The history of passive obedience since the Reformation

SECT. VI.

Among these Divines I will place one Civilian, the famous Al∣bericus Gentilis; who, tho Born in Italy, yet lived long in England; the King's Professor of the Laws in the most Famous University of Oxon, of which he was one of the greatest Ornaments. I shall not mention, what he says on this subject in his Books de Jure belli; since he hath undertaken it professedly in his three Royal Disputations, * 1.1 as he calls them; in the first of which, treating of the absolute power of a King (wherein his Notions are very agreeable to the Sentiments of his Master King James in his true law of free Monarchies, to which he refers) he affirms, that he is absolutely supreme, * 1.2 who acknowledges nothing above him, but God, to whom only, and not to any other he is to render an account. — he confesses there were some Magistrates im∣properly called Kings, such as the Kings of Sparta, and of Egypt, to which last there were laws set how far they should walk, and how of∣ten bath themselves, who might be accus'd when they were dead, and be∣ing convicted be denied decent Burial; but those do not deserve to be cal∣led Kings, whose Subjects pay them no more obedience, than they please. — A Prince is a God upon Earth, his Power is greater, than either that of a Father of old over his Children, or that of a Master over his Servants. All Princes are feudataries to God, * 1.3 to whom they ought to render an ac∣count of their Government, who is their only Judge, * 1.4 — 'tis a Maxim in the Civil Law, Princeps legibus solutus est, a Prince is free from

laws; the Greek Interpreters understand it, of his freedom from Penal Laws; for a Prince hath no Judges, who can compel him; others, that he is exempt from the coaction, not from the direction of the law, — but all agree against any force to be used against him.

This, and much more to this purpose, the Reader will meet with in that first disputation; while the third treats largely, how unjust any violence is, * 1.5 which Subjects use against their King, — by King, he says, he means such a Prince, as hath no Superior, no Judge, or Governor over him; he means also a lawful Prince, not a Tyrant; but such a lawful Prince who rules Tyrannically, i.e. seeks the destruction of the Commonwealth. It is a fundamental and unquestionable Law, that Men ought to honour their Prince, * 1.6 and not to speak evil of him, — and that what injuries ought not to be done to a Parent, * 1.7 ought much less to be done to a Prince; but no Man, says Tully, can take away the life of his Father with∣out great sin. This perhaps he spoke like a Stoick, but it was also spo∣ken like a great Lawyer; for the Roman Lawyers were great followers of that Sect of Philosophers; * 1.8 — the Power of a Prince is by Divine Right, not by the sole Constitution of Men. — Suppose a Prince going about to destroy his own Country, * 1.9 as Nero did, even Tyranny is more tole∣rable than Anarchy; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what happened when Nero was slain? In the Reigns of the three following Princes, * 1.10 which lasted but a few Months, more blood was spilt, than in the 14 years of Nero's Government. When it is objected, that we owe more to our Country than our Prince, he flatly denies it, — affirming, that the very Heathens knew, that God sent evil Princes, and that to reclaim Men from their sins; and that God hath left us remedies for such evils, such as repentance of our Vices, obedience to our Sovereign, * 1.11 thereby to encline them to be kind, and gentle; patience to take off the edge of their fury, * 1.12 and sighs, and tears. — If the case of the Low Countries be objected, and that our excellent Queen Eliza∣beth both praised, and defended them; the same answer must serve for this, as for all examples; that we must judge not according to examples, but according to Laws: or the case of the Men of Libnah, who rebelled against Jehoram, 2 Chron. 21.10. be insisted on, we must answer, says Drusius (and so we have another witness to this truth, the Learned Drusius) that every action, that is related in Holy Scripture, is not praised, nor was the cause good, that because the Prince had deserted the true Re∣ligion, therefore they might desert him, — for the Christians did not de∣sert the Apostate Julian, * 1.13 and that action is not to be made a pattern, that is done contrary to reason and law; nor does our defence of the Dutch confirm the Justice of their cause; for we may justly defend those, who themselves are engaged in an unjust War, * 1.14 as I have in more than one

place proved as to this fact of Queen Elizabeth. — If Equals have, no power one over another, how much less hath an inferior power ove•• his superior, a Subject over his Prince? he shall be restrain'd by his supe∣rior, who is God, — is it not in every Mans mouth, that a Prince hath no other Judge but God? — Shame and conscience, * 1.15 and honour may check them, but not their Subjects. — Obj. But do not Aqui∣nas, Luther, Peter Martyr, and Beza allow of resistance? Answ. the book de regimine Principis is not Aquinas's, says Sigonius (lib. 17. de regn. Ital.) Luther was deceived by the German Lawyers, and brought to alter his opinion for the worse, and what he spoke he said only of feu∣dataries, and of a Defensive War. Martyr was swayed by examples, not reason; as if because the Jews resisted the Macedonians, and Romans, whose Subjects they were not, therefore Subjects may resist their lawful Sovereigns, — the example of St. Ambrose does not reach this case, for he used no force, nor had he any right to deny the temple to the Emperor, which was his, — and Beza says only, * 1.16 that the Laws must authorize such resistance. — But there are cogent reasons to encline to the practice of Passive Obedience. 1. It is a rule, that we must not speak evil of the Prince. 2. Force towards a Father is unlawful, therefore to∣wards a Prince. 3. A less evil is not to be removed, if a greater will follow. 4. If a Man in defence of his Mother ought not to resist his Fa∣ther, neither ought he to resist his Prince in defence of his Country. 5. No one can depose a Prince, but he, who made him; but the People did not make him, &c. 6. No evil is to be done, that good may come of it. 7. How can a King have absolute Power, when he hath so many Ephori over him, as he hath Subjects? 8. The Authority of the Ancients, Plato, and Tully. — If it be objected, that Plato says, that Pa∣rents, when they grow mad, must be restrain'd; and that others say, that a Tyrant is a Madman: I answer, we constitute a Guardian over a mad Prince; * 1.17 but we deny that a cruel Tyrannical Prince is to be rec∣koned a Madman. Plato and Tully, and Bartolus are of the opinion, * 1.18 that there can be no just cause of rebelling against, or resisting a Prince. The sentence of Mr. l'Hospital is observable, that the Fa∣ction of the League was very potent; the defence the Hugonets made, seem'd necessary, but that only the King's cause was just; that both the Hugonots and Leaguers, were guilty of waging War against their King; but the Hugonots in a lesser degree, because the necessity of self defence is more excusable, than the Ambition of a Crown; bu•• no Cause was just, but the King's; for there cannot be any just cause of resisting a lawful Prince.

Notes

• * 1.1

  London 1605. 4 to.
• * 1.2

  p. 9, 10, 17.
• * 1.3

  p 17.
• * 1.4

  p. 34.
• * 1.5

  p 39. p. 100.
• * 1.6

  p. 101, 102.
• * 1.7

  parad. 3.
• * 1.8

  Rom. 13.
• * 1.9

  p. 103.
• * 1.10

  p. 105, 106, 107.
• * 1.11

  ☞
• * 1.12

  p. 112.
• * 1.13

  ☞
• * 1.14

  p. 116.
• * 1.15

  p. 118. p. 121, 122 123.
• * 1.16

  p. 12••. &c.
• * 1.17

  ☜
• * 1.18

  p. 132.