A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

Answer.

It is certain that God wills, that all men should be saved, and that he doth not give them his Grace, but to save them. But it is yet more certain, that if God gave them his Grace with a particular intent to save them all, they all would be saved: There∣fore God doth not dispense his Grace by particular wills. I have elsewhere explained and proved all the propositions of this argument, there must there∣fore needs be an error in the objection, and tho I could not discover it, I ought not therefore to quit a

Truth, proved by every thing which we know of Gods Conduct; because of an objection grounded upon that which we do not know: Nevertheless, it is easie to resolve the difficulty. For the Reason why I maintain, that God ought not to act by particular wills, is, that his Conduct may be uniform, and thereby carry in it the Character of his Wisdom, and Immutability.

Now, tho God when he created the World, did form the Bodies of Animals, by particular wills, it is evident, that this doth not disturb the simpli∣city of his ways: it cannot be said, that herein, he changed his Conduct. Therefore God might by particular wills, form Plants and Animals; and, in their Seeds, Iodge that which might propagate their Species, in consequence of the general Laws, without doing any thing unworthy of his Attri∣butes. If God, by particular wills, did again form Plants and Animals in the Seas, which the first Proposition of the proposed Objection imports, the difficulty would be more considerable: But I maintain, and always have maintained, that the Germes of Animals increase, and Plants are un∣folded, in consequence of the general Laws of Nature. I hold, that all organized Bodies were formed at the beginning of the World, so as to draw their nourishment and come to perfection by the Laws of the Communication of Motions; and that it is for this reason, and the relations which God hath made betwixt the Mother's Brain, and that of the Fruit she bears in her Womb. (It is plain enough, that I here speak only of the primi∣tive parts, for which we have no name, and which are unknown to us) Upon these accounts, I say,

it is, that there are to be found so many Irregula∣rities and Monsters among Animals. For I never said, or thought, that God, by particular wills, forms every day the Bodies of Animals and Plants.

That which follows, viz. That, according to my Principles, God ought to have formed a World, without any other organized Bodies, but those of Men, that he might have made it by the most sim∣ple ways, shews, that the Objector doth not com∣prehend my meaning: For besides, that God might have great reason to form such bodies, by particu∣lar wills, I hold, that it being at that time neces∣sary to determine the first motions of matter by such like wills, the conduct which he then obser∣ved, became nevertheless simple, by this way of acting: and doubtless his work is thereby made more perfect, for the wisdom of the Creator is most visible in organized bodies. The Objector doth not observe, that the difference of bodies proceeds from the various motion of the neigh∣bouring parts; and that therefore to form all or∣ganized Bodies, it was enough for God to give di∣vers motions to the divers parts of matter, from the beginning of the World. But to do this, 'twas necessary he should act by particular wills, 'tis true; but it was likewise necessary for him to imploy such like wills to begin the Chaos, and divide mat∣ter into such parts as would have been fit to have form'd a World without Animals. Thus it comes to the same thing, as to the simplicity of the ways. But, on the other side, to have formed all organi∣zed bodies at once for all ages, shews an infinite wisdom; whereas to have moved the parts of mat∣ter indifferently on all sides, to have form'd a

World without Animals successively, and by little and little, would have been no sign of knowledge. In a word, I affirm, and it ought well to be obser∣ved, that there needs no more particular wills to form Animals, than to divide the parts of matter. But tho infinitely many more were requisite, be∣sides, that these wills were necessary when the World was formed, they could not disturb the simplicity of God's ways, since they preceded the general Laws, and the striking of bodies upon one another, which is the occasional cause of them. But the general Laws being once established, God cannot, without great reasons, cease to observe them. Thus we see, that God, in consequence of his Laws, kills an infinite many Animals, and that he preserves none of them by particular wills. Lastly, Tho it should be proved, that God doth yet, at this day, form Insects by particular wills, this would make nothing against the main Prin∣ciple of the Treatise: For St. Paul teaches us, that Men do not receive Grace, but by the inter∣cession of J. C. in consequence of the general Law, by which God would sanctifie and save all, in his Son and by his Son, as I think I have proved in se∣veral places, and chiefly in the Second Discourse of this Treatise.