣crement of an Aliment. That it is no part properly so called, nor an Aliment of the Body, it is so manifest that there needs no enquity thereabouts. Therefore they conceive it remains that it must be an Excrement. And therefore they say that the Seed is the remainder of that Blood which is distributed into al the parts of the Body, and can nourish al parts; and be∣cause it is voided forth they say it is an Excrement. But this reasoning offends against the Laws of Demonstration; since Seed is bred not only in Animals of Blood, but in Plants without Blood; and though the Seed which in Animals is voided forth may in some sort be called an Excrement, yet this does not betide al Seed, viz. the Seed of Plants. More∣over, the Seed of Animals is not only the superfluity of Blood, which therefore because it is superfluous (as the Menstruous Blood is an Excrement) it ought to be expelled, but by a primary Intention of Nature, as a thing most necessary it is made of the best Blood by the Sperm-making Faculty. And therefore in the foregoing Argument there is an insufficient Enumeration, and besides the Part, the Aliment, the Excrement, there is a fourth, viz. the Fruit. For the Seed is the Fruit of a living Creature brought forth to that end that its like may thereby be engendred. And therefore Epicurus (as Plutarch hath it, de Placitis Philosophor.) called it an abstract of the Body and Soul, and as the Author of Medicinal de∣finitions relates, Zeno Citions defined the Seed after this manner. The Seed is the Abstract of a Man, and a Mixture of the Nature of his Progenitors, which a man transmits with the moist part of his Soul; being such a thing as that from whence it was voided. Yea, and the holy Scriptures teach, That the Earth by the Divine Benediction brought forth the Herb-seeding Seed, the Fruit-tree bearing Fruit, and every thing having its seed in it self,

according to its kind; where the Fruit and the Seed are one and the same thing. And if any man esteem more of the Authority of Aristotle in this point than of the holy Scriptures, let him consult with Aristotle, who in 1. de Generat. Animal. cap. 18. writes, That the Fruit is either the Seed, or that which contains the Seed in it. And since it is manifest in Plants, as also in Fishes and Birds, that the Seed is not simply an Excrement, but somwhat produced by the Generator, which hath its own peculiar Quantity, Figure, and Conforma∣tion; why should be Seed be counted an Excrement in other Animals, although it be voi∣ded in a liquid and fluid Form; since the same proceeds from it which proceeds from the Seed of Plants, Fishes, and Birds.

But if you wil cal the Seed before it goes away and is separated from the Generator a part of the Animal, you shal commit no absurdity. For (which is chiefly manifest in Plants) it both cleaves unto the whol Body, and is informed by the same Soul whereby the whol Bo∣dy is informed. Yet because it is generated to that end, not that the Generator may be thereby constituted, but that it may be separated from the whol, I conceive it may more fitly be called the Fruit.

Seed therefore as it belongs to al living Bodies is a Body formed by the Generator, * 1.153 full of inbred heat, profitable to propagate any sort of Soul; or, it is a Body produced by the Generator, out of which a living Body arises of the same sort with that from whence it came. And indeed in the Seed of Plants that same innate Heat is in an Oyly and Fatty Form, and hardly in any part of the Plant is there more Oyl than in the Seed: which appears at least hereby, in that from the Seeds of Plants a great quantity of Oyl may be stilled and pressed; as is manifest in Line-seed, Poppy-seed, Hemp-seed, Juniper Berries, Almonds, and other such like. In such Animals as breed Eggs 'tis represented in the form of an Egg: in such Creatures as bring forth live yong ones the innate Heat is in a spirituous form, and therefore it easily exhales and is dissipated, unless it be presently received or conceived by the Womb, and cherished by the warmth thereof.

Here nevertheless it is to be observed that the name of Seed is taken, somtimes more large∣ly, other whiles more strictly. The Seed is largely taken for al that Body which serves for the propagation and generation of a living Creature. But strictly taken it is a most simple substance, or a certain spirit in which the Soul and Formative Faculty is immediately seated, and containing in it self the Idea or Model of that Organical Body from which it is taken, and therefore having in it the Power to Form a Body like to that from whence it was taken, and to perfect it self into an Individual of the same sort with the Gene∣rator.

Now the Seed consists of two Substances, the Matter, and the Form. The Matter is that same Body or bulk of the Seed, which is various in different Creatures, and of another kind in Plants, and variously distinguished by the admirable wisdom of the Creator, according to the Nature of every sort of living thing; of one fashion in Fishes, another in Birds, another in other Animals. And that matter again consists of two parts, of which one is a thick sub∣stance, another spiritual, or (as Aristotle saies) a Spirit and Nature answerable to the Ele∣ment of the Stars. And the Spermatick Faculty is as the Form being the Original of moti∣on, and which hath so great a power, that Plutarch, (de Commun. Notionib.) saies of the Seed, that it is more magnificent and great than that from whence it came, and of which it was bred; and that which Aristotle saies in general of Principles, 5. de generat. Animal. cap. 7. is chiefly true of the Seed, viz. That Principles though smal in bulk, yet are excee∣ding great in faculty and ability. Which power of the Seed Seneca also admires, Lib. 2. Quaest. nat. cap. 6. Let us consider (saies he) what a mighty power smal Seeds do secretly put forth; and those whose smalness doth hardly take up any room betwixt the joyning of two stones, they grow so strong as to draw asunder huge stones, and dissolve the Monuments of the dead. And Gregory the Great, in his 26. Homily upon the Evangelists, writes excel∣lently of the wonderful nature of Seed: Behold! in one grain of the smallest Seed lies the whol bulk of the Tree that shal spring therefrom. For let us set before our eyes the great∣ness of a Tree, and think with our selves what original it had which is grown so great; we shal doubtless find its original to have been a smal Seed. And now let us consider where (in so smal a grain) lies the strength of the Wood, the roughness of the Bark, the greatness of the tast and smel, the plenty of Fruits, the greenness of Leaves. For if you feel a grain of Seed it is not firm or hard, whence then comes the hardness of the Wood? it is not rough, whence then came the roughness of the Bark? it is not savory, whence then is the tast of the Fruits? It hath no smel, and how then came the Fruits to be so fragrant? It hath no greenness in it, whence then proceed the greenness of the Leaves? All these therefore lie hid in the Seed at

one and the same time; yet are they not produced out of the Seed al at once. For out of the Seed the Root is produced; out of the Root sprouts a Branch, out of the Branch grows Fruit, and out of the Fruit is produced Seed again. Let us therefore ad that the Seed also lies hid in the Seed.

Hence therefore some do not unfitly term the Souls Idea's or Patterns, because in them as in a Prototype, the Nature and Fabrick of al Visible Bodies which they form and shape, and of al accidents which they produce in their Bodies, is comprehended.

But that the Principal part of the Seed is the Soul, and that therefore the Seed is anima∣ted, shal be anon proved by firm Arguments, wherewith a mind desirous of Truth may be sa∣tisfied. But because I see that most men now adaies do not regard so much what is true as what is old, it were worth the while to alleadg the Authorities of ancient Philosophers and Physitians; but we have done that already in the beginning of this Chapter. Also the Au∣thorities of Divines (both Greek and Latins) might be produced; but because most of them speak only of the Soul of Man, of which we shal speak hereafter, it shal suffice in this place to alleadg only the Authority of Aristotle, who 2. de Generat. Animal. c. 1. thus writes: All things whatever are made by Nature or by Art are made by that which is actually out of that which is potentially such or such. The Seed therefore is such a thing as hath such a Motion and Principle in it self that the motion being finished every part exists, and each part also is animated. And in 2. Phys. cap. 3. text. 31. The Seed, and the Physitian, and he that advises with him, and every Efficient, are all of them Causes, whence there is a Principle of Mutation, Rest, or Motion. And more such like places Scaliger produces, Exercit. 6. Sect. 7. Also consider what follows, out of which it manifestly appears that though Aristotle saies the Soul is potentially in the Seed, yet that he holds it is really there. Which appears by the example of a Geometrician sleeping, waking, contemplating, which he makes use of. For as the Geometrician sleeping and waking hath the power to contemplate, the former a remote power, the latter a neerer power, each of which notwithstanding pre∣supposes an Act, such as is not in al men, but only in a Geometrician; so in a Tree (for ex∣amples sake) in the Winter time when it grows not there is a neer power to grow, because it hath Organs necessary to cause it to grow already perfect: but in the Seed there is a re∣mote power, because it is as yet destitute of Organs; yet each power pre-supposes an act, and neither the Seed nor the Tree could be called potentially such, unless the Soul were present.

But it is demanded, * 1.154 What Soul is in the Seed? Aristotle indeed saies, That the Gene∣ration of a living thing is the participation of the first Nutritive Soul with the inbred heat. And in 2. de generat. animal. cap. 3. he writes, That a Man lives first the life of a Plant, then of an Animal, and lastly of a Man. But this is not so to be understood as if three Souls came at distinct times. For every living thing (even according to Aristotle) hath but one Soul, whereby it is that which it is. And therfore in al seed whatever there is present∣ly the whol Soul, which nevertheless does at first form the Instruments necessary for Nutri∣tion; which because it is chiefly and almost only conspicuous in Plants; a man is said to live first the life of a Plant. Afterwards in process of time the Instruments both of Sense and Motion are formed in Animals; which being perfected, a Man is then said to live the life of an Animal, and of a Man. For neither (as I also shewed in Lib. 6. Physicae, cap. 1.) the Ve∣getative and Sensitive, or the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational, are peculiar and general Forms or three Essences, but only general Conceptions arising and constituted from the comparison and agreement of living things, which exist no where separated save in the Mind of Man; nor is the Nature of any Plant perfected only by the Vegetative Faculty, but eve∣ry Plant hath a specifick Form, endued with a vegetative power indeed, but yet with other Faculties also.

This Opinion of Aristotle (and indeed the very Truth) concerning the presence of the Soul in the Seed most excellent Philosophers and Physitians of al Ages have acknowledged, whom I cited in the beginning of this Chapter, and especially Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exer∣cit. 6. Sect. 7. et sequent, and amongst later Writers, the most learned Fortunius Licetus, (who as elsewhere, so in Lib. 4. de spont. vivent. ortu, cap. 32. propounding as it were the Sum of what he had taught elswhere) writes, That the Seed is an imperfect Animal, and that a Lyon and the Seed of a Lyon are Univocals, and have the same Soul for their Essen∣tial Form, and differ only in the Organization of their Bodies; and Lib. 1. cap. 74. That the Father then truly generates when he casts out his Seed, his Soul being parted by partiti∣on of its subject, and of one being made two; and that which remains in the Seed being che∣rished by the temper of the Womb and obtaining a fit matter exercises its Faculties there∣upon,

and forms it self a body fitted with those Organs it stands in need of, to perform the o∣ther operations of life: so that the seed is an Animal and living, only wanting a multitude of Organs; and the Fathers generation is not performed in the Womb after the Fathers's death, but when he issues out his Seed.

But I wil not contend only by Authorities, * 1.155 nor is it fitting to begin the proof of this point from the Generation of Man, since that were contrary to the Laws of demonstration. For some do not a little involve this point with obscurities, when they dispute whether the seed be animated, not sufficiently explaining their mind, whether they understand the Seed of Man, of brute Beasts, or of Plants; [or when they cannot satisfie themselves, but remain doubtful, they affect obscurity on purpose that others may not easily understand what they think. Lest therefore any doubt may remain in a matter so serious, by a Living thing we understand a substance wherein there is a Soul actually, and our Question is whether the seed be such a substance] which they ought by any means to have declared. For there are some who wil not grant that any seed is actually animated; others that the seeds of Plants indeed are animated, but they deny the seed of animals especially of Man to be actu∣ally animated. But I conceive it most probable that al seed is animated. And therefore we undertake to prove in general concerning all living things, that their seeds are animated. Now those most evident and firm and hitherto unanswered reasons which have induced most renowned Men to be of this Opinion, are these. The first is this, that the operations of the soul are most manifestly discerned in the seed. For it is a maxim granted by all Philoso∣phers; every thing that moves is actually in Being. And these three follow one another necessarily; to be, to be able, to operate. And therefore Operations bring us to a power, and a power to an Effence. For such powers do flow from the very Essence of the soul, and they are ••••••eparable from the soul, nor do they pass from one subject to another. And as Fienus speaks wel, it is so absurd as nothing can be imagined more absurd, to hold that con∣formation, as also nutrition and augmentation, which begin with the soul it self, do flow from a Principle which is not not vital. Nor can a vital power communicate its Virtue to another thing which is not vital. Since therefore the operations of the soul appear in the seed, we do thence rightly and necessarily conclude, that there is therein a soul furnished with the powers to exercise these operations. Now that the seed hath Motion and Action is as manifest as that which is most manifest, and so often inculcated by Aristotle, when he cals the seed the Beginning of generation and Motion (1. de generat. Animal. 2. & 21.) and the Beginning of the Form or Species, which works the Menstrual Blood into its own proper shape. 1. De generat. 20. and 4. de generat. 1.

Now there are two operations in the seed which bring us most certainly to the knowledg of the soul lying hid, * 1.156 viz. The quickenning of the seed and Conception; and afterwards the shaping of all the parts necessary for the performance of the vital actions. For in the first place, every seed (as is manifest in Plants) is preserved by its own soul, and for a certain season remains fruitful, some the space of a year, others two years or more according to the diffe∣rence of sorts; and as long as it is perfect and uncorrupted, and hath gotten a fitting place, present nutriment and external heat to excite the same, it is apt to grow up into a Plant of its own kind. It seems indeed an absurdity to Libavius and some others, that grains of Wheat lying in the Corn-loft should actually live, but he shews no reason why it should be absurd. Contrarily it is more agreeable to reason that seeds should live. For although in the seeds of Plants there is no motion apparent to the sense: yet the soul lying hid within is not idle, but it vivifies the seed: after the same manner as in Trees in the Winter time no action appears to sense, and yet they are not destitute of their soul, but are enlivened by the same concealed within them, which in the spring time by manifest actions does again discover it self; and the same happens in seeds. For Seeds whiles they live are fruitful and fit to be sowed; but those which are dead are not fit to be sowed, nor wil any Plant spring from them. And if seeds were not alive, whence comes it to pass I pray you that being only moi∣stened and cherished by Heat they presently begin to sprout?

The second operation is the forming and shaping of the living Body: * 1.157 an admirable work truly, and wherein as (Galen speaks) there appears the greatest Art and Wisdom imaginable. For if there be any work in nature admirable, and wherein we must be fain to acknowledg our own Ignorance and to admire the infinite Wisdom and Power of the Creator, it is the shaping of the Child in the Womb, the Chick in the Egg, and the Body of a Plant out of the seed thereof. For who does not admire that the Bodies of Plants and Animals are so artifici∣ally framed, and in respect of Magnitude, Number, Figure, Order, Scituation, Colour, Smel, and other things, so formed, as to transcend all the Art and Iudustry of all the Artificers

in the World? Hippocrates truly every where, especially in Lib. de Alimentis, de Corde, de Articulis, in epidemiis, cals Nature most Sagacious, most Just, most Artful, most Provi∣dent, most Discreet. Aristotle compares her to a prudent Hous-holder rightly mannaging all things, who in generation makes nothing superfluous, nor omits any thing necessary, chan∣ges nothing, nor produces any thing sooner or later than need requires, does nothing in vain; so that there is no member in a living body but hath its action, nor is there any action which wants its member or Instrument. And 1. de part. Animal. ch. last, he admires the Wis∣dom and Power of Nature even in the meanest things. Galen also in his 16. de Ʋsu parti∣um, ch. 1. does teach that distributive justice is in nature very eminent, and in 15. de Ʋsu partium, chap. 1. that Mans words cannot express the wisdom of Nature; and in the same Book, ch. 7. he saies that Nature is more skilful than the skilfullest Artist. Which in 17. de Ʋsu partium, cap. 6. he proves by example of Phidias, who though he had with such ad∣mirable workmanship engraven in a Ring Phaeton in his Chariot with four Horses, that the parts of the four Horses might be discerned distinct one from another, and the sixteen Feet of the Horses were visible: yet the workmanship of nature in the Thigh of a Gnat is more admirable than that of Phidias, in all those members of the four Horses. For besides the Articulation, there is found therein a faculty to move, nourish, and grow. And how great the Wisdom and Power of Nature is, even a Plant the lowest sort of living things does suffici∣ently shew; * 1.158 in which there is so much variety and beauty, in figure, colour, scituation, that no man can sufficiently admire, much less imitate the same. And from the Praises of Nature Galen fitly raises himself in many places to praise the God of Nature; and no Philosopher is more large in setting forth the praise of God, and all his Books of the use of the Parts of the Body (as himself saies) are nothing but an Hymne in Praise of the Admirable works of God. But especially Lib. 3. de Ʋsu part. cap. 10. he writes excellently indeed; But truly (••aies he) if I should speak any more of these kind of Cattel, men better minded might justly be of∣fended at me perhaps, and say that I defiled that sacred discourse which I frame as a true Hymne in praise of our Maker, and I conceive that herein is true Piety, not to Sacrifice to him many hundreds of Oxen, or to burn Callia Lignea and a thousand other sweet perfumes and Oyntments, But if I first know my self, and then declare to others what his Wisdom is, his Virtue and Goodness. For in that he would adorn all things with convenient furni∣ture, and suffer nothing to be deprived of his benefits that I count as a token of most perfect Goodness; and in this respect his Goodness must be celebrated by us with Hymnes. But to have invented all this, how and after what manner every thing should be adorned, is a point of the highest Wisdom; and to have been able to bring to pass al that he pleased, is an argument of an invincible and unconquerable Virtue and Power. Thou must not therefore so admire the Sun, Moon, and universal order of the other Stars, being so exceeding artificially mar∣shalled & disposed; nor let their Greatness, Beauty, perpetual Motion, or so certainly described Circuits render thee so astonished as to think these sublunary things mean in comparison, and void of all ornament. For here also you shal find a like Wisdom, Power, and Providence. For do but consider the matter whereof every thing is made, and do not vainly perswade thy self, that of menstrual Blood and Seed an immortal Creature could be made, or one that is impassible, or alwaies movable, or as bright and fair as the Sun. But as you estimate the Art of Phidias, so consider the Art of the Maker of all things. But you may perhaps be astonished at the wonderful Ornaments of the Statue of Jupiter Olympius, the bright Ivory, the store of Gold, the largeness of the whol Image. But if you should see such an one of Clay, you wil pass by the same it may be with contempt. But so wil not an Artist do nor one that is able to judg of the works of Art, but he praises Phidias as much, if he see his workman∣ship in common Wood, or Wax, or Clay. For a vulgar and unskilful Eye is astoni∣shed at the richness of the matter, but an Artist is only amazed at the Beauty of the work∣manship. Come on therefore, be thou a skilful Naturalist, that we may not term thee a rude Plebeian but a true Philosopher. Leave the difference of matters, and consider the bare Art it self. When thou observest the Fabrick of the Eye, think that it is the Instrument of Seeing, and when thou viewest the Foot, think that it is the Organ of Walking. But if thou thinkest of Eyes made of the substance of the Sun, and of Feet made of pure Gold, thou forgettest the matter which is Bones, and Skin, and Flesh, whereof they are made. Re∣membring that therefore consider whether light be an Heavenly Substance, or an Earthly Slime: for so give me leave to call the Mothers Blood flowing into the Womb. As there∣fore if you give Phidias Clay to make an Image of, you wil never require of him an Ivory Statue; after the same manner having given Blood to the Work-master, you cannot re∣ceive from him a Sun, or a Moon, or such a bright and beautiful Body. For those Bodies are divine and Heavenly, and we but Statues or Images of Clay, and yet the Art of the Work-master is equal in both. So far Galen.

Yea, and this Work can hardly be sufficiently admired, concerning which Franciscus Titelmannus writes excellently and piously, Lib. 8. Physic. c. 11. (I will give you the whol place) and thus he saies. Is it not superadmirable that of a smal Seed (taken from some Herb or Tree) cast into the Earth, a green Herb should spring up, or a Tree, and that the same in process of time drawing its nourishment out of the bowels of the Earth should joyn to it self its just quantity, and fit all its parts according to the condition of its own Nature, with so beautiful a variety, so comely a disposition, and so admirable an order that the wit of Man is not able to comprehend the Workmanship that is in one smal Herb? For consider as a Tree grows up from the Seed, how it sends its Roots into the Earth be∣neath, and fixes them so fast, makes them stick so close in the bowels of the Earth that after a little time it can hardly be stirred or plucked up without great violence; how it sends its Stock and Trunk upwards, which outwardly it cloaths with Bark as with a Coat, a∣gainst the inclemency of the Air, and the injuries of cold and heat. And in the inmost part the marrow is placed, and round about Veins great and smal are dispersed through the body of the whol Trunk; and they in an admirable order springing, the lesser from the greater, through which all parts draw nourishment to themselves. And in the upper part how wonderfully do the Leaves spring out of the Branches, wherein also we behold a wonderful Connexion of Veins and Arteries. Also the Leaves have all the same shape, the same smoothness or roughness, a like longitude and latitude well-neer, the same color, tast, and smel; and in every respect Trees of the same kind are exceedingly one like another. I pass over the beauty of the Flowers, the sweetness of the Fruits, and in both a wonderful Ar∣tifice And all these Originally spring from the Vertue of one Seed. And in the Seed like∣wise of a living thing, and consequently of a Man (out of which the Child grows as to its Body) is not that alone exceeding wonderful, that by reason of the Vertue which is inso exceeding vile altogether deformed and filthy matter, such a decency of Members, so beau∣tiful a composition, so convenient an order, so effectual a disposition of Members, so rare a conjunction of parts should arise? namely, That beneath a broad part should be shaped upon which the whol body might firmly stand, and move from place to place; the extream part whereof should have a manifold dvvision, so that the matter should be carved as it were into particles, viz. That the Feet should have Toes, and that these parts again should have such an order that that which is in the first place should be longer and thicker than the rest, and so to proceed gradually, as that the last Toe is of all the smallest and the shortest. Likewise, That these parts at the end of the foot should be so regularly and gene∣rally five in number, that he is counted for a Monster that hath six. Also that each of these parts hath its joynts wherein they may be bowed, and the first and greatest hath only one joynt in the middle, the rest every one two. And all these things are manifestly apparent in the composition of the Foot and Hand to him that shall look no further than the out side. And in the uppermost Part of the Body, how there is framed with rare Artifice a round part, which is covered above with the Skull, of so hard and indissolvable a boney substance that lying many yeers together in the Earth it cannot be consumed. Which Skul is covered with flesh and skin, whence flow the Hairs which cloath the part all over. But under this Skul is formed a certain noble and most tender substance which we term the Brain, and that in several parts variously formed that in might be a sit receptacle for divers Vertues, and the Organ of sundry noble Operations. In which upper round part the Eyes also are pla∣ced, beautifully formed in their sockets, yet so as they might be most readily moved, which also have their Eyelids and Eyebrows. Ʋnder these the Nostrils, and on the sides the Ears; and under the Nostrils the Mouth-hole to receive the Meat, and round about the Jaw-bones ful of Teeth; the foremost of which at the entrance are thin and sharp to cut and mince the Meat, but the hinder are more than twice as thick, which like Mill-stones grind what the other hath cut into smal particles, in which regard they are also called Grinders. But on the back-side of the Head all is shut up, and no opening to be seen: but there are strong Nerves, and wonderful Joynts which fasten the Head (the upmost part) to the Sboulders beneath, so that though the Head do not touch the Shoulders, yet it is beauti∣fully supported by them without burden by interposition of the Neck. And hence from the Shoulders (as it were two Boughs) the Arms are stretched out for the performance of any work, which in the middest (namely the Elbow) are made to bend, and have their utmost parts orderly divided into Fingers, as was said before of the Feet. Moreover that same most noble member the Heart is so wonderfully seated in the middest of the Body, ha∣ving the Lungs placed round about to fan and temper its heat, drawing the Air continual∣ly in by their respiration like a pair of Bellows, and so tempering its Heat: also having the

Liver its neighbor the Work-house of Blood, and the Stomach as the Cook of the whol Bo∣dy, receiving the Nourishment of the whol: also the Spleen, the Kidneys, the Guts, all wonderfully knit together and rowled about. That all these things, I say, which we have only touched at, and other things hid within much more wonderful, should be so orderly, so perpetually shaped in the Body of a Man, yea, or of another Creature, by the power and ver••••e of so vile a substance as the Seed, who can chuse but count this the greatest miracle in the World? Had not the Psalmist reason to say to the. O Lord, thy Knowledg is made wonderful in me, and strengthened, and I cannot attain there unto? And have not we had reason in the Preface of this Book to aver that Men carry Miracles alwaies about them more wonderful than al the Miracles in the World besides? And truly it would not seem so great a wonder if we should aver, That God by his Omnipotent Power of himself did frame all this connexion and disposition of Members which we see in our selves. If as in the beginning he created Adam of the Earth, and Eve of his Rib without the power of any seed, taking only the Earth sor matter, and administring all the power himself; so he himself al∣so should frame our bodies in their most beautiful dispesition and proportion. Also, if as at the first be created Trees and Herbs without the Vertue of any seed; so be should now by his all-powerful Command cause them to spring up out of the Earth. For we know that to him nothing is impossible, and nothing difficult. It is to us no news if he does great things, of whom it is written; He alone does wonderful things. But that this disposition of the Body of Man should proceed from the Vertue and Power which lies hid in the Pa∣rents seed (a most silthy, and hardly to be named substance, which no man beholds with∣out abomination) and that therein so rare a vertue should lie concealed to make and shape so admirable a body; that the whole efficacy of this wonderful disposition of parts should really exist therein, this justly ads weight unto our consideration above measure, this ren∣ders us amazed and astenished, and compels us to cry out, and to confess with open mouth, that he is not only great in himself, nor only great in great things, but that even in the most abject, contemptible, and smallest things, he is full of Glory. So far Titel∣mannus.

But since certain it is, * 1.159 That God does not immediately and alone effect al these things which come to pass in the Generation of Living things, but that Nature is constituted, which is the ordinary Power of God, and which performs al the vicissitudes of Generations; the Question now is, What is the immediate Author of this admirable Fabrick in living things, both Plants and Animals. And although Galen despaired to find the cause by which al these things are done, and confesses that he could find nothing so much as probable in this point, which made him exceeding sad, Lib. de foetu formato, cap. 6. Yet if he had consi∣dered that these Operations were proper to the Soul of every sort of living Creature, he might without great difficulty have known that al these operations did proceed from the Soul which lies hid in the Seed.

That these are the Operations of nothing but the Soul of every living thing, he wil easily understand who considers what it is which of a smal Birth makes a large Animal, preserves in Nutrition the same Figure of the Body, lest by the continual growth of the parts it should be changed, restores the flesh lost, breeds oftentimes large Veins. Which Galen saies he saw in the Head of one, Lib. de semine, repairs the teeth which yong people do cast, restores every year the fallen Leaves of Trees, brings forth the Flowers and Fruit, in Peacocks and other Birds supplies new Feathers suitable to their kinds. For since it is certain, that the Soul and form of every sort of living thing is the specifick cause of al these operations, and that hence every yeer each Tree hath its own Leaves restored, of one fashion to the Oak, of ano∣ther to the Pear-tree, of another to the Peach-tree, and Harts-horns to the Hart in room of those are fallen off, but not the Horns of an Ox, Claws of a Crab, every one according as suits with their particular Nature: What need is there I pray you in the first structure of every living thing out of its Seed, to seek any other cause of Formation than the Soul it self, which is one and the same in the Seed, and in the living body formed? For it is altogether the same work, when the Soul lying hid in the Seed, and drawing matter, shapes the body of a Plant, and when the same Soul repairs the fallen Leaves, restores the Flowers, produces new branches, boughs, and roots. And so since the same operations in the Seed, and in the Plant, are seen in every respect absolutely perfect, they shew that there is the same Principle and Agent in both. And therefore since in the seed it self are persormed the operations proper to the soul, why should we deny the soul to be in the seed? For al the faculties of every form, and especially of the soul, are properties inseparably flowing therefrom, and therefore it may be most rightly concluded; Where the faculties and operations of the Soul are found,

there the Soul also it self is present, and we easily come by the operations to the knowledg of the hidden Essence and Soul. For if one Faculty were in the Seed, another in the grown body, of what form was that the power, or when went it away, and whither, when the body was formed? It is an absurd thing truly to hold, that the Formation of the Flesh, Membranes, Bones, and other parts, is begun by one faculty, and continued and perfected by another different therefrom; and that so as to continue the work begun with the same thred without any Error. Doubtless one and the same continued Operation, which lasts from the Beginning of Generation to the end of Life, cannot proceed from divers Prin∣ciples.

This also confirms the same that in Plants we see a Root, or Branch, or also a Leaf only, as in the Indian Fig-tree, being pluckt from the Plant and stuck in the ground, does grow in∣to a compleat and perfect Plant; which is the work of nothing but the Soul present therein. And since the same thing is done in the Seed, we justly conclude that the Soul is present and therein, and performs the same work. Yea, and when we see the same Plant (as Rosema∣ry for example) propagated both from a Seed and Branch we acknowledg the same cause in both cases. For otherwise there would be two different causes of one special effect, and two conforming Facukies of one and the same Plant, which is false and absurd.

To answer this Argument, Fienus (truly) labors and sweats hard, de from. foet. quaest. 5. * 1.160 Conclus. 6. but yet in vain. For he saies that a new Plant is produced one way out of the Root and Branches, another way out of the Seed. For of the former a new Plant is not made, but they being severed from their stem are themselves a new Plant; because being cut from the whol they have already a vegetative soul multiplied, but do not acquire the same, by which they augment themselves and attain to their perfection. Contrariwise, that the Seed is no new Plant, because it hath no soul, but it becomes a new Plant by the coming of a soul into it after it is planted in the Earth; or by the soul which is newly pro∣duced in the seed after it is put into the Earth.

But Fienus can by no means thus free himself. For in the first place, though it seem ano∣ther manner of propagation to the sense, that which is by the Root or Branch, from that which is by the Seed: yet in respect of the principal Efficient it is indeed one and the same, since it proceeds from the same soul. Fienus denies indeed (by reason of a pre-conceived Opinion) that the soul of the Plant is in the seed, but he proves it by no reason. Con∣trariwise, from the operations of the Formative Faculty which are in both alike we firmly conclude the same soul to be in both, viz. in the Seed (for examples sake of Rosemary) and in the Branch thereof. Moreover in the same sence, as a Root, a Branch or a Leas may be cal∣led a new Plant, the Seed may also be so called. For in each there is its Soul, but in the Seed there is wanting the ultimate perfection springing from the Organs. Thirdly, if he grants the whol soul may be in the Slip of a Root, and in one Leaf of a Tree, and that by cut∣ting off the soul is multiplied, and that the soul which before was but one in number, viz. while the said Root, or Branch, or Leaf did grow to the Plant, by cutting the same off is multiplied; why does he not grant that the same multiplication may be made by the seed? especially since al seeds are rarely fashioned, and some of them have a more artificial shape than the Root of an Hop or any other Plant, or the Leaf of an Indian Fig-tree? The same Operations in both do argue (doubtless) the presence of the same Soul in both.

We do therefore rightly argue from this wonderful Fabrick of the Body which is made in and of the seed, that the soul is present therein. For, whatsoever is made by Nature or by Art must be made by that which hath an actual Being; and that which moves must have an actual Being; and every immediate efficient Cause must necessarily be joyned with the Patient. And therefore in the generation also of al living things that which forms the Body must be present, and must be joyned to that Body. And that which is yet more, the ministring powers themselves which wait upon the Formative Faculty do al appear in the seed. For the first Operation which is performed in the Seed is in a Plant the drawing of nourishment from the Earth, and in Animals the drawing of the Mothers blood. The second is the Vivification and Animation thereof, or Communication of the Soul thereto. For the Nutriment drawn out of the Earth is inanimate, and the blood also is of it self inanimate. But when of these the parts of a Plant and of a Child are made, they must needs then be ani∣mated. But nothing can give a Soul but that which hath it, and therefore the Seed is animated. The third Operation is the separative. Since the Liver is made of one kind of matter, the Stomach of another, the Heart of another, the Brain of another; a Vein, a Nerve, an Ar∣tery of another, the Soul in the Seed discerns and separates these matters one from another.

Fourthly, when these matters are severed by the same Soul each is put in its own place, the Brain and Stomach in one place, the Heart and Liver in another. The fift is the Formative peculiarly so called, by which its own shape, quantity, number, and the like, are allotted to each part.

Secondly, * 1.161 There can be no other Agent here assigned save the seed. For first of al, the Generator himself is many times absent. So in the Spring, when a Plant springs from seed, the Plant which bare that seed is many times dead long before; and whiles the Animal is in the Womb of the female receiving its shape, the Male which ingendred the same may happen to be dead.

Again, * 1.162 Neither can the inbred Heat of the Seed be the Cause of Formation. For though it cannot be denied, that the innate Heat is an Organ wherewith as other actions in the body, so conformation is shaped, yet it is not the primary Cause; since so admirable a work can∣not be ascribed to a bare quality, as to give to so many different parts almost infinite in num∣ber, each its peculiar figure, quantity number, scituation; but there is need of a far Diviner Agent. Of which Scaliger, Exercitat. 6. Sect. 5. If (saies he) the form comes from without (as they tel us) and in the mean while the matter is furnished with al kinds of perfection; of necessity both the Qualities and Quantities, the numbers, orders, and scituations, must be provided and ordered by somwhat which is within, and in conclusion the whol Body must be shaped by the same internal Principle. Now this shaping of the bo∣dy is performed, either by a substance, or by an accident, or by both. Not by an accident alone. First of all, because no accident works but in the vertue of its substance. Again, because no accident hath knowledg. But that same Vertue and Power which is Architect of so noble a Temple hath been judged by all Philosophers to be most exceeding wise. It must be therefore framed and built by a substance. And this substance is the Form of the Seed. Doubtless the form of the Seed if it be not a Soul it is a bruit thing: and if it frame the body, it is equal to the Soul. But in growing and restoring of wasted Flesh the soul it is which does all. There must be therefore in the Seed a shaping Soul which comes before that Soul for which it prepares its house. And therefore that former Soul is more wise and noble than this latter. And a little before: The Form it self is the cause of this prepara∣tion. For it both alters the whol, and disposes of the parts for its ownuse. Nor when the body arrives to the perfection of its preparation, does it then also arrive to the sub∣stantial Form. For the Form it self exists before-hand. And therefore there is no progress made to it, but to its act, that there may afterwards be use made thereof.

Nor in Animals can the Vertue of the Mothers Womb be the cause of the Conformation and shaping of the Body. * 1.163 For if the Formative Faculty were in the Womb, and not in the Seed, the Father should confer nothing to the Conformation of the yong one, and should af∣ford only a passive Principle, and consequently should not generate. Again, there can be no cause assigned why the Child should be somtimes like the Father, and why Females should not alwaies be ingendred. Thirdly, in Eg-bearing Animals the Conformation is not performed by the Womb, but the Eggs are perfected into Chicken, without the Body of the Hen; as neither the Earth (which to Plants is as the Womb) hath any power to shape the Plant, but al that Faculty is in the Seed. Moreover, if heat brings (as they say) the power of the Seed into act, a Quality engenders a substance. Nor can they avoid the force of this Argument who answer, That this substantial Power is so ordered and disposed by the Ge∣nerator, that the said Quality being awakened it breaks forth into an act like the Generator. For what I pray you is that substantial power? Certainly unless it be the Soul it is a meer figment, which appears by their own rule, when they say that the next power is reckoned for an act. For since a thing cannot be at once both in act and power, if the next power be an act, certainly it cannot be a pure passive power, but a formal one, and so the Soul it self.

Nor is that of any moment which Thomas Fienus brings against this argument, * 1.164 de form. foetus, quaest. 5. conclus. 6. For seeing he grants that there is no other cause of the Confor∣mation of an animat Body save the Soul, it is rightly hence concluded; That whatever hath in it the Efficient Cause of Formation hath in it the Soul: But the seed hath in it the cause of the Conformation of an animate Body. Ergo it hath in it the Soul. Here indeed Fienus answers; I acknowledge the Premises are true; but I deny the Consequence. It is indeed rightly inferred that there is some Soul in the Seed, but not that it is the Soul of the Seed. There is indeed a Soul brought into the Seed after that the Seed is conceived in the Womb, or planted in the Earth, or the Eg is set under the Hen, when al things are put into act; but

that is not the Soul of the Seed, or which did pre-exist in the Seed, or which was bred in the Stones, the Tree, or the Hen, but the Soul of the young Conception which was afterward introduced thereinto. But in very good deed, how can the Consequent be denied if both the Premises be true? For in a Syllogism, that which is false cannot be inferred from true Premi∣ses. He saies nevertheless that the Minor is false, and he denies that the soul which is the Cause of Conformation is the soul of the seed: but falsely. For it must be shewed, as hereafter shal be said, what is the cause of those operations and of the conformation in the seed before the soul is come, according to his opinion. Moreover since he saies the soul is not present til all things be actuated, he ought to shew what is the Author of that same actu∣ation and conformation, in Plants, Eggs, Bruit Beasts, before the soul comes. Thirdly he ought to have told us, whether the Souls also of Plants, Birds, and Beasts, are introduced, and from what cause they proceed. Doubtless when some Seed is cast into the Earth, or in any place is moistened with water (without any other cause) first it puts forth a Root, and a little after it begins to sprout. What I pray you is the cause of this operation and formation, save the Soul already pre-existent in the Seed? Or if it be not the Soul pre-existent in the Seed, Let Fienus shew whence it should afterwards come.

And this Argument which hath hitherto been propounded and explained, drawn from the operations of the Soul appearing in the Seed might alone suffice to perswade a mind not per∣tinacious, but desirous of truth, that the Soul is in the Seed: howbeit there are other Argu∣ments evident enough to prove the same.

For in the second place, * 1.165 whatsoever ingenders its like must needs communicate its Es∣ence to the thing ingendred; otherwise it would not be essentially like it. But every living Creature begets its like, Ergo it communicates its Essence to the thing ingendred; and con∣sequently not only the matter, but also the form, whereby the Essence of a thing is chief∣ly accomplished. And if this were not so there could be no univocal Generation, and the Generator could give nothing but the matter, nor could any man tel us whence the Soul should come; when frequently the Generator before a Plant or Animal is made of the Seed may come to die, and afterward nothing should be found to form the Plant or Animal save external Heat. Thus the Seeds and bulbous Roots of Plants are somtimes kept many yeers before any Plant grow therefrom, the Plant which bate the Seed or Bulb being long since dead. So out of an Egg even by the Heat of a Furnace a Chick is hatched, the Cock and Hen from whose copulation the Egg proceeded, being long since kil'd and eaten. And que∣stionless if there were not in the Seed an active Principle communicated by the Parents, the Parents could not be truly said to generate, since they should afford only the Matter.

Thomas Fienus indeed makes answer, de Format. Foet. quaest. 6. that the Parents do herein really and actively generate, in that they afford the Seed and Matter of Generation, and imprint thereupon all dispositions necessary for the Introduction of a Soul. But this is the Begging of the Question. For we deny that that which only affords the matter of Generation however disposed to fit it for the reception of the form, does communicate an active principle and truly Generate. For all these dispositions do belong to the matter, and he that does not communicate the principle of acting, he cannot be said actively to ingender.

Thirdly, If the Seed had no Soul in it, * 1.166 and yet should produce a Creature with a Soul in it, the more noble should be produced by the less noble, and the Virtue of the Seed should produce a Substance, which is absurd. For nothing acts beyond its ability; also that which is not animated should perform actions proper to the Soul, Conformation, Nutriti∣on, Auction, Attraction; should make Bones, Flesh, Membranes: all which actions are performed at the first conformation, which happens soon after the Beginning of the Con∣ception.

And though it be objected by some, that an Agent by virtue of another thing may pro∣duce an effect more noble than of it self it were able to compass: yet if this be done, it must be done when the principal Agent is present, and not when it is absent, which does not hap∣pen in generation. For the Father may be absent from the place where Generation is made, yea and he may be dead before that time. So also the Mother may be absent or dead, as it happens in Chickens, which are hatched by the Heat of a Furnace, or by some Fowl of a∣nother sort.

All the Premises therefore being considered, it is most rightly determined, * 1.167 that the soul it self is in the seed, and as Zabarella wel saies de Facult. Anim. cap. 11. that Living things when they generate their like do communicate some of their Matter and some of their Form, when they afford an animated seed furnished with the same vital faculty which was in the Generator.

For though the Souls of living things of themselves have no Quantity nor are divisible: * 1.168 yet according to the extension of the matter wherein they are they themselves are extended, which Fortunius Licetus hath proved in two Book de Animae Coextensione Corpori, and when it is divided they are divided, or rather multiplied, and yet they themselves are neither greater nor less than they were. So the Soul which is in a smal Twig that first shoots out of the Earth, is no less than that which is afterward in a tall Oak; nor is the Soul of a Calf less than that of an Ox. After the same manner the Soul diffuses it salf into the Nutri∣ment which is newly adjoyned to the Body, and so according to the extensi∣on of the Body which it informs it self is extended, and yet becomes not greater than it was: as on the Contrary, when a Branch is pluckt from a Tree, the Soul of the Tree is not made less than it was. After the same manner it is in Generation. For whereas before a Plant generates the soul is but one in number, because it is but in one subject: yet now that the Plant generates seed, viz. such a matter as wherein the soul which was before in one numerical subject may now be multiplied in its existence; & that Seed being ripe is separated from the Plant: in each seed though never so smal the soul remains entire, and now it lives by its own soul and subsists by it self; and since of one Plant of Poppy more than an hundred seeds are bred, the same soul of the Poppy exists entire in each seed; and then the Soul is said to multiply it self: which when it doth, it becomes no lesser than it was; since of it self it hath no Quantity.

But which way the soul it self remaining entire can communicate its Essence to another, * 1.169 this is that which hath perplexed great Wits, and not being understood hath raised many disputes and bred many Errors. For Jul. Caesar Scaliger saies rightly concerning the Soul, Exercit. 307. sect. 29. We see the shallowness of our Ʋnderstandings. Who dares say he comprehends the species of substances? We cannot attain to that exquisite knowledg, how of two things one is made; how the Form is totally in the whol Body, and totally in every part. So divine a thing is the Form, that being a substance it fils another substance ful of it self, so that of both one is made. Therefore to enquire further is the part of an over curi∣ous and busie mind; for it is a part of humane Wisdome to be contentedly ignorant of some things.

But chiefly that question hath much troubled many, * 1.170 whether the Soul he totally in the whol Body, and totally in every part thereof: also how the Soul is divisible, whether in re∣gard of its extension by means of the Body. Where some hold that all the Souls of perfect Animals (and they only) are indivisible and unextended: others hold that all the souls of perfect Animals are divisible and extended, only the rational Soul of man excepted. But the Conimbricensian Collegiates do hold both these Opinions to be very probable, and therefore they answer the Arguments brought to prove both, and so leave the Reader unre∣solved: yet they confess they had rather maintain the former. Fortunius Li••etus, in his two Books of the Coextension of souls with their bodies, holds that al souls, yea the rational, are co-extended with the Body.

Hence also another controversie hath risen, * 1.171 how in the Augmentation of the parts of the Bodies of Animals which grow the growing parts do receive the Soul; which is attended with exceeding great difficulties, as Zabarella also confesses, and is so obscure, that it mo∣ved Sebastianus Basso (a man otherwise quick-sighted enough in the things of nature) to de∣ny that there is any such thing as a substantial form, and absurdly to hold that the form in a body natural is nothing but a certain collection of particles of the same kind into an excellent kind of Harmony. Now among others, Jacobus Zabarella hath written largely of this Question, Lib. 1. de Accretione, where having in Chap. 13. recited contrary Opinions, and rightly rejected the Opinion of Scotus and others, who hold that the Soul flows with the matter, and that in the parts of the matter bred of the Aliment particles of the Soul are bred, and that so just the same soul does not last during the life of the Animal; and had undertaken to defend the other Opinion, that the Soul all the Life time remains the same in number, and when new matter comes is extended to inform the same, Chap. 16. he propounds two very urgent doubts against the same: The first is, That after this manner, when the Soul which is in the old flesh passes over to inform the Flesh newly composed of Nutriment, the Form seems to go out of one subject into another, which seems to be absurd. The other is, That thus the Soul wil seem to be movable of it self; whereas Aristotle in the 6. Physic. teaches, that Bodies only are of themselves movable; and that the Soul is movable only by accident according to the motion of the Body, in 1. de Anima. But Zabarella rightly answers to the first, that the Form in this manner does not totally forsake his subject but remains therein, yet passes over to inform new matter, which transition, or diffusion wants a proper name.

And to the Second; That the Soul does not pass over to inform new matter by motion, but after a certain manner to us hid and unknown. Which things although Basso does laugh at, yet if rightly explained they are most true. Al the Errors which many run into in this point do proceed from hence, because they attribute such things to the Form and Soul as belong only to the Body, viz. Quantity, Divisibility, and parts. But that which Scaliger writes concerning the motion of Angels, Exercit. 359. Sect. 12. is also true or the Soul; * 1.172 that it is extended without pred••camental Quantity, and moved not with corporeal motion, by passing from place to place, but with the motion of a thing incorporeal and extended by changing its Ʋbi. For as it is in Exercit. 307. Sect. 13. Whatever is moved is in a place. But the Soul is not in a place, because it hath no quantity. For that which hath quantity cannot be at once in al the parts of a living thing that hath quantity. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Soul is in every part of the body which hath quantity. And a little after; The Soul it self becomes no greater, by means whereof the body is made greater. And therefore he himself cals it not motion properly so termed, but in the same place he writes: When it is introduced into that part which is added to the body, the Soul which before was in the magnitude (for ex∣ample sake of a foot and an half, is advanced half a foot. And a little after: The Soul is transferred by promotion of it self, from it self to al that which is newly added to the body, even to the utmost circumference, al the matter being mean while filled which lies betwixt. For thus when the Nature of a thing is not very cleer, neither is it easie to invent names, and those names we use are equivocal, and taken from things more known.

But that we may in some fore explain the Nature of the Soul as far as the weakness of our Understanding wil give leave, * 1.173 and that we may declare how we are to understand what is commonly said, that the Soul is a total Being, which may be divi∣ded, extended, multiplied, and that some light may be given to al this Doctrine of the Gene∣ration of living things, thus the case stands. * 1.174 All natural Bodies consest of Matter and Form, which in living things is the Soul. The matter of the Body is of it self subject to Quantity, and divisible into parts having Quantity, and a Body so takes up place that it wil admit no other body thereinto, and it is movable from place to place. But the form and soul hath no quantity, and therefore it fils and penetrates the whol Body, it is indivisible of it self, yet is co-extended with the whol Body without quantity. But fince (as the School∣men ••ghtly teach) a thing is said to be some where three manner of waies, either Defini∣tively, or Repletively, or Circumscriptively and Locally: the Body only is circumscriptive∣ly in a place, and so said to take up a place. For two Bodies having quantity can never be in the same place, and that place which one body hath taken up another cannot possess un∣less the body first by local mutation pass into another. But substances free from quantity (as also sensible species) c••n be either divers of them together, or with other bodies in some place; of which we have spoke more largely in our 1. B. of Natural Philosophy, chap. 5, and 6. And although the manner of existing any where repletively does properly belong to God, who (as Damascen writes) is all, and totally every where, wholly in all, and whol∣ly above all, high, glorious, immense, incomparable, incomprehensible; but Souls are not every where as God is, but are limited and contained within their own Bodier; yet learned Men (and amongst the rest Johannes Faber stapulensis, Dialog. 2. Physicarum Intro∣duct.) do attribute the manner of being some where repletively to the Soul also, and being carried aloft by the wings of their Mind from the lowest plenitude to the highest and infinite, they acknowledg the Image of God who fils al things, and exists totally in the World, and totally without, even in Souls; and that rightly. For the Soul of al Animals fils the whol Body which it informs, nor is it hindred though the Body have filled this place before, but that it also can be in al the parts of the Body. And al Dimensions being taken away, the form of any of us may be in the same Ʋbi with that of another, nor would the presence of one hinder the presence of the other. As we see many lights scattered through the same Air, nor does the presence of one hinder the presence of another; and although there are many in the same place, yet they are not mingled, which the shadows declare. Also we may see the same Soul which at first fils the Body of a smal Branch sprung up from an Acorn, and of a smal Infant; afterward when the said Branch is grown up to a call Oak, and the In∣fant is become a large Man, yet it fills the same Bodies though it self be not aug∣mented.

And to apply what hath been said to our present purpose; * 1.175 as when of a smal Branch a tal Tree is grown up, or of a Calf an Ox is made, of an Infant a strong wel-set Man; the soul in the Tree, Ox, Man, is not made larger than when it was in the Branch, Calt, Infant: so the soul when by the seed it gives Essence to divers individual matters, it is not made lesser,

nor does it lose any thing, and the soul which is in the seed both by a tall Tree is no lesse than that which is in the Tree it self.

By al which it appears that it is more proper to say the soul is multiplied than divided. * 1.176 For since nothing is divided but what hath Quantity, and one part without another, but the Soul hath no quantity, nor hath it one part without another, properly it is not divided neither by it self, nor by accident. The body indeed as having quantity and one part without or behind another, is divided, nor is the part taken from the Body of the same Essence with the whol: but that part of the soul which is separated from the Generator is of the same Essence with the soul of the Generator; and although it be in a smaller body yet is it as total∣ly and entirely there, as the soul of the Generator is in this Body. And that Extension may offend no man, nor cause him to think that the Soul because it is ex••ended hath parts; let him ponder with himself how that of Scaliger is to be understood, Exercit. 359. Sect. 12. That the Soul is extended without predicamental quantity. Where we must distinguish betwixr extension properly so called, and extension taken only analogically. Extension properly belongs to quantity and bodies which have parts to disposed that where one is the other is not; for examples sake, where the Foot is there the Hand is not. But the Soul although it be joyned to the body, because it informs a body measured and extended, and the plenitude and replency thereof (for so the School-men term it better than Extension, and Fortunius Licetus might better have used this word in the Title of his Book de Coex∣tensione Animarum cum Corpore) is as large as the body it self, and its dimension, and sills it though it grow never so big, no part being added thereto. Yet there is not one part of the Soul in the Eye, another in the Foot, nor is the Soul in a Man greater than that in an Infant; but as God is immense and infinite every where, not having part without part, or behind or after part: so also after its fashion the soul fils the whol body, not having part after part. Whereby we may easily answer that Objection which hath troubled many, and Bass•• amongst the rest; That if the Soul be totally in the whol Body, it wil follow that when a part of the body is cut off (as for examples sake, the Hand) the Soul wil be divided with the division of the Body. For in such things truly in which the Seminal Principle is spred al the body over, as in a Willow, the Soul is multiplied by cutting off a branch, or as they commonly speak, is divided: but in Animals where Propagation is made by Seed the soul temains intire in its body, though a part of the body be cut off; as also in growing, although the soul communicates it self to the parts added to the body, yet it does not pass out of one subject into another. * 1.177 Fortunius Licetus also acknowledged thus much, Lib. 2. de ani∣mae Coextensione, cap. 4. where he makes a twofold extension, one material belonging to magnitude, which is only in a thing which hath corporeal quantity; the other formal and belonging to an incorporeal substance: and he rightly adds, That although these two exter∣sions, Material and Formal, have an analogy and proportion one to another (viz. Because either of them bounds the thing defined within certain limits: for God alone is torally every where) yet herein they differ, That extension formal so called makes not the thing to which it belongs to be subject to quantity, no•• necessarily divisible, either of it self, or by ac∣cident: but material extension so called makes a thing both to have quantity and divisibility. Sensible species do also afford an Image of this thing. For if a bright shining thing be in some place, or any other image of a thing, and there be only one man that sees it, or one Looking-glass to receive the Representation; the whol Image of the visible thing is in the eyes of one Man, or in one Glass. But if an hundred, or a thousand, or more men come, or a thousand Glasses be set, the same image which was before received by one Man and by one Glass, does now appear in a thousand Men, and a thousand Looking-glasses; nor yet is the Species or Representation of that visible Object divided into Quantitative parts.

And hence arose that famous Axiome of Philosophers; * 1.178 That every Form multiplies it self. Which although Zabarella quotes, de sensu agente, cap. 5. where he treats of sensible Species: yet it does not therefore follow (as one unskilfully imagines) that it is only true of accidental Forms. Contrariwise, it is rather generally and primarily true of the substan∣tial forms, and only consequently of the accidental. For substantial forms are really forms; but accidental forms are only their Images and shadows as it were. And therefore if acciden∣tal forms have a power to multiply themselves, much more have substantial forms the same power; since accidents do al that they do by vertue of their forms. So that it is apparent that Zabarella understood this Axiom of substantial forms, from Lib. de facultat. animae, cap. 11. where he w••ites, That it is the proper condition of the Vegetative Soul that the Ge∣nerator should afford some of his own matter and some of his own form; and in that whol Chapter he teaches expresly, that that same vulgar Opinion of the Eduction of Forms out of

the aptitude of the matter by the action of an external Agent hath by no means place in living things. And Aristotle also himself expresly teaches, 2. de Anima, cap. 2. text. 20. That some Souls do multiply themselves, when he writes that some Plants divided and separated do therefore seem to live because the Soul which is in them is actually indeed one in every Plant, but potentially many; which also he grants in some Animals. * 1.179 Which if it be true in Plants which live divided, why should it not be true in them also which are propagated by Seed, that so the Soul should be said to be one, but potentially many, viz. by the Seed, as wel as they can multiply themselves by the division of their body?

Now this multiplication is performed divers waies, as shal be said hereafer. But this is common to al, that the Soul should have its proper subject wherein it might cleave, and by which it might be separated from the Generator, and might constitute a new Individual; which is the Seed, or somwhat analogical to the Seed. Al four-footed Beasts do communi∣cate their Souls by their seed; Birds, Serpents, and Insects some of them, do bring forth Eggs, or somwhat analogical to Eggs, and by them they multiply themselves. In Plants there is a various manner of Propagation, as shal also be said hereafter. For some propagate themselves by Seed, some by Branches, some by a Root or Bulb, and some by divers of these waies. For it is not in them as in Animals, where the Soul is tied to the seed, or to somwhat which answers the Seed, but it is diffused through the whol Plant, or through its parts, so that it can multiply it self by any part if it be put into the ground, so that thence a new Plant wil arise. Nor are the Souls nevertheless divisible in Plants although it be common∣ly so said; since they have not one part without another, but the body of the Plant only is divided, and is made less by cutting off some bough, branch, or Root: nor does it give part of it self to the Seed, the Branch, the Root, but its whol self, and so multiplies it self.

Here also I must explain how that is to be understood which I have written in Chap. 9. * 1.180 de Consens. & Dissens. Chymicorum cum Aristot. & Galeno, that the forms also of Metals are multiphed after their fashion; since a certain malignant Person hath charged me to hold that a stone begets a stone, and metal begets metal. For I am not so blockish and foolish as to beleeve that this Load-stone, this Diamond, this Crystal, this Gold does engender, as one Poppy breeds another, and one Lettuce another. For multiplication taken in this sence do•••• properly belong to the living and Vegetative Soul; aed Generation is the Work of a living body only. Yet this is true in the mean time, That Jewels and precious stones were not al particularly made at the first Creation, but Experience and Histories cited in the place aforesaid, do evince that the Mines and Matrixes of Jewels and Metals being once ex∣hausted are filled again, and others succeed in the room of those that are digged up. * 1.181 This ther∣fore is my Understanding, wherein I agree with Anselmus Boetius, and other most learned men; that as in Plants and Animals, by the soul lying hid in the seed is formed a Plant and an Animal; so also by a certain Gold-making, Silver-making, Stone-making, Crystal-ma∣king Spirit, containing the Architectonick form in it self, Stones, Jewels, and Metals are ge∣nerated in the Earth; and from it according to every ones kind, figure, color, and other proper accidents are given to them; and that this Spirit diffuses it self into the exhausted Mines and Quarries of Metals and Jewels, and there generates new Metals and Jewels. But where that Spirit lies hid, and which is the seat thereof (in this darkness of Humane Minds, and the ignorance we are in concerning the Constitution of the inner parts of the Terrestrial Globe) is to us unknown. This is certain, that those Architectonick Spirits are various according to the sorts of Jewels and Metals, nor are they found in al parts of the Earth, but in some places only. And so much by the by, concerning the Generation (as it were) of Stones and Metals, I have said in this place to free my self from Slan∣der.

Now the Souls and several sorts of things received their Power of multiplying themselves from the divine Benediction at the first Creation of the world, when God said, * 1.182 Let the Earth bring forth the Herb seeding Seed, the Fruit Tree bearing Fruit according to its kind, wherein is its own Seed upon the Earth. And Encrease and Multiply. For God did not only command, as Thomas Erastus wel writes, de occult. med. propr. cap. 15. that the things created should exist, but also that they should so propagate themselves as he had crea∣ted them. Nor was that Command of his in vain, but very effectual. For when he comman∣ded, he gave to each a power whereby they were able to accomplish his Command. By vir∣tue therefore of this benedicton, and help of the Seed, Souls are propagated as one Candle is lighted by another; and where ever they meet wi•••• fit matter wherein they may subsist by themselves, such as is the body of the seed, they c••••transfuse themselves thereinto, and as

Scaliger saies, cloath themselves therewith, so that that part (if I may so cal it, for it is not properly a part) of the form hath the same Essence with the whol form, which is in the whol from whence it was separated, and afterwards also it begins to perform the same ope∣rations; and so the same Essence of the Soul which is in a tall Walout Tree is in the Nut and that Sprout which arises from the Nur, and atterwards also having obtained sitting mat∣ter whereby to augment it self it performs the same operations, produces every year new Branches, and ingenders Nu••s. And thus out of the first Individuals of all four-footed Beasts, creeping things, Birds, Fishes, Plants, Ammals, at first created, the sorts and kinds have been since continued, and all Beasts, Creeping things, Birds, Fishes, Plants, have been generated by multiplication of their Souls.

Chap. 7. Arguments to the contrary Answered.

ANd although this is a plain case, so that a Mind not prepossessed with Opinions may ea∣sily perceive the truth: yet as commonly happens in this darkness of humane Minds, some are of another Mind, whose Opinions and Arguments to the contrary come now to be examined.

The first thing which hath troubled many so as they could not see the truth, is, that nei∣ther in the seeds of Plants, not an Eggs, nor in an imperfect Conception, those operations are to be seen which are performed by perfect Plants and Ammals. * 1.183 But they themselves are not ignorant that the first and second act do differ, nor does an Argument hold from denial of the second act••o a demal of ••he first act. For the Essence of the Soul is in the Seed by the first act, not can it be proved by any reason that it should afterward receive the same from elsewhere: only the second act is wanting to the Seed since it wants only express Instruments necessary to perform its operations, which nevertheless it hath a power to prepare. And so the Seed wants only that perfection which belongs to the Body and the structure of its parts, but not that which belong unto the So••••. Nor can we argue in perfect Plants from the ne∣gation of the second act, to the negation of the first, as may be seen in Trees and other Plants which last all the Winter, in which there is no manifest operation: and yet the Soul is really present in them.

Again, Those actions which proceed from the Soul are twofold, Organical or Second, which are performed in a perfect Body, and Prince or Inorganical, viz, the Vegetation of the Seed, the Formation of the Body, with its nutrition and augmentation. For as soon as the Body begins to be formed, it begins to be nourished. And although the Seed in the Corn-lost be not nourished, yet it hath a Vegetative and Nutritive faculty: after the same manner as Plants pluckt up are likewise not nourished, yet are really animated, and being transplanted into another soil they are again nourished.

A other thing which troubles Galen, * 1.184 is, that the Vegetative faculty being void of Wisdom and reason seems unable to perform so wonderful a work, wherein the greatest Art and wis∣dom appears, and which cannot be done but by a most wise and powerful Artist. But no man wil wonder at this who knows that the Soul is the Principle and immediate cause of these operations, but yet that it hath not its power from it self, but hath received the same from the most wise and powerful Creator; whence also Scaliger Exercitat. 188. & 359. sect. 11. de∣fines Nature to be the ordinary power of God, and in Theophrast. de Causis Plant. cap. 1. the power of God in the second causes, to which himself hath prescribed certain rules to act by. * 1.185 For as Thomas Erastus writes, de occult. med. propriet. cap. 15. Nature is nothing but that same command or God by which all things are what they are, and perform that which they are commanded. For God did not only command them to exist, but also to propagate themselves as they were created by him. And what reason hath Galen to admire that so w••nderful things are done by the formative Faculty, since he might have observed things as strange in the Elements themselves? The Elements are moved in a straight perpendicular Line, upwards and downwards, although they know not what a perpendicular Line is, be∣cause God hath commanded them so to do.

A third thing which hath moved many is this; * 1.186 That they conceive nothing can be the sub∣ject of the Soul but an Organical Body, [being moved thereto by Aristotle's definition, who defines the soul to be the act of an Organical body. But Aristotle did not define the soul simply considered in its Essence, but in ••••er and respect to the Body. Which nevertheless, simce it finds not, but forms and shapes ••or it self, it must needs at first be in an inorganical

Body.] But that an organical Body is not necessary to receive the Soul into, ma∣ny things do shew. For in the first place, since to an organical constitution is required a certain Quantity, Number, Figure and scituation of parts; all these things are not necessary for the reception of Forms. For Forms (such as souls are) ha∣ving of themselves no quantity, are received into matter without Quantity or Figure. And this we see manifestly in Plants, in which the Quantity and Figure are variously changed the same soul remaining. For the Quantity and Form of a Branch springing up from a Seed is one, and of the same grown to a tall Tree, another. The stalks of many die in the Winter, the Root remaining alive, and in it the Soul. Again, the figure of bodies is an Effect of the Forms and Souls. And therefore it is not a previous disposition foregoing them. * 1.187 For the Form it self is that which determines the Quantity of its own body, and each Soul brings in a determinate Figure into its own Body, and preserves the same in Nu∣trition and Augmentation; hence there are so many figures and magnitudes of living bo∣dies as there are differences of souls, and a Rose hath one magnitude and figure, an Oak another, a Fir Tree another; a Partrich hath one, an Hen another, a Peacock another. Thirdly, the Soul is of it self and primarily in the parts as they are similar, * 1.188 and not as they are organical. But the similar parts as such have no certain figure: and therefore the soul is not in them as they have a certain figure, or quantity, but only as they are such similar parts. And it is in the organical parts, only as they consist of similar parts. So that the Soul is not in the Bone, as it is a Tooth, a Shank, an Arm-bone, or an Ankle∣bone, but only as it is a Bone, and it is equally in all Bones. And therefore in fractures in which the Bones have many times another figure than naturally they should have the Soul remains nevertheless, and is as much in a great Callus as it was before in the sound Bone. And therefore in Nutrition it is brought into the aliment which hath no figure; and it suf∣fices that it hath this or that temperament and similary Constitution. And so the organical disposition is not necessary for the first act, but only for the second act, or to perform the operations. Nor is the body as it is organical simply the adequate subject of the Soul; but then only an organical body when the body is now perfect, and ought to operate, and by its operations to preserve it self alive. And the Organs are required for operation and not to simple being; and then only are necessary to being when the being cannot be preserved with∣out operations; which happens when the Body is already brought to a perfect state. But the figure and organization (as some speak) is after the Soul and not before it; and therefore it is not a disposition necessary to the reception of the Soul. Moreover the dis∣positions to the form are immutable: but the figure and organization in living things are not immutable. Both is apparent in Animals and Plants. The fortieth day is the longest term set by those that hold the Soul is infused. But then the parts are only rudely delineated. And what shal be said of bruits whose Souls none hold to be infused? Is not the Soul there presently on the first daies of the Conception? And this happens much more in Plants. For in the first daies when Plants begin to shoot and sprout out of their seeds the shape of the Plant is yet so rude that it cannot be known (save by most skilful Herbarists) to be this or that Plant, which afterwards in process of time is many waies changed.

Nor is that of any moment which Sanctacruzius objects here; since Souls are more noble than the forms of Elements and Bodies simply mixed, they require also a noble configuration and formation, and by how much living things are more noble, by so much the more noble body they require, and hence the so many sundry figures of Plants and Animals have their original. True it is indeed, that all living things by reason of the divers operations they are to perform do require divers organs; and therefore Plants have one manner of shape, Ani∣mals another, and every sort is differently figured according to the nobility of the forms. But it does not from thence follow, that those figures are required for the fabrick of the or∣gans, before the introduction of the Soul, and that they are a disposition necessarily forego∣ing the Introduction of the Soul; because (as hath been said) that same formation of all the Organs is not necessary to simple being, but only for the better being and performance of operations. And if those that contend so eagerly that the body must be organized before the soul can come into it did but observe such things as dayly happen in Nature they would think far otherwise. Fortunius Licetus the most renowned professor at Padua hath taught sufficiently, de spont. Vivent. Ortu, that the soul may remain sate and sure in a matter far more vile and ignoble than any seed can be thought to be, although it be destitute of such things as are requifite to its second Act; which at last having attained a fitting matter does rouze it self up and becomes a Plant or Animal. Of which I shal speak bereafter in my Discourse of the spontaneous original of living things.

Fiftly, Some do also use this Argument, which is also the fift Argument of Thomas Fie∣nus, quaest. 6. de format. foetus, which Alphonzus a Caranza, a Spanish Lawyer, does so highly esteem, in tract. de partu naturali & legitimo, cap. 1. pag. 44. that he cals it a sin∣gular and irreprehensible Argument, and which quite over throws the contrary Opinion, and therefore he thinks fit to set it down word for word; whose words I wil also transcribe in∣tire, that the Reader may see whether the force of this Argument be so great as Caranza imagines. * 1.189 Now thus saies Fienus. If in the seed there were an active Principle of Confor∣mation or Generation (as others confound them) the seed should act upon it self; but nothing acts upon it self, as Aristotle teaches, 1. de Generat. & Corrupt. cap. 7. Ergo. Because if any thing should act upon it self, the same thing should be Agent and Patient, in act and power in respect of the same; which is impossible. Secondly, because it would be destru∣ctive to it self, especially the seed: because that action thereof should tend of it self to its de∣struction. For it would tend to the Generation of a living thing, which cannot be done without the destruction of the seed. Scotus in 2. sentent. distinct. 18. in sine, after he had said that the seed is not the active principle of the last form, viz. the rational soul, he enquires whether it can be the previous alt••ative Principle of an Organical body which is generated; and he concludes that it cannot, and brings this reason among others; because (saies he) this absurdity would follow, that somwhat should act upon it self: which argument he counted so strong, that he said, to find the principle of Conformation we must be forced to fly to the Action of God, and of the Heavens. To answer this argument it is commonly said that in the seed there are two divers substances; the one thin and spirituous, the other gross and terrestrial. That in the former resides the Activity, and the latter is the matter and passive principle; and that the active vertue out of the spiri••uous part does act upon the thicker part of the seed as upon matter; and that for this reason one and the same thing does not act upon it self, but on a different subject; not that one and the same thing hath the notion of an active and passive principle in respect of one and the same thing, but only in respect of divers things; which is not absurd. That that same active principle or vertue does reside in the seed, Aristotle teaches in 2. de Generat. cap. 3. in these words: There is in the seed that which makes it to be fruitful, viz. That which is called Heat; and that not fire, nor any such faculty, but a spirit which is contained in the froathy body of the seed, and that nature which is in the seed having affinity with the Element of the Stars. Tho∣mas Aquinas teaches the self same thing, 1. Parte, quaest. 118. art. 4. in these words: And therefore there is no need that that same active faculty should have any organ in act, but that it be founded in the spirit it self inclosed in the seed, which is froathy, as the whiteness thereof shews. And the very same be saies, 2. contra gentes, cap. 89. and in some other places. But this Answer is not worth a button, and in very truth, is no other than a meer evasion invented to shun the force of the argument. Because it is not true that such a ver∣tue resides in the spirit of the seed. Which is proved first, because the spirit which is in the seed is either an essential part thereof, or it is not. If it be, it wil follow that one essential part of a being is destructive to the other essential part of the said being. This cannot be, first because infinite things are found in the World consisting of divers and hererogeneal parts, in which nevertheless we never find that the one destroyes the other. For if one were ordained to destroy the other, it would follow that it were ordained for the destruction of the whol, and consequently of it self. For one essential part of a thing being destroyed the whol thing is destroyed. But the contrary is true; because the essential parts of one Being are not made to fight one against another, or to destroy one another, but that they may be friendly united, and by their friendly union be able to sustain the form; and the form again is ordained to hold those parts united, and to govern them, that they may not part asunder, nor mutually destroy each other. For if it were not so, the form could never persist and abide in things heterogeneal, no not the smallest time imaginable. Add hereunto, that all action proceeds from a total being, and a perfect being; but the essential parts of one being are not the whol being, nor a perfect being; and consequently they act not by themselves. So far Fienus.

But this Argument is not so strong as Caranza doth imagine. * 1.190 For in the first place we must know, that to speak properly the seed is not the cause of Conformation, but the soul in the seed. And so when a living body is formed out of seed, the same thing does not act up∣on it self. For there are in the seed two parts; the soul and the body of the seed. Now the first Agent is the soul, which does not act upon it self, but upon the subject matter, viz. the body of the seed, and also upon the Mothers blood, which in Animals it draws to form the yong one, and in Plants upon that Aliment which it draws out of the Earth. And al∣though

when a Plant or Animal is generated the seed ceases to be: yet that Generation is no corruption but perfection, and that body which is called Seed whiles it turns to a Plant or Animal it is brought into a more noble state and perfected; nor (as Jul. Caes. Scaliger speaks, Exercitat. 268.) is the Seed otherwise said to be corrupted than that it ceases to be as it was before, viz. in aptitude, and becomes as it was not, viz. in act. Now it is the same matter with the same formal Principle, to which nothing else is added than the expres∣sion of the Organs which were before confused. And thus while of the Seed is made a Plant or Animal, the Body of the Seed does not transser it self into another condition, but by the Soul lying hid therein it is thereto advanced. Nor (as Fienus thinks) wil he that shal diligently weigh al these things use that answer which Fienus brings and endeavors to re∣sute, that there are two divers substances in the Seed, the one thin and spirituous, the other gross and earthy; and in the former resides the active vertue, the latter being the matter and passive principle. Such a spirit there is indeed in Seed, but it is not the primary cause of conformation, but the Instrumental; but the Soul which uses that spirit is the primary cause. And whereas he dares deny that there is a spirit in the seed, I can scarce sufficiently admire it, and the reasons whereby he would prove it are very sleight. For in the first place that spirit which is in the seed as an Essential part tends not to the destruction but to the perfe∣ction thereof. Also it is false that every action proceeds from a total being. For is there no action of the soul upon the body which it informs? And whereas he denies there is a spirit in the seeds of other living things, we shal refute that hereafter.

Fiftly, * 1.191 This also offends some that they suppose that thus the distinction is taken away betwixt the internal and external Causes: of which the former are the matter and form, the latter the Efficient and End: and they aver that no Efficient Cause does ever go into the Essence of the Effect, and that Animals in Generation do not produce seed either out of their own matter, or out of their own form; but that the seed is generated of the mixture of blood and spirit in the stones, and that a man does not generate by communication of his Essence, but by his form as an Efficient Cause. But in very deed, this Doctrine of the pro∣pagation of Souls does no waies take away the distinction of Causes. For it is known even to Novices in Philosophy, that the same Essence may be both the Form and the Efficient Cause, the Form as it informs the Matter, the Efficient as it is the cause of al Operations per∣formed in the compound. The rest are but Beggings of the Question, and are said, not pro∣ved. I like Zabarella's Opinion better, who writes, de facultat. animae, cap. 11. That li∣ving things when they generate their like do confer and bestow some of their matter, and some of their form, inasmuch as they confer an animated seed, and endued with the same vi∣tal faculty which was in the Generator. For although they communicate no part of their own body, yet they communicate that self same matter of which they are nourished, but changed into a more noble substance. But that which hath brought very many into this Er∣ror is this, * 1.192 Because they conceit living things are generated after the same manner as artificial things are produced by an external Agent. But there is a great difference betwixt Artificial and Natural things. For every Artificer communicates nothing of his own: but living things which beget their like cannot do the same unless they communicate their own Essence.

Sixtly, Neither is that of any moment that they suppose if Generation should be made by tranimission of the soul, that then the soul should pass into another matter as a new sub∣ject, or should be of it self divisible. For as in Augmentation, and when of an Acorn a tal Oak grows up, the Soul when it communicates it self to new matter does not pass from one subject to another, but remaining stil the same communicates it self to new matter: so when the soul communicates it self to the seed it does not pass from one subject to another, but re∣maining the same in the Generator it diffuses it self into the seed. Nor is it therefore of it self divisible. For as when a root or branch is pluckt from a Plant, * 1.193 of which (being set in the ground) a new Plant arises, the soul of the former Plant is not diminished, but remains en∣tirely the same: so also when a soul is communicated by the Generator to the seed, the soul of the Generator is not made lesser, but remains the same it was. Nor is there here any dif∣ference betwixt the Root and the brauch pluckt from the Plant and the Seed. For there are several waies of propagating Plants. And that the root and branch is animated, but not the seed, is only said, but not proved. For though the Seed be not a part as the root and branch is; yet it is the fruit of the Plant which is animated as much as the parts are, yes, and con∣tains the soul after a more excellent manner.

Seventhly, Many do also object this, That if the seed of the Plant were animated it should be already essentially a Plant. But if it were essentially a Plant when it grows out

of the ground, * 1.194 there would be no Generation of a Plant, and so in the Tree and that Herb in which the Seed was produced there should be a generation, and a Tree or Herb should be generated in a Tree or Herb, and not in the Earth; which is absurd. But the whol argu∣ment is granted in its sense, and that which is counted absurd is no waies absurd indeed, pro∣vided it be rightly explained. * 1.195 For truly the generation of the seed in a living thing does not finish the Generation; how beit the principal and chief work which is necessary to Genera∣tion is the Elaboration of the seminal matter that it may be a fit subject wherewith the soul may be propagated, and the communication of the Soul to the matter so elaborated. How∣beit this also afterard belongs to Generation, that the seed which hath received the Soul from the Generator may no longer adhere to the Generator, but may be separated there∣from, and that that which before was but one individual of the same kind may now become more than one. * 1.196 Which when it is performed a Tree or Herb is truly said to generate, but not when the Plant grows up out of the Earth. And when a Plant shoots up out of the Earth that is not its generation, but it is the bringing of a Plant which is in its imperfect act to its perfect act. Nor is it considerable, as Fienus himself writes, quaest. 5. conclus. 6. (though he be otherwise of a contrary Opinion in this Question) what the common People cal Generation, or what not; nor what agrees with their understanding, but what is suita∣ble to right reason and to truth. For the common people are ignorant of Philosophy, and know not when or where the true production of a Plant is made, and its Essential Genera∣tion; and know not how to distinguish betwixt the first and the second act; betwixt that which is imperfect and that which is perfect, and therefore takes one for another, and con∣ceits that a Plant is then generated when it is perfected and operates, and when it brings forth roots and Leaves, whose production is not the very Generation of the Plant, but the operation and perfection thereof being already generated. And Aristotle himself calls the seed and that out of which it is bred, * 1.197 Synonyma's; We must therefore distinguish betwixt the Entitive and Formal Act, and that which is simply Formal, and respectively. For then is the Form said to be present in a perfect act when it hath al its Organs necessary to perform its actions, but not when it is in a part, or in the matter of the seed, and that not yet fitted with al its Organs. For otherwise the branch of a Fir-tree (in which it cannot be denied that the soul is) should be called a Fir-tree; and the Foot of a Man should be called a Man. And therefore we cannot argue from the presence of the Form to the denomination of the thing formed, but then a thing is rightly said to be an Animal or other living body when the soul is in its subject rightly disposed, or can perform the Operations belonging to its kind.

Eightly, * 1.198 Out of which their Objection may easily be answered, who say, If the seed were actually animated, the seed of a Poppy were a Poppy, and the seed of a Dog would be a Dog. For the sorts of Natural things are not denominated from the Essence which the Form gives, but from that Constitution whereby they are sensible species of the World. And therefore though in respect of the Form the Essence of a Dog and of the seed of a Dog is one and the same; yet since the Constitution of the seed and the Dog differ in respect of the Corporeal and sensible parts, the seed is not called a Dog, but the seed of a Dog. After the same manner though there be one and the same Soul in the Butter-fly and the Silk-worm, yet the Silkworm is not called a Butter-fly till it hath wings and can flie.

Ninthly, * 1.199 They say, if the seed were animated it should live, if it lived it would grow, for every living thing is nourished as long as it lives, as Aristotle testifies de Respirat. cap. ult. But because seeds lying in Corn-lofts and granaties, or shut up in Chests and Boxes are not nourished, therefore they do not live, and consequently they have no soul in them. But life is taken two manner of waies, * 1.200 either for the first act, or the essence it self of living things, or for the second act or operation. Seeds live by the first act, but not necessarily by the second act, nor do they necessarily perform the actions of living things. And that place of Aristotle is only to be understood of living things perfectly formed. But in the mean while the soul in the seed is not quite idle, but it keeps the seed alive, and therefore seeds are so long fruitful as they retain the soul in them: but after they have lost the soul they become dead and unfruitful. Nor are the Operations of the Soul confined to nutrition only, but there are also other Operations thereof, as Conformation. Yet as soon as any Conforma∣tion is made, and as soon as the seed hath attained a fit place and matter, the soul presently draws nourishment for the formation and nutrition of its body.

And thus I conceive it is proved in general, That the soul is in the seed, and that it is the Cause of the Conformation of the Body animate, and I conceive al Objections are fully an∣swered.

Howbeit some when they can hardly object any solid reason against our Opinion do fly to the Authority of Aristotle, but miss-understood, and they say that Aristotle writes that the seed is potentially animated, and that therefore there is not actually any soul in the seed. But here the most renowned Casparus Hofmannus rightly answers, tract. * 1.201 de origine formarum, that Aristotle does so often attribute an act to the seed, that it is the part of a man very unskilful to urge only those places wherein he saies it is an aptitude. Howbeit, more Reasons shal be produced in the following Chapters, wherein we shal treat particular∣ly of the generation of living things, viz. Plants and Animals: and what hath hitherto been alleadged shal be explained and confirmed, and such objections as may yet be made shal be answered.

See also of this Subject the lately commended Doctor, Casper Hofmannus, who in tract. de form. origin. joyned to his Books of the Generation of Man, proves the same Opinion by most firm reasons, and solidly refutes the contrary Opinion of Bonamicus, the Conimbri∣censian Collegiates, Peter Fonseca, Franc. Suarez, Ant. Ruvio, Benedictus Pererius, Franciscus Vicomercatus, Fridericus Pendasius. And in good deed the judgment which he makes of the Conimbricensian Collegiates is most true of al those who defend the Edu∣ction of the Soul out of the aptitude of the matter, and deny that seeds are actually ani∣mated. Not to say (quoth he) that they mix many things not belonging to Natural Phi∣losophy, they invent distinctions little less than foolish, they put conditions where they ought not to be, the greatest difficulties they touch not so much as with their little finger: in a word, they intangle and obscure, but do not explain the Question.

But the Soul frequently uses the Spirit (in its shaping the Body) which is in the seed, * 1.202 and makes it to be fruitful, and resembles the Element of the Stars, as Aristotle tels us 2. de ge∣nerat. cap. 3. And as long as that spirit is in the Seeds, so long the soul is as it were in its pro∣per subject: but as soon as that spirit vanishes, the Soul can bide no longer in the seed, and the seed becomes unfruitful. Which spirit I admire that Fienus could not discern. Cer∣tainly if he had seen a spirit drawn by Chymical distillation out of dry seeds which wil take flame, he would not have written, de format. mat. quaest. 6: what spirituous substance can there be in the seeds of Plants, kept a long time in a Box, and dry, but yes fruitful?

He indeed objects in Apolog. Adversus Sanctacruzium, pag. 99. If there are (quoth he) Spirits in Plants, in what place are they generated? For there ought, as in Animals, so in Plants some place be assigned, in which they spring, and from which they flow into the Plant. Again, he saies; there is no actual Heat. But in Plants there seems to be no actu∣al Heat. For if there were it would be perceived some way or other. For a tangible qua∣lity is the proper object of the sense of feeling. Therefore where it is it must needs be per∣ceived. How comes it therefore that in a great heap of Herbs, and a great heap of Seeds, Corn, Pulse, there is not at least some smal heat perceived. Thirdly, heat and cold are contrary qualities, and mutually destroy one another, and the greater and more intense does overcome and corrupt the lesser; how can it therefore be that this heat in so many Plants which last all the Winter, should not be extinguished. For the Heat of infinite living Creatures being much greater, is extinguished by the Winter cold, and why should not that of Plants be extinguished if they have any?

But these are toies unworthy so famous a man. For, first there needs no place nor cavity in Plants for this spirit to breed in as there is in Animals: for as they have not any thing an∣swering to the stomach or Liver of Animals, wherein their nutriment is bred, but that nu∣tritive power is spred through their whol body: even so that spirit is bred in the whol body of the Plant. And if any man shal hold, that in the root or trunk rather, as the nutriment so the spirit also is chiefly elaborated, he wil hold nothing that is absurd. And that there is such a part in Plants that are tender is manifest, as in the Colewort and many more. For although the cold and frost do so hurt the Leaves that they die: yet if that part which is in the middle, which the Germans cal the Heart, remain safe and sound, the Plant recollects it self and grows again. But if that part be also hurt the whol Plant dies. For although (as Fienus objects) branches cut from the Tree do grow; yet that makes not against our Asser∣tion. For as those souls according to the division of their subject, are in some sort divisible: so also the spirits are which make the proper subject of the Soul.

Secondly, That also is of no moment which he saies: where there is no Heat, there is no Spirit; and where Heat is it must needs be felt. Is there not I pray you Heat in the Spirit of Wine? and is it actually felt? Is there not fire in all mixt bodies? and yet are they al actually hot? by no means. For as Zabarella rightly teaches, Lib. 2. de mist. gene∣rat.

& Interit. the Qualities in mixt bodies are after a sort hidden by the tempering of contraries, so that neither of them can be distinctly discerned. Nor is that objection of any force if it be not felt in one Plant, it ought to be felt in a great Heap of Plants. For the Nature and proportion of mixture is one and the same in a great Heap of Plants as it is in one Plant. But hath Fienus never seen what an Heat is raised when such an heap of Plants comes to putrifie, or when an heap of Corn begins to sprout? Certainly in Granaries even in the coldest time of Winter, heaps of Corn which have lain long unstirred do conceive no smal Heat, which a man may feel with his Hand. Yea and the Corn it self if it lie long unstirred does sprout.

Thirdly, That this same Spirit and Heat in some Plants (for all do not outlast the Winters cold) is extinguished, comes from the nature of mixture. For there is a several mixture in several Animals and in several Plants. Geese go bare-foot in the cold Ice which men cannot do. Rosemary is hurt with a smal cold, but so is not the Fir-tree. But I easily agree with Fienus that some hidden Quality of kin to the Element of the Stars does concur.

Chap. 8. Of the Generation and Propagation of Plants.

ANd so much may suffice to be said of the Original of Souls in General: and it hath been sufficiently declared that all living things do multiply themselves by their seeds, and that in the seed is the Soul which is is transfused from the Generator into the thing gene∣rated. For the cleerer manifestation whereof I think it best to declare the same particularly with reference to the several kinds of live things. * 1.203 Now there are two kinds of live things, Plants and Animals, or living creatures: which have also a different way of propagation. For there is in some living Creatures sexes, in others not. In such as have no sexes one seed is suf∣ficient, which is a body so elaborate and disposed by the Generator, that when it is perfect it may be seperated from the Generator, subsist intire by it self, and with it the soul of the Generator may be transferred into the thing generated. And then a Tree ingenders as (Sca∣liger saies, * 1.204 Exercit. 6. sect. 10.) when it produces seed. And that this seed is animated, appears from the reasons propounded in the foregoing Chapter; and it is so manifest, that Joh. Gallego de la serna a Spaniard, was forced to grant that the seeds of Plants were anima∣ted, de Princip Generat. Lib. 2. cap. 6. (although he denies that the seeds of Animals are ani∣mated) and writes that this opinion is so founded upon the most firm reasons of Philoso∣phy, that they being understood no true Philofopher can deny the same. And the reasons are indeed most strong whereby it is proved that the seed of Plants is animated. For in the first place since when the seed was in the Plants it was animated as being a part of the Plant, surely when it is separated it must be animated; since no cause can be assigned which drove out the soul, nor can separation alone do that, for even in the separated seed also the actions of a soul appear, and therefore as Branches, Roots, Buds, Bulbs, by avulsion do not lose their soul, but grow and flourish: it is also so ordered that the seed being separated from the Ge∣nerator can subsist intire and fresh, although some seed a longer, other some a shorter while, which other parts pluckt from Plants do not commonly do, but presently die. Moreover as soon as by the Heat of the Sun, yea and of the Fire in the Winter time, it is but warmed in a stove, and finds fit matter, or but a little Water if it be moistened therewith as is seen in the making of Mair, it begins to display it self, and first thrusts out a Root, by which after∣wards it draws nourishment, and forms the body of a Plant like that it came from: which formation of the bodies of Plants is no less wonderful than the Generation of Animals. For so it attracts matter fit for every part, * 1.205 Roots, Flowers, Fruits, and gives all parts their Magnitude, Figure, Scituation, Colour, in a certain measured proportion, that no Geo∣metrician or Painter can imitate its workmanship. Moreover, since we see that Plants not only by their Roots, but also by a smal Branch of a Willow, a bit of an Hop or Acorns Root cut off do grow up into a like Plant, the Soul being pluckt away with the part; and it is ma∣nifest that of a branch of a Willow or a Vine, or of another Tree, although in it there is no Root, nor all the parts of a Plant, yea of a Lease only of an Indian Fig-tree an whol entire Plant is formed; and no other cause can be assigned of the formation of this new Plant than the soul pluckt away from the former Plant with a part thereof: why should we not con∣clude that a Plant is formed of the seed after the same manner? Nor is it credible that al the o∣ther productions of Plants are made by the communication of the soul from the former Plant

and only that made by the seed should be performed without the presence of the soul in the seed. But more likely it is that as when Roots, Bulbs, Branches, Boughs are put in the Earth they do not from thence receive their soul, but that with the soul which they actually had they perfect themselves by producing necessary parts and organs: that in the same man∣net also it is in seed. Nay we have more reason to think that this should happen in seed, be∣cause it is generated by the Plant to this very Intent, and hath a much more perfect disposi∣tion necessary for the conservation of the soul and its propagation than the Roots or Bran∣ches; since the wonderful artifice of Nature is apparent in many seeds. There is indeed one man who conceives that this does not declare the manner of the souls propagation, for this reason, because in Growing whatever grows on the Plant is a part of its body, and the part ought to have the same soul that the whol hath: but the seed is no part of the bo∣dy nor grows fast to the same. But although it cannot be denied that the seed of a Plant since it is not generated to that end to abide upon the Plant, nor does alwaies stick to the same, but may be separated therefrom, is not after the same manner a part of the Plant: yet because while it is in the Plant it lives by the common soul of the Plant, in that sence also it may be called a part of the Plant. But since it is made to be separated therefrom, it may most conveniently (as was said in Cap. 6.) be termed the fruit. Which is equally anima∣ted with, yea and after a more noble manner than the parts, viz. inasmuch as thereby the soul may be propagated, which in Animals by the parts it cannot be. Sure it is in the mean while, that as when the Soul is diffused into new matter it becomes neither greater nor les∣ser: so also when the soul is propagated with the Seed; the soul of the Parent is not dimi∣nished thereby.

For here it is to be noted, * 1.206 That there is not one and the same manner of propagation in Plants; which being observed that may easily be cleared which hath scrupled some, and a∣mong the rest also Franciscus Vallesius, de sacra Philosoph, cap. 1. how that should be true which we find written in Genesis 1. verse 11. that God commanded that the Earth should bring forth Herbs or Plants, having Seed in themselves according to their kind; when as the Willow, Fern, and very many Plants besides, do beat no seed. For the seminal na∣ture in Plants is not one and the same, nor does it confine the seed to Fruits and Cods only; but this happens to some alone; but in others the seminal Vertue is adherent in other parts, somtimes in one, somtimes in more, and somtimes in different parts. For examples sake, Poppy is propagated only by its seed, not by its toor, stalk, or leaf. And so it is with Let∣tuce and very many more. Rosemary is propagated both by seed and branch, and so are Pear-trees and Apple-trees; the Hop by its toor; the Indian Fig-tree by its leaf; Onions and most bulbed Plants by root and seed both; such as bear buds, goslings, or palms, are propagated by their branches, as the Vine, Willow, and others. Also some have their semi∣nal vertue in the tears or liquor which drops from them. For as the souls are more or less noble; so for the multiplication of themselves they require a more or less noble matter wherein to propagate their seminal vertue. And hence it comes to pass that Mushroms or Toadstools being the most ignoble of al Plants are propagated only by pouring then deco∣ction about the Roots of Trees. Yea, * 1.207 the seminal matter of Plants may be transferred in inundations of Water, and in Rains, as Theophrastus, Lib. 1. de Causis plant. cap. 5. re∣lates, how by reason of a certain thick shower of Rain, Laserpitium sprung up in Apturea, whereas it had never grown in that part of the World before; and that there a great Wood hath grown up where there never was any before. So that it may rightly be said of such things which are beleeved to spring out of the Earth of their own accord, that the nature se∣minal rather hes hid than is not, as shal be said hereafter when we handle the Original of things which spring of themselves. Nor am I inclined to say with Vallesius, that there are ei∣ther Animals or Plants, which though as the first they were not created, yet they might after∣wards grow naturally from the Elements of the World. For the Elements of the World have no vertue to produce such a seed. Nor let any man attribute this Formation of Plants to the Suns Hear. For this Formation is not only made when a Plant is cherished by the Heat of the Sun, but by the Heat of the Fire also. * 1.208 And it belongs to the Form and not to the Sun to determine Quantities. For Nature uses Hear as a Minister or Instrument, not as a Law-giver or Work-master. Otherwise in al Plants that same Quantity would be produ∣ced, and the same figure. For the Sun is the same to al; and the store-house of Mother Earth is the same; and the contrary is seen to happen, as Julius Caesar Scaliger writes in 1. de Plantis.

Not let that trouble any man in this place which Thomas Fienus aledges de format. foet. quest. 5. as also was said before that a Plant is produced after one manner from a Root, a Branch, or Leaf, and after another manner from the seed. That out of the former a new Plant is not produced, but they themselves when cut off from the Plant are new Plants, be∣cause by the cutting from the whol, they have already the vegetative soul multiplied by division, but that the contrary happens in seed. For that the seed is not a new plant, be∣cause it hath no soul, but it becomes a new Plant by the souls coming into it after it is planted in the Earth. But here is no diversity of propagation; for the Root, the Branch, the Leaf, is not an entire Plant, and after the same manner as by the cuttting off of these from the Plant, the soul is multiplied by division; so also by the Generation and emission of seed the soul is multiplied. And whereas he grants the Soul is in the Root, the Branch, the Leaf, and denies it to be in the Seed, he does it without Reason. For since in it the same Operations appear as in those; why should we not grant the soul to be as wel in it? And if in the Seed cast into the Earth there is no Soul, whence I pray you is it afterward produced therein, and whence communicated? Also that is false which he writes, That the Soul which is in the Branch or the Root planted, is the same numerically with that which is in the Tree or whol Plant. Indeed it was the same in number while the root or branch was on the Tree; but after it was cut from the Tree it began to exist by it self; and was made different in number from that in the Tree. I wonder also that Fienus should deny the Seed of Plants to be animated, since nevertheless in the Chapter foregoing, quaest. 5. Conclus. 6. he expres••y holds that the Conformation of the Seed in the Earth is not an essential Generation, but only the perfection of a new Plant already constituted and generated in the Tree. For there is no other Generation of a Plant in the Tree, save when seed is genera∣ted.

But concerning the Seed of Plants, * 1.209 two things are here to be observed: the first is, That that same multiplication whereby the Soul diffuses it self into the new Plant, is most of all manifest in Plants, and almost infinite. Not to spewak of Poppy, Turky Wheat, and very many others; Tobacco does so mukiply it self, that he who first by numbring, and then by weighing (for it were an endless labor to number al the seeds) wil take a scantling and com∣pute the number of the seeds, he shal find that of one Seed more than three hundred thou∣sand seeds do spring, and if the product of these be sown the third year, he shal find an en∣crease of an hundred thousand Mytiads (a myriad containing ten thousand.) So powerful was that Divine Benediction; Encrease and multiply.

Moreover, * 1.210 This also is to be noted touching the seed of Plants, That in them as in al seeds there are two parts; the one primary and which is only worthy of the name of seed; and another which serves only as a covering. The former consiste of the Soul, which is the Au∣thor of the lif•• and formation of a Plant, and the matter, of which the first rudiments of the Plant, viz. the Root and the first Sprouts are constituted. For the Seeds of Plants in what ever place moistened and cherished with heat, even without the Earth, do first gape and thrust out their roots, and afterwards their first sproutings: but the body of the perfect Plant can∣not be entirely formed, unless aliment be drawn from the Earth by the first smal roots. And so in these there is not the same Agent and Patient, but the Soul is the Cause of Formation, I say the Efficient and Agent Cause, and the Matter is the Patient on which it works. But that which is in Plants is properly the Seed, and hath the soul and matter out of which the first Rudiments of the Plants are framed is only that pulp which contains in it the Idea and delineation of the whol Plant. * 1.211 And indeed the whol pulp of the Seed is not animated, but only that part thereof which is commonly called Corculum. Which part if it be corrupted, the seed wil not grow. And therefore the Pismires are reported to gnaw that part of the seed that when it is by them hoorded up it may not sprout. Contrariwise, although the rest of the Body be gnawn by worms, yet it grows, provided the Heart be safe, as we see in Beans and Pease, and French-bean••. But the rest and greatest part of the Pulp is not made in vain, but is in place of Nutriment as it were for the tender Plant which is immediately produced of the seed most properly so called, as i•• easie to see in French Beans, which being set in the ground, when they begin to shoot one part goes downwards and makes a root, the other goes upward and makes the rest of the Body of the Plant. On one side of this tender Plant lies the rest of the body of the seed, out of which a channel or pipe of Conveyance goes into the tender Plant, by which alimentary juyce is carried thereinto, until it grows up and gets strength of it self to draw alimentary juyce out of the Earth to it self, * 1.212 and to elaborate the same. In respect therefore of the pulp of seeds it happens that the remaining part of the seed so called, viz. the external Bark, is only the Case (as it were) of the true seed which defends the pulp or

true seed against external injuries, and that external Bark to the Barks, and Shels, and Membranes of Eggs. For since the seeds of Plants are not presently cast into the Mothers Womb as the seed of Creatures that bring forth live young ones is, but are many times kept long out of the Earth which is their Matrix, this Bark defends that same internal seed against the external injuries, lest before it begins to sprout, or in the very sprouting, it should be hurt by external occurrent causes.

From which it appears, although (as was said before cap. 6.) the seed may also be called Fruit: yet that there is some difference betwixt Fruit and Seed. For that is properly seed which is simply necessary to generation such as is the marrow of the seed, which also ne∣vertheless because it is produced by the Generator it may also be termed the Fruit. But because the Creator hath compassed some seeds with Pulps which are not necessary for the generation of that species, but serve for meat for man or for other uses, as in Cherries, Apples, Pears, Peaches, Grapes, all that wherein the Seed is it commonly called the Fruit. And so according to nature the Fruit is either Seed, or that which contains seed in it, as Aristotle writes, 1. de generat. Animalium, cap. 18. Yet by Art it may come to pass that the fruit so called may be without seed: as Cherries without Cherry stones, and the Berries of Grapes without stones: which is performed by taking the marrow out of the Branch. From which it appears that the Marrow in Trees does thiefly make towards Generation.

Chap. 9. Of the Generation and Propagation of Animals in General, and of Bruits in Special.

HAving said thus much in general of the Original of living things, and then more especi∣ally of Plants; in the next place we are to treat of the propagation of live things, and first of Bruits. Where in the first place we are to give warning that some think too mean∣ly, yea, and grosly of the Souls of bruit Beasts. * 1.213 For some (truly) there are whose under∣standing is so plunged in the Elements that they can understand nothing above them; and therefore they endeavor to deduce al things out of the Elements, and date to write that the first individuals of bruit Beasts were totally and according to either part (viz. their matter and form) produced of the Elements, and that al bruit Animals both in respect of their body and their soul are in al generations Elementary, and shal continue such to al Generations. But Scaliger was much more in the right, Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. judging of the Souls of Bruits from their actions which are far above the forces of the Elements. For admirable and wonderful actions appear in Bruits, which can proceed from no Element nor Elementary na∣ture, but depend upon a more noble Principle. * 1.214 Such wonderful things are related of the wit and capacity of Elephants, that they seem to transcend all belief, unless they were rela∣ted by credible Persons, Pliny, Lib. 8. cap. 3.4.5. Christopher Acosta, and at large by Justus Lipsius, Cent. 1. Epist. 50. What wonderful things in Peace, what admirable things in War an Horse performs, the same Lipsius shews plentifully; Century 3. ad Belgas, Epist. 56. What happened to the Sybarites who could dance both they and their Horses, Histories te∣stifie. And who wil not beleeve the most credible Scaliger being an Eye Witness, who re∣lates a strange story of the apprehensiveness of an Horse, Exercit. 209. concerning Alex∣anders Horse Bucephalus who does not read strange things both out of Gellius, and many other Historians? Also what the Sagacity of Dogs is, and their sidelity to their Masters, and their aptness to learn any thing may be learn'd from Pliny, Scaliger, Camerarius, and Lipsius, Cent. sing. ad Italos & Hispanos, Epist. 59. & Cent. 1. ad Belgas, Epist. 44. yea, and it is manisest by dayly Experience. What tricks Apes play, and how they coun∣terfeit mens actions, is unknown to none. That an Hare learn'd to keep company among Dogs without fear, and would go on hunting with them (among many other such things) Julius Caesar Scaliger testifies, Exercitat. 224. Among Birds Justus Lipsius reckons the Letter-carrying Pridgeons, in Epist. 59. Cent. sing. ad Italos & Hispanos. Who knows not that Parrots wil learn to speak as men speak; yea, that the Mag-pie, Nightingale, and Thrush wil do as much, Martial, Plutarch, Ovid, Pliny, and many others witness. That Cranes journey with a certain Discipline and keep watch, is averred by those that write the Histo∣ry of Birds. The wit and industry of Bees and Pismires is vulgarly known. Every Cot∣tage is ful of the Artificial Works of the Spider. Beasts know their own strength and Arms and their own weakness; and have their familiar Medicines which they are acquainted with.

Which wonderful abilities and works of Bruits they that endeavor to derive from an Ele∣mentary principle do but wash the Blackmore.

And as the Operations of Animals are more various and wonderful than those of Plants; so their propagation is more labored and curious. It is not my intent in this place to pro∣pound al that may be said of their differences and various Originals, but only as much as shal suffice to declare the propagation of their souls. * 1.215 Now to the Generation of perfect Animals there is required a double Generator, and neither is of it self sufficient to Genera∣tion; though there is a controversie as touching the manner. For I know the disputes be∣twixt the Aristoteleans and Physitians concerning this point, whiles the former conceive that the seed of the Male is the only efficient, and that the Female affords nothing but mat∣ter: but the latter hold that the Female affords seed also which is both effectual and fruit∣ful. Which great Controversie being prolixe I think not fit to handle the same in this place. Certain it is that neither Male alone, nor the Female alone is sufficient to generate a living Creature, but both of them contribute their share whatever it is to the constitution of an Animal. Whence Empedocles also (as appears in Aristotle, 1. de gener. animal. c. 18.) said, That it is the joynt concribution of the male and female, but the whol proceeds from neither of them. * 1.216 They indeed that hold that the Seed of the male only does concur actually to ge∣••••••ation may easily free themselves from many Objections urged against their Opinion. But most Physitians think the contrary, who hold that the formative vertue is as wel in the Seed of the Female as of the Male; and they conceive they have reason so to think, as for other causes, so because of the likeness of the yong ones, sometime to the Father, somtime to the Mother, and somtime to both: not only when Animals are generated by Animals of the same sort; but then also when Generation is made by Animals of different sorts, where∣in the work of the Fathers and Mothers soul does manifestly appear. So a Mule is made of a Mare and a hee Ass, a Mulet of a stone Horse and a shee Ass; of an Ox and an Ass the strongest sort of Mules; the Indian Dog of a Tiger and a Bitch; the Dog-lyon of a Lyon and a Bitch; a strong Dog of a Wolf and a Bitch; the Laconick Dogs of a Dog and a shee Fox; of the Pard and Lyoness the Leopard; a Musmus of a shee Goat and a Ram; and many other Animals: of which see Johannes Baptista Porta, Lib. 2. Mag. Natural. Yea, and Histories record that a Woman coupling with a Beast hath brought forth a Creature like her self. Yet these men can easily free themselves from dubious objections. For this Law hath been established by the Creator, that as it were from two partial causes one prin∣ciple and one total cause should arise, from whence one motion and efficiency should arise to the production of the yong Animal, * 1.217 but in a certain Order and Method. Nor should the Mixture of Souls or Forms offend any one in this case, by reason of some feigned Metaphysi∣cal Axioms, For the Male and Female are of the same sort, and therefore it is as little ab∣surd that the soul of the two seeds should be conjoyned as for two flames to be united. Hippocrates did not count the mixture of souls so absurd a thing, as appears by that Speech of his, Lib. 1. de Vict. rat. text. 61. If any man cannot think that souls are mingled, he is void of reason. Here Fienus objects in his 6. Quaest. de form. foet. If the Seeds should be mixed, and the actions of both should concur, their effect would alwaies be mixed, and alwaies half Masculine and half Feminine, and no yong one would ever perfectly resemble the Father or the Mother, but alwaies partly one, and partly the other. Also he thinks it impossible that those two vertues can alwaies so evenly conspire to one effect, but that they should often err, and instead of one part make two; or instead of two one, one formative vertue making one in this place, and of this part of the seed, and the other making another in another place and of another part of the seed; so that Monsters would be frequently in∣gendred. Averrboes and others do easily answer this Objection who hold there is no active Principle in the Seed of the Female. But they also who hold that there is an active Princi∣ple, and a formative Faculty in the Females seed, have an answer for this Objection. How that God made two Sexes, and in al Animals created both Male and Female is a sure thing; but why he made Sexes is known to his own Wisdom. Plato relates a Fable in Symposio, That in the beginning there was no difference of Sexes amongst Men, and that al were then Hermaphrodites, but because of their Pride and Arrogance God cut Men asunder, and esta∣blished the two Sexes distinct one from another, so that one could do nothing towards its own preservation without the other. But Sexes are not in Man-kind alone, but in other Animals also.

But to the Objections of Fienus it may be answered, That there alwaies appears a sign of the conjunction of both souls, and there is no creature but the yong one does resemble both the Parents, either in the external form of Body, or the dispositions of the mind, or in both.

Yet it is not necessary that they should alwaies equally resemble both Parents. For if ei∣ther of the seeds be stronger than the other the yong wil most resemble the Parent which that seed came from. * 1.218 Not is it any way necessary that an Error should be committed in confor∣mation if the souls be conjoyned. For they are of the same species & like as when two flames are united they perform one inseparable effect, so two souls joyned together do conspire to make up one effect. And there are also examples hereof in Plants; whereof Scaliger Exercit. 106. sect. 6. thus writes: I wil tel you a greater matter which wil more advan∣tage you in searching out the manner of Generation, than to know all unprofitable rules and Laws of Cylinders. Set three Date Stones, and so many Palmes wil thence grow up, and so distinct, as the Stones themselves were; and these three branches wil grow togeher and become one Palm with one Stock. And of these Stones no otherwise set than aforesaid springs the Palm-tree as Theophrastus informs us: one stock in number arising from three Trunks, separated in Original, Matter, Quantity and Place. So far Scaliger. For every stem and each palm first springing out of the Earth hath its own soul: yet ne∣vertheless these three Palms grow into one numerical Palm; which is not only to be seen in the palm, but in the Ingrasting of all Plants in which the Stock on which the Branch is ingrafted hath its own soul, also the Branch hath its soul: of the branch and stock one Plant and Tree is made and furnished with one only soul. And not only of the same sort, but dif∣ferent souls are also joyned, as was said, and may be seen in the generation of a Mule, in which the souls of an Horse and a shee Ass are joyned, as is manifest by the shaping of its parts; also in the ingrafting of a Pear upon an Apple, and of other Trees of several sorts. For where the power and faculty of the soul is, there is the soul it self: but in the conformation of a Mule the actions of each soul, both of the Horse and the Ass, are apparent. And therfore here also with Scaliger in Lib. 1. de Plantis, we must say, where the thing it self is apparent, if Opinion contradicts the same, we must seek a reason, and not be Ignorant of the thing. And therefore whatever objections are made concerning one seed whether of the Male or Fe∣male, they are of no moment. For neither is one seed alone sufficient for Generation, but both are necessary.

Now the Generation of Animals is twofold; * 1.219 for some bring forth Eggs out of which living things are hatched; others conceive live things within themselves and afterwards bring them forth. To each of these Generations the seed of the Male and Female are requisite, and of them joyned together the Conception is made in which the soul is the principal cause of the shaping of the young Creature. For al the reasons which prove that the seed of Plants is ani∣mated, the same do also firmly prove that the seed of Animals is animated; and the rea∣sons which prove that generation is made in Plants by the animated seed, the same reasons de∣monstrate the same thing in Animals. Some indeed do o••unt it a vain way of reasoning, * 1.220 to ar∣gue and demonstrate the Generation of Animals from the Generation of Plants. But in my judgment they are therein much deceived. For since Generation is an action of the vege∣tative faculty, or of the natural faculty as Physitians call it, and that faculty is most vigorous in Plants, the way of generation in Animals may thereby wel be proved. For since all Ge∣neration is performed by communication of the Soul and the Body, or as Zabarella speaks, every Generator when it Generates does communicate some of its matter and some of its form, and this communication of matter and soul is most conspicuous in Plants, so that it can no waies be demed that Plants communicate their souls by Seeds, Branches, and roots, and that no Generation is made without the soul be communicated by the Generator, Why should I not hold that it betides after the same mannerin Animals? And since in Plants the presence of the form in the subject is collected by firm demonstration from their operations; and in the seed of Animals the operations of the soul, Attraction, Formation, Augmentati∣on are found, we justly conclude that the soul is present therein. And since no Agent can immediatly concur to the production of a living Creature, but it must have the same degree of life formally; and the seed of Animals by its own proper virtue, without any new assi∣stance of the Generator, or any motion or direction thereof, yea separated therefrom in place, and many times also in time, does produce a living Animal, and is the principal and ••mmediate Agent in the production of the young one; it must of necessity have formally a like and univocal Soul. And this appears both in such as breed Eggs, and living things.

For in the first place, as concerning Eggs, * 1.221 that the soul of the future Animal is already in them, this shews, that as soon as Eggs are cherished by a convenient Heat the soul in them begins to rouze it self and forms an Animal, like that from whence the Eggs came. Nor can the Generator be the cause of this form; since it is many times dead when the Eggs are hat∣ched;

nor can any other univocal cause be so much as imagined. That the Eggs of Silk∣worms are hatched by a temperate heat, Hieronymus Vida does testifie in the first Book of his Poem of Silk-worms.

Nor are the Silk-worms Eggs batched one way Alone, for some do in the Sun-shine lay The little seeds, until they batched are. Nor shouldst thou be asham'd, O! Lady fair, To give them (wrapt up in thy Lilly Breast) Betwixt thy Rosie Nipples awarm Nest: If thou do'st love to wear a brave silk Gown: For in a day or two, thou up and down Shalt see the wonderous little Worms to creep, Who in their Eggs did lie before asleep.

'Tis commonly known that Hens Eggs are hatcht by Ducks, and Ducks Eggs by Hens. Yea and Jul. Caes. Scaliger relates that in the City of Grand Cairo Chicken are hatcht by the Heat of a Furnace. In all which waies there can be no univocal Agent assigned, but the soul which lies hid in the Egg. * 1.222 For the Eggs of Animals being of a middle nature be∣twixt the seeds of Plants and Animals do agree with both in some things, and in other things they differ: they answer to the seeds of Plants herein, because they contain in them both the soul and the matter of the future yong one; moreover the true seed is covered with a Bark and Membranes: but herein is the difference, that the seeds of Plants when they are committed to the Ground, from it they draw the matter which is necessary to form the body, and of the matter of the seed the first smal Roots and sprouts only are framed, the other parts of matter being drawn out of the Earth: but in Egs since the soul is so barricadoed and shut up in Skins and Shels, that it can draw nothingfrom without, and in the mean while the yong one is in a manner perfectly formed in the Egg. Eggs do not only contain soul and matter fit to shape the first rudiments of the yong Creature, but also matter necessary to shape so per∣fect a Body and to nourish the same. And with the seeds of Animals they do herein agree, that the seed is first of all bred in the Stones or the parts analogical to the Stones, and that the seed is perfectly cast by the Male into the Womb of the Female, which is not so in Plants whose seeds are exposed to many external Injuries, being out of the Earth their Nurse. And here∣in such as breed Eggs differ from those which bring forth living Creatures, in that the seed of the Egg-bearers is not perfected in the Womb of the Females, as the seed of such as beat live young ones is, but is perfect•••• without, and therefore their seed does not remain li∣quid like that of the others, but had need to be governed by an external help and recep∣tacle.

Now the Generation of living Creatures from Eggs is not after one manner. For some are excluded by the Females while they are Egs, and after become Animals being cherished by external Heat. But in Crabs the Eggs stick fast to the Mother, and Crabs are generated in them whiles they are there sticking. * 1.223

But such Creatures as engender within themselves or in their Wombs, do all generate by the meeting together of the seed of the Male and the Female; which seeds as soon as they are conceived in the Womb the souls displaies it self and begins to frame it self a fitting mansion house, which being perfected is called a living Soul Live-wight or Animal. Now the seed of both the Parents although it hath the soul in it, and therewith lives of it self, yet is it no Ani∣mal, nor can an Animal be made thereof unless both are joyned together. That thing is ani∣mated which hath a soul in it, and lives thereby of it self: and that is an Animal or living thing which is furnished with a Soul and Body that hath all the Organs requisite to such a Creature. But the seed of the Male or Female alone cannot become an Animal, but the Con∣ception which consists of both seeds, or of the seed and menstrual Blood, becomes an Animal. And therfore the Male does neither Generate in himself, nor doth he engender an Animal es∣sentially perfect, * 1.224 nor does he ingender alone.

Now that this seed of Animals is animated or hath the soul in it, the Conformation or sha∣ping of the yong one shews. For either the yong is formed by a cause without the seed, or within it. Not without it, for none can be imagined; or if any, it must be the Womb. But that formation does not spring from the Womb is the common opinion of learned men, nor is it destitute of reasons to just fie the same.

Among late Writers (••fuly) Johannes Gallego de la Serna, de princip. generat. Lib. 3. * 1.225 cap. 20. endeavors to prove that the Soul of the Mother is the principal cause of the Orga∣nization and Animation in other Animals, and of the formation and union in Man. And to prove his own Opinion he alleadges certain Authorities of some Philosophers and Physiti∣ans; but contrary to their own evident Understanding, which therefore I list not to set down in this place: And the Reasons which he uses are evidently frivolous.

The first is, That there is no Organ in our Body, which by its own similitude and natu∣ral Inclination hath the power of attracting any useful substance for attractions sake alone, but to enjoy the same, and consequently to change the same; but the Womb hath a power and most vehement Inclination to draw to it self the matter of the child; ergo it draws it not only for attractions sake, but to enjoy, and consequently to change the same. But I answer to the minor, that it is false that the Womb in Creatures that have blood does draw to it self blood necessary to form the yong one; but the soul which is in the Seed draws the same, and therefore also changes the same. For as in Plants the seed cast into the Earth, or a branch of bu•••• set therein, does first form and produce roots by which it draws nourishment out of the Earth; so the soul in the yong one in the Womb forms the umbilical Vessels, by which it draws blood and spirits.

Moreover he conceives the Generative Faculty hath need of a peculiar Organ, and that the Womb is that Organ, since in the whol body there is none like it so accommodated for such an action.

But both of these suppositions are salfe. For in the first place the changing faculty is not Organical, not is it performed in a part as it is Organical, but as it is similar, and furnished with its innate heat. And although the stomach and Liver, and other parts, which do change and generate some substance are Organical: yet they change not nor generate any thing as they are Organical but as they are similary. But they have their Organical constitution for their more convement Reception, Retension, and Expulsion. So the stomach hath the upper Orifice which receives the meat and drink, the Cavity wherein it holds the same the lower Orifice, by which the generated Chylus is sent forth. But Concoction is performed in the sto∣mach inasmuch as it is a similar part, and furnished with its Natural Heat. Again, that pre∣supposition is false, That the Womb does change and inform that blood which comes in for the formation of the Child; since that is done by the soul in the seed. For as when the yong one is formed it hath in it self a nutritive and growing faculty which does not proceed from without: so it is also in the formation or shaping of the said yong one. But the Womb on∣ly affords the place wherein the formation is made, and al the Organical Constitution there∣of is contrived to that intent and purpose.

On the contrary, There are most evident Reasons which prove that the Womb of the Mo∣ther does not perform the shaping of the Child, and that it does not give the soul to the Child, For in the first place, if the Womb did shape the Child or yong one whatever, the Male should not communicate the active Principle of Generation, but only the passive. Yea, and the Female alone should be the cause of Generation, as bestowing both matter and form, and so the female might conceive in het self without a male. Secondly, no reason could be given why the yong one should be somtimes like the Sire of Father. Thirdly, why should not Females be alwaies generated, and how comes there to be Males? Fourthly, That which performs the work Formation must needs immediately touch the Child or yong one: but the Womb does not iminediately touch the yong one, but Membranes come betwixt it and the Womb, and those watry Excrements contained in the Membranes. For whereas Joh. Gallego conceives it conveighs its vertue to the yong one through the Membranes them∣selves, it is absurd, nor are the Membranes parts of the yong one, as Gallego would have it. Much less can that vertue pass through the Excrements. Nor is that of any moment which he saies of the Torpedoes benumming a Mans hand who touches is only with the end of a very long rope, and that the Load-stone moves Iron through a thick board. For those actions are performed by spiritual Species, as was said before in the Second Discourse, chap. 4. of this Treatise, which are as a Ray continually thrust forth, as Jul. Caesar Scaliger, Eaercit. 344. Sect. 5. speak••. But the concocting and changing and forming Faculty is immanent, no•• does it pass from one subject to another, and remaining in its own proper subject, per∣forms its operations, but does not transmit its force through the Membranes and excrements ou•• of the Womb. Indeed Johannes Gallego conceits that it is the part of a blockhead to doubt, Whether the Soul of the Mother can animate the internal parts of the child, al∣though they are covered with Membranes. But I am of Opinion the quickest wit in the World cannot conceive how the Soul being absent and distant in place, can animate the yong

one. For suppose the Womb could work some alteration thereupon, through the Mem∣branes and Excrements of Water, yet could it not cause animation.

Therefore we must needs hold that the Cause of Conformation is in the seed it self. * 1.226 Which is the common Opinion of learned Men, viz. of Aristotle, 2. de generat. animal. cap. 1.3.20. 1. de generat. animal. cap. 20.21. 4. de generat. animal. cap. 1. and el••ewhere. Ga∣len, Lib. de format. foetu. cap. 2.3.5.14. Lib. 1. de sem. cap. 8.18. 2. de sem. cap. 1.2.5.14. de usu partium, cap. 7.8. and others. And it hath questionless strong reasons to support the same. For in the first place, since Conformation is a Natural act, it proceeds from an Internal principle, not an external. Secondly, conformation begins in the seed equally, and al the parts within and without are equally conformed. Thirdly, since in Birds which breed Eggs the principle of Conformation is internal, no reason can be shewed why it should not be so in al other Animals.

And if you now enquire what that internal Principle is, * 1.227 no other can be assigned save the Soul. Some say it is logos Plasticos, or a formatwe Understanding or Faculty: but unless thereby they understand the soul it self furnished with a formative Faculty, this Opinion cannot hold, and hath been sufficiently refuted before, chap. 5. Others hold it is the Native Heat: but neither is that the principal Cause of Formation. For so noble an action which al Philosophers cannot sufficiently admire, can only be ascribed to a quality. And heat is on∣ly a common Instrument, nor can it give to al parts their quantity, figure, and number, and out of question no quality can act unless it be directed by a principal and superior faculty, of which there is need in this case.

Nothing else therefore remains which can be the cause of Conformation in the Seed, save the Soul it self. Which while Thomas Fienus denies he is in great Error, quaest. 5. conclus. 6. and in the first place he hath not indeed rightly stated the Controversie. * 1.228 For whereas he ought to have disputed concerning al Souls living, or al Animals, he contrary to the Rules of Demonstration. goes about to demonstrate an adjunct of the whol kind of Animals, touching one sort, viz. Man-kind. For it is not a thing proper to Man alone to generate from seed cast into the Womb, but common to al Creatures which bring forth yong ones alive. And in the beginning of Quest. 5. he does not rightly form the Question, where he writes. The Question here is not, Whether the Soul brought into the Seed after Conception is the Effi∣cient Cause of Conformation? but whether the Soul pre-existing in the Seed before the Conception, and bred in the Testicles of the Parents is the Cause. For there is no Questi∣on concerning the latter; but this is the Question in controversie; Whether the seeds of the Male and Female joyned together in the Womb, have an intrinsecal formative Faculty (which he grants) and consequently a Soul (for that necessarily follows) in them.

For let us put the case that in a Man the Soul is introduced and confused by God: yet since in Bruits there can be no such Infusion it must needs be presently in the seed, and that communicated from the Parents. And this is sufficiently proved by one Argument which Fienus himself brings, * 1.229 so that there is need of no more, and that is this; that which shapes the body is within the Seed, as he proved, Conclusion the third. That which shapes is some Soul; for shaping is a proper power of the Soul. Ergo, there is a Soul within the Seed, or a Soul of the Seed: for that which he answers (as was said before, chap. 6.) is of no moment. I confess (saies he) the Premises are true. But I deny the Consequence. It is indeed rightly inferred that there is some Soul in the Seed, but not that it is the soul of the Seed. There is indeed a Soul brought into the Seed after that the Seed is conceived in the Womb, or planted in the Earth, or the Egg set under the Hen, when all things are put into act; but that is not the Soul of the Seed, or which did pre-exist in the Seed, or which was bred in the Stones, the Tree, or the Hen, but the Soul of the yong one conceived being after∣wards introduced thereinto. For suppose indeed that the Soul is introduced into humane Seed; yet into the Seeds of Plants, the Egs of Hens, and the seeds of Bruits, 'tis false to hold that the Soul is afterwards introduced, For what introduces the Soul into the seed thrown in the ground, what introduces it into an Hens Eggs whiles a Duck sits over them, or while they are hatched by the heat of a furnace? Here can be no cause assigned by which the Soul should be introduced. And if the Parents should not give the Soul, but some exter∣nal thing, like should not ingender its like. And what need is there I pray you (in this case) tomultiply things to no end, and to hold two Souls; one which is the Soul of the Seed, or which did pre-inexist in the Seed, and was bred in the Stones, or the Tree, or the Hen, and another introduced afterwards. * 1.230 And he contradicts himself in this point, whiles in Conclul. 6. he writes: That the shaping of the Seed in the Earth is not essential generation it self, but only the perfection of the new Plant already constituted and generated upon the Tree; and

the bringing thereof now to a perfect act, which was before constituted only in an imperfect act; nor is it any matter what the vulgar people think or call Generation, or what they do not so call; nor what agrees to their understanding, but what agrees to the Truth. For the common people are ignorant of Philosophy, and knows not when and where a Plants form is truly produced, nor when is the Essential generation of a Plant; and knows not how to distinguish between the first act and the second, betwixt that which is imperfect, and that which is perfect: and therefore they take one for another; and conceive that a Plant is then first generated when it is perfected and operates, and when it brings forth Roots and Leaves; whose production is not the Generation of the Plant, but the operation and per∣fection thereof, being generated before. So fat Fienus. And in very deed if Fienus as he rightly understood the presence of the Seed when Conformation it made, so he had also known the propagation and original thereof he might easily have freed himself from al•• doubts besides. For the truth in that point being discerned al doubts are easily resolved.

For although they that think otherwise do alleadg many things: yet they can bring no∣thing solid and firm for their Opinion: which knowing, that they might abuse the Reader contrary to the Laws of Demonstration, such things as they should dispute of the seed and formation of Animals in general, those they dispute in particular touching the Soul and for∣mation of Man; which when they are examined in general and in their own place they prove of no force. For many being of Opinion that the soul of Man is not propagated from his Parents, but infused by God when the body is formed, and the same being also immortal; al those absurdities which are objected against the Animation of Seed from the Prerogative of the Humane Soul do fal to the ground if they be propounded in general so as to concern bruit Beasts also. For they are not able to shew whence proceeds the soul and formation of the Body of an Horse, a Lyon, a Dog, unless the Soul be derived from the Parents with the Seed; nor can they tel us who it is that begins the Delineation of the yong one in al Animals, or why it should be necessary that the said Information should be begun by one, and perfe∣cted by another. But especially they are nat able to shew how out of the Eggs of Birds yong ones of the same kind are hatched, especially by a Bird of another kind sitting on the said Eggs, or when they are hatched by the heat of a Furnace, unless the Soul were already in the Egg. And therefore since in Bruit Animals those Arguments are of no force, the most of those also which are urged concerning the Generation of Man wil also be of no force. And although some distinguish betwixt the Conception and the Seed, and cal that white sub∣stance bred in the stones the Seed, which is shed into the Womb in the time of Copulation; and that Body bred of the Seed in the Womb the Conception, wherein there are some linea∣ments of the future Animal already drawn; yet they themselves cannot shew a Reason whence the Soul in Bruits (for here we wil set aside the Humane Soul, thence thereabouts, for the reasons aforesaid there is a peculiar dispute) should come into the Conception, if it were not in the Seed before; nor tel us what cause began that first delineation and figuration of the parts of every Animal. For whereas Johannes Gallego de la Serna, saies it proceeds from the Womb, that is altogether false. For so the Female should only generate, since she alone gives the soul, and the Male affords only the matter.

But let us see their Objections. In the first place many indeed Object, and therein also triumph, That nothing is animated but a body and its parts; but the Seed is an Excrement and a certain superfluous moisture bred in the stones, being just like the Chyle in the sto∣mach, the blood in the Liver and Heart, and the milk in the Dugs. But in good deed this Argument of theirs is of no weight, as shal be also shewn hereafter in Chap. 14. * 1.231 For in the first place, they beg the Question, and this very thing is a part thereof, whether only the parts of the body, or the seed also be animated. For although the Seed is bred in the stones, as Chyle in the stomach, and is no nutriment of the body; yet it does not thence follow that it is an Excrement. For there is a third thing generated in living Creatures, viz. the fruit or seed, cal it which you please, which the seed of Plants does evidently declare. For some do make exceptions and say, that there is a difference betwixt the seeds of Plants and Animals, and that the Seed of Plants is not like the seed of Animals, but like the Conception made in the Wombs of Animals. But suppose it so to be; yet thereby is proved, that there is also somwhat bred in Animals which is neither a part of their Body, nor a Nutriment, nor an Ex∣crement. Nor does that prove the contrary which Johannes Gallego de la Serna objects, de princip. generat. Lib. 2. cap. 5. while he writes that the seed of Animals cannot attain to that ultimate disposition to the Introduction of the Soul, which those parts of the same sub∣stances have attained, which have been turned into the substance of the parts; and that the seed hath only received from its organ assimilation, such as the concoctive Faculty was able

to give it, and such as Milk hath received, and that therefore it remains inanimate. For they are meet beggings of the Question, and the seed of Plants does demonstrate the contrary. For if the seed of Plants could receive that disposition necessary for the propagation of Plants; why cannot the seed of Animals receive the same? And milk it self which Johan∣nes Gallego brings for an example, evidently declares that somwhat may be ingendred in the bodies of Animals which is no part of the body nor its Aliment (for the Mother is not nou∣fished with the Milk she breeds) nor a meer Excrement: such as seed also is, which is not therefore bred in the stones by the concoctive Faculty only that it might be voided forth as al Excrements are, but therefore and to this end that by it a new Individual might be gene∣rated, * 1.232 and so the kind might be preserved. And therefore though the Concoctive Faculty does not animate the Seed, as neither in other parts does the aliment receive the Soul from the Coctive Faculty: yet after the Seed hath received from the Concoctive Faculty such a disposition that it can be a fit subject for the Soul, the soul which is in the animate body does communicate it self thereto as wel in Plants as Animals: which after it is separated from the Parent, by vertue and power of the soul which it possesses and hath received from the Generator it is able to constitute a new individual, or particular dist••••ct live thing. For in them also the seed is first elaborated by the Concoctive Faculty; and when the seed is wel wrought and ripe, then the soul communicates it self thereto. The same comes to pass in Animals, nor is there any reason to shew that it is otherwise; save that in Ammals as being more perfect there is a more labored preparation, and both the male and the female communicates somwhat to the Constitution of the yong one; nor is the seed cast into the Earth, * 1.233 but into the Womb. Nor let that trouble any one that the seed of Animals which bring forth quick yong ones, is of a different Nature from the seed of Plants, and that the seeds of Plants are wonderously and variously shaped: but the seeds of Animals represent only a Liquor like milk. For seeing the seeds of Animals are presently cast into the womb of the Mother, and cherished thereby, and therein receive blood necessary to nourish the yong one; there was no need that they should be senced against external Injuries, by external co∣verings as the seeds of Plants and Eggs also are.

Howbeit in the Womb it self the Seeds of Animals do frame many things which are neces∣sary for the Formation and augmentation of the yong one; such as are the Coats which in∣fold the same, the Umbilical or Navel Vessels, and such things as belong to these. Finally, in such Creatures as produce Eggs, because the Eggs were to be kept long before the Chicken are hatched, and that is not performed by the heat of the Womb, but by an external Heat, yet they are covered with shels after the same manner as the seeds of Plants. For Eggs do herein agree with the seeds of Plants, that as in Plants to the marrow or pap which is pro∣perly the seed, other things are added either to guard the seed, or to make food for Man-kind, or for other uses; so also in Eggs other things are found besides the true seed. Which does even hereby appear, That the Eggs which the Hens lay untrodden by the Cock have al that is food in Eggs, yet are they unfruitful because they want the seed of the male. Which hap∣pens also in Insects. Al female Silkworms without difference yield Eggs: but such as have not coupled with the male al their Eggs or seeds are unfruitful. Yet this difference there is betwixt the seeds of Plants and Eggs, that of those things which are added to the true seed, the Plant is neither formed, nor noutished, nor augmented; but the seed draws nourishment to it self out of the ground, save that (as was said before in Chap. 8.) the first rudiments of the tender Plant do draw their Nutriment out of some part of the Pulp; but Eggs, because without the Womb and out of the Earth, they become a perfect Animal, and the seed (of which at first the Chick is formed) is covered with a shel that it can draw nothing from with∣out: in the Egg there lies already so much matter as may suffice to perfect the Chick til such time as it is hatched.

Secondly, * 1.234 Johan. Gallego de la Serna, Lib. 3. de princip. sem. cap. 5. promises that he wil prove that the Seed is only a material principle of Generation, that no man unless he be blockish and stubborn, wil hereafter dare to deny the same. But he performs not his great Promises, * 1.235 and those are sleight Arguments which he brings. For in the first place he saies that the Seed is much more imperfect than the Generator, and the yong one to be gene∣rated. For it is a certain Excrement of the Generator. But I answer, That the seed also of Plants which he grants to be animated, is more imperfect than the Generator and the Plants generated therefrom, not because it hath no soul, but because it hath no formed Organs which lie hid nevertheless aptitudinally in the seed, which contains in it an Idea or Plat-form of them, and they are fabricated by the Soul it self. But that the Seed should be only an Ex∣crement was before refuted.

Again, He conceits that the virtue of the same sort cannot be received in a matter of a di∣stinct sort. But the form of the seed differs from the form of any Individual of what sort soever. But he does not rightly understand the nature of Seed. True indeed it is the soul cannot persist in a perfect manner, nor last long save in a body fit for it, and furnished with such Organs as it hath need of, but that it cannot be propagated by a different body, viz. the seed, and abide therein so long til it have generated and built a Body for it self, ex∣perience it self teaches that to be false, and he himself granted as much before in Plants. For there is indeed one soul in the seed, and in the Animal ingendred thereby: but yet that which is in the Animal differs not from that in the seed, save in the accomodation and per∣fection of Organs. Verily neither the seeds of Plants, nor the Bulbs, nor the Rootes, nor the Branches (if you consider the perfection of Organs) are of the same condition with perfect Plants, for example sake, the seed and bulb of an Onion after a sort is not a perfect Oni∣on; the seed of Poppy after a sort is not an entire Poppy Plant; the Branch of a Pear Tree is not a perfect Pear Tree: yet in all these there is the perfect soul belonging to that sort of Plant. Nor is the matter in the seed and that in the young one of a different but of one and the same sort.

Thirdly, Gallego does also very much urge this Argument, 1. de princip. Generat. Lib. 3. * 1.236 Cap. 18. when a thing is by Nature & Art so made for some other thing that the latter cannot exist without the former, it must needs be that that which is made for the necessity of another should go before it in time. But the matter and all its dispositions are for the form: Ergo they ought to precede the same in time. For the form should never be united to the matter save for the Instrumental actions, Ergo the Organs and necessary Instruments ought to precede before the Introduction of the form, and the whol preparation of the matter necessary for the actions of the soul cannot any waies be made by the same form whose actions they are, but by the Agent to which the whol work of Generation is committed. For to the same Agent to which it belongs to Introduce the form into the new matter, it belongs also before its Introdu∣ction so to prepare the matter that by no means it can be received in another, nor the matter it self can receive the active form. But both the Major simply taken and the Minor are un∣true, and the proof thereof is false. That the Minor is false, both the formation of the Bo∣dy of Plants, and Nutrition and Augmentation of Animals do teach. For first of all, when the seed of a Plant is cast into the Earth, or a Branch or Root or Bulb is set therein, there is no other Agent which can first form the Body and Instruments sit for the soul, but the soul in the Seed, Bulb or Branch, does first form the Roots, by which it draws out of the Earth convenient matter to form a body fit for it self, and of it forms the parts of its own body. Why then should not the same thing be done in Animals? Yea the thing it self tels us that the same is done. For the seed being received into the Womb, the Soul first forms the Membranes in which the seed is included, and then the umbilical Vessels by which it draws blood necessary to form the body withall. Which thing also Eggs do testifie, which being cherished by any heat whatsoever Birds are thence produced. Where no cause can be so much as imagined which should fit the matter to receive the soul save the soul it self which is in the Egg. Again, The proof of the Minor is false, which builds upon that never granted Hypothesis, that after the ultimate disposition of the matter then the soul is educed and springs forth. This indeed is true, that al the organization (as he phrases it) is for the form, that is to say, that the form may have sit Instruments whereby to act; but that the soul could not be there in its first act before it can perfectly operate by the Organs can no waies be proved.

Fourthly, Others object that if the seed of an Animal (for example of an Horse) hath actually the soul in it, the seed of an Horse is an Horse; since the form of a thing being sup∣posed, three things are supposed, the Essence of that thing, the Name, and the Operation thereof. But here is no consequence at all. We grant indeed that the Essence of a thing does chiefly depend upon the Soul, and consequently the denomination, and that from it the operations flow: yet the soul is not the whol thing, but a part thereof. And therefore the other part being wanting, viz. the organical body, the soul cannot be called an Animal.

Fiftly, Some do Glory in this Argument, viz. that it is a metaphysical Principle, * 1.237 that the same thing cannot be at once actually and potentially. Since therefore the seed is po∣tentially an Animal, it cannot be actually an Animal. But there is no strength in this Argu∣ment. For not to dispute in this place of the genuine sence of that metaphysical Axiom, since the same thing in divers respects may be said to be both actually and potentially: I shall only speak to that, whereas the seed is said to be potentially an Animal; and I Answer, That this Argument is drawn from Authority, and that which upon a like occasion the most

learned Thomas Fienus said from Plato's Charmides; it is not to be regarded what any man saies, but whether he speaks true or not. Again saving the Authority of Aristotle, the most renowned Casparus Hofmannus hath wel written, as before we hinted more than once, In tract. de formarum Origine, rat. 2. Aristotle hath so often said that the seed is an Act, that it is the part of a very unskilful Person to urge only those places where he saies it is po∣tential. For seeing (as was said before) that which moves is actually, but the animated seed actually moves, certainly the seed must have a certain act which moves. This act is that same beginning of Generation and Motion (as Aristotle cals it) 1. de Generat. An. cap. 2. and the beginning of the shape which turns the Courses into its own likeness. 1. de gener. animal. cap. 20. & 4. de Gen. cap. 1. 1. de part. animal cap. 1. And left any should feign I know not what spermatick Principle (of which we spake cap. 5.) different from the Soul, he terms this Punciple, a member or part of the Animal, which is immediately in the Seed, 2. de gen. anim. cap. 1. And whereas Aristotle somtimes saies, that the seed is poten∣tially animated; this he therefore said, as Scaliger wel observes Exercit. 6. sect. 7. not be∣cause it needs another substance to draw forth and perfect the same (for so it were but begun) but because it wants perfect Instruments which are in its power to make. Which also Za∣barella held, who (de Mente humana cap 9) expresly writes, that the Seed hath a Soul potentially, because its soul does not yet work by its proper Organs.

Sixtly, They say if the Soul frames its own Mansion house, (as is asserted) Why does it not presently frame the same in the seminary Vessels? But let them tel us, why the Soul of a Dog does not see in the Dogs Tail, nor produce Seed, nor form a Body in the same place. For where the Place and Organ is wanting, there no Operation can be perfor∣med.

Seventhly, * 1.238 They say if the seed is actually animated, why is there no nutrition discerned therein, which is the most common action of the Soul? But it is denied that nutrition is the most common action of the soul, for vivification is its most common action. For Nutri∣tion belongs only to the Body already formed, and when Nutriment is at hand. Hence the seed of Barly, Whear, or other Grain lives in the Granary, which Johannes Gallego does grant, but it is not nourished, because it is not in a convenient place wherein it may be che∣rished and receive aliment.

Eighthly, * 1.239 They object if the seed be animated and both the Parents contribute the same, the soul wil be a thing compounded of the soul of the Father, and the soul of the Mother. But mixtion and composition as hath formerly been said does only belong to things of diffe∣rent sorts; but if things joyn which are of the self same sort there is no composition; nor is the fire which arises from many flames united called compound: and the example of Palmes was formerly alleadged out of Scaliger. And that example also Fort. Licetus (de perfecta constitutione hominis in utero chap. 8.) alleadges; that by ingrafting when a branch is put into the trunk of a Tree, two and somtimes more souls do joyn, and yet the Tree is but one, and hath but one soul. Whence that fals to ground which some do urge touching the Com∣migration of two Essences, and the subsistence of two Essences in one, which they count absurd. For all these things are true only of compleat Essences and which can sub. sift of themselves; but not of those which are ordanied to make up the perfection of one thing.

Ninthly, * 1.240 Whereas they count it absurd that many souls should proceed from one Parent, and that the Parent in every time of copulation should lose a part of his soul, all this pro∣ceeds from their ignorance of the nature of the soul. The soul (as hath been said before) hath no parts properly so called, and it is deprived of no part thereof, but remaining stil the same does variously multiply it self. For though one Tree in one Summer do produce a thou∣sand Apples, and each Apple hath sundry seeds, and out of each of them a like Apple-tree wil grow: yet the soul of the Apple-tree is not diminished but remains totally the same. And the same holds in Animals. And therefore it is more decent to search and admire the wonderful works of God than to calumniate the same. And all those absurdities which are objected against the wonderful work of Generation are nothing but disparagements of the works of God proceeding from Ignorance.

Finally, That the seed is animated, Thomas Fienus does (de format. faet. quest. 5.) thus Impugn: Neither the Blood (saies he) nor the Spirits are animated: ergo, not the Seed. He proves the Consequence because they are produced in parts much more noble than the Stones are, viz. in the Heart, the Brain, the Liver, which if they could not impart the soul to the Blood and Spirits, neither can the stones. But the Principal parts have their dignity. And therefore although the Liver, Heart, Brain, do generate Blood and Spi∣rits:

yet for the Generation of Animals the stones have a peculiar seed-making faculty, such as no other parts have, that of the blood and spirits bred in other parts they may form a peculiar matter which is the fit subject for the soul to be propagated in, which is termed Seed, which is much more excellent than the Blood fince it is the fruit of an Animal, and the Blood is only the nutriment.

Chap. 10. Of the Propagation of the Humane Soul.

ANd hitherto we have demonstrated by firm reasons (as I conceive) that Plants and bruit Animals are generated by Seed which hath a Soul in it communicated from the Gene∣rator; which lying hid in the Seed forms it self a fit Mansion house according to the kind of Plant or Animal from whence it came. It remains that we speak of the Generation of Man, * 1.241 concerning which Authors are of divers Opinons. Some had rather suspend their Judg∣ments than determine any thing in so difficult a matter. Others hold that as the Body, so the Soul of Man is propagated from the Parents into the Children by vertue of the Divine Benediction. Others conceive that new Souls are created for every person by God, and in∣fused into their Bodies aster they are formed, and so they ascribe the production of Souls immediately to God. As to the first Opinion, I acknowledg indeed the difficulty of the mat∣ter, and I confess that it is here dangerous to determine any thing. Howbeit since in matters difficult 'tis praise-worthy to do a mans endeavor, and we ought to labor with al our might to know the Truth, setting aside the first Opinion we shal examine and weigh the two latter. And in the first place I am not indeed ignorant what Priviledges the Soul of Man hath, viz. To it alone immortality is granted by God, which is denied to the Beasts, and it alone shal be partaker or eternal Blessedness. But whether the Propagation thereof by the Seed can derogate any thing from this Prerogative of Mans Soul is a question. Nor would I (truly) hereabouts hatefully contend with any man, but I allow every man to abound in his own sence, and to enjoy his own Understanding; but if I may speak my own mind, there are three things which lie me in hand to prove. First that it is more probable and likely that the Soul of Man is propagated from his Parents by vertue of the Divine Benediction. The Second is, That whether we hold the Soul to be created and infused, or to be propagated and traduced from the Parents; yet nevertheless we must hold that the Soul is present in the Seed at the first conception, and when the seed of the Father and Mother are joyned together in the Womb and retained, and as soon as ever the work of shaping the Body begins, and that no other efficient Cause can be assigned which performs the work of Conformation, sa∣ving the Humane Soul it self. Thirdly, though I know great Authors differ in this point, yet (if setting aside Authority, Reason shal be only considered) I shal demonstrate, That scarce any solid Reason can be brought against the Propagation of the Humane Soul by the Seed. And whereas this point is disputed both with Philosophical and Theological Rea∣sons, I shal not put my Sickle into other Mens Corn, but use only Philosophical Arguments. And if any man wil defend the other Opinion by Theological Reasons it concerns him to see and shew how these Arguments may be answered. Which if he shal do I wil not be wilful in defending mine own Opinion, but shal willingly follow him that shews me better. In the mean time, and til that be done, as far as I am able to judg in this darkness and weakness of Humane Understanding I cannot think otherwise. But I give others free leave to think otherwise. For I desire not to be a Dictator, but only to propound my Opinion as wel as others do theirs.

Now that the Soul is propagated from the Parents into the Children by the Seed is first hereby proved, in that (as was said before) like begets its like. * 1.242 Which Aristotle evidently shews, 2. de Anima, chap. 4. text. 34. where he thus speaks: This Operation is of all others most natural to living things; I mean to such living things as are perfect, not mai∣med, and which are not born without seed: every thing I say to beget another like it self, an Animal an Animal, a Plant a Plant, that thus they may continue alwaies, and attain as much as may be a Divine Condition. For since God made every thing in its kind perfect, but Man most perfect of al; verily he could not be called perfect, but should according to Aristotle be reckoned amongst maimed things if he could not beget another like himself, and that intire. And therefore both according to Philosophers and Divines, Man ingenders Man, and the whol Man an whol Man, which could not be if the Generator did not communicate the Soul. For since a Man consists of Body and Soul, if the Soul should not be communica∣ted

by the Parents, a Man should not engender a Man. Also that a Man communicates his soul to his Child is altogether agreeable to the holy Scriptures. For God, Gen. 1.18. said to Man (as wel as other Creatures) when he blessed him, Encrease ye and multiply: by vertue of which Benediction the whol Man ingenders an whol Man; which could not be if the Soul were infused from without. Of which more largely in Chap. 11. For what ever pertains to the Essential Integrity of a Man that is propagated by Generation. But not only the Body, but the Soul pertains to the Integrity or entire being of a Man. And there∣fore the Soul also is propagated by Generation. Whence also Damascen, Lib 4. de Ortho∣doxa fide, cap. 7. defines Generation to be the Procreation of an Individual of like sub∣stance by the Copulation of a Man and a Woman. Nor is the beginning of the Soul of Man to be fetched from Creation. For every thing that is created is not immortal. Yea, rather whatever is created is of it self mortal. And that some things are mortal, others immortal, proceeds not from the condition of Nature, but from the most free good pleasure of God; who created what he pleased, when he pleased, and how he pleased. And such is the Nature of Man, as God would have it to be; and it is so propagated, retaining its Essence given by God, even as he pleased.

But let every man hold here as he pleases, * 1.243 and let him beleeve that the soul is infused on propagated: yet this (in the second place) I conceive to be most certain, That the Soul is present immediately upon the first Conception as soon as the seed of the Man and Woman are joyned and retained in the Mothers Womb, and the body begins to be shaped; and he that holds the contrary, whether he stand for the Propagation, or for the Infusion of the Soul, he is in an Error. For there are in the first place some of them who hold that the Rational Soul is not immediately created and infused by God, * 1.244 but propagated from the Parents, who notwithstanding slip back into that vulgar Opinion of the School-men concerning the Educti∣on of Forms, and hold, That the Soul does not at first lie hid in the Seed actually, but only potentially, and when the seed is somwhat wrought, and the members of the body are in some measure delineated, that then at last by the formative faculty inherent in the seed the Soul is educed out of the power of the matter excited and kindled, so that whereas before it only lay hid potentially, now it begins actually to be, to live, and to inform its body.

But all which hath been formerly alleadged, Chap. 4. and 5. against the Eduction of Forms out of the power of matter and the formative Principle in the seed do make also a∣gainst this Opinion, which it is needless to repeat in this place; only I think fit to produce here what is alleadged by Balthazar Meisnerus, in Philosoph. sobr. part. 1. sect. 3. cap. 6. quaest. 1. And to omit his other Theological Reasons which he brings, many Inconveniencies and absurdities follow from this Opinion. For in the first place an accident, viz The for∣mative power which is in the second rank of Qualities should produce so noble and excellent a substance, which is absurd. Secondly, the formative faculty should be without a sub∣ject. For the Prolifick Faculty is not a faculty of the seed, but of the soul. And there∣fore where there is no soul there can be no prolifick faculty unless we would have an accident to be without its subject. Again, this faculty in the seed is either corruptible, or not. If you say it is not, then the seed being corrupted either it passes into the soul newly produced, or else to some other place. But neither of these can be. Not the former, because the pow∣ers inherent in the soul are produced thereby, but do not produce it. How absurd were it therefore to say that the formative faculty does first raise the Soul out of the seed, and af∣terwards insinuate it self thereinto, and flow therefrom? Not the latter, because either it would go away by it self, or pass into another subject. The former is contrary to the Na∣ture of accidents which do not subsist separated: and the latter is improbable, because no subject can be named to which it mixes it self. Therefore that Formative Faculty must needs be corruptible; which being granted, it follows that the Soul it self is cor∣ruptible and mortal: for an incorruptible thing cannot be generated out of a cor∣ruptible.

But those who hold the Creation and Infusion of the Soul do al of them conceive that the Soul is not infused at the first Conception, but when the body is formed.

But they who setting aside Authority and anticipated Opinions are willing diligently to weigh and consider the matter it self, cannot otherwise hold than that the soul of man is pre∣sent immediately after the first Conception, * 1.245 and as soon as a Mans body begins to be formed. And for the proof thereof I wil use the same Argument which formerly I used in general to prove the presence of the Soul in the Seed. viz. Where ever the operations of the Humane Soul are, there that must of necessity be present. But at the first Conception the operations

of the Humane Soul are forthwith present: ergo the Humane Soul is there also. Now these Operations are first the formation of the membranes which infold the Child, and af∣terward the shaping of the Child is self, which (as afterwards shal be said) begins at the first Conception. Afterward the augmentation of the Child it self. For sure it is, as soon as the parts of the Child are delineated they begin to grow. But in growing the Soul is com∣municated to the parts which are added to the Body. Therefore also in the first augmenta∣tion the parts which accrew must needs be animated. And absurd it were that the child being born should be augmented by one Soul, and in the Womb by another.

The most renowned Thomas Fienus, Professor of Physick in the University of Lovaine, * 1.246 was moved (de form. foet. quaest. 8. Conclus. 11.) by the force (doubtless) of this Argument to dissent from al those who hold the soul to be infused, and that not til about the fortieth day after Conception, and to hold that the Rational Soul is infused the third day after the Conception of the Seed: which he proves by these Arguments. First, That which shapes the child shapes the membranes; but that which shapes the membranes ought to be the third day in the Seed. Therefore the Rational Soul ought to be about the third day in the Seed. For that which shapes the membranes ought to be in the seed before they be shaped, or at the same time when they begin to be shaped; since every Efficient Cause is in time before, or together with the Effect. But the membranes are shaped at the furthest on the fift or sixt day. Therefore they begin to be shaped on the third day at least; and therefore the Ra∣tional Soul ought to be in the seed at least on the third day. For two or three daies at least seem requisite to perfect the same; since they have a structure artificial enough, and little Veins and Arteries running through their substance which cannot be formed in a moment of time.

Now that what forms the Child does also form the membranes, he thus proves: Beings are not rashly and without necessity to be multiplied. Now one and the same soul can perform al the Conformation which is requisite to the seed. For al parts are begun at one and the same time though al do not so soon appear perfect. And therefore more than one Soul to shape is needless. Nor can any other soul or vertue be assigned which might form these membranes save the Rational Soul in the seed, which in quaest. 8. he proves at large. Yea, and he further shews that it is the Office of the same formative faculty which makes the child to make the membranes also. For in the first place the membranes are shaped for the childs sake, and the Seed is covered with them lest it should be defiled by the filth of the Womb, and the Menstrual blood, lest the seed should run about and slip out of the Womb, and that the spirits therein might not exhale. Secondly, the Membranes are formed of the same matter that the child is formed of, viz. of the seed, and consequently of the same for∣mative Faculty. Thirdly, the membranes live, ergo are formed by the same soul where∣with they live. Fourthly, the Navel Vessels are formed by the same cause the child is for∣med by; ergo the membranes also. For the Membranes ought fitly to be joyned to the Na∣vel Vessels, and the Navel Vessels ought to be cloathed by them, and to perforate and go through them. But that union and connexion cannot be made by different formative facul∣ties. And ridiculous it were to think that the membranes are not made by any formative fa∣culty, but are only bred by the heat of the womb as the crust of a Loaf by the Ovens heat, and the skin upon milk by the heat of the fire. For the generation of the membranes and their con∣junction and connexion with the Navel Vessels is far more artificial than that it can be cau∣sed only by the drying of the fire; nor is it made by necessity of the matter, but it is special∣cially intended by Nature, as without which there could be no Child made of the Seed.

Nowthat the Membranes are made the fift or sixt day, Experience it self, * 1.247 and the observa∣tion of Physitians does witness; as appears from Hippocrates, Lib. de Natura pueri, where he speaks of the dancing Wench who cast a Conception out of her Womb the fixt day after it was conceived being covered with a Membrane; Galen, 1. de sem. cap. 4. where he writes that frequently three or four daies after Conception the seed it self comes away covered with a Coat: And Macrobius, in som. Scipionis, Lib. 1. cap. 6. and al observations of later Phy∣sitians confirm the same. Secondly, he proves the same hereby, because towards the Intro∣duction of the Soul (he speaks according to his own supposition, or else he would have said propagation) there needs no other action then that seeds should be mixed in the womb by the vertue and heat thereof, and be there fermented and actuated. And to such a mixture fer∣mentation and actuation there needs no long delay of time. For Nature (truly) is not idle a moment, but begins to work as soon as the seed is conceived. And when the last disposi∣tions (he speaks again according to his own Hypothesis) are induced to the Introduction of

the Soul, there is no further need of any other great alteration or elaboration thereof in the Womb. Which he proves by the example of the Seeds of Plants upon which the ultimate dispositions are so imprinted that often of their own accord they begin to sp••out on the boat∣ded floors where they he.

Touching which Opinion of that most learned Man that I may give my sence; * 1.248 he writ most diligently and accurately above al others touching this matter; and serting aside Autho∣rities, he freely and ingenuously propounded his own Opinion, and confirmed it with rea∣sons, and for the most part held the truth. For in the first Conclusion he ••ightly proves, That neither God, nor Intelligences, nor the Soul of the World, were the efficient Causes of Conformation; in the second, That the formative faculty is not in the Womb; in the third. That the conformative faculty is in the Seed, and that it is intrinsecal thereunto; in the fourth, That the Native heat is not the principal efficient cause of Conformation; in the fift, That the Generative Faculty of the Parents is not the efficient cause of the conformation or changing of the seed in the Womb; in the ninth, That the Rational Soul is the first and only Soul in the Seed, and that no other does precede the same; in the tenth, That the Ra∣tional Soul in Man does shape its own body, and give the same its form; in the eleventh, That the Rational Soul is present about the third day after Conception. And thus from the formation of the Child he perceived evidently and cleerly, that the whol formation thereof was begun, continued, and perfectly accomplished by one and the same soul about the third day, yea, in the end of the second, or rather (since Nature is not a moment idle) as soon as ever the seeds are mixed in the Womb. Which is a thing so manifest that al who hold the contrary must needs fal into most absurd Opinions.

But since even before the third day (as we shal shew anon) certain operations and some formation is made, * 1.249 he does not shew what causes that formation, either in Man, or in Bruits. Moreover, his Arguments do only prove, That the Rational Soul of a man is present soon af∣ter the beginning of Formation: but they do not prove, That the Soul of a Man is about the third day infused, or rather (as he phrazes it) increated by God. For although it be suffici∣ently demonstrated, That the Rational Soul of a Man is present at the beginning of the shaping of the child; yet another Question does now arise, viz. Whether it be propagated? or whether it be infused by God, and by him created in the seed disposed for it. * 1.250 Where he brings no Arguments nor Reasons for his Opinion, and his other Propositions wherein he differs from my Opinion, viz. The sixt, That the Soul of the Seed is not the efficient Cause of Conformation; the seventh, That in the Seed as it is Seed, and as it is in the Stones, and before it hath received the Soul in the Womb, there is no active vertue of Conformation or Generation; and that the Seed is not an Instrument in Generation, or an efficient, but only a material Cause; and that in neither of the Parents seed there is any active principle of ge∣neration, but only passive; the Eighth, That the Efficient of Conformation is the soul which comes into the seed after Conception: al these I say spring from that Hypothesis, viz. That the Rational is infused by God: had it not been for which he would doubtless have acknow∣ledged the presence of the Soul in the Seed. Which Hypothesis nevertheless is built upon Authorities and no sound Reason, as shal hereafter appear; nor do the Patrons thereof bring any substantial proof for it, but only fly to that of Justus Lipsius, who when (Lib. 3. Physiolog. Stoic. cap. 7.) he had produced the Authority of Tertullian and many Latines, who held that the Soul was bred in the seed, and did not enter into the same, and had praised Gregory Nyssen, who said none in his wits could think that the original of the Soul was later than the Constitution of the Body, he concludes: That it was an Opinion which might be maintained, had not the Church the purer sort of Divines agreed to beleeve otherwise: and therefore we must obey.

And that which moved Lipsius to deny the propagation of the Humane soul by the seed, and rather to hold that it was infused, that doubtless hath moved others also, and amongst them the renowned Marcus Marci, who if he would have contended only with Physical Reasons, questionless he would have granted the propagation of the Humane Soul by seed. Which appears in that, in Lib. 1. Ideae Idearum operatric. cap. 4. he writes: And if any one would bring a reason of this diversity (viz. That the souls of Bruits are propagated with the seed, and not of Men) I refer that man to the Omnipotency of the Creator, who gives to al things not only such a faculty as is agreeable to their nature, but also their manner, time, number, order, and certain limits. But the Question is not here what God can do, yea, and what he hath done. But it is only pre-supposed and not proved, that God wil not have the Soul of Man propagated by seed; nor if that were held, does it import any absurdity; which does even by that appear which he afterwards adds. But nothing hindred if the Creator had

so thought fit, but that the Soul of Man might have been so fastened to the seed that it also might be frequently multiplied and born again as it were in particular persons. But the reasons formerly produced do prove, That it so pleased the Creator, nor are there any suf∣ficient reasons to prove, that God would not have it so. Marcus Marci endeavors indeed to prove that, when he adds: Yet because it was inconvenient that a Man should be so born, and disagreeable to the end for which he was created, the omnipotent goodness would not have it so. For the souls of Bruits tend only to adorn this world, and because through their corruptible Nature they cannot hold out in one Individual they diffuse themselves in∣to many, that one succeeding another, that variety may be preserved. But the soul of Man does not only adorn this temporary Scene of the World, but is co-heir with the blessed Spirits of the Eternal World to come. Whence of necessity (the act of this life being fini∣shed) it is transferred into that same eternal Life which wil make it either happy or misera∣ble. And in case there were but one soul in al, the same at the resurrection of the body should be happy and miserable, beloved and hated of God. But I conceive these reasons are not of sufficient weight. Nor does the propagation of the humane Soul by the Seed make it incapable of another life, nor does it thence follow that there should be one soul of al either now or hereafter. For he himself grants that the Creator could have caused the humane soul to be multiplied in the Individuals. But the holy Scriptures shew that God nor only could, but would have it so, when they teach that God commanded that not only other Animals but Man also should beget his like, and multiply himself into Individuals; and the actions themselves which appear in the seed, and other reasons fore-alleadged do prove that several Individual persons have their several Souls, which being immortal shal neither be abo∣lished after death, nor shal grow into one, but each at the last day shal be restored to its Body.

And if (as I hinted before) Fienus and other learned men who have written of the for∣mation of the yong one had sought the cause of the formation of a living body, * 1.251 not in Man as being too narrow a subject, but in general in al living things, Plants, and Animals, they had more easily found out the truth. For when (Quest. 5.) Fienus was necessitated to grant that the seed o•• Plants is animated he ought in the next place to have enquired how it is with the seed of Bruits whether it is animated or not, and what therein is the cause of the Conformation of an animate body. And since he himself grants that Conformation begins presently after Conception is made (and he solidly proves there is no other cause of Con∣formation but the soul, and the soul of Bruits is not infused from Heaven) he might thence have easily collected both that the seed of Bruits is animated, and that the soul therein is the Cause of the Conformation of the body. But seeing those things which he objects against the presence of the Humane Soul in the Seed do also oppose that of the seed of Bruits, he ought to have considered how they should be answered. For if he had done this he would easily have seen how those doubts which are objected against the presence of the Humane Soul in the seed might have been answered. One thing only had remained for him to en∣quite into, viz. Whether in the point of propagation the Humane Soul hath any thing pe∣culiar to it self, which the bruit Animals have not: and since the formation of the members (which himself makes an argument of the presence of the Soul) begins not on the third day, but at the first moment of Conception, he ought to have proved why that formation should not be a sign of the souls presence.

Moreover, neither do the Arguments of Fienus prove this, * 1.252 that the soul is not present in the seed before the third day. For seeing as he grants, Nature is not idle a moment; but begins to work as soon as the seed is conceived and the operations begin to be performed in the seed after the first moment of Conception immediately, and as Galen hath it 1. de sem. cap. 4. three or four daies after the Conception the seed is already inclosed in a Membrane, and the Membranes (as Fienus proves) are formed by the same soul: it is truly necessarily concluded, that the soul was present before the third day, and had begun the work of her formation of the humane body. The observations of Abortions do conclude the same. Hippocrates de nat. Pueri, writes that he saw a Conception retained six daies in the Womb, and then came away, which was thus qualified, as if a man should take off the outward hard shel from a raw Egg, so that the humor contained within might be discerned through the thin skin. After this manner was that liquor disposed, and it was morever red and round. Also there were seen white & thin sibres contained in the Membrane, with a red thick bloody water, and the Mem∣brane it self on the outside was died with blood resembling the colour of such as have stained faces. In the midst whereof there was a certain smal extant which seemed to me to be the Navil, and that it first breathed therethrough, and from thence was drawn a Membrane

which imbraced the whol seed. And the same Hippocrates in his Book de Carnibus, saies that he Conception hath upon the seventh day all that it becomes the Body to have; and that an Abortion made at this time being put into water does shew to him that shal diligently view all things the rudiments of all the parts of the Body. In like manner Felix Platerus writes in Quaest. med. quaest. 1. that for many years he had seen many abortions which in the first week were just after that manner: First of all (saies he) that same procreative faculty which lay hid in the seed does rouse it self and disposes those more remarkable portions of the seed which flowed from the three Principal parts of the Parents into three Bladders as it were, swelling with spirits, which are Rudiments of the Brain, Heart, and Liver, shut up in a smal body: and the other portions adhering thereunto it rudely separates into Limbs and Mem∣bers growing thereto, which are commonly perfected in the first week, so that the Embryon being at that time cast out by abortion, such a shapeless smal lump made up as it were of con∣gealed seed, round and rould together, appears dishinguished with the three Bubbles afore∣said. Such as Hippocrates observed to come from that same dancing Wencb, who caused a∣bortion by her violent Dancing. And I my self saw such a kind of an Abortion like a round white Ball of the bigness of an Hazel Nut, which came from a certain Woman who every year almost did suffer Abortion not many daies after she had conceived: and I took it out of the thin coat Amnios wherein it did float, and when I pulled it asunder, I observed three such like Bubbles, the lower of which expressing a rudiment of the Liver was somwhat pale, but not red, also four portions to frame the Arms and Legs, and (which was pleasant to behold) I saw two very little black points marked out for Eyes; which as in others, so I observed the same in a certain Gentlewoman who for two whol years together (which was wonder∣ful and not heard of before) did miscarry every month, and often sent me such an Abortion that I might judg what it was, and I alwaies found them after the same manner.

Which things being so, * 1.253 it easily appears that the Conformation of the Child does begin at the first moment of Conception. Whence Macrobius in his 1. Book in somn. Scipionis cap. 6. writes: that Seed which after it is cast into the Womb does not come back again in the space of seven hours is held to be a due Conception. And a little after: that Conception which any Woman holds beyond seven hours is created for life. And Ludovicus Merca∣tus Lib. 3. de morb. Mulier. cap. 6. writes; when the seeds abide in the Womb, and seven hours after are not cast forth, if they be conserved and regulated by the heat of the Womb, it is to be believed that a Woman hath conceived. Hence Hippocrates tels us, that the begin∣ning of Conception is to reckoned from that day in which the seed was retained and not from the seventh day, when in his Book de genitura he saies, If a Woman be acquainted with Child-bearing, and marks when the Seed does not come away, but abide in her Womb, she may know on what day she conceived.

With which reasons Tertullian (Lib. de Anima) and with him many of the Latin Fathers being moved held, * 1.254 that a man is sowed or planted in himself or by himself, and that the Seed is alive from the very beginning. And among the Greek Fathers Gregory Nyssen, de anima & resurrectione writes; no man that is wel in his wits wil imagine that the original of souls is later and newer than that of bodies; since manifest it is, that no inanimate thing hath in it self a power to move it self, and also to grow. But of yong ones conceived in the Womb there is no question made of their growing and encreasing; nor of their motion from Place to Place. It remains therefore for us to hold, that the beginning of the Consti∣tution of the Soul and Body is one and the same. And even as the Earth if it receive a Branch pluckt from the Root, it makes thereof a Tree not contributing thereto the faculty of growing, but only the matter of the growth: so we say, that also which is plucks from a Man (the Seed) to sow a Man, it also is after a sort an Animal, and of an animate thing an animate thing. And moreover he saies, that all the faculties of the Soul are in the Seed, yet they lie hidden; whichin time and order rouze themselves up, and set themselves on work.

Chap. 11. VVhether Like may be said to ingender its like if the Soul be not communicated with the Seed?

ANd thus we have proved that it is most agreeable to truth, that the Soul is propagated with the Seed: Secondly it hath been shewed, that the Soul whether it be propagated or infused is present at the first Conception, and is the Builder of its own House. And they that hold the contrary, do two things principally: First, they oppose the reasons

brought to prove the traduction of the Soul from Father to Son, and the propagation there∣of by the Seed. Secondly, they endeavor to bring reasons to prove the Contrary.

For in the first place, whereas it bath been said, * 1.255 unless the Parent communicate the soul to his Child in the Seed, like should not generate his like, nor should a Man Generate a Man, but an irrational Creature: many have several waies endeavored to answer this Argu∣ment but in vain. For in the first place, whereas some say, a Man may be said to beget his like, if he communicate the immediate matter fitted to receive the Soul; that is of no mo∣ment. For Matter does not suffice to constitute his like. And he which does not give the form of a Man, he does not beget a Man. For a Man without his form (which is his Soul) is no Man. And therefore if the Parents do not give the form of a man, they do not beget a man. Yea, and if the Father do not confer the Soul, the Child should neither have Body nor Soul from the Parent according to this Opinion. For Aristotle 1. de gener. animal. cap. 2.20 & 21. and 4. de gener. animal. cap. 4. denies that the Seed of the Father contributes any part of the matter to the Body of the Child. Which although Physitians deny: yet this is certain, if from the Seed any part of the Body proceeds, that is very little and only the first lineaments of the Body; and Aristotle w••ites that the Body is formed of the Mothers Blood, and that the Father does rather conser the Soul, 1. de Generat. anim. cap. 20. The Male yields the form and the Principle of Motion, but the Female the Body and Matter. And what we said before in gentral of the Original of souls, the same must be here repeated, viz. If we hold that the soul is infused into the Body after it is shaped, it fol∣lows that they that are dead do generate. For since Generation is the union of the Soul with the Body, and according to their Opinion who hold that the Soul being created is in∣fused by God, it may be infused upon the fortieth day or later, and in the mean while the Father may die: either the Father cannot be said to have begot that Child, or he must be said to have begot it after he was dead. * 1.256

Again, Some conceit that a Man begets his like in respect of the species or sort, inasmuch as the end of Generation is the perfect nature of Man, and inasmuch as he is not born not comes into the Light according to the order appointed by God, save with a body and a rati∣onal Soul. But this Answer suffices not. For if the rational Soul comes from without, the vital conception is not perfected into a Man, but there is nothing ingendred save an Irrational Animal. Nor is the Question concerning the birth of a Man, but his Generation; which is not performed in the birth, but in the due Conjunction of a Man and Woman according to the Ordination of God. Nor does a man only come into the world, but a Man is also con∣ceived, as it is said of Cain, Genes. 4. ver. 1. Adam knew his Wife and she conceived and bare Cain. Nor is their objection more strong but the same with this, who say, that if that which is generated by a man is in its time perfected into a man, a man begets his like. For if he hath not his Form and Rationality from his Parents, but from some other, Like is not in∣gendred by its like.

Thirdly, Whereas some say that Axiom [Every Animal when it generates gives both the Body and Soul to its Issue] is to be understood only of those souls which are drawn out of the power of the Matter, but the rational soul is not drawn out of the Matter, * 1.257 nor depends upon the Body, as to its Essence; that also is of no great moment. For it is falsly and with∣out all Reason presupposed, that the souls of Bruits are drawn out of the Power of the Mat∣ter, and depend upon the matter as to their Essence; seeing by Virtue of the divine benedi∣ction they are propagated by the Parents to their yong ones. Nor does the nobility of our understanding both in respect of its Essence and Operations shew any other. For so it pleased the Creator to associate a most noble substance to the Body. And therefore if a ra∣tional immortal soul can long abide in a mortal Body, Why may it not also be propagared with the Seed? Which if we affirm no absurdity wil follow, as we shall shew here∣after.

Fiftly, Some say, a man does so far beget his like, inasmuch as he generates a sensitive Soul, yea and the inclinations of his Parents of Virtues and Vices, and which is more, Origi∣nal sin also (they say) is transfuted by means of this sensitive soul from the Parents into the Children. But this is only said and not proved, that there is in Man a sensitive Soul ex∣isting of it self besides the rational: And if there were, yet a man by communicating the same should not ingender his like. For the Essence of a man is not compleated by a sensitive soul but by a rational. But whether Original sin in our first Parents did stick only in the sensitive soul, and not in the rational also, I leave to the judgment of Divines.

Chap. 12. Whether God, or some Formative Faculty does shape the Body of Man.

MOreover, * 1.258 since that which prevails most against those who deny the soul to be in the seed is the Formation of the body of Man, and yet they wil not be content to sub∣mit to the Truth, several men seek several excuses. For since none can deny that same ad∣mirable structure of our bodies, they severally invent several Causes to which to attribute the same rather than to the soul immediately present in the Seed. And here some fly in the first place to God the first Cause of al things. So Alphonsus Caranza a Spanish Lawyer, tract. de part. natur. & legit. cap. 1. when he had rejected al the Causes which others pro∣duce, at length he determines the first Cause of the Formation of Man to be God, and the Divine Power and Wisdom, and for his Opinion he brings that in Psalm 118. verse 73. Thy Hands have made and fashioned me. And that of Job, chap. 10. Thy Hands have fashioned me. Hast thou not poured me forth like Milk, and curdled me as Cheese? Thou hast cloathed me with skin and flesh, and covered me with Bones and Sinews. But in ve∣ry truth the Wisdom and Power of God is sufficiently seen in the shaping of our Bodies: but that is not therefore to be accounted the immediate and sole Cause of our Conformati∣on. For the same power and wisdom is seen in the Formation of Animals, yea, and of Plants too. And concerning the Lillies of the Field our Savior saies Matthew 6.30. That God hath cloathed them. As therefore it must not be thence concluded, that God on∣ly is the Cause of the Formation of Plants and Animals; so neither may we conclude that he is the immediate Cause of the Body of Man. For God is not the Physical Cause, but the first and universal Cause, not by Natural Motion, but after an eminent and unexpressible manner, as by his presence he conserves al things, cherishes them, and governs them in their actions. Who though at first he created the World and al that is therein; yet he appoin∣ted Nature which is the ordinary power of God, according to the Rules whereof the Gene∣ration of things is now perfected. That Wisdom (truly) and infinite Power is primarily in the Creator; yet hath he given Power to Second Causes to perform artificial Works, which they also themselves do really accomplish (as was shewed before in chap. 2.) And there∣fore though it cannot be denied that God concurs in this work as the first and universal Cause (of which Concurrency of God as the first Cause with the second I spake in the fore∣said Chapter) yet that he is not the proper Cause does hereby appear, in that Errors do somtimes happen in the Conformation of living Bodies; which would not be if God were the immediate Cause of Conformation. For he never errs in his Actings. Nor could Natural Causes be rendred of those Errors, which nevertheless Physitians do render either from the fault of the Matter, or inconveniency of the Place, or Imagination of the Mother. But the Actions of God cannot be corrupted or marred either through fault of the Matter, or Inconveniency of the Place, or Imagination of the Mother.

Others seek the Cause in the Seed it self; * 1.259 amongst whom some hold there is a Formative Principle which shapes the Child, and that the Parents use the seed as an Instrument in pro∣ducing their yong ones. But this Opinion hath been sufficiently exammed before, and re∣futed, unless by the Formative Principle they understand the Soul it self. And to ad this one thing more, a certain late Writer conceits he may avoid al difficulties, if he holds that the Formative Power does not immediately follow the Essence of the Soul, but that by the Divine Benediction it was given to the soul to raise up in the seed a Formative Faculty, which the Seed afterwards being shut up in its place does faithfully retain; and that this fa∣culty does produce a substance, not by its proper vertue, but by that vertue it hath received from the Rational Soul; and that this Faculty when its work is finished does remain joy∣ned to the Soul til the yong one be grown up, and then it puts it self forth again, and infuses into the seed a formative vertue like it self.

But that which is wont commonly to fal out [that they who hold a false Opinion while they strive to shun one absurdity they fal into many] the same hath happened here. * 1.260 For in the first place, whereas every accident requires its subject, and is in the subject by its form: I demand, By what form (if the seed is not animated) this faculty can be in the seed. Which since there can be none assigned there would be an accident without a substance and subject. Secondly, since proprieties are only in one and their own subject, this Formative power

should first be in the seed as one subject, and after it should be joyned to the Soul as another subject. Thirdly, Whereas the Formative Faculty (as by the augmentation of the body, and the regeneration of parts lost, and chiefly in Plants and Animals does appear) is a pro∣per power of the Soul, it can be no where save where the Soul is, and where it is we may firmly and demonstratively conclude that there the Soul is. Fourthly, it is said but not proved, that an accident by a vertue communicated may produce a substance. For no accident can so much as act, much less produce a substance unless it be directed by the Form from whence it flows, and from which it hath its power of acting, as hath been sufficiently de∣clared before in Chap. 5. concerning the separate Instrument. But which way soever they explain this formative faculty, unless they hold the soul to be in the seed, they involve them∣selves into inexplicable difficulties. For if they hold it to be a substance they multiply En∣tities in vain. And since al things belong thereto which are proper to the Soul, why should it not be the Soul? But if it be an accident it can have no subject, and it wil act beyond its abilities.

Chap. 13. Whether there are more Souls in a Man than one?

BUt others when they cannot deny the presence of the Soul in the Seed, and are forced to confess that the body of the Child is thereby shaped, * 1.261 and yet wil not grant that the Ra∣tional Soul is present at the first Conception, they fancy divers Souls to be in a Man, not building upon solid reasons, but chiefly induced by the Authority of Aristotle, whom in 2. de gener. animal. cap. 3. teaches, That a man first lives with a Vegetative Soul, then with a Sensitive, and at last receives a Rational Soul. The words of Aristotle may be seen in the place alleadged. But what the sence of those words of Aristotle should be, is as great a question as any amongst the Expositors.

For in the first place, Some hold that every Soul is a simple substance, and that therfore there does not first come a Vegetative, then a Sensitive, and lastly a Rational Soul; but that one and the same Soul in the Conception does first perform the Operations of growing, then of feeling and moving, and lastly of reasoning. For since the Soul cannot exercise its Fa∣culties unless it be furnished with sitting Instruments, and does first perform the most neces∣sary actions, and to Nutrition few Instruments are required, and that is in the first place most necessary, therefore that is begun in the first place to be practised; but since Sense and Reason does require many Instruments, they teach that the operations thereof are exercised in process of time, when the Organs of the Body are more perfect.

Others on the contrary do reject this Interpretation, and say that it is not agreeing to the words of Aristotle, while in the place alleadged he expresly writes that the Vegetative Soul is first had in the Conception; and that the Sensitive Soul whereby he is an Animal is received after that, as also the Rational by which he is a Man, and that this only comes from without.

Since therefore the Expositors themselves of Aristotle are doubtful of his meaning, the surest way is to set aside Authority, as is altogether most fit in the search of Truth, and to consider the matter it self, and mannage our business with reasons only. Which doing we shal find that it is most suitable to truth to hold that there is only one Soul in Man, * 1.262 viz. The Rational Soul, yet furnished with the abilities of the inferior Souls, and be∣guifted with a Vegetative and Sensitive Faculty. And if the words of Aristotle admit this sence, of which I dispute not, it is a sence convenient enough. For (which we are to note in the first place) the Soul is a simple Essence, and there is one only Soul in every living thing, but furnished with divers faculties. * 1.263 In every Plant there is a specifick Soul; yet that hath sundry Faculties, it nourishes, augments, ingenders Seed, and also performs the proper actions of its own kind; and the properties and actions of a Rose are of one sort, of Rosemary of another, of Rhubarb of another, of Helle∣bore of another, of the Eugh-tree of another. Every Animal is nourished, augmented, be∣gets its like, hath sundry Senses, is moved, and finally performs that which is proper to its kind; and a Bee hath one sort of properties and actions, a Pismire another, a Sheep ano∣ther, a Crow another, an Elephant another, an Ape another: which are not indeed Ratio∣nal, yet as the Understanding is the specifical propriety of a Man; so those also (besides sense and motion, which are actions common to al Animals) have somwhat specifical. And if it be not absurd in a Plant or Animal for divers Faculties and Actions to proceed from one Soul, why should it be absurd to hold the same in Man?

* 1.264 And that we should hold that there is but one Soul in every Animal from whence divers faculties and actions do proceed, and not divers souls, many reasons there are that perswade us. For in the first place, If there were divers souls in a man every man should not be one Animal, but should have divers operations from divers forms and acts. Whereof Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercit. 307. Sect. 5. hath treated largely. There is no reason (saies he) which can perswade me that our Soul (an immaterial substance, and a certain particle as it were of God) should be any waies compounded, especially of two things actually contrary. For I do not think Water is so contrary to Fire, as that which is Rational is to that which is Irrational. The Soul which is totally in every part of the Body, how can it have at once two parts actually contrary one to another? And a little after: For a Man should be so one as an heap of several things laid together, no true Man but a Geryon, and true Chymera or Monster. Nor can those who hold the contrary avoid the force of this Argument, by saying, That there is in Man only one first specifick form, and that the rest are generical and subordinate to the specifical, and that the rational soul in Man as the chief does only perform the office of a form; but the rest though of their own Nature they are forms, and are actually in the living Creature, yet being compared with the principal they are more like matter than acts. We may indeed grant that there may be divers forms in one Individual, of which only one is specifical, and the rest pertain to the disposition of the matter; yet all those forms as they belong to the matter are passively disposed, and the specifick form as the pri∣mary Agent uses them as its subject and primary Instrument; and they do not perform such actions as determine and constitute any Individual to be of such or such a sort. But the Vegetative and Sensitive Faculty (they cal it Soul) do not pertain to the disposition of the matter, but are primary faculties; and according to their Opinion, the Sensitive per∣forms the office of a specifick form, before the coming of the Rational. And therefore if be∣fore the coming of the sensitive soul the vegetative, and before the coming of the rational soul the sensitive should constitute the same Individual, one numerical Individuum should at divers times be informed with divers specifick forms; which is absurd: and so if an Indi∣vidual should contain divers perfect beings in it self, it would be one by accident, and an heap of things.

Secondly, If a man should in process of time receive divers souls, this absurdity would follow, That there are divers living Individuals which should belong to no sort of live Crea∣tures. For while a man lives only by the vegetative soul he must be a Plant, not yet should he belong to any sort of Plants; while he lives with a sensitive soul he must be an Animal, but yet not belonging to any sort of Animals. * 1.265 To which reason although some endeavor to answer; yet they alleadg nothing that is of any moment. Joh. Gallego allows the answer of Tolet. 2. de Anima, cap. 3. who saies, That such an Individual is not essentially a Plant, and therefore is nor under any kind or sort of Plants; but that it is contained under the kind of an Embryo, and under some sort of the same kind; and that Nature bath made two distinct sorts of Vegetations, the one of which is a Plant, and the other an Embryo or yong Conception; and that this kind of Embryo's does contain under i•• so many sorts of Embryo's as there are of perfect Animals, and that the sort of Humane Embryo's hath a Nature by it self, which as the Instrument of the Generator makes an Organization conve∣nient to receive the Humane soul created by God. But one absurdity being granted a thou∣sand follow, and thus one absurdity is heaped upon another. For if this vegetative degree is common to Plants and Animals, how comes it to pass that from that vegetative soul which is in the Embryo an Horse is brought forth, and not a Rose, or a Dog? And since they make so many sorts of Embryo's as there are sorts of perfect Animals, it must needs be that one Embryo, if it be of a different sort from another, it must differ by some specifical form. But that is of no moment which the same Gallego saies, that the vegetative form of an Embryo produced by the Womb of a Woman does not make the Organization of a Plant, nor of another Animal, but rather that of a Man; both because it is directed by the soul of the Woman having the same Organization; and also because of it self it hath a natural In∣clination to make such an Organization. For in the first place, false it is, and not yet pro∣ved, That the soul of the woman directs that Organization, as was shewed before. More∣over, whence hath it that inclination to such an Organization? Certainly it cannot have it from the common and generical form, but every determination is from the specifick form. And what wil it be then when it comes beyond the degree of a vegetative, to the degree of a sensitive Embryo? For since it is then neither a man nor any other Animal (for the sensi∣tive faculty constitutes no particular sort of Animal) what I pray you must it be, since it is constituted in no sort of Animals as wanting a specifick form? Therefore it must needs

come to this, That the Soul which is in a perfect Child is also in the Embeyo, and that which finishes the work is the same which began it: viz. That the Soul of a Lyon forms it self a convenient body, the Soul of an Horse forms a body fit for it self; and that in the Embryo of a Lyon there is no form distinct from other Animals but the Soul of a Lyon; and that the form of an Embryo (as it is described by Tolet and Gallego) is a meer fig∣ment.

And except this be granted, a reason of the formation of an Humane Conception, of its nutrition and augmentation, and of al the operations performed therein cannot be rendred. For the formation of the child in the Womb, and of al its parts and Organs, as also its nutri∣tion and growth, are quite different from other Animals. For no sort is constituted by di∣vers forms, either at the same or a different time, but by one only, which thence also hath its name, and is called specifical. It does shape it self such a body as answers the Idea thereof in it self, and by such a body performs such actions as by which it is distinguished from other sorts. Hence a man from his own specifick form or soul hath such a body as no other Ani∣mal hath, and performs such actions as no other Animal does.

Thirdly, If first the Vegetative soul should inform the body, afterward the sensitive, at last the rational, a Man should be compounded of a Plant, a Bruit, and an Animal. And this absurdity would also follow, That if the sensitive and rational did flow from divers forms, it would be no essential axiom or declaration, when we say a man is an Animal or living thing; for the Nature of the Animal should not flow from the form of Man. But if from both souls the same Attribute should slow, a Man should not be one Animal, but two; viz. An irrational Animal in respect, or by vertue of his sensitive Soul, and a ratio∣nal in respect of his rational soul.

Nor are the Objections made to the contrary of any weight. * 1.266 For in the first place they say, That many and divers beings cannot proceed from the same Form, nor can the same being proceed from divers and distinct Forms since the Form is the adequate Cause of the Essence. And therefore since the same subject is a Man, an Animal, a living thing, he cannot have these divers beings from one form, but from divers. And contrariwise, Because Man, bruit Ammals, and Plants, are living things, and that distinct in their forms, that which is common to al of them cannot proceed from the forms by which they differ, but from that form which is equally in them al. But we deny that the vege∣tative, sensitive, and rational, are three distinct Beings proceeding from divers forms; but they are only the powers of one and the same soul. And that which hath deceived many is this, That they hold that in some body there may be the vegetative soul alone, * 1.267 in another the sensitive, and that by it an Individual may be constituted. For the Vegetative soul constitutes no Plant, or other sort of living thing, but nutrition and augmentation are com∣inon to al living things, and Plants differ specifically one from another as wel as Animals do, and there is one form and specifical soul of a Rose, another of Rosemary, another of an Oalt, another of a Pear-tree, another of an Apple-tree; whence, though a Rose, and Rosemary, and an Oak, and a Pear-tree, and an Apple-tree are nourished and augmented; yet they are augmented after a different manner, and each draws a different Aliment, and produce leaves, flowers, fruits, after a different manner; some of them grow to a great height, * 1.268 others creep by the ground, or at least grow not very high. After the same manner sense and motion does constitute no Animal, but al sorts of Animals have their specifick forms or souls, by rea∣son of which sense and motion are in al sorts of Animals different, and the external senses are in several sorts different, as also motion; some creep, others fly, others walk. Howbeit, besides sense and motion they perform actions proper to their kind; a Dog is quick-scented and faithful; an Horse is couragious, and after his fashion proud; an Elephant is discreet in its way; of which see Justius Lipsius, Cent. 1. Epist. 50. the Spider weaves its nets; the Bee makes Honey-combs, &c. For in al living things there is a nourishing, growing, and generating faculty; but these faculties and actions do constitute no sort of Plants; but in each Plant there appear yet other actions which flow from the specifical form as such, and by which Plants differ one from another. In al perfect Animals there is sense and motion, but sense and motion do constitute no particular sort of Animal; but besides sense and motion there are in every sort of Animal other powers and actions which proceed from the specifick soul as such, and whereby Animals differ one from another. Nor are the vegetative or sen∣sitive, or the vegetative, sensitive, and rational, certain peculiar forms distinctly existing, and three Essences. For although they are really somwhat in Nature: yet they subsist not by themselves apart, nor are they any where, or at any time separately existing save in the mind, just as a Being, a substance, and a body; and therefore they do not multiply the Essence of a thing.

Secondly, * 1.269 They object, that if in a man there be not a vegetative and sensitive Soul, but only their faculties, then there wil be a power of a power. But this does not follow, nor does the vegerative faculty flow from the sensitive, nor the sensitive from the rational, but all the three faculties flow immediatly from one soul, as from the same form of Fire Heat and Lightness do proceed.

Thirdly they say: Where there is the operation of any form there is the form it self; but in Men besides his understanding there are the operations propet to other souls, therefore there are in him other souls also. But the answer is the same we gave to the first argument. Nor are the vegetative or sensitive faculties, Powers which proceed from any peculiar and specifick form. A Rose, Violet, Willow, Oak, Dog, Lyon, Ox, are coun∣ted so many sorts of living things, but there is no where existent a vegerative faculty which does constitute any species by it self: but the vegetative and sensitive (as was said before) though they may be conceived and considered distinct in our minds, yet they do not any where or at any time exist distinct in nature. And what wil they answer concerning Bruits, of which the same question may have place? For when an Horse is formed, that action per∣tains to the vegetative faculty, and is a work of the formative faculty; but that vegetative faculty is no peculiar soul different from the sensitive and the specifick which Neighs (for by this mark the unknown specifick form of an Horse is commonly described) but these are faculties of the same soul, which in the first place forms the Organs of Nutrition, as being in the first place necessary, and afterwards the rest.

Fourthly, they object: Where there are operations differing in kind, there also are dif∣ferent forms; but in a Man there are operations differing in kind, Vegetation, Sensation, Intellection: Ergo also souls differing in kind. But different operations do only argue di∣vers forms where the subjects are divers. But in one subject different operations may pro∣ceed from the same form.

Fiftly, * 1.270 they object: If the humane soul were a simple Nature not compounded of a ra∣tional Essence and of a sensitive and vegetative soul, by the same very soul a Man should be a Man, a Beast, a Plant; and seeing whatever belongs to a man that belongs to him of it self and primarily by virture of his specifick form, a Man should be primarily and of himself, a Man, an Animal, a Vegetable. But a man can no waies be said to be primarily and of himself a vegetable, or sensitive Creature; both because vegetation is a proper passion of an animate body, which is the remote Genus of a man, common to every sublunary living thing, and Sensation is the property of an Animal common even to Bruit Beasts. And ther∣fore the adjunct of a kind does not of it self primarily belong to a sort of that kind. But out of our Answer to the first Argument an Answer may easily be brought to this also. For that which they count absurd is not so, viz. that by the same soul a man should be a man, and an Animal, and a Vegetable; or to say better, should both understand, move, and grow. For neither is an Animal or Vegetable, any thing distinctly subsisting in nature; but as a man by one and the same soul is a Being, and a Substance: so is be also a Living, Sensitive, Moving. Mean while, because these Conceptions are different, some Generical, others Spe∣cifical, some most special, we may not attribute the adjuncts of a Being or Substance to the soul of Man as it is rational, and as he differs from all other animals.

Sixtly, * 1.271 they say: Corruptible and Incorruptible differ in kind. But the rational soul is incorruptible, the rest corruptible. Therefore they cannot be in one subject. I grant the whol Argument. For neither is the soul of man compounded of a corruptible and incorrup∣tible, either substance or faculty: but the sensitive and vegetative faculty in man are as in∣corruptible as the rational, since they flow from the same soul.

Sevently, Whereas Plato and those who follow him, do therefore conceive they ought to hold divers souls in a man, because there is a certain fight betwixt the rational part of the soul and that part which is subject to passions; since nothing fights against it self: that by Christians is easily Refuted, who know, that that same fight betwixt the divers faculties of the soul is not Essential thereunto, but came in by the sin of our first Pa∣rents.

Let us therefore constantly retain the Opinion of most learned Men, which is guarded with strong reasons, and against which nothing solid can be alleadged; that the soul in eve∣ry living thing is only one, but furnished with divers faculties which in every Plant performs the acts of Nutrition, Augmentation and Generation, but in each after a peculiar manner, and moreover performs that which is proper to every Plant; whence a Rose differs from an Oak and a Vine: and that in Animals there is somwhat which besides Nutrition, Motion and Sense, performs that which is proper to every Animal. For no Animal is perfected by

sense and motion only; but as understanding is proper to a Man, so in every Animal (beside the moving and sensitive faculty) there is a proper faculty, which answers to ratiocination in a man, and by which one Animal differs from another.

Now the Soul does not perform all these operations together at the first Generation of an Animal, but those in the first place which are most necessary, * 1.272 and therefore she does in the first place finish the Organs of the said most necessary actions. For not to speak now of the Child in the Womb, but of the Infant when it is born; that it hath a perfect Soul is out of Question; yet it does not presently Go, it does not Speak, it does not Reason: but in process of time it performs all these things; but it is presently nourished and augmented: but when the Organs necessary for those other actions are finished and perfected it performs all those things. And hence also it happens, that although Generation pertains to the ve∣getative faculty yet it does not shew it self before the twelfth or fourteenth year; although the operations of the sensitive and rational soul do sooner exercise themselves.

And suppose we should grant that the rational soul hath somwhat peculiar: yet no cause can be assigned, why as in Plants (which cannot be denied) all actions proceed from one soul, they may not do so in all other living things, and why the specifical soul of every Animal may not forthwith be present with all its faculties. Not can they alleadg at least one proba∣ble reason whereby to prove that in a Dog, or Lyon, at first there is only a vegetative soul, and that the sensitive and motive faculties do come afterwards. For as it does not follow, that the moving soul is not in a Whelp, because it does not run as soon as it is born, or in a Chicken or Pigeon because it does not fly: so also we cannot conclude that in the seed there is not present the sensitive and motive soul, because those actions are not performed by the Seed.

And verily those who think otherwise do involve themselves into many difficulties; and whiles they build, now upon Reason, now on Authorities and false suppositions, and endea∣vor to reconcile Truth and Falsehood, they involve themselves in Labyrinths and Mazes in∣extricable.

For in the first place, Aquinas grants out of Aristotle, That first there is only the vege∣tative soul, and that afterward the sensitive comes, and then follows the rational. But he holds that the vegetative soul perishes when the sensitive comes, and that the sensitive perishes when the raional comes; and that because (5. Phys. text. 38.) he finds written, that one numerical thing hath only one numerical Act, and that consq••uently divers forms cannot be in one subject, and therefore he thought, when the later form comes the former must perish.

Aquinas was in the right in judging that one thing hath but one form; and if he had held, that presently upon the first original there is only one soul in every living thing, he might have easily acquitted himself. But while he endeavors to reconcile this true opinion with a false one, viz. that at different times different souls are produced and come into a man, he fals into absurdities. For thus the Child in the Womb wil not remain the same in number, but wil be a different thing; being one kind of thing when in the first daies it is nourished and augmented by the vegetative soul; afterwards another when it is governed by the sensi∣tive soul; and again another when the rational soul comes into it. And if the soul or spe∣cifick form of another Animal, after it comes, is sufficient for Nutrition, Augmentation, Sense, Motion, and to perform that which is proper and specifical to every Animal, Why may not the same also in Man presently upon the first Conception be the Cause of Nutrition? And what great need is there to multiply Beings, since one soul is sufficient to perform all the actions which belong to every Animal?

And the very shaping of our Body does sufficiently shew the absurdity of this Opinion; * 1.273 and that formation is begun and perfected only by one soul there are many things which prove. For in the first place (as was also said before) there is no vegetative or sensitive soul simply existing, which is not determined to some certain species. In Plants indeed there is a vegetative soul, and in the Conceptions of Animals. * 1.274 But the Vegetative in Plants is so ordered by Nature that it draws nourishment out of the Earth and fastens it to the Plant: contrariwise the vegetative of Animals draws it not out of the Earth, but in the Womb from the Mother, and after the Child is born out of its Veins. In like manner the sensitive facul∣ty is in a Dog, in an Ox, in a Man. But in an Ox it delights in Hay, not in a Dog, not in a Man. Mean while, since according to these mens opinions there are the operations of a ve∣getative and sensitive soul in the Child in the Womb before the rational soul be present, there should then be operations which should proceed from no soul. For there could not be in the Child in the Womb the soul of any imaginable Plant, not of any Animal that can be na∣med.

Secondly, Since presently after Conception Conformation begins, that should be perfor∣med by the Vegetative Soul which is first present. But since that according to the Opinion of Aquinas it is soon extinguished, and its conformative faculty is withal abolished (for a faculty cannot pass out of one foul into another) and nevertheless Conformation is continu∣ed, it must needs be that the sensitive must finish the same, and when that also is abolished the rational. But it is absurd, that one numerical Conformation should be made by three powers of distinct sorts, or (as they say) specifically different, or the faculties of three souls specifically distinct. And how wil they explain the Conformation of Bruits in which (according to their Opinion) there is no such succession not introduction of divers Souls? And therefore as in bruit Animals by the same faculty the yong one is nourished, the tenth day, the twentieth, the thirtieth, and al the months of Gestation, or while it is in the Mothers Womb, yea, and al the rest of its life; and al those acts or nutrition do make up one numerical entrition continued from the beginning to the end of the Creatures lise: so also no cause can be given, for which the Child also in a Womans Womb should not be nou∣rished the tenth, twentieth, thirtieth day, al the months of its being in the womb, yea, and al••ts life time by one Soul.

Thirdly, If the soul which is first introduced is the cause of the Conformation of the parts for the introduction of the following soul it should act beyond its forces. For the vegetative soul hath not the ability to form parts necessary for the following soul being sensi∣tive; nor hath the sensitive soul (I speak according to their imagination of three distinct souls) power to form parts necessary for the rational soul. 'Tis therefore better to hold with Themistius that each soul is the builder of her own house.

Secondly, Alphonsus a Caranza when he saw that he could not hold divers souls in one Man, he sought another starting-hole, and de part. nat. et legit. cap. 1. parag. 2. de anima∣tione, holds a twofold Animation, answering to the double formation of a Man, the imper∣fect and the perfect; and he teaches, That in the first time of that ruder formation the child lives with the life of Plants, * 1.275 and in the second time with a perfect life, or with a sensitive and rational Soul at once. Now he teaches that by the life of a Plant we are to understand a certain vital and nutritive faculty, but not a true life which is not in Plants; since Philoso∣phers in this manner of speaking do not understand a true life, nor do speak properly, but improperly and by way of similitude. Forasmuch as there is only one soul in man, and one life, and that there is no concourse of souls, following one after another in the same subject, but one soul which is infused after the utmost perfection of the body. And he writes, That Aristotle being moved by this reason wrote in 7. Politic. c. 16. That to avoid over-abun∣dance of Children (according to the Gentiles Custom) it is lawful to endeavor Abortion, pro∣vided it be done presently after the Conception, when the Child lives the life of a Plant; but that after the coming of the rational Soul it is wickedness to do it.

But in good deed, these things are thus said without al reason, and do contain many falsi∣ties. For in the first place, it is false that the Plants do not truly live. For though others do otherwise define life, yet which way soever it be defined it properly belongs to Plants as their operations do testifie. And where there is life there is a Soul, and there is no life with∣out a Soul. Since therefore he acknowledges vital Operations in that former and rude for∣mation (and it cannot also indeed be denied) he must needs acknowledg the soul to have been long since present; or let him shew us that subject to which those faculties belong which perform those Operations of nourishing, augmenting, and forming. And therefore secondly, if the rational Soul is not infused (as he holds) before the perfect Formation of the body, I desire him to shew us what it is which forms the body til the thirtieth or fortieth day.

CHAP. XIV. The Contrary Objections Answered.

NOW that some should think the contrary, * 1.276 and neither allow of the Propagation of the Soul from the Parent to the Child, nor of the presence thereof in the Seed, they are moved with divers Reasons, and most do chiefly urge the prerogative of the Humane Soul; and use three Reasons drawn therefrom, which they fetch out of Aristotle, 2. de generat. animal. cap. 3. The first is; That cannot be without a body, the action of whose Principles is corporeal, for examples sake to walk without Feet: but the mind alone comes from with∣out, because the corporeal action communicates nothing therewith. But let us indeed grant that the soul separated from the body does communicate no more with the body and bodily actions, and uses no bodily Organ: * 1.277 yet that the soul when it is in the body hath nothing to do with bodily actions, subsists by it self, and therefore is in the generation of a Man created, is false. For the Question is not now concerning the Soul, which hereafter (being sepa∣rate from the body) shal persist by it self through the singular pleasure of God, as shal here∣after be said; but concerning the work of Generation our Question is, and concerning the Humane Soul as it shapes and informs the body. That this Soul in this life hath no com∣munion with the body cannot be granted. Indeed if the Rational Soul in Man were a pe∣culiar soul distinct from the vegetative and sensitive, this reason would have some probabili∣ty. But since there is only one Soul in a Man, having a vegetative, sensitive, and rational Faculty, as was proved in the foregoing Chapter, and the Soul of a Man does not only un∣derstand and reason, but also informs the body (not of an Hart, or a Lyon, but a Man) nourishes it, augments it, conserves it, and makes it enjoy sense and motion, and that not after the manner of Bruits, but of Men; it is most manifest that it cannot want corporeal In∣struments, and that when it informs the body, and performs these Organical actions, it communicates simply with the body. And although in respect of the rational Faculty some of its actions are inorganical, as when it understands the intelligible species without a spe∣cies, and when it refects upon it self, and knows that it understands that it is able to know it understands, also when it wills; and indeed the mind does not understand by the body as the means and Organ wherewith; yet because while it is in the body it needs a Phantasm for its object, and as Aristotle himself (3. de Anima, text. 39.) speaks, the Intellect needs to contemplate the Phantasms; and nothing is in the Understanding which was not in the Sense: certainly the Understanding must needs communicate with the Phancy. Which is sufficiently declared by sundry sorts of mad men, in whom Ratiocination also it self is hurt, by reason of the society it hath with the disposition of the body and bodily Instruments; as also the variety of Wits, whiles some are excellent for sharpness of wit, and others are bloc∣kish, proceeds from the same cause. All which things being so, and though the Understan∣ding do not use the body to understand withal: yet since it is necessary that it should specu∣late the Phantasms, there is no cause why we should so absolve the Understanding from communicating with the body as long as it is therein. Much less is there any cause why at last when the body is perfectly shaped it should come in from without.

But especially al that have followed this Opinion have been deceived by that false Hy∣pothesis, touching the Education of Forms and Souls out of the power of the matter. * 1.278 For since they beleeved the souls of Bruits were drawn out of the power of the matter; they would not ascribe so ignoble an original to the Humane Soul, and therefore they argue; The Rational Soul is not drawn out of the power of the matter, ergo it is created. Or, Whatsoever is not made of a pre-supposed matter or subject, that is created; but the Ratio∣nal soul is not made of another matter or subject, ergo it is created. That is the false Hy∣pothesis (I say) which they build upon, That some souls are drawn out of the power of the matter. If (truly) those souls of bruit Animals and Plants did spring out of the power of the matter, it were not absurd to ascribe a more noble beginning to the Soul of Man; but since that Hypothesis is false, and no souls of any kind are (to speak properly) drawn out of the power of the matter; but souls were put into al living things, and received from the Divine Benediction a power to multiply and propagate themselves, nor are they made of the seed as of matter, but are propagated with and in the seed: if the same original be at∣tributed

to the Humane Soul, no absurdity wil follow: if namely we shal hold, That being in the first Creation made by the most good and great God, and implanted in the body of Man, by vertue of that Command Encrease and multiply it hath received a faculty to pro∣pagate and multiply it self in and by the Seed. Not is the Rational Soul an Essence com∣pleat by it self, as the Angels are, which subsists alone by it self; but it is the one half of a Man which informs the Humane Body, and therefore as its society with the Body derogates nothing from its nobility and immortality, no more does the propagation thereof with the Seed.

Secondly, * 1.279 Many have been moved to hold that the Humane Soul comes from Heaven and from without into the body, because they conceit that if it were propagated with the seed, it must needs be mortal. And in good deed (to speak ingenuously) this is a very promising Argument, and by many variously urged and aggravated. For since the seed is sundry waies shed so that no Conception follows (as when a man spils it out of wantonness; in the Gonorrhea; when a man couples with a woman with child, or with a barren woman, and indeed many waies the seed is often so shed that no formation follows) they conceit it should come to pass that so often the soul of Man (which is otherwise counted immortal) should perish, and man-slaughter should be committed. And therefore by this Argument which they count invincible and unanswerable, being moved, many have held the infusion of souls; and seeing they did acknowledg it necessary that the formation of the child should begin presently after the first Conception, and yet they durst not attribute the same to the Ratio∣nal Soul, some invented one, others another cause of formation, and attributed the same to a formative Faculty, or to the Womb, or absurdly to a certain sensitive soul present before the rational, the vanity whereof hath been shewed before. But the strength of this Argu∣ment is not so great as is imagined. For as Scaliger rightly teaches, Exercitat. 61. Sect. 5. and Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. God alone is truly immortal and incorruptible, because he only hath his being from himself, and depends on none; but in respect to God al created things are mortal and corruptible, which at the pleasure of the Creator may be deposed from that being wherein they are constituted. Yet some of them are not corrupted, as Angels and the rational Soul, because the Creator wil not have them corrupted, and hath made nothing con∣trary to them whereby they might be corrupted, nor hath so plunged them in matter as that they cannot subsist nor operate without the same: and so they are immortal not by Nature, but by Grace and special favor, as Damascen speaks, de Orthodoxa fide, cap. 3. And questionless (as was said in the answer to the foregoing argument) there is great difference betwixt Angels and Men. They have never had any thing to do with matter, nor shal have. But the Humane Soul (while it is in the body) does necessarily use corporeal organs, and therefore it is not propagated without matter. And therefore that is false which they say, if the Humane Soul exist after death by it self without matter, therefore it is also produced without and free from matter. For as it pleased God that the Humane Soul should not sub∣sist without the body, but should naturally have its subsistence in an Humane body; so it is also his pleasure that it should be propagated in and with the seed. In a word: the manner of Generation makes nothing to the corruptibility or incorruptibility of an Essence, but that depends simply upon the will of the Creator who made al things of nothing when they did not exist, and by his power preserves them so long and after such manner as he pleases from sliding back into nothing again. Without which Divine pleasure and peculiar Grace to Man-kind, the forms of men should have perished as wel as those of Bruits. It is there∣fore no consequence, if the Humane Soul whose natural habitation by the will of the Crea∣tor is an humane body, being separated therefrom by death can subsist by the Divine plea∣sure, therefore of necessity it did subsist out of the body before it was associated thereto. And whereas they who assert the Creation and infusion of the soul do hold that God makes Humane Souls immediately without seed: it is impious to say that God could not also make them immortal by means of the seed. And to those other things that are brought to aggra∣vate this argument, touching the effusion of seed without any conception following: I an∣swer, That the Divine benediction, and those gifts of Grace which God by his free pleasure and ordination hath granted to the seed and soul of both Parents joyned together in Concep∣tion, must by no means be attributed to the seed of one Parent alone, not shed after such a manner as is necessary to Generation. Yea, and since neither in other Animals the seed of one Parent hath such perfection that one alone is sufficient to make a Conception, and those attributes which are rightly attributed to the seeds joyned may not be attributed to the seed of either by it self; that is much more true in Man.

But why God made Sexes in Animals must be ascribed to his divine Windom and Plea∣sure. God if he pleased could have created more Worlds, ye the created but one. * 1.280 For God does not alwaies that which is absolutely most perfect, or seems so to us, but that which is best in respect to the End by him aimed at. And therefore though God had created one man more perfect, and who might have had in him the perfection of ho••h ••exes, yet had not the World been thereby more perfect, whose perfection consists in the wonderful consent of al Essences, and in their coordination and conspiration to one End. For one sex being wan∣ting, the life and Society of mankind would be less pleasant (which consists in Wedlock) and less firm. And therefore the most good and great God made a double sex that each might have what to love out of it self, and so not only represent the wisdom of God by knowing, but his goodness also by loving.

Thirdly, they object that the seed is an excrement of the third digestion, * 1.281 and therefore not so noble as to be capable of the rational soul; but that only a perfect Body and furnished with al its Instruments is apt to receive the rational soul. Of this Argument we have spoken in the Chapter foregoing, and in Chap. 6. and 7. where I have demonstrated that the seed is not an Instrument properly so called, nor that any unprofitable thing is generated in the Bo∣dy; yet in that sence it may be called an excrement inasmuch as it is voided forth of the Body. Otherwise and of its own nature it is the most noble substance of the whol Body, and an Epitomy (as it were) and fruit of the whol Man, as hath been said. Much less is it an excrement of the third concoction: but is bred of venous and arterial Blood, and vital spi∣rits in their vessels, that it may be a sit receptacle to receive the soul. And there in all sorts of Animals it is capable of the soul. And if the rational soul may be received by a Body formed of the Seed and menstrual Blood, Why may it not also be received in the seed?

Besides these three Reasons, some do use divers general Arguments against the presence of the soul in the seed propounded before, especially in Chap. 7. as also the 8^th & 9^th, which it is needless here to repeat, since they concern not the seed and soul of Man in particular, but the seeds and souls also of Plants and Animals; and Fienus himself confessor they are but weak, and also answers them, de format foet. quaest 5. But because he adds two which he counts more strong, I must not let them pass. The first (and so the fourth objection which also we propounded before Chap. 9.) is this: Neither the Blood nor the Spirits are animated, Ergo, consequently not the Seed. He proves the Consequence, because the former are produced in parts much more noble than the Stones, viz. the Heart, Brain, Livet; which if they could not bestow a soul upon the Blood and Spirits, neither can the Stones do it. But it is there also answered, that the seed is the fruit of a living body, and far more noble and excellent than the Blood and Spirit.

His second Argument and so the fifth objection is: if in the seed of a Man there were a soul it should be either Rational, Sensitive, or Vegetative. But it can be none of chese. That it cannot be Rational is proved, First, Because if it were rational, the seed of a Man being in his Testicles or Parastate should be a Man. Secondly, The spilling of a Mans Seed upon the ground should be Man-slaughter. Thirdly, The Seed cast upon the ground must be Bap∣tized, lest the soul should be damned eternally. Fourthly, if the seed were animted with a rational soul, the seed of a Woman should be no less animated than the seed of a Man: and if the seed of a Woman were animated she might engender by her self. Fiftly, if the rational soul were in the seed, either it should be the soul of the Parents extended in the seed, and di∣vided and multiplied according to the division of the seed, or it should be some soul bred a∣new and produced in the feed or infused by God. But al these things he counts to be absurd. First he conceives that the soul of the Parents cannot be multiplied, because then it would follow, that the rational soul is divisible and consequently mortal, and that all Men have one soul, and that our soul should be a particle of our Fathers soul; and the soul of our Father a particle of the soul of our Grandsire; and at last al our souls shal be particles of the first man, and so communicated by Generation. Al which things he counts to be false & different from the Catholick Religion. Also he saies the soul cannot be produced afresh from the soul of the Father, for so it should be drawn out of the power of the matter and become moreal: nor that it is infused by God, and Created in the Testicles; because there it could neves come to a perfect state, &c. Nor does he conceive the Soul to be in the seed, because since a Man hath two Testicles and a Woman hath also two, if in Copulation animated seed should fal from four Testicles, four souls should be united, or one should be coagulated of four glewed to∣gether. Secondly, Because then the seed of Animals should be a Plant; and a Man before

he should arrive to a rational soul ought to pass through the form of a Plant, and afterward through the Form of a Bruit, and be once an Ass or a Dog. Thirdly, Because that Vegeta∣tive Soul should be produced by a Rational soul existent in the Testicles, which cannot be, because the Rational Soul cannot have the power to produce a Vegetative Soul, since those souls are species distinct one from another. And many other absurdities he objects in case we shal say that the Vegetative Soul is in the Seed, which for brevities sake I omit.

But I wonder that so renowned a man, and who in the beginning of the foresaid Book writes, that no man had found out the efficient cause of shaping a man in the Womb, or if some few had smelt it our, they had neither cleerly opened nor by any reasons maintained the same, but that he would prove his opinion with such firm and evident reasons, that no man should afterwards have occasion to doubt, should use such frivolous and light reasons in so serious a matter. For first of all intending to write accurately of the Efficient cause of the Childs formation, he ought to have remembred that a Physitian must borrow many things of the natural Philosopher, that he may attain to the knowledg of the Subject he is to work up∣on; but because he doth not equal Causes with their Effects, nor adjuncts with their proper subjects, viz. such to which they belong primarily and of themselves, and inasmuch as they are such, his discourse breeds no true knowledg, as Jacobus Zabarella Lib. 2. de Method. cap. 11. teaches. For since it is not Man alone that is formed in the Womb, but also other Animals which bring forth live yong ones; moreover Animals are hatched out of Eggs, Plants are formed out of their Seeds: he ought to have enquired in general of the Generation of all A∣nimals, yea of all living things, and what Cause did shape both Plants and all Animals; and the Cause being found, to consider whether it belong to a Man also, or whether we are to hold a peculiar Cause of the Conformation in a Man, and to render a Reason why that power which forms other Animals hath not place in a Man, but that another ought to be sought out. Again, he ought to demonstrate and not barely suppose it as a thing granted, that there are three sorts of souls in a man, and not one furnished with divers Faculties. Thirdly, he ought also to have noted this, that not the Seed of the Man or Woman alone does suffice to produce the Child, nor is the seed cal'd a Conception whiles it is in the Testicles, but when both Seeds are joyned in the Womb, which things being observed he might easily have answered all his own Reasons. For in the first place, he might easily have marked that the Seed of a Man whiles it is in the Testicles does not suffice to Generation, and that therefore when it is shed upon the ground it needs not be Baptized, nor does the Womans Seed alone suffice for Generation. And whereas he conceits that it is false, absurd, and different from the Catholick Religion, that the Soul should be propagated from the Father to the Son; indeed it is not agreeable to the Doctrines of the Schoolmen, but it is nevertheless most true and agrees with the holy Scriptures. For how shal that Precept Encrease and Mul∣tiply be fulfilled, unless from the first Man and Animals at first Created all the Men and Animals that do live and have ever lived unto this day had received their Souls? And in Genes. 46.26. it is said that Sixty six Souls came out of the Thigh of Jacob; and Exod. 1.4. that the Souls that came out of the Thigh of Jacob were Seventy, which I nevertheless do leave to the consideration of Divines. Nor does it hence follow that al men have one Soul or that the Soul is mortal. The first Man had one Soul from whence al came. Nor is there any reason that the Soul of Man if it be multiplied should be mortal: for the Creator commanded that it should be multiplied, and nevertheless it was his pleasure it should be immortal. Which things being granted, al the rest fals to the ground, so that there is no need of an Answer. Also it wil appear from what shal be said against the sixth and seventh Objection, what is to be answered to the rest; and that though the Soul be communicated from the Father and Mother, that yet it is not compounded.

Sixthly, * 1.282 Some late Writers do thus argue; Either the Seed is ammated by the Soul of the Parent, or by its own proper Soul. Not by that of the Parent: for then the Soul of the Parent should become the Soul of the Son; and should go out of the Parents Body with the Seed. Nor with its own Soul; because since both Parents contribute Seed, the Son should then have a double Soul, or one should grow to the other and it should be com∣pounded.

But if this Argument were objected against the Generation of Plants and brute Animals, that which a man should then Answer may here also serve for an Answer. Moreover, I say in general that both in Plants, Bruits, and Mankind, the Seed is animated with the Soul of the Parent, viz. according to the sort; for otherwise like would not beget its like. Also

true it is, that the Seed hath its own Soul, and that numerically different from the Soul of the Parent. Yet thence it does not follow, that after this manner the Soul passes out of the Patents Body with the Parents Seed. For the Soul of the Parent remains perfect and en∣tire, although it multiplies it self. And as it does not follow, when in augmentation and in the shooting forth of the new Boughs on a Tree the Soul diffuses it self into the new matter and cloaths it self therewith, that it goes out of the former Body: so it does not follow when it communicates it self to the Sed, that it goes out of the Generator. For this is the force of the Divine Benediction, that the same Soul remaining perfect and entire should be able to multiply it ••el••. And whereas it is said that the Soul of the Son should be double, or com∣pounded, this may easily be answered by those who hold, that the Seed of the Father or the Mother only is prolifical. Not do they want an Answer, who say that the Seed of both the Parents is prolifical; and before cap. 9. we have answered thereto, viz. how that the Souls being of the same fort when they are joyned together do not make a compound; and it hath been said before Chap. 9. out of Scaligers Exercit. 106. sect. 6. that of three stems of a Palm joyning together one Palm-tree is made, and a flame made of ten Torches or Links is called but one flame, and not a compounded flame. And if it be commonly said without ab∣surdity that the soul is totally in the whol body, and totally many part; why should it be absurd to hold that the soul is totally in the Mans feed, and totally in the Womans? And moreover, as the whol soul is said to be in the Eye, the Bram, the Heart, nor does it therefore follow that one soul is compounded of many souls; but this continues stil a truth, That it is one Soul which informs the whol and al its parts: so although it be said that the leed both of the Man and Woman is ammated, it does not therefore follow that one soul is compounded of two souls, or one made up of two.

Another forms the same Objection after this manner: if the Soul of a man be propagated, * 1.283 it is done either by cutting off some part of the soul of the Parents, or by the instrumental efficiency of the seed, or the soul of the child is immediately produced from the soul of the Parents, so that the seed ha•••• no hand in the production of the soul, but only causes the dis∣positions, or at most is the Vehiculum of the soul by which it is carried from the soul of the Parents into the Child.

But al these Objections arise from ignorance, because they know not the nature of the soul, nor how that saying is to be understood, that every form and soul does multiply it self, and how that Divine Benediction, Encrease and multiply, hath hitherto been effected, and is stil effected: but if they did diligently consider, and in the first place search out how souls are multiplied in Plants and Animals, also the manner how the same is done in Man∣kind, if (I say) they understood these things as far as they may be known in this darkness of our Minds, they would not invent so many absurdities. * 1.284 For the last (if rightly explained) is true, viz. That the seed (understand the body of the seed) is the Vehiculum or carriage, by which the Soul is communicated from the Parents to their issue: which action is called traduction or delivering over, the word being borrowed from Plants. For as in Trees in which the seminal faculty is disfused through their whol bodies, if any part be cut off, and grafted upon another Tree, the soul of that Tree from whence the branch was taken is com∣municated to the Tree upon which it is ingrafted: so with the Seed the soul of Animals is transplanted into the womb of the Female, and so from that seed endued with its soul a perfect Animal does spring up. But as, when a branch is cut from the Tree with its Soul in it, that Tree neither loses its soul, nor does that soul become less: even so when the soul of the Parent in the seed is delivered over unto the issue, the soul of the Parent remains intire. And as when in augmentation the soul is communicated to the aliment flowing in, the soul which is in the rest of the body does not become lesser; and as when from a root or stem of a Vine, or the root of an Hop, many and long branches grow up in one Summer, all which receive their souls from the root and stem, and yet the soul is totally in the yong branches, and totally remains in the old stock or root, not being made lesser: so also the soul of the Parent is transplanted with the seed into the child, it self nevertheless remaining entire. And this multiplication of souls presents an image of the immense and infinite God, who (as Ju∣lius Caesar Scaliger speaks) reigns every where without place, al without al things, and the whol without parts. I said an Image. For God the Beginning of al things is an infinite fulness, filling al things, whom neither the Heavens nor Earth do contain, totally existing within the World, totally without, and yet restrained within no limits. But our soul in∣deed is joyned together by dimensions, and its fulness is only so large as the body is, and bo∣dily dimensions: yet though we should suppose a body to grow from the smallest quantity

to the greatest bulk, the same soul would fil it al remaining the same without any Addition. Also in like manner, though an Animal generate often, and the soul multiplies it self, and communicates it self to the issue, it is not diminished of any of its parts as having none. Of which we have spoke more largely before, Chap. 9. Which things it were better attently to consider, than to oppose the truth though far out of sight.

Eightly, Neither are those things of any great moment which Aphonsus Caranza here objects, and whereby he would prove, That the Rational Soul is infused at the last when the body is perfected. For in the first place, as to that place in Exodus, 21. which he cites out of the Septuagint, and proves afterwards from Philo, Lib. de spectal. leg. viz. If the In∣fant were not shaped he that struck the Mother so as to cause Abortion should be fined, but if it were shaped he was to be punished as a Man-slayer. I (••uly) wil not put my sickle into other mens Corn; yet thus much I say, That which he alleadges is not in the Hebrew text, nor can it be proved thereby that the soul is not present at the beginning of Conception. And let us suppose there was such a difference of penalties, and let the Civil Laws and Lawyers here quoted by Caranza retain their Authority: yet thence it no waies follows that the Seed is not animated presently upon the Conception. The Law-givers perhaps, and the Lawyers had their Causes known at home, into which I shal not now enquire, and which I leave to their place, why they would otherwise punish him who destroys a Conception per∣fectly shaped, than they would do him that destroys one less perfect; and this perhaps a∣mongst the rest was not the least, that before the Child begins to be moved there is no such great certainty of its life, and many things might happen to it in the Womb, although no ex∣ternal cause was added, which might take away its life before it came to ful perfection; so that what Hippocrates saies of the Child born in the eighth month, it is not, and it is, that may much rather be said of such an imperfect Conception; and therefore they would inflict a greater punishment upon him who should destroy a perfect Child, and upon him a less that destroyed an imperfect one of less hope, and subject to more casualties. Mean while I conceive it never entred into the thoughts of the Law yers, that by their Laws they would de••••••a••e from the principles of Nature, and oppose such things as Natural Philoso∣phers and Physitians (to whom in such Questions they alwaies appeal, and whose Autho∣rity they reverence) do demonstrate by most firm reasons to be true. Which appears most evidently by Augustus, constitut. quart. part. 4. whereby it is macted that he should not be punished by the Sword, but according to the discretion of the Judg, who gave a Medicine to procute Abortion, if the Child were not yet quick, and was cast forth before the middle time, reckoning from the Conception. No man (certainly) wil say that a Child is not quick at the end of the fourth month, and at the middle of the time her wixt the Conception and the Birth, since al men count the fortieth day the longest term in the space whereof the child receives the Soul. Yea, and before the Nativity the Lawyers count not the child a man, per text in L. cum inter Veteres, Codice de sidei commiss. But what Natural Philoso∣pher wil say an Infant is not a Man til he is born? And therefore by a vital child the Civil Laws understand such an one in which the manifest signs of life appear, especially from the motion thereof, which first happens about the middle time of Conception. Concerning which thing Thomas Fienus does also wel write in Apolog. advers. Sanctacruz, That he who kils an animated Conception, however smal or imperfectly organized, wanting yet sense and motion, is a murderer no less than if it were perfect; but it does not thence follow that al homicide ought to be punished alike; since though both are alike perfect essentially, yet are they not alike accidentally perfect. Would not (adds he) any man think that a greater injury was done him by him who had hewn him down a very tall and fruitful Pear∣tree, than by him that should pluck out of the Earth and break a smal branch only, a foot high, newly planted, and that therefore he is worthy of greater correction, and more stripes.

Nor is that argument which he brings in the Second place, of any great moment; whereby he concludes, Because God made Adam of the slime of the Earth, and when he was for∣med and fashioned, breathed into his face the breath of Life; that therefore in Generation also the Rational Soul is not infused before the formation of the body. But Creation and Generation are of a different Nature. The Woman was created of the Rib of the Man, yet is she not so generated.

But in the third place, I admire that a Christian should endeavor to prove by that action of Hippocrates, de Nat. pueri, That the Rational Soul is not in the Child the first daies. For inasmuch as Hippocrates advised the Dancing Wench with child, that within the sixth

day she might cast out the seed by dancing, he conceives that Hippocrates thought that the seed retained so long in the Womb had not the rational soul in it; for otherwise he would not have perswaded her to cause Abortion. Moreover he brings for the same the Authority of Aristotle, who Lib. 7. polit. cap. 16. allows the destruction of a child in the Womb as long as it is not furnished with sense and life, as if he did suppose that the Conception was without life some notable space of time. But Johannes Baptista Sylvaticus, because of this very place, does conceive (and that not without cause) that the Book was not written by Hippocrates, Controvers. 32. and if it were written by him, yet this Counsel of his is by no means to be allowed, but is to be reckoned amongst the foolish Imaginations and Ratio∣cinations of the Pagans, of which St. Paul speaks Romans 1.21. And the like reckoning we are to make of that same destroying of Conceptions used by the Heathen, of which Aristotle speaks, Lib. 7. politic. cap. 16. And therefore also that Decrea of the Canon Law, in Decreto in cap. sicut ex Literarum, de Homicidio, where a Monk by whose assi∣stance a woman had procured her self Abortion, is not counted irregular, and is allowed to say Divine Service, because the Child (as was thought) did not live, is by Franciscus Ran∣chinus, a most learned Physitian, in his Commentary on Hippocrates his Oath, rightly ter∣med unjust, and that distinction faulty.

If yet any further Objections may be made against our Opinion, their Refutation is suf∣ficiently apparent from what hath been said. The sum whereof comprehended in the words of a certain great Divine, is this: An whol Man according to the Primitive Ordination of God begets an whol Man. An whol Man Ical a Male and Female, who are made into one flesh, or become one flesh, Genes. 2.24. Matth. 19.6. Ephes. 5.31. Now the Parents generate inasmuch as they are men, that is, according to that which belongs to the whol spe∣cies or sort of Mans Nature, in vertue of that Divine Word, Gen. 1.28. God blessed them, and said, bring forth fruit, and multiply and replenish the Earth. And they generate by the conjugal conjunction. Nor does the male ingender alone, nor the semale ingender alone, not the Body only, nor the Soul only, but the whol Man, viz. Male and Female coupled according to the Ordination of God, And therefore a Son or a Daughter proceeds not from the Father alone, or from the Mother alone; but the Son and the Daughter is from the whol Father, and the whol Mother, and equally the Son and Daughter of the one as of the other; and as the Generation of the Patents is common, so the work of Child-making or Filiation, is common to both as to Nature.

THE CONCLUSION.

AND thus I conceive I have delivered the true Opinion concerning the Generation of li∣ving things, and the propagation of Souls by the seed from the Parents to the Issue, both in Plants and Animals, yea, and in Man himself; and established the same by firm rea∣sons, and refuted the Objections of those that are contrary minded. In the mean while by the admonition of Scaliger, Exercit. 297. I see, observe, and remember, how weak the sight of our mind is, to search into the secret Closets of Nature; and I hear al learned men in a manner (especially in the Question of the Original of the Humane Soul) complain of the obscurity and difficulty thereof. And therefore I also (peradventure) may be deceived and err. Yet this I conceive I have demonstrated by a most firm reason from the Act to the Power, and from the Power to the Act, or Form and Soul, that there is the Soul in the seed both of Plants, and of Animals, and of Man himself (whether it be propagated by the Pa∣rents, or sent in by God) as soon as ever the formation of the living body begins. And this Tenet I shal so long maintain til it shal be to me demonstrated how without the souls pre∣sence this work of the formation of a living body can be performed. Which unless it can be done it wil be the part of a mind studious of the Truth not to labor how to oppose that most firm demonstration by certain Objections, and so to render it suspected, but rat her to be careful how to answer his own doubts. For Julius Caesar Scaliger, in Lib. 1. de Plan∣tis, writes from Aristotle; where the thing it self is apparent, and Opinion opposes the thing, we must seek a Reason, but not be ignorant of the thing. Now that thing is appa∣rent

which is demonstrated by most firm Reasons. And here at last I solemnly protest that I acknowledg and confess the Excellency and Eminency of the Humane Soul, and its diffe∣rence from the Souls of Bruits; that it alone bears the Image of God, is separable from the Body, and immortal. And therefore, if I have said any thing (as I hope I have not) which may really oppose this Prerogative of the Soul, I wish it were unsaid. But whether the propagation thereof from the Father to the Son, do that, and whether therefore it must necessarily be held to be immediately infused into our Bodies by God; I leave that to the Judgment of every Man. What seems to me most probable I have freely declared.

THE FIFTH DISCOURSE. Concerning the Spontaneous Generation of Live Things.

Chap. 1. False Opinions concerning the Spontaneous Original of Living Things.

BEsides the Generation of Living Things of which we have hither∣to spoken, and which, * 1.285 because like evidently Generates its like, is commonly termed univocal Generation, there is yet an∣other, which because there in like is not thought to generate its like, it is called vulgarly Spontaneous and equivocal. So, of Hors-Dung those flies are Generated which we cal Beetles, of Corne a certain Worm called in some places a Wibble, of Beans another sort of Worms, of Wood another, of the foul∣ness of the Skin and Garments Lice and Fleas, as also out of Cheese and Flesh and other putrefying things Worms and Insects commonly so cal∣led, of sundry sorts do arise, as shal afterward particularly appear, The consi∣deration of the Generation of which kind of Living Things is necessary and not un∣worthy the Cognisance of a Natural Philosopher; which very thing Aristotle did hint, when 1 de Part. Animal. Cap. 5. he thus wrote: With a certain Childish scornful∣ness to despise the disputation and Consideration which may be had concerning the meanest Animals, and to count it tedious, is no way beseeming a Philosopher; since there is nothing in Nature in which there is not somwhat to be admired. And as it is reported that He∣raclitus said to those that came to speakwith him, and because they happened to find him sit∣ting by chance in a Bakers Cottage to Warm him at the Oven, they would not go to him, as abashed at his bomly manner of sitting in such a place: for he bid them enter boldly, since even this place (quoth he) is not void of the presence of the immortal Gods: the very same may be said touching the Inquisition into the Nature of Animals. For we ought to contemplate and discuss all things without shame; since in all things the Divi∣nity of Nature and her Honorable and Beautiful contrivance is conspicuous. And that so much the more diligently, inasmuch as sew have written any thing that is solid and agreeable to truth, concerning this subject. Above all others the most Re∣nowned Fortunius Licetus Professor at Padua hath written most diligently and larg∣ly of this Matter, in his 4. Books of the Spontaneous Origmal of Live Things. As for me, though I acknowledg the difficulty of the matter, and am well aware that it is dangerous to hold any thing different from the vulgar opinions, and liable to de∣traction, especially in this subject: yet I had rather freely shew my judgment in an obscure matter and contribute mine assistance, then to cease from the investigation of truth Let every one follow what Opinion he pleases. I obtrude mine upon no man. And if any man will shewe me better, I shall willingly assent unto him.

Now this Generation, as hath been said, * 1.286 is by some called Spontaneous (Aristotle 1 de Generat. Animal. Cap. 1. saies that such Creatures are Generated by Nature working of her own accord, and thence Julius Caesar Scaliger borrows the Phrase of Automatismos, production of it own accord, Exercitat. 168.) the word being tranf∣ferred

from moral actions to Natural. For Scaliger conceives, Exercitat. 77 Sect. 1. that this Adverbe Sponte, (of it own accord) was derived ex sponsionibus, from pro∣mises. Now all promises are voluntary and free. And the same Scaliger concerves Exercitat. 140. that it cannot be accurately or properly said, that a Tree grows Sponte of its own accord. But the word seems to be more general, and to be oppo∣sed to that which is against ones will, or to that which is not done save by an exter∣nal Agent, and contrary to Natural Inclination. And therefore, as it is attributed to other actions which are performed by an internal Agent, no external Cause concurring, so also it is attributed to Natural Generation. Whence Virgil.

Such Fruit he plucks as the free ground affords, And gentle Trees bear of their own accords.

But in more special manner it is attributed to those Generations, the efficient cause whereof lies concealed in the thing it self, and is not so manifest to the senses, and when that which is Generated breaks out of its own accord as it were without Seed. Of which Virgil.

For somethings grow even of their own accord without mans Labor. And, Such things as of their own accord do grow.

* 1.287 It is vulgarly called Equivocal Generation, viz. Because the cause of such Living things is not thought to be of the same kind with the thing ingendred.

But what things they are which be thus Generated of their own accord is a questi∣on. * 1.288 It was an old Opinion, that all Brutes, Yea and Man himself, did at first grow out of the Earth. Which Plato teaches in Menexenus, as also other Philosophers much Ancienter then Plato: after whom followed the Poets in this Opinion. Lucretius hath these Verses.

Hardly smal Creatures now She makes at last Who all things made and Beasts with Bodies vast. It is not therefore without Reason good The Barth should bear the Name of Mother-hood. For she mankind out of her Bowels Spun, And all the Beasts that on the Mountains Run Her teeming Womb did at fit Season Bear, And many fashion'd Birds that flie i'th' Air. But since 'twas fit that She some end should make Of teeming Labors, and her Quiet take; She now leaves off like Wife worne out with Age.

And Juvenal, Satyr the 6.

For in th' Earth's Non-Age, under Heav'ns new Frame, They stricter liv'd who from th' Oakes Rupture came, And Clay-born had no Parents.

And Virgil in the Second Book of his Husbandry.

When first all Cattle their Beginning had, When of the Barth mankinds hard race was made.

But these Opinions had their Original from the History of the Creation of the World. For having doubtless hard somwhat thereof, from the writings of Moses, they turned the truth into these Fables; and since in the Creations History it is said, that God commanded the Earth should bring forth the Living Creature in ge∣neral after its kind, the Beasts and Creeping Things, with Cattle according to their kind, and that God made Man of the Clay of the Earth; (but they in the mean while knew not the Creator:) they thence invented this same Spontaneous Original of things out of the Earth. * 1.289 This Opinion is also by some attributed to Avicenna. But it is not credible that Avicenna so great a Philosopher should follow so Fahu∣lous an opinion. Avicen indeed writes Lib. 15. de Animalib. Cap. 1. As men might cut themselves off from Generation, either by their own free will, or by Pestilential Air and so come all to die, and then if a man should be made he would Generate, and so the

kind would be renewed: and making and engendring would mutually assist one the other, in preserving the kind. But the sence of those words is this: if all Men should perish, either voluntarily, forbearing to Generate, or Slain by Pestilence, if after the Death of all Men a new man should be made, which way soever, whether by Gods Creation or any other means; he being a new man cannot be thought to want the power of engendring other Men like himself, by which the kind might be maintai∣ned.

Now concerning the original and efficient Cause of such living Things, * 1.290 Authors do very much dissent. Cardanus Lib. 9. de Subtil. saies that such things as are said to be Generated of their own accord are Generated by Fortune and Chance. But therein he is out. For Chance and Fortune have no hand in Natural things, and whatsoever things are made by Chance and Fortuitously, they are not alwaies en∣gendred of the same principles and after the same manner. But things which grow up of their own accord are alwaies bred of the same Principles, and after the same manner, and have certain efficient Causes, which also act for a certain ends sake, and produce certain effects. So, of Hors-Dung Beetles are bred, and not Eare∣wigs; out of Cheese Mites, and other kind of Worms out of flesh, and in general, alwaies things determinate breed of such and such things; Yea, and they are born at a certain Season too; and the kinds of flies, Ear-wigs, Worms, Beetles and But∣ter-Flies do all spring and perish at their certain Seasons. And although as Car∣danus Objects, in sundry places on the Earth, in the Waters, in dead Carkasses and elswhere, we see the same things bred: yet they are Generated of a determi∣nate matter, which may be found in divers places frequently. And although it may happen, that the matter which is fit for the Spontaneous original of things may in some places be collected by Chance: yet that matter is determined, nor are living things made thereof by Chance, but the next efficient is determined, and al∣waies acts after the same manner. Nor matters it that such things as arise Sponta∣neously are less perfect (an Argument whereof they take to be their not Genera∣ting) and therefore cannot have the notion of an end, and so seem to be made by chance. For though compared to others they are somwhat imperfect: yet in re∣spect of their own essence they are perfect, are Nourished, Augmented, Moved, and perform operations besitting their species. But that conceit of theirs is false, when as they imagine such things do not Generate; since even the very least and most ignoble of these kind of Creatures do couple and Generate, as Aristotle tea∣ches every where, and especially in his 5. de Histor. Animal: and Experience also it self doth testifie as much. And although in comparison of other Creatures they seem ignoble, yet are they necessary for the perfection of the whole Universe, as shall be said anon from the Exercitation 250. of Jul. Caesar Scaliger: and that Avicenna wrote well when he said it was better Lice should be bred, then that pu∣trid matter should remain in that condition, is the Opinion of Learned men, who acknowledge a rare piece of workmanship even in the structure of a Louse. For if in the first place we consider the prime Work-Master of all things, he that he might discover his infinite Wisdom and Omnipotency, had rather that living Crea∣tures should be multiplied in the world, then corrupt and putrified matter void of Life; and it is his pleasure, that the bodies of more perfect living Creatures, when they are corrupted should not turn simply to putrid matter, but into more ignoble Aniruals. Hence, from the parts and Excrements of Animals, from Plants and their fruits sundry sorts of living Things do proceed, and from such and such de∣terminate Things such and such determinate Creatures arise and no other. So thought and wrote Jul. Caesar Scaliger, who in the forecited place thus writes: Man was made for God, the world for Man. And soon after: Man is the Prince of Animals. Now man should not have been Prince, if he had not been made as he is, viz. in the middle. Nor could he be in the middle, unless betwixt extreams. They were therefore made for the Mediums sake. Now if any of the extreams, or of those things which are seated betwixt the middle and the extreams, were wanting, there would be a vacuum amongst the forms. Which would be a greater fault in Nature, then a Vacuum in Quantity without a Body. For what is more absurd then a middle without Extreams? which Austin also taught long ago, de Civitate Dei Lib. 12. Cap. 4. It were Ridiculous (saith he) to imagine that the faults of Cattle and Trees, and other Mutable and Mortal things, which want either understanding

or Sense or Life, should be damnable: since those Creatures have received that manner by the appointment of God, that by giving way and succeeding they might accomplish the lowest pulchritude of times, in their kind, agreeing to those parts of the World. And a little after: the comliness of which order therefore doth not delight us, because we according to this our mortal condition being Woven in as a part thereof, we are not able to discerne the whole, to which those particles which offend us do very aptly and decently agree. And again: Nature considered in it self and not with reference to our commodity or discommodity, gives Glory to its Work-Master.

Others though they do not hold that such things are bred by Chance or Fortune; * 1.291 yet they conceive they have no other immediate Cause efficient, but only the com∣mon and remote one, in which opinion is the Conciliato, who Differ. 29. doth make this difference betwixt other Living Creatures and those which breed of themselves, because the former besides the Universal agent, viz. The Heaven, do also require a particular one, since the Sun and Man Generates a Man; But the lat∣ter want an immediate Cause, and are produced without a particular agent. And the Name it self seems to say as much. For since they are said to arise of their own accord, that seems to hint that they have no external immediate efficient Cause distinct from themselves: for else they would not be said to be Generated of themselves. But in very truth, there ought alwaies to be a proportion betwixt Causes and Effects, that Universal Effects may have Universal Causes, and Parti∣cular Effects Particular Causes, and General General, and Special Special. And if it were not so, no demonstration could be made; which is not made by the imme∣diate Cause, and so no demonstration nor science can be had of such thing as are generated of themselves. Moreover, the common and remote Causes are all ex∣ternal and manifest. But that such things as grow of themselves do arise from an internal Cause lying hid in the matter, we shall shew anon sufficiently. Moreover, since there is a great variety of things which breed of themselves, and differences, and certain sorts, they verily cannot all proceed a like from one common Cause, but to every sort its next special Causes must be assigned. And that those common Causes do not suffice doth hereby also appear, that which way so ever they turn themselves who defend this Opinion, they cannot disintangle themselves. Whence they are divided into sundry Opinions concerning that remote Cause

Scotus held that the Souls of these kind of Creatures do proceed from the most high God immediately. * 1.292 But the Generation of al living Things is Natural. And therefore a Ratural Cause ought also to be sought out; nor must we presently run to God, who having created and constituted Nature, doth now produce nothing im∣mediately and miraculously. And since the original of Plants and other brute Ani∣mal is from their Parents by means of Seed, but not from God, save as a remote and universal Cause, shal God be the immediate Cause of such Ignoble Animals? Nor do the two Reasons which John Duns Scotus brings for his Opinion any waies prove that God may rather be said to be the Cause of these Spontaneous things then of such as arise from Seed; as Fortunius Licetus doth prolixly examin his Opinions, Lib. 1. de Spont. Vivent. Art. a Cap. 77. ad 84. Nor do I think fit to spend time in a plain Case.

Luther upon Genes. Chap. 1. verse 20. * 1.293 thus writes: If you ask by what virtue this Generation is caused, which they term Equivocal, Aristotle answers, that the pu∣trified Humor is cherished by the Suns heat, and so a live Creature is produced. But I doubt whether this be a sufficient Reason. For the Sun heats, but generates nothing, unless God say by his divine power, let a Mouse come out of that putrefa∣ction. A Mouse therefore is also a Creature of Gods making &c. and a little after: therefore we do here also admire the Creature and work of God. And the same may be said of Flies.

From this Opinion Johannes Gallego de la Serna the Spaniard dissents not, de Princip. Generat. Lib. 1. Cap. 3. who holds God alone to be the principal cause in this kind of Generation, and writes, that though every Univocal cause cannot pro∣duce its individuals, unless God as the first cause concur with its action: yet God concurs with each after a different fashion, according as the Generation differs more or less from the Equivocal kind, in which God alone operates as the principal Cause

And in Chap. 4. he adds, that these weak kinds of living Creatures do need a more vehement concourse of God then those that have a greater ability to bege•• their like.

But the most good and great God, (after he had made Nature, * 1.294 which is his ordi∣nary power) is not alone the next and immediate efficient cause of any thing, but by his universal Concourse conserves all Natural things, and regulates their Ge∣neration; which concourse of his to restrain to one thing, (especially being more vile and Ignoble) more then to another, and to hold that he is more vehemently and painfully busied in some imperfect base thing, then in others that are more per∣fect and noble, is very absurd. Scaliger saies far more rightly and divinely, Ex∣ercit. 1. That power (saith he) of God took no more pains in building this universe, then in making the basest tree: nor did it express more subtilty when it made that by its Virtue the Load-stone should have a cause in it self restraining the efficiency of attraction, then when he gave to the first matter the form of Air, that it might ascend. For in his works there is the greatest Equality. And in 2. de Plantis. God. neither idle nor la∣boring; neither in nor without worke; but without worke the Head of the work, the beginning, the Middle, the End, the whole; and that in one word I may Express all, Compass all, Transcend all: He himself, by whose most simple and indivisible under∣standing of himself all the Worlds were made: so that all have their own End and Order.

Nor doth Francisous Suaresius think any righter, Who, in Disput. 18. de Causis Proxim. Effic. Sect. 2, Num. 33. writes: that the Heaven indeed by its own proper Virtue cannot make Souls; yet that it makes them by the power of God, as the Au∣thor and general provisor of Nature, who by his greater assistance can supply what∣ever virtue is wanting in the immediate Causes. But the answer is the same which was given to the other Opinion. For since God created all things very good, he al∣so furnished them al with necessary forces, and consequently here is no defect, no weakness, which need to be supplied either from Heaven, or by the extraordinary assistance of God.

Others therefore take pains indeed to find out this immediate cause, but all un∣happily, whiles they seek the same out of the matter, and not in the matter, and define Equivocal Generation to be that in which the efficient out of matter which came not from nor out of it self, but is of a quite different Nature, generates a thing specifically unlike it self and its own form. But none of them hath been able with∣out Absurdity to say or shew what that efficient is, and how it could Generate a thing specifically unlike it self, and its own form.

Avicenna held that an Intelligence Subordinate to God, * 1.295 whom he calls Colco∣dea, doth produce the Souls of these things. But it is not yet proved, that there are such Intelligences from which things Natural proceed. For from God alone as the first cause of all things, and Nature, all Natural things proceed. Nor is Creation to be attributed to any other thing but God Omnipotent. But the immediate effici∣ent Cause of Generation ought to be like, either in sort, or in the next kind, to that which is Generated. And therefore these Spontaneous live Things cannot arise from a Cause of a quite different kind from themselves, since they are Natural Bodies.

Thirdly, * 1.296 Others hold the immediate efficient Cause of these Bodies to be the Hea∣ven. But this Opinion will not hold Water, more then the other. For in the first place, the Heaven is the common cause of all things Sublunary, as Subservient to their Generation: and therefore it cannot be said to be only the immediate cause of these Spontaneous Creatures, for the Heaven after its fashion advances the Generati∣on of these kind of Creatures, and of such as engender one another, all a like; nor can any Reason be assigned, why it should rather advance the Generation of Spontane∣ous things then of others. For if they will run to Heaven for want of an immediate Cause, we shal declare sufficiently hereafter, that it is not wanting neither, in the Generation of these Spontaneous Creatures. Moreover, although they that hold the Heaven to be the Cause of this Generation do sundry waies endeavor to declare the same: yet none of them do sufficiently explain the matter: For some, as Aver∣roes, do hold that the heat of Heaven is the efficient Cause of these Creatures: or that these Creatures are produced by the Heaven, by help of its heat. Others (as Albertus Magnus) do hold that the light of Heaven is the immediate Cause of the

Original of things; others, the motion of Heaven, as Thomas Aquinas; 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the occult influences, as Fernelius. But which way soever they turn themselves, they help themselves not, but are still pressed with the same difficulty. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Heaven which way so ever it acts, as was said before, is but a remote and univer∣sal Cause. * 1.297 But every effect requires an immediate Cause, and a special effect a special Cause. Moreover, Heat, Light, Motion, and occult Influences are acci∣dents. But no substance, such as the Souls of these creatures are, can be produced by an accident. Some indeed do hold, that Heaven is not only an universal Cause, inasmuch as it affects all Sublunary things, but also a Particular, in as much as by a Peculiar Virtue it concurs mediately or immediately to the generation of all things. But neither is the knot thus loosed. Indeed I grant, that after its fashion the Heaven doth also particularly concur to the making of all things Sublunary, and that not one face of Heaven nor posture of the Stars, and influence thence pro∣ceeding, and seasons thereon depending, but sundry, are necessary for several Plants, when they grow, when their flowers ripen, when their fruit comes forth; and that some things spring at certain positions of the Heaven, and die away at other positions, and that doubtless there is a Peculiar Sympathy betwixt some certain sorts of things and some Stars. But the question is whether the heaven gives the forms which constitute those species: which we deny, and hold that the Heaven by its influx doth only stir up some first qualities in the Air, and also by an occult influ∣ence excite the forms of living Things, and cause them to buckle themselves to their proper operations. And so, as the Heaven in Univocal Generation so called, while the Sun and a Man do generate a Man, is not the next and immediate, but the remote and mediate cause: so also, in this Spontaneous original, it is not the im∣mediate and next, but the remote and mediate cause. Which in Plants and Eggs is hereby manifest, in that even the heat also raised from Elementary Fire doth often perform as much. So the heat of a Stove can in the Winter cause, that forms which lie hid in Seeds will begin to rouze themselves up and sprout. After the very same manner Flesh also in the Winter time kept in an hot place wil pu∣trifie and breed Worms, as wel as in Summer. And as the Dugs of Virgins whiles by their heat they hatch the Silk-Worms Eggs do not give a form to the Silk-Worms, nor the heat of the fornace doth not give to Eggs the form of Chicken: even so the Heaven doth not either by its heat or hidden influx give the form to these Spontaneous Creatures; but as it cannot ingender a Man without a mans help, so, unless there lie hid in the matter a seminal principle it can engender nothing there∣from. For the Heaven indeed may hold its course without inferior causes: but in the things themselves below it alone can ingender nothing without the concourse of inferior causes, they being in every Generation the immediate and principal agents.

Alexander, * 1.298 Olympiodorus, Cardan 9. de Subtil. Libel. de Animal. quae ex putred. Oriuntur, (whom Caesalpinus Lib. 6. de Nat. Rerum, Cap. 21. and others do follow) hold that the Spontaneous Generation of living Things doth proceed from the warmth of the Ambient Air, either as from an instrument of the Subcoelestial Nature, or as from a primary efficient cause. But since heat is an accident, it cannot act beyond its own forces, so as to produce a substance. Moreover, heat is only the instrument of vital actions; and therefore no primary agent.

Others, * 1.299 as Philoponus, Themistius, and the Platonists most of them, do suppose that the Soul of the World is the efficient cause of these Spontaneus living Things. For so Themistius 1 de Anima Cap. 24. That there is (saith he) an only and Ʋniver∣sal Soul of the world, which gives to all living Bodies their Soul, or life if you will so call it, which is nothing but a certain vital and generative faculty, passing through all things Natural, those Animals which are Spontaneously bred of putrid matter do most clearly prove. And Marsilius Ficinus, Lib. 4. Theolog. Platon. Cap. 1. writes, that the Soul of the World every where through Land and Water contains in it self spiritual and Vivifical Seeds, and generates of it self, wherever Corporeal Seeds are wanting, also it cherishes the Seeds left by Animals, and of a putrid Grape-seed it can generate a various orderly and precious Vine-Tree; and wherever a generator is wanting, and accidental qualities do only shew themselves, it performs genera∣tion, and undergoes the office of a generative substance. But in good deed, we have elswhere shewed, that there is no Soul of the World. For though in Animals

sundry actions proceed from one Soul: yet it is not proved, that the world is after such a manner one as an Animal is one. And if the world indeed had a Soul, it should be only an universal cause, not an immediate, nor could any Reason be given why Spontaneous things should rather proceed therefrom then non-spontaneous: and of necessity a cause must be which in Spontaneous things should determine the same to this action, as there are specifical causes in the Generation of other living Things. Nor was it therefore to be constituted, that it might supply the defect of a next Cause, in things of Spontaneous original. For we shall hereafter shew that such a cause is not wanting in the Generation of those things. And how can so ma∣ny sorts of things Spontaneously generated proceed from one Soul?

The Opinion of Cicero and Seneca differs not much from the foresaid opinion, * 1.300 who attribute that which the Platonists ascribe to the Soul of the World, unto the Soul of the Earth and Water, or of the Terrene Globe especially. For so Cicero, 2. de Natura Deorum writes: And if so be those things which are contained in Plants of the Earth do live and grow by the Art of Nature, verily the Earth it self is con∣tained and held in by the same force and Art of Nature: forasmuch as she being ful of the Seeds of things, engenders al things, and pours plants out of her self, em∣braces, nourishes and encreases them: and the her self likewise is nourished by the upper and extream Natures. And Seneca, 6. Quaest. Natural Cap. 16. 'Tis evident saith he, that the Earth hath a Soul. I do not mean that Soul only whereby she holds her self, and joyns her parts together, which is even in Stones and Dead Bo∣dies: but I mean a vital vigorous Soul which nourishes all things. If She had not this Soul, how should she infuse Spirit into so many Trees which have their life from nothing else, and into so many Herbs? How should she be able to foster so many Roots, so different, in so various manners buried in het, some creeping in her sur∣face, others growing deep downwards, unless she had plenty of Spirit, which gener∣ates so many and vatious things, and affords nourishment to the same? And Marsi∣lius Ficinus, Lib. 4. de Immortal. Animae Cap. 1. We know for a certain (saith he) where nutrition and augmentation follows Generation, there is Life and Soul. But we see the Earth by her own Seeds Generate, nourish and cause to grow innu∣merable Trees and living Creatures. Also she cause Stones to grow, as it were her Teeth, and Herbs as it were her hairs, as long as they stick fast by their Roots, which if they be plucked up and rooted out of the Earth they do not grow. Who will say, the Womb of this Mother is void of Life, which of its own accord brings forth and nourishes so many Children; which sustains its self, whose back brings forth Teeth and Hairs? The same may be said of the Body of the Water. The Water therefore and the Earth hath a Soul, unless perhaps some man will say, that those living Creatures which we (because they seem to have no Seeds of their own) say are generated by the Soul of the Earth, are not bred of the said Soul, but from the influences of Heavenly Spirits.

But as this Opinion differs not much from the former, so after the same manner it is easily refuted. It is truly manifest that much Air and Spirit is contained in the Bowels of the Earth. But that the said Air and Spirit is the Soul of the Earth can∣not be proved. Nor are those Spontaneous living Things we speak of Generated only in the Earth and Water, but also in Animals and Plants, as sundry sorts of Worms. And if in the Earth there were such a Soul, she would not be less noble then her effects, but would also be nourished, grow, and exercise Senses. Also no necessity forced them to suppose such a Soul in the Earth. For it is most known that all other living Things have their Seed from whence they are Generated: and we shall hereafter shew that Spontaneous things are not without their immediate cause neither. And if there were indeed such a Soul, since it would be but one, it could not produce so many different sorts of Creatures, but of a determinate specifical Effect a determinate Cause is requisite. And though the Earth as a common Store-House doth afford nourishment to Plants and certain Animals: Yet it fol∣lows not, that she gives them their Souls. The Plants are first constituted by their Souls, before they draw nourishment out of the Earth. Nor doth the Earth of Her own substance afford nourishment to Plants, but only as a Store-House, in which are many mixt Bodies, which prove nourishment for Plants.

Erastus dissents not much from this Opinion, * 1.301 Part. 2. Disput. Contra Paracels. who makes the divine power implanted by God in the whole matter at the first Cre∣ation the Author of such effects. But he doth not prove that ever God gave to the whole matter such a power. God produced Plants and Animals out of the Earth and Water, and put into all of them their forms, and commanded every sort of Plants and Animals to multiply themselves, and to bring forth Seed and Fruits ac∣cording to their kind: but that God gave the whole matter out of the sorts and kinds of things a power to produce Living Things, is no where read in Scripture. But whether this Opinion may any way be tolerated shall be expressed in the follo∣wing Chapter.

Franciscus Picolhomineus, * 1.302 concerning things springing from putrid matter, Chap. 3. held that living Things which spring of their own accord without Seed do arise from a spirit produced out of Heaven. For thus he writes, among other things: Towards the Generation of Animals which arise out of putrid matter, the Sun or Hea∣ven performs after a sort the office not only of a common but also of a proper cause, in asmuch as by its light and motion is constituted the spirit which immediatly forms Ani∣mals and gives them life, which answers by way of proportion to that Spirit by which Seeds are made Fruitful, and the Child is formed. Which Spirit, although it hath its vitality from the emment life of Heaven; yet that it may produce this or that life, it hath from Heaven, as it is Heaven, but as it is received in a determinate matter with a a determinate measure, suitable to the determinate sorts of living Things.

But these things are said, not proved, nor do they make appear that the Heaven lives, and that such a vital Spirit is sent from the Heaven into these lower Bodies. And if this same spirit be the immediate Cause, what needs a determinate matter? Which being necessary, we should therein rather seek the Cause of Spontaneous living Things. But the Heaven can be only a common Cause, as it is in those things which are generated of Seed: and because it hath only one uniform faculty, it is no more disposed to breed a Flie, then a Wasp, or Flea, and therefore it cannot be the proper cause whereof we treat in this place.

Others therefore, * 1.303 seeing it was in Vain to search out of the matter for the efficient Cause of such live Things, they have sought the same in the matter and that rightly. Nor could that move them, of which we spake in the foregoing Discourse, that some conceive that the form and matter are internal causes, the efficient and the end ex∣ternal. For it is false, that the efficient Cause should be alwaies reckoned amongst external causes; but the form it self, as Aristotle testifies, is many times one and the same with the efficient. But some have sought this Cause one way, some another. The most do hold putrefaction alone to be the cause of the Generation of Spontane∣ous live Things. * 1.304 And with what Authorities they endeavor to prove this their Opi∣nion, I regard not, in case I prove it to be False. Which by this only Reason may be proved, in that the whole Nature of putrefaction consists herein, that it is the corruption of a mixt Body, consider'd as such. And if any thing else proceed from putrefaction, it is by accident. Moreover, experience shews that many Plants and other things are generated of their own accord without putrefaction. And of worms sundry flying infects are bred without putrefaction. And in Cyprus in the Brass Fornaces Pyraustae or Fire-flies are bred without putrefaction. And there∣fore we must hold concerning other living Things, that they are not bred of putre∣fied matter, although somtimes in a putrid thing, and out of the part thereof which putrifies

Others seeing that putrefaction could not be the Cause of these Creatures held that concoction was the Cause. * 1.305 But in good truth, Coction is only an alteration and perfection of the Temperament, and induces no change save in qualities, and therefore of it self can produce no substance, but tends only to perfect a thing alrea∣dy constituted by its form. Or if any Coction precede the Spontaneous Generati∣on, it it only a Previous disposition of the matter, which being attained, the La∣tent form begins to rouse it self, and begins to form its own body. And although Aristotle 5. de Histor. Animal. Cap. 19. writes, that it is common to all Worms, and such Animals as spring from Worms, to receive the beginning of their Genera∣tion from the Sun or Spirit; yet that is not to be understood of the communication of the Soul, but only of the disposition of the matter to receive the form under the notion of a Soul, which is caused by heat.

Some again, * 1.306 not being likewise able to find a sufficient cause of this kind of Ge∣neration in putrefaction do again fly to the power of the Heaven, and write; that this Generation is made out of putrefaction, by force of the Heaven and Stars ex∣citing the putrid heat, and directing that which is unnatural to the Garkass to be∣come Natural and a certain primary efficient, to induce the forms of some peculiar Animals out of the subject matter. But this will not help a bad Cause. For in the first place, not the heat of the Stars only, but any other heat wil serve to raise putrefaction in plants and Animals. Moreover 'tis a begging of the Question to affirm that forms are drawn out of the power of the matter. Moreover they must shew, how heat which is a quality can act beyond its abilities, and not only as an Instrument of a more noble agent, but as the chief efficient, produce a substance, and that such an one as the Soul of an Animal.

Chap. 2. The true Opinion concerning the Spontaneous Original and Efficient Cause of these Living Things.

SInce therefore the Generation of Spontaneous living Things cannot proceed from the Causes hitherto specified (concerning which thing Licetus treates largely and laboriously in his whole 1 Book de Spon. Vivent. Ortu.) another cause must be sought after. For the right finding whereof, we must first enquire what is the dif∣ference betwixt the Generation of living things which breed of their own accord and of such as arise from Seed, and what living Things are properly said to be Spontaneous. And we must know in General, that those things are sand to be ge∣nerated Spontaneously, which are generated without any evident and manifest cause. So Hippocrates in the 1 Book of Aphorismes, Aphorisme 2. calls those fluxes of the Belly and vomiting Spontaneous, which happen without the use of Medicaments, and Lib. 2. Aphoris. 5. he calls those wearinesses Spontaneous, which proceed not from motions and exercises, but from some hidden fault of Hu∣mors. So also Plants which grow without the care and labor of the Husbandman are cal'd Spontaneous. Of which Virgil in his 2 Book of his Husbandry.

Nature on Trees doth different Births bestow; Some of themselves without Mans aide do grow, And round the fields, and crooked Rivers come, As Limber Osiers, Poplars, tender Broom, And Grey-leav'd Willows.

And Animals which spring from Copulation of their Patents are not cal'd Spon∣taneous; but such as are generated without the help of Parents are cal'd Spontane∣ous. Thus Pliny Lib. 9. Cap. 51. writes of Frogs: 'Tis wonderful bow after six months life they turn to slime, no man discerning; and again in the Spring they are re∣generated after the same secret manner, and this happens every year. Also Limpins and Scallops do breed of their own accord in sandy places. But yet from the premises it is not sufficiently apparent, what those living Things are which be said to spring of their own accord. For although many plants grow without the Care and Labor of Men: yet they do not all grow without Seed; since many sow themselves, and cast their Seeds into the Earth, or Propagate themselves by Roots. We are there∣fore now to enquire the difference betwixt things that are generated of their own accord and such as are not.

Fortunius Licetus, Lib. 2. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 2. holds, that the Spon∣taneous Original of living Things proceeds from an Occult Principle which lies hid in the matter wherein the Generation is to be made, * 1.307 and therefore from a principle internal to the thing generated, though Latent. But the Spontaneous original of things is not thus sufficiently differenced from the non-Spontaneous; since also in the non-Spontaneous original of living-Things the hidden principle of the thing to be generated lies lutking in the matter or Seed. For the principle of generation is equally hidden to the sense, in an head of Garlick, an Onion, or a Corn of Wheat, as in Hors-Dung, whence the beetle arises. This rather ought, I conceive, to be

accounted the difference: * 1.308 that such things as are not Spontaneously generated do proceed from a Seed, or Bulb, or some other thing answering to Seed, manifestly produced by a plant of the same kind: but such living things as Spring of their own accord are produced without a manifest generator of the same sort. Truly when generation it self is made, or rather the formation of an organical Body, the generation of a Spontaneous living Thing differs not from that of a non-Spontane∣ous. For in both the motion and the formation of the Body is made by an agent, which lies concealed in the matter. But herein they differ, in that, before the parts begin to be formed, the Soul in its essence, and as such, and as it performs the office of a Soul, is in the Seed or matter in the non-Spontaneous generation: but in Spon∣taneous generation, although the Soul be in some sort in the matter of which the living thing is made; yet the Body of a Carkass, or what ever other matter, doth not participate the same under the notion of a Soul; because a Carkass is not pro∣perly animated, nor yet under the notion of an efficient cause, because as yet it is dul and Stirs not.

Howbeit, * 1.309 in this thing, there is stil no small difference. For some things are really engendred of matter specifically different; as the Beetle of Hors-dung, worms of Cheese or flesh; but some things seem only to the sense to be generated without seed, and of a thing specifically different, when as indeed they are made of seed, or of somwhat answering to Seed: as some Plants are said to grow of their own ac∣cord, after Rains or Inundations of Water, when as in truth they are made of Seeds mingled with Rains or Waters. So of Swines dung, Carduus, and Sow-Thistle and other Plants do grow, not as Beetles do out of Hors-Dung, or Worms out of Cheese, but because some of the Seed of these plants unchanged by digestion are voided afterwards with the Dung. Which two differences of Spontaneous Generation must needs b•• observed.

And though there be some difference of Spontaneously Generated live Things: * 1.310 yet they all proceed from an univocal agent and not from an Equivocal: which Aristotle teaches in many places (nine of which Fortunius Licetus quotes) in al which he tels us, that all substances are generated by an efficient actually of the same Na∣ture univocal. The First is, 1 de Generat. et Cor. Text 30. The Second, 1 Magnor. Moral. Cap. 10. The Third, 1 de Part Animal. Cap. 1. The Fourth, 7 Metaphysic. Text 22. The Fifth, in the same Book, Text 30. The Sixth, in the same Book Text 31. The Seventh, in the same Book, Text 32. The Eighth, in the 12. Me∣taphys. Cap. 13. The Ninth, in the same place, Text 18. all which may be seen in his works. We shall only produce one or two. For Aristotle in 1 de Generat. & cor∣rupt. Text 30. 1 Magnorum Moralium, Cap. 10. 1 de Part. Animal. Cap. 1. writes, that even those things which are said to breed of their own accord have a like efficient cause preceding, as well as things produced by Art. And in the 7. Meta∣phys. Text 22. and Text 32. he writes expressly, that it is proper to a substance for to have necessarily another like substance actually preexisting, whereby it may be Generated. And in the 12 Metaphys. Text 13. and Text 18. he therefore rejects the Platonical Ideas, because all things both Natural and artificial have like univocal causes by which they are produced.

Although therefore it is to be granted, * 1.311 that even the Spontaneous Generation of living Creatures is after a fort univocal; Yet I shall not deny that Generation is an Analogical kind; and that Univocal Generation is more evident in non-Spontaneous, then in Spontaneous living things. Which Aristotle himself seems to hint, who in the place but now alleadge, 7 Metaphs. Text 30. saies that all things are made after a sort by an Univocal agent. And indeed the Nature of the Generation of Plants which proceed from Seed properly so called, (such as that is of non-Spontaneous live Things, as also of those things which arise from a latentseed) is different from that of those live things which are most properly said to arise Spontaneously and Equivocally. For in the former, the Seed of which they are Generated, viz. Herbs, hath actually a Soul in it already: but in these latter, the matter of which the living thing is Generated hath not actually in it the Soul of the thing generated; suppose a worm. Yet the form lying hid in the matter is apt to be turned into a Soul, so as to communicate it self to the matter, in notion of a Soul, and thereout to frame a living Body. Whence that difference betwixt Seneca, Scaliger, and Licetus, concerning the Seed, may easily be compounded. For

Seneca 3. de Beneficiis Ch. 29. and Scaliger in Theophrast. de Plantis Lib. 1. Ch. 5. teach that al things have their Seeds. But Licetus, de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Lib. 4. Cap. 2. denies that al things have their Seeds, and holds that some things are pro∣pagated by no Seed properly so called, though they have somwhat answering to seed by way of proportion. For an answer may be made out of the very words of Licetus; viz. Seed is taken properly, and improperly. * 1.312 Seed properly so called is a Body, which as the proper subject contains in it self a Soul, in the first formal act; which comes to pass in such things as are not generated of their own accord: but improperly that may be called a Seed, or at least somwhat answering to a Seed, which hath not indeed a Soul actually, yet containes a principle or form, which at∣taining a fit disposition of matter begins to exercise the Office of a Soul. Whence, the Carkasses of Plants and Animals out of which Worms are Generated do not contain in them the Seed of Worms, yet they have in them a form, which doth af∣terward advance it self into a Soul. Mean while this also is true, that such things are not altogether Equivocally Generated as is vulgarly imagined: which appears even hereby, that those living things which are thought to be generated of them∣selves and Equivocally, are of the same sort with those which are not so Generated: which thing is manfest from Generation it self. For although some things Spon∣taneously bred do not generate, as Toad-stools, and Vine-Worms, and other vile creepers: yet most of them engender a living Thing like themselves, as Experience testifies. Theophrastus writes 1. de Caus. Plant. Ch. 1. and 5. and Scaliger upon him, that a Plant Sprung of its own accord hath by its Seed produced another like it self. So Laserpitium which grew up naturally of its own accord, and a whole Wood of Trees, where never were any before, did produce Plants that bare Seed. Bees bred out of a Bul are fruitful. And Avicen, 15. de Animal. Cap. 1. doth testifie, that he had a friend who made Scorpions, either by burying the Juyce of Basil, or by some other means, and they afterward generated other Scorpions. And that in a certain City of the Saracens, called Scealikam, after a great Rain, Silk-Worms were seen to cover the ground many miles together, and every Worm made Silk, and afterwards they flew away and made Seed.

Now that the univocal Agent by which Spontaneous living Things are bred is a Soul of the same sort with that whereby they are constituted in their being, * 1.313 and vi∣visied, Fortunius Licetus teaches Lib. 2. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 26. For fince, as Aristotle both in other places and in 1 Magn. Moral. Cap. 10 teaches, Plants and Animals arise from Seed as an univocal principle, but the Seed is not univocal to the Animal or Plant to be generated, save as it participates a Soul of the same sort; it seems from thence apparent, that the Univocal efficient from whence Animals have their original which are Spontaneously generated, is a Soul of the same Nature with that wherewith they are enlivened. And questionless the case is plain. For since it is most Natural and proper to the Soul to generate live things; nothing can Naturally procreate living Things which hath not a Soul in it.

Now that the Soul of these living Creatures is in the matter, and that we are not to seek their efficient Cause out of their matter, the Generation of Worms out of Flesh doth shew, in which no external Cause helping, unless the heat of the Ambient Air, Worms break out of the Flesh of their own accord.

Now whence this Soul which is the efficient Cause of these Spontaneous Animals doth come into the matter, of which they arise, is further to be enquired into. * 1.314 And although this be a very difficult point, and one of the obscurest in Nature, and it is also hazardous for a man to propound his opinion herein: yet will I freely pro∣pound my mind, which if it shall not please all men, yet such as are studious of the truth will acknowledg thus much, that it comes nearer the truth then that Opinion of the Eduction of forms out of the power of the matter, which is an Opinion that paies a man with words, but hath nothing in it to satisfie a studious mind, as is suf∣ficiently declared in the 4. Chap. of the foregoing Discourse. * 1.315 And first of all we must hold (which I conceive to be out of question) that nothing can contribute such a matter nor consequently the Soul, unless it be a Living thing, or proceed from a living Thing; and that therefore Spontaneous living Things do only proceed from living Things or such as have lived: which also experience teaches. For it was never yet known, that of the simple Elements, of Metals, Minerals, Jewels, as such,

any Animal or living Thing hath been bred, but every thing of which such Animals are Generated is either a living Body, hath lived, or hath proceeded from a living Body.

Now to find out the manner of this generation, * 1.316 in the first place we must enquire, how many waies the Soul may be in a thing. For in the first place, which no man denies, there is a twofold act of the Soul: one Essential, called the first Act, and is the bare Essence of the Soul: the other accidental, which is called the Second, and is the operation proceeding from the Soul. And therefore the participation of the Soul is also twofold, the first is the Participation of the simple substance of the Soul, as of a form perfecting its matter; the Second is the Participation of the Soul operating. The Second participation is when Organs are provided for the perfor∣mance of the actions; to the first there needs only a disposition of the matter, that the Soul may thereby be fit to perform the Office of an Efficient Cause and to form the Body.

But besides these two manners, there is yet a Third, and the Soul may yet after another manner be in some kind of matter, * 1.317 so as neither to inform the same and vi∣vifie it, nor to perform the proper operations of such a living Thing. So the Seeds of Plants and Animals may be in the Water and in the Earth, and the Soul may be in them, and yet they neither inform nor Vivisie the Water nor the Earth. Hence Aristotle said, not without reason, 3. de Gen. Animal. Cap. 11. that all things are ful of Souls, while he thus writes: Now Animals and Plants are bred in the Earth and Water, because there is moisture in the Earth, Spirit in the Water, Animal Heat in the Ʋniverse, so that all things are in some sortful of Souls. And therefore they come speedily to a Consistence, when that heat is comprehended or received. Which very thing manifestly appears from things putrid, out of which sundry kinds of Worms are every where bred, and in Plants which grow in Common Fields and Gardens where no Seed hath been cast. And scarce any place is so barren but that Plants and Animals will breed therein of their own accord. * 1.318 Now this speech of Aristotle is thus to be understood, not that all things do live and are animated; for which cause he did not simply say, that all things are ful of Souls, but in some sort, viz. in all things in a manner there is such a like substance, which when all impediments being removed it hath got a sitting matter, it rouses it self and per∣forms the Office of a Soul. * 1.319 For, to live, is not to have and contain a Soul after any fashion; but to participate the same and to be informed by it, and as that which frames and preserves the organical Body. For, as Aristotle teaches, Animal heat, and consequently that which hath the Soul adjoyned thereto, is truly in all the lower part of the world, the Air, Water and Earth: but not as their essential part or attribute; since the Earth and Water are of their own Nature cold, and neither of them are informed by any Soul: but as a thing placed in a place or Vessel, viz. because the Earth, Water and Air, do contain the Carkasses parts and Excrements of Living Things, in which are Atomes and smal Bodies having Souls in them. And so the Generation of things Spontaneous is then caused, when the Souls (as Fort. Licetus speaks) are now by the benefit of heat united and associated to such things in which they were contained only as in a place or Vessel, under the notion of a Cause efficient, forming an organical Body; or as Aristotle speaks, when the matter shall comprehend that same heat of Animals and the Soul with it, and shall make it proper to it self; presently by way of Spontaneous Generation that mat∣ter receives the Consistency of a living Nature, putting on the Soul in Nature of a Form, which before it contained distinct from its Nature, like a Ves∣sel.

Concerning which thing Fort. * 1.320 Licetus treats at large, Lib. 2. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 11.28. et Seq. and endeavors with much labor to prove, that the form and Soul is two waies in the matter, viz. as an act and perfection in its proper subject, and then as a thing contained in a Vessel, not belonging at al thereto, or as an acci∣dent in the subject. And this distinction is the foundation of his whole Doctrine of the original of these kind of Creatures. 'Tis not worth while to cite here all that he there alleadges. For sure it is, the Fire with its form is in the Iron, is in the hot Wa∣ter, is in Rain, is in the Earth, and yet doth not inform them. And which is a most clear example, Gold resolved into its smallest Atomes is in Aqua Regia, and Silver in Aqua Fortis; yet so as to retain their forms entire, as appears by their

Reduction; yet they do not inform those Waters, but the Form of Gold and Silver is in the Waters, as in a place. The same appears in the Souls of living Things. For the Seed cast into the Earth is therein as in a place, nor is the Earth informed by the form of the Seed. Yea and which is much more wonderful, the Form of a Plant will somtimes remain in dry Wood, as Virgil writes of the Wood of an Olive Tree, in the Second of his Husbandry.

And (Wondrous to be told) an Olive Tree Out from a dry cut drunk oft springs we See.

Of which we shal speak more at large in Chap. 7.

But whether Souls may properly be said to be in a place, and whether all the Souls of Spontaneous Creatures are thus in the things whence they spring, I doubt. Truly if Seed, or a Body answering to Seed consisting of matter and form, may be said to be in a place, as Frogs spawn, or that Seminal Body out of which after Raine Plants do Spring, it is rightly said to be in a place. But whether the Soul it self which is therein, in the Water, or Rain, may properly be said to be in a place, I doubt. But let us thus take the Soul with its proper subject, and let it in this manner be said to be in a place: yet whether after the same manner in a Pine, out of which Ear-wigs, or in other woods whence worms spring, or in Corn whence the Wibbles are Generated, that Soul of the living Creature be present, may be justly doubted. For the Atomes of Gold and Silver consisting of their matter and Form, are in the Aqua Regia or Aqua Fortis, as in a place: and the Seed of some Plant or Frog, consisting of a Soul and matter, wherein the Soul is as in its proper subject, may be in the Earth or Water, as in a Vessel or place, but by means of the matter or Body wherein it is. But when of Wood or Flesh a live Animal is bred, there the Soul which of it self is in no place, hath no matter wherein it may be as its own proper subject, and in respect of which it may be said to be, in Wood or Flesh, as in a place or Vessel; but the proper subject of that Soul is that same thing or Flesh, wherein nevertheless it is not formally, but only really, nor hath the notion of a Soul, but then begins to be formally, and to be separated from the Wood and Flesh, and to live and exist by it self, and to have the notion of a Soul, and to exercise living operations, when through putrefaction or rather the heat joy∣ned to the putrefaction, that matter is so elaborated that it may become a fit subject wherein the Soul may formally exist.

And therfore as was said before, * 1.321 there is not only one way of Generation of Plants and Animals which are Generated of their own accord. For some are indeed Ge∣nerated from Seed bred by a living Creature of the same kind, although they seem to be Generated of their own accord. So, after overflowings of water, after Rains and Winds, Plants do somtimes spring of themselves, of Swines dung Thistles and Sow-Thistles are bred. In which there is no other difference betwixt the Spontaneous and non Spontaneous, save that in the former the Seed lies hidden, in the latter it is manifest. And there are Seeds of different Nature. For some unless they be dili∣gently lookt to and manured they lose their Seminal faculty and their Soul. O∣thers although they seem corrupted, yet in a certain Juyce or in some Atomes the Seminal faculty is preserved. Again there are other Spontaneous live Things which are bred without Seed, as when of Cheese, Flesh or Wood, Worms are bred, in which there is no such Seed found as is in the Waters and in the Earth.

Now concerning the original of the latter kind, the question is very difficult, * 1.322 wherein to determine any thing is very liable to blame. Fortunius Licetus, Lib. 2. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 36. holds that the efficient Generating Cause of Spon∣taneous Animal, is a Soul of the same Nature with that whereby such Animals are constituted in their being, but not quickening nor any waies actuating the subject wherein it is, but lying concealed, as in a vessel, in that Carkass out of which these Animals are Generated: and that the Soul which is in the Carkass is the same with that which did constitute the Animal or other living thing, but impaired, not having the notion of an actuating form, and perfecting that wherein it is, but of pri∣vation; since such an impairing deprives the Soul of its Ancient perfection, which was to quicken and perfect its subject Body. For as a sensitive and seeing Soul is an habit in an Animal that is found; but in one that is blind, it being evervated by the marring of the Organ it degenerates into Privation: so also he holds that after

Death the Soul of an Animal which remains in the Carkass degenerates into Pri∣vation, and being weakned it Creates Spontaneous imperfect Animals.

Now how the Soul is cast down from that perfection, he teaches in the same Book Cap. 37. and sets down two waies, by which the matter of the Carkass obtains a non-Quickening Soul. The first is; that when the Live-Creature dies, all the heat necessary to life is not abolished, but so much of it remains as suffices to retain the Soul in the Body, as in a Vessel. In which case, he writes, that as it may happen frequently, that together with the weakning of the heat and Death of the living Thing, the substance of the vegetable and sensitive Soul supported by that heat may suffer an Essential Empairement, whereby it may come to degenerate into a more imperfect nature and a baser kind of Soul; so he conceives it may somtimes come to pass, that retaining its Ancient Essence it may put forth its weakned forces. The other manner he makes to be this: because, saith he, while the old living Creature dies, and while the Excrement is driven out of the Body of the living Creature, its Soul yet remaining may introduce a new Soul into the next matter lately bereft of the same Soul, with a smal heat in the first instant of Nature, not yet able to vivifie its subject Body, but may be bred therein as in a Vessel, som∣times of the very same sort with the generating Soul; but most frequently imper∣fecter and Baser: both because of the imperfection of the matter, which cannot re∣ceive so perfect a Soul, as also by Reason of the Infirmity and Debility of the forces of the Soul Generating, which in the Death of the former Animal either perishes, or is very much weakned, that it cannot engender one like it self, but is able to pro∣duce one inferior to it self. Of which he treates at large to the 39. Chapter; where∣in at last he concludes his Opinion in these words: the immediate efficient Cause of the original of Spontaneous living Things from which they immediately receive their Soul and all Spontaneous living Things are generated, is nothing else but a ve∣getable or sensitive Soul, abiding in the Carkass, or in the Excrement proceeding from living Creatures, as in a Vessel, lying hid with a weak heat, not actuating the same, nor any waies perfecting it, somtimes of the same sort, or also Numerically the same with that which was formerly in those living things: yet many times of a different sort and a more base Nature, and imperfecter substance; into which with the decay of the Body and heat, the former Soul is degenerated: which Soul in the Carkass or Excrements, proceeding from the former living Creature not quick∣ning its subject Body, it remains therein, not exercising the actions of life, not as a form in its subject, but as in a place, and in a vessel, as it were by necessity of the matter, or at last by the total vanishing of the heat whereby it is supported, it self perishing; or with the augmentation of the said heat and vigour acquired from the Warmth of the Ambient Air, communicating it self to its subject Body, as a form and quickning Soul, and performing the functions of life, as shaping of a Body and generating of a Spontaneous live thing.

But in very good deed, * 1.323 it seems hard to hold, that the former Soul remains in the Carkass; and to affirm it in a man, is most absurd: whereas nevertheless worms are as well bred of the Carkass of a man, as of other Animals. Indeed, Lib. 2. Cap. 39. Licetus excepts the rational Soul, and writes that only the Sensitive and Vegetative Souls remain. But it is only affirmed and not proved, that there are three Souls in a Man, of which the Sensitive and Vegetative may remain after his Death. Yea and in Brutes that same degenerating of nobler forms unto less noble is absurd, and is propounded without Reason. Rather the Constitution of Body and various operations do shew, that Spontaneous Animals which are Generated out of dead Bodies do differ in kind and Form from those Creatures out of which they are bred. Nor doth he shew any Reason, why the Soul of the living Creature should degenerate into the Soul of this creeper rather then another: since we see that every Spontaneous Animal is not bred of every living thing, but certain Animals are bred of certain Bodies. Nor in a blind Man doth the seeing Soul degenerate into a Privati∣on; but in the Eye, because of the disease thereof, Privation of sight is introduced; but the soul it self hath the same perfection it had before, and the disease being removed fees again; nor while a man is blind doth it perform other operations. Yea, and the Soul while it lives informs the blind Eye, although it cannot cause sight therein by reason of its disease. And if the soul should remain in the eye of a blind man, as it doth

in a Carkas, contributing nothing thereto, the Eye would be mortified and Sphacela∣ted; but we see the contrary. And although it is true that some part of innate heat and Radical moisture remains in the Carkasses of Plants and Animals, which is not destroied save by Putrefaction and Rottenness which many times happens long after Death; yet that temper and heat of the living Thing doth not remain, and therefore neither can the specifick Soul of the living thing remain; seeing the death of an Animal and of a live Thing is the extinction of that Vital heat, and thereby Souls are separated from their Bodies, but the Soul doth no way suffer any essenti∣al impairment (for the Essence of forms is indivisible) whereby it can degenerate in∣to a more imperfect Nature. And when a living Thing is Generated of the Excre∣ments of Animals, it is not credible that the Soul remains in the Excrements; since in the living Body, the Soul was never in the Excrements.

But to me it seems more agreeable to truth, * 1.324 that in living Things there are divers Auxiliary and subordinate forms, yet so that one is principal and Queen, which informs the living Creature, and from which the living thing hath its Name, viz. The Soul it self of every living Thing; and the rest are Servants as it were, which as long as that superior and Lady Soul is present, do pertain to the disposition and condition of the matter, and therefore they do after a sort inform the said matter, that it may be a sit subject for the specifick form, and they have also actions of their own, yet they do not animate the same, nor do they give it the Name of a living thing; which is the Office of a specifick Soul only. * 1.325 Nor let any man hate∣fully traduce this Doctrine of subordinate forms as new. Most learned men have delivered the same, and have taught that these forms do constitute the Seminal mat∣ter as it were of live Things. Jul. Caes. Scalig. Exercit. 59. Sect. 2. writes: As in the Earth Plants are changed one into another; so above ground they breed Animals out of themselves. And that not out of putrefaction, but cherishing in themselves certain Seeds for Generation. The same Scaliger, Exercitation, 190. Animals (Saies he,) Are not bred of putrid Plants, but are the Of-spring of Remaining Vigor which is in them. For it is certain that beans are not putrified, when Animals breed in them. He also Lib. 2. de Plantis, p. 389. rightly teaches, that it is manifest that Fir-Wood and straw or Chaf have in them the Natural ru∣diments of Wig-Lice. Also he writes in the same place, that it is commonly repor∣ted, that of Wig-Lice broken Wig-Lice do also engender. Which he counts un∣likely. But that from the same original whence those that are broken did arise, new ones are Generated in the same place. But I see no cause why those rudiments of the Wig-Lice may not remain in those that are rubbed in pieces. Shegkius the German, Aristotle, de Occultis Med. Facult. Lib. 2. Cap. 1. Page 103. in my Edi∣tion, saies, it will be no absurdity, if we shall say that divers forms are in one substance. And afterwards, he proves in Plants, that the specifical form being abolished, there remains not only the temperament, but also the substantial form, and that it is the Author of Occult Faculties. Zabarella also, Lib. de Gener∣at. and Interitu, Cap 4. writes, that the form of a mixt Body in a living Creature doth not perform the Office of a form, in respect of the whole living Creature, but rather of Matter. But that the Soul being taken away, the same Form of mixture begins to perform the Office of a Form, and to constitute that Body specifically. And this he declares in the same place by an example. Just as, (saith he) if when a King is dead some Servant be made King, he was also before during the Kings Life, but he was not as King; and therefore if any shal ask whether a new King be created or no, answer ought doubtless to be made, that a new King is created, and the King is changed. Even so, at the Death of a living Creature, a new Form is acquired, inasmuch as that which was before as a Condition of the matter, be∣ing subject to a more noble Form, doth now begin to be a Form to constitute the compound, and to bear Rule. And that which Zabarella speaks only of the forms of mixt bodies, that is to be understood of all Forms excepting the Elements, which are necessary to the Constitution of a living Body. And that there are such Forms, is proved before in the Second Discourse of this work. Nor doth it import any absurdity, that besides the specifical Forms there should be other subordinate Forms: but as Zabarella, Lib. 1. de Generat. & Interit. Cap. 2. writes, if it be not against Reason there should be two, neither is it that there should be four or an hundred together in the same subject.

There is one who argues here, * 1.326 that subordinate Forms are also specifical. But either he understands not what a specifical Form is, or he cavils Maliciously; and in the mean time he grants in the same living thing divers forms. Verily, There is no form, which by it self considered may not be termed specifical. So the form of fire, where ever fire is, is specifical: but when Fire is in a man, it is not the speci∣fick form of a Man, but the rational Soul is mans specifick Form. He Fights there∣fore with shadows, and Toies with cavillations, who denies subordinate Forms, and thinks they are not to be distinguished from specifick forms, because they also are specifick. The Form (saith he) of the Earth is under the command of a speci∣fick Form, yet it is in its proper matter, and retains the Nature of a specifick Form, although it be under another Specifick Form. For it is not the Specifick form of that thing to the Form whereof it is subject, but of that matter whose Form it is, with which it abides, comes and goes. But if the form of the Earth be subject to another Form, why shall I not term the same (with Zabarella) a subordinate Form? But in a Man to hold both the Form of Earth, and the Humane Form to be specifical, is most absurd. For there is no Natural thing which hath two specifick Forms. Yet those specifick Forms which whiles they are in the living Thing do belong to the matter, the specifical form departing, do become specifical, as the same Zabarella teaches, and perform the operations of a specifical Form. So that Form from whence there arises out of a Carkass a Beetle, a Wasp, a Bee, while it is in the Horse, or other living Animal, it cannot be called the form of a Wasp, a Beetle or a Bee; since then it performs not the Office of a Form, but is in place of matter. But when it performs the Office of a Form, it can then multiply it self, and beget its like. And indeed the Nature of a Form is far different when it is subordinate and in the place of matter, from what it is when it becomes speci∣fical. Therefore also subordinate Forms do not give a Name to their subject, nor can I say that in a man there are Worms, in an Heyfer fed with Mulberry Leaves there are Silk-Worms, but at last when the Specifical Form departs, they begin to perform the Office of a specifick Form, and give a Name to the thing.

Whence also that is of no moment which some Object, if the Soul of a Worm were in a Plant, the same substance would be a Plant and an Animal; since the Form gives as well the Name as being to a thing. For the species or Forms of Things, truly, are not simply known or defined by us according to their Essence, but so far forth, as being sensibly parts of the World, by their Bodies and actions they fall under our sense; and a Name is given them, not from their essential act, but from their faculties and actions which they exercise in such a subject. For indeed, the Seed of a Dog doth not essentially differ from a Dog: yet because by the term Dog we do not understand simply the Soul of a Dog with any kind of matter, but a four footed barking Beast, the Form of a Dog in the Seed is not called a Dog, before it have shaped a Body fit for it self. After the same manner, in a Silk-Worm and Butter-Fly, there is one and the same Soul, yet is it not termed a Butter-Fly, til it is changed into a Winged Creature. So also, in a Plant, though there is the Soul of a Worm, yet the plant is not termed an Animal, but the Government of the Plants form ceasing, and another Soul receiving and exercising the Soveraignty, 'tis termed an Animal.

Nor can it be hence concluded (as some object and think it may) that there are in man and sundry other Animals Worms, * 1.327 or that this or that living Creature hath Worms or other live Things in it. For to the Constitution of such Animals, as of all other Natural Bodies, there is requisite not only a Form, but also a matter, and the Form ought to inform the said matter. But those Forms, though they are really in other living things, yet are they not therein in the Nature of forms, nor do they perform the Office of Forms, nor Animate the matter, nor quicken the Body, nor exercise the operations of life therein, but all these things are performed by the more noble and specifick Form, or Soul of the living Thing: but they themselves belong to the disposition and determination of the matter. But when that specifick and more noble Form or Soul goes away, they being stirred up by the ambient heat, and having gained a fit disposition are advanced into the quality of Forms, and communicate themseves to the Body as vivifying Souls, and in the first place they set themselves to shape Bodies fit for them, but afterwards they begin to exercise

therein the functions of Life. * 1.328 Yea and the same Forms do lie hid under different external Figures, and so pass into the Theatre of Nature. 'Tis a clear case in the Palmer Worms, in which one Soul puts on divers Bodies, and as Aristotle 5 de Hist. Animal. Cap. 19. and Pliny, Lib. 11. Nat. Hist. Cap. 22. saies, there is a various suc∣cession of Forms, viz. external ones. For the internal remains the same. Which though it may seem to some absurd: yet is it no waies absurd, but it is easie for any one to make observation of the truth thereof. For first of all, of the Egg of a kind of Butter-Fly is made a Palmer Worm; this Worm, according as Libavius dili∣gently hath observed, Singular. Part. 2. Bombycior. Lib. 1. Cap. 21. in a months space changes its Skin four times. And who will say, that here the internal form is changed; unless he will say when Snakes cast their Skin that a new Generation is made. Afterwards, it becomes a Silk-worm; where again there is no essential mutation, for a Silk-Worm is no other then a Palmer Worm grown up. And when afterward it becomes a Nymph, there is again no essential mutation, but the inter∣nal form only working it becomes a Butter-Fly. Nor doth this happen only in the Palmer Worm and Silk-Worm, but in all Egg-bearers, as for example in the Chick of an Hen. For look as, while by the heat of a Bird of another kind, or also of the Fire, a Chick is hatched out of the Egg of an Hen, there cannot so much as any thing be imagined which should give the Soul to the Chick, unless it had been be∣fore in the Egg: so also when by the Warmth of Womens Dugs the Eggs of Silk-Worms are hatched, and there comes out Silk-Worms, nothing can be assigned which might generate the Soul. And that one Soul can assume various Bodies the degeneration also of Plants doth shew, whiles Rie and Barley do turn to Wheat, and Wheat again into Rye and Barley, the same internal Form remaining, and the external duly changed.

Hitherto also belongs the degeneration of Plants into other Plants; * 1.329 which hap∣pens in those Plants whose Seeds are either ambiguous, and contain divers forms in them, yet so as that one Rules and the other serves; unless upon occasion ano∣ther alteration be made; or whose Soul is disposed to receive divers forms ex∣ternal, as appears in Silk-Worms, yea and Bees too. For as the same essence of a Form doth in them remain under divers external shapes, and first there is a Palmer Worm, then a Silk-Worm, then a Butter-Fly: so also in Plants, there is the same transmutation of the external Form. Which also Julius Caesar Scaliger doth grant, when in 1 de Plantis, (saith he) there are the confused principles of divers things in Seeds, as of Rapes, Cole-worts, and others Licetus indeed Lib. 2. Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 14. writes, that a Form upon great mutations of the matter is changed into another species, and depressed into a more inferior degree. But this degeneration upon the mutation of the matter is made not only into an inferior degree but also into a Superior: which experience doth testifie. Wheat degenerates into Darnel; Water-Cresses into Mints; Rape into Radish; Basil into running Betony; the white Vine into the black, and the black into the white; Barley into Wheat, and again Wheat into Barley. If in Hungaria they sow German Rye it turns into Wheat. If a Field be somwhat barren, our White Oats (as they call them) degenerate into black; if the same Seed be sowed some years together, it grows more base. And therefore after some years the Husband-men are forced to change their Seed. Contrariwise, if black Oates be sowed in a fat Soil, white Oats will Spring up ther∣from. Gilly-flowers, Roses, Violets, do oft change their Colours. Whence Vir∣gil writes of Seeds.

Choice Seeds and with much Labour culled out Do yet degenerate.

And Galen writes of his Father, in 2. de Ele. Facultatibus, Class. 2. Page 30. that, when in his declining Age he was delighted with Husbandry he somtimes sowed Wheat and Barley, and pickt out al other kinds of Seeds that were mingled with them, that he might certainly know whether Cockle and wild Barley would pro∣ceed from the change of the said grains, or whether they had a proper Seed of their own. He therefore found among the Wheat frequent Darnel, and amongst the Barley wild Barley or wild Oates; and made the same experiment in other Seeds. He therefore found in Lentils also, that they were changed into hard and round

Vetches and Ax-wort, also Goof-grass grow therefrom. If some would now adaies use the like diligence, they should merit most worthy commendations. For so they would not so frequently become laughing stocks for Country Clowns. And this ex∣perience would tend more to the gaining of the knowledg of Natural Philosophy, then those Vain speculations, and more base then Ditch-Water, so much in request. I shall say more of the degeneration of Plants beneath. Chap. 7.

And so much may suffice to have said of the primary efficient cause of the Genera∣tion of Spontaneous live Things. Only this one thing is yet to be noted, that these degenerations are not properly Spontaneous Generations, since they are made of Seed and that evidently: although those Forms, according to the divers dispositi∣on of the matter, have the power to shape sundry figures of the external Body. Also the Ambient heat, especially that of the Sun and Moon, do concur to their Ge∣neration: but that heat is not the primary agent, but only stirs up the Soul which lies secretly hidden, and prepares and affords fitting matter to the same. And therefore that what we have said of the Spontaneous original of living things may be more apparent, we must speak yet somwhat concerning their matter.

Chap. 3. Of the Matter of Spontaneous living Things.

ANd indeed the chiefest difference betwixt live Things of Spontaneous and non-Spontaneous original, * 1.330 is in their Matter. For both Animals and Plants which are not Spontaneous do so Spring out of their Seeds, that it is manifest to every one whence they proceed. But the principle of Spontaneous live things lies hid∣den, and so they arise of their own accord, as it were without any Generator. Yet they have also their principle. For every one of these is not bred of every matter, but such and such a sort of such and such a matter, as shall hereafter more particu∣larly appear.

And whereas we said before, * 1.331 that some things seem to be generated of their own accord, which yet are indeed generated out of a Seminal principle, by a living Crea∣ture of the same sort; others proceed from Bodies specifically different; we must know, that the Seminal principle is not in all things tied to the same matter; which also appears from Plants, which do not spring of their own accords. For all Plants do not proceed from Seeds peculiarly so called, but some are propagated without Seed by Roots, others by bulbes, others by branches pluckt from the whole, and others by Leaves pluckt off, as the Indian Fig-Tree. And therefore it is no wonder, if the Seminal principle may be preserved entire even in Waters, in Rains, yea and in the dung of Animals, as shall be hereafter more particularly ex∣pressed. Yea, and in more Ignoble Animals, the Seed is after the same manner preserved in the Earth and in the Water, as shall hereafter be declared. So that Aristotle, 3 de Generat. Anim. Cap. 11. said that al things were ful of Souls. For there is Scarce any Body from which such Spontaneous Creatures do not arise. Licetus indeed Lib. * 1.332 2. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 13. holds that such living Things are not bred of Bodies imperfectly mixed: but that must be rightly explained. For sure it is that of Rains, Mists, Dew, sundry kinds of Worms are bred, and experience doth testifie the same. Which though they are imperfectly mixed bodies if they be considered in their own Nature, and in them some Element is predominant, as in Dew and Rain Water: yet among these Bodies other Bodies perfectly mixt are mingled in their smallest Aromes, in which as in Seeds there are the Souls of living Things, and out of which Worms are also Generated afterwards. And there∣fore Worms are not bred of every Rain, nor of every Dew, but of some only.

Touching this immediate material cause of Spontaneous live Things, Fortunius Licetus treats, * 1.333 Lib. 2. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 13, 14, 15, 16. the Sum whereof is this. He saies the Spontaneous and non-Spontaneous Generation of live Things do herein agree, that each is made of a perfectly mixt Body being very near of a tem∣perate complexion, having in it self the last disposition and immediate aptitude to receive a Soul for its Form; and that the preceding disposition or that same priva∣tion both in the non-Spontaneous and the Spontaneous generation is nothing else

but a temperament just under the degree of the Soul, not having the Soul any waies adjoyned thereto, and that it is a certain degree of heat. But that the difference is herein, that the non-Spontaneous Generation of a living thing is caused by an exter∣nal agent, first preparing the matter for it self by previous alteration, and after∣ward when it is prepared, by way of Generation furnishing the same with a Soul: but contrariwise, the Spontaneous Generation of living things is caused by an agent lurking within the matter, prepared by virtue of the Ambient Aire. And that con∣sequently the disposition of the matter subservient to the Spontaneous Original of living things is nothing else but Coction by the Ambient Heat. Moreover he laies down two attributes of the immediate matter of Spontaneous live Things. The first is, that no Animal can be Spontaneously generated, save of a matter which was also before in some sort living, and Animated, either in the rank of Plants or of Animals, whether it be the part of a living Thing, or the Fruit, or the Excrement, or somwhat else belonging thereto; which nevertheless hath not now its Soul any longer as a form, but contains it as a Vessel, forasmuch as it belongs not to the essence of the Carkass wherein it is contained. Another is, that it must be immediately collected and prepared by the heat of the Ambient Aire, that it may put on the Soul and Na∣ture of a living Creature, either of the same sort with the former, or of another sort. For when the matter hath comprehended a natural heat and made it its own, pre∣sently it attains a living Nature, and puts on a Soul under the notion of a Form, which before it contained only as a Vessel, being distinct from its Na∣ture.

But in good truth, this Opinion needs a convenient Explication and Limitation. * 1.334 For in the first place, we must needs here repeat what we said before, that there is not one manner of Generation of Spontaneous living Things, but some proceed from a concealed seed of the same kind, as when of a secret Seed a Plant is Generated after Rain, even out of Stones; and others do Spring from dead Carkasses. And therefore, the first attribute of the matter of Spontaneous live Things, viz. that it is a Carkass, wherein there is a Soul as in a Vessel, not Animating, doth agree only to the second kind. But if, as he himself holds Lib. 3. Cap. 117. some powder or Juyce of a plant, having in it a Seminal principle, shal creep into the Chink of some Stone, being brought thither by Rain, there truly a Plant doth not grow out of a Carkass, but out of a Seed of the same fort. Which also happens out of the Dung and excrements of Animals, in which there is either undigested Seed, or some Semi∣nal Juyce. For, as was said before, the Seminal principle is not in al Plants Seed peculiarly so called, which is Generated in a certain part of the Plant endued with a certain Form external, but in some it is diffused through the whole Plant, as in the Wllow, and therefore a Willow may be generated by a bough pluckt off from the Tree and Planted in the ground. When therefore of such a Seed or such a Seminal Juyce a Plant is bred, either in the Earth, or in a Stone, or in another Tree, there the plant is not made of a Carkass, but of Seed. Moreover, this also wants explanation; when he writes, that the matter of which such a Generation is made must be very near temperate. For this indeed is true of the efficient cause. For neither a faint heat nor a burning heat can dispose the matter to receive a soul, but it ought to be moderate and of a digestive Nature. But I think it is not necessa∣ry, that the matter which is bred by that digestion should be temperate in all. For there is a great difference in respect of temper in the Bodies Generated. For worms are bred of Cole-worts, Wormwood, Pitch wood, Flesh, which have most differ∣ent Temperaments.

But as to the difference betwixt Spontaneous and non-Spontaneous Generation, * 1.335 true indeed it is, that in the non-Spontaneous Generation of living Things, or that which is caused by Seed, the matter is Elaborated by the Soul of the living Thing in the Body thereof, and is so prepared, that that which before was not (for nei∣ther is the Blood in Animals nor the Alimentary Juyce in Plants Animated) be∣comes a fit subject for a Soul, and the Soul communicates it self thereto, and then it is called Seed, out of which afterwards when it is cherished by the heat of the Womb or the Sun, or some other thing, and the Latent Soul stirred up, a living Creature of the same kind springs forth. But after this manner the first kind of Spontaneous live Things doth not differ in manner of their Generation from that lately decla∣red. For since, as Jul. Caes. Scaliger saies rightly, Exercit. 6. Sect. 10. a Tree or

Plant generates when it produces seed, but not when the Tree or Plant Springs up out of the Seed, but then the thing generated which was before imperfect becomes perfect. That Seminal principle, out of which either in the Water or in the Earth or out of Stones, Plants Spring without the culture of man, was Generated in Plants of the same kind, and did for a season lie hid in the Water, Earth, or Stone, til it obtained a fit matter whereof to frame it self a Body. And then if that pro∣duction of a Plant shall be counted a generation, it is also performed by an inter∣nal principle. But in the other kind of Spontaneous living things, when Worms are bred of the Carkasses or Excrements of Plants, the Soul is also present in the Carkass, although not under the notion of a specifical Form, yet realy notwith∣standing. But it cannot proceed into act, and exercise the Office of a Form and Soul, nor can it prepare a matter whereto to communicate it self, which is done in Plants and Animals, but there is need of the Heat either of the Ambient air, or that which arises from pu••refaction, that the matter may be fitly prepared and dispo∣sed; which when it hath obtained the said form begins to put it self forth, and to exercise the function of a Soul. Also the influx of the Heaven and especially of the Moon, doth not a little assist towards the introduction of such a disposition. For experience teaches that Wood which is cut a little before the new moon is not easily infested with Worms; contrariwise, such as is cut about the full-Moon is most subject to Worms. So out of mud which is dug up about the New-Moon to make furnaces and Hearths, * 1.336 Crickets are easily bred. Now the Bodies in which these Souls lie hid are either the Carkasses of Living things, or parts of the said Carkasses, or the fruits or Excrements of living Things, of which very things Ari∣stotle 2 de Generat. Animal. Cap. 3. expresly writes, that they have a vital principle; and those Souls did pertain to the disposition of the matter which was the proper subject of that living thing. Hence it is, as Aristotle saies well, that every form requires its proper matter, that as the Souls of living things differ, so also those subordinate Forms which constitute the proper matter for every Soul must differ, and therefore every Animal is not bred of every Carkass, or of every part of a liv∣ing or dead Body, or of every Excrement, but determinate Animals are bred of de∣terminate matter. Of Flesh one kind of Worms and none else is bred; of Cheese Mites proper thereto and no other: of the Leaves of Herbs Palmer-Worms; of the Pine the Buprestes and Pityocampe, and no other Worms; of Horse dung a parti∣cular sort of Beetles; Long-worms bred in the Guts; Lice and Fleas in the soyl of the Skin; a certain kind of Worms and Beetles under the Shoes, of the silth of the Feet.

Fortunius Licetus indeed, * 1.337 Lib. 2. de Spo••t. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 14. thinks other∣wise in this point, (as also hath been said before) and is of opinion that the Soul which he conceives lies hid in the Carkass, as a thing placed in its place, is the same form which was before in the living Creature; and that it remains in the Carkass with some degree of heat, although it belongs not at all to the substance thereof, and that upon a great mutation of the matter it is changed into another sort, and thrust down into a lower degree. But this is a great supposition, that a soul should remain in the Carkass of an Animal after its Death; as also that these Forms should be changed into other species. Nor is it truly credible, that the soul of a Pitch-Tree, or a Pine-Tree should be changed into a worm, or the soul of an Horse into a Wasp. And when Worms are bred of the Excrements of Animals. Whence hath the soul its Original in such a case? Yet we grant, that the soul or seminal principle of such things as have been once generated of their own accord, their bo∣dy being corrupted, may stick in some matter, and come to live again. So Flies and Frogs may melt in the mud, and of that corrupt matter in the spring time other Flies and Frogs may breed. But all these things shall be hereafter made more manifest, in our Particular Discourse of the Original of Spontaneous live Things, where we shall speake of all the sorts of them.

To conclude therefore this present subject, * 1.338 this I conceive may be most probably held concerning the matter of these kind of Creatures: (since there are two kinds of Spontaneous live Things, as was said before;) that in the former the Seminal mat∣ter, as the proper subject of the soul, is communicated from the Generator it self, and that so disposed, that it can retain the soul though it be divided never so smal.

Nor is this absurd; * 1.339 but that forms may be contained in the smallest Atomes and in∣comprehensible to the senses, even Metals do shew, which are dissolved into their smallest particles by Aqua Fortis and Aqua Regia, so as they may be strained through a paper, and yet nevertheless they retain their Essence entire in those smal particles, as by reduction doth appear. Whereof we have spoke at large in the Third Discourse, Chap. 1. of this Work. But in the other kind, as in dead Carkasses, the Soul hath that subject wherein it was in the living Body, while it was in place of an immediate matter to the superior Form. But as the Seeds of non-Sponta∣neous Live Things although they are cast into the ground do not alwaies put forth their inbred Virtue, but are corrupted, somtimes by cold, somtimes by heat, or through want of fit nutriment, and so come to die, or to rest a long time before they put themselves into action; (as many Seeds rest al the Winter in the ground, until by the heat of the Ambient Air they be cherished, and can draw fit nourishment out of the Earth:) so also in those things which are said to arise Spontaneously, the Se∣minal virtue rests, til it obtain a fit matter out of which to frame it self a Body, and be roused up by the heat of the Ambient Air, and cherished: whence it comes to pass, that Animals which arise of their own accord are not generated in the Win∣ter, unless somtimes under Dung, where the cold cannot come, but in the Spring, Summer and Autumne, viz. When by the heat of the Ambient Air caused chiefly by the Sun and Moon, a fit matter is afforded, out of which the Latent Soul may frame it self a Body, and the Soul it self may be set on work. But somtimes this same Seminal Virtue doth quite perish and die. Nor would I have any Man carp at what I have hitherto said and shall hereafter say concerning Souls, and the Semi∣nal Virtue in Atomes and smallest bodies, and charge me as if I held that such souls, because in so many mutations they remain entire, are immortal. For, * 1.340 as the seeds of non-Spontaneous Plants do many times remain long entire, and yet at last die: the same may also happen in the Spontaneous, viz. if they meet with some contra∣ry, or the matter be too much divided. Concerning which thing Francisc. Agui∣lonius, Lib. 5. de Optic. Propos. 8. thus writes: although there is no smallest quan∣tity, yet there is the smallest light Natural, that is, a light so weak and thin, that it cannot be made thinner without perishing. After which manner there are also the smallest parts of Natural Bodies; viz. which if they be further divided they lose their Form and Essence. And Propos. 15. And this Imbecillity of Subsistency is common not only to these qualities which admit the diversity of greater and lesser, but also to al Bodies which vary their magnitude. For as these without some bulk, so the other without some degree of excellency cannot preserve themselves from perishing. For their forces being further attenuated do perish and come to no∣thing, not destroied by any contrary, but only through want of measure, which is a necessary condition by the irrefragable law of Nature required for the proper maintenance of every one. For that which Aguilonius speaks here concerning qualities must also be understood of Forms from whence the qualities do flow.

Now one there is, who from this Doctrine indeavors to Calumniate me, * 1.341 as if I held that al the Forms of Beasts are separable, and may exsist in the first act, out of their matter, and that therefore they are immortal. For this never came into my mind, but I have held with all Philosophers, that no Form saving the Humane is separable from its matter, but doth perish therewith. Yet this we must hold, that al Forms are not of the same kind, but some so coupled to their Bodies and perfect, that the said Bodies perishing, they also perish, such as are the Forms of an Ox, a Lyon, a Goose, a Crow, and of other perfect Animals. Nor can it be that the Body of a Lyon, an Horse, a Goose, a Crow, being destroyed, the Souls of the said Animals should remain alive. But it is otherwise in plants, wherein the Soul may remain in the Root, Seed, branch, Leaf, yea and as shal be shewn hereafter, in the Juyce. And the same holds in Insects, whose Soul may be preserved in base matter unfurnished with Organs. Yet these Forms cannot exist any where, but though they are not in an Organical Body, yet they are in a proper matter, and indeed the very same which was their matter in an Organical Body. Much less are they immortal, but that matter perishing or being corrupted, they also are abolished, as was lately said.

Chap. 4. Of the End of Spontaneous Live Things.

THere remains yet one thing to be explained in General, * 1.342 viz. to what end Spontaneous living Things are Generated. For that such Things are not made by Chance or Fortune, was said before. But concerning the end of these things se∣veral men are of several minds. Some are of Opinion, that they are therefore ge∣nerated, that putrid matter might be consumed, and the Air by that means purged. For since out of putrid Bodies many bad exhalations are lifted up, which defile the Air, whereby afterwards more perfect Animals are hurt and become diseased; to prevent this, and to provide for the health of men and other perfect Animals, they hold that Nature produces these petty Creatures, and spends the matter both in their Generation and nutrition. But in good deed, these petty Animals are neither generated of putrid matter as such, nor are they nourished therewith. For al∣though they are made of matter which putrifies, yet are they not made thereof as it is putrid, but rather of the digested and better part thereof being Separated from the putrid. And therefore after the Generation of Worms and such like Animals, putrid matter remains, which pollutes the Air no less then it did before. Nor are these petty Animals which are Generated out of putrifying matter nourished by putrid matter, but seek their food upon other Creatures, as Plants and live Animals. Nor are those Countries or places where these Creatures are plentifully bred, more healthful, but for the most part more unhealthful then other places.

Others are of this Opinion, that as other created things, so these also are made for the sake of Man. But Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercit. 250. Sect. 1. doth justly laugh at them who say that Fleas were created for mans sake, to suck out his unpro∣fitable Blood, or that Wig-Lice are sent by Nature to wake us out of our sleep in the nights, that we might pray to God. For are not Dogs also and other brutes ful of Fleas and Lice?

Others, as Avicenna, do hold that it is better that Lice should be bred, then that the putrid matter should so remain; and they acknowledg rate workmanship in the structure of such petty Animals. Others conceive such Animals were made for the perfection of the Universe, and that not only perfect Animals, but also such imperfect ones as these do make for the Pulchritude and Integrity thereof. Which Scaliger seems to have taught, who in the place forecited thus writes: Man for God, and the World is made for man. And a little after: Man is the Prince of Animals. Now man should not have been Prince, if he had not been such as he is; viz. in the middle. He could not be in the middle, save betwixt extreams. Extreams were therefore made, that he might be in the middest. They were therefore made for the sake of the middlemost. Now if any of the extreams, or of those which are betwixt the middle and the extreams were wanting, there would be a Vacuity or Empty space among the forms. Which would be a greater fault in Nature, then an empty space without a Body. For what is more absurd then a middle with∣out extreams?

Which two last Opinions seem not much different, * 1.343 and are convenient enough, if rightly explained. For God the Work-Master of all things would every where discover his Wisdom and power, and therefore was rather willing that living Crea∣tures should be multiplied in Nature, then corrupt and putrid matter; and that the Bodies of perfect Animals when they are corrupted should rather turn to Ignoble Animals, then meer putrid matter. Which kind of Animals are various, yet determinate, and every one according to their kind. For seeing, as Aristotle well writes, that as Souls differ one from another in Nobleness and baseness, so also the Nature of that Body wherein they are, and which is the proper subject of every Soul, doth differ: this difference must needs proced from some Form, which al∣though in the living Body of perfect Animals it is instead of matter; yet afterward, the Soul departing, it rouses it self up, and performs that which is in its power to do. Hence, look how many sorts of perfect Bodies there are, so many sorts there are also of Animals arising from them; of which also Austin, Lib. 12. de Civitate

Dei. Cap. 4. to count (saies he) the faults of Beasts, and Trees, * 1.344 and other mutable and mortal things, wanting either understanding, or Sense, or Life, to be dam∣nable, is a ridiculous Thing: since those Creatures have by the will of the Crea∣ter received that manner of being, that by going and coming they might perfect the lowest Pulchritude of times, agreeable to the parts of this world, according to their kind. And a little after: the beauty of which order therefore delights us not, because in this condition of our mortality being interwoven therein we can∣not discerne the whole, to which the particles which offend us are decently and aptly fitted. And Again: Nature considered in her self and not with reference to our commodity or discommodity Glorisies her Work-Master. For living Things make a nobler degree of Bodies, then things simply mixed. And Aristotle himself 1 de Part. Animal Cap. 5. (which place also we cited before) acknowledges the Wisdom of the most good and great God, in such petty Animals, while he thus writeth: With a Childish scornfulness to despise and be troubled at the disputation and consideration of the meaner sort of Animals, is an unworthy thing: since there is nothing in Nature which hath not some wonder in it. And that which Heraclitus is reported to have said to those who coming to speak with him, and because they found him fitting in a Bakers Shop Warming him at the Oven, they stept back and would not go to him; come in boldly quoth he, and be not ashamed, for the Immortal Gods are even in this place al∣so. The same must be done in the searching out of the Nature of Animals. For we ought to attempt every thing, without any shame since the Divinity of Nature is in them all, and her comly and beautiful Artifice. For that is every where chiefty joyned to the works of Nature, where nothing is done rashly and by chance, but all to some end and purpose. Now the end for which any thing is, or was made, hath in it the Notion of goodness and Honesty. But if any man think the contemplation of other Animals to be Base and Vile, be must needs think the same of himself also, for we cannot behold without much loathing those things whereof the Body of man consists, as Blood, Flesh, Bones, Veins, and such like. So far Aristotle. Fortunius Licetus indeed, Lib. 1. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 11. opposes their Opinion who hold that such things are Generated for the per∣fection of the universe, with this reason chiefly, because the universe is before them in Nature, and furnished with its own perfection, which no Generationof Spontane∣ous things can encrease, and because it many times happens, that some sort of these Spontaneous Creatures is wanting in the world, and yet the world is not therefore imperfect. But although the universe were perfect before some such Spontaneous Animal was bred, and granting (whereas nevertheless if they are not in one place, they are commonly alwaies in another) that some sort of these Creatures is wanting in the world: yet the forms from whence they proced never have been nor neve•• are wanting. And he himself grants, that Souls may lurke in other Bodies, as in a Vessel, so as neither to have the notion of an efficient; nor of a Soul.

Chap. 5. The Sum of what hath been said concerning the Spontaneous Original of Living Things.

AND that we may contract what hitherto hath been said concerning the Spontaneous Original of live Things, into a smal compass; * 1.345 Spon∣taneous live things are Generated, when either the Seed, or Se∣minal principle, and the Soul it self of live things, being somwhere secretly hidden, having obtained a fitting matter, and stirred up by the heat of some Ambient Body, doth put it self forth and begins to exercise vital operations: or when the Form which was necessary to the constitution of the subject of some more Noble living thing, the former Soul departing, becomes its own Master, and being excited by the Ambient heat or the heat of putrefaction, and having obtained a new disposition sit to exercise Vital actions, it rouzes it self, and becomes an actuating and Vivifying Form to the subject matter, and begins to exercise the actions of a living thing.

From whence it is apparent, * 1.346 that all matter which is necessary to Spontaneous Generation, and which contains secretly in it self the Form and Cause of a new and Spontaneous Body, proceeds from living Things, and it is either Seed, or som∣what answering to Seed, either the whole Carkass or part of the Carkass of a living

Thing, or an excrement, or somwhat that some way proceeds from a live thing, and contains in it self a vital principle. For, as was said before, the Seed and Seminal principle, and that which answers to Seed, may long lie hid in Atomes, divers mat∣ters, powders, dry things, and in the Earth. Yea and the more Ignoble sort of Animals some of them, although they somtimes seem deprived of life, and to ex∣ercise no Second act of the Soul, as it happens in Flies, Frogs and some other Ani∣mals, which lie all Winter long as it were dead: yet the Soul lying hid even in vile matter doth vivifie the same, and being in the Spring cherished and awakened by the Ambient heat, it exercises vital actions by the Second act, and is then said to revive again. Moreover there is no living thing, out of whose Carkass Excre∣ments, Urine, Sweat, Vapors, and steams going out of the Body, and filth gathe∣red in the Skin and Garments sundry kinds of Worms are not produced; so that Aristotle said rightly, that all things were after a sort ful of Souls. Now the Soul which lies hid in such things as proceed from perfect Animals, and afterwards pro∣ceeds from them, is alwaies of an inferior degree and sort, but never of the same or an higher, unless they be some imperfect Animals, as was newly said of Flies and Frogs. For the same Soul cannot inform Bodies of divers sorts, nor cannot any thing act beyond its strength. And although as was also said before, Fortunius Licetus, Lib. 2. Chap. 17. teaches that the same Soul, or of the same sort and con∣dition with the Soul of the former live thing, is in Spontaneous live things: yet that may not be allowed, for the cause aforesaid. And the Nature of Degenerati∣on is far different from that of the Spontaneous Original of living Things. For in degeneration, as also in Silk-Worms and Butter-Flies, it may happen, that the same Soul may be in divers bodies, and so be naturally disposed to put on divers external Forms, as when Rye is turned into Wheat, and of the Egg is made a Pal∣mer-worm, then a Silk-Worm, then a Butter-Fly: but in Spontaneous Generati∣on, properly so called and of the second kind, it is impossible, that a more noble Form should remain in the Carkass or Excrements. But these things will be more clearly understood, now we come to particulars.

Chap. 6. Of the Spontaneous Original of Plants, and first of the Generation of Mushroms.

NOw al living things Spontaneously generated whether of the first or second or∣der, * 1.347 do belong either to Vegetables or to Animals. And both of these again are twofold: Vegetables are Mushroms, Puck Fists, Moss, and perfect Plants; Animals are Plant-Animals, and true Animals.

In the first place all Puckfists are generated without any tillage or manifest Seed, which as Scaliger saies are to themselves Root, Stem and Fruit; also Mushroms, and Toad-stools, which spring up so swiftly that they are generated in one Night, and attain that greatness which belongs to their Nature. For they neither afford any Seed of which to be generated, nor are they procreated and multiplied by setting any part of them into the ground. Since therefore they are bred of their own accord, they must needs have the common way of generation with other Spontaneous Live things of which we spake before. For whereas Matthiolus writes, that the Earth by an hidden faculty doth breed Puck-fists, and Mushroms in her self, that must be fitly explained. For the Earth is not in it self and by its own Nature the efficient Cause of Puck-fists and Toad-Stools, but a Soul lying hid in the Earth, or in some Juyce mingled with the Earth. But whence that Soul pro∣ceeds is not so manifest.

Fortunius Licetus, * 1.348 Lib. 3. de Spont. Viv. Ort Cap. 4. thus writes thereof: the Spontaneous Original of Puck-sists and all Toad-stools in general, is, when the Soul of a more perfect living thing, Plant or Animal, abiding in the Carkass, as in a Vessel, being much impaired, and having gotten a matter not exactly disposed, and having none of the best instruments for the Organization of the parts, commu∣nicates it self for a Form and quickening Soul to the subject matter, first disposed by the moist warmth or heat of the Ambient Air, which works chiefly upon the Earth in the Spring and Autumn, with Thunder and Rain, or rather with the Sun,

after Rain. The same Licetus, Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 5. conceives that the matter of Toad-stools is an aliment fit to nourish plants, falling upon the ground from the Carkasses either of other Plants or of Animals, which when the neighbou∣ring Plants do not draw to nourish themselves, the Soul of its own accord turns it into Toad-stools and Puck-fists.

But in very deed, there is not only one kind of Toad-stools, * 1.349 as hereafter will appear when we speak of their differences. Some grow to Trees, some Spring out of the Earth. The former proceeds from the Soul in the Body of the Tree, nusta∣king by reason of the unfitness of the matter it works upon, but not from the Soul weakned. And as in Man certain Toad-stools are bred, sundry sorts of Warts, Wens and other Excrescences, by reason of Vitious Aliment, which Nature chan∣ges into the best Form it can, and such as the Nature of the place will bear: so also in Trees, especially those that are aged, when either vitious Aliment flows in, or in a weak part it is not well digested, Nature generates such like Toad-stools. The rest have their nourishment in the Earth, but not all that which Licetus would have. For if all that which Licetus would have were the immediate matter of Toad-stools, they would grow every where in Fields and Gardens; since there is such matter in all places: which nevertheless doth not come to pass. Nor hath it ever been observed, that Toad stools and Puck-fists were bred out of Animals; as for those which are said to breed upon men, they are only so called by way of similitude.

And therefore I conceive it is more probable that Puck-fists do arise and grow on∣ly upon and out of Plants. * 1.350 And that in the Earth they are generated out of the Roots and Barks of Trees and Shrubs, either Putrified and Corrupted, or sending some Juyce out of themselves, and consequently of such matter which was the proper and immediate subject of the Soul of the Plant, and contains in it a subordi∣nate Form, which being afterwards stirred up by heat, and having got a fitting matter it turns to a Toad-stool to which it is Naturally disposed. For when som∣what is separated and divided from the Tree, and is no longer governed by the Form of a plant, then that concealed Form is stired up by the moist Heat of the Earth about it, and begins to exercise the Function of a Soul, and of its subject matter being disposed thereto it forms the Body of an imperfect or half Plant. Whence it is that after Thunder and Showers great store of Toad-stools are wont to Spring up. ••nd that which Rains especially coming down with Thunder do per∣form by their Warm moisture, that also Leaven mixt with Blood-warm water can effect. And Matthiolus writes, in Lib. 1. Dioscorid. Cap. 93. * 1.351 that a white Poplar Tree cut off close by the ground to the very Root, and Sprinkled with hot Water wherein Leaven is dissolved, within four daies brings forth store of Mushroms or Toad-stools very pleasant to Eat.

And because Toad stools are speedily Generated and grow up, * 1.352 Licetus holds Lib. 3. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 10. that there must needs come together at once ma∣ny such Atomes as are fit to Generate Toad stools, so as to make up a sensible bulk; because the Soul of one Atome is so weak, that it cannot vivifie nor shape the matter of a Toad-stool, nor perform that which the Souls of many Atomes flowing together into one Body and becoming one, can do. But there is some doubt in this point. For wonderful, truely, is the Nature of Forms and Souls, which of it self hath no quantity, and hath the same force in a smal Body which it hath in a great. Nor doth the bulk of a Toad-stool prove that which he saies; since we see of an exceeding smal Seed a great Plant doth arise, matter being drawn out of the Earth for the formation and Augmentation thereof. The most swift encrease of Toad-stools doth rather seem to perswade what Licetus thinks; since it is not cre∣dible, that in so short a space of time a Soul lurking in so smal a Body can draw to it so great a quantity of matter. Unless any man will peradventure say, that the matter is prepared by little and little by the Soul of the Toad stool, and afterward it suddenly Springs up.

The Differences or Sorts of Mushroms or Toad-stools, and of Puck-fists.

And although all Toad-stools do arise from plants, and the Roots, Branches, * 1.353 Stocks, and Barks of Trees and shrubs: yet there is great difference amongst them,

in regard of diversity of their matter. For some grow to Trees and Wood, some grow under Trees and in the ground. Nor is it easie to find a Toad-stool where there is not or hath not been some Tree or Wood. * 1.354 And the matter, truly, of such as grow upon Trees and Wood proceeds in the first place from the substance it self of the Trees, or that matter which is the proper subject of the Soul of the Tree. But a Toad-stool is not made thereof, so long as it is under the dominion of the Soul of the Tree, or Shrub, but when it is deserted thereby, and either the whole Plant, or some part thereof comes to die. And therefore we see that Toad-stools for the most part do not grow upon sound and uncorruped Trees, but on such as are old, and in some part decaied. Secondly, The vitious Aliment of the Tree or Shrub. Thirdly, some Excrement shed from the Tree or Bark; whence Pliny, Lib. 22. C. 23. writes that Toad-stools are bred of the Flegm of Trees. And indeed, it is credible that Toad-stools which grow on living Treees by means of the two last causes and manners are the works of the Soul it self of the Tree. For like as, ac∣cording to what was formerly said, Toad-stools and Warts are generated on the Body of Man, while Nature, which is never idle, turns and Forms the vitious and superfluous Humor (which breaking through the Membranes and Pores, it can∣not change into the substance of the part, by reason of the unfitness of the matter and the weakness of the part) into such a substance; so credible it is, that the same doth happen in trees.

The matter of those which Spring out of the Earth is either some part of a Root, * 1.355 or a Bark, or some other part separate from the Tree. And therefore where Toad∣stools are bred, there for the most part you shal find the Barks and parts of Trees, which when they are corrupted and Rot, by Rain falling upon them they are cove∣red in the Earth, and being cherished with the Heat thereof are changed into Toad∣stools. * 1.356 And that also may be artificially procured. So of the Leaves of Poplar Trees cut in pieces and buried in the ground Toad-stools do arise, as Scaliger ob∣serves Exercit. 104. Sect. 17. the same happens of a Fig-Tree buried underground, as Athenaeus, Lib. 2. Cites from Nicander, whose Words are these.

Cover a Fig-Tree under store of Dung, And Water't well, then store of Mushrooms Yong Will Spring apace.

Hitherto also may be referred the Toad-stools which grow out of Tree branches burnt, * 1.357 of which Cardan, Lib. 13. de Subtil. Page 509. you shall have Mushroms when you burn dry sticks, and Rain fals upon them, or (in case it Rain not) if you sprinkle Water upon the remainders. And that this is so, not only when the sticks are burnt, but also when they are not burnt, any one may easily try. For when I had used to manure my Garden with Earth that had smal fragments of sticks mingled therewith, the second year there grew up store of smal Mushroms or Toad-stools al about.

Again though no part of the Tree or Shrub be found evidently corrupted in the ground: yet of them Toad-stools are bred, when the Juyces or Excrements of Trees lie hid in the ground. For such is the Nature of these more Ignoble Forms, that even in the smallest Atomes and Juyces they can remain intire, which after∣wards gaining a convenient place, and being stirred up by the heat of some Ambient Body, they rouze themselves, and Form and shape the Body of a Toad-stool. For since a Soul can abide in the smallest Seeds of Plants, and when it gets place and matter it can Form a great Plant: why may not these Forms much more Ignoble be preserved entire in the smal Bodies or Atomes of Plants?

Now the chief cause of the variety of Toad-stools is the diversity of Trees and Shrubs from whence they arise; * 1.358 for some forts grow upon or under some kind of Trees or Shrubs, and some upon or under others. So, those great and very white Toad-stools like a mans Skul, which Chirurgeons use to stop Blood, and are cal∣led Crepitus Lupi, do hardly grow any where but in Vineyards, and they grow out of Vine Branches dead and corrupted. Also the variety of the Parts themselves of the Trees.

Howbeit, I am apt to believe that the variety of Toad-stools doth not only depend upon the diversity of the matter which Trees afford them, but also upon

the variety of matter which is otherwise found in the Earth. For seeing certain it is that all this great bulk of some Toad-stools doth not come from the Tree, doubtless the form or Soul communicated by the Tree doth in the Earth associate such matter as it meets with, and thereof frames to it self a convenient Body; as also we see that smal Seeds do draw matter and aliment out of the Earth, and that thence great Plants grow up. And that the Soul of the Toad-stool doth snatch any Obvious matter, and thereof shape a Toad-stool, appears even hereby, that Pliny Lib. 19. Chap. 2. writes: We know what hapned to Laertius Licinius a Pretorian, being Judg at Carthage in Spain, a few years since; who biting a Mushrom had his fore Teeth loosned by a Brass Farthing that was therein.

Of the Harts Toad-stool or Boletus Cervinus so called.

And since among other Toad-stools, both in regard of the shape and strong smel, the Fungus Cervinus or Harts Toad-stool is remarkable, Now Matthiolus writes thereof, as of a thing by himself lately found out, Lib. 3. Epist. Ʋlt. ad Julium Mo∣deratum in these words: seeing I know that you are much delighted with novel∣ties, I have sent you with these my Letters a certain Subterranean Puck-fist, which the Bohemians cal Harts Mushrom. For I conceive it is a thing you never heard of before, because no Ancient nor late writers make any mention thereof; and be∣cause it is not to be found, save in those Woods where there are many Harts and Hunters, who know these secrets of Nature: but because these things are unheard of in your parts, I will not have you any longer unacquainted with the History and Virtue of this Toad-stool. Now Hunters relate that this Toad-stool after the manner of ordinary puck-fists grows under the ground, where the Earth is infected with the Harts Sperm falling thereupon. Which many times happens when the Male draws his Yard out of the Genitals of the Female containing Seed in the pas∣sage, by reason of the Females withdrawing her self from the Violence of the Male. And perhaps no man could ever find this Toad-stool, did not the Harts themselves at a certain season of the year discover the place where they grow. For led by a Natural Instinct they scrape with their fore Feet upon the ground whereunder the said Toad stool grows which they are said to discern by the smel. For the Toad∣stool hath a very strong smel, especially when it is first dug up. Hunters and Country-men which are acquainted with the Secret and frequent the Woods dili∣gently observe the places, being drawn by the Harts Feet, and digging the pit they take out the Toad-stools and sel them to the Apothecaries, who cut them in pieces, draw them upon Threds, and dry them afterwards in the shadow, and keep them for Medicinal uses. They are of the same shape (for the most part) which we see in other Puck-fists, yet all are round like Globes and uneven. The outmost thin Rind is swarthy somwhat, but the fleshy Fungus substance is white. Some say there is a certain kind of these Puck-fists resembling a mans Yard Erected, with the Nut un∣covered, and at the other end certain Knobs resembling Testicles. But that vulgar Opinion of the Hunts-Men touching the Original of these Toad-stools sounds like a Fable, into which perhaps the strong smel, and in the latter sort the shape, might bring them. Whereof Thomas Jordanus, de Pest. Phaen. Tract. 3. P. 605. * 1.359 They ex∣ceedingly commend the Harts Toad stool so called, bred of the Sperm of that Beast, and found by the Goates Scraping up of the Earth. They are found truly in such places where in the Memory of Man there was never any Hart seen. At Trenzine a Famous town of Hungary about the Clifts of Carpathus they are very plentiful; in Mountanous places, and dark Woods, where though you may find Harts, yet is there not so great plenty, as to suffice for the Generation of Wain-Loads of these Puck∣fists, if that were to be thought true which is related of their Generation. Also I have as touching the latter kind been brought into a suspition by what I observed here at Wittenberge, in the year 1626. For the Trench being to be repaired and the City to be fortified, the Captain of the Garrison walking accidentally in the Ditch, drawn by the smel▪ he found one of these Puck-sists having the form of a Mans Yard, and wondering (for he had from Hunters drunk in the foresaid Opinion con∣cerning the Original thereof) how in a place where no Hart had been this Toad∣stool could be Generated, he brought me to the place, and being some spaces distant I also perceived that same exceeding strong smel proper to this kind, and under an

Elder Shrub I found ten such Puck-fists. But seeing it is certain, that there never came any Hart into that place, probable it is, that such Puck-fists are not Genera∣ted of the Harts Sperm, but of the Juyce or corruption of some Plant, and matter determined to this kind of Toad-stool, arising from some certain Plant.

Toad-stools growing out of Stones.

Moreover this is also worthy of consideration whether Toad-stools or Puck-fists grow out of Stones. * 1.360 Many learned men affirm the same, and hold that there are Mushroms fit to Eat growing out of Stones. Jul. Caesar Scal. Exercit. 173. Sect. 2. writes: The Particular Nature of a certain Stone is to be reckoned amongst the most wonderful. This Stone is highly esteemed by the Romans. I saw one at Naples, in which Kingdom they say they are found▪ It hath a thick crust. Which being covered with Earth nine inches deep, and sprinkled with warm Water, the fourth day after it sends forth Mushroms. And Cardan, Lib. 13. de Subtilitate, saies: Mushroms grow from certain broad Stones buried underground, after the manner of measures, four inches underground within four daies Water being sprinkled thereupon. They a∣bound in groves and grow speedily: for they require a dry heat, and therefore those stones must have some adustion, for the Generation of Mushroms is speedy, and as it were without a Root, for nothing grows without a Root indeed. For if is draw aliment, if it live, or grow though it live not, it draws out of the Earth; now that which draws must be Joyned to that whereout it draws; and the part whereby it is Joyned is the Root. And Matthiolus upon Dioscorides, Lib. 4. Cap. 78. hath these Words: Mushroms are at this day in so great request at the Tables of Italy, (where they are most frequently Eaten) that at Naples stones are found, which being Dug up and carried into Wine Cellars, covered a little with Earth, and now and then sprinkled with Blood-Warm Water, within four daies they produce pleasant Mushroms. These Stones I have seen at Rome and Naples; where they are kept with great diligence, because by help of them they can Eat Mushroms when th••y please. Which is confirmed by Johannes Baptista Porta the Neapolitan in Sua Villa Lib. 10. Cap. 70. The last kind of Mushroms (quoth he) are Bred out of Stones. They are cropt off to be Eaten, and fresh one•• grow up, by a continual fruitfulness, They grow to their perfection in seven daies; fixtimes a year they cut them off; the Stone is covered with nine inches depth of Earth. The Stones are brought to Naples from the Mountain Vesuvius; to Surren∣tum from Fagetus the highest Mountain of that Tract; to Abellinum from the Par∣thenian Mount; in Apulia, from Garganus and the highest part of the Mountains; for when they once perceive the stones have born Mushroms, they dig them up, and expose them to sale. Somtimes they do not grow in the fashion of Caps, but like Tendrels or in the shape of Asparagus, and divided into branches. And Fortunius Li∣cetus Lib. 3. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 11. relates, that Jacobus Antonius Marta a Neapolitan told him, that the Parthenian Mount aforesaid, the highest of all the Mounts in the Territory of Naples, in the top thereof hath store of Stones of a won∣derful Nature, which being put under the droppings of the Wine Spiggots, and drin∣king in the drops of Wine do in the morning afford Mushroms, sprung up the night before, delightful to the tast, and not prejudicial to Health.

But, * 1.361 forasmuch as the said Licetus, in the place cited, relates, that he saw at Padua, in the Garden of Benedictus Sylvaticus a Famous Physitian, three such Mushroms bearing Stones, sent him from the Country of Naples, and that he did Eat Mushroms which grew upon them; and adds, that those Stones were very soft, yielding to the touch, so that they seemed rather pieces of Wood then Stones; we may justly conclude, that Mushroms never grow out of true Stones, but that these Neapolitan Stones so accounted are pieces of wood, by a Stone-making Juyce hard∣ned into the Similitude of Stones; or as Licetus would have it, that these Stones had their original from Earth, which being ful of the parts and Juyces of Plants was by a stone making juyce hardned. Which Woods or parts of Plants containing in them the Form of a Mushrom, when by the pouring on of Wine or warm Water they come to be softired, and to be mingled with the juyce of the Earth about them, and by the heat of wine or warm water to be digested, the Form lying hid within breaks into act and Forms the Body of a Mushrom. But those Mushroms which are

bred by Wine dropping upon the stone do owe their original chiefly to the Wine. * 1.362 Yet the Clay which is there found, or is Generated by the continual dropping of the Wine upon the Stone may be mingled therewith.

Chap. 7. Of Plants which grow up of themselves.

NOW several Men are of several minds as concerning the manner how Plants come to grow of their own accord. * 1.363 Some follow the Opinion of Erastus pro∣pounded Chap. 1. and hold, that every Earth is endued with a peculiar faculty of producing Peculiar Plants, or that it hath a Seminal power communicated by the blessing of God at the first Creation, which is brought into act by the Sun and influx of the Stars. And they are induced so to think, because, if Earth digged out of the deepest Pit or Well be placed upon the highest turret, it produces Plants. And Johannes Baptist. Port. writes Lib. 2. Phytognom. Cap. 1. That when he had gotten Earth out of the deepest Cellars of certain Houses, that there might be no suspition of Seed, and had set it in the open Air on the top of his House, lest the wind should bring seeds into it from elsewhere, not many daies after out of the several sorts of Earth in so many baskets several kinds of Plants Sprung up, but such as usually grow in the Neapolitan Soil. For clayish ground did bring forth one sort, the Pateolan Mould another, gravelly Earth another. And Porta adds that in the Island of Crete, whithersoever a man carry the Earth, unless somwhat else be sowed therein, it presently brings forth Cypress. And most certain it is, that in Fields and Meadows some Plants are Natural to one Field or Meadow, some to another. Which Opinion if any man will follow, I shall not quarrel with him. Yet these doubts occur in this Opinion: first, that God did once command the Earth, at the Creation, to produce Plants, and it was accordingly done: And he blessed the Plants, and commanded them to produce their Seeds, whereby they might multiply them∣selves, but he did not bless the Earth. Which doubt whether it can be answered by saying, that it is not to be understood of simple Earth, but of the kinds of Earth, of which Questionless there are many, and they mixt Bodies, and that these mixt Earths have a Seminal faculty put into them by the Creator whereby they produce Plants; I leave to the Judgment of the Reader. St. Ambrose seems to incline to this Opinion, who in Lib. 4. Hexamer. Writes thus concerning this matter: That first word of God whereby he created all Creatures, is the Law of Nature, which hath continued ever since in the Earth, giving a rule to Future succession. Another doubt is, that this Earth doth not bring forth Plants before it is moistened with Rain. So that the Seminal Virtue may seem rather to be communicated thereto by Showers of Rain, then to be Naturally implanted therein.

But suppose, indeed, * 1.364 that this is one manner of the Spontaneous Generation of Plants; Yet is it not the only manner: but that oftentimes Seed is communicated from elsewhere to an Earth of it self barren, appears even hereby, in that it hath been observed that after Rains and inundations of Water new Plants have sprung up in certain places. But how this comes to pass, is not very apparent. I con∣ceive that all this Spontaneous Generation of Plants, may be reduced to those two manners, which I formerly propounded in General. For some plants although they are not Generated of Seed manifest to our senses, nor spring from branches set in the Earth, yet they really proceed from another Plant of the same sort, and from the Seed thereof; which although it be not in a visible Body, yet is it in the smallest Particles or Atomes containing the Soul of the same sort, which Particles may lie concealed in Rain or in the ground; whose Soul having afterwards gained a fit place, and being provoked by the heat of the Ambient Air, it displaies it self. Licetus indeed. Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 13. * 1.365 doth grant that these Atomes perform the Office of Seed, and answer to Seed by way of proportion, but he denies that they are really seed: but I see no cause why he should do so, unless peradventure inasmuch as this Seed hath no external Figure as other Seeds have; meanwhile it may wel be called a Seminal Principle. For an external Figure and a certain man∣ner of Formation doth nor primarily constitute Seed, but the Soul lying hid in the same with that same implanted Spirit which is said to answer to the Element of

the Stars, and makes the Seeds fruitful: which because they with their subject may be in the smallest Atomes, there is no cause why they may not be called a peculiar sort of Seeds, or a Seminal Principle. And although the Soul which lies hid in such smal Bodies or Atomes doth not inform the Earth or Water wherein it is contai∣ned, but lies therein concealed as in a Vessel; yet those little Bodies it informs wherein it is as its proper subject, and is in them according to its first Act, and it then comes to its Second Act when it hath got a convenient place.

But other Plants are more properly said to be Spontaneously Generated, when they proceed not from a Seed or Soul of the same sort, but from that Form which in a more noble Plant was instead of the next matter, and the subject of its specifical Soul, just as Toad-stools (whereof we treated in the former Chapter) and moss do grow upon Trees.

Now Moss grows upon sundry Trees, as on the Cedar, Poplar, Oak, and Pitch-Tree, from which in the Mountains of the Valley of Anania above Trent, * 1.366 Matthio∣lus saies he had frequently gathered very long Hairy moss, much sweeter and fairer then that which grows upon the Poplar and Oak, in 1 Dioscorid. C. 20. Yea, and there is hardly any Tree but when it is old it bears Moss, and it is a token of a Trees being Old, when it begins to be covered with Moss. Also Fab. Columna hath de∣scribed sundry sorts of Moss, Minus Cognitar. Stirp. Lib. 10. Cap. 158, 159, 160.

To Mosses belong the kinds of Liver-wort, which although, as Dioscorides Lib. 4. Cap. 48. writes, it grows familiarly on Stones, as on Rocks, the Stones of Wells, the Tiles of Houses: yet the same Fabius Columna tels us they grow also upon the stumps of Trees, in moist and Champian Countries especially, in the foresaid Book, Cap. 154. Yea in our Countries also that same kind of Moss which they cal Tree-lung-wort doth grow upon Trees.

Nor must we here pass over that singular Opinion of Fortunius Licetus, * 1.367 which will seem a Paradox to some, touching the Generation of Plants out of dried Plants, which are commonly thought to be dead and void of all Soul. We have in Gener∣al, indeed, spoken somwhat hereof before: yet I think fit more Particularly in this place to repeat the said Question, and more clearly to explain the same. Now Fortunius Licetus is of this Opinion, that the same Soul which did constitute the Living Creature doth remain in the dead Carkass, but doth not inform the same: Yet that it doth again rouze it self, and is able again to perform the Office of a Form; and that two manner of Waies. For somtimes the same Soul (he saies) being decaied and weakned doth procreate imperfect things: and somtimes again, as he shews Lib. 3. de his qui diu sine Alimentis Vivunt, Cap. 7. out of the Body which is accounted for dead a new plant is produced. Forasmuch as Plants pluckt up out of the Earth, or broken off from their Roots or trunks, do not presently die, only being destitute of a fit place out of which they may draw Aliment they can∣not grow, and they cease bearing branches, leaves, and Fruits; yet in the mean time the self same Soul doth Vegetate that Body: as seeds that are kept in the Winter time shew no other sign of a Soul in them, but that their Body is thereby kept alive; whence it is, that the said seed is fit to be sown and to be used in Phy∣sick: but when it is no more animated but corrupted, it becomes both unfit to be sown, and loses all its vertue in Physick: If the Wood of an Olive (saies he) be simply dry, it will live no longer; since life consists in moisture, and dryness ac∣cording to Aristotle is the Death of Plants; but there wil be the Carkass of an Olive-Tree, wherein with some degree of Heat, and some Foot-steps of the former temper, (if the Soul be yet contained in it as in a Vessel; not quickening the Wood) when it is digged up and hath gained a fitting heat for life from the Ambient Air, and like its former temperament, then it becomes fit for the Soul again therein as the consti∣tuting Form of an Olive Tree to shew it self: * 1.368 but if the Olive Wood were not ex∣actly dry, but still had life in it, it would sprout of it self, and produce an Olive Tree, by a non-Spontaneous Generation. Now this chiefly brought him into that Opinion, in that Woods do last many Years and preserve their strength. Yea, and which is strange, it hath been observed that they have sprouted the Second time and performed the operations of the Soul. Of Which Virgil, 2 Georgic.

Some need no Roots; the Pruner Young Slips cuts, And them into the Earth securely Puts. And (wondrous to be told) an Olive Tree Out from a dry cut Trunk oft Springs we see.

Which Verse although some interpret concerning ingrafting: yet they do it contrary to the mind of Virgil, who treats of ingrafting in the verse following. And why should that be counted a wonder? But Servius hath rightly interpreted this Verse. That (saith he) which is here said is true of the Olive and Myrtle, whose dry stocks are cut to the middle or pith, and so put under ground, and from them Trees do shoot forth, which is strange indeed. Theophrastus taught the same thing Lib. 3. de Caus. Plant. Cap 4. who writes, that in an ordinanry course of Nature the dry wood of an Olive Tree will sprout again. For those Woods also, saith he, which sprout of their own accord, as the Olive-Tree-Wood, and all such like, which they reckon for Miracles and Wonders, have their Reason in Nature. For they are Naturally long lived and apt to sprout, because of their thickness and moisture, and therefore as soon as they are sensible of any Liquor from without, presently they send forth branches. In very deed, for the most part Wood covered with Earth and laid in moist places doth Sprout; besides that, a bough cut off hath been seen to shoot forth Twigs soon after, because it had in it moisture enough, and the Spring was at Hand, the like whereof happens to the Squil or Sea-Onion, and such other Plants as Sprout after they are hanged up in the House. And the said Theophrastus in Lib. 5. de Hist. Plant. Cap. 10. writes, that the Wood of the Olive Tree doth above all other Woods Sprout and send forth Twigs, both rude, or rough and when it is wrought into some work, if it be sensible of any moysture and have attained a moist place, so that a part of a folding door hath been said to Sprout, and a wooden Cup which fel into the Dirt. So, credible Authors relate that Hercules his Club which was made of Olive-Tree-Wood did Sprout. * 1.369 And Fortunius Licetus, in the place fore alleadged Lib. 3. de his qui diu vivunt fine Ali∣mento, Cap. 7. writes that he saw at Rechum in the Garden of his Unkle Bartholomew Licetus, the stock of an Olive Tree which had been Planted, and was now near dri∣ed up and had been Naked ten years together, and of it self separated from the Trunk, and never after that Planted in the Earth; which being thrust into the ground near a Wel to prop up some other Wood, and Nailed to the Wood which it bore up with Iron Nailes, it budded and branched many Olive branches laden with Leaves and Fruit, and afterwards bare in like manner, many years. Johannes Ludovicus de la Cerda confirms the same, who, upon that Verse of Virgil aforesaid, commenting, thus writes: the Eyes of many most skilful Husband-men have been witnesses, of whom I made enquiry: the Art it self is a Witness, which is now much in request in Spain, where at present I live. The Husbandmen cut the stock of an Olive Tree (whose Root and branches are taken away) into many parcels, and so they bury it in the ground, which forms first a Root and then a Tree, which Virgil wonders at; for it is really a wonderful thing.

Other Trees also besides the Olive have been observed to do as much. Yea Ari∣stotle himself grants, 2. Phys. Cap. 1. * 1.370 that a Wooden Bed-sted buried in the ground may Sprout. They report as much of the Male wild Ash, of which Romulus his spear was made, which Plutarch in the Life of Romulus writes that it took Root again, and sprouted. Which Ovid confirms Lib. 1. Metamorph.

And as Astonisht Romulus of Old Did on Mount Palatine his Lance behold To flourish with green Leaves: the fixed Foot Stood not on Steel, but on a living Root. Which now no weapon, spreading Arms displaid; And gave Admirers unexpected shade.

And Jalius Caesar Scaliger, in Theophrast. de Causs. Plant. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. Writes, that he hath seen Willow Rods carelesly thrown away, and not so much as stuck into the Earth, to sprout, yea and a great Trunk of a Poplar long after it was cut off.

The premises therefore being such, and confirmed by the Testimony of most lear∣ned men, Yea, by experience it self, upon which the Judgment of Licetus is foun∣ded, although his Opinion seem Paradoxical, yet it is not simply to be rejected, but to be dextrously explained and limited. * 1.371 This in the first place is certain; that all Plants pluckt up out of the ground do not presently die, as may be seen in the Squil and the American Sempervivum. But that all Plants pluckt up out of the Earth and dried should retain their Souls and live, and that only nutrition in some sort ceases in them, this cannot easily be granted, especially if the Root being cut off, and the bark taken away, they be cut in pieces. Much less can it be granted, that the Carkasses of Animals do retain their former Soul. For every Soul requires its proper subject, viz. Innate Heat, consisting of the implanted and influent heat, in Animals; but in Plants, likewise, a temperament so and so disposed, which because in dried Plants it is changed, so they come also to lose their Life.

But because the former experience cannot be denied, * 1.372 we are now to enqure how it hath and may come to pass, that the Wood of a dry Olive Tree should Sprout again. Which though it be hard to find out, yet because it is not Miraculous but Natural, I will propound my Opinion: let every man follow what Opinion he likes best. And in the first place, this must be remembred, as hath been many times said before, * 1.373 that there is not one manner of the Propagation of Plants. For all Plants are not propagated by Seed formed after a certain fashion, and included in one part, but that same juyce containing in it the Seminal principle is in many d••••∣fused through the whole Plant; so that those Plants may be propagated by a sl••p or branch puld off, or by their Roots, and so multiply themselves; and after this manner the Seminal faculty communicated either from Seed properly so called, or from a Root, or any other way from a Plant of the same sort, may many times lie long hidden. Jul. Caesar Scaliger relates, that the Seed of Bears-Foot hath thus lain hid in the Earth eight years together, Exercitat. 140. In my little Garden (saith he) which is next my study, I planted Bears-Foot, I kept it a long time diligently. Some Thievish Herb gatherers, from whom nothing can be kept, had to my think∣ing pluckt it all away by the Roots. For above eight years there was no appear∣ance therof. A Berberry was set near that place. The place it self was digged and rak't, and sowed with patience Seed, which they here falsly count to be Raved. The Patience grew and fild the bed and was gathered. I falling sick, that plat lay wast and was not stirred for three years together. This present year I find the re∣mainder of my Bears-Foot, viz. two Plants with most beautiful neat leaves, a large stalk and fairly flowred. And therefore as in Wheat, Barley, Oates, and other dead Plants, the Seed may remain in the straw shut up in its Chaffie cases: so also, that same juyce containing the Seminal Principle, diffused through the whole Plant, may in some Plants dead and dried last for a season. And as (nevertheless) he should not say truly who should say that dried Oats or dried Wheat in the barn doth live, although in the dried straw a living Seed is contained: so also it must not be said that the foresaid wood doth live, but only that it containes in it self a Seminal principle. Yet few Plants once dried do recover that same Ancient Semi∣nal disposition which was necessary to the exercise of the Second Act. That it somtimes so happens in the Olive Tree hath been observed, since it above all others abounds with that same Fat Balsamick Juyce. That the same hath hapned in an Ash and Poplar hath been said before. * 1.374 But that Herbs after they are rotten and corrup∣ted may revive again, daily experience shews, while in Fields and Gardens manu∣red with Dung those Plants which have putrified in the Dung are Generated, the Juyce which contains the Seminal principle having remained unhurt. And al Hus∣band-men know, * 1.375 that of Hogs-Dung Sow-Thistle is bred, in Vine-yards, Gardens and Fields. This Thistle is a Familiar food to Swine, and therefore the Germans call it Soew-Diestel, Sow-Thistle. And al these things although they seem wonder∣ful and almost incredible: yet that they are true appears even hereby, in that also of the Tears and Gums of Plants Plants are generated, as shall be said hereafter.

But although these things are true of Plants: * 1.376 yet the Souls of perfect brute Ani∣mals cannot survive after Death. And whereas out of the Carkasses of Animals such Ignoble petty Animals are bred as aforesaid, that doth not happen because the

Soul of the Animal remaining the same being reduced to a more Ignoble degree does produce worms (for the Soul of a Man, a Lyon, an Ox, doth not go into such Animals) but because the subordinate Form lying hid doth then rowze it self up, as was said before.

Moreover, after both the manners before propounded sundry Plants do Sponta∣neously arise. For in the first place, out of the Ground although never sowed with any Seed some Plants do spring up of themselves, as Virgil said of Trees.

Some Plants without Mans labor freely come.

Now this doth nor only happen when (which belongs not to this place) the Seeds themselves intire are carried by force of Winds or overflowings of Waters into some other place; but also when those little Bodies containing seed in them are carried thither either by Winds, Rain, or inundations of Water, or when some Plant of the same kind hath putrified in that place, and yet hath there left its Semi∣nal rudiments. * 1.377 And thus Pliny writes concerning the Spontaneous Original of the herb Laserpitium, Lib. 19. Cap. 3. We find, (saith he) in most credible Greek Authors, that this Herb suddenly sprung up after the Earth had been moistened with a Pit∣chy shower, about the Gardens of the Hesperides, and the greater Syrtis, seven years before the building of Cyrena, which was built 143. years after our City. And the force of the shower reached four thousand African furlongs. Doubtless that same shower, so thick, black, and Pitchy as it were, did contain many smal Seminal Atomes of Laserpitium, containing in them the rudiments of that Plant, which being forced into the ground produced that Herb all along that tract of Land aforesaid. And after this manner, viz. * 1.378 those little particles containing in them the Seed being brought from elswhere by showets, Winds, inundation of Waters, whole Woods have somtimes sprung up of themselves, as Theophrastus doth witness, Lib. 1. de Causis Plant. Cap. 5. Also after this manner, in Earth digged deep out of the ground, and containing no Seeds in it, being exposed to the Air and Rain, Plants do Spring up. Unless any man will follow their Opinion which we mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, who hold, that the Earth by Virtue of the divine Benediction given at the Creation hath a peculiar faculty to produce certain pecu∣liar Plants.

Moreover, Another manner of the Spontaneous Generation of Plants is, * 1.379 when a pl••n•• is generated out of another Plant of a several sort, in the Earth. The Genera∣tion of which Plants is the same with that of Mushroms, viz. When an inferior form which was formerly under the superior Form in the notion of matter, now the su∣perior Form is lost, is set at liberty, and shapes a convenient House for it self. Thus Moss grows upon Trees. Unless any man will here also hold, that when the Soul through fault of its Organs (which happens in aged Trees) or badness of the Aliment, cannot change it into such parts as it ought to do, that it may not be idle it Genera∣tes Moss and such like Things.

Hither may be referred the degeneration of Plants, * 1.380 of which we spake also be∣fore Cap. 2. when a Plant springs indeed from Seed, but of a different kind from it self; when Water-Mint turns to mint; Wheat to Darnel; Barley to Oates, Basil into running Betony; a rape into a redish; a white Vine into a black; a black in∣to a white; Barley in Wheat; Wheat into Barly, and other Plants degenerate in∣to others, Whereof Scaliger hath a rare example, Exercit. 140. I sowed with mine own Hand the Seed of the Vulgar Smallage, which they commonly but fals∣ly call Persley, by a Wall which would defend it from the Summers heat; that growing up and preserved by the shadow it might serve for the Kitchins use. But it never sprung up according to the usual manner: but another Plant quite different therefrom, to my admiration. It was that which the more learned call Scorodotis and hath been hitherto falsly taken to be Scordium by many. Its leaves when it is yong (if you look on it at a distance) are like Violet Leaves, it hath a white flower, with the Smel and Tast of Garlick. [This should be that we call Jack by the Hedg, or sawce alone, and our Herbals All••aria.] in which case nevertheless a man must take heed that he be not deceived, and think that Plant which springs up from some se∣cretly hidden Seed to arise from the degeneration of another. We spake before of Bears-Foot from Scaliger, in the place lately cited, how that when he thought it

was Rooted al up, and had not appeared for about eleven years, at length it sprung up again.

Now how this degeneration comes to pass is doubtful: * 1.381 Fortunius Licetus, in∣deed, Lib. 4. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 35. and elsewhere, holds that Forms do al∣so degenerate whiles they are weakned, and through weakness come to degenerate into weaker Forms. Now he writes that they are weakned, either by a contrary agent working upon them by it self; or upon the mutation of the subject upon which they depend as to their Essence; or from both causes together. So the Soul of a Calf when it dies degenerates into the Souls of Worms and Bees, which Spontaneously breed out of the Carkass thereof; so the Essence of Wheat is chan∣ged into the substance of Darnel and Oates; so heat Fainting away degenerates in∣to Luke-warmness, so that not only the Forms of the substances but of the accidents also are changed, as he writes. But as was said before, this degeneration of forms, so that the form of a calf should degenerate into the form of worms, is not agreeable to Reason. Rather there is a certain kndred of Forms, as Matthiolus speaks in his preface upon Dioscorides, and some Seeds are Equivocal, that is, common as it were to divers sorts. And as the fame internal Form Bears one while the Form of a Palmer Worm, another while of a Butter Fly, another while of another Worm, and then of a Silk Worm: so also in Plants, some Souls are so constituted, that, according to the disposition of the matter they may form now this, now that shape of Body; or they are so subordinate that one is Lady and the other a Servant, and the Lady exercises her Soveraignty so long as the matter of which the Plant is for∣med and nourished is wel disposed; but when there is any deficiency therein, the Hand Maid takes the Soveraignty.

Theophrastus disputes whether Plants degenerate in the Seed or in the Root, * 1.382 4. de Caus. Plant. Cap. 6. and denies that it is made in the Root, because the Nature of the stalk, Leaves and Seed, do alwaies follow the Nature of the Root; and he con∣cludes that it is made in the Seed, and that it grows fruit less either through penury or superfluity of nourishment. Johan. Gallego de la Serna de Princ. Generat. Lib. 2. Cap. 7. conceives that these degenerations of plants may happen two manner of waies, either because the Soul of the Seed weakned by faultiness of the matter could not produce its proper issue, and bred a monster, as happens in Animals; or because the form of Wheat, for example, is quite corrupted, and upon the corruption the matter remains so disposed, that by the universal cause the form of Darnel or Spelt may forthwith be produced in it. But neither of these waies may be simply allowed. For, as to the first, this is true, that through fault of the matter the Soul cannot produce that which it is ordinarily accustomed to do, otherwise. Yet that Body which it pro∣duces is not alwaies a monster. And the generation of Monsters is ried to no cer∣tain Rules. But the degeneration of Plants is made certain waies, and such Plants degenerate into such and no other, or not into any at least. But the second manner is absolutely false, viz. That the Soul is corrupted, and from the disposition of the matter remaining the universal Cause produces another. For the Universal cause doth not produce any specifical effect. And he acknowledges, that the said effect is not indefinite and indeterminate, and that of Wheat Turnep or Cole-wort is ne∣ver made, but only Darnel or Spelt. As also of the Carkasses of Animals only some sorts of Animals arise, and not any whatsoever. This therefore is more likely, that the Creator hath given to those forms the faculty to shape themselves sundry Bodies; so that when the matter is rightly disposed it makes some kind of Bodies; and so of Wheat grows commonly Wheat, but when the matter is ill disposed, yet that Nature may not be idle it hath the power to produce another Body; for examples sake, when the Soul of Wheat hath matter indisposed, it makes the Bo∣dy of Darnel or Spelt. And it is here much after the same manner as was said be∣fore concerning Palmer Worms and Butter-flies, where the same form at sundry times makes sundry Bodies. And that the Soul doth not perish appears even hereby, in that after Spelt is sprung form Wheat, black Oates from white, if it find again a convenient soil it will return to Wheat and white Oates again.

And although all Spontaneous Generation of Plants may be reduced to these two manners, whether it be properly or improperly so called: yet that the thing may be more Plain, I think fit to explain this business according to the matter and subjects in which these Plants Spontaneously arise.

Secondly therefore, * 1.383 what hath been newly said of the Earth is much more true of Dung; since therein lie hid and Jumbled together the Seeds, parts and juyces of sundry Plants, and other things, and al the causes of Spontaneous Generation in the Earth may be found much more in Dung.

Thirdly, That many Plants Spring up in the Waters, Duck-weeds, * 1.384 Water-Lil∣lies, Water Caltrops, and many others, is most notoriously known. Now such Plants are not all of them Spontaneously Generated (to speak properly) but the Roots of some are divided out of which new ones spring up, others sheed the Seed which they generate into the Waters, whereof Plants of the same sort are bred, and the Seeds of Plants by the Wind and Inundations of Waters are brought in from other places. But those which are so Spontaneously bred that they spring not from intire Seed, are Generated either from Plants putrefying in the Waters, or from Atomes or smal Bodies having Souls in them, falling into the Water in Rain showers; which may also be caused by the Winds, when they blow into the Water amongst the Dust such petty smal Bodies containing the Souls of Plants in them; or because from the Roots of Trees some Juyce or Excrement containing in it a Seminal principle is shed into the Water. For by all these manner of waies those petty Bodies containing the Souls of Plants, or at least their forms which will turn to Souls when they meet with fit matter in the Water, (which chiefly comes to pass in standing Waters) and are cherished by the ambient heat; they are rouzed up, and generate such a plant as they are Naturally fitted for.

Fourthly, Some hold that Plants are also bred out of the Snow. * 1.385 But more credi∣ble it is, they grow under the Snow. For although it may come to pass, though seldom, (for that cannot easily happen in Snow which happens in Rain) that pet∣ty Bodies (with the rudiments of Plants in them) may descend with the Snow: yet the heat by which they might be brought into act is wanting therein, and therefore very seldom or never, if by chance the Snow begin to be warmed and Melt with the heat of the Sun, or if that part of the Snow especially being deep which is next the Earth do begin to be warm through hot Exhalations Springing out of the Earth, and the Soul lurking there be rouzed up and brought into act, Plants are bred out of the Snow.

Fiftly, 'Tis also found that some Plants grow upon other plants. So, * 1.386 many times, upon Willows great Celandine, Bitter-sweet and somtimes Elder doth grow, yea and Services and other Plants. Which happens, either because whole Seeds are brought thither by the Winds (which yet is not Spontaneous Generation properly so called) or smal Bodies containing in them the Seed of Plants are brought by the Rain or Wind. Now this happens chiefly in those Trees in which part of the Tree begins to Rot, and turn to dust as it were: which often happens in old Willows cut off about the Head as they cal it. For since there is found matter fit to Form and Augment a Plant, the Soul of a Plant can easily display it self there∣in. And therefore in such Generations the Tree which grows in the Earth affords only a place to the Plant which grows upon it.

Sixtly, 'Tis also very wel known that Plants do grow upon Rocks and Stones, * 1.387 as a kind of Moss doth every where grow upon Stones, and Coral grows out of Sticks upon Rocks in the Sea, and Sea-Moss grows upon Rocks and upon Shell-Fishes. But I doubt whether Corals do grow of their own accord. For although no Body Plants it in the Sea: yet because it is a certain sort of Natural thing, which is no where else Found save on the Rocks of the Sea, (nor can it be said to grow from the Corruption of any other Plant or Animal;) this doubtless is its Natural place, and it was doubtless created upon these Rocks at the first Creation, on which it is pro∣pagated, either by Roots or by some juyce containing in it the principles of this Plant. But as to other plants, they grow upon stones, when showers fal upon them, which contain either petty Bodies with the Forms of plants in them, or smal Bodies separated by the corruption of other plants, yet fit to produce plants. And this happens more easily, if upon the Rains any Clay or Earth stick upon the said Stones. For then those Seeds find a more convenient place to display themselves. The same also may happen by the Excrements of Birds falling upon the Stones; since also in those very Excrements the Forms of plants may remain unchanged. But it oft fals out, that not perfect Plants, but only some Moss grows on Stones. For since by Reason of defect of Aliment that same Soul cannot make what it

would, it makes what it can, and rather then be out of employment it frames Moss.

And whereas Plants seem to grow somtimes, not only on the surface of Stones, but also to spring out of the depth of them; the cause (doubtless) is, that those Stones have Clifts not discernable by our Eye-sight, into which those petty Bodies or Atomes, containing in them the form of a Plant do insinuate themselves with the Rain, which Form being wakened by the Heat of the Ambient Aire doth at last rouze it self up and fall to work.

And whereas Plants do somtimes grow out of Brick or Stone Walls Joyned with Mortar, Yea, and Shrubs and Trees; it is no wonder. For their Original is the same with Plants that grow out of the Earth, when as either in the Sand which is mixed in the Mortar the Seed of some Plant is mixed, or is brought thither by Birds, or by the force of Winds, and insinuates it self into the chinks of the Walls (which ne∣vertheless is not Spontaneous Generation properly so called) or when with the Excrements of Birds or Rain petty Bodies containing in them the form of Plants are brought thither, and creep into the Chinks, and so in time Sptout forth.

Also Theophrastus teaches, * 1.388 Lib. 1. de Causis Plant. Cap. 4. that Plants do also grow out of the Tears and Gums of Plants. Which Generation although Licetus saies it is Spontaneous, Lib. 3. Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 25. yet I had rather hold that this is no Spontaneous Original; since they are produced in a manner of Seeds, and that of the same sort; and Theophrastus himself saies, that the Generation from Tears doth plainly answer to that which proceeds from stalks; which question∣less is not Spontaneous. And he teaches that there is a fruitful principle in the Tears, when he writes: But that is a most peculiar way of Generation which pro∣ceeds from Tears, as that of Horse-smallage, Lillies and some other Plants. Nor is a Reason wanting, but this plainly answers to Stalks. For the tears have in them a fruitful principle, and that is al the cause. And whereas Licetus holds a threefold fruitful principle, viz. Seed, a bodily part of the plant, as a Root, or stalk, and the Soul, he is out. For he doth ill to ad the Soul, as a different manner of pro∣pagation from the others; since all propagation is made by the Soul, and the soul is never propagated without the Body. And whereas he propounds the subjects or Bodies wherein the Soul is, and by which it is propagated, to be the Seed, and Root, and Stalk, he errs therein also. For the Soul may also be in the Tears them∣selves, which Julius Caesar Scaliger causelesly opposes, when upon the forecited place of Theophrastus, he writes, if of a Gum sowed a plant is bred, the Gum cannot be the excrement but must be a part of the plant, wherein there is a vigorous generative principle. For all know that the word Excrement is taken equivocally when it is attributed to the Dung of the Belly, Urin, and other Excrements properly so cal∣led, and afterwards to the Seed. But as Theophrastus hints, al plants wil not spring from Tears, but only some certain kinds.

But those plants which spring from plants of a different sort are properly said to grow of themselves. * 1.389 So sundry sorts of Moss do grow upon trees. So Misselto grows upon the Oake, the Hazel, the Apple-Tree, Pear-Tree, plum-tree, Birch∣tree, but grows no where by it self. That other Herbs and Shrubs grow upon trees, as hath been said, is not unknown. But that is not Spontaneous Generation; since they grow not out of the Trees, but only upon the Trees, from their own Seeds, and the Tree which sticks in the Earth doth only afford the place; which chiefly, comes to pass when some part thereof is putrified and turnd to Earth as it were, whereof we have already spoken.

Now Licetus propounds four manner of waies whereby plants of a different scart are bred of other plants, * 1.390 de Spont. Viv. Ort. Lib. 3. Cap. 27. two Spontaneous and two non-Spontaneous. The first he makes to be, when the Soul of an old plant in a mat∣ter some waies within it self procreates a new Soul different from it self, which constitutes a new plant of a different sort, and less perfect then it self. The second is, when the seed of any plant doth any waies fall upon another plant. Of which second manner there is no doubt, but the first can hardly be allowed. Nor is it credible that a Soul should procreate another Soul different from it self. More likely it is that the generation of a new and different plant doth proceed from a

subordinate form; as hath been said concerning Worms bred out of plants. But that manner is properly Spontaneous.

The Third manner, and that not Spontaneous, he makes to be; when in the chinks and passages of an old Plant the pouder of Animals and Plants containing in it the Soul, as in a Vessel, are by the heat of the Ambient Air disposed to life. But, since those pouders do contain in them a Seminal principle, we have formerly shewed in what sence this generation caused by them is Spontaneous. For Moss doth not belong to this manner of Generation, as he imagins with Costaeus. For Moss is not made of the poudery matter of Moss cast upon the Trees from elswhere, but out of the barks themselves of Trees when they now begin to be corrupted, as was said before.

The fourth manner is, when sundry Excrements of an old Plant, (the former Soul that had Animated the same being put off by Death, but yet contained in them as in a Vessel) when they come by the heat of the Ambient Air to be digested they are disposed to a new life, and take to themselves again the weakned Soul, degenera∣ting from its old species or sort, so as to become a new vivifying Form, constituting a new Plant.

Peculiarly, as to what concernes the Generation of Missleto, * 1.391 Julius Caes. Scaliger treats largely thereof Exercit. 168. where first he relates the Opinion of the Anci∣ents, imagining, that the Berries of Missleto being Eaten by Thrushes, the pulp ther∣of is concocted; but the Seed comes away indigested with the dung, and fals on the boughs of those Trees whereon the Thrushes are wont to settle. But he conceives this Opinion is therefore to be rejected, because it is not any where planted or sow∣ed, nor grows upon every sort of Tree, nor is it credible the Seed can enter into the hardest boughs so as to cleave the Bark, and become one with them without any Roots; that it proceeds out of some branches where no dung could ever rest nor no Seed stick; nor could he ever find any grains of Misselto in the Crops or Guts of Thrushes, having nourished them with the berries thereof on purpose, and after∣ward cut them up. But he holds, that as horns (as it were) grow out of the Bones of Animals, so Missleto grows out of Trees, and that the unshaped principles of Missleto being cherished by the inward heat, assisted by the outward, in a Juyce con-natural thereto, it grows into this Plant. And therefore there is one Wood of both, nor is the Missleto inserted into the bough of the Tree like a Pant thrust into the Earth. Which Opinion is so far true, as it holds that the principle of the Missle∣to is in the Trees on which which it grows, and doth not come from without, but is Generated within the same, and proceeds from superfluous matter, as horns in Animals. Yet herein is a difference, in that Missleto is not bred on all such Trees, as all Animals of the same sort bear horns, but on some Particular Trees only. There must therefore, doubtless, some peculiar disposition concur in some sorts of Trees, and in some Individual Trees of those sorts, by reason of which this superfluous Humor may be generated, which the Soul of the Tree doth afterwards drive into the outward parts, and thereof Generates Missleto. And whereas it may be objected, that because it grows upon Trees of several sorts it cannot proceed from one and the same principle but if it came from the inward Nature of the Tree the Leaves of the Missleto should differ according to the difference of the Tree: to that Scaliger answers, that it is not necessary that the Excrements of different Bo∣dies should differ in outward appearance, but it suffices if they be rationally or re∣spectively different, as we see in the Tears of Plants. And although the external face is one and the same, yet the Nature it self is different, and the Missleto of the Oak hath far other Virtues then that of the Apple-Tree. As also Galls are bred on sundry Plants, as shall be anon declared. And this Juyce hath one peculiar pro∣perty, that though the leaves of the Tree fal off, yet the Missleto keeps his Leaves all the year. Theophrastus indeed, in 2. de Causs. Plant. writes that Missleto holds its Leaves all the year, upon such Trees as hold their Leaves, but loses them if it grow on Trees that shed their Leaves. But Scaliger rightly accuses this of falsity. For every where in the Woods we see Missleto at all times green, upon the Oak, the Apple-Tree, the Birth-Tree, the Bullas-Tree, when those Trees have lost their Leaves. Yet is not this Humor simply superfluous, but either part of the Alimenta∣ry or Seminal Juyce of the Tree, which the tree wantonizing (as it were) doth thrust

out: and therefore those Trees on which Missletoes do grow do for the most part die.

After the same manner as Missleto doth grow on divers Trees, * 1.392 so also Gals do grow upon the Oak, the Holme, the Beech; yea and Scaliger writes in the forealleadged place that he saw Galls grow upon Sage, of an Ashy colour; and he relates also that Italian Merchants trading to Aleppo and other parts of Asia informed him, that there is such Apple-bearing Sage to be seen in many parts of Asia.

Whether Plants breed of Animals is doubtful. * 1.393 Licetus indeed every where affirms that Plants are bred of corrupted Animals. But I scarce think there are any exam∣ples to be found of such a thing, and that of the substance of Animals and their Ex∣crements Plants should be generated, as Worms are; unless peradventure the Seeds of Plants, or a Juyce containing in it the Seminal principle of Plants be con∣tained in the Excrements of Animals. And the examples which are brought of Plants bred out of Animals do hardly prove any thing else, then that the Seeds or rudiments of Plants may stick outwardly to the Bodies of Animals, and grow out of them and be augmented. Now Plants are bred either in living Animals or dead ones. * 1.394 As for live Animals, Aristotle, in 9. de Hist. Animal. Cap. 5. And Theo∣phrastus, 2. de Causs. Plant. Cap. 23. do relate, that an Hart was caught, with green Ivy growing in his Horns, which (as Aristotle wel adds) being accidentally thrust into the tender horn, as it were into a green Tree, became incorporated ther∣with. Which both Pliny confirms, Lib. 5. Cap. 32. as also Julius Caesar Scaliger, who in his Comment upon that place of Theophrastus, writes, that in the budding of his Horns the Hart rubbing them against some Ivy had broken a branch with a Root at it, which fastned it self into some tender part. Licetus indeed adds also two other manners, Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 28. The former whereof is, that a dusty matter being blown into the Roots of the Horns near the Hair, and mixt with a various Humor, either proceeding from the Body of the Hart, (in form of sweat or some other Excrement, or from the Air in form of dew or some other matter) did stick unto the Horns, to which poudery matter the form which had long lain therein as in a Vessel being stirred up by the Heat of the Ambient Body doth now adjoyn it self as a quickning and Jvy-making form. The other is this. He holds, that out of the Body it self of the Hart an Excrementitious substance, bred chiefly by eating of Ivy, by the concoctive and expulsive faculty separated and ex∣pelled with other Excrements of the third digestion to the Roots of the Horns, and by reason of its own clamminess or some other glutinous matter sticking there fast, it is by the ambient heat digested into a new living Plant. But neither of these waies is probable. For as to the former, if so great a quantity of dusty mat∣ter might be collected at the Roots of Horns in the Hairs, that therein as in the Earth Ivy might grow, other plants might also grow there. Nor can any reason be shewed, why that poudery Humor gathered at the Roots of the Harts-Horns should be collected only from Ivy. Again, it cannot easily be shewed, how the Soul of the Ivy through so many digestions can arrive safely to the Horns of the Hart; nor can any reason be shewed, why other Plants also should not grow on the Harts-Horns.

But on the back of Shell-fish and Whales mossie Herbs grow out of the Mud and Scum of the Sea, * 1.395 sticking to the Backs of these Fishes, which contain in them the Seeds or Seminal rudiments of Moss and other Plants. But that other manner ad∣ded by Licetus of Excrements driven from the inner parts of the Beast into the surface is less probable then the former. For it is not credible, that Whales feed upon Moss and Plants. And if this manner were true, other Fishes which are known to feed upon Grass, Moss and Plants, should have mossie Plants growing upon their Backs. * 1.396

Now it is worthy our consideration to examin, whether Plants do grow also out of the Carkasses of Animals. Licetus saith they do, and that it is no news, Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 32. But this must be fitly explained. For I cannot be∣leeve, that as Worms are bred of the very substance of dead Carkasses, so also Plants are Generated of the same substance; nor doth experience confirm the same. Upon the Skuls and Bones of Men Moss is bred. But since it grows not up∣on such bones as lie under a roof or covering, but on such only as lie in the open Air

and are wet by the Rain, the original thereof is rather to be attributed to the Rain, like that which grows upon Stones. For since, as was said before, the principles of the Seeds of Plants are mixt with Rain, if they fal upon bones, especially such as are Rotten and begin to turn to dust, the said Seminal principle sticking in them and finding matter to work on, and cherished by the Ambient heat, if it do not make other Plants, it will at least generate Moss.

Some also relate th••t Coral hath grown in the Sea upon a dead mans Skul. * 1.397 Yet it is impossible that it should grow out of the substance of the Skul: But, question∣less, in the Sea some matter having the Rudiments of Coral in it stuck fast to the Skul out of which afterward the Coral grew.

It is an old Story that Asparagus grows on Rams-Horns, * 1.398 but Fabulous without doubt; nor doth experience confirm the same. Fortunius Licetus indeed, in the place fore alleadged, endeavors to defend it by four Reasons, but all in Vain. For First he sa••es Plan's grow out of Stones, much more may they grow out of Horns. But as was said before Plants grow not out of the very substance of Stones, but of seed or a Seminal matter which sticks to them.

The other is, because Animals are bred of the Carkass of Plants, Namely worms out of Wood, whereas nevertheless the Carkasses of Plants are more imperfect then the Carkall••s of Animal. And seeing that it is much easier for a thing to procreate that which is more imperfect then it self, then to act beyond its forces by breeding that which is more perfect: credible therefore it is, that Asparagus may grow upon the Horns of a Ram. But Carkasses do not as the efficient causes breed any thing of them∣selves, but we must look to the disposition of the matter, and consult with experi∣ence, what may be made out of those subordinate forms. Moreover, although Worms are Animals, yet it is a question whether they are more perfect then perfect Plants. Nor doth any reason enforce, that as out of an Animal another Animal though of a different sort may be generated, so also a Plant may be bred thereby.

His Third Reason is, because it hath been observed that in the Sea Coral hath grown out of a dead-mans Skul. If therefore Coral were bred out of a Skul, Aspa∣ragus may also grow out of horns. But how Coral may grow upon a Skull, (which notwithstanding is very rare) hath been lately shewed.

Fourthly, Since Ivy hath been found to grow upon the Horns of an Hart; Aspa∣ragus may in like manner grow upon a Rams horns. But the case is different. That Ivy did not grow out of the substance of the horns, but the Root of Ivy stuck thereupon, as was said before. And therefore, warily, Lib. 1. Cap. 18. he recites indeed the Ancient Opinion, but he makes it not his own, where he writes; 'tis also reported, that Asparagus hath grown upon the horns of Beasts being bruised, and buried in the ground.

Much less are Plants generated out of Metals, * 1.399 for there is in them no dispositi∣on towards the Generation of Plants. And if plants have grown upon Brazen Statues, as Pliny reports Lib. 17. Cap. 25. And Lib. 24. Cap. 19. that was not cau∣sed by the Metal, but the Seminal principle of some plant was by the Rain, or Winds, or birds, or by some other means cast thereupon.

J••lius Caes. Scal. Exercit. 307. Sect. 29. * 1.400 doth wel complain of the shallowness of Human understanding, as being unable to comprehend the Essences and Forms of substances. And he concludes at last: that it is a part of Mans Wisdom to be con∣tentedly ignorant of some things. Which difficulty and obscurity hath deterred many from making any further search into the Nature of Forms. Whence it comes to pass, that little is to be found (and that of smal solidity) in the writings of Natu∣ralists concerning the Nature of Forms and Souls. But because beautiful things are alwaies difficult; the hardness ought not to discourage us from searching into so noble a subject. And having spoken somwhat in the former part of this Treatise of the Or••ginal and Nature of Souls, I shall here undertake the explication of one question of sufficient difficulty and explained by few: * 1.401 viz. whether the Souls of plants and brutes when they die do perish and turn to nothing.

Some deny it, and hold it for an axiom and principle, that Naturally nothing is made of nothing, and again, that somthing doth not turn simply to nothing. And to beleeve it they are perswaded by these Arguments, propounded also by Sca∣liger, Exercit. 307. Sect. 14. If saies he, any substance can be so corrupted as to be∣come

nothing, then on the other side some substance may naturally be made of nothing; [unspec 1] First of all because, whatever is created by God that can no Creature Annihilate, nor can the Creator be compelled, or hindred from that action where∣by it is preserved, [unspec 2] the withdrawing of which action is Annihilation. Secondly, Because God did not repent him of his works, but saw that al was good which he had made. [unspec 3] Thirdly, Because those Souls and Forms do pertain to the perfection of the universe. [unspec 4] Fourthly, Because Ecclesiast. Cap. 3. v. 14. the Preacher saies, I know that all the works which God hath made do endure for ever. [unspec 5] Fiftly, B••cause many things which are said to have perished did not indeed perish, as Serpents and Frogs tu••∣ned to slime are in the spring time regenerated, and live again.

But since these men acknowledg the difference betwixt the rational Soul and the Souls of Plants and Brutes; and do grant that every form besides the rational Soul cannot subsist of it self and by its own power, out of and without the help of the matter; and that they depend upon the matter in their making, being and oper∣ation; I cannot see, how they can so simply deny this. Especially since they them∣selves cannot tel us where these Souls remain after Death. Some say they turn to somwhat which was before and simpler then themselves. But they cannot make out what that former and simpler thing is, nor prove that those Souls were compounded of any thing existing before them; since they are Naturally most simple essence. For if, as Jul. Caes. Scaliger rightly saies Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. every Soul is the perfection of the Body, and the Act of the matter, and the matter nothing but the four Elements; the Soul must needs be a sift Essence, and that most simple, having nothing before it whereof it could be compounded.

Some of the later Chymists, * 1.402 and amongst them Severinus, do hold that they go in∣to the Chaos, Orcus, or Abyssus, or Night, (which Hippocrates terms Hades, Orphe∣us cals Night; Hermes Trism gistus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the invisible Region; as also Dio∣nysius the Areopagite, in Eccl-siastica Hierarchia, Cap. 2. Apollomus Thyaneus, Ousi∣an, the substance; Seneca Cap. 36. Nature; Servius upon the 8. of the Eneid•• the Generality) and to their Fountains, from whence at their appointed times taking new bodies they enter again upon the stage of the World. For which opinion they cite a place of Hippocrates, Lib. 1. de Diaeta; Whereof we have spoken in our Book of the Consent and Dissent of the Chymists with Galen and Aristotle. But the Heathens could not explaine what that same Orcus, (or Generality of things) is, or where it is; and al these opinions have arose from the Ignorance of the Creation of the World, and of the Conservation thereof.

Johannes Marcus Marci, * 1.403 in Defen. Idaearum suarum, Prefat. Loco Tract it. Pre∣missa, teaches, that such Forms divided from the society of matter, because they are impassible do need no place. Yet because a finite Essence is necessarily desi∣ned to be in some part of an imaginary place, he holds, that it abides in that part of a place where it is separated from its subjuct, and is neither by it self nor by ac∣cident Locally moved. And in Chap. 4. of the same Treatise, he writes that such Souls, the Corporeal number failing, (into which they had degenerated by the fel∣lowship of matter) being freed from Corporeal Laws they return to the unity of the simple essence in which they were at first created. Yea, he conceives that they are not to perish at the last day, but that the form of this world being passed, they shal not at all be subject to those vicissitudes, nor reassume any Bodies, but passing the time in eternal silence they shall as well as the Elements distinguish and adorne the world with a wonderful variety of Essences, without sensible Figures, the world being no less absolute and perfect then now it is. But these things are only said and not proved, nor do the Reasons before alleadged for this opinion suffici∣ently prove the same. To which before we make answer, that is to be noted in the first place which Scaliger hath, Excrcitat 207. Sect. 20. All that is (saies he) is either the first principle or proceeding from the first. There is but one first, there∣fore the rest depend thereupon. Therefore all things, but one, are in their own Na∣ture corruptible. For although beings are free from subject and Term; yet are they not free from cause. They are therefore by another and from another. But every thing dependent may be changed by that on which it depends if it be voluntary. And therefore the immaterial minds themselves as they depend upon the first Princi∣ple, at the Pleasure of the first they may be deposed from that Essence wherein

they are placed by him. For if they could not, they must have in them another principle resisting his infinite power. And then he should not be the first principle. But they are not corrupted, because it is not his pleasure.

And Johannes Serranus upon the Timaeus of Plato, writes according to Platos opinion: God only truly is, and therefore he only is truly eternal, and the Foundation of all created things, all which have this common adjunct, that they had a beginning; yet the Nature of things created is not one, but various and manifold. For some by the pleasure and power of the Work∣master have a more firm and constant essence, and therefore compared with other things they have a kind of eternity, given them by favour of the Creator: yet are they not truely eternal; since they did proceed from a certain be∣ginning, and when the Work-master shall please may have an End. For the glorious God is only independent and simply immutable. But all the parts of the World being created by God, as by a voluntary Principle, do depend upon him in their Essence and conservation; or they have their Essence in God, and are preser∣ved by him. But Angels and the Human Soul, inasmuch as they are immortal, they have not their immortality of themselves and their own Nature, but by the Fa∣vor of God, by whose power they are preserved. God only hath immortality and immutability communicated from no other: but the Human Soul and Angels have immortality indeed, but communicated from God, by whose Favor and grace it is that they have in themselves no inclination to non-being, but may also be conser∣ved and subsist without matter. Whereof Damascenus, Orthodox. Fid. Lib. 2. Cap. 3. Angelos Athanatos, ou Phusei, alla Chariti: an Angel is immortal not by Nature but by Grace. Now God hath afforded this Grace and Favor, not to all Creatures, but only to Angels and the Human Soul; but all other forms and Souls are so subject to the will of the Creator, or so immersed into this matter, that out of it they can∣not be preserved, but their subject perishing they have a natural inclination to not being, and being destitute of their subject they are annihilated.

Out of which it is easie to answer to the Arguments for their opinion who hold, * 1.404 that the Souls of Brutes and Plants cannot be Annihilated. For First, whereas they say, that what ever is created by God cannot by any creature be Annihilated, [unspec 1] nor the Creator be hindred from the action of conservation; all that, truly, we grant, but we say withal, that such was the free pleasure of God, that some forms should be immortal, others corruptible; and therefore he is not by any Creature hindred from the act of Conservation, but by his own most free will withdraws the said act, since he would have such to be liable to perpetual Generation and cor∣ruption, and would not have individuals perpetual, but that the kinds of things should be perpetuated by reparation of new Individuals. And if it were not so, what difference would there be betwixt the Soul of a man and the Souls of Beasts? And thus not only the Human Soul, but the Souls of brutes and Plants should be immortal.

Secondly, [unspec 2] Although the Souls of Plants and Brutes do perish as soon as an In∣dividual dies: yet God doth not therefore repent of his works. For as God of his own most free Good will created them of nothing, as an Essential being, so he most freely withdrawing his conservation suffers them to return to nothing.

Thirdly, All sorts indeed of things tend to the perfection of the world, [unspec 3] and no sort is abolished; but all Individuals are not necessary for the perfection of the world, but there is in them a various Intercourse of Generations and Corruptions. Now the sorts necessary to the worlds perfection may be as well maintained in a few Individuals as in many. And when after the flood there were but a few indi∣vidual Animals, the world was not more imperfect then now it is.

Fourthly, [unspec 4] That Place therefore of Ecclesiastes must be understood of the sorts and not of the Individuals of Animals and Plants.

Fiftly, [unspec 5] We grant that the forms of Plants and imperfect Animals do not alwaies perish when they are thought so to do, but those that were thought to be abolished do lie hid for a time, and afterwards return to life again, either in their former or in a new shape.

Now this therefore happens, because those forms do not require for their simple being a matter so noble, variously elaborated, and furnished with so many Organs, but can many times lie hid for a Season in some place. But this is not al∣waies,

for they also are at last abolished. But in more perfect Animals, where the Seeds if they must be perserved must of necessity be forthwith received into the Womb, the Soul cannot be perserved out of its Body and out of its Seed. And let them shew us but the least sign or token, whereby it may appear that the Soul of a Lyon, an Ox, an Horse, a Dog, did ever live after the Death of the said Animals.

Chap. 8. Of the Spontaneous Original of Animals.

NOW of Animals that breed of themselves there are sundry kinds. * 1.405 The Wee∣zel lives upon Corn; the Worm Midas feeds upon Beans, Trox a Worm so cal∣led Eates Pease; There is a Worm which feeds upon the Vine, which Pliny calls Volvox, Columella cals it Volucra; the Worm Cossus and Teredo Eates Wood, especi∣ally that of the Pitch••••••ree; the Moath Eates Garments, the Worm cal'd Termes breeds in Dogs. And there are almost innumerable more of this kind of Worms, whose differences we shal explain by and by, being drawn from the Bodies where∣in they breed. Now touching the Generation of little Animals and insects, I could wish more were extant written by others then there is; and I wonder that Vlysse•• Aldrovandus a most Learned man (in that most laborious work concerning Insects) relates many other petty matters concerning them, but mentions very little about their Generation. For although most insects do couple, and bring forth somwhat resembling Eggs; of which see Aristotle, de Histor. Animal. Lib. 5. Cap. 8. and 19. yet since it is certain that such insects are also Spontaneously generated; the first question is, which were first, those that are Spontaneously Generated, or those which spring from Copulation and Seed. Austin toucht this question Lib. 1. de Genesis, * 1.406 when he wrote: it is a question, whether any of these petty Animals were made at the first Creation, or whether they were a consequent to Creation, or bred of the corruption of Carkasses, and some of the Corruption of Woods and Herbs, and some of the Corruption of fruites. Now this question Eucherius answers, Lib. 1. de Genesis, where he determines that the forms of al things were extant at the beginning, but some Actually, others Potentially. Touching the smallest sorts of Ani∣mals (saith he) we must beleeve, that whatever of them are bred out of the Waters and the Earth, were made at the first Creation, but the rest that are bred of the corruption and putrefaction of Bodies, Woods or Carkasses, were not then crea∣ted in Specie, but there was present in their Bodies a Seminary original, that in pro∣cess of time out of their corruptions several kinds might arise. So far Eucherius. Wherein he is in the right and thinks the same with us, so that there is no reason that I should be accounted the first Innovator and Broacher of Paradoxes. For we are indeed to beleeve that all petty Animals how smal soever, which are not bred of the corruption of other things, were created and had actual existency at the beginning of the world; but such as now proceed from the corruption of o∣thers, they were not made at the first Creation so as actually to exist, but their form was already present in other bodies, although not actually, nor performing the office of a form, but subordinate to the other more noble forms, and affording to them a matter and fit subject. * 1.407 And thus what was before said of the original of live things in general is true also in the original of Spontaneous Animals; and the most Famous Philosophers and Physitians who have diligently weighed the matter have acknowledged that such Animals can by no means proceed from putrefacti∣on, nor yet from that Heat which is joyned to putrefaction. Amongst the Anci∣ents is Theophrastus, who de Causis Plant. Cap. 13. writes, as in other things pu∣trefying a certain kind of Animal is generated: so in these also (among the rest he speaks of the wild Fig-Tree) there is a certain Animal-making Nature. Which Jul. Caes. Scalig. in Comment. approves, and Ʋlysses Aldrovandus Lib. 3. de Insect. Cap. 5. confesses, that he likes wel of this Opinion, which holds that there is in Herbs certain principles tending to the Generation of Animals, and that it is fit to explain the mind of many of the ancients. Eustachius Rudius consents also with them, who in Lib. 2. Pract. Cap. 27. concerning the Generation of Worms thus writes: be∣cause, (saith he) simple heat being an accident cannot by its own power make a substance and that a living one (for heat in living Creatures nourishes by Virtue of

the Soul and of the Aliment begets a substance) hence it is that this Heat was to be lively and strong, and endued with a vital faculty. Nor ought we to refer this force to the simple Intention of heat, as Galen did, 3. Aphorism. 20. who propounds no faculty above heat. For although heat concurs to the production of living things; yet unless a superior vital cause doth concur, it cannot of it self produce an Animal. And whereas afterward he makes that Cause to be the Coelestial Bodies, therin he is out; since he doth not propound an univocal and proper Cause, as was said before in Chap. 1. The Opinion of Thomas Minadous long since a renowned professor in the University of Padua was more true and accurate, who in his Treatile De hu∣mani Corporis Turpitudinibus, Lib. 2. Cap. 9. Treating of the Generation of Lice (and the case is the same with such like petty Animals) thus writes: Here (saith he) the understanding of man is dimsighted, and dazled at the knowledg of this and such like things, as the Eyes of an Owl at the Sun-light. And a little after when he had related their Opinion who held heat to be the efficient Cause, he adds: but on the other side, since it seems impossible, that the introduction of a Form and shaping of an whole Animal should be the effect of bare heat, but that it depends upon some provident action of a certain Artificer working with discourse and pru∣dence; the mind is forced to seek out another agent besides heat, which can moder∣ate all things in the forming of an Animal with Councel and Choice. For heat alone hath never learnt to shape an Arm, a Leg, an Eye, with its own shape, nor hath it been accustomed to use the Discipline of some Master; but acting alwaies after the same manner converts it self to sundry things, sets it self about sundry forma∣tions, according as the builder and Architect of all the parts directs and moves the same. Nor doth Minadous attribute the generation of perfect Animals alone to a superior power, but of Lice also. For although Galen considering the Generation of Wig-Lice, Lice, Fleas, and the like petty Animals, durst not ascribe their Generati∣on to this div••ne formative faculty, not being able to understand, how so excellent and noble an agent is able to abase himself to so mean employment, without dimi∣nution of his Majesty: yet he counts it better to conclude, that the same mind mo∣derates the generation of these petty Animals and those more perfect; and to hold that it is by a common providence the orderer of the smallest matters, rather then to say it is like a stepdame, making difference of her Children, so as to contemne some and leave them only to Fortune and Chance, but to regard others as her own; when as nevertheless none of them can be finished and duly accomplished without the Providence and Counsel of the Work-Master.

Also what hath been said before Chap. 4. concerning the final End or use of Spon∣taneous live things, doth belong to this place.

This also is to be observed in General, of which we spake also before in Chap. 2. * 1.408 although these petty Animals and insects are generated of the corruption of Plants and Animals: yet most of them do afterwards lay Eggs or things resembling Eggs, whence more of the kind do afterwards spring, as shall hereafter be shewed parti∣cularly.

Now, I think fit to propound the differences of these Animals, * 1.409 according to the variety of things from whence they spring. In the first place, which is to be admi∣red, in the very fire, in the Isle of Cyprus, in the Copper Furnaces, winged petty Animals are generated, a little bigger then our largest flies, which fly and leap through the Fire, and die when they are removed therefrom, as Aristotle 5. de Hi∣stor. Animal. Cap. 19. Pliny B. 11. Cap. 36. Seneca Lib. 5. Quaest. Nat. cap. 6. Jul. Caes. Scaliger, Exercit. 23. and other credible witnesses, yea and such as have seen them with their own Eyes do testifie. * 1.410 Yet are they not generated in the Fire nor by the Fire. For a pure and simple Element cannot produce an Animal. Fortu∣nius Licetus, Lib. 3. de Spontan. Vivent. Ort. cap. 38. imagines these Pyraustae or Fire-slies aforesaid are bred of the Smoak of Wood, especially green Wood, which ascends from the burning. But seeing Wood is burnt every where, and no such Animals are bred, save in the Copper furnaces of Cyprus, the cause must needs be proper and peculiar to those furnaces. Now Aristotle seems to point at it, when he writes, that in Copper Furnaces Fire-flies are bred, * 1.411 where the Stone Cha••citis is thrown in and burnt many daies together. Now Copper is molten in Cyprus out of its proper Vein or Oare, which Aristotle here cals a Stone; Galen names it som∣times a Stone, somtimes Earth, viz. because it is hard as a Stone, but crumbly, and

when it is burning it rises into bubbles. And therefore without doubt that same stone contains in it some kind of Earth tempered with moisture, in which moisture doubtless the form is, which is afterward actuated by the force of Heat, and being rouzed ingenders this Animal; as in other furnaces and about Bakers Ovens Crickets are engendred of the Morter. And these Fire-flies have a different matter from all other Spontaneous Animals; viz. a most dry sooty vapour raised from adust matter and cleaving to the sides of the Furnaces, wherein the form lies hid, which is by the strongest Heat disposed to formation, but dies with cold.

That Animals are also bred in the Snow Aristotle teaches, * 1.412 5. de Hist. Anim. Cap. 19. Yea also, saith he, in those things which can suffer no corruption, we have known Animals to breed, as reddish hairy Worms in old Snow. But in the Snow of Media greater and Whiter are found; they are all sluggish and move very hardly. He relates also the same thing in 2. de Plantis, Cap. 1. And Pliny Lib. 11. Cap. 35. writes. In old white Snow Worms are found; in the middest of the Snows thickness reddish (for the Snow it self looks red with Age) hairy, large, and Lazy. And Olaus Magnus, Lib. 2. de Hist. Septentr. reg. cap. 8. saith thus: in the most vast desarts of Iseland, especially under Juniper Trees, and great heaps of Chaff or Straws, although the Sun be in the Scorching sign of Leo, there is snow lying, wherein in the Summer time they keep Wine and Beer who desire to drink Luxuri∣ously; but no Body mingles the Snow with his Wine or Beer, because of its Clam∣miness and Impurity. For Worms and Moths are found in it, just as in Cloaths ill laid up.

Mercurialis indeed, Lib. 3. Variar. Lect. cap. 4. doth altogether question the truth hereof, because Heat is required for the Generation of Animals which is not in Snow, and because the Snow is wont to kill such petty Animals in the Earth as are wont to hurt the fruits thereof. And if any Worms are seen in Snow, he con∣ceives they came out of the Earth, and so entred into the Snow. But these Reasons are not sufficient to make us reject the testimonies of so many Learned Men. For there is some heat in Snow. Although Snow of its own Nature is exceeding cold, yet it may receive Warmth from the Sun and from the Earth; especially out of the Earth many hot exhalations do arise, which the Snow retains within it Self. And therefore husband men do in the Winter wish for Snow to cover their sowed Lands; because experience hath taught them, that the Corn is sooner hurt by the coldness of the Winter Air if it be not covered with Snow, then when it is so covered; not that the Snow it self doth warm the Corn, but because it keeps in and retains the exhalations which spring out of the Earth, and hinders the coldness of the Air from piercing to the Corn.

Now these Worms are bred in the Snow, * 1.413 not as it is simply Snow or Rain congea∣led with cold but inasmuch as Pouders, Juyces, or Excrements of Plants or Animals disposed to the production of such Worms are mixed therewith; and then Worms are bred of Snow after the same manner as of Rain, of which we shall speak here∣after. Again the same Exhalations and Atomes may ascend out of the Earth, be∣ing ful of them, when it is covered with Snow, and may so be mingled with the Snow. Yea and dust containing in it the Rudiments of such Animals may by the winds be brought from elswhere, and mixed with the Snow; which chiefly hap∣pens in Snow that hath lain long. Now this matter which way soever it comes to be mingled with the Snow, when after it comes to be cherished by the Ambient heat, raised partly by the Sun, partly from hot Vapors exhaling out of the Ground, the concealed form displaies it self and produces Worms. Now, this seldom happens in the upper part of the Snow, since the heat exhaling out of the Earth, necessary to excite the Form, doth hardly rise so high, nor can long continue there, seeing it is easily dissipated by the cold Winds.

It is also wel known to Husband-men, * 1.414 that out of Rain, Dew, and Mists, sundry petty Animals are bred in those Plants which they fal upon; as they often find to their great dammage. For by the Heat of the Sun Vapors out of all kinds of Sub∣lunary Bodies are carried from the Earth up into the Air: wherein there being Atomes containing in them forms disposed to breed such petty Animals, or an Ani∣mal-making Nature, as Theophrastus calls it; when they are cherished by the Ambi∣ent heat, and gain that disposition of matter which is necessary to the performance of operations sundry sorts of Worms are generated. And these Worms are either

generated in the Plants themselves, viz. Trees and Herbs wherefore somtimes af∣ter Rains, especially those smal showers which fal the Sky being clear, and are ter∣med heat drops, and after Mists and Dew a great quantity of Palmer Worms Ca∣terpillars and such like Creepers are found: or as some think, they are found in the Air it self.

For it hath been also observed that petty Animals have fallen down with Rain. * 1.415 So Olaus Magnus, de Histor. Septentr. Lib. 18. Cap. 16. writes: Not only in Norway, saith he, but also in Hestingia, and in many other Provinces of the Diocess of Ʋpsal certain smal four-footed Creatures called Lemnars, of the bigness of Mice, with a party coloured Skin, do fall down with the Rain; and it is yet unknown whence they come, whether brought by the Winds from the neighbouring or other remo∣ter Islands, or bred rather in the clouds. Yet this is well known, that some of them having been cut open as soon as they fell down were found to have raw Herbs in their stomach, as yet undigested. These falling down like Locusts in Huge quantities destroy all green things, and infect whatever they touch with their mouths, and they live till they tast the Second sprouting of the Herbs and go away all together, like swallows taking their flight; but at a certain set time they die in great multitudes, exceedingly infecting the Earth and Air, which becomes pesti∣lential; whereby men are taken with dizziness in their Heads and with the Yellow Jaundize. So far Olaus Magnus. But it is scarce credible that Animals can be bred in the Air. For suppose it, that Animals have fallen out of the Air: Yet, it is doubtful whether they were bred there; seeing Winds and whirle Winds carry many things from the Earth into the Air which owe their original not to the Air but to the Earth. And since there are sundry winged Animals in the Summer time flying in the Air, if they should be surprized with a sudden thick shower, or beaten down with the weight of great drops of Rain, or should be hindred from flying by the wetness of their Wings, they might well fall down with the Rain, though they were not Generated in the Air. Nor is it probable that they could be bred in the Air. For, since all Animals are heavy, and rise not up into the Air, unless by Leaping or Flying, or except they are detai∣ned therein some other way; they do by their weight all tend unto the Earth, and rest themselves upon the surface thereof, and consequently cannot be generated in the Air. * 1.416 For the shaping of parts which accompanies generation since it cannot be done in an instant, but in process of time, the Animal not yet per∣fectly shaped so as to be able to susta in it self by slight cannot be held in the Air, and therefore must needs fal down rude and imperfect. And as to that greater Ani∣mal called Lemmer, Fortunius Licetus indeed conceives Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu. Cap. 40. that it is generated of putrid Clouds, or rather of the Vapors of pu∣crid Carkasses carried aloft, and brought into Norway by force of Winds. But that Clouds being rare Bodies should so putrifie as for Animals to be bred of them; or that vapors from Carkasses, (few being drawn up in those cold Countries) should be carried aloft and putrifie in a cold place, and be turned into Animals, is not probable; but likely it is, that in some Isle, or other neighbouring place unknown (as there are many unknown places in those Regions) those Animals were bred, and by force of Winds like Locusts were brought into Norway. Which may be known hereby, that when the said Animals were cut up presently upon their falling raw Herbs were found in their Stomachs undigested, which doubtless they had eaten in some other place, and not in the Clouds.

Experience teaches that sundry Animals are bred in the Waters, * 1.417 especially in standing Waters. Concerning the Tipulae or Water-spiders that run upon the top of the Water Aristotle writes, Lib. 5. Histor. Animal. Cap. 19. Water-Spiders are commonly bred in Wells and Pits, wherever the Water stands, and there is an Earthy Muddiness setled in the bottom. First of all the Mud it self putrifying be∣comes whitish, afterwards blackish, then Bloody-colord. Whereupon little red∣dish things come out, which for a time cleaving to their original are moved, then they become perfect and move through the Water, being called Tipulae; then a few daies after they rear themselves on the top of the Water, being hard and immovable; a while after the Shel being broken, a gnat arises and sits thereon, til being moved by the Sun or Wind it falls a flying. Also Spiders, and sundry other petty Animals are found in the Waters in the Summer time.

Now, * 1.418 Animals are bred in the Waters sundry waies. For some though they seem to be ingendred Spontaneously: yet properly they are not Spontaneous, but are bred of Seed, and by Animals of the same sort, as Frogs. For as Fishes cast their Eggs into the Water, which afterwards become Fishes of the same sort; so Frogs and other like petty Ignoble Animals do shed their Seeds into the Water, which afterwards by the heat of the Sun are cherished and awakened. Moreover of the Juyces and Excrements of Animals and Plants, being corrupted, sundry sorts of Animals are bred in the Waters; which being not of the same sort with those things out of which they are Generated are rightly said to be of Spontaneous origi∣nal; and they are generated after the same manner as Animals which breed of dead Bodies corrupted, and of Plants.

Many Animals are also bred out of the Earth. * 1.419 But not out of pure Earth, but that which is slimy, and Muddy. That Frogs are bred of the Dust of the Earth moistned by Summer showers, is very well known. And in some places also Frogs grow out of the Earth it self, whereof Ovid hath a verse:

The Earth hath Seeds which Generate green Frogs.

Also certain kinds of Fleas are bred out of the Earth in the Summer time, when there is want of Rain, which Eat yong plants, and the Buds of Hops, which the Germans cal Erdflaehe, Earth-Flea. Also that Worms are bred in the Earth, espe∣cially under dung, is commonly known. But especially after the overflowings of the River Nilus sundry sorts of Animals are bred out of the ground, whereof Ovid in the 1. of his Metamorphosis thus writes:

So, when seven Channeld Nile forsakes the Plain, When ancient Bounds retiring Streams contain, And late-left Slime aethereal Fervors burn, Men Various Creatures with the Gleab up turn: Of those some in their very time of Birth; Some Lame, and others half alive, half Earth.

Which passage of Ovid is rarely imitated by the Prince of English Poets and Glory of London his Native City, Edmund Spenser, in the 1. Canto of his Faery Queen and the 21. Stanza, where our Thames-Swan thus Chaunts it:

As when old Father Nilus gins to swel With timely pride above th' Egyptian Vale, His fatty Waves do fertil Slime out well, And over flows each Plain and lowly Dale: But when his later Ebb gins to a Vale, Huge beapes of Mud he leaves, wherein there breed Ten thousand kinds of Creatures, partly Male, And partly Female, of his fruitful Seed; Such Ʋgly Monstrous shapes elswhere may no man read.

That Fishes are dug out of the Earth, * 1.420 even where no Waters are, Aristotle tels us, de admirand. Auscult. cap. 69, 70, 71. Strabo in Lib. 4. Pliny Lib. 9. cap. 57. also Theophrastus in Lib. de Piscibus, where he writes: but besides these, there is another thing of a peculiar Nature, and needs to be examined, viz. how they are said in Paphlagonia to dig Fishes out of the ground in great quantity and very good; which they dig deep out of the Earth where there is no standing water, nor doth any River run through the place, by which (as we said before) Eggs and princi∣ples of generation might be brought and left; so that they must needs breed of them∣selves, and that frequently, for they cannot couple: and if it be true, we must con∣clude also that that ground is moist and fruitful and fit to engender such Animals; or else that some moisture is brought thither from elswhere, containing in it the prin∣ciples of Generation; and that the place is fit to receive and nourish the same. For we can hardly think of any other way besides. Also those Fishes are known which our Country-men cal Peissker, and some Earth-Weazels, which George Agricola describes in his Book of underground Animals Chap. 16. Which are really Earth-Fishes. For in puddlish and Muddy places, where the Summer hath dried up the Water which had been there collected in the Winter, they are dug up out of the

Mud. And concerning Eeles it is reported, as we read in Aristotle, Lib. 6. * 1.421 de Histor. Animal. Cap. 16. that they are neither bred by Copulation, nor do breed any Eggs, nor was there ever any Eele caught having any row, Eggs or Seed, or any passage for Seed to come out at; and that in some Muddy Ponds all the Water being let out, and the mud cast away, Eeles have bred again after Rain had fallen. But I cannot beleeve that Eeles have no Seminal principles; seeing they are caught in Rivers, as wel as in Muddy Ponds, 'tis credible those that are taken do leave some Seminal principle behind them, out of which afterwards others are generated: and some conceive that Eeles do grow of the slime, which the former Eeles cast from their outsides, as the Snake casts his Skin. Of which Scaliger also writes Exercit. 15. Eeles are thought to generate nothing within themselves, but by their mutual twi∣ning and twistings one about another they are thought to make a kind of Slime, of which yong ones are generated without.

Oisters also and all Shel-Fish are bred of Slime, concerning which Opianus, in his Poem of Fishes, Lib. 1. thus writes:

They couple not nor bring forth any young, But of themselves they breed the Mud among, As Oisters do, Glib Oisters that no Male Nor Female have.

Yet some aver that Snailes do also couple, and that they have seen them Joyn together, and sticking one to another, so as to send forth a slimy froth, which after a day or two was changed into the shape of a Snail. Nor is it absurd, that they may be bred both waies, so that when many have been generated Spontaneously, those may afterwrads generate more by Copulation of Male and Female.

Moreover the Ʋrticae, Purpurae, * 1.422 Ʋngues (Plant Animals so called) and all such as stick fast in the Earth, seem to be of Spontaneous Original, and are so accounted by Licetus Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ort. Cap. 35. For since they remain fastned to their places, they exercise no Copulation, nor do they seem like Plants to shed any Seed. But this may be doubted of. For although they have no sex, yet they may have Seed, since they are Plant-Animals, and belong partly to Plants, wherein also there is not properly any Sex; and therefore it is not absurd to think they may send forth Seed, which sticking to the Rocks may be formed into a Body like the Ge∣nerator; which way soever this emission of Seed is caused, whether by Seed proper∣ly so called, or by some other thing Analogical to Seed.

And inasmuch as so many Animals are bred out of the Earth, Aristotle said very wel, that all things are after a sort ful of Souls. For every where almost smallest Bodies or Petty Atomes are found, severed from the Bodies of Animals, wherein there is a Soul but Latent, and not exercising the second Act or Functions of a Soul. For those more Ignoble Animals do not send forth seed as the perfect Animals do, but a Seminal principle dispersed through their whole Body, as it is in some Plants. And therefore it is no wonder, that the Bodies of such Animals being turned to Dust should be like Seed, and having afterward attained a sitting place should again produce Animals. Pliny knew thus much, who Lib. 9. Cap. 51. writes thus of Frogs: 'Tis strange (saith he) how after six Months time of Life they are turned into Slime and no man perceives it, and in the Spring they are again regener∣ated in the Water, after the same secret manner, and this happens every year.

Also sundry Animals are bred of Plants, and some of Plants that are yet living, and others of dead Plants: yet every Worm is not bred of every Plant, but certain Worms of certain Plants; as also the same worms do not breed out of all Carkasses of Animals, but some out of one sort, some out of another, and the forms of such insects seem to be subordinate to the forms of Animals and of Plants. Which Sca∣liger also teaches, Exercit. 59. Sect. 2. and Exercit. 190. But which are generated from which, we shall hereafter shew when we come to speak more particularly. Concerning which Aristotle hath many excellent things wel worth the reading in 5. Hist. Animal. especially in the 19. Chap. Where he teaches in general, that Worms and Caterpillars are bred of Plants, and of them Chrysalides Golden-Worms, and of them butter-flies and other Winged Animals are bred. For not

only Butter-flies, but other winged Animals also are bred of Plants, as Flies, Bee∣tles and such like. * 1.423 Concerning the Spontaneous Original of Flies Ʋlysses Aldre∣vandus writes, Lib. 3. de Insectis, Cap. 1. some do suppose, that they spring partly from corrupted fruits, and rotten Carkasses of Animals, and partly from the Cor∣ruption of the Air, as Ovid shews Lib. 5. Metamorphos. but that their chief matter is Earth. I, as I will not deny but Flies may be generated out of any putrid matter, and out of the Carkasses of Animals, (and I have shewed before that out of the pu∣trifying flesh of other Animals as wel as of Bulls Bees are generated as from the most fitting matter) yet I conceive they are bred for the most part of Plants, and I have observed an example thereof. For when, some years agone, in the Winter time, when no other green Herbs were to be had, I did beat red Cole-worts, and kept them in a stove til they bred Worms, the Worms generated thereof turnd in∣to Golden Caterpillars, which when I had kept shut in a Box, and afterward came to open the same, a troop of smal Flies made their escape, which were bred of the Caterpillars, and broke out of their Crackt Skins.

But to come to Particular sorts; * 1.424 in the first place, truly, 'tis very well known that of Mushroms which are the lowest sort of Plants, Worms are bred. Of the Generation where of Fortunius Licetus disputes Lib. 3. de Spont. Viv Ort. cap. 44. and conceives that they cannot be produced by the Soul of the Toad-stool or Mush∣rom, because it is in the lowest ranke of vegetables and cannot act beyond its power, so as to procreate a sensible Soul more noble then the vegerable. And that also for the same reason the Soul of a Mushrom cannot be changed into a sensitive Soul. But he himself holds that Worms are bred of Mushroms, because in the substance of a Puck-fist, a Toad-stool or Mushrom, many petty Bodies or Atomes are contained, which came from the Bodies of Animals either living or dead, in which Bodies a Portion of the old sensitive Soul doth remain as in a vessel, which the Toad-stool coming to wither, and it having by the heat of the ambient Air at∣tained dispositions necessary to life, it is Spontaneously animated and turns to little Worms. But this opinion of Licetus hath been often propounded and examined. In this place, we shall first observe this doubt therein, whether or no those little Worms which are of the kind of Animals are simply more noble then Plants: of which there seems no necessity. For the Creator did not in the first place intend and create those Worms, but the Plants as we shewed before, cap. 4. speaking of the final end of these kind of Creatures. Again it hath been often said, that that Hy∣pothesis of Licetus will hardly be granted, that the form of nobler Animals should be changed into the form of Ignoble Worms. Moreover Toad-stools are often bred upon Trees, and under Trees in Woods, where it is scarce credible that there hath been any Carkass of an Animal. Yea and they are bred every year. And al∣though peradventure Animals have discharged their Excrements in those places, yet the Soul of an Animal was not in them.

Moreover worms are bred out of sundry perfect plants, * 1.425 whiles are they living. Pliny Lib. 13. cap. 6. writes, The Turpentine Tree bears certain Bladderkies, out of which certain gnats or other Animals do spring. And Jul. Caes. Scalig. Exercit. 59. Sect. 2. nor are these petty Animals bred only in fruites alone, such as Wivels or Wibbles which breed in Wheat, Maggots in Nuts, and other petty Animals in others, of which see Theophrastus; but also of the bladders of a Lentisch Tree, which it bears besides its berries, like Cods: so that they seem contrived on purpose by Nature, to be first the Wombs and soon after the Cottages of these smal winged Animals. As in the Cods of Elmes there are bred much such like. And therefore the Arabians are wont to call the Elme the Tree of Wig-Lice. or lowlie Tree. So out of the pith of the Fullers Thistle when it is ripe a smal Worm grows: which Dioscorides truly reports to be good against the Quartan Ague. Such Bladders also the Turpentine Tree bears, wherein are a certain Liquor and Gnats. It is exceeding well known that Worms are bred in Hasel-Nuts, Cherries, Apples, and Plums. Upon the Leaves of Oakes little Apples grow like Galls, in which about the beginning o•• Autunme, either a little Worm, or a Fly, or a Spider is found: each of which are thought to be Prognostications of the year following, and that the Worm sig∣nifies Plenty, the Fly scarcity, and the Spider Pestilence. On wild Rose bushes hairy Apples grow, called Spunges of Roses, which have a Worm within them.

In a word, as Julius Caes. Scaliger upon Theophrastus rightly saies, every Worna grows in his own Tree or Plant.

But especially of living plants sundry sorts of Caterpillars and Palmet Worms, * 1.426 and out of them divers kinds of Butter-flies are bred. And Ʋlysses Aldrovandus de∣scribes near an hondred sorts of Caterpillars or Palmer Worms, Lib. 2. de Insectis Cap. 4. and more then an hundred sorts of Butter-flies, in the same Book Chap. 1. And that which was said before in general is also true of Caterpillars, that every sort grows out of its own Plant. Which also Fabius Columna confirms by his own experience, in observat. Lib Minus Cognit. & Rarior. Stirpium addit. Pag. 87. where he saies, that Caterpillars and other petty Animals do not only breed of certain plants, but that a Caterpillar bred of one Plant doth not feed upon another, but only upon its own out of which it was generated: as for example, if a Cater∣pillar were bred out of a Plant of Rue, it will feed upon other the like Plants of Rue, but not on all that bear the Name of Rue, as Goates Rue and Dogs Rue, by late Authors so called, nor on the Leaves of any other Plant unless it be of the same Nature, and quality. And those that are bred upon the Radish will Eat the Leaves of Radish, but of no other plant, unless peradventure it be a Plant of the same kind, as Cole-worts, Rapes, Navews and such like. From which observation of the fee∣ding of Caterpillars I conceive a man may know the qualities of the Plants they feed upon. For Silk-worms we know eat the Leaves of Brambles and Mulberries, our People when the Worms are little lay Bramble Leaves upon them for their food, and when they are greater the Leaves of the black Mulberry Tree, which are question less of the same Nature with the bramble leaves, for they do doth bind and color, as Dioscorides testifies: so that from the food of these Caterpillars and Butter-flies we may know what Plants are of like Nature. For if Caterpillars or Butter-flies feed upon divers Plants of the same kind, 'tis Credible they have like Vertues and qualities. So far Fabius Columna.

But touching the Generation of Caterpillars and Butter-Flies Authors agree not. * 1.427 Aristotle, Lib. 9. de Histor. Animal. cap. 19. thus writes thereof: Butter-Flies (saith he) are bred of Caterpillars; Caterpillars of living Leaves of Plants, especi∣ally of the Cole-wort. First of all a smal Seed less then Millet lies upon the leaf, soon after of that Seed smal Worms are bred and grow, then within three daies they become smal Caterpillars; which being augmented cease moving, and change their shape, and are for a smal time called Chrysalides, as if you would say Golden Worms. They are covered with an hard Shel stirring when you touch them, and full of little pores. They have no mouth, nor other member discernable. A long time after the Shel being broken, out Flies a parcel of winged Creatures which we call Butter Flies. And therefore at first whiles they are Caterpillars they are nourished by food, and void Excrements. But when they are turned into those Aureliae or Golden-worms, they neither Eat nor void any thing. And concerning the Generation of the Silk-worm, in the same place; It is made of a certain large worm, which thrusts out two horns as it were, and is of a kind by it self, which is first wholly changed into a Caterpillar, then it becomes a Fly like a Butter-Fly, and afterward it is called Necydalus. Which various succession of Forms is ac∣complished in the space of six Months.

But Ʋlysses Aldrovandus in the place fore alleadged dissents from Aristotle, and thus he describes the Generation of these Creatures: every Butter-fly is bred of the Worm called Chrysalis the Chrysalis of a Caterpillar, the Caterpillar of the Eggs of Butter∣flies; whose end is not to breed Caterpillars or Gold-Worms, but other Butter-flies. But he blames Aristotle for not having observed that the seed on the leaf was the seed of a Butter-fly; and for not understanding, that those little Worms which first break out of the Eggs are smal Caterpillars. But in good deed, although it cannot be denied, that some Caterpillars are bred of the Seed of Butter-flies (which I doubt whether Aristotle were ignorant of) and that the Seed on the Leaves of Plants, less then that of Millet, is the Seed of Butter-flies: yet the question now is, whether Butterflies are only bred of Seed, or whether they are not also Spontaneously generated: since certain it is that many Animals Spontaneously generated do send forth Seed. And experience shews that such Worms and Caterpillars are bred out of Dew and Rains falling down upon Plants. For in the spring time for the most part Caterpillars are thus bred before

Butterflies are seen; and therefore since these Caterpillars come before Butterflies, it is a sign that they are not bred of the Seed of Butterflies, but of corrupted Plants. Which Aldrovandus himself was forced to confess, when he relates afterwards, that those Caterpillars which are turned into Butterflies are not all bred of Butterflies Eggs, but some of them of the corruption of Plants. Which experience also doth Testifie, whence it is manifest, that frequently Caterpillars are bred of the corrup∣tion of Plants, and of the Caterpillars Butterflies are bred, which bring forth Eggs, out of which again Caterpillars are bred, and of them again Butterflies. In the same place Aldrovandus denies that all Butterflies are bred of Caterpillars, but some, he saies, are generated of Worms; and he writes that if Corn be over moist it breeds Worms, which turn to Gold-Worms, and they to Butterflies. He writes also, that he hath seen Butterflies come out of hollow Trees especially Willows, with their Skins wherein they were bred scarce off. But here it is to be inquired, whether or no those Worms were not Caterpillars, which were afterward changed into Gold-worms, and they into Butterflies. Nor are Caterpillars all of one kind, but some are bred of Living Plants, others of Corn, others out of Wood. And those Caterpillars of which Silk-worms are engendred do not retain the same Fi∣gure, but change their Coats four several times. Whereof see Libavius Lib. 1. Bombyctor. who hath written most diligently concerning this matter. This is ge∣neral, that all those little worms which hide themselves in down, or wrap them∣selves in the Leaves of Trees, after some changes of their outward shapes are changed into a flying Creature, like to that by which the Eggs were laid

This I have also observed in Caterpillars bred of Indian Water-cresses, which they frequently feed upon, being kept in a Glass; that out of their Bellies live Crea∣tures did come forth, which died soon after, and would question less revive again the next Spring, and the Caterpillars themselves also died, no Butter flies being of them generated. Wherein I was confirmed by that which Aldrovandus relates Lib. 4. de Insectis, Cap. 1. how that such as have written of the wonders of the new World do report concerning Pismires, how that out of the Body of the dead Parent innu∣merable little Worms arise, which live after a wonderful manner, until being winged they fly out of their underground Habitations; although the Parents do somtimes bring forth during their Life.

We conceive that Gnats also are bred of the corruption of living, * 1.428 or withered Plants. For although Gnats are generated out of Water and Vinegar: yet that happens, because they contain in them either the parts or Juyces of Plants. For although, as Aristotle relates, de Histor. Animal. Lib. 5. Cap. 19. they are also bred of Water, especially standing Water: yet there is no question but many things are bred therein by the corruption of Plants. And those which are Genera∣ted of a sowre Humor Aristotle calls Conopas; and of them Pliny relates, Lib. 9. Cap. 51. that they are generated of a tart Humor; and Lib. 10. Cap. 70. that they fly to and feed on sowr things, but care not for what is sweet. Yet they are not im∣mediately Generated of the acid Humor, but of a Worm which is first bred of the said Humor. So that the Original of all these petty flying Animals is from some peculiar kind of Worm.

More Particularly, * 1.429 Gnats are bred of the wild Fig-Tree, whereof Aristotle, 2. Histor. Animal. Cap. 32. The wild Fig-Tree generates certain Fig-Gnats out of its Apples; first there is a Worm, soon after the Skin breaks and out Flies a Gnat, and changing its place it goes to the unripe Figs, whereinto insinuating it self it keeps them from falling. Theophrastus, 2 de Caussis Plantarum, adds that they are bred of the Seeds, a sign whereof is, that after they are fled away there are scarce any Seeds in the Figs. For they fly away maimed, leaving a Feather or a Foot in the Apple. Which Pliny comfirms, Lib. 17. Cap. 27.

Fortunius Licetus holds a fourfold Original of such as spring from living Plants, * 1.430 Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 46. The first he saies is of the Excrements of Plants. For seeing Plants are nourished by an Earthy Juyce, with which a great quantity of dung and mixt matter is mingled proceeding from the Bodies of Animals living or dead, he holds that there is therein re∣maining some portion of the former sensitive Soul, and that the said mat∣ter

is carried for the more abundant nourishment of the Plant to the flours, or Fruites, leaves, or Barks, or elswhere, which when it is digested by the heat of the Ambient Air, and acquires dispositions necessary to life presently the Soul which lay hid therein doth display it self, and somtimes a Caterpillar, som∣times a Wi••el, otherwhiles a Moth, otherwhiles a Worm, somwhiles a Goose, other whiles a Duck is bred, and somtimes another Animal. But this manner is scarce agreeable to reason; especially that Geese and Ducks should be thus bred. For it is not credible that the Souls of such perfect Animals should be able to re∣main perfect and intire under so many Mutations. Nor doth the sensitive Soul con∣stitute any Animal in its kind; and every Animal, as for example a Lion, an Ox, a Goose, an Hare, hath not only a sensitive Soul but a specifical Soul of its own, diffe∣ring from the Souls of all other Animals.

The Second manner he makes to be of Atomes, * 1.431 which have flowed from the Bo∣dies of Animals, flying in the Air, and driven into the substance of Plants and sticking thereto by the clamminess of Dew, and being driven within the Porous mat∣ter, or the Downy corpulency; which in fit season being digested by the concoctive faculty of the ambient Air, and prepared for another life, they become living Creatures, viz. Caterpillars, Spiders, Cantharides, Geese and such like Animals. But neither is this manner probable unless it be limited. For that Geese should be generated of Atomes flying in the Air, and sticking to Plants, as it is a thing unheard of, so any one may easily understand that it is impossible. But this we grant, that with the Rain and Dew a matter fals upon Plants, and cleaves to them, out of which Caterpillars are generated, and other such like Insects. Nor do we deny, that Atomes in which the Seeds of such living Creatures do stick may descend with Rain or Dew upon Plants: Yet we do not think that this is alwaies necessary since the Excrements of Plants and Animals and their corrupted parts have this power, and the Seminal principles of these Animals are fastned upon Plants by the dew and Rain.

The Third manner he makes to be, when Atomes or Juyces of the same kind, * 1.432 be∣ing any waies slipt out of the Bodies of Animals, and by the Earth communicated to a Plant, are by the heat of the ambient Air awakened and enlivened. Nor yet is it necessary that this should be done, but the parts of Plants themselves if they be corrupted may turn to such petty Animals. And if after this manner Animals should be bred of living Plants, many more would be generated then are: How beit certain Animals are nevertheless bred of certain Plants.

The fourth manner he makes to be proper to those which are bred in the Water, * 1.433 viz. when of the Juyce, Atomes, or Excrements of Plants mingled with the Water, and cleaving to the substance of Plants which grow in the Water, Animals are bred.

Two manners therefore are altogether sufficient. The First is, * 1.434 when of the cor∣rupted parts of Plants Animals are bred, as of the Barks of Pine Trees corrupted Pine Caterpillars are bred. The other is, when Atomes containing the Forms of such Animals do with the Dew or Rain fall upon Plants; which happens most fre∣quently when few little drops fall as the Sun shines, which we call heat Drops. For with these not only the Leaves of Plants (as it is wel known) are corrupted, but also Husbandmen know, that by this shower little Animals are bred in them.

Animals are also bred of dead and dry Plants; and that Moths, and Wood-Lice, * 1.435 Coss-worms, and sundry sorts of Worms are bred in rotten Wood, every body knows. Aristotle, Lib. 5. de Hist. Animal. Cap. 19. writes that the Beetles called Bulls are bred of the Worms which are generated out of dry Wood; and in the same Book, Chap. 32. he relates, that the smallest creature in the world, called Acari, is bred not only in old wax, but also in white Wood.

Among Animals that breed out of rotten Wood, * 1.436 we must reckon that little worm which is called Xulophthoros, and which Arissotle, 5. Histor. Animal. Cap. 32. de∣scribes. Which I take to be no other then that which our Germans cal Stoch-wurm that this Stick-worm, and we in England, if I mistake not, call them Cad worms, which is bred in the Water of Rotten sticks and Stocks of Trees, being a River VVorm, and taken in the Spring time with River Gudgions. But Aristotle seems to have described this Worm, rather when it puts on the Form of a Gold-worm, then when it lives in the Water. The same Aristotle

writes, that he had not yet experimented what Animal was bred thereof. But ex∣perience shewes that it is changed into that commonly known infect which Ʋlysses Ald••ovandus (2 de Insectis Cap. 10.) calls Perlas, the Silesians term it Schneider, those of Misnia Boltzen.

Whence the Cimiees Wig-lice or Wall-lice so called are bred, * 1.437 is doubtful. Most are of Opinion they are bred of the filth proceeding from mankind; and Aristotle, 5. de Hist. Animal. Cap. 31. saies: they are bred of the Humor which is in the upper parts of the Bodies of Animals. But if this were true, why should they not be bred in the Skin, hairs, or Garments of Men and Women, as Lice and Fleas are? And therefore it is more likely, and experience doth witness the same, that they are bred in Bedsteads [understand Dutch Beadsteads] and especially in their chinks, and in the Wood of the Walls next the Bed, which is their proper place. And if they are found elswhere in the Straw, or in Garments, they have crept thither from the Bed-steads. Howbeit, there is assistant to their Generation the filth or rather the Vapors of Men and Women sleeping, which sticking to the Wood corrupt the same and cause it to breed these Vermin. Now they are chiefly bred in Wood of the Fir and Poplar Trees. Whereof Julius Caes. Scaliger doth well write (save that he holds they are bred in straw likewise) in Lib. 2. de Plantis; That certain Woods, as the Fir, and Straws, have in them Natural Rudiments of these Animals.

Concerning the Scotch Geese call'd Brant-Geese.

Hither some refer the Stotch Geese called Barnacles, which some write are bred of rotten Wood. Because Authors Dissent hereabouts, I think here sitting to speak som∣what Particularly thereof. Most, as hath been said, are of Opinion, that they are not bred of Eggs, but in the Sea, out of rotten Wood; although some say in one place some in another. Munster saith in the Islands call'd Orcades, others in Ireland, others in Scotland, others in the Islands called Hebrides; some say they breed in any Sea if the Ships be made of Wood which grew in Scotland, and therefore some do not ascribe the place of their breeding to one part, but to all that tract betwixt the Orcades and Scotland, and betwixt the Hebridae and Ireland. Moreover, there is a controversie whereof they are bred. For some suppose, that in the Orcades upon the Banks of the Rivers there is a Tree which bears a fruit resembling Ducks, which when it is ripe fals off, and if it light upon the water it presently conceives life, and becomes a bird, but if it fall upon the Land it putrifies. Others write that of the pieces of Ship Masts floating in the Ocean there is first of all somwhat thrust forth, and that afterward at the Sea-weed (or Sea-grass called W••••r or Wear) sticking with the pitch to those pieces of wood, there hang little Shel-fish like Cockles or Muscles, which in process of time receive wings and Fly through the Air, or fal into the water and Swim. Others think that these Geese are bred, neither of rotten wood, nor on Trees, but out of Shels. Others conceive they are bred none of these waies, but that they are hatched of Eggs, as other Animals are.

But I think it wil be best to set down the Relations of Authors themselves concer∣ning this matter. Fortunius Licetus produceth this follwing Account (in Lib. 3. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 47.) out of Turner. The former Goose is termed by our country∣men a Brand Goose and a Barnacle; it is less then a wild Goose, on the brest partly black, on the Rest of the Body of an Ash-color. It Flies and cries like wild Geese, frequents standing Waters, and devours standing Corn. The flesh of this kind is somwhat unplea∣sant, and not in request amongst the Rich. No man ever saw the Nest or Egg of a Bar∣nacle; which is no wonder: because they are without the help of any parent, Spontane∣ously bred after this manner. When the mast, or some Fir-boards of a Ship have lain Rotting for a time in the Sea, there grows thereout, at first, certain Mushroms as it were; in which in process of time the manifest Forms of Birds are to be seen, which are afterward cloathed with Feathers, and at last quicken and fly. And I would not have any one think that this is a Fable, for besides the common Testimony of all People living upon the Sea-coasts of England, Scotland and Ireland, that same Fam us Historian Gyraldus, who hath wrot the History of Ireland, (more happily much then could be expected in the Age wherein he lived) doth testifie that Barnacles are Generated no otherwise then as we have said. But counting it not safe to

beleeve vulgar reports, and not crediting Gyraldus by reason of the Novelty of the matter, while I was ruminating upon this subject whereof I now write, I made enquiry of a certain Irish Divine Named Octavianus, whom I knew by experience to be a very honest and credible Person; whether he conceived a man might beleeve Gyraldus in this point: whose answer was (swearing by the Gospel he did profess) that what Gyraldus had reported concer∣ning the Generation of this Bird was most true; and that he had seen with his own Eyes, and handled with his hands some of these fowl before they were come to perfection; and that if I would tarry a month or two longer at London, be would ere long cause some of the imperfest Birds to be brought to me. I am therefore by the credible report of honest and learned men who were Eye witnesses perswaded, that it is a real truth, that Brand Geese or Barnacles, are bred out of the rotten Masts of Ships, after the manner of Mushroms. In Wales, which is a part of England, in Ireland and Scotland, these Birds are found up and down upon the Sea-shores imperfect and unfeathered, but having the true and proper shapes of Birds.

Hector Boetius in his description of the Kingdom of Scotland, thus writes concerning this matter: It remains (saith he) that we should declare what (after long and diligent search into the matter) we certainly know and understand concerning the Scostish Geese which they call Clack-Gees, and which are commonly but falsly thought to grow upon Trees in these Islands. For I conceive that the Virtue which breeds them is rather in the Seas which flow betwixt these Islands, then in any other thing. For we have seen them Gener∣ated sundry waies, but evermore in the Sea. For if you cast a piece of Timber into that Sea, in process of time, there are first of all Worms bred, the Wood being hollowed, which by little and little have Heads shaped, and then Leggs and Wings, and at last are covered with Feathers: Finally growing as large as Geese, when they are come to their ful ripeness of Age they fly in the Air like other fowl, which was evidently seen in Buthphan by many spectators, in the year of our Lord 1490. For when as in that Island at the Castle of Pech∣slege a great log of this kind of Wood was brought a shore by the Sea Waves, those that first espied it, being astonishe•• at the Novelty of the thing, ran to the Lord of that place and acquainted him with the news. He coming caused the Log to be sawed asunder, which being done, presently there appeared an huge Multitude, partly of Worms, of which some were yet unshaped, others had some members formed; and partly of Birds perfectly shaped, of which some bad Feathers, others bad none. Being therefore astonished at the strangeness of the thing, at the command of the Lord they carry the Log into the Church of St. Andrew at Tyra (a Village so called) where it remains at this day bored through as it were with Worms. The like Log in the Isle Taum was cast ashore by the working of the Sea, at the Castle of Bruthe, two years after, which was shewed to many that came running of pur∣pose to see it. Nor was that any other which two years after the former was seen by all the people in Lethe a port of Edin-burge, For an huge Ship whose name and Badge was St. Christopher, when it had Lien at Anchor three years together by one of the Hebrides Islands, and was brought bither again and laid in Dock, the Beams being eaten asunder as sar as it had lien in the Water, there were seen therein a great number, partly of such rude Worms, not yet having their perfect shape, and partly of fowls fully perfected. But some may cavil and say, that there is such a virtue in the Wood of the Trees which grow in those Islands: and that the Ship Christopher was made of Timber which had grown in the Islands Hebrides: Therefore I shall not think it tedious to set down, what I my self saw seven years ago. Alexander Gallowid the Pastor of Kilkenny, a man besides his singular honesty incomparably studious after Rarities, having drawn out some Sea-weeds, and seeing betwixt the stalk and the branches, from the bottom to the top, certain Shell∣fish growing, he was amazed at the Novelty of the thing; but when presently for his fur∣ther satisfaction he opened the Shells be stood much more astonished then before. For he found no Fish in the Shells, but (strange to tell) a Bird, and according to the bigness thereof, he observed the Shells to be bigger or lesser. Wherefore he speeds him to me forth∣with, whom he knew of old to be exceedingly desirous of the knowledg of such things, and acquaints me with the whole business, being no less astonished at the strangeness of the thing, then delighted with a Spectacle so strange and unheard of. Now I conceive it is suffici∣ently apparent, that these Seeds of breeding these fowles are not in the Trunks or Boughes of Trees, but in the Ocean it self, which Virgil and Homer do not without cause term the Parent of things. But when they saw that Apples falling from Trees that grew upon the Sea-shore, in process of time, the like Birds came out of them, they were brought to conceive

that the Apples were changed into such Birds; but they were mistaken. For in time by the Seas virtue Worms grew to the Apples, and they encreasing, and the Apples rot••ing by the moisture and vanishing, they through want of good heed imagined that the Apples were turned into these kinds of Fowles. So far Hector Boe∣tius.

Julius Caesar Scaliger, * 1.438 Exercit. 59. Sect. 2. thus writes concerning this matter: You may rather wonder that in the Britannick Ocean, a Bird unknown in your parts hangs by the Beak in the Timber of rotten Ships, till it grow to perfection, and swim away, be∣ing fashion'd like a Duck, and living upon Fish. I have also seen one of these Fowls. The Gascoigns inhabiting by the Sea side call them Crabrans, but the Britanies Bearnacles. And a little after: There was brought to the most excellent and great King Francis, a Shel∣fish as it seemed, not very large, in which there was a young Bird almost perfected, with the tops of the Wings, the Bill and Feet, sticking to the farthest parts of the Shell

Petrus Pena, * 1.439 and Matthias Lobelius, In their Observations of Plants, near the end, write thus concerning these Geese. This example of Natures endeavouring to draw some good even out of corruption makes us now willing to beleeve many things which else we should have laughed at, if we had read them in the Historians of the Northern parts of the World. Although they relate the matter somwhat differently, that this is only found in Scotland, or in the ••slands of O••cades, anciently conquered by the Roman Navy. But we have not only from Scotland, but here also, in the River Thames where it runs by the City of London, Shells which have been pluckt from the Bottom of an old Ship, with thick rugged stalks. They are very smal, as round in a manner as Cockles, white without, shining, Smooth, as thin and Brittle as Egg shels, opening with two sides like Limpins, of the size of an Al∣mond Nut compressed: now these hung on the outside of the Belly of a large Ship, upon which being half rotten with Moss and Mud there grew as it were the stalks of Mushroms, resembling the Navil-strings, the ends whereof after the manner of Fruits were inserted into the broad end or Basis of the Cockles, as if the little Birds were thence to draw their life and nourishment, the rudiments of which Birds were to be seen in the upper sides of the Cockles which gaped. These stalks Historians report to grow first out of Worms, which we could not discern, nor do we yet beleeve it to be so: although we know that such kind of Cockles most neatly shaped do grow on pieces of Wood cast up by the working of the Sea. And such of them as fall upon the dry land dye; but such as remain in the Water do hatch a Duck or a Fowle of that kind. The English and Welsh eat them Barnacles; the Scots cal them Clack-Geese, and there are many of them in Scotland, where they are caught, when the standing Waters are fro••en with Ice. When we did eat of them, we conceived that they tasted like a Duck, or wild Goose.

Among the Germans, * 1.440 Michael Mejer, in his Treatise de Volucri Arborea Chap. 3. him∣self being an Eye witness relates, that out of Shels like Cockles such Geese are bred, and that he had seen wellnigh an hundred such Cockles, which being opened, there were smal young birds in them, ready as it were to come out of the Egg, with all members necessary to fly with, some of which Birds he had in his own hands. Thus he describes them: if at any time a piece of a Ship-mast smeared with pitch fall into the Sea which runs betwixt the O••cades and Hebrides Islands, and lies there for some considerable time, it grows not only rotten by reason of Worms bred within it, but it is covered all over with Sea-weeds, store of which grow in those garts, and upon any wood that is in the Water, especially if it sweat forth a Pitchy fatness, as the Masts of Ships made of Fir or Pitch-Tree, and abounding naturally with Rosin, and pitched over for the service of the Ship, that the sailes may be swiftly hoised up and let fall, and not stick any where. Now the Sea bears these weeds on the bottom thereof, whence at a certain season it rises up to the top, being as it were pluckt up or cut off by the Waves. This weed being bred in the Water doth not easily putrifie, having much saltness in it; and therefore in North-Holand, and many other places, they make Dams thereof very strong against the Violence of the Ocean, so as they fetch a remedy from whence the Disease comes. The foresaid pieces of Wood therefore being covered with this weed, which insinuates it self into the smal holes which remain by reason of the rotten∣ness thereof; in process of time, at the other End of the said weed smal Cockles as it were do grow, which are whitish, or of the colour of a Mans Nail, and in shape much resemb∣ling the Nail of ones little Finger, and the two Shels being so joyned together, that they stick close, on the upper and more pointed sides they receive the Sea-weeds end, and are

firmly shut on the broader sides, which are afterwards opened, that the fruit being ripe may go out of its own accord to fly. After this manner thousands of ••••al Shels more or less do stick, each Shell at the end of a Weed, the other end of the said Weed (as hath been said) being fastned to the pitched Logs of Wood, and that so many in number that the Wood can scarcely be seen: which pieces of Weeds are hardly above twelve Fingers breadths long, and strong, as if they were thongs of Leather. Somtimes they are cer••a••n feet long.

Carolus Clusius, in Auctario Exoticorum, thus writes concerning them: * 1.441 The Clack-Geese so called by the Scots, which the English cal Parnacles, the Highland••rs Rot geese, is a kind of Fowl seen only in the Autumn and the Winter resembling a Duck. The Original of these Fowls being unknown, it came to pass that the common people imagined their first Rudiment to be certain Shells of whitish col••ur growing to the Trunks or frag∣ments of Wood, which are wont in these parts to be driven on shore by the flowing in of the Sea, where the Wood doth not otherwise Grow, and resembles in some manner the shape of these Birds. But that he ever saw a living and perfect bird come out of those Shells, no man dares averre. So far Hoierus. Moreover, these are not the Birds which are commonly thought to grow upon Trees in the Orcades Isles, and are called Bar∣nacles, or Rot Geese; but Birds commonly not less then a Duck, which I have som∣times s••en, yea and tasted of their flesh. And all is found to be fables which hath been repor∣ted of them by the Hollanders, who some few years since sailed to Nova Zembla, and past beyond the Bay of Nassou, commonly called Weygaz. For they observed those Birds sitting upon their Eggs in the Rocks, and brought many of their Eggs into the Ship, to satisfie their Hunger. So far Clusius.

Which is confirmed by Gerhardus de Vera, of Amsterdam, in the Navigation to China: Then rowing, (saith he) to the Island which was middlemost, there we found many Eggs of Barnacles (which the Hollanders call Rot-Gansen or Rot-Geese) and the Fowls themselves sitting in their nests; which being chased away, did cry Rot, R••t, Rot, (whence they have their name of Rot-Geese) and by the throw of a Stone we killed one of them, which we did boyl and Eat, with about threescore Eggr, which we carried with us to the Ship. These Geese or Barnacles were true Rot-Geese, such as in great Quantity do hant every year and are caught about Weiringen in Holland; which where they laid their Eggs (this man never read Albertus Magnus) and hatched their yong, hath been hitherto unknown. Whence it came to pass, that some Authors have da∣red to write, that they grow out of Trees in Scotland, from the branches whereof han∣ging over the Water, if the fruit fall into the Water yong Geese are thereout generated; but if they fall on the ground, they perish and come not to perfection: which appears now to be false. Nor is it any wonder that it hath been hitherto unknown where these Birds laid their Eggs, since 'tis most certain, that none was ever heard to have come to the eightieth degree of Latitude before, nor was that part of the Country (which I conceive to be Groenland) ever known before, much less were those Geese ever found sitting upon their Eggs.

Out of all which Narrations it is manifest, * 1.442 that these Geese are not bred out of rotten Wood, but out of certain Shels, which by means of Sea-weed are fastened to the holes of rotten wood, as the foresaid Mejer writes. Those Cockles as it were with black Shels are alwaies found sticking to wood lying in the Water, as to the wooden foundations of Bridges, and to Ships sunk under the water. Now they stick to the wood by certain thrids of Hair or Snevil as it were, or else by Sea∣weed. And Mejerus adds this also in their description, that if the Cockles open themselves, those smal yong Birds appear, like Chickens in their Eggs, which have a Bill, Eyes, Feet, Wings, also the Hairy Rudiments of Feathers. And as they encrease, so their Shells encrease, as it is with all Shel-fish and Snailes. And cre∣dible it is, that these Cockles do draw nourishment out of the fat and clammy sub∣stance of rotten wood, by those pieces of Grass or Sea-weed, that goes between them, as by Navil-Vessels. And as to the relation of the Hollanders who found these Geese sitting upon Eggs, it may thus be reconciled with the rest, by saying that some were first bred in England and Scotland, out of the Shels, which might fly to other places: of the number of which were those Geese, which the Hollanders saw upon the Rocks in their Voyage to Nova Zembla. For since the greatest part of Insects being Spontaneously bred do afterwards couple and Generate: why may not these Fowls being Animals much more perfect do the same?

Now there is nothing of certainty to be found in Authors concerning the Genera∣tion of these Geese. * 1.443 The said Mejer Chap. 5. attributes the Generation of these kind of Shels and Birds to the Heaven, and conceits they proceed from I know not what imaginative Virtue in the Heaven. But, as we have said elswhere, the Hea∣ven is only an universal Cause; whereas here our question is about the next and im∣mediate cause. Nor do I conceive that the Generation of these Fowls is Sponta∣neous, but I conceive they are bred as other Cockles or Shel-sish are.

And if any one shall wonder that a Bird should spring out of a Cockle or Shel∣sish, let him think with himself that it was as easie for the Creator to make a Cockle bring forth a Bird as another Cockle; and let him consider how many other won∣derful things do happen in Nature. Amongst which is that Relation concerning the Lamb which in Tartaria grows out of the ground, which Sigismund Baron of Her∣berstein (in Rerum Muscoviticarum Commentariis) thus describes: * 1.444 Not far, (saith he) from the Caspian Sea, betwixt the Rivers Volga and Jaik, there dwelt once the Sawol∣hensian Kings of whom I shall speak hereafter. Among these Tartarians, Demetrius Danielis (as he was counted among the Barbarians, a grave and credible Man) told me a wonderful and scarce credible thing; How that his Father being once sent from the Duke of Muscovia to the Zawolhensian King; while he was upon this Embassage he saw a Seed a little greater and rounder then the Seed of a Musk-Melon, but otherwise not unlike the same: out of which being set in the ground there grew up a thing very like a Lamb five hands high, which they called in their speech Boramez, or the little Lamb: For it hath an Head, and Eyes, and Ears, and all other parts like a Lamb newly brought forth, also a delicate fine Skin, which many use in that Country to line their Caps withal. He said moreover, that this Plant, (if it may be called a Plant) hath blood indeed, but no flesh: but instead of flesh a substance very like that of the flesh of Crabs. Moreover it had little hoofs, not horny like those of a Lamb, but Cloathed with hairs resembling horn: the Root thereof was at the Navil or the middle Belly. And it lived so long, til having eaten all the grass round about it, the Root it self for want of nourish∣ment withered away. And this Plant was exceeding sweet, so that Wolves and other Ravenous Beasts did exceedingly delight to Eat thereof. This Relation is confirmed by others. Fortunius Licetus, Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 45. hath this Relation out of the Journey of Odoricus Ʋtinensis to the great Cham of Tartary. I write, (saith he) a wonderfull thing, not seen by my self, but which hath been told me by very credible persons, who say that in a certain Kingdom there are Mountains called Capesci, where grow very great Pompions, which being ripe do open, and therein is found an Animal like a smal Lamb, which hath flesh and the substance of a Pompion to∣gether; and although this may seem incredible, yet as there are Trees in Ireland which bring forth Birds, so may there in that place be such Pompions as we speak of. And in another place he reports the same thing saying. One day I saw a beast, as big as a Lamb, white as Snow, whose Wooll being like Cotton might easily be pulled off from its Skin; the by-standers being asked told me, that it was given by a certain Baron to the great Cham, as the best flesh in the World for a Man to feed upon: and they said withal, that there was a Mountain called Capsium, in which there grew great Pompions, which when they are ripe do gape, and put forth such an Animal. Julius Caesar Scaliger, ap∣proves the same in Exercit. 181. Sect. 29. The things aforesaid (quoth he) are but toies in comparison of that wonderful Tartarean plant. Zavolla is a prime Country of Tartaria Famous as the seat of their most ancient nobility. In that Country they plant a Seed, very like the Seed of a Melon, but rounder. From whence arise a plant which they cal Boramez, or the Lamb. For it grows in the shape of a Lamb, about three foot above the ground, having Feet, Hoofs, Ears, and the whole head like a Lamb, only it is without horns. Instead of borns it hath hair resembling an horn. It hath a very thin skin whereof the inhabitants make Caps to cover their Heads. They say the inner pulp is like the flesh of a Crab, and of an admirable sweetness. A Root grows out of the ground fast∣ned to its Navil. And which makes the wonder greater; as long as any Herbs grow about it, it lives like a Lamb in a good pasture: But when they are consumed it pines away and dies. Which happens not only by chance, and in tract of time, but also when the grass is taken away, for experiment sake. And to encrease the miracle, it is desired by Wolves, but not by any other Beasts which live upon Flesh. See concerning this thing, Andreas Libavius, 2. Part. Singular. Exercit. de Agno Vegetabili Sci∣thiae.

But how Animals should grow out of dried Plants, is a doubtful question. * 1.445 For∣tunius Licetus, Lib. 3. Cap. 48. doth blame Jul. Caesar Scaliger, Exercit. 59. Sect. 2. for holding that Plants do generate Animals out of themselves, because a living piece of Wood contains only a vegetative Soul, and therefore cannot produce a sensitive Soul more noble then it self, whereby to constitute an Animal, nor change its own Soul into a sensitive. * 1.446 But he himself holds (which is the first manner ac∣cording to his reckoning) that a Spontaneous Animal is bred out of the Excrements which yet remain in the rotten Wood, together with the Aliment drawn out of the Earth, made up of the dung and Juyces out of the Bodies of sundry Animals; which afterwards from some external agent receives a disposition at last, to put on the Nature of an Animal; and the Soul being present as in a Vessel presently displaies it self, and gives it self thereto, as an Essential and Quickening form.

But although I leave every mans Opinion free to himself, yet the Opinion of Sca∣liger is more agreeable to truth. For the vegetable Soul doth not produce the Soul of an Animal nor is changed thereinto, but contains under it another Soul of an Animal, which doth belong to the disposition of the matter, which afterwards being set at liberty displaies it self. And therefore Scaliger said not absurdly, that Plants contain in them certain Seeds for the Generation of Animals. Nor is it sufficiently proved, that such insects and imperfect Animals are more noble then the noblest Plants; seeing both the Plants themselves have more noble faculties, and are of longer life then such petty Animals; nor were they produced at the be∣ginning of the World by the first intention of the Creator, as other sorts of Living things; but were only bred out of the Corruption of other things. And if the Opi∣nion of Licetus were true, a great many more sorts of Animals would be bred of Woods, seeing the Excrements which Plants draw are various, and therefore of the same Wood sundry Animals should be bred; whereas nevertheless only cer∣tain Animals are bred of certain Plants.

Afterwards Licetus propounds three other manners, * 1.447 according to which Animals are bred out of the Carkasses of plants. The Second manner he makes to be, when Animals are bred of the Carkasses of Plants in the Waters; and that he saith comes to pass, when the Juyces, Excrements or Particles of Animals contained upon any occasion in the Waters, have in themselves (as in a Vessel) some weakned part of the former sensitive Soul, with a small degree of heat, and so cleave to Plants, and sink into them through some pores or Chinks, and being digested by the ambient heat they are prepared for life again, whereupon the Soul as lying hid in the Form be∣gins to be a substantial and quickning Form, and to constitute an Animal. But though it is not to be denied, that sundry Excrements of Animals with their Juyces and parts are contained in the Water, and may there cleave unto Plants: yet if this manner should be allowed, sundry Animals answering to the several froms of Ani∣mals should be bred of woods in the waters, which nevertheless is not so. And therefore after this manner also lately declared, I hold that Animals are bred in the Waters out of dry Plants, and that the Water contributes nothing, save that it disposes the dead Plants to putrifaction, and supplies heat necessary to actuate the hidden form.

He makes the Third manner to be, when as out of the water, * 1.448 in the surface of wood, Atomes or Juyces which have flowed from the Bodies of Animals, living or dead, and fly in the Air, do light upon logs of wood, when they are come to a due quantity, and have from the Ambient Air attained a disposition necessary for Life. For then the sensitive Soul which before lay hid in them as in a Vessel, gives it self to them in the Nature of a quickning Form. And thus he holds that Moths, Flies, Worms, and other such Animals, are bred in the rotten boughes of Trees, which touch neither the Earth nor the water. But those little Animals are Gener∣ated, not so much out of the woods, as out of the things which did stick to the said woods: and if they are generated of the substance it self of the rotten woods, they belong unto the first manner.

Finally, He makes the fourth manner to be, * 1.449 when out of the shavings and juyces of Animals shed from their Bodies upon the Earth, and from the Earth some waies chrust into the Bodies of dead Plants, being digested by the ambient heat, and pre∣pared

for life, an Animal is bred. But this manner seems not much to differ from the Third.

Animals are also bred of the Juyces of Plants; * 1.450 as is seen by Vinegar and Wine, and other Juyces, and Aristotle makes mention of wine gnats 5. Histor. Animal. Cap. 19. to which also Honey may be referred. For Animals are also bred there∣of, especially if bread be mingled therewith. Now Licetus makes a twofold origi∣nal of these Animals, Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 49. The First is, when in particles long since fallen from the Body of an Animal, and infected with Dung and Onions, and pressed out with Wine or Juyce of Onions and Basil (for of the Juyce of Onions and Basil he conceives Scorpions are bred) some degree of the former Soul remains, which when by the ambient heat it is cherished and disposed to life; the sensitive Soul lying hid as in a Vessel joyns it self thereto as a quickning form, by which the Worms are first Animated. But Licetus hath recourse to the same man∣ner, which he never proved, as if it were impossible that an Animal could be bred of other then an Animal; wheras nevertheless experience teacheth, that such Ignoble petty Animals are bred of the matter which in living Plants was the proper sub∣ject of the specifick Form of the Plants. And if Animals were bred of juyces after this manner, not only Flies and Wine gnats would breed out of Wine, but other Animals also; since it is not credible that the forms of Flies only are contained in the dung wherewith Vines are manured. And whereas many things are every where reported by Authors concerning the breeding of Scorpions out of Basil, (con∣cerning which experience must be consulted) it is not credible that all Basil Plants have drawn with their Aliment the particles of Scorpions; since in many places Basil grows, where there are no Scorpions. It is more credible, that since of cer∣tain Juyces not any Animals but only a certain sort is bred; the Creator being rather willing that of the Corruption of Plants an Animal should be made, then a putrid Body, hath given to the Bodies of Plants a power for the production of such determinate Forms.

Moreover it is well known, * 1.451 that most Animals are generated by the Copulation of Male and Femal, or of the Seeds of Male and Female Joyned together. Yet it is also observed that some Animals are Generated without the Congress of Male and Female. Female Mice engender of themselves, and thence it is they are so speedi∣ly and plentifully generated. So, Aristotle 6. de Histor. Animalium relates, Cap. 37. that a Mouse with young being shut up in a Barrel of Milet, a while after the Vessel being opened, an hundred and twenty yong Mice were found therein. And a little after he writes, that in a part of Persia, a Mouse with yong being cut up, the Female Mice in her Belly were found to have yong ones in them: and that there are some who stand stifly in it, that if Mice lick Salt they breed yong without Copulation. So that a man may (not without Reason) doubt, whether that is true which is repor∣ted of Mice being bred of rubbish. For since Mice can be so easily generated, if some Mice do but Leap to seek Food out of an old Ship into a new one, they may easily grow to a great multitude. * 1.452 So Aristotle tells us that Eels have no Male nor Female 4. Histor. Animal. Cap. 11. and that they have neither Seed nor Eggs, but they are generated of a slimy matter coming from the whole surface of the old Eele, as Snakes Skins come from them. And he tells the same thing in 6. de Histor. Animal. Cap. 14. and 16.

From the premises 'tis easie to answer to the objection of some men, * 1.453 who cannot understand how the Seminal matter may lie hid in rubbish, (viz. Such as mice are said to be bred of, if so be they are so bred as hath been said) can be of the same spe∣cifick Nature with the Seed of the Male and Female, of which they are otherwise ge∣nerated. For we must observe that in such more Ignoble Animals Generation is not so strictly tied to the Seed of Male and Female, as in perfect Animals, but that one sex alone may also generate. And as some Seeds of Plants can consist and abide even in a base matter, as in Rain: So also the Seminal matter of these Animals can lie hid in rubbish, or other base matter.

Fortunius Licetus reckons this kind of Generation, * 1.454 when an Animal is bred of another Animal of the same sort, but without Seed, or without the Seed of the Male, to be a Spontaneous Generation, Lib. 3. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 50. But I conce••ve this to be no Spontaneous Generation properly so called. And as the Generation

of Plants which have no sex by their Seed, or by a branch or Root, is therefore ter∣med non-Spontaneous, because it is made by the same sort, and by Seed, or part containing in it the Seminal principle: so also Mice, if they breed Seed in them∣selves without the Male, or if Eeles are produced out of the slime containing in it the Seminal principle, they are not properly said to be of Spontaneous Ori∣ginal.

Those Animals are more properly said to be Spontaneous, * 1.455 which are generated out of Animals of a different sort. Now this comes to pass three manner of waies. For somtimes petty Animals are generated in Living Animals; and somtimes Ani∣mals proceed from the Excrements of Living Animals, and somtimes out of the Bodies of such as are dead. And of such as are bred in live Animals, some are bred in the very substance of the living parts, and some in the Cavities. And because both these kinds proceed from Excrementitious Humors, we shall treat of them to∣gether. * 1.456 Hitherto pertain those little Dragons which are bred in the external ha∣bit of the Body of such as dwel in the Easterne parts of the world. Of these P. Aegineta doth write, Lib. 4. cap. 59. In the Indies (saith he) and the upper parts of Egypt, little Dragons are Generated, or certain Animals resembling Worms, in the Musculous parts of the Body, as in the Arms, Thighs, Legs; and they creep a∣long the sides of Children, under the Skin, so as they are plainly seen to move. Moreover when some reliques of a Dragon have remained long in a place, the place suppurates, and the Skin being opened, the Head thereof comes forth; when it is drawn it causes pain, especially if it be broken off. Diodorus Siculus also menti∣ons the same Disease, Lib. 4. Cap. 3. and Straboin Lib. 6. who writes that this Dis∣ease happens to the Ethiopians who are next to the Silli who live upon Locusts; and Plutarch 8. Sympos. Quaest. 9. in these words: those that inhabit about the red Sea, when they are sick (as Agacharehides relates) as they are vexed with other unbeard of Symptomes; so also with little Snakes, which breed in their Arms and Thighs and put out their Heads to eat the flesh, and being touched enter into the Flesh again, and creeping through the Musculous parts cause intollerable inflam∣mations; which kind of Disease was never heard of before, or since, in any other people. Also Amatus Lusitanus treates of this Disease in Cent. 6. Curat. 64. [I have beard here in England strange stories of People that have had Wolves in their flesh which they were fain daily to feed with raw beefe. Which I allwaies reckond for Fa∣bles. I knew a Woman in Amsterdam that pretended one in her brest, but upon visita∣tion I sound it an Imposture, to move pity, and that the Meat which was given her to feed the Wolfe she might Eat her self.

Fortunius Licetus, Lib. de Spont. Viv. Ort. cap. 51. * 1.457 makes the fiery Serpents which God sent amongst the Israelites, Numb. 21. to be these kind of Dragons aforesaid, and reprehends Vallesius, for that in his Philosophia Sacra where he handles such like subjects, he did not observe and signifie as much; and holds that really out of the Bodies of the living Israelites little Serpents and Worms were generated, of so Malignant a Nature that they did cruelly eat their Members, and exceedingly inflamed the same, raising most sharp and burning pains, whence they were called fiery Serpents. But he reproves Vallesius without cause, and his Opinion doth not agree with the text of the Bible, from which it is manifest∣ly apparent, that as by the sight of the Brazen Serpent the stinging of those Serpents were cured, so God for to punish the People of Israel had sent amongst them such Serpents as did bite them without, but were not bred in their Bodies.

It hath been observed that Worms grow under the Tongue of an Hart, * 1.458 and Aristotle saith as much, 2. de Histor. Animal. Cap. 15. And Hunts-men relate, that mad Dogs have a great Worm in the loose parts under their Tongues, bred of black blood, whereof that Vein is full, which being shut up in a little bag sends Poisonous vapors into the brain and makes the Dogs mad; which Worm being taken out in time prevents their madness. Pliny makes mention thereof, Lib. 29. Cap. 5. and writes that the Greeks call this Worm Lytta.

That certain Vermine called Ricini and Cynorrhaistae or Tykes are bred in the Skins of Dogs, Sheep, Oxen and Harts, is very well known. * 1.459 That Worms are bred in almost all the parts of a Mans Body, I have shewed, in Lib. 2. Instit. Medic. Part. 3. Sect. 1. Cap. 11. which happens also in other Animals. For in them are

bred Fleas and Lice. Aristotle makes mention of the Acari. And Julius Caesar Scaliger speaks of an Animal much lesser, Exercit. 194. Sect. 7. which the Piceni cal Pedicellus; the Taurini, Scirus; the Gascoignes a Brigant. They are vulgarly cal∣led Sirones or Chirones. And he writes that it is wonderful, that they have no ex∣press shape, save of a Globe, and that they are scarce discernable by the Eye-sight, and so little that they seem not to be made of Atomes, but to be themselves the Atomes of Epicurus; it quarters so under the Skin, that by making holes it breeds a burning pain.

As to their Generation, * 1.460 Licetus propounds a threefold way and manner, Lib. 3. de Spont. Vivent. Ortu, Cap. 51. The First is when the Soul of the old Animal begets another Soul in the Excrements contained within the Body subject thereto, not like it self, but much more imperfect; being hindred by the imperfection of the matter; as the Seed of an Horse coupled with an Asse doth not generate the Soul of an Horse, but one of a far inferior Nature, by Reason of the baseness of the matter.

The Second manner he makes to be out of the Excrements separated from the Ali∣ment, wherein (as in a Vessel) there is a portion of the former living Creature from whence the Aliment came. For such Excrements being digested in the Body of the Animal by the heat of the Ambient Bowels, and by digestion having attained dis∣positions necessary to Life, they come to receive the Latent Soul, in the notion of a quickning form. And after this manner Worms (he saies) are frequently bred in the Belly of Man, out of the Excrements of the first digestion brought thither.

The Third manner he holds to be of Excrements into which by the action of heat the substance of that living thing is turned, in which such Animals are Spontane∣ously generated, in which Excrements there is yet remaining some portion of the former Soul, as in a Vessel; which when by the digestive heat of the Ambient Air it hath attained dispositions necessary to Life, it gives it self to its subject matter in the Nature of a quickning Soul, which constitutes divers kinds of Animals; for that the former Soul is so impaired as to degenerate into an Essence much more im∣perfect then it was before. And that after this manner a Serpent may Spontane∣ously breed in the Womb of a Woman, a Flea or Louse in the Skin of a man, or a Crab-Louse within the pores of the Skin.

But in very deed, as to his first manner of Generation, it is hardly agreeable to truth. For it is not yet proved that one Soul can beget another of a different sort. The forms indeed by the indisposition of the matter are so hindred that they cannot attain their end, so that somtimes Monsters are bred; and that one Soul may put on different Bodies, was said before: but that it may produce another Soul, is not agreeable to truth. Every Soul indeed can multiply it self, not by generating an∣other out of or in the subject matter, but by multiplying it self, by the divine Be∣nediction, and by communicating some of its Essence, without Diminution of its self. Nor doth a Mule Generate, because the Soul of an Horse acting upon the mat∣ter of an Ass doth produce the Soul of a Mule, as baser then it self; but the Horse communicates his Soul, which being mixed with the Seed and Soul of the Ass doth not produce an Ass, but a Mule, equally participating of the Nature of an Horse and an Ass.

Also the Second manner cannot take place. Nor when Worms are bred in the Guts, was there a portion of the Soul divided from the Worm; but such was the disposition of the matter, that thereof a Worm might be bred.

Thirdly, In Excrements indeed into which the substance of some part is turned, Worm are bred, as happens somtimes in Ulcers: but who can beleeve that the Soul of a man (for that there is but one Soul in a Man we proved before) should so degenerate as to turn into the Soul of a Worm? And to let pass that question con∣cerning the Soul of a Man; Worms often breed in the Ulcers of Horses, but who will beleeve that the Soul of an Horse is turned into the Soul of a Worm? I hold to that which I have said in my 12. Chap. de Consens. & Disen. Chymic. cum Galen. And I have said before in general, that of the matter which is the subject of the spe∣cifick Form such Animals are bred; and therefore as that matter is various, so also various Animals are generated, and determinate Animals of such and such matter;

in Ulcers Worms, not Lice or Fleas, of the filth of the Skin Lice and Fleas, not Worms. For just as Plants (as Scaliger writes, Exercitat. 59.) breed Animals, not by putrefaction, but cherishing certain Seeds within themselves; and in Ex∣ercit. 100. Animals are not bred in putrid Plants, but are the work of the remaining vigor of the said Plants; so is it in Animals: and as he writes in 1. de Causs. Plant. Cap. 5. in Spontaneous living things there are certain most secret Seeds.

Moreover Animals are bred of the Excrements of Animals of the same sort. * 1.461 Pliny Lib. 9. Cap. 51. writes concerning Fregs, that they are dissolved into slime, and in the Spring time breed again in the Waters. That dead Flies and Bees revive again, is most known; and of dead Bodies little Animals of the same sort are gener∣ated. Concerning Silk-worms it is ••••••ed Case, of which Hieronymus Vida in his 1 Book of his Poem of Silk-Worms, hath these Verses:

Go luckie Souls, and in your labors blest, That die with courage; when you are at rese Venus of pitty shall new Bodier give, And you in open Air again shall Live.

And Paulus Zacchias writes concerning this matter, Quaest. Medico-Legal. Lib. 4. Tit. 1. Quaest. Ʋlt. Also that Worms and Beetles, and many Bodies of Insects, are oftentimes changed, and do many times live again, and take new shapes, any one that will may easily experiment, and the most industrious Physitian Petrus Castellus hath a thousand times experimented. Which it would also become others to experiment, before they did deny things contrary to manifest experience, yea and traduce them as absurdities. This indeed is strange, but experience manifests it to be true. For the more Ignoble Forms are so ordered by Nature, that they can lie hid under mat∣ter of a different sort as to external Form, and their Soul can retain its Essence en∣tire without the operations of Life. * 1.462 Where it is to be noted that such insects som∣times do not really die, but only because they are ill disposed they lie as it were dead, exercising no manifest operations: in which manner, Flies lie in cold Cham∣bers as it were dead in the Winter time, but as soon as the Chambers are heated they begin to Fly again. But somtimes they die really, which comes to pass when Frogs are turned into Mud as it were, or such insects are so broken to pieces that there is no more disposition to Life; where nevertheless the Latent Soul having gotten fit matter it shapes it self a Body like the Former.

Fourthly, 'Tis very well known, * 1.463 that Animals of a different sort are bred out ••f the Carkasses of Animals. That Bees may be generated out of the Carkass of an Heiser Columella relates from Democritus, Magus, and Virgil, de Re Rustic. Lib. 9. Cap. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. That of the Carkass of an Ass drones are bred, and Hornets of the Car∣kass of a Mule, and Waspes of the Carkass of an Horse, many Authors relate. Hieronymus Vida tels us that Silk-worms are bred of the Body of a yong Heifer fed with Mulberry Leaves, Bombyc. Lib. 2. And many like things are related, concer∣ning the truth whereof we must consult with experience. Many report that a Toad wil breed of the Carkass of a Duck. And divers give out, that of the marrow of a Mans Body lying in the Grave Serpents are bred, of which the Poet;

When a•• Mans Back-bone in the Grave doth Rot Some think a Snake is of his Marrow got.

And Pliny. Lib. 10. Cap. 66. reports from many Authors, that a Snake is bred of the marrow of a Mans Back-bone. But this is doubtless Fabulous, nor doth expe∣rience confirm the same. Ovid writes that Scorpions are bred of Crabs:

From a Land-Crab taking his Clawes away, If what remains under the Ground you lay, Out comes a Scorpion with his hooked Tail Threatning to sting you, if he can prevail.

Concerning these things therefore we must consult with experience. For all such Animals are not bred of every Animal; but some of one only, some of ano∣ther.

Nor doth it follow from our Opinion, * 1.464 as one man cavils, that the Bodies of Ser∣pents, or Serpents themselves, Frogs, Toads, Lizards, do go to the constitution of our Bodies, and that we are actually made up of such things as are destructive to our Natures. For no man ever saw such Creatures bred of the Body of a Man. And although such things have been bred in Mens Bodies, yet have they not been bred of the Body it self, but of vitious matter brought into the Body from elswhere. Yet is our Body so disposed that some Worms may breed thereof, which never∣theless were not actually in the Body, but that matter had a disposition that Worms might be made thereof. Where nevertheless this is also to be considered, seeing our Body may be considered as in health, and as being sick, we must mark whether these Worms are bred in the Body being sick or in health. And it is most credible that such Worms are bred in Mans Body being sickly, but not as it is sound; but rather of vitious Aliment, and Excrementitious Humors, as in Arabia the fore∣said little Dragons are reported to be bred of Excrementitious Humors in living Bodies; and little Worms breed in the back of Infants, of which we spake before. Johannes Marci in his Idea Idearum Operatric. makes the cause thereof to be the eating of Locusts. For since those people Eat Locusts frequently (from whence they are termed Acridophagi) in proces of time there grows an itching and putrefa∣ction in their members, and their flesh is changed into a kind of insect not unlike a Locust, whereupon they pine away and die. For he writes, that in the Chile and blood, yea and in the flesh it self, strange forms are contained and may be preser∣ved, because in all those Mutations nothing is generated contrary to them. For the latter Form approaching doth not change the whole substance and abolish the former Forms, but takes away only such as are contrary to its own faculties. So, that same subordination of forms must not be stretched too far, nor must we if any thing be bred of the Body of an Animal presently conclude, that it proceeds from the Natural matter thereof; since it may be bred from the Aliment and Excremen∣titious Humors therein. So I do not conceive, that the Form which shapes the Bo∣dy of a Silk-worm in the Carkass of an Heiser is a form subordinate to the form of an Ox, but that it lay concealed in the Mulberry leaves, as appears out of these Verses of Hieronymus Vida, in the 2. Book of his Poem of Silk-worms.

But if your stock of Silkworms should decay, And all your Seed should chance to die away, By wrath of Jove: As Bees they say are bred From Heifers Body, kil'd and buried; From the same Body, only with more care, Your missed Silk-worms Generated are. For twice ten daies, and twice ten Nights, at first Keep her from Grass, nor let her quench her thirst With any Water. But in Stable shut Mulberry Twigs and Leaves see that you put Into the Crib: no other Meat or Drink; Then kill and let her Carkass Rot and stink: When lo a Lusty swarme of Silk-worms smal Out of her Sides and Back you'll see to Crawle.

The manner of Generation is the same, which we have formerly declared conter∣ning Plants.

Now this is also to be noted, * 1.465 that there is some difference betwixt Spontaneous Animals. For some are altogether base, which generate nothing, as the Wine Gnats and such like Worms; other somwhat more perfect do not Generate living yong ones, but produce little Worms, or somwhat like an Egg in Nature, out of which afterwards petry Animals of the same sort are Generated. So Flies engender little Worms, which grow to be Flies; which also Julius Caesar Scaliger observed, as he relates, Exercit. 191. Sect. 2. Lice breed Nits, which also turn to Lice; although

some falsly deny the same; as we have shewed in our Tract de morb, Infant. Part. 2. Cap. 5. de Phthiriasi. Others produce Animals of their own sort, as is wel known of Mice; provided it be certain that they are Spontaneously generated. And truly I conceive there are few Animals Spontaneously Generated, which do not after∣wards generate such as themselves. Aristotle in Lib. v. de Hist. Animal. Cap. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tels us that Glow-worms are Generated out of a certain kind of hairy Palmer-worms. Yet Fabius Columna relates, in Observ. Lib. min. Cognit. et Rar Starp. Addit. that Carolus Vintimillias the Panormita: observed in Sicily, that Glow-worms are some Male and some Female. For keeping divers naked ones in a Glas: * 1.466 for his pleasure, and delighting to see them thine in the night, (for which cause he fed them with moistned bread) as he was at Supper, a winged one came flying about the Candle, which he caused to be caught and put into the Glass unto the rest, which presently (he looking on) one Trod one of them and stuck to her, as the Silk-worm is wont to do, and being Pluckt from her he Trod another and ano∣ther: and the day following they laid their Eggs, resembling Milet Seed in shape and color.

This only we shall add by way of Conclusion, * 1.467 that we conceive Aristotle to have been in the right when he wrote, that all things in some sort are ful of Souls. Which though they do not allwaies Animate and inform the things wherein they are, no nor act at all, yet they lie concealed in them; and when they find their time and have gained fit matter they display their forces. And therefore again, Julius Cae∣sar Scaliger did wel write, in 1 de Plantis, that there are most secretly hidden Seeds of Spontaneous live things. And therefore, if we list to speak accurately, nothing can properly be said to be Spontaneously generated; but every thing is bred of its own Seed, though hidden and not discernable by our senses, or at least of a prin∣ciple answering to Seed. And this is all the difference betwixt Spontaneous things and non-Spontaneous, that the latter have a manifest Seed, the former an hidden secret Seed, or somwhat equivalent thereto. For we list not here to contend a∣bout words. Only this must be remembred, that those things which are said to be Spontaneously generated do not proceed from an external equivocal agent, but from an internal principle; which if any man will cal Seed, or a Seminal principle, or somwhat answering to Seed, he shall have my Consent. For although Licetus, Lib. 4. de Spont. Viv. Ort. Cap. 2. denies that all things have their Seeds: yet there he grants, that those things which are said to be of Spontaneous original have somwhat answering to Seed. Now the manner of their Generation is this; as an Animal is said to nourish and augment it self, whiles the common principle and first cause of nutrition and augmentation communicates it self to the assimilated Aliment, and insinuates it self thereinto, but doth not make a Soul like it self in the ••liment: so the Spontaneous original of live things is effected, whiles the agent lying hid within the matter, and not yet manifestly performing the operations of a Soul, having gained a matter rightly fitted and disposed, communicates it self thereto, and begins to perform therein the operations proper to it self, and to exercise the function of a Soul, but doth not produce another Soul in the matter.

THE CONCLUSION.

AND so much shall suffice to have spoken (though but briefly) of a most excee∣ding hard and obscure subject. It had been easie to have discoursed more largely of more sorts of Spontaneous living things: but my purpose is not in this place to write a natural History, but only to propound the manner of the original of Spontaneous living things, and to declare the same by certain examples. And although I know many things may be objected against that manner of the Generati∣on of these things which seems to me most probable: yet this I know withall, that it is easier to oppose the truth then to declare the same; and that a right line is the measure of it self and a croaked line too; and who ever shall rightly discern the truth may easily answer all objections, of which a thousand may be invented.

Nevertheless if any thing obscure and doubtful shall occur in an Argument handled by few Authors, it is not fit to reject or condemne the same, before som∣what better shall be substituted in the place thereof. And therefore, friendly Reader,

If ought thou know'st, which is then this more true, Write is; if not, Ʋse this: and so Adiew.

SUch is the Acuteness and Solidity of this Excellent Philosophical Treatise, wherein out learned Author hath in my Opinion performed his Master piece, that he and the Engli∣sher thereof may well say in the words of Ovid:

And now the work is ended, which Jover rage Nor Fire nor Sword shall raze, nor Eating Age. Come when it will my deaths uncertain houre, Which of this Body only bath a power: Yet shall my better part transcend the Skie And my immortal name shall never die. For wheresoere the British Peoples spred Their conquering Arms, I shall of all be Read.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Two man∣ner of Principles of Natural things.
• * 1.2

  The Na∣tural Phi∣losopher must know God to be the first Principle of all things:
• * 1.3

  the second Causes:
• * 1.4

  The World created by God:
• * 1.5

  The World created of nothing
• * 1.6

  the World was made in time:
• * 1.7

  the Use of the holy Scriptures in natural Philosophy
• * 1.8

  Things to be obser∣ved in the explication of the Hi∣story of the World
• * 1.9

  Whether the Prin∣ciples are contrary?
• * 1.10

  the End and use of Matter.
• * 1.11

  the Form the princi∣pal Cause of Gene∣ration.
• * 1.12

  The first Original of Forms.
• * 1.13

  The first Qualities are only an instrumen∣tal Agent in Genera∣tion.
• * 1.14

  Whence the Elements have their forms.
• * 1.15

  Whether Forms are drawn out of the ap∣titode of the Mat∣ter?
• * 1.16

  Whence that Opi∣nion arose, of drawing Forms out of the ap∣titude of the Mat∣ter.
• * 1.17

  The dif∣ference be∣twixt Ar∣tificial and natural Effects.
• * 1.18

  The Pro∣prieties of Forms.
• * 1.19

  Privation.
• * 1.20

  The Na∣ture of Privation explaingd.
• * 1.21

  There is a Consent & Dissent of Natural things.
• * 1.22

  A Natural Appetite, & a Natu∣ral Know∣ledg.
• * 1.23

  Examples of the Con∣sent and Dissent of things.
• * 1.24

  Precipi∣tation.
• * 1.25

  The cure of persons burnt, and such as are frozen with cold.
• * 1.26

  The tem∣per of Camphire.
• * 1.27

  Whether there is ••••y other matter of Bodies be∣sides the Elements?
• * 1.28

  There are Forms su∣per-added to the forms of mixt Be∣dies.
• * 1.29

  Fernelius defends occult Qualities.
• * 1.30

  Whether occult Qualities be the Re∣fuge of Ig∣norance. The occult qualities cause sci∣ence.
• * 1.31

  The won∣derful pro∣perties of Fire.
• * 1.32

  the names of occult Qualities and what they are.
• * 1.33

  'Tis mo∣ved that there are occult perlities.
• * 1.34

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ons of oc∣cult qual∣ties diffe∣rent from these o•• the mani∣fest 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.35

  Also the manner of acting is different.
• * 1.36

  Occult qualities known & asserted by learned Men.
• * 1.37

  Sancto∣rius his Discourse of Hidden Qualities examined.
• * 1.38

  Sancto∣rius his arguments examined.
• * 1.39

  Of the differences Occult dities.
• * 1.40

  Of the Antipathy betwixt a Man and a Cat.
• * 1.41

  That there are Occult Qualities which a∣rise not from the first, pro∣ved by cer∣tain Expe∣riments.
• * 1.42

  All things are not vain which are reported of Occult Qualities.
• * 1.43

  A Story of the Echeneis, Remora, or Stop fish
• * 1.44

  Tis ridi∣culous to deny a ma∣nifest ef∣fect becaus the causeis unknown.
• * 1.45

  The mix∣ture of the first Qua∣lities can∣not pro∣duce the occult Qualities.
• * 1.46

  Occult Qualities are not drawn out of the po∣wer of the Matter.
• * 1.47

  Whether the forms of Plants and Bruits spring from the Elements••.
• * 1.48

  Whether there be nothing in a thing which was not in its Principles.
• * 1.49

  Life, how many wais taken.
• * 1.50

  Whether the occult Qualities flow from Heaven?
• * 1.51

  The true Original of Occult qualities. The dif∣ferences of of Occult qualities.
• * 1.52

  Occult qualities in certain sorts of living things.
• * 1.53

  Individu∣al Pro∣prieties.
• * 1.54

  Of the Occult Qualities of Jewels, Stones, & Metals.
• * 1.55

  Occult Qualities of dead things.
• * 1.56

  Whence they pro∣ceed.
• * 1.57

  Whence the subor∣dinate Forms ••roceed
• * 1.58

  The end of those Forms.
• * 1.59

  The sub∣ject of these forms.
• * 1.60

  Occult qualities in things which are naturally bred in Plants & Animals.
• * 1.61

  Occult qualities of things preterna∣turally bred in the Bodies of Animals.
• * 1.62

  The dif∣ferences of occult qualities.
• * 1.63

  Material Qualities and spiri∣tual spe∣cies, how they differ.
• * 1.64

  What spi∣ritual spe∣cies are.
• * 1.65

  Occult material Qualities.
• * 1.66

  Spiritual Qualities.
• * 1.67

  The third difference of Occult qualities.
• * 1.68

  The fourth Difference.
• * 1.69

  The fist difference.
• * 1.70

  Occult quality of Aliments.
• * 1.71

  The qua∣lity of oc∣cult Medi∣caments.
• * 1.72

  The Oc∣cult quali∣ties of Venoms.
• * 1.73

  Of Anti∣dotes.
• * 1.74

  The praise of Demo∣critus.
• * 1.75

  The De∣ctrine of Atomes a most anci∣ent Do∣ctrine.
• * 1.76

  'Tis foun∣ded on Reason.
• * 1.77

  The Do∣ctrine of Atomes explained.
• * 1.78

  the man∣ner of Atomes.
• * 1.79

  Many have held there are Atomes.
• * 1.80

  'tis pro∣v••d that there are Atomes.
• * 1.81

  Fiery A∣tomes or Bodikies.
• * 1.82

  Aerial Atomes.
• * 1.83

  Watry A∣tomes or Bodikies.
• * 1.84

  Earthy A∣tomes or Bodikies.
• * 1.85

  Alteration what it is. What hea∣ting is.
• * 1.86

  The Fire is no Acci∣dent.
• * 1.87

  Refrige∣ration.
• * 1.88

  Of the Elementa∣ry Atomes mixture is made.
• * 1.89

  The Me∣teors are made of Atomes.
• * 1.90

  A Cloud.
• * 1.91

  The se∣cond kind of Atomes.
• * 1.92

  Chymical Operations prove A∣tomes.
• * 1.93

  Precipi∣tation.
• * 1.94

  Reduction.
• * 1.95

  Many∣shap'd Mercury.
• * 1.96

  Atomes of Animate Bodies.
• * 1.97

  The A∣tomes of Plants.
• * 1.98

  The A∣tomes of purgatives
• * 1.99

  Atomes retain the forms of things.
• * 1.100

  Atomes are deter∣minate.
• * 1.101

  Things smallest in Nature.
• * 1.102

  Mixture what it signifies.
• * 1.103

  What mix∣ture it.
• * 1.104

  Whether things mixable do in the mixture ••etain ••heir ••o••ms?
• * 1.105

  The Opi∣nion of those Au∣thors who hold the Forms re∣main in the mixt ••edies.
• * 1.106

  Arguments for this Opinion.
• * 1.107

  The prin∣cipal cause of mixture
• * 1.108

  The Opi∣nion of Erastus touching the Cause of Mix∣ture.
• * 1.109

  Mixture how it is made.
• * 1.110

  Nature the Hand∣maid of God.
• * 1.111

  All things from God.
• * 1.112

  The Ge∣neration of a living and life∣less mixt Body does differ.
• * 1.113

  Whether a fight of the Ele∣ments is requisite in Mixture?
• * 1.114

  Whether in mixture the Ingre∣dients must needs be reduced into A∣tomes?
• * 1.115

  The Edu∣ction of Forms is rejected.
• * 1.116

  Whether the Ele∣ments only are mixed.
• * 1.117

  Into what mixt bo∣dies are resolved.
• * 1.118

  Some Mi∣stions are made by consent & dissent of Atomes.
• * 1.119

  Whether Wines, me∣dicaments, Treacle, Mithri∣date, and distilled waters, are bodies really mixed.
• * 1.120

  The essen∣tial parts of living things.
• * 1.121

  Souls are rather multiplied than made
• * 1.122

  The Souls not from God.
• * 1.123

  How God concurs with se∣cond cau∣ses to the generation of things.
• * 1.124

  Whether Souls come from Hea∣ven?
• * 1.125

  The Opi∣nion of Fernelius.
• * 1.126

  Fernelius his Opini∣on of the Original of Souls confuted.
• * 1.127

  His Ar∣guments.
• * 1.128

  A twofold Generati∣tion of Living things.
• * 1.129

  Four Opi∣nions con∣cerning the Gene∣ration of Living things.
• * 1.130

  The Ori∣ginal of the soul in general is to be en∣quired into.
• * 1.131

  Whether Souls are drawn out of the ap∣titude of the matter
• * 1.132

  Who was the Author of the Opi∣nion of drawing of form out of th aptitude of the mat∣ter.
• * 1.133

  Reasons for the E∣duction of forms out of the ap∣titude of the matter.
• * 1.134

  How living things are generated.
• * 1.135

  when ge∣neration of living things is truly made
• * 1.136

  whether that Opi∣nion of the eduction of forms out of the power of matter can be ex∣plained.
• * 1.137

  Absurdi∣ties which follow the Opinion of drawing the Forms out of the aptitude of the matter
• * 1.138

  The Opi∣nion of Fortunius Licetus concerning the Edu∣ction of Forms out of the ap∣titude of the Matter.
• * 1.139

  The diffe∣rence of a Logical & a Natural kind.
• * 1.140

  Whether the Edu∣ction of the Form out of the ap∣titude of the Matter he founded on the holy Scriptures
• * 1.141

  The Opi∣nion of Albertus Magnus concerning the forma∣tive Fa∣culty.
• * 1.142

  The Opi∣nion of Jacobus Schegkius.
• * 1.143

  The Opi∣nion of ••aucta∣cruz con∣cerning the Instru∣menium sedaratum.
• * 1.144

  This Opi∣nion refu∣ted.
• * 1.145

  There is no separate Instrument which acts by it self.
• * 1.146

  The first & second Act of an Instrument
• * 1.147

  An Instru∣ment dire∣cted by the principal Cause Acts beyond its own Abi∣lity.
• * 1.148

  The Cause of the Mo∣tion of things hur∣led.
• * 1.149

  Wherein the nature of an In∣strument consists.
• * 1.150

  That the Seed is animated.
• * 1.151

  Authors who hold the seed to be anima∣ted.
• * 1.152

  What is the Nature of the seed
• * 1.153

  What Seed is.
• * 1.154

  What Soul is in the Seed.
• * 1.155

  'Tis pro∣ved that Seed is a∣nimated.
• * 1.156

  The Ope∣rations of the Seed. The first Vivifica∣tion.
• * 1.157

  The Se∣cond, the shaping of the Body.
• * 1.158

  Galen sings an Hymne to God the Creater.
• * 1.159

  The shape∣ing of the Body of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 live crea∣ture is the work of the Soul.
• * 1.160

  Fienus his Reason a∣gainst the Animation of the seed of Plants.
• * 1.161

  There is no ••gent in the seed except the soul.
• * 1.162

  The innate Heat in the Seed is not the Principle of confor∣mation.
• * 1.163

  The vertue of the Mo∣thers Womb is not the Cause of the forma∣tion of the yong one.
• * 1.164

  The Ob∣jection of Fienus against the presence of the soul in the seed.
• * 1.165

  Like would not beget its like, if the Seed were not anima∣ted,
• * 1.166

  A Thing Inanimate cannot in∣gender that which is Animate.
• * 1.167

  How Live things are generated.
• * 1.168

  Souls are co-exten∣ded with their Be∣dise.
• * 1.169

  How the Soul mul∣tiplies it self.
• * 1.170

  Whether the soul be divisible.
• * 1.171

  How souls are co-ex∣tened with the Body:
• * 1.172

  Whether the soul move?
• * 1.173

  The na∣ture of the soul decla∣red.
• * 1.174

  The Body hath quan∣tity, it di∣visible, takes up place, i•• movable.

  The soul of it self hath no quantity, fills the body, is in∣divisible, is co ex∣tended with the Body.

  Three manners of being any where, two bodies can∣not be te∣gether in the same place.

  What things are repletively any where.

  God fils al things.

  The soul fills the whol body:
• * 1.175

  Now th•• soul can be multi∣plied:
• * 1.176

  The soul properly is not divi∣ded: Whether the soul be co-exten∣ded with the body?
• * 1.177

  A twosold tutension
• * 1.178

  Every form can multiply it self:
• * 1.179

  Many manners of the souls propagati∣on.

  The soul is multi∣plied in its proper sub∣ject.
• * 1.180

  Whether the forms of Metals are multi∣plied.
• * 1.181

  How Me∣tals are ge∣nerated.
• * 1.182

  whence souls have power to multiply themselves
• * 1.183

  The Soul is two waies in the Body
• * 1.184

  The force of Nature, whence it is.
• * 1.185

  What Na∣ture is.
• * 1.186

  Whether the soul cannot be but-in an organical Body.
• * 1.187

  The Form deteamines the Quan∣tities and Figures.
• * 1.188

  The Soul is in the parts as they are similar.
• * 1.189

  Whether the seed acts upon it self?
• * 1.190

  The soul is the first Agent in the seed.

  Two parts in the seed.
• * 1.191

  Whether the Effici∣ent Cause be alwaies external?
• * 1.192

  The diffe∣rence be∣twert Na∣ture and an Artifi∣cer.

  Whether the soul goes out of one sub∣ject into a∣nother.
• * 1.193

  The soul is not di∣visible.
• * 1.194

  whether the seed be a Plant?
• * 1.195

  what things are required to genera∣tion.
• * 1.196

  when Ge∣neration is made.
• * 1.197

  How many waies the form is in a thing.
• * 1.198

  whether the seed be an Animal
• * 1.199

  whether the seed•• lives?
• * 1.200

  How ma∣ny waies life is taken?
• * 1.201

  Whether the seed be potentially animated?
• * 1.202

  The soul uses the spirit when it shapes the body.

  Whether there be a spirit in the seeds of Plants.
• * 1.203

  How ma∣ny kinds of live things
• * 1.204

  The seed of Plants is anima∣ced.
• * 1.205

  The won∣derful Ge∣ration of Plants.
• * 1.206

  Sundry manners of the propa∣gation of Plants.
• * 1.207

  Plants propagated by Inunda∣tions of water, and by rains.
• * 1.208

  The for∣mation of Plants not caused by the Sun.
• * 1.209

  The won∣derfulmnl∣tiplication of Plants.
• * 1.210

  Two parts of the seed in Plants.
• * 1.211

  The pulp of the seed.
• * 1.212

  The Bark of seed why made
• * 1.213

  Whether the Souls of Bruits spring from the Elements?
• * 1.214

  the won∣derful un∣derstan∣ding of Bruits.
• * 1.215

  The Sexes in Animols
• * 1.216

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.217

  The mix∣ture of Forms is possible.
• * 1.218

  The Con∣junction of souls ab∣surd.
• * 1.219

  The Ge∣neration of living Creatures twofold.
• * 1.220

  The Seed of Animals is anima∣ted.
• * 1.221

  Eggs have a soul in them.
• * 1.222

  Eggs com∣pared to the seeds of Plants.
• * 1.223

  Animals which bring forth quick joung ones.
• * 1.224

  The Seed of Animals is anima∣ted.
• * 1.225

  The yong ones of Animals are not shaped by the Womb.
• * 1.226

  In the seed it self is the Cause of Confor∣mation.
• * 1.227

  The soul is the cause of the shaping of an Ani∣mal.
• * 1.228

  The Con∣troversie touching the forma∣tion of the yong ••ne stated.
• * 1.229

  'Tis pro∣ved that the soul in the seed is the Cause of Confor∣mation.
• * 1.230

  When a Plant is generated.
• * 1.231

  A refut••∣tion of ar∣guments brought a∣gainst the presence of the soul in the seed of Animals. The seed is not an excrement.
• * 1.232

  How the Seed is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 anima••••••
• * 1.233

  The diffe∣rence of the seed of Plants and Animals.
• * 1.234

  The Obje∣ctians of Joh. Galle∣go.
• * 1.235

  In what sense the seed is more Im∣perfect than the Generator.
• * 1.236

  Whether the Organs introduce the soul.
• * 1.237

  Whether the seed be actually a∣nimated?
• * 1.238

  What is the most common action of the soul.
• * 1.239

  Whether souls are united.
• * 1.240

  Whether the Parent in genera∣tion loses any of his soul:
• * 1.241

  Divers Opinions touching the origi∣nal of the Soul of Man. The pro∣position of what is to be said of the origin∣nal of hu∣mant souls.
• * 1.242

  The Hu∣mane soul is propaga∣ted into the chil∣dren by the seed.
• * 1.243

  The hu∣mane soul is present at the be∣ginning of the Con∣ception.
• * 1.244

  The hu∣mane soul is not edu∣ced out of the power of the matter.
• * 1.245

  The soul of a Man is present at the first conception.
• * 1.246

  The O∣pinion of Thomas Fienus concerning the pre∣sence of the soul in a child in the womb. The Coats of the child in the womb are formed by the soul
• * 1.247

  The mem∣branes are made pre∣sently up∣on the be∣ginning of the concep∣tion.
• * 1.248

  The Au∣thors judg∣ment con∣cerning the Opinion of Fienus.
• * 1.249

  Wherein Flenus comes short.
• * 1.250

  Fienus his alse Conclusion.
• * 1.251

  The sha∣ping of a living be∣dy common to all li∣ving things.
• * 1.252

  Fienus dots not prove that the Soul is not in the Seed before the third day.
• * 1.253

  That the shaping of the Child does begin presently after the first mo∣ment of Concepti∣on. Conception when it be∣gins.
• * 1.254

  The Opi∣nions of the Fathers concerning the forma∣tion of the Child.
• * 1.255

  Whether, unless a man com∣municate the Soul in his Seed he can be said to beget his like.
• * 1.256

  The Birth does not confer the likeness of Sort, but the Gene∣ration.
• * 1.257

  The Souls of Bruits are not drawn out of the po∣wer of the Matter. The nobi∣lity of mans Soul may Iland with the propa∣gation thereof.
• * 1.258

  Whether God he the Cause of the forma∣tion of Mans Bo∣dy.
• * 1.259

  Whether a Formative Principle be the Cause of shaping the Child in the Womb.
• * 1.260

  Whether any forma∣tive facul∣ty can be in the seed without the soul.
• * 1.261

  Whether there are divers souls in a Man?
• * 1.262

  There is one soul in a Man.
• * 1.263

  Divers faculties and acti∣ons flow from one foul.
• * 1.264

  Reasons to prove that there is but one soul in a Man.
• * 1.265

  There is no vege∣tative thing but pertains to some sort of vegeta∣bles.
• * 1.266

  Whether a Man hath three Essences?
• * 1.267

  The Vege∣tative soul constitutes no Plant of it self.
• * 1.268

  Sense and motion do constitute no sort of Animals.
• * 1.269

  From one soul flow all the sa¦culties of the same sort of A∣nimal.
• * 1.270

  How a Man is at once a Man, an Animal, A Vegetable.
• * 1.271

  Nothing Corruptible in the soul of Man.
• * 1.272

  Why the soul pre∣sently upon its Rise does not propagate all its ope∣rations to∣gether.
• * 1.273

  The Child is shaped only by the Soul.
• * 1.274

  As the ve∣getative is in Plants and Ani∣mals after a different manner, so is the sen∣sitive in Animals.
• * 1.275

  Whether Plants do truly live?
• * 1.276

  Such things an∣swered as are brought against the propagati∣on of the Humane soul.
• * 1.277

  Whether the human soul parti∣cipate with bodi∣ly actions
• * 1.278

  The souls of Bruits are not drawn out of the po∣wer of the matter.
• * 1.279

  Whether if the Hu∣man soul be propa∣gated from the Father to the Son, it should be therfore mortal.
• * 1.280

  Why God made Sex∣••••••ia Ani∣mals.
• * 1.281

  Whether the Seed be an Excre∣ment.
• * 1.282

  With what Soul the Seed is a∣nimated.
• * 1.283

  The soul of the Pa∣rent in ge∣neration remains entire.
• * 1.284

  The Tra∣duction of the Soul what it is.
• * 1.285

  The gener∣ation of Live things how manifold.
• * 1.286

  Spontane∣ous Gener∣ation what it is.
• * 1.287

  Equivocal generation
• * 1.288

  What things are Generated of their own ac∣cord.
• * 1.289

  Whether Avicenna held that Men could grow out of the Earth.
• * 1.290

  The effici∣ent Cause of Living things Ge∣nerated of themselves
• * 1.291

  Whether things ge∣nerated of them are produced only by the common Cause.
• * 1.292

  Whether they receive their Soul from God
• * 1.293

  A place out of Lu∣ther con∣cerning the generation of these kind of Creatures.
• * 1.294

  How God concurs to the gener∣ation of things.
• * 1.295

  Whether the form of these Creatures is made by Intelligen∣ces.
• * 1.296

  Whether they are generated by the Heaven.
• * 1.297

  Whether the Heaven be also a Particular Cause.
• * 1.298

  Whether these spon∣taneous Creatures do spring from heat.
• * 1.299

  Whether they pro∣ceed from the Soul of the world.
• * 1.300

  Whether from the Soul of the Earth.
• * 1.301

  Whether Plants Spring up of their own second by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ty ••••plan∣ted 〈…〉〈…〉 Earth.
• * 1.302

  whether from a spirit pro∣duced from Heaven?
• * 1.303

  The effici∣ent Cause of Sponta∣neous live things lies hid in the matter.
• * 1.304

  whether putrefacti∣on be the Cause?
• * 1.305

  Or from Concoction
• * 1.306

  whether from pu∣trefaction and the Heaven?
• * 1.307

  The opini∣on of For∣tunius Li∣cetus.
• * 1.308

  The true difference.
• * 1.309

  The diffe∣rences of Spontane∣ous living Things.
• * 1.310

  Places of Aristotle where he teaches that all things are Generated by an uni∣vocal A∣gent.
• * 1.311

  How spon∣taneous living Things are generated by an Uni∣vocal ge∣nerator.
• * 1.312

  Seed taken properly & improperly
• * 1.313

  The effici∣ent of spontane∣ous live Things it the Soul.
• * 1.314

  Whence the soul comes which Causes Spontane∣ous Gener∣ation?
• * 1.315

  Spontane∣ous live Things grow only out of Things living.
• * 1.316

  How ma∣ny waies the Soul may be in the mat∣ter? A twofold Act of the soul.

  Essential Accidental

  A double operation of the soul.
• * 1.317

  A soul may be in a matter & not inform it.
• * 1.318

  How all things are ful of souls.
• * 1.319

  What 'tis to live.
• * 1.320

  The soul is two waies in the matter
• * 1.321

  Spontane∣ous Gener∣ation how manisold?
• * 1.322

  The opini∣on of Fort. Licetus of the origi∣nal of spon∣taneous live things properly so called.
• * 1.323

  the opinion of Licetus examined.
• * 1.324

  The opinion of the Au∣thor con∣cerning the original of Spontane∣ous Live things pro∣perly so called.
• * 1.325

  There are subordi∣nate souls.
• * 1.326

  Whether the subor∣dinate forms are specifical.
• * 1.327

  How sub∣ordinate forms are in thinge.
• * 1.328

  One Inter∣nal form may put on divers ex∣ternal ones
• * 1.329

  The dege∣neration of Plants.
• * 1.330

  The matter of sponta∣neous live things.
• * 1.331

  The v••••••∣ous propa∣gation of Plants.
• * 1.332

  Whether Animals Spring from ••o∣dies imper∣fectly mix∣ed.
• * 1.333

  The Opini∣on of Li∣cetus con∣cerning the matter of Spontane∣ous live things.
• * 1.334

  The opinion of Licetus examined.
• * 1.335

  The dif∣ference be∣twixt Spontane∣ous and non-spon∣tax•••••• generati••••••.
• * 1.336

  The mat∣ter of spon∣taneous live things
• * 1.337

  Whether one Form is changed into ano∣ther.
• * 1.338

  The mat∣ter of spon∣taneous live things
• * 1.339

  Forms re∣main in Atomes.
• * 1.340

  The Semi∣nal virtue somtimes dies.
• * 1.341

  The souls of Brute Beasts are not im∣mortal.
• * 1.342

  Sundry opinions concerning the end of Spontane∣ous live∣things.
• * 1.343

  The true Opinion.
• * 1.344

  The Glory of God shines in the smallest Creatures.
• * 1.345

  A brief of the opinion concerning the original of sponta∣neous live things.
• * 1.346

  Spontane∣ous live things spring only from live things.
• * 1.347

  Spontane∣ous live things how manifold they are.

  The Ge∣neration of Mushroms and Puck∣fists.
• * 1.348

  Whence toad-stools have their Soul.
• * 1.349

  The kinds of toad∣stools or Mushroms
• * 1.350

  All toad∣stools or Mushroms arise from Plants.
• * 1.351

  Toadstools from a white pop∣lar tree.
• * 1.352

  Why toad∣stools are so suddenly Generated.
• * 1.353

  The differ∣ences of toadstools.
• * 1.354

  The origi∣nal of toad stools which grow upon Trees.
• * 1.355

  Toadstools Springing out of the Earth.
• * 1.356

  Out of a poplar tree

  Out of a Fig-tree.
• * 1.357

  Out of tree branches Wither••d.
• * 1.358

  The varie∣ty of Toad stools.
• * 1.359

  The Harts toad-stool is not bred of Har•••• Seed
• * 1.360

  Toadstools out of Stones.
• * 1.361

  What kind of Stones they are out of which Musheoms grow.
• * 1.362

  Mushroms growing from wine dropping upon the Stone.
• * 1.363

  Plants, how they grow up of themselves
• * 1.364

  The man∣ner of the Spontane∣ous gener∣ation of Plant
• * 1.365

  Whether Atomes containing the Soul may be cal∣led Seed
• * 1.366

  The gener∣ation of Moss.
• * 1.367

  The Ge∣neration of Plants out of dried Plants.
• * 1.368

  A dry alive stock wil sprout againe.
• * 1.369

  Hercules his Club did sprous.
• * 1.370

  The spear of Romn∣lus being made of ash sprou∣ted.
• * 1.371

  All Plants do not die as soon as they are pluckt out of the Earth.
• * 1.372

  Which way a dry Olive tree may come to sprout a∣gain.
• * 1.373

  Sundry waies of the Propa∣gation of Plants.
• * 1.374

  Herbs that Root, re∣vive again
• * 1.375

  Of Hogs-dung Sow-Thistles are bred.
• * 1.376

  The Souls of Brutes Mortal.
• * 1.377

  Laserpiti∣um bred by a shower.
• * 1.378

  How plants are propagated by Rains.
• * 1.379

  Plants bred of Plants of a differente sort.
• * 1.380

  The dege∣neration of Plants.
• * 1.381

  How it comes to pass.
• * 1.382

  The Dege∣neration of plants where caused.
• * 1.383

  Plants a∣rising from dung.
• * 1.384

  Plants breeding in the waters
• * 1.385

  Plants out of Snow.
• * 1.386

  Plants growing upon other plants.
• * 1.387

  Plants growing on Rocks. Whether Corals grow spon∣taneously.
• * 1.388

  Plants from the tears of plants.
• * 1.389

  Plants from plants of a several sort.
• * 1.390

  The four manners of Licetus.
• * 1.391

  The gener∣ation of Bird-lime.
• * 1.392

  Galls.
• * 1.393

  Whether plants breed of Animals.
• * 1.394

  How plants grow in Animals
• * 1.395

  Moss gro∣wing on Shel-fish and on the Backs of Whales.
• * 1.396

  Whether plants grow out of the dead Bodies of Animals. Moss bred on the bones of men.
• * 1.397

  Coral gro∣wing on a mans skul.
• * 1.398

  Whether Asparagus do grow upon the horns of a Ram.
• * 1.399

  Whether plants grow out of Metals.
• * 1.400

  Whether the souls of plants and brutes do perish by Death and come to nothing.
• * 1.401

  Whether they perish.
• * 1.402

  The opini∣on of the Chymists.
• * 1.403

  John Mar∣cus Marci.
• * 1.404

  The former arguments answered.
• * 1.405

  Animals which breed of themselves
• * 1.406

  Whether Spontane∣o•••• Ani∣mals were made at the fir••t Christion.
• * 1.407

  The origi∣nal of spon∣tane•••• live things
• * 1.408

  Spontane∣ously bred Animals dogenerate
• * 1.409

  The differ∣ence of Spontane∣ous Ani∣mals. Flies that live in the Fire.
• * 1.410

  Not gener∣ated in the Fire.
• * 1.411

  Whene•• bred.
• * 1.412

  Animals bred out of the Snow.
• * 1.413

  How Worms are bred in the snow.
• * 1.414

  From Rain, Dew Mists.
• * 1.415

  Animals falling down with Rain.
• * 1.416

  Animals are not bred in the Air. The Lem∣mer of Norway.
• * 1.417

  Animals bred in the Water.

  Water-spiders or Tipula.
• * 1.418

  Animals bred in the Water sun∣dry waies.
• * 1.419

  Animals bred out of the Earth
• * 1.420

  Earth Fishes.
• * 1.421

  The Ge∣neration of Eeles.
• * 1.422

  Plant-Animals
• * 1.423

  The Spon∣taneous O∣riginal of Flies.
• * 1.424

  Animals bred of Mushroms
• * 1.425

  Worms out of living Plants.
• * 1.426

  The gener∣ation of Caterpil∣lars and Butterflies
• * 1.427

  How Ca∣terpillars and Butter flies are Generated
• * 1.428

  The gener∣ation of Gnats.
• * 1.429

  Gnats ge∣nerated of a wild sig∣tree.
• * 1.430

  A fourfold original of Animals that breed of living Plants. The First
• * 1.431

  The Se∣cond.
• * 1.432

  The third.
• * 1.433

  The fourth
• * 1.434

  Two man∣ners of the generation of Animals out of liv∣ing Plants
• * 1.435

  Animals bred of dead plants.
• * 1.436

  The Cad∣worm.
• * 1.437

  Wall-Lice.
• * 1.438

  The rela∣tion of Jul. Caes. Sea∣liger.
• * 1.439

  Of P. Pena and M. Lobel.
• * 1.440

  Of Mi∣chael Me∣jer.
• * 1.441

  Of Carolus Clusius.
• * 1.442

  The true Opinion concerning these Scot∣tish Geese.
• * 1.443

  The Ge∣neration of these Scot∣tish Geese
• * 1.444

  The Vege table Lamb of Musco∣via.
• * 1.445

  Animals Springing from dried Plants.
• * 1.446

  Their man∣ner of Ge∣neration according to Licetus. First.
• * 1.447

  The second manner.
• * 1.448

  The Third
• * 1.449

  The fourth
• * 1.450

  Animals bred of the juyces of Plants.
• * 1.451

  Some Ani∣mals ge∣nerate without Copulation Female Mice en∣gender of themselves without the Male
• * 1.452

  Eeles have no Male nor Female
• * 1.453

  The Semi∣nal princi∣pal of same Animals may lie hid in sundry Bodies.
• * 1.454

  The Ge∣neration of Animals without sex is not Spontane∣ous.
• * 1.455

  A three-fold Origi∣nal of spontane∣ous Ani∣mals
• * 1.456

  Dragon-worms.
• * 1.457

  The Ser∣pents sent by God a∣mongst the Israelites in the wil∣derness were not these little Dragons.
• * 1.458

  Worms un∣der the tongue of Harts and Dogs:
• * 1.459

  Ricini or tykes, worms so called:
• * 1.460

  Animals Breed in Animals after a threefold manner, according to Licetus.
• * 1.461

  Animals bred of the Excre∣ments of Animals.
• * 1.462

  Some Ani∣mals after they are dead re∣vive a∣gain:
• * 1.463

  Animals of a differ∣ent sort out of the Carkasses of Ani∣mals:
• * 1.464

  How worms are bred of the Bodies of Animals:
• * 1.465

  The dif∣ference of Spontane∣ous Ani∣mals.
• * 1.466

  Glow-worms do 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.467

  Al things ful of souls