SO that in respect of the causes, * 1.1 a Symptome is properly divi∣ded into a Symptome of a Disease, a Symptome of a Cause, and a Symptome of a Symptome; for they labour in vain•• who endeavour to draw all Symptomes from Diseases.
A Symptome of a Disease is that which immediately fol∣lows a Disease, * 1.2 no other affect contrary to nature comming be∣tween, as when an ill concoction follows a distemper of the sto∣mach, which is called in Greek Cylosis. A Symptome of a cause is when the action is hurt, although the faculty, and its organ be well; the faculty being hindered by an external fault, as when the Liver, though sound, cannot sanguifie, by reason of vitious chyle; * 1.3 they trouble themselves exceedingly here, who endea∣vour to deduce every Symptome from a Disease, and actions hindred, which happen without a Disease, no way worthy the name of a Symptome, but think them worthy to be called certain natural differences, or imbecilities, since that they are accoun∣ted to perform nothing beyond their own strength: but they plainly erre in the matter, for that any work: may be perfected, not onely the agent, and that rightly disposed, but also the pa∣tient which receives the operation of the agent, is required: For as in voluntary actions; as for example, in gesture, or lifting of a weight, the businesse is in the free will of man, but that some work may be performed in the body; as for example, Sangui∣fication, Nourishment. It is necessary that the patient be joyn∣ed and coupled with the agent, but since the action of him that moves, and the patient moveable is but one motion, and dif∣fer onely in reason, as Aristotle teacheth, in the second Book of his natural Philosophy, Chap. 3. Title 23. Diservedly there∣fore in natural actions, when that is not performed which ought to be, especially in natural concoctions, all that which either is hurt, or frustrated, is deservedly called a Symptome, whether it be done by reason of the agent, or of the patient; for although,