A philosophical discourse of the nature of rational and irrational souls by M.S.

A Discourse of the NATURE of Rational and Irrational Souls.

'TIS a solid Argument for the Truth of Revelati∣on, That it clear'd our Understandings, and gave a noble and rational account of things, when the whole World was wand'ring in Darkness, and lost in foolish Disputes, where neither Party was in the right. By the universal Maxim of the Ancients, De nihilo nihil in nihilum nil possere verti; even those, who believ'd a Deity, asserted the impossibility of creating any thing out of nothing, or annihilating any Being, and so put Limits to an Infinite Power. But Dr. Cudworth spends almost a whole Chapter to free them from this Error; and says, Their meaning was, that nothing naturally or of itself comes from nothing or goes to nothing; that is, something could not make it self out of nothing, nor turn it self into nothing again: and if that be all they mean, their meaning's true, but very childish. He adds, That Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius abus'd this Theorem, and built their Atheisti∣cal Philosophy upon it: But if they abus'd it, why did not the others rescue it? which we no where find. The dif∣ference between the Incorporealist and Corporealist was not about the meaning of this Theorem, that was admitted in its literal sence on both sides; but their difference lay about the Principles of Worldly Beings, and the efficient Cause which put those Principles into that form as we now see in the World: the one held Matter the only Principle, and Chance the efficient Cause; the others asserted two Principles, Matter and Spirit, and God the efficient Cause: but they no where say, that God made these Principles out of nothing. For it's evident, that from in nihilum nil posse reverti, the Incorporealists concluded the Immortality of

all Souls; and if from thence be prov'd the Immortality of Souls, so is the Post-eternity of Matter. And if from the later part of their Maxim they concluded a post-eternity of Principles, there is no manner of reason to doubt, but that from the first part of their Maxim they concluded a Prae-eternity: for de nihilo nihil is altogether as strong for a Prae-eternity, as in nihilum nihil is for a Post-eternity; therefore they must be understood by their prae and post-existence of Souls, eternal existence. Which I could also prove from variety of express Authorities, but for brevity sake I refer the Reader (if yet unsatisfied) to the incompa∣rable Dr. Stillingfleet, * 1.1 now Lord Bishop of Worcester, who takes this Theorem of the Ancients to task, because it de∣nies Creation out of nothing.

And as from hence sprung their prae as well as post-exi∣stence of all Souls, so likewise the Opinions, That the Souls of Men and Brutes were of the same nature, only differently operating according to the Organs of that Creature in which they were plac'd; of Transmigration of Souls, That the same Soul acted in the man at one time, in the Beast at another. Thus far then the Corporealist and Incorporealist agreed, That there could be no Creation out of nothing, or annihilation of any Being; and that the Souls of Men and Brutes were of the same nature. In both these Agree∣ments about the nature of all Souls, both built upon a false foundation, whereby each Party was drove into ridiculous Absurdities.

Hence we may observe in part the great Advantages brought to Mankind by Christianity, which confirm'd and made publick the old as well as new Revelation, by the light whereof men of mean understanding may, if they please, refute all these Errors, and be above the reach of the highest human Wisdom without the Light. It is hard there∣fore to give a reason why divers of our modern Writers are for maintaining that Error of the Ancients, that there is no

essential difference between the Souls of Men and Brutes. Thus the late Socinian Writer, in his Philosophical Harangue,

[Who is he that comprehends how the parts of Matter being in their own na∣ture lifeless and sensless, they do (for all that) in some positures and textures, acquire Life, Sensation, and even Volition, Memory, and Reason.]

Now if Matter can acquire Volition and Reason, then, for ought we know, all Souls are Matter; nor have we any medium left to prove an Incorporeal Being; from hence therefore I should con∣clude this man an absolute Corporealist: But since in another place of his Pamphlet he seems to disown that, I shall only conclude, that he knows as little the Why of his Opinions in Philosophy as in Di∣vinity. The Opinion in fashion runs into the contrary Extreme, and will not allow Omnipotence it self able to create even Sensible Matter; but Incorporeity must be prov'd from the Phoenomena of Sensation, and Immortality from Incorporeity; but Incorporeity does not prove Immortality, if any thing incorporeal be mortal: Either therefore the Phaenomena of Sensation do not prove Incorporeity, or Incorporeity does not prove Immortality; and then there's an end of all Natural Arguments for Immortality, or all Sensible Creatures are immortal. * 1.2 And in the sence in which that is admit∣ted, I suppose an Epicurean will not deny the Soul of Man to be immortal; as Demonax in Lucian said when he was ask'd, Whe∣ther the Soul of Man were immortal or no? It is (said he) but as all things else are. For those who make the Soul to be nothing but meer subtile and active Particles of Matter, do not think upon Death they are annihilated, but that only they are dispers'd and dissipated, or, in the Platonist's Phrase, may return to the Soul of the World.

But for fear the mighty Beast should not have Honour enough by bare Immortality, he is allow'd Reason too, and whatever is sen∣sible is rational: and we are told, 'tis the rational Soul in Man which performs the whole Oeconomy of Sensation; that were it not for that notable definition of a two-leg'd Animal without Feathers, we were altogether at a loss for a distinction between Man and Beast.

This is so vile a scandal to Human Nature, an affront so high to the Holy Scriptures, and of such pernicious consequence, that tho' I have spar'd the Names of some Authors, I will not spare their

Opinions, and let them defend themselves if they can; but the best on't is, they must prove themselves only the better sort of Brutes at most, in justifying their Philosophy.

I hold, in Man are two distinct Souls or perceptive Substances, the Sensitive and Rational.

This at present is against the general Opinion, and in particular is with haughty contempt oppos'd by Dr. Cudworth * 1.3.

Be∣sides (says he) the monstrosity of this opinion in making two distinct Souls and perceptive Substances in Man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal sence, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the Rational Soul, the Incorporeity of any Substance, and by consequence the existence of any Deity distinct from the Corpo∣real World.

This looks with so magisterial an air, as if 'twere design'd to ter∣rifie Men from all other but submissive approaches to it. Does inter∣nal sence consute the monstrosity of our Opinion? as how? But I presume the Dr. thought it sufficient that he had said so; but I shall not only say, but prove by and by, that Internal sence gives a clear evidence for our Opinion; in the mean time let us examine, Whe∣ther we are left in an absolute impossibility of proving the Immor∣tality of Rational Souls. * 1.4 We hold the Souls of Brutes, and the animal Life of Man, to be corporeal; and if they are corporeal, nothing can be prov'd incorporeal, and so no∣thing immortal: But if we hold the sensitive Soul of Men and the Souls of other Animals incorporeal, then Immortality is prov'd from a Maxim the Dr. makes for the Ancients, † 1.5 That No∣thing naturally, or of it self, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing. But this Ratiocination (he says) would be altogether as firm for the Prae-existence and Transmigration of Souls, as it is for their Post-existence and Future Immortality, did we not (as indeed we do) suppose Souls to be created by God immediately, and in∣fus'd in generations. ‖ 1.6 And thus our vulgar Hypothesis, of the new creation of Souls, as it is Rational in it self, so it doth sufficiently salve their Incorporeity, their future Immortality, or Post-eternity without introducing those offensive Absurdities of their Prae-existence and Transmigration.

Were there nothing more to be said against the notions of Prae∣existence and Transmigration, but by supposing all Souls, of Men and other Animals, immediately created, we have no manner of reason to part with them; for it's evident, that the Souls of Brutes, and the sensitive Soul of Man is native and ex traduce. It is the settl'd Opinion among our modern Anatomists, that the whole Bo∣dies of all Animals, even of Man, are contain'd in the Eggs of the Females before conjunction with the Males, and the Males by con∣junction only impregnate those Eggs, only add to them the vivi∣fying Principle. Which Opinion I shall make good by these Instan∣ces. Those Animals which lay their Eggs before they produce their young, will lay them without conjunction with the males, which in all appearance are perfect Eggs, excepting only the vivifying Principle, which, 'tis plain, is given by the male, because those Eggs will never produce living Creatures. But there is yet one mighty Instance, which will put an end to this debate: I hope no Religionist will deny, that the whole Body of our Saviour was the Seed of the Woman only; and if the whole Body be the seed of the Woman, what is it that's added by the seed of the Man? or, what needs Copulation, if all the rest be created? so that if the Animal Life nad the Rational Soul of Man be the same thing, we cannot avoid the conclusion, That the Rational Soul of Man is na∣tive and ex traduce: wherefore the vulgar Hypothesis of the new Creation of all Souls, is but a vulgar piece of ignorance, and Prae∣existence and Transmigration stand sound Philosophy, if there be nothing more to be said against them. And now let us see whe∣ther the Dr. has better luck in setting up the Post than he had in pulling down the Prae-existence; according to his Philosophy, the Maxim of the Ancients proves as strongly the Souls of Brutes as the Souls of Men immortal: * 1.7 But lest it should be a bur∣then upon Mens minds, to be told Brutes are immortal, he adds, We shall endeavour to suggest something towards the easing the Minds of those who are so much burthen'd with this difficulty, that they may, if they please, suppose the Souls of Brutes, being but so many particular Eradiations or Effluxes from the source of Life above, whensoever and wheresoever there is any fitly-prepar'd Matter capa∣ble

to receive them, and to be actuated by them; to have a sence and fruition of themselves in it, so long as it continues such; but as soon as ever those organiz'd Bodies of theirs, by reason of their indisposition, become incapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be re∣sum'd again, and retracted back to their original head and fountain.

If this supposition does not plainly imply both Prae and Post∣eternal existence of Brutal Souls, I must confess not to understand it, and so can receive no Mind's ease from this Recipe. But if this wont do, the Dr. has another, † 1.8 We may hold they are crea∣ted out of nothing, and again by the same Power anni∣hilated.

So we may suppose the Souls of Brutes annihilated, and then prove the Immortality of the Souls of Men by in nihilum nil posse reverti: destroy the Rule first, and prove by it afterwards.

Now, we say, the Soul Rational only is immaterial, which if we make good, we fully prove its Immortality, to those who deny a Deity by in nihilum nil posse reverti, without introducing the offen∣sive absurdity of Brutes Immortality, and save our selves the labour of flying from that Objection to these miserable Subterfuges. Yes, all this is true, if we can make out the Rational Soul's Immateriali∣ty; but that we can never do, unless we admit all thinking Substance immaterial, nor ever make out the existence of a Deity distinct from the corporeal World, which is, in short, roundly giving up the defence of a Deity; for if it can be prov'd (as it shall be beyond all reasonable contradiction) that the Souls of meer Animals are cor∣poreal; then farewell Deity! 'Twas very rash to put the Cause upon that issue, when every thing we see demonstrates a Deity, whether the Dr's Opinion or ours be the truth of the Matter now debated.

Nor shall we be so hard put to it to prove Immateriality, as the Dr. imagin'd; for * 1.9 supposing that all Sensation in Man doth arise from corporeal motion, which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers, and that the high∣est conceptions which depend on sence can amount no higher than Imagination, which is evident: If it can be prov'd, that there is a Principle of Action in Man, which proceeds in a different way of

operation than Sensation doth, and that there are such operations of the Soul which are not imaginations, it will be then clear, that there is a Principle in Man higher than Matter and Motion, and impossble, without a spiritual and immaterial Being, to salve such appearances in Man which transcends the power of Imagination.

That great Philosopher the Lord Bacon was thought attentive to the dictates of Internal sence, to hold the Belief of a Deity and Im∣mortality of the Soul; yet he asserts two distinct perceptive Sub∣stances in Man. † 1.10

The sensible Soul, or the Soul of Beasts, must needs be granted to be a corporeal Sub∣stance, attenuated by heat, and made invisible. — Let there be therefore made a more diligent enquiry touching this Knowledge, and the rather, for that this Point, not well understood, hath brought forth superstitious and very contagious Opinions, and most vilely abasing the dignity of the Soul of Man, of Transmigra∣tion of Souls out of one Body into another, and lustration of Souls by periods of years, and finally, of the too near affinity in every point of the Soul of Man with the Souls of Beasts: This Soul in Beasts is a Principal Soul, whereof the Body of Beasts is the Organ; but in Man this Soul is it self an Organ of the Soul Rational.

Our famous Dr. Willis wrote a Treatise in vindication of our Hypothesis, entituled, De Anima brutorum quae hominis vitalis ac sensitiva est; wherein he says, That some do not only ascribe Un∣derstanding and Discourse to the Rational Soul, but all the offices of Sense and Life, and the whole Oeconomy of Nature; (which is exactly the sence of some of our late Writers.) Which Opinion (says he) tho' it passeth currant in the Schools, has been refuted by the most learned men of all Ages. To avoid being tedious (says he) I shall produce but two Authors, (sed quorum uter{que} agmen est) the first is the most renown'd Philosopher Peter Gassendus, who Physic. sect. 3. lib. 1. cap. 11. proves the sensitive Soul to be corpo∣real, extended, native, and corruptible; but that the rational Soul is a substance incorporeal, and therefore immortal. The other is the most learned Divine Dr. Hammond, who in his Notes upon 1 Thess. v. 23. says, Man consists of three parts, 1. the Body, which denotes the Flesh and Members; 2. the vital Soul, which animal

and sensitive Soul is common to Man and Brute; 3. Spirit, which is the rational Soul. Which division he confirms by the testi∣mony of Heathen Authors and Ancient Fathers.

Those then who do not believe the Scriptures, these two admi∣rable Authors Gassendus and Hammond will furnish them with other Authorities; but those who do believe the Scriptures, need no more Authorities, if St. Paul has determin'd this point, as he has (if Dr. Hammond's skill in expounding Scripture may be taken) by that Text before cited; And I pray God your whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preserved. Where the Apostle distinctly and in order speaks of the three parts which make up the Man; to which we may add what the same Apostle saith in another place * 1.11, The Word of God is sharper than any two edged sword, pier∣cing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow. The meaning whereof is, let things be ever so closely united, God can separate them; but then they must be in their na∣ture separable, or else it implys a contradiction: so, if the Soul and Spirit are separable, we have gain'd our point; if they are not, the Apostle has told us that can be which cannot be. But fur∣ther, the Apostle demonstrates the truth of the Soul and Spirit's be∣ing two distinct Substances, of different natures from the dictates of Internal sence, * 1.12 I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me: for I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members: So then, with the mind I my self serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.

Now, what can be more expressive of two distinct perceptive Substances in Man, whose Natures and whose Laws are contrary to each other? But perhaps you'll say these contrary Laws do in∣deed arise because Man is a Compound of contrary Natures; yet there is but one Perceptive Nature in Man, but that Nature having the several Faculties of Sensation and Reason, and being united to Flesh, whereby the Sensitive Faculty may be gratified, hence ari∣ses the War between Sence and Reason. To which I answer, Thus

far then we are agreed that Sence is the source of all Carnal De∣lights, Pains, and Aversions; therefore Sence is no Faculty of the Spirit, or all Carnal Delights, Lusts, and Passions spring from the Spirit: and, What excellent sence would this make the Apostle speak? I find a law in my Mind warring against the law of my Mind; so then, with the Mind I my self serve the law of God, but with the Mind the law of sin: For if Sence be a Faculty of the Mind, the Laws of Sence are as much the Laws of the Mind as the Laws of Reason are.

The Soul and Spirit, by reason of their close unaccountable union, have also unaccountable mutual Influences upon each other, but for all that, their contrary Natures are very discernable; and to make Sence and Reason Faculties of the Spirit, is to make the Spirit, as the Man, a Compound of contrary Natures: for, that Sence and Reason are of contrary Natures, is discernable; as the Apostle and Internal Sence declare; from the natural and con∣stant struglings and contentions between them; secondly, from the natural Fruit they bring forth, which are of contrary natures, if Good and Evil are so. But lastly, the Souls of meer Animals and the Sensitive Soul of Man are corporeal, but the Rational Soul of Man is a spiritual immaterial substance.

Before I insist upon the proof of this, 'twill be necessary to take notice of a late Author, who says,

I must confess, that the Car∣tesians and some others, Men that have given no occasion to be suspected of Irreligion, have asserted, that Brutes are Machins & Automata — Omnipotence it self cannot create Cogitative Body.—None but besotted Atheists do joyn the two notions together, and believe Brutes to be rational or sensible Machins; they are either the one or the other, either endow'd with sence and some glimmering Rays of Reason from a higher Principle than Matter, or (as the Cartesians say) they are purely Body devoid of all Sensation and Life.

The Cartesians, and some others; who those others are that af∣firm Brutes senceless Machins, I cannot find; nor do I believe this Author can inform me: But to say, none but besotted Atheists believe Brutes to be sensitive Machins, is so notoriously false, that

'twas extreamly surprizing to see it publish'd by a man of Learn∣ing and Credit; but tho' he took this Liberty with men, yet methinks he should have spoken more warily of Almighty Power than positively to assert, It could not create Cogitative Body, there ought to be undeniable Reasons to support such an Assertion, yet the substance of all his Reasons amounts to no more than this, we cannot conceive how meer Matter and Motion should produce Sensation. His Arguments were good against those he was dispu∣ting with, who pretend to solve this difficulty without a God; but be overshot himself in his conclusion, That therefore it could not be by the Power of God. No Religionist, as I remember, who affirms Brute sensible Machins, does pretend to explain how meer Ma••ter and Motion can produce Sensation. Quo ritu, in brutis perceptio, * 1.13 objectorum discriminatio, &c. Ex∣plicatu difficillimum videtur; proinde ut nonnulli, cum aliter hunc nodum solvere nequiverint, etiam brutis animas immate∣riales, & post corpora subsistentes tribuerint. To which this lear∣ned man replies, Quod si verum esset, nescio cur non quadrupedes, aequè ac homo, intellectu, & ratiocineo polleant, immo scientias, & artes discant; quandoquidem in utris{que} praeter animas pariter imma∣teriales, eadem prorsus sit conformatio organorum animalium; à qui∣bus sane animam rationalem dum in corpore est, quoad actus, & habitus suos pendere constat, quoniam laesis aut impeditis organis, horum pri∣vatio aut eclipsis succedit: Quamobrem quòd bruti anima, iisdem ac homo organis utens, nihil proeclarè scire, nec supra actus, & objecta materialia assurgere potest, planè sequitur, illum ab anima rationali diversam, insuper longè inferiorem, & materialem esse.

We readily acknowledge, we cannot conceive how meer Mat∣ter and Motion should produce Sensation, but we say 'tis no good consequence, that therefore they are incapable by the Power of God so to do: shall we say, 'tis impossible for Matter and Spirit to be united, and have mutual Influences upon each other, because we cannot conceive how it should be so? If we can prove Matter and Spirit are united, and have mutual Influences upon each other, it's certainly sufficient, without being accountable for the How, any further than that it is affected by the Power of God: And if

by the same power we can prove, that Matter and Motion do produce Sensation, so it is, tho' we cannot account for the how: And if also we can prove Brutes are devoid of Will and Reason, which are the essential Properties of Spirit, then, I think, we shall not be bound either to hold with Des Cartes, That Brutes are devoid of all Sensation and Life; or with others, who hold They have a higher Principle than Matter. I shall now therefore endeavour to make out these four things; first, That Brutes are sensible; secondly, That they are devoid of Will and Reason, which being the essential Properties of Spirit, will go a great way in proving, thirdly, That the Souls of all meer Animals, and the sensitive Soul of Man, are corporeal; which I shall make good by several other Arguments; and then, fourthly, I shall prove, that the rational Soul is a spiritual immaterial Substance.

First, That Brutes are sensible, we are as sure as a man can be that another man is sensible: I cannot feel the impressions made upon another man of Pain, Hunger, and Thirst, but must judge of that by outward indications; and I have all the same outward in∣dications, that Brutes feel all these, as I have that any Man feels them; and therefore 'twould be a ridiculous Undertaking, to go about to prove this by particular instances: However, I shall have occasion to say something more to this point hereafter.

Secondly, Brutes are not endow'd with Will or Reason in the least degree. To those who hold the contrary, I beg leave to put a Question or two. Do they in earnest think, that Brutes were en∣dow'd with that Spiraculum which Man was honour'd with in his Creation? If they do, they strike at the Mosaick Relation; if they do not, can they tell me what that Spiraculum was, if not the Ra∣tional Spirit? Were this alone well consider'd, we should hear no more of the Rationality of Brutes from those who acknowledge the truth of Revelation. But further,

Common observation assures us, that all the Actions of meer Animals are either the Effects of a bare sensitive Nature, which in various degrees is common to all, or of sensitive Creatures, as they are fram'd of this or that peculiar species or kind: for what those Creatures act, according to the Nature common to all, is plainly

the effect of bare Sensation; for we see Ideots do as much, who have no use of Reason, they distinguish who feeds them, and fear who beats them: Outward Objects must affect the Animal Spirits, and the Animal Spirits must make traces in the Brain, and lodge those Ideas: and so far Will and Reason has nothing to do.

And altho' the Actions of meer Animals, as they are of this or that peculiar species or kind, are very agreeable to Reason, yet they prove only a wise Author of Nature: and that they the more strongly prove, because those Actions are not the effects of any reasoning Principle in those Creatures; for Actions, that are con∣stantly agreeable to Reason, must be directed by Reason some∣where: but they are not the effects of Reason in those Creatures. For,

1st, In earthly created Beings we find Reason is improv'd by degrees from a series of Observations, or from Information: Men cannot conclude or reason about any thing, but à posteriori from the operation and effects of things; but meer Animals act accord∣ing to their Nature, immediately and without information: as for instance, Ducklins hatch'd under a Hen shall immediately paddle in the Water; turn out a Pigeon that never saw either Hawk or Crow, you'll find her regardless of the one, but terrified at the other: nay, young Animals shew what are to be their defensive Weapons before they have them; therefore they could not at that time reason from the Parts to the use, as young Boars will strike with their Jaws before they have Tusks, Calves will butt with Heads before they have Horns, Cock Chickens will strike with their Legs before they have Spurs. These Instances are as so many demonstrations, that Animals are instructed by Nature, not by Knowledge, especially if we consider,

2ly, That meer Animals always act according to their nature, when by plain and visible accident they act against the most appa∣rent Reason. One would think a little, very little Reason, would instruct Creatures, that they could not eat when their Mouths were few'd up, at least a tryal would learn them that knowledge; yet sew up a Ferret's Mouth day after day, and for all that he'l as warmly pursue the Rabbets for his Food, as if his Jaws were at li∣berty.

Nay, meer Animals must act according to their kind when so acting is visibly their certain ruin. Take a Bull-dog and muzzle him, throw him Bones that he may find he cannot open his mouth, yet after that shew him a Bull, and he shall as boldly attack the Bull as if he had no Muzzle on: so take a Game Cock, cut his Spurs clear away, and put him down to one well gaftled, and the unarm'd will be as forward as the arm'd for the engagement: whereas if the unarm'd knew any thing of his own want of Spurs, and his Adversary's being spurr'd, and could reason in the least upon it, he would certainly make what shift he could to avoid battel. I am sure we should think that man mad, who naked, and with his Hands ty'd behind him, would undertake an arm'd man as strong and as brave as himself.

3ly, If meer Animals have the power of Reasoning, it must be seen in their Oeconomy of propagating and preserving their Young, for therein is their greatest appearance of Reason. We will therefore take one Instance for all, and look into the Oeconomy of Fowl: All of them make proper Nests for the preservation of their Eggs and Young, and produce their Young in proper seasons; they sit no longer in their Nests than is necessary to lay their Eggs, till they have laid out their number, and then sit close till they produce their Young: those which breed in Trees, there being no convenient place to lay their Food for the Young to feed them∣selves, the Old ones bring them Meat in their Mouths, and the Young gape to receive it: those which breed upon the Ground, their Young run about and feed themselves as soon as hatched. Now there is not one step of all this, but shews Wisdom and Con∣trivance, but where that Wisdom lies, is the question.

That Fowl make proper Nests for the preservation of their Eggs and Young, is not from any Art or Reason in them; for if it were, it must be got by experience, else all of a kind would not make their Nests exactly the same way, and with the same mate∣rials; which they do, but 'tis evident they do not learn this by experience, because in some Nests there's variety of materials and curious workings undiscernable to the Eye when the Nest is per∣fected, and as soon as the Young ones flye, they quit their Nests,

and the Old ones quit them, and yet the next breeding time the Young begin and finish their buildings as soon as the Old. That they sit no longer in their Nests than is necessary to lay their Eggs till they have laid out their number, and then sit close till they produce their Young, is neither from instruction or experiment; for take Chickens from the Hen as soon as they are hatch'd, before they have time to learn the Philosophy of Eggs from the Hen, and bring them up among themselves only, they'l take the same me∣thod the first time of their laying; but unless they were told, or by experience knew the nature of Eggs, Reason in them was not their director. That they should breed in proper seasons, I presume no man will say is any more choice in them than 'tis in a Tree, in bringing forth its Fruit. That the Young bred in Trees should gape for their Food, and those bred upon the Ground should feed themselves as soon as hatch'd; if that be from Reason in the Young, they begin to reason early; but you'l say the Old ones teach them; no, they are ty'd by their nature to this very manner of feeding, for young Birds bred in Trees will starve with Meat before them, if 'tis not put into their mouths; and those whose kind breed on the Ground can never be taught to gape for their Food, as 'tis frequently try'd by hatching Chickens under a Crow, who will endeavour to seed them, but can never learn them the art of gaping. All these Instances, I say, are therefore evident marks of a Providential Wisdom, because they are rational actions perform'd not accidentally, but constantly, by irrational Agents.

4ly. Understanding being got by a series of observations, or in∣formation, therefore 'tis some old Arts are improv'd, some quite lost, some new ones found out; but all meer An••mals act the very same yesterday and to day, thus far they always went, and no further; which fully proves they were originally compel'd and limited to act according to their kind, and had nothing to do with Will or Reason.

But perhaps it may be here objected, that several sorts of Animals are very docible Creatures, and learn several things by the disci∣pline of Mankind; which makes it appear, that those Creatures have some degrees of Reason.

To which, I say, thus far is prov'd, That those Creatures do act artificially and for ends without deliberation and knowledge; and those being the chief ends for which they were made, we cannot reasonably suppose they should blindly act that part, and yet have the use of Reason in things of less moment; it must therefore be concluded, that the utmost extent of their ability was to Do, not to Know; and therefore tho' by the impressions made upon the Senses they may be forc'd to do what their nature is capable of doing, yet this is all from the Senses, and Reason but begins where the Senses end: to do and to know why we do, proceed, from different Prin∣ciples; and therefore Apes may mimick several things they see Men do, but they give no indication that they know why or to what end they do them.

5ly, And lastly, (which also is the last Argument I intend to insist on, to prove two Perceptive Natures in Man) The Souls of all meer Animals, and the sensitive Souls of Men are corporeal, and there∣fore all their motions are necessarily made by external or internal force or impulsion: But Will and Reason can be no other than the Powers of a self moving Principle, which therefore must be a Spiritual and Immaterial Essence. When these things are prov'd, I hope it will be granted, that Brutes are devoid of Will and Rea∣son; and, that in Men are two distinct Souls or perceptive Sub∣stances.

First then, That Matter is no self moving Principle, * 1.14 the great Dr. Stillingfleet refers the Cause to the judicious Phi∣losopher Dr. H. More * 1.15, who plainly demonstrates,

That if Motion did necessarily belong to Matter, it were impossible there should be Sun, or Stars, or Earth, or Man in the World.

Secondly, The Souls of Brutes, and the sensitive Souls of Men, are corporeal. Those who call Sence and Imagination the lower Fa∣culties of the Soul, admit those lower Faculties are able to conceive nothing but what is corporeal; and if they did not admit it, every man may find in himself, that the highest conceptions which de∣pend upon Sence, amounts no higher than Imagination, and that Imagination is unable to receive any other than corporeal Ideas;

nor can it reflect or make any conclusions about what it perceives: so that Brutes may be thus far endow'd without any reasoning Fa∣culty. Now from hence I argue; If it be a good Argument, that Matter and Motion by the Power of God are incapable of produ∣cing Perception, because we cannot conceive how Perception is producible by them; it is also a good Argument, that Sence and Imagination are produc'd by Matter and Motion, because we can∣not conceive how spiritual Perceiving Faculties should in their na∣ture be incapable of conceiving any thing incorporeal, for like is perceiv'd by its like; and I may from hence altogether as strongly conclude Sence and Imagination are produc'd by Matter and Mo∣tion, as others can conclude them Spiritual Faculties, because they cannot conceive how Matter and Motion should produce Percepti∣on: wherefore had we no more to say, as they have not, this is at least sufficient to put the judgment in suspence, and defer the de∣termination till another day: But, I think, we have something to add which will turn the Scale.

These Souls are Matter, because they are extended and divisible, for the Animal Life and Sence are in most parts of the whole Bo∣dy. But this, some say, proves no more than that the Immaterial Substance is so closely united to the Material, that it perceives every impression made upon the Body. To which I reply, That we could not then feel distinct Pains in several parts, but the Pain must be equally felt over the whole Body, which contradicts the full evi∣dence of Sence; for the Soul being indivisible, it cannot feel in parts, but the whole must feel, and so consequently the whole Body seem in equal pain: Nay, that wonderful profound piece of Philo∣sophy of the Soul's being the whole in the whole, and the whole in every part, will not solve this difficulty; for admit all that, and that the Soul is illocabilis, and I know not what besides, provided the whole be indivisible, the whole must feel the pain, and so con∣sequently the pain must be in all the parts which the whole makes sensible: Nor could there be any degrees of Pain in the sentient parts, but a cut in the Flesh would smart as much as a cut amongst the Nerves, there can be no reason assign'd why it should be other∣wise, but because there is more of the sensible nature in one part

than in the other; but how can there be more or less when the whole feels both? Wherefore if there are degrees of Pains in the sentient parts, if we can feel Pain in this part, and none in the other, and can at once feel several distinct pains in several distinct parts, then the Soul must either feel by parts which an Indivisible cannot, or Sensation must belong to another Principle, whose Properties are Extension and Divisibility; and if those Properties do not be∣long to Body, or can belong to Spirit, we have no notion either of Body or Spirit.

We have therefore good reason to subscribe to the universal Judg∣ment of Physicians, besides the weight of their Authority, that the Animal Spirits are the efficient cause of all Sensation; which, as the judicious Dr. Gibson saith, * 1.16 are made by the Brain out of the Vital Spirits and the Arterial Blood their Vehicle, and by the Brain they are communicated by the Ducts or Rivulets of the Nerves to all the sentient parts of the Body, and which there∣by are endow'd with the faculty of performing Animal Actions. When therefore we assert the Animal Part of Man incorporeal, we at once discard all Physicians in a matter which they should best understand. But I shall yet further make good their Opinion.

As the Animal Spirits fly off by what we call the Insensible Tran∣spiration, we are sensibly enfeebl'd, and grow unactive, till new Animal Spirits are made out of the Blood, which Blood must be again supply'd by corporal nourishment: And this is the reason why sensible Pleasures so quickly tire us, they cause expence of Spirits, and then we both tire and lose our relish. I need not ask the Question, Whether it be possible for us to live without eating and drinking; but if we cannot, what's the reason of that, but be∣cause our Life flies away by degrees, and is again made up by cor∣poral nourishment? Thus we see Bodies unaccustom'd to hot Coun∣tries, in those places their Pores are so much open'd, that the Spirits fly away in such quantities, that the whole Life would soon expire without the assistance of spirituous Liquors, which give a speedy supply of Spirits. On the other hand, we find Dormice will sleep whole months without the help of Food; but if you observe those Creatures in their sleep, they are stiff and cold, their Pores are so

contracted, that the Life cannot fly off, and therefore they want no recruit; but when warmth awakens them, whereby their Pores are open'd, they can fast no longer than other Creatures. There∣fore if the Animal Life flies off by parts, which are new made by corporal nourishment, it's a clear evidence, that the Animal Life is corporeal, and that the Physicians in this case are right in their Judgment.

And this gives us a plain and true notion of Death, that it is not as usually defin'd, a separation of Soul and Body, that's but a Consequence of Death, but it is an absolute extinguishment of the Animal Life, which like a Flame expires; as that eminent Dr. Willis, in his De Sang. Incalescentia, shews,

We cannot in rea∣son attribute the incalescence of the Blood to any other cause but that the Blood is accended; and for that there is good reason, be∣cause the Passions of the Fire and Flame agree to the Life of the Blood, a free and continual access of Air, a constant sulphureous Pabulum or Fewel, and that it be ventilated, whereby as well its fuliginous as thicker Recrements may be continually amanded from it; and therefore (says he) it seems very rational to affirm, that Life it self is a kind of Flame.

But when Men joyn toge∣ther, That meer Animals are a Compound of Matter and Spirit, and that Death is only a separation of Body and Spirit, it's ridicu∣ling all the natural Arguments for Man's Immortality, by making them hold full as strong for the Immortality of Brutes, which is against Divinity and common Sence. But to return to our Argument.

I verily believe, the reason why some Physicians (who of all men should admire most the Wonderful Works of Creating Wis∣dom) have been atheistically enclin'd, is because they are able to demonstrate, that Sence is made by Matter and Motion, and there∣fore have carelesly concluded Reason to spring from the same Prin∣ciple, and so all the Actions of Man to be accounted for by Me∣chanism: And those Divines help much to confirm them in their Opinion, who assign the office of Sensation to the Rational Soul, and allow Reason to other Animals. There is no Adversary to Religion, but will readily grant the Animal Life and Rational Soul to be the same thing, and that all Animals are rational; but then

he subjoins, That the Animal Life is corporeal, and therefore con∣cludes Rationality does not prove Immateriality; as argumentum ad hominem, he bids us shew the difference between these two re∣lations; Let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his kind; let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind: And when we tell him, there was something more in the Creation of Man, he presently asks What was that more? for (says he) you hold Brutes are Rational Creatures, and what more can you say of Man? And I must desire those that can, to tell him. But further.

Let the Earth, let the Waters bring forth the living Creatures, &c. And it was so. What was so? Did the Earth and Waters bring forth the living Creatures? Why then do they say, these living Creatures are the one or the other, either as the Cartesians say, they are de∣void of all Sensation and Life. What? Are the living Creatures devoid of Life? Yes, it must be so, or they are endow'd with a higher Principle than Matter. Can Earth or Water bring forth a higher Principle than Matter? If then Moses has said true, That the Earth and Waters did bring forth the living Creatures, both those Opinions, that these are devoid of Life, or that they are endow'd with a higher Principle than Matter, are apparently false. In the next Chapter, where Moses comes to describe the particular man∣ner of Man's Creation, he seems to me, lest Men from thence should fancy a higher Principle than Matter in the composition of Brutes as well as Man, to repeat again, And out of the Ground the Lord God form'd every Beast of the field, and every Fowl of the air: for else, having but in the Chapter before declar'd, that those Creatures were made by a producal terra, there is no appearing reason of introdu∣cing the relation of God's bringing the Creatures to Adam for Names, by an Out of the Ground the Lord God form'd every Beast of the field, and every Fowl of the air: However, be the occasion of Moses's saying so what 'twill, so he has said, and what he said I be∣lieve. And after all this, Moses very frequently, and in express terms, tells us what the Life is, particularly in Lev. 17.14 The Blood is the life of all flesh: which, as he declares, was the reason of the repeated prohibitions of eating Blood; which is a substantial reason

indeed; and when even learned men (one would wonder which way) have made a shift to overlook this Reason, what miserable trifling stuff do they deliver in the room of it? Some will have the reason of this prohibition was, to make men cautious of Manslaugh∣ter; but if that were a good reason then, 'tis so still, and the prohi∣bition continues in force, for Manslaughter is as much against the New as it was against the Old Law. The learned Bishop Taylor gives another reason for this prohibition, which is, to prevent the Jews from eating the Flesh of Beasts alive; * 1.17 for (says he)

If Blood were here directly prohibited to be taken and drank or eaten, this reason could not have concluded it, (because it is the life, therefore you may not eat it) being no bet∣ter an Argument than this, You may not eat the Heart of a Beast, for it is the Life thereof; but the other meaning is proper, Ye shall not eat Flesh with the Blood, which is the Life thereof; that is, so long as the Blood runs, so long you must not eat, for so long it is alive; and a Beast may be kill'd but not devour'd alive.]

That Beasts should not be devour'd alive! If that were all, then they might eat the Blood after it was drawn from the Beast, and eat Beasts strangl'd; but that's against the Custom of the Jews to this day, and against the direction of the Law, Lev. 17. He shall even pour out the blood, and cover it with dust: But it had been as good an Argument to say, You may not eat the Heart of a Beast, for it is the Life thereof. What strange reasoning is this? The Life is something dispers'd over the whole Body; the Heart, it's true, is the Machin or Instrument which disperses the Life into every part, the trajection and distribution of the Blood and Vital Spirits depend upon the Systole thereof, but the Heart is no more to be call'd the Life than an Engine to be call'd the Water it throws about. In fine, we cannot reasonably think, that the prohibition of eating Blood is not direct in the Precept, when 'tis as direct as words can ex∣press it; nor reasonably suppose, that that prohibition should be so often and earnestly press'd under so great a Penalty to prevent the Jews only from eating Flesh alive, especially as we have no know∣ledge they were ever addicted to it. Let us therefore see what Moses saith upon this subject, who represents God speaking thus:

* 1.18 I will even set my face against the foul that eateth blood, and will cut him off from among his people: for the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul. Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, No soul of you shall eat blood. He shall even pour out the blood thereof, and cover it with dust. For it is the life of all flesh, the blood of it is for the life thereof: therefore I said unto the children of Israel, Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the blood thereof: whosoever eateth it shall be cut off. How can a man read all this and say, that it is not directly over and over affirm'd, that the Blood is the Life, or that the prohibition of Blood-eating is not direct, but accidental, in the Precept; or that the reason of this Prohibition was only, that the Jews should not eat Flesh alive, when God himself tells us the wonderful and substantial reason of this Prohibition? The Blood then is the Life, and for that very reason, because it is so, it was reserv'd for the Altar, typify∣ing that Life which was to be laid down, that Blood which was to be shed for the wonderful Redemption of Mankind. Thus I think I have sufficiently made good both by Reason and Scripture, that the Sensitive Soul or Life of all Flesh is corporeal.

And now I should in order advance to that other point propos'd, That the Rational Soul is a Spiritual Immaterial Substance: but for a little while let us take it for granted, and then the sum of all is this; That in Man are two distinct Souls or Perceptive Substan∣ces, of different natures; that the Souls of all meer Animals, and the sensitive Souls of Men are native and ex traduce; that their Sub∣stance is corporeal, endow'd neither with Will or Reason; that Death is an absolute extinguishment of the Animal Life. And now we shall see these Opinions are truly serviceable to us upon divers accounts.

1st, They preserve the dignity of Humane Nature, by shewing an essential difference between the Spirit of Man and the Souls of other Animals.

2ly, They put an end to the Question, Whether meer Animals are immortal or no; without shaking the Arguments for Man's

Immortality, and without flying to the Miracle of Annihilation, of which the Holy Scriptures are silent, and which is by no means knowable by Philosophy.

3ly, They justifie the History of Moses, which all other ways of reasoning impeach; for those Creatures we call meer Animals have either Life or not; if we say they have no Life, we flatly contra∣dict not only Moses, who affirms them living Creatures, but we contradict also the clear evidence of our Senses: If we say they have Life, that Life is a higher Principle than Matter or not: If we say 'tis a higher Principle, then by plain consequence we contra∣dict Moses, who affirms those living Creatures were brought forth by Earth and Water, and that the Blood is the Life of all Flesh. There is therefore no other Opinion but ours which can agree with Moses, and that abundantly vindicates the truth of our Hypothesis.

4ly, They help us to a fair and plain exposition of that Article of our Creed (He descended into Hell) concerning which the Fathers have been at such variance among themselves. The learned Bishop Pearson, after he had run thro' all the different Opinions of the an∣cient Fathers, and some of later date, upon that Article, concludes, That the Soul of Christ, really separated from his Body by death, did truly pass unto the places below, where the Souls of Men de∣parted were.

And I conceive (says he) the end for which he did so was, that he might undergo the condition of a dead man as well as of a living.

He goes on,

All which was necessary for our Re∣demption, by way of satisfaction and merit, was already perform'd on the Cross; and all which was necessary for the actual collati∣on and exhibition of what was merited there, was to be effected upon and after his Resurrection.

Now, we cannot in reason suppose that Christ's descent into Hell was for no end or purpose, and (as it plainly appears from what this learned and judicious Author has said) we cannot conceive any other end or purpose of this descent, but because Christ was to un∣dergo (Sin only excepted) all the Conditions of Humane Nature, and therefore was to perform the Condition of a dead, as well as of a living Man.

Hence I argue, If the whole end of that descent into Hell was only

to undergo the condition of a dead Man, there is no reason from that end to conclude Christ's Rational Soul in Hell, if we take Hell for the place of the Damn'd; for the part of a dead Man is perfor∣med by every good Man, who never descends into that Hell. Nor do I see how that Opinion of Christ's Rational Soul's continuance in Hell for three days, can be reconcil'd with the Promise he made to the Thief upon the Cross, This day thou shalt be with me in Para∣dise; for our Saviour, in the Parable of Lazarus and the Rich man, has told us there is a great Gulf between Hell and Abraham's bosom, which is but another expression for Paradise; therefore our Saviour's Humane Spirit could not be in two such distinct places at the same time. Now, if we add to this what Dr. Hammond says, * 1.19 These word's (says he) He descended into Hell, being af∣firm'd of Christ in the Creed, but not found in Words in the New Testament, will not necessarily signifie any farther than either, first, the places of the New Testament (from whence the Compilers of the Creed may seem to have collected it) will seem to import; or, second∣ly, the use of the Phrase among either prophane or Scripture-writers will require; or, thirdly, the Context or Circumstances in the Creed will enforce. And all these will not necessarily extend its sence any farther than this, That for the space of three days he was, and truly continu'd to be depriv'd of his natural Life. And so he goes on, and maintains what he had said.

Thus much more then may be said in favour of our Hypothesis of two Souls or Perceptive Substances in Man, That we cannot, a∣greeable to any other Hypothesis, give a reasonable account of that Article of our Creed, He descended into Hell; but according to ours, we do give a plain and reasonable account of that Article, and say, the whole of Christ's Manhood was thus divided and dispos'd on, his Body was buried, his Animal Life was extinguish'd, and its sub∣stance in Hades, or (as that word signifies) in darkness, his Spirit or Rational Soul was in Paradise, in the hands of his Father, where he recommended it just before his departure.

And now, if Men will but take the pains to weigh the whole which has been said, I hope they will be enclin'd to think we have not unadvisedly concluded, that there are two distinct Souls or Per∣ceptive

Substances in Man; for, besides proving the point, I have made it plainly appear, that this Opinion helps us in several consi∣derable cases; and there is yet this to be added, it does no disser∣vice in any case. The whole Charge drawn up against this opinion is, That if the Sensitive Soul of Man, and the Souls of other Animals are corporeal, 'tis impossible to prove the Rational Soul immaterial, and consequently the existence of a Deity distinct from the corpo∣real World; which is as much as to say, that there is nothing more to be said for the Incorporcity of Man's Rational Soul than there is for the Incorporeity of his Sensitive Part, or of the Souls of Brutes. And so says the Atheist too; but we deny it: And this brings me to enquire concerning the Nature of the Rational Soul. Secondly, I shall enquire of its Origin. And lastly, of its state after this Life.

First, Of its Nature. I hold the Rational Soul to be a spiritual immaterial Substance, for these following Reasons.

1st. Because it is rational, and has freedom of choice, neither of which can possibly belong to Matter, for all the motions of Matter are necessarily made, no choice but force makes their motion, and that force must be immediate; for Matter moves no longer than the impulsion lasts: But to deliberate and judge of a train of Con∣sequences, is no immediate impulsion of Matter, for those Conse∣quences are not yet in being, but only such things as will be upon our acting thus or thus; nay, perhaps only such things as may, but never will be; and to chuse to act, (as such Power we have, and every man feels it in himself) purely in regard to those con∣sequences, is many times to act in opposition to all the immediate and strong impresses of Matter: and therefore 'tis plain, that nei∣ther Will or Reason do belong to Matter, but to something of ano∣ther nature.

2ly, The Animal Spirits make no other impression upon the Brain than as things appear, not always as they are, which Error is corrected; yes, you'll say, but 'tis corrected by the Senses them∣selves: But what puts the Senses in the way and method to correct themselves? If the Senses are their own directing Power, then all Creatures that are alike sensible would be alike knowing, and meer Animals would be daily finding out new Arts and Inventions, as

well as Man: It's impossible to give the least shadow of a Reason why it should be otherwise, unless we allow a Principle in Man which Brutes have not. We see (except Man) all Creatures of the same kind run in one and the same constant setled method, and because they know not the reason of things, one kind of Animals never learn any thing from another kind: Birds do not learn from the Bee, the Ant, or Squirrel, to lay up Provisions for the Winter, no, nor from their often being pinch'd in the Winter for want of that forecast, tho' they have more opportunities of laying up Hoards than any Creatures whatever: But we find Men not only learning from eve∣ry thing they see, but they invent how to learn, and try the truth of their Inventions by experiment, and sometimes they find them∣selves in the right, sometimes in the wrong. Now, tho' in these ca∣ses the truth or falshood of this or that Invention is prov'd by the Senses, yet the Invention preceded the Proof, and therefore could not be from the information of the Senses: Besides, 'tis yet more evident those Inventions are not from the Senses, but from another Principle, because those Inventions are sometimes false, and will not hold; but when we come to prove them, our Senses will bring in no such appearances.

3ly. Althô we know nothing but à posteriori from the operati∣ons and effects of things, yet from visible operations and effects we can consider and reason about the nature of the invisible Operator, as from the beauty and order of the Universe, we reason there must be a mighty, good, wise, invisible Power, which fram'd and con∣tinues this beauty and order. Now the impressions of Matter upon Sense goes no farther than so these appearances are: and here there∣fore we should of necessity for ever rest, had we no other Princi∣ple but Matter, and could never enquire how or why things come to be so; but when we advance to the notion of an invisible Ope∣rator, then certainly we outfly our Senses, unless our Eyes are so good to see an invisible Object: But suppose there is no such invi∣sible Object, but that all our notions concerning such a Being are but meer Chymera's: Well, let us for Argument sake suppose all that; however, whether the notion of an invisible incorporeal Ope∣rator be true or false, so much is true, That there is such a notion

amongst Men, and that it is a full evidence that there is an incor∣poreal Principle in Man, because Matter cannot possibly impress or be impress'd with any other but material Ideas. Therefore were the whole compositum of Man nothing but Matter, he could not possibly stir beyond material Ideas, and the World had never heard of immaterial Substance. And now, I think, I have made good my Promise of proving the Rational Soul a Spiritual Immaterial Sub∣stance; nor do I see where holding the Sensitive Soul corporeal stands in the way.

The next thing propos'd for our enquiry was the Origin of the Soul-rational, Whether it be by immediate creation and infusion in generation, or native and ex traduce; the enquiry whereof, as the Lord Bacon well observes, is not to be made in Philosophy, because (says he) the Substance of the Soul was not deduc'd and extracted in her creation from the mass of Heaven and Earth, * 1.20 but immediately inspir'd from God, and the Laws of Heaven and Earth are the proper subjects of Philosophy. So that in this case we are wholly left to the Scripture account, and herein the Scri∣ptures not being expresly decisive, has been the reason why some Fathers are on one side, some on 'tother some halting between both. St. Augustine was inclining to the opinion of Immediate Creation, but what stuck with him was, how then to derive Original Sin from the Parents to the Children: And according to his opinion of Original Sin, immediate Creation of Souls could not be sound Divinity. But I conceive, if Original Sin be rightly understood, there can be no Argument drawn from the derivation of Original Sin from the Parents to the Children, on either side of the Question. I shall not trouble the Reader with the various unintelligible Opi∣nions of Authors upon this subject, but shall endeavour (according to the best of my understanding) to keep close to the Opinion of our Church contain'd in her Articles, which is,

That Original Sin is the fault and corruption of the Nature of every man, that natu∣rally is engender'd of the Offspring of Adam, whereby Man is very far gone from Original Righteousness, and is of his own nature enclin'd to Evil, so that the Flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spi∣rit, and therefore in every Person born into this World, it deserveth

God's Wrath and Damnation.

And this Infection of Nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the Lust of the Flesh, called in Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which some do expound the Wisdom, some Sensuality, some the Affection, some the Desire of the Flesh, is not subject to the Law of God. Thus far the Article.

That excellent and learned Orator Dr. Allestry, in his Sermon on Phil. 3.18. speaks thus;

He (meaning our Saviour) suffer'd on the Tree, that we might be renewed into that constitution which the Tree of Knowledge did disorder and debauch. Before Man eat of that, his lower Soul was in perfect subordination to his Mind, and every Motion of his Appetite did attend the Dictates of his Reason, and obey them with that resignation and ready willingness which our outward Faculties do execute the Wills Commands with: then any thing, however grateful to the Sen∣ses, was no otherwise desir'd than as it serv'd the regular and pro∣per Ends and Uses of his making; there was a rational harmony in all the tendencies of all his Parts, and that directed modulated by the Rules and Hand of God that made them: In fine, then Grace was Nature, Virtue Constitution. Now, to reduce us to this state as near as possible, is the business of Religion, but this it can in no degree effect, but as it does again establish the subordination of the sensual to the reasonable part within us: that is, till by denying satisfactions to the Appetite, (which is now irregular and disorder∣ly in its Desires) we have taught it how to want them, and to be content without them, and by that means have subdu'd its inclina∣tions.

According to this great man, the Corruption of our Nature does not lye in the Mind, but only in the lower Soul; and Regenera∣tion is no more than reducing that lower Soul to obedience to its Superior the Mind. But because this plain Point has been made a mighty Mystery by some People, I shall yet further explain it.

When Man by his Fall had incurr'd the Penalty of Death, and became a mortal Creature, he thereby usher'd in Diseases and Infir∣mities, the Forerunners of Death and Dissolution, and therefore pro∣pagated unequal mixtures and constitutions, which naturally, ac∣cording to the prevailing part of the mixture, raises powerful and pressing Lusts and Passions, which not only make violent and repea∣ted

Storms upon Reason, but they also interrupt her Operations in other Duties, by the frequent touches of the Animal Spirits upon that Image in the Brain of the belov'd Object, and intrudes it among our thoughts whether we will or no. And for this cause (thô in other things we are reasoning men) when the tender is touch'd, we can scarce understand a plain Conclusion from plain Premi••les, till the gratifying of those prevailing Lusts has wasted many of our sen∣sible Spirits, and then Reason freed from Violence puts on Shame and Remorse for her defeat; but no sooner is Nature recruited than Reason is press'd to forget her Repentance. And this is the best of our degenerate condition; for in most Men, either thro' the want or the too abundance or irregular motions of the Animal Spirits, the Reasoning Faculty is generally obstructed, and they reason weakly in every thing: nay, sometimes the Reasoning Power is quite block'd up, and some men are distracted, others meer Chang∣lings: But besides, that in the best of us the Reasoning Power is often obstructed, and has forcible Inclinations to deal with, the work of Reason in general is by the first Apostacy abundantly encreas'd. She must maintain Patience and Submission under Diseases, Pains, Infirmities, Poverty, loss of Parents, Husbands, Children, and Friends; She must maintain Charity and Humility in the Rich and Wise, com∣mand visits to the Sick, assistance to the Prisoner, Fatherless, and Wi∣dow: But in the state of Innocence there was no Objects for the exercise of these and many more Virtues, nor no provocations to the contrary Vices All these Objects are the natural consequences of Dust thou art, and to Dust shalt thou return, and of that Curse which God sent upon the Earth for Man's transgression.

Here then we see the reason why the first Covenant was perem∣ptory; The day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely dye; because Man was blessed with ability to keep his Covenant with God: but thrô the greatness of Mercy, in the second Covenant, we are pro∣mis'd the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and when we fall, as the best of us must with our utmost care, God is pleas'd to accept of our Repentance, knowing it impossible for Man propagated in the con∣stant methods of Nature to keep himself free from Sin.

Hence it was, according to the prediction of Moses, That the seed of the Woman, exclusive of the Seed of the Man, should break the Ser∣pent's

head. The Body, which is the Seed of the Woman, receives all its Disorders from the sensitive Soul, which is the Seed of the Man, and to be of a disorder'd composition, tho' we never act disorder∣ly, is a blemish, and our Blessed Saviour was to be without spot or blemish, and therefore it was necessary to exclude the Seed of the Man in his composition. And if this was not the only Reason why the Seed of the Man was excluded in the composition of our Saviour, 'tis plain one Reason it was, and a substantial Reason it is.

In fine, in the state of Innocence Constitutions were regular, and therefore Reason was strong and uninterrupted in her operations, and her work short and easie, but by the Apostacy Constitutions became irregular, and therefore the strength of Reason was im∣pair'd, her operations interrupted, and variety of other hard works which were not in the state of Innocence, are now become our rea∣sonable service.

By this account of the Fall of Man from Original Righteousness, and how that degeneracy is deriv'd from the first Man to all Poste∣rity, it appears, that the Rational Soul is not immediately conta∣minated by reason of Original Sin, but is necessarily so as soon as we are capable of sinning. Thus the Article of our Church; [So that the Flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit; and therefore in every person born into this World it deserveth God's wrath and dam∣nation.] i. e. every person capable of the contrary Lusts of Flesh and Spirit deserveth God's wrath and damnation. So that the Flesh lust∣eth contrary to the Spirit; but the Flesh cannot lust contrary to the Spirit till the Spirit is capable of lusting; not therefore immedi∣ately because our Parents fell, but from the consequences of that Fall, the Flesh lusteth so strongly against the Spirit to overpower the lusts of the Spirit, and so bring us into actual Sin, and therefore every person deserves damnation. And this is what I understand our Church to mean, and what is agreeable to a reasonable Understan∣ding; for, How can we say, that Children deserve Damnation meerly because Adam fell, when Adam himself, by his Fall, incurr'd only the Penalty of Deprivation of natural Life? The Sanction of the Law given to him was no more than, The day thou eatest there∣of thou shalt surely dye; that is, thou shalt be mortal. And that Pe∣nalty he suffer'd, and therefore Adam could propagate no other but

a mortal Offspring, which of necessity must be subject to all the disorder'd consequences of a mortal nature; wherefore Infants are justly mortal before actual Sin, and justly liable when capable of actual Sin, to the constant Lusts of a disorderly sensitive nature: But to say Insants are liable to Damnation too meerly and imme∣diately because Adam fell, is to say they are liable to suffer more barely for Adam's Transgression, than God declar'd Adam himself should suffer for it. And one would wonder how such a notion should ever enter into the Heads of considering Men, it being plain∣ly and flatly contradictory to all the notions we have of Justice! Original Sin was no more than a wilful actual Sin, and therefore there is no more reason why the Rational Souls of Children should not be immediately contaminated with and answerable for all the wilful actual Sins of their Parents, as well as Original Sin; and this would be a comfortable piece of Divinity! But notwithstanding the Fall of our first Parents, the Apostle witnesseth, that the Inward Man or Spirit is entirely for the service of God, But I find (says he) another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my mem∣bers. Here the Apostle plainly shews where the corruption of our Nature lay, in the Members, that is in the sensitive part, not in the Spirit, for that was entirely for the service of God. And then he tells us how the Spirit comes to be polluted, by being over∣power'd and led captive by the Lusts of the Flesh.

Wherefore the traduction of Original Sin from the Parents to the Children, is no Argument on either side of the Question, Whe∣ther the Rational Soul be native or immediately created: But if after all this Men will have it, that the Rational Soul is immediate∣ly polluted by Original Sin, then the Point is decided, and they should talk no more of immediate creation of Souls; for if the Soul be immediately created, it is created perfect; Infinite Perfection creates all things in their kind perfect; and if the Rational Soul notwithstanding be polluted before it's capable of actual Sin, it is polluted by the very union with mortal Flesh: But we are sure an immediate created Spirit is not polluted by the bare union with mortal Flesh; because our Saviour's Human Spirit was not pollu∣ted, and yet united to mortal Flesh.

Nor can those, who will not admit two distinct Perceptive Sub∣stances in Man, avoid the consequence, that the Rational Soul is ex traduce; for I have prov'd, that the Animal Life is given by the Male; so that if the Animal Life and Rational Soul be the same thing, the Rational Soul is ex traduce; and I believe some men are not aware of this consequence.

But if we take for granted, first, that Philosophy cannot be by us consulted about this Point; and secondly, that there are two di∣stinct Perceptive Substances in Man; and thirdly, that the tradu∣ction of Original Sin from the Parents to the Children makes for neither side of the Question, then the Arguments will be but very short on both sides; for immediate creation of Souls they argue from many places of Scripture, which call God the Father of Spi∣rits; and from other places which say, the Spirit returns to him who gave it: And this is the whole substance out of Scripture gene∣rally insisted upon to prove immediate creation. But there is ano∣ther Text which seems to me in favour of this opinion, which is this * 1.21, At the time appointed will I return unto thee, ac∣cording to the time of life, and Sarah shall have a son. Now if we understand, according to the time of Life, the time when Sarah should receive the vivifying Principle from Abraham, it looks as if God's returning at that appointed time, was the crea∣tion of the Rational Soul. On the other side, that the Rational Soul is ex traduce, it is expresly said, That God finish'd the Crea∣tion in six days, and rested the seventh day from all the Works of his Creation; and how that can agree with continual Creation is something hard to be understood. Again, God gave the same Com∣mandment to Man as to other Animals, Be fruitful, and multiply. Now this Commandment did plainly mean to other Animals (as already has been prov'd) that they should propagate their whole kind, why therefore should it not mean the same thing to Man?

Thus I have represented the Arguments on both sides, and think there is no conclusion to be made from any of them but what is meerly conjectural; and therefore men should positively assert neither the immediate creation of Souls, or that they are ex tra∣duce; for Thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, Eccl. 11.5.

And now I come to the last point, which is an enquiry of the Ra∣tional

Soul's state after this Life. Having prov'd the Rational Soul a spiritual immaterial Substance, it follows, that Spirit must ever∣lastingly continue Spirit, as Body must everlastingly continue Bo∣dy, it there be not a Power which can annihilate or quite alter and change the nature of things; therefore to those who do not believe such a Power, the proving the Soul a spiritual immaterial Substance does necessirily prove its Imm••rtality: But I will not say this is a direct proof of Immertality to these who believe a Deity, who created all other Beings out of nothing; for then, of consequence, all created Beings are absolutely depo••ding upon the Creator's Will, and therefore from the nat••••e of created Beings we cannot direct∣ly prove their Eternity: In nihilum nil posse reverti, denies the de∣pendance of Beings upon the Will of God, or that He has a power to annihilate or change the very nature of things. And therefore I have been often surpriz'd to observe Heathen Philosophers, with Pomp introduc'd among Christian Assemblies, to prove the Im∣mortality of the Soul, when the Grounds of their Opinion was a wretched Mistake; and tho' they held the Soul of Man an Imma∣terial Substance, yet here they spoil'd all again, by holding the Souls of all other Animals to be so too, and so equally with Man entituled to Immortality.

But thus far we conclusively reason, That because the Rational Soul is a Spirit, therefore it must live eternally, unless God is plea∣sed to annihilate it, or quite alter and change its nature. But whe∣ther God will please to work that Miracle or no we are wholly left to his declared Will in Holy Scriptures, which give us full assurance of Immortality.

We also argue rationally from the inequality of Temporai Bles∣sings, and from the Nature of God, as he is just, from the Nature of Man, as he is accountable, that Men shall hereafter receive Re∣wards or Punishments according to their Works in this state of pro∣bation: But that there should be a Resurrection and Re-union of Soul and Body, which Union shall never be separated, and a solemn Day of Judgment, wherein the whole Race of Mankind shall by irreversable decree be either justly condemned to eternal Misery, or rewarded with eternal Joy and Happiness. These discoveries indeed could not be made by the light of meer Natural Reason,

yet now they are made, they are so consonant to Reason, as to command the assent of all unprejudic'd Persons.

But notwithstanding all this, there still remains some Doubts and Questions: What becomes of the Soul till the wonderful Resurre∣ction and this Judgment pass'd? Can the Soul exert any of its di∣scernable Power, or be capable of Pleasure or Pain, without an Or∣ganical Body and the Sensitive Faculties? We find by the indispo∣sition of Organs, and by the want or disorder of the Animal Spirits, the Rational Soul in part is often, and sometimes wholly depriv'd of her discerning power, which seems to indicate she can discern nothing, unless united to an organical sensitive Body.

Some of the ancient Fathers freed themselves from these doubts and questions, by a positive opinion, that Human Souls were never strip'd naked of all Body, but when Death had separated them from these gross Bodies, there was nevertheless adhering to them subtile aërial Bodies, which were capable of corporeal Pleasures and Pains. But I must needs confess, neither the Reasons nor the places in Scri∣pture they offer seem to me a sufficient warrant for this opinion. However, tho from the Parable of Lazarus and the Rich man (which is the chief place those Fathers rely on) it cannot be concluded, that immediately after death we suffer corporal Pains, or enjoy cor∣poral Pleasures, yet it is very evident from thence, and many other places in Scripture, that the Wicked, immediately after death, do suffer, and the Righteous have Ease and Pleasure: And therefore so it is, whether we by our Philosophy can make it out or no. But there is something to be said in this case; for if we seriously reflect upon the Operations of the Rational Soul, we may observe, that tho' the disorder of the Animal Soul obstructs the operation of the Ra∣tional Power, yet when the Animal Soul is tolerably regular, the Rational Soul has Notions, Pleasures, and Pains, which are not cor∣poreal impressions. It enters into profound speculations, flies be∣yond sensible appearances, and searches for the cause of those appea∣rances, and reasons about the nature of the invisible Cause of all vi∣sible Beings. It reflects upon its own nature, and reasons about its own futurity, distinguishes the different natures of Good and Evil, enters into judgment with it self, and condemns or acquits; in pur∣suance to which judgment, follows either Remorse and amazing

Fears, or Delights and encouraging Hopes. And what has Sensation to do with all this? Yes, some say we are told of these things by designing Men, or else we should think nothing at all of them: But who told those designing Men? If they thought of these things without being told, why may not others do so too? We see then the Soul, while 'tis in the Body, is capable to retire itself from corporeal Images, and to be busie with Ideas of another nature, which no corporeal Impression could possibly make. And this affords considerable instruction how the Soul may ope∣rate and be capable of Pleasure and Pain when separated from all Body. It is not Sence, but Reflection that wounds the Conscience; Sence, 'tis true, may divert that Pain, but can never make it, and when Death puts an end to sensible Diversions, the never dying Worm may lash without controul. In fine, if Bad men were sure to undergo no other Pains or Horrors, and if the Good were sure to receive no more Joys and Plea∣sures till the Resurrection than proceed out of the Heaven or Hell they carry with them, and from the certain and constant expectations of ano∣ther Heaven or Hell; that would be sufficient, if well consider'd, to de∣ter Men from Vice, and encourage them to Righteousness. But the Scri∣ptures intimate more, and plainly inform us, That the Souls of Bad men are immediately upon death translated to a Place of Torment, and the Souls of Good men to a place of Ease and Pleasure: but I do not think those places are what we generally understand by Heaven or Hell, or that the completion of Happiness or Misery is till the Last Judgment. The sence of Holy Writ, in this case, is judiciously set forth by the ad∣mirable Dean of St. Paul's, in his late excellent Treatise of Future Judg∣ment, p. 208. to which I refer the Reader.

Thus I have, with what brevity and perspicuity I could, shew'd the essential diffe∣rence between the Nature of Man and other Animals, the confounding whereof strikes at the whole of Religion, and renders That unnecessary and Man contemptible. * 1.22 I said in my heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath, so that a man hath no preheminence above a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto one place, all are of the dust and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spi∣rit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth? Wherefore I perceive that there is no∣thing better, than that a man should rejoice in his own works, for that is his portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him? Here Solomon sets before us the great Argument by which wicked men overturn all Religion: Beasts and we are of the same nature; we are sure Men and Beasts breath, dye, and turn to dust alike; and we know nothing of our Spirits ascending, and theirs descending; therefore let us enjoy the World, for that's our Portion. The Conclusion's fairly drawn from the Pre∣misses, nor can we by natural reason except against any part of the Premisses, if the Souls of Men and Brutes are of the same nature; therefore Men should be very cautious of asserting any thing which gives the least colour or countenance to that Opinion.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Orig. Sac. p. 404.
• * 1.2

  Orig. Sacr. p. 385, 386.
• * 1.3

  Intell. Sys. p. 46.
• * 1.4

  See from p. 44.
• † 1.5

  P. 43.
• ‖ 1.6

  P. 44.
• * 1.7

  P. 44.
• † 1.8

  P. 44.
• * 1.9

  Orig. Sacr. l. 3. c. 1. p. 386.
• † 1.10

  Adv. L. 208, 209.
• * 1.11

  Heb. 4.12.
• * 1.12

  Rom. 7. v. 21, 22, 23.
• * 1.13

  Willis de Ani∣mi Brut. p. 58, 59.
• * 1.14

  Orig. Sac. p. 439
• * 1.15

  Immortal. of the Soul, b. 1. ch. 11, 5, 3. Ep. 3. ad Cartes p. 88.
• * 1.16

  Epit. Anat.
• * 1.17

  Duc. Dub. 214, 215.
• * 1.18

  Levit. 17. Vers. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.
• * 1.19

  Pract. Catec. p. 334.
• * 1.20

  Adv. L. 288.
• * 1.21

  Gen. 18.10, 14.
• * 1.22

  Eccl 3.18, to the end.