A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

Answer.

All this sounds well out of the mouth of St Au∣gustin, speaking of the Manichees. I should wil∣lingly make such Answers my self, did I speak to these Hereticks, or those to whom they would be satisfactory, or were not capable to compre∣hend such as are more abstract. But since, in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, I speak to those who have espoused Principles which the Manichees knew not, I am bound to give other Answers to them; and this the more, because I see they abuse excellent Principles, and draw from them Conse∣quences injurious to Religion.

Whether Monsters be, or be not Faults in the Universe; Whether God wills, or wills them not with a positive will, this is much the same to me. I suppose that they are faults, and that God wills them only indirectly; because this, if I mistake not, is the most common Opinion, and which I think is true. Yet surely it is lawful for me to

justifie the Wisdom of God to the Minds of those who are of this Opinion, tho they nevertheless should be deceived. But how far is this from be∣ing that, for which I composed the Treatise of Nature and Grace? If I have laboured to justifie the Wisdom of God in the Works of Nature, not∣withstanding Monsters, it is because * 1.1 I then in∣tended to justifie his Wisdom and his Goodness in the Works of Grace, notwithstanding the infi∣nite number of wicked Men and Reprobates. It sufficiently appears, that if I speak first of the Disorders of Nature, in the first Discourse of the Treatise, and have searched after the Reasons thereof; it was that I might render my Princi∣ples more sensible, and accustom Men to search after, and acknowledge the Cause of other Dis∣orders, more considerable than the generation of Monsters.

And tho some may say, they admire Men do not perceive how much my way of speaking ought to offend Christian ears, yet I fear not to repeat it: The Universe is not as perfect as absolutely it might be, but only as perfect as it could be, with relation to the ways most worthy of the Divine Attributes. There are visible Faults in the Work of God, in his Work, I say, but not in his Conduct. It is a visible fault, that an Infant should be born with su∣perfluous Members, and which hinders it from living. I have said this, and this I maintain. I had rather leave this fault in the Body of this unhappy Infant, and consequently in the Universe, than cast it upon the destructive intentions of its Author. I know very well, that this Monster comes not into the World, but by the will of God, as St. Augustin

says, and that there is no need of having recourse to an evil Principle, with the Manichees, that we may explain its Birth. But I think I am bound to maintain, in honour of the Divine Attributes, that it is not the Effect of a particular and direct Will of our God; it is because he is obliged to preserve the simplicity of his Laws, rather than hinder this particular disorder; it is because he permits it; or that tho he doth it, 'tis not because he directly and positively wills the doing of it, as I have explained so many ways.

But, it may be said, What need of these simple Ways, and these Metaphysical Principles, unknown to the Ancients? Is it not the shorter way to deny, that there are any Faults in the Work of God? This, I answer, is true: This is to cut the knot, instead of unloosing it. But I speak to those who hold, that Monsters do disfigure the Universe, or that Sinners do not. I think I ought not to tell them, that it is the Ignorance of Men, which make them look upon Monsters as visible Faults, lest I should confirm them in this Error, That Sinners are ab∣solutely necessary to the Beauty of the Universe. For 'tis to turn them from this abominable thought, that, from Metaphysical Principles which they re∣ceive, I draw Consequences which perhaps may displease some persons.

But how is it, that Men do not see, that this Answer, which is so much valued, and is founded upon St. Augustin's Authority, is only fit to darken the mind, tho well adapted to the understanding of the Manichees? Supposing it be true, that it is, in truth, the ignorance we are in, of the designs of God, which makes us find fault with his Works; what

can we find in the World, which deserves our admiration? Let the World be made how it will, it will be always alike admirable; that is, it will not be admirable at all. Since we know not the designs of God, that which appears Monstrous to us, is not so in respect of him; it is because we are deceived, and our ignorance makes us find fault where there is none: Very well. But by this Principle, nothing is Perfect, but with rela∣tion to the designs of the Creator; now these de∣signs are unknown to us: Therefore we ought to admire nothing in his work. If I judge it an hand some and becoming thing, that God has plac't the Eyes in the uppermost part of the Head; I ought by the same reason, to think it is an un∣comely thing, that he has placed them in the Bel∣ly of a Monster; or caused one to be born with Eyes which cannot receive the action of the Light. In a word, let the order of the World be what it will, I ought equally to admire it, or rather I ought not to admire it at all, if it be not per∣fect, but with respect to those designs which are unknown to me. 'Tis therefore to be wilfully blind to compare the Works of God with his unsearchable Designs, instead of discerning their Beauties, and consequently their Defects by the Light of that universal Reason, which inlightens all minds and teaches the most Stupid, that the Eyes were made for seeing, and plac'd in the up∣permost part of the Head, that we might see fur∣ther: Is it not plain, that the perfection of a work, depends not upon the designs of the work∣man, if his designs themselves be not agreeable to the Reason which enlightens us. If all the parts

of a Watch have such relations and connections with one another, as are necessary to measure the time exactly; this is a perfect work in its kind, tho it should be supposed, that the Watch∣maker had the extravagant design of making a thing good for nothing, and if a Watch should not rightly point to the hours, it would have an Essential fault, what design soever he had, who made it.

Thus a Monster is an imperfect work, whatsoe∣ver the design of God was, in making it. Ought we not to find fault rather with the works of God, than with his designs? Should we not rather leave in the World those visible defects, which all Men observe, and which we cannot remove, and main∣tain that all these disorders are consequences of the simplicity of the Natural Laws; then pretend that God directly and positively wills them, and attribute to a Being absolutely Perfect such de∣signs as are unworthy of his Wisdom, his Good∣ness, and his other Attributes? Not that I as∣sume to my self a Right of pronouncing concern∣ing all natural effects: For I confess there are an infinite number that are Equivocal, of which we cannot determine whether they do, or do not, render the World more Perfect. But there are such Monsters whose Deformity is visible, and which are so far from making the World more perfect, that God seems to have repented that he brought them to Light, seeing he strikes them with Death presently after their Birth; in this number I put not only those effects which we call Monsters, but all Creatures which want parts ne∣cessary for their preservation: I hold that God

directly wills the Perfection of the World, and of all the parts that compose it. For a World made up of Creatures, which want nothing which they ought to have, is more Perfect than a World full of Monsters, and a great many Beings which have not that which Reason teaches us they ought to have for their preservation. But it should al∣ways be remembred that all this is but accessary to the Question in hand; the Principle is, that wicked Men are not necessary to the perfection of the Universe, and if we meet with a great ma∣ny of them therein notwithstanding God abhors them, it is because (altho he may hinder them by his Power) his Wisdom permits him not to have practical wills for this end; and because his Justice subjecting them to the Law of Order, they contribute whether they will or no, not to the Sovereign Perfection of the Universe, but ra∣ther to the glory of its Author, and do admira∣bly set forth the wisdom of his Conduct.

But, it may be said, you do not consdier the the World in all Ages; you look only upon the present time: Cast your Eyes further. And if you have a Soul large enough, admire the Rela∣tions which there are betwixt this World, and the future Church; betwixt the different States of the World, in different Ages.

I Answer, I confess that these Relations are ad∣mirable: But it is because God wonderfully serves himself, even of those disorders themselves which happen in consequence of the natural Laws; and makes even the ill use which spirits make of their Liberty, subservient to his glory. Once more, it is not because Monsters are necessary to ren∣der

the World more perfect: It is not because he positively willed, that the number of the Dam∣ned should be the greatest part. Infernal Baby∣lon is not properly his work, but the Devils. By the Rigours of his Justice, the Wicked are re∣duc't to Order: But he wills not their Malice, tho he uses it to brighten, and set forth the vir∣tue of his Saints. He figures Morality by Na∣ture, Sinners by Monsters; but he directly wills neither the one, nor the other: He suffers them because he can reduce both to Order. But if he suffers them, 'tis because the simplicity of his Laws require it, and because he ows this to him∣self, that his Conduct should bear the Character of his Attributes. That which renders the World admirable in all its Conditions, is not so much the perfection it contains, as the simplicity of the ways which have produced, and do preserve it. If the future Church was more ample, and Hell not so full of Reprobates: If the Elect were still more Holy, and the Devils less Wicked: If all the Creatures did Praise the Lord, and not the greatest part Blaspheme his Holy Name; is it not evident that the World would be more perfect than it is? The Devils therefore and the Damned render it less perfect. And tho God corrects this disorder in his Creatures, yet never∣theless 'tis a disorder, that the greatest part of Men should Blaspheme their Creator. But God is not concern'd that there should be disorders in Hell, provided that there be none in the Hea∣venly Jerusalem; he is willing that there should be faults in his work, but not in his Conduct, and in his designs: The Damned are in disorder, but

God's conduct, in respect of them, is perfectly agreeable to order: The faults of any work ob∣lige those who would judge of it, to compare it with the ways, that, at the same time, they may admire both the work and the ways; but the faults of any design directly suppose either malice or ig∣norance in the Workman. Hence we are forc'd to say, that God has made the World not absolutely as perfect as he could, but as perfect as it could be, with respect to the ways which his Wisdom and o∣ther Attributes did oblige him to observe, which is the Foundation of the Treatise of Nature and Grace. I desire it may be examined without preju∣dice, and with that attention which is necessary to understand it in its utmost extent, and with refe∣rence to all its consequences; and then let Men judge of it. Then I hope it will have that effect upon them it has had upon many persons, tho pre∣vented with the sentiments which it overthrows, without leaving any other difficulties, if I am not mistaken, than those which have always been look'd upon as incomprehensible to the mind of Man. I do assure my self, that they will clearly see, that there are no such certain Principles to prove by reason, that which Faith teaches, and to silence both the Libertines and the Hereticks, in a matter wherein they use to insult and pretend to triumph.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See the first Di∣scourse of this Treatise,