A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

The First Discourse. Of the Necessity of the General Laws of Nature and Grace.

First Part. The Necessity of the General Laws of Nature.

Advertisement. I Think I ought to Advertise, That they who are well acquainted with the Principle which I have proved, in the Search after Truth, and elsewhere, need not to read the following Additions, nor even the Explications which are at the end of this Treatise; without which my Meaning may be very well understood: But they may perhaps be usefull unto those whom I had chiefly in my mind, when I wrote the Treatise of Nature and Grace, and whom I should extreamly desire to content, as well as others.

Additions.

The Will of God can be nothing else, but the Love which he bears to himself. Now he cannot will and act but by his own Will: Therefore he cannot act but for himself. But the World is not worthy of God: It has no Proportion to God; for there is no relation betwixt finite and infinite: God therefore cannot form the Design of producing it. God cannot act with a design of doing nothing for himself, since he cannot act but for himself. Now the World with respect to God, is nothing; for the relation of finite to infinite is a Cypher: God therefore cannot resolve to make any thing, if a Divine Person does not joyn himself to his Work to render it Divine, and thereby wor∣thy of his Complacency, or answerable to the infinite Action of his Will. Thus,

I.

Since God cannot act but for his own Glory, nor finding it but in himself, he could have no o∣ther design in the Creation of the World, but the Establishment of his Church.

Additions.

But what Divine Person shall sanctify the Work of God? It must be the Eternal Word. For it is the Word, or the Wisdom of God, which ought to be, as I may so say, first consulted to regulate the Di∣vine Operation, and in some sort make way for God's Action. A Prophane World being unworthy of God, the Wisdom of God rendred God impotent; or hindred him from acting. Thus, supposing that God would procure to himself an Honour worthy of him, (which nevertheless is every way indifferent to him, since he is altogether sufficient to himself) his Wisdom would fail him in some sence, if it did not in the first place

offer its self to him to be united to his Work, since otherwise his Work would not be worthy of him. The Word is universal Reason: 'Tis he therefore who was to come and enlighten Men, who could not be reasonable, but by Reason. 'Tis according to him, and by him that we are form'd: 'Tis therefore by him, or according to him, we must be perfected, or reformed. Thus, since a Divine Person must render the Work of God Divine, make Gods of us, or the Adopted Children of the Eternal Father; it was necessary that his only Son should be the First-born amongst many Brethren, and that we all should re∣ceive of his Abundance, or of that Fulness of Di∣vinity which dwells in him. I might therefore say according to these Principles, speaking of the Church, that it is the great Work which the Son built to the Glory of the Father. * 1.1

II.

Jesus Christ, who is the Head thereof, is the Beginning of the Wayes of the Lord; He is the First-born of all Creatures: And though he was born amongst men in the fulness of time, yet he is their model in the Eternal designs of his Fa∣ther. It is according to his Image that all men were made, they who were before his Temporal birth as well as we. In a word, it is in Him that all things subsist; for it is he alone who could render the work of God perfectly worthy of its Author.

Additions.

Jesus Christ, who is the Head of the Church, is the beginning of the Wayes of the Lord. I use these Expressions, because Scripture uses them. The Title of Head plainly shews, that Jesus Christ

as Man, is not only the Meritorious cause of Grace, but also the Occasional, Physical, Distributive; since He gives his Spirit to his Members which compose the Church, as I shall explain more largely in the Second Discourse. And it may be said, That Jesus Christ is the Beginning of the Ways of the Lord: Because God, by the Creation of the World, goes out, as I may say, of himself, since the term of his Ope∣ration is not his own substance, as in immanent Ope∣rations, by which the Son is continually begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds. It is upon this account that the Wise man after these words in the Eighth Chap. of the Proverbs; The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his Wayes, adds for Expli∣cation * 1.2, Antequam quidquam faceret a princi∣pio. That Jesus Christ is the Head of the Church is without dispute: But that he is the beginning of the Ways of the Lord, in this sence, is that which may be doubted. I have followed the common opini∣on of the Fathers upon the 22. ver. of the 8th. ch. of the Prov. for almost all of them understand this passage, which the Arrians abused, Dominus posse∣dit; or (as they then read according to the 70.) Creavit me in initio viarum suarum, of the incarnate Wisdom. It is useless here to transcribe all the Quo∣tations of Salazar upon this place of the Proverbs. Jesus Christ is the first-born of every Creature, primogenitus omnis creaturae, Col. 1.15. He is our model, since St. Paul exhorts us to put Him on, or to become like unto Him: Therefore, as we have born the Image of the Earthly, let us also bear the Image of the Heavenly. It is according to his Image, that all men were made in the pur∣pose of God. For the Word is universal Reason,

and immutable Order; and God has made us to con∣form us to Reason and Order. There are none but the Elect, whom God has efficaciously predestinated to become conformable to the Image his Son: Quos praescivit & predestinavit conformes fieri imagi∣ni Filii sui, Rom. 8.29. I confess it. But God would Save all men, He wills there Sanctification; This is the will of God, your Sanctification, 1. Thes. 4.3. The Wisdom incarnate is moreover our mo∣del after a sensible manner, and suitable to men who only harken to their senses. God foreseeing sin, re∣solved to give unto Jesus Christ a body that it might be a victim, which He might offer unto Him; for every Priest must have something to offer. Neces∣se est & hunc habere aliquid quod offerat, Heb. 8.3. Now God thought on the body of his Son when he form'd that of Adam, and hath given unto us all a body, by which we may Merit, or which we ought to sacrifice as Priests, and according to the Exam∣ple of our Sovereign Priest: Obsecra vos ut ex∣hibeatis corpora vestra hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo placentem, Rom. 12.1. To conclude, all things subsist in Jesus Christ, Omnia in ipso constant, Col. 1.19. Every thing was created in J. C. and by J. C. Omnia per ipsum & in ipso creata sunt, Col. 1.16. Omnia & in omnibus Christus, Col. 3.11.

III.

There ought to be some relation betwixt the World and the Action by which it is produced. Now the Action by which the World was drawn out of nothing is the Action of God, which is of infinite value; and the World how perfect soeve•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 might be, is not infinitely amiable, and cann•••• 〈…〉〈…〉 unto God an Honour worthy of

him. Thus, separate Jesus Christ from the rest of the creatures, and see if he who cannot act but for his own glory, and whose Wisdom has no bounds, cou'd resolve to produce any thing from without. But if you joyn J. C. to his Church, and the Church to the rest of the World, out of which it was taken; then you will raise to the Glory of God a Temple so august and so ho∣ly, that you'l perhaps be surprized, that the foun∣dations of it were laid so late.

Additions.

See then the order of things! All is for men, men for J. C. and J. C. for God; Whether things pre∣sent, or things to come, all are yours; and you are Christs, and Christ is Gods. 1. Cor. 3.22. God hath Subjected all things to J. C. All Power is given to me both in Heaven and Earth; St. Mat. 28.18. Heb. 2.9. That J. C. might sub∣ject all things to God, and give up his Kingdom at the end of the World, having destroyed all Principalities and all Powers, 1. Cor. 15.24. That the Son himself may be for ever subject to him that put all things under him, and that thus God may be all in all. Ver. 28. This is the Spiritual Temple which must be altogether filled with the Majesty of God, and remain eternally, because its immovable foundations are laid on J. C. before those of this world, which must Perish: * 1.3 Ab aeterno ordinata sum, & ex antiquis antequam terra si∣eret, Prov. 8.23. God has elected us in J. C. be∣fore the Creation of the World: Eph. 1.4. His grace is given to us before the world began. 2. Tim. 1.9. And J. C. himself in his Prayer after the celebration of the holy Supper, beggs of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Father,

that glory which he possessed in him before the world was, i. e. before he resolved to form the World St. John 17.5. To conclude, J. C. being the first of the predestinated, since we are not predestinated but in J. C. God who has made the world only for the predistina∣ted (Omnia propter electos) must, as I may so say, have thought of J. C. before all things. For if these passages, and such like, be interpreted only of the E∣ternal prescience, it also may be truly said, that the motion of a straw is in God before all ages, as well as the Incarnation of his beloved Son, who renders all the Work of God Amiable to him. If the dif∣ferent manner after which the H. Spirit speaks of the works of God in the H. Scripture be observed, it cannot be doubted, in my opinion, that J. C. and his Church is truly the design of God. See where∣fore it is evident by reason, and certain by Faith, that God never repents, or changes his design. God is not as the Son of man that he should repent, Numb 23.19. Yet nevertheless the H. Scripture says, that God repented he had made man, Gen. 6.6. And that the Jewish Priest-hood, their Ceremo∣nies, their whole Burnt - offerings were not at all pleasing to him. Isa. 1. Psalm 50. Why did God make a World which he was obliged to destroy? Why has he established a worship which he is bound to reject, he who is constant in all his purposes. It is because he would thereby signify, that the pre∣sent world is not properly his work, or his true de∣sign; nor the Jewish worship a true worship, or wor∣thy of him. But what then is his immutable design? The Lord sware, and will not repent; thou art a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec. God will never repent of having made J. C. Sove∣reign

Priest: He thereby receives Divine Honours. His Priesthood shall continue for ever, having been confirmed by an Oath, Heb. ch. 7. &c. God re∣pented that he had made Saul King over the people. Saul, I say, the figure of Herods, and the Image of Politick Kings, who only seek their own greatness. But David the figure and Father of Jesus Christ, is after Gods own heart. God never repented that he had made him King over his People. I have Sworn once by my Holiness, that I will not fail David. His Seed shall endure for ever, and his Seat is like as the Sun before me, Psal. 89.34, 35. Be∣hold thou shalt conceive and bear a Son — and of his Kingdom there shall be no end.

When Abraham by the sacrifice of his only Son, had represented Jesus Christ raised from the Dead, God assures him, and that also with an Oath to ren∣der this promise irrevocable, that in the Antitpye of Isaac delivered from the Dead, (that is to say in J. C. raised from the Dead, set at his right hand, made a Priest according to the order of Melchisedec, and a King over his People) all the Nations should be abundantly blessed. By my self have I Sworn saith the Lord — in thy seed shall all the Nations of the Earth be Blessed. Thus we see, when God speaks of the Incarnation of his Son and of his Priest∣hood, he thereunto adds an Oath, to shew that this is his irrevocable purpose, or rather his purpose; for since God never repents, all his designs are irrevoca∣ble. But I think I ought to advise, that what I have hitherto said, is not essential to my purpose, which is principally to justify the Wisdom and Goodness of God, notwithstanding Monsters, Sinners, and all the irregularities found in the World. If I place J. C.

at the Head of all things, if I make him the prin∣cipal design of God; it is because I hope by this means to justifie the thought, or desire, which God had to go out of himself by communicating himself to his Crea∣tures; and by the regular order of Meditation, it seems to me I ought to begin there.

IV.

In the mean time, if you observe that the glo∣ry which redounds to God from his work, is not essential to him; if you grant that the World can∣not be a necessary Emanation of the Divinity; you'll plainly see that it was not to have been eter∣nal, tho' it never should have an end. Eternity is the Character of Independence; it must needs be therefore that the World had a begining. The annihilation of substances is a mark of inconstancy in him that made them; they therefore shall ne∣ver have an end.

Additions.

I mean that Eternity does not imply independence. But independence implys Eternity; for nothing can be independent that is not Eternal. Eternal existence therefore is the manner whereby that thing which is in∣dependent exists. GOD could not give Eternal existence to Creatures. To consider only the Power of God, he was able to have created the World from all Eternity; for he never was without his Power. But if his Wisdom, which is his inviolable, be con∣sulted, he ought not to have done it; and consequently in one sence he could not; for it is not in the pow∣er of God to belie himself, or to despise the Laws which his wisdom prescribes to him. The same thing must be said concerning the annihilation of substances. If you consider only the power of God, he may annihilate

them. But if you consult his wisdom, it appears that he will do no such thing: for God acts alwayes after the wisest manner that he can, or which best comports with his divine attributes. He may chuse whether he will act at all, in this he is very indifferent, for he is altogether sufficient to himself. But if he acts he cannot change. His conduct must alwayes bear the impression of his wisdom and his immutability. It seems to me that order, which is his inviolable law, requires it should be thus. See the 2d. discourse, Articles 50, 51, 52.

V.

If therefore it be true, that the World ought to have a beginning, and that the creation of J. C. could not be so ancient as the eternal genera∣tion of his divine Person; an eternity must needs have preceded time. Thus, do not think that God delayed the production of his work, he too much loves the glory which he receives thereby in J. C. It may be truly said in some sence, that he has made it as soon as he could. For tho' in respect of us, he might have created it ten Thou∣sand years before the begining of the World; yet ten Thousand years having no relation to e∣ternity, he could not have made it sooner or la∣ter; since an eternity must needs have gone be∣fore.

VI.

It is plain, that soon and late are the proper∣ties of time. And if it should be supposed that God had created the World sooner than he did, by so many Millions of years, as there are grains of sand upon the Sea-shore, might it not still have been asked, Why God who so much loves the

glory which he receives by the Establishment of his Church, had not begun many Ages before? Thus it is sufficient to say, that an Eternity * 1.4 went before the Incarnation of the World, to shew that this great mistery was accomplished neither too soon nor too late. It was therefore necessary that God should have created the World for the Church, the Church for J. C. and J. C. for to find in him a Sacrifice, and a Sovereign Priest worthy of the divine Majesty. This order of the designs of God cannot be doubted of, if it be observed, that he cannot have any other end of his actions but himself. And if it be understood that eter∣nity is not proper to creatures, it will be granted, that they were made when they ought to have been. These truths being supposed, let us endea∣vour to discover something in the conduct which God observes for the execution of his great de∣sign.

Additions.

Read the Objection and Answer which is at the end of the third explication, where I shew, that St. Augustine did not pretend that the Judgments of God are impenetrable in this sence; that the truths which Faith teaches us being supposed, it is unlawful to justifie his wisdom and goodness in the execution of his intentions. 'Tis certain, that the Fathers, and all Divines have endeavoured to give a reason of their Faith, and we ought to meditate upon the truths of Religion, to attain unto the understanding of that which we already believe. But to remove all scruple concerning my way of proceeding, I shall now shew, that St. Augustine himself approves it by his Example and his Reasons.

Consentius had some difficulties concerning the Tri∣nity, he had proposed them to Alipius, that he might ob∣tain the resolution of them from St. Augustine. But having learnt that St. Augustine was in a place of retirement, and proper for meditating and clearing up his doubts, he writ to him himself, (as unto a man whose spirit * 1.5 penetrated into the highest myste∣ries) that he would give him those explications he desired, if he thought convenient. Nevertheless he openly declares, that 'twas his opinion, the reasons of our mysteries ought not to be sought after, but that men should depend upon Faith only. These are his words, Epis. 221.

Ego igitur, cum apud memetipsum prorsus de∣finierim, veritatem rei divinae ex fide, magis quam ex ratione, percipi oportere, si enim fides Sanctae Ec∣clesiae ex disputationis ratione, non ex credulita∣tis Pietate, apprehenderetur, nemo praeter Philo∣sophos at{que} Oratores, beatitudinem possederet. Sed quia placuit Deo, qui infirma Mundi hujus elegit, ut confundat fortia, per stultitiam Praedi∣cationis salvare credentes; non tam ratio requi∣renda de Deo, quam autoritas est sequenda Sancto∣rum. Nam profecto, neque Ariani, qui Filium, quem genitum confitemur, minorem putant, in hac impietate persisterent, neque Macedoniani Spiri∣tum Sanctum, quem ne{que} genitum ne{que} ingenitum credimus, quantum in ipsis est a Divinitatis arce detruderent, si Scripturis Sanctis, magis quam suis ratiocinationibus, accomodare fidem mallent.

But see St. Augustin's Answer.

Quod autem petis, ut questionem Trinitatis hoc est de Unitate Divinitatis, & discretione Perso∣narum, caute, prudenter{que} discutiam, ut doctrinae

meae, sicut dicis, ingenii{que} serenitas, ita nebulam vestrae mentis abstergat, ut quod nunc cogitare non potestis, intelligentiae a me lumine declaratum quodammodo videre positis. Vide prius, utrum ista petitio cum tua superiori definitione concor∣det, superius quippe in eadem ipsa Epistola, in qua hoc petis, apud temetipsum definisse te dicis, ex fide veritatem magis quam ex ratione, percipi o∣portere. Si enim fides, inquis, Sanctae Ecclesiae, ex disputationis ratione, & non ex credulitatis pietate apprehenderetur, nemo praeter philosophos at{que} Orato∣res beatitudinem possideret, sed quia placuit, inquis Deo, qui infirma hujus Mundi elegit, ut confundat fortia, per stultitiam Praedicationis salvos facere credentes, non tam ratio requirenda, quam autoritas est sequenda Sanctorum. Vide ergo, secundum haec verba tua, ne potius debeas, maxime de hac re, in qua fides nostra Consistit, solam Sanctorum au∣toritatem sequi, nec ejus intelligentiae a me quae∣rere rationem. Ne{que} enim cum caepero te in tan∣ti hujus secreti intelligentiam utcun{que} introduce∣re (quod nisi Deus intus adjuverit omnino non potero) aliud disserendo facturus sum, quam ra∣tionem, ut potero, redditurus: quam si a me, vel quolibet doctore non irrationabiliter flagitas, ut quod credis intelligas, Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea que fidei firmita∣te jam tenes, etiam rationis Luce conspicias. Absit nam{que} ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit inquam, ut ideo credamus, ne rationem accipia∣mus, sive queramus; cum enim credere non pos∣semus, nisi rationales animas haberemus. Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus, ad doctrinam salutarem per∣tinentibus,

quas ratione nondum percipere vale∣mus, sed aliquando valebimus, fides precedat ra∣tionem, qua cor mundatur, ut magnae rationis ca∣piat, & perferat Lucem, hoc utique rationis est. & ideo rationabiliter dictum est per Prophetam, Nisi credideritis non intelligetis. Isa. 7.9. secund. 70. Ubi proculdubio discrevit haec duo, dedit{que} consilium, quo prius credamus, ut id quod credi∣mus intelligere valeamus. Proinde ut fides prae∣cedat rationem rationabiliter visum est. Nam si hoc praeceptum rationabile non est, ergo irrationa∣bile est. Absit si igitur rationabile est, ut ad mag∣na quaedam, quae capi nondam possunt, fides pre∣cedat rationem; proculdubio, quantulacun{que} ratio quae hoc persuadet, etiam ipsa antecedit fidem. Propterea monet Apost. Petrus, paratos nos esse debere ad responsionem omni poscenti nos ratio∣nem de fide, & spe nostra: quoniam si a me in∣fidelis rationem poscit fidei & spei meae, et video quod antequam credat, capere non potest hanc ip∣sam ei reddo rationem, in qua, si fieri potest, Vi∣deat, quam prepostere ante fidem poscat rationem earum rerum quas capere non potest. Si autem jam fidelis rationem poscat, ut quod credit, intel∣ligat; capacitas ejus intuenda est, & Secundum rationem redditam sumat fidei suae, quantum po∣test, intelligentiam, majorem, si plus capit; mi∣norem si minus: cum tamen quous{que} ad plenitudi∣nem Cognitionis, perfectionem{que} perveniat, ab i∣tinere fidei non recedat. Hinc est quod dicit Apostolus, Phil. 3.15, 16. Et tamen si quid a∣liter scitis, id queque vobis Deus revelabit: verun∣tamen in quod pervenimus, in eo ambulemus. Jam ergo, si fideles sumus, ad fidei viam pervenimus,

quam si non dimiserimus, non solam ad tantam intelligentiam rerum incorporearum, & incommu∣tabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus potest, verumetiam ad summitatem Contemplatio∣nis, quam dicit Apostolus, facie ad faciem sine du∣bitatione perveniemus. Nam quidam, etiam mi∣nimi, & tamen in via fidei perseverantissime gra∣dientes, ad illam beatissimam Contemplationem per∣venerunt. Quidam vero, quid sit natura invisi∣bilis, incommutabilis, incorporea utcun{que} jam sci∣entes, & viam quae ducit ad tantae beatitudinis mansionem, quoniam stulta illis videtur, quod est Christus Crucifixus, tenere recusantes, ad quietis ipsius penetrale, cujus jam Luce mens eorum, ve∣lut in longinqua radiante perstringitur, perveni∣re non possunt. Sunt autem quaedam, quae cum audierimus, non eis accomodamus fidem, & ra∣tione nobis reddita, vera esse Cognoscimus quae credere non valemus. Et universa Dei miracula ideo ab infidelibus non Creduntur, quia eorum ratio non videtur. Et revera sunt, de quibus ra∣tio reddi non potest, non tamen non est. Quid enim est in rerum natura, quod irrationaliter fe∣cerit Deus? Sed quorundam mirabilium operum, ejus etiam expedit tantisper occultam esse ratio∣nem, ne apud animos fastidio languidos, ejusdem rationis cognitione vilescant. Sunt enim, & mul∣ti sunt, qui plus tenentur Admiratione rerum, quam Cognitione Causarum, ubi miracula esse desistunt; & opus est, eos ad invisibilium fidem visibilibus miraculis excitari, ut charitate purgati, eo per∣veniant, ubi familiaritate veritates mirari desi∣stant. Nam & theatris Homines funambulum mi∣rantur, musicis delectantur: in illo stupet difficul∣tas,

in his retinet, pascit{que} jucunditas. Haec dixe∣rim, ut fidem tuam, ad amorem intelligentiae co∣horter, ad quam ratio vera perducit, & cui fides animum praeparat. And afterwards — Porro au∣tem qui vera ratione jam quod tantummodo cre∣debat intelligit, profecto praeponendus est ei qui capit ad huc intelligere quod credit. Si autem nec cupit, & ea quae intelligenda sunt credenda tantummodo existimat, Cui rei fides prosit, igno∣rat, vid. de Lib. arbit. Lib. 11. c. 2.

We see then, by this Epistle of St. Augustine, that they who blame my way of proceding, are of Con∣sentius's opinion, which St. Augustine Condemns. Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea quae fidei firmitate, jam tenes, etiam ra∣tionis luce conspicias. Absit enim, ut hoc in no∣bis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis Animantibus excellentiores creavit. — Haec dixerim ut fidem tuam ad amorem intelligentiae cohorter, ad quam Ratio vera perducit, & cui fides animum praeparat. This is the Method, which I think I have hitherto observed, according to St. Augustine; who did not believe that he had any wise derogated from the Majesty of our Mysteries by the 15. Books which he Composed, about the Trinity.

VII.

If I was not perswaded that all men are rea∣sonable, only because they are enlightned by the Eternal Wisdom; I should doubtless be very rash to speak of the designs of God, and to endeavour to discover any of his wayes in the production of his Work. But since it is certain, that the Eternal Word is the universal reason of minds, and by the light which he continually casts up∣on

us, we may all have some commerce with God; I ought not to be blamed for consulting this rea∣son, which altho' consubstantial with God himself, fails not to Answer all those who know how to pe∣tition him by a serious attention.

Additions.

That which I say here, that it is the Eternal Wis∣dom which enlightens us, &c. is all taken out of St. Augustine. I have sufficiently prov'd it, in the pre∣face to the Search after Truth, in the Chapter con∣cerning the nature of Ideas, and in the Explica∣tion of the same Chapter.

VIII.

I confess nevertheless, that Faith teaches many Truths, which cannot be discovered by the natu∣ral union of the mind with Reason. The Eter∣nal Truth doth not answer all our Prayers; for we sometimes ask for more than we can receive. But we shou'd not use this as a pretence to cover our Idleness and want of application.

Additions.

We ask more than we can receive, when we attend but a little to subjects much compounded; or when we do not reason upon clear Ideas.

IX.

The generality of men are soon tired by the natural prayer, which the mind shou'd make by its attention to inward truth, to the end it may receive therefrom light and understanding. And tired by this troublesome exercise, they speak of it with contempt, discourage one another, and hide their weakness and their ignorance under the deceitful appearance of a false humility.

Additions.

Thus they do, who are of the opinion of Consen∣tius condemn'd by St. Augustin.

X.

Their example should not teach us this agreea∣ble virtue, which entertains in mens minds sloth and negligence, and comforts them in the igno∣rance of those truths, which are most necessary for them. We ought continually to beg of him who enlightens all men, that he would commu∣nicate to us his light; that he would reward our Faith with the gift of understanding; and above all, that he would hinder us from taking proba∣lity and confused sentiments, (which precipitate the minds of the proud into the darkness of er∣ror) for that evidence which attends his An∣swers.

Additions.

To this end we should observe the rule which I think I have demonstrated in the 2d. Chapter of the Search after Truth, and the necessity of which I have shewn in all the rest of that Book; for the Libertines are either the most ignorant, or fullest of errors and prejudices.

XI.

He that pretends to speak of God with any exactness, ought not to consult himself, or speak as the common sort of men. He should lift up his mind above all creatures, and with a great deal of attention and respect, consult the vast I∣dea of a Being infinitly perfect: And since this Idea represents to us the true God, very different from him whom the greatest part of men do fan∣cy to themselves; we should not speak of him ac∣cording

to the popular Language. It is permit∣ted to all men to say with the Scripture, that God repented he had made man; that he was angry at his people; that he delivered Israel from Capti∣vity with the Strength of his Arm. But these ex∣pressions, and the like, are not permitted to Di∣vines, when they should speak exactly: Thus, when it shall be observed in what follows, that my expressions are not common; none ought to be surprised thereat. It should rather be care∣fully considered, whether they are clear, and whe∣ther they perfectly agree with the Idea which all men have of the Being infinitely perfect.

Additions.

The reason of this is, because we ought not to judge of things, but by the Idea we have of them; For to judge of God by ones self, is to make God like un∣to himself: A man cannot judge even of other men by himself, without falling into many errors.

XII.

This Idea of an Infinitely perfect Being, contains two Attributes absolutely necessary for creating the World; a Wisdom which has no bounds, and a Power which nothing is able to resist. The Wisdom of God discovers unto him an infinite number of Ideas of different works, and all pos∣sible wayes of executing his designs; and his Pow∣er makes him so much Master of all things, and so independent upon all assistance whatsoever, that it is sufficient for him to will, to the end, that what he wills may be done. For it must especi∣ally be observed, that God has no need of Instru∣ments for acting; that his will is necessarily ef∣ficacious: In a word, that as his Wisdom is his

own understanding, so his Power is not different from his Will. Of this infinite number of wayes whereby God might have executed his purpose, let us see which is that which he was obliged to prefer before all others; let us begin with the Creation of the Visible World, of which, and in which, he forms the Invisible World, which is the Eternal Object of his Love.

Additions.

Of this infinite number of ways by which God might have executed his purpose, let us see which is that he was obliged to prefer before all others. This without doubt is that which agrees best with the character of the divine attributes. Now this is the most simple, the most general, the most uniform. But observe, I do not engage my self to enquire which is the most simple, this is not necessary: It is suffi∣cient for my purpose, that God acts by simple and general wayes, because these wayes are more worthy of him, than those which are particular; and that amongst these simple and general ways, he chuses that which is most worthy of his Wisdom, in relation to his Work. It is not at all necessary, that I should particularly explain, which is this most wise way, and most worthy of God.

XIII.

An excellent Workman should proportion his Action to his Work; he does not that by wayes very much compounded, which he may perform by more simple; he acts not without an end, and never labours in vain. Hence it must be conclu∣ded, that God discovering in the infinite treasures of his Wisdom an infinity of possible Worlds, as necessary consequences of the Laws of motion

which he might establish, determined to create that which might be produced and preserved, by the most simple Laws; or which might be the most perfect in relation to the simplicity of the means necessary to its production and preservati∣on.

Additions.

This is a comparison which I use, to keep up at∣tention of mind, and to heighten it so as to conceive the way by which he acts, unto whom none can be compared. For few men can comprehend that the de∣signs of God are wise and enlightned, and that God does not form them, but according to the relation which they have with the ways or manners of acting which carry in them the character of his Attributes. They think that God chuses the design most worthy of him, without considering, or without regard to the ways of executing it. But let them observe, that God wills that his ways be most wise, as well as his designs. He wills not that his designs should honour him, and his ways dishonour him. He compares the wisdom of his design, with the wisdom of his ways, and chu∣ses both the design and the ways which altogether best agree with the character of his Attributes. This is my Principle, by which I shall justifie the wisdom and goodness of God, notwithstanding all the irregu∣larities of nature, monsters, sin, and the miseries to which we are now subject. I begin with the faults of the Material World.

XIV.

God doubtless might have made a World more perfect, than that which we Inhabit. He might, for example, have ordered that the rain which serves to make the Earth Fruitful, should fall

more regularly upon Lands that are cultivated, than upon the Sea, where it is not so necessary. But to have this World more Perfect, he must have changed the simplicity of his ways, and have multiplyed the Laws of the communicati∣on of motions, by which our World subsists: And then there wou'd no more have been that proportion betwixt the Action of God and his Work, which is necessary to determine an infi∣nitely wise Being to act: Or at least, there wou'd not have been the same proportion between the Action of God and such a perfect World, as there is betwixt the Laws of Nature, and the World which we Inhabit. For our World, how imperfect soever it may be imagined, is founded upon Laws of motion so simple and so natural, that it is perfectly worthy of the infinite Wisdom of its Author.

Additions.

I use the example of the irregularity of ordina∣ry rain, to prepare the mind for another rain, which is not given to the merits of men, no more than the common rain which falls equally upon Lands that are Sown, as well as those that lie Fallow. I suppose it to be easily comprehended, that it is because the rain falls in consequence of natural Laws, that it is so ill distributed in relation to the necessities of the Earth. But I think I ought to advise, that they who don't distinctly remember the proofs which I have given in the Search after Truth, that it is God who does all, that he does not communicate his power unto Creatures, but by making them the occasional cau∣ses of determining the efficacity of the general. Laws, by which he executes his designs in a way worthy of

him. I think, I say, I ought to advise these persons to read and meditate upon at least the first explicati∣on, which is at the end of the third discourse; for to do it well, recourse ought to be had to those places wherein I demonstrate my Principles.

XV.

In truth, I am perswaded that the Laws of mo∣tion necessary to the production and conservati∣on of the EARTH, and of all the STARS in the HEAVENS are reduced to these two. The first, that Bodies in motion endeavour to con∣tinue their motion in a right Line: The second, that when two Bodies meet one another, their motion is distributed from one to another propor∣tionably to their bulk; so that afterwards they may be mov'd with an equal celerity. These two Laws are the cause of all the motions which make that variety of form which we admire in nature.

XVI.

I confess nevertheless, * 1.6 that the second does not always seem to be observ'd in the experiments which may be made upon this subject; but this is because we see only that which happens to Bo∣dies that are visible, and that we think not at all upon the Invisible that surround them, which by the efficacy of the same Law make the spring of visible Bodies, thereby obliging them to recoil, and not observe this same Law. I must not in this place explain this any further.

XVII.

Now these two Laws are so simple, so natural, and at the same time so fruitful, that tho there were no other reasons to judge that nature ob∣serves them, yet we should have cause to believe,

that they are appointed by him, who always acts by the most simple wayes, in whose Action there is nothing irregular, and who proportions it so wisely with his Work, that he does infinite mar∣vels, by a very few [Practical] Resolutions.

Additions.

It would require a whole Book to prove that which I say here concerning the fruitfulness of these two gene∣ral laws of the communication of motion. It will be easily seen that I speak not at all adventures by those who are exactly well acquainted with the Physical prin∣ciples of Mon. des Cartes. But this is not essen∣tial to my subject. It is sufficient that the Laws of Nature are general. These three Articles may be looked upon as a kind of parenthesis.

XVIII.

We must not judge of the general cause as of particulars, of the Infinite Wisdom, as of limi∣ted understandings. God foreseeing all that should follow the natural Laws, even before their establishment, could not have established them to overturn them. The Laws of Nature are con∣stant and Immutable, they are general for all times and all places. Two Bodies of such a magnitude and such a swiftness striking upon one another, will be reflected after the same manner now as heretofore. If the rain falls upon certain grounds, and the Sun burns up others; if a season favou∣rable to the Fruits of the Earth, be succeeded by a Prost which destroys them; if a Child comes into the world with a monstrous and useless head which grows out of his breast and makes him miserable; it is not because God intended to pro∣duce these effects by particular wills, but because

he has established the Laws of the communicati∣on of motions, of which these effects are neces∣sary consequences: Laws otherwise so simple, and withal so fruitful, that they produce all that we see beautiful in the world, and in a little time repair the greatest Mortality and Dearth.

XIX.

He that having built an house, and then un∣dermines the Foundation, discovers his ignorance; he that plants a Vineyard, and immediately pulls up that which had taken root, shews his folly: Because he that wills and wills not, wants ei∣ther understanding, or constancy of mind. But it can't be said that God acts either by caprice or thro' Ignorance; when an Infant comes into the world with superfluous members, which hin∣der him from living, or when an Hail-Storm destroys the Fruit almost ripe. Thus if God makes the Fruit to fall by a Storm before it is ripe, it is not because he wills and wills not: For God acts not by particular wills, as particular causes do. He has not established the Laws of communication of motions with a design to pro∣duce Monsters, or to make the Fruits Fall before they be ripe; he appointed these Laws by rea∣son of their Foecundity, and not their Barrenness. Thus that which once he willed, he wills still; and in general, the world for which he made these Laws, shall subsist eternally.

Additions.

I have not here proved a Posteriori, or by the effects, that the general cause, acts by general Wills or Laws, whose efficacy is determined, by the action of occasional or particular causes, tho' these sorts of

proofs are very many and undeniable. (1.) Because I supposed in the Advertisement to the Reader, that he had read what I have written against the pre∣tended efficacy of second causes. (2.) Because none can want these sort of proofs; for every one knows, that a body is never mov'd before it be struck, and that it is never stricken without being mov'd: E∣very one knows it is day when the Sun is risen, and that it is night when it is set; and that thus God produces the motion, and the light in consequence of the general laws of nature. (3.) To conclude, be∣cause the proofs a priorit, taken from the nature of the cause, tho more abstracted, appear to me clearer, stronger, and more proper to the subject I Treat of. For if I had not proved only by the effects, that God does all that we see in nature, by simple, general, uniform and constant ways, it might be answered: 'Tis true, but in grace he does quite otherwise; he there does all by particular wills. Whereas having proved by the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, that he does all that we see by simple ways; since God does not bely himself, this proves that he does by the like wayes all that we do not see. Thus men begin to reflect, that God must act after such a manner as comports with his Divine Attributes. Nevertheless at the end of this first Discourse, * 1.7 I have proved the same principle by Arguments a posteriori, that I might touch the minds even of those who reflect up∣on nothing.

XX.

Here it must be observed, that the essential rule of the will of God, is Order; and that if man, for example, had not sinned, (a supposition which wou'd much have changed his designs) then

order, not permitting he shou'd have been puni∣shed, the natural Laws of the communication of motion, cou'd never have been able to have made him unhappy: For the Law of order, which re∣quires that the Just do suffer nothing, whether he will or no, being essential to God; the Arbitra∣ry Law of the communication of motions ought necessarily to be submitted thereunto.

Additions.

God has but two Laws; Order, which is his inviolable Law, his natural Law, his Word, or his Wisdom, which he loves invincibly; and the divine Decrees, the Arbitrary Laws, with which he some∣times dispences; but he never dispences with them, but when order requires: For it is against order, that a wise and immutable Being should change his conduct without reason. It is a weakness to have a changeable mind, it argues want of knowledge, or of constancy. Man, tho' subject to error, is offend∣ed when he is reproached with his change. We must therefore take care not to ask miracles of God, or to attribute them every moment unto him: This is to tempt God, and to have sentiments unworthy of him. See the fourth Explication, in which I shew, that all that is done now, or which was done under the Jewish Law, against those natural laws which are known to us, is not always a miracle, or an effect produced by God, by particular wills; because the Angels, for example, have power over the present world in consequence of some general laws which are unknown to us; as I have proved by Gods way of proceeding in the old Testament.

XXI.

There are indeed some sew occasions, where

these general Laws of motion must cease to pro∣duce their effect. But this is not because God changes these Laws, or corrects himself; it is because by the order of grace, to which that of Nature must be subservient, Miracles are wrought upon certain occasions. Besides, it is convenient that men should know, that God is so much Master of Nature, that if he submit himself to the laws which he has established, it is because he chuses to do so, rather than that he is absolutely neces∣sitated.

Additions.

Since the greatest part of men imagine, that be∣sides God, there is a certain Nature that does all: 'Tis convenient that God to make himself the better known, should act against the custom of this pretend∣ed Nature. God makes himself admired by the wise, or true Philosophers in his ordinary works; but all the world are not Philosophers. There must be effects, which surprise and strike the mind of those who make no reflection upon any thing that is ordinary. See St. Augustine upon St. Joh, Tract. VIII. & XXVIII. Christian Meditations. 8. Medit.

XXII.

If then it be true, that the general cause ought not to work by particular wills, and that God was obliged to establish certain, constant and in∣variable Laws of the communication of Motions, by the efficacy of which he foresaw that the world might subsist such as we now see it; it may be truly said in some sence, that God desires that all his creatures should be perfect; that he wills not that Infants should perish in the womb of their Mothers, that he loves not Monsters, that

he has made no laws of nature to beget them; and that if he could have made and preserved a World more perfect by as simple means, he wou'd not have established Laws, whereof so many Mon∣sters are the necessary consequences: But that it would have been unworthy of his Wisdom to multiply wills to hinder certain particular disor∣ders, which in the Universe make a kind of Beauty.

Additions.

That if he could have made and preserved a World more perfect by as simple means, he would not have established laws whereof so many Mon∣sters are the necessary consequences. This is e∣vident at least in the order of grace, in relation to which I say this. For God wills that all men should be saved, 1 Tim. II. 4. This is the will of God, our Sanctification, 1 Thes. IV. 3. God has no need of the wicked, Eccles. XV. 12. On the con∣trary, He hates the ungodly and his ungodliness. Wisdom XIV. 9. Certainly the design of God in the CREATION is to make a Beautiful work. Now all irregularity disfigures the WORK. God truly deserves to be admired, but much more in the simplicity of his ways, than in the Beauty of the Ʋ∣niverse. If God has made the world for man, why so much barren ground? why more Sea than habita∣ble Earth? It is because all this is a consequence of the simplicity of his ways. This is not because God particularly wills that such a ground shou'd want wa∣ter, for 'twou'd be a formal disobedience if it was so; 'twould be to find fault with Gods conduct, and to insult over his wisdom, to make new water courses. Can any thing be more disorderly and less regular, than the distribution of Rivers, than the disposition

of Land and Sea? The Philosophers looked upon the Ʋniverse as the work of blind nature; the rea∣son is, because they thought not on the simplicity of the ways by which it is preserved. But if there had been as simple ways, or as worthy of God, capable to form and preserve a more beautiful work than the world we now inhabit; it must be said, things being as they are, that either the Author of Nature wanted under∣standing, or that his intention was to make an imperfect work. See the 3d. Explication, Christian Meditat. 7, 8.

Monsters make in the Universe a kind of Beau∣ty. Not that Monsters are Beautiful in themselves, for all things being equal, it would be better there were none at all; but it is because men often judge of the beauty of certain things, by the deformity of others. Certainly the Church of Jesus Christ, the future world shall be more perfect than the present world, and have no Deformity, no Monsters, no In∣justice, no Sin. Eph. V. 27. Apoc. XXII.

XXIII.

God gave to every Seed its own bud [germe,] which contains in little, the plant and the fruit, another bud which is fastned to this, and contains the root of the plant, which root has a new root, whose imperceptible branches spread themselves in two Lobes, or into the Pulp of this Seed. Does not he sufficiently shew by this, that he truely wills in some sence, that all those seeds should produce their like? For why should he have gi∣ven to those grains of Corn which he intended should be barren, all the parts proper to make them fruitful. Nevertheless, since rain is neces∣sary to make them encrease, and since it falls not

upon the Earth, but by general Laws which do not shower it down upon improv'd grounds on∣ly, and precisely at proper seasons, all these grains are not increased thereby: Or if they be, the Hail, or some other unlucky accident, which is a ne∣cessary consequence of the same Laws of Nature, hinders them from nourishing their Ear. Now because it is God who has established these Laws, it might be said, that he would that some certain seeds should be fruitful rather than others; if we did not know otherwise, that the general cause ought not to act by particular wills, nor an in∣finitely wise Being by compounded ways; God ought not to take other Measures than those which he has taken to govern the rains according to the seasons, and places, and desires of the Husband∣men. We need to say no more of the order of Nature: Let us explain a little more largely that of Grace; and above all things, let us ob∣serve that it is the same wisdom, and the same will; in a word, the same God, who has establi∣shed both the one and the other of these Or∣ders.

Additions.

Above all, let us observe, that it is the same wisdom and the same will; in a word, the same God who has established both the one and the other of these orders; that is to say, that of Grace, and that of Nature, This is of the greatest consequence. For God cannot be false to himself, or not follow his wisdom in the establishment of the order of Grace. It is therefore necessary, to the end that Gods conduct may bear the Character of his divine attributes, that his ways be simple, gene∣ral,

uniform and constant. Thus we may already see, that it will not be impossible to justifie the wisdom and goodness of God, tho Grace often falls without effect, and tho there be more men who are damned, than those who are saved: God will appear wise, tho Grace should not be always proportioned to our weakness: He will be good, and love men, tho all be not saved; because we cannot take it ill, that God has greater love for his wisdom, which is con∣substantial to him, than for his work, which is on∣ly an imperfect Image of his substance.

THE SECOND PART. Of the Necessity of the general Laws of Grace.

XXIV.

GOD loving himself by the necessity of his Being, and resolving to procure an infinite glory to himself, and honour perfectly worthy of him, consulted his wisdom about the accom∣plishment of his desires. This divine wisdom, filled with love for him from whom he received a Being by an Eternal and ineffable generation, seeing nothing in all possible creatures (the in∣telligible Ideas of which he contains) that might

be worthy of the Majesty of his Father, offered himself that he might establish to his Honour an Eternal Worship, and as Sovereign Priest; offer unto him a victim, which by the dignity of his Person might be capable to please him. He re∣represented unto him an infinite number of de∣signs, for the Temple which he intended to raise to his glory, and at the same time, all possible ways of performing them. That design which at first sight seems Greatest and most Magnificent, the justest and most easily understood, is that which has most relation to the Person unto whom all the Glory and Holiness thereof must refer; and the wisest manner of performing this design, is to E∣stablish certain very simple and fruitful Laws to bring it to its perfection. This is that which Reason seems to answer, to all those who consult it with attention, and according to the principles which Faith teaches us: Let us examine the cir∣cumstances of this Great design, and afterwards endeavour to find out the ways of performing it.

Additions.

The proof of all this is; because God does nothing without his Wisdom, or without his Son, which Scrip∣ture teaches us, as well as Reason, Joh. I. 3. Heb. I. 2. &c. That Jesus Christ is the principle design of God, see the first Article, and the following. That he is the Model of the Elect, Rom. VIII. 29. And a∣bove all, that his ways do more than any other bear the Character of the divine Attributes; that which I have already proved, and which you may see further ma∣nifested in the third explication. I shall not hereaf∣ter stop, in the Explication of what is clear enough in its self, and of little consequence.

XXV.

The Holy Scripture teaches us, that it is Je∣sus Christ who makes all the Beauty, the Holy∣ness, the Greatness and Magnificence of this Great Work. For if it be compared therein to a Ci∣ty, it is Jesus Christ who makes all the Splendor thereof: The Sun and the Moon does not en∣lighten it, * 1.8 but the Brightness of God and the Light of the Lamb. If it be represented as a living bo∣dy, all whose parts have a marvelous relation to one another; * 1.9 it is Jesus Christ who is the head thereof; it is from him that Spirit and Life is communicated to all the Members that compose it. If it be spoken of as a Temple, it is Je∣sus Christ who is the Corner-stone, * 1.10 upon which all the building is founded; it is he who is the Sovereign Priest: It is he who is the Sacrifice thereof. * 1.11 None of the Faithful are Priests, but because they partake of his Priesthood: They are not Sacrifices, but because they partake of his Holiness. It is only in him and by him that they continually offer themselves to the Majesty of God. To conclude, it is only by the Relation which they have to him, * 1.12 that they contribute to the beauty of this august Temple, which always has been, and for ever will be, the delightful Object of God himself.

XXVI.

Reason also teaches us these Truths: For what relation is there betwixt creatures how per∣fect so ever they are supposed to be, and the Action by which they are made? Every Crea∣ture being limited, how can it be worth the Acti∣on

of a God whose price is infinite? Can God receive any thing from a pure Creature, which may incline him to act? But let it be, that God hath made man in hopes of being honou∣red by him: Whence is it that the number of those who dishonour him is much the greater? Doth not God hereby sufficiently declare, that he very much neglects the glory pretended to be received by his work, if separated from his well beloved Son; that it is only in Jesus Christ that he resolved to produce it, and that without him it should not subsist a moment?

XXVII.

A man resolves to do somthing, because he hath need thereof, or because he wou'd see what wou'd be the effect of his work, or lastly because he learns by trying his strength what he is able to do: But God has no need of his creatures. He is not like men, who receive new impression from the presence of objects: His Ideas are eternal & immutable, he saw the world before it was form'd, as he sees it at present. In short, being conscious that his will is efficacious, he perfectly knows, without making any tryal of his strength, whatsoever he is able to do. Thus Scripture and Reason teach us, that it is by Jesus Christ that the world subsists, and that it is by the dignity of this divine person, that it receives a beauty, which renders it agreeable in the sight of God.

XXVIII.

It follows, in my opinion, from this principle, that Jesus Christ is the Model or Pattern by which we are made, that we are form'd according to his Image and likeness, and that we have nothing beau∣tiful,

but so far as we are his representations, and figures; that he is the end of the Law, and the fini∣shing of the Jewish Ceremonies and Sacrifices; that till this succession of generations which preceded his birth had an end, it was necessary they shou'd have had certain relations to him by which they were made more agreeable to God than any others. That since Jesus Christ was to be the Head and Spouse of the Church, to represent him, all men were to proceed from one, and their propagation to begin after that manner which Moses relates, and St. Paul explains. In a word, it follows from this principle, that the present world ought to be the figure of the future, and that as far as the sim∣plicity of the general Laws will permit it, all they who have or shall dwell therein, have been or shall be figures and resemblances of Gods only Son, from Abel in whom he was sacrificed, to the last Mem∣ber that shall be of his Church.

XXIX.

We may judge of the perfection of a Work by the conformity there is betwixt this work, and the Idea which the eternal wisdom gives us of it: For there is nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, but by relation to the essential, necessary and inde∣pendent beauty. Now this intelligible beauty be∣ing made sensible, became also in this estate the rule of beauty and perfection: Thus all Corpo∣real Creatures must still receive from him their Beauty and Splendor. All minds must have the same thoughts and the same inclinations with the soul of Jesus, if they would be agreeable to those who see nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, but that which is conformable to Wisdom and Truth.

Since then we are obliged to believe that the work of God has a perfect conformity with the eternal Wisdom; we have all reason to believe, that the same work has infinite relations to him who is the Head, the principle, the model and the end there∣of. But who can explain all these relations?

XXX.

That which makes the Beauty of a Temple, is the order and variety of the Ornaments which are there to be seen. Thus, to render the living Temple of the Majesty of God worthy of him who is to inhabit it, & proportion'd to the infinite wis∣dom & love of its Author; all Beauties ought to be found therein. But it is not with the Glory and Magnificence of this Spiritual Temple, as it is with the gross and sensible Ornaments of Material Tem∣ples. That which makes the Beauty of the Spiri∣tual Edifice of the Church, is the infinite diversity of the Graces, which he who is the Head thereof, communnicates to all the parts that compose it; it is the order, and the admirable relations they have by him to one another; it is the divers degrees of Glory which shine on all sides.

XXXI.

It follows from this principle, that to establish this variety of rewards which compose the beauty of the Heavenly Jerusalem, it is necessary that men upon Earth shou'd be subject, not only to afflictions which purisie them, but also to the motions of Con∣cupiscence, which gives them opportunity of gain∣ing so many Victories by engaging them in so great a number of different Combats.

XXXII.

The Blessed in Heaven will doubtless have an

Holiness and variety of gifts, which will perfectly answer the diversity of their good works. These continual sacrifices, by which the Old Man is de∣stroyed and annihelated, will Adorn and Beauti∣fie the Spiritual substance of the New Man. * 1.13 And if it became Jesus Christ himself to suffer all sorts of afflictions, before he entred into his glory; the sin of the first Man, which brought the evils into the World which accompany Life, and Death which follows, it was necessary, that men having been tryed upon Earth, might justly be rewarded with that Glory, the variety and order of which will make the beauty of the future World.

Additions.

The sin of the first Man was not necessary in it self. God might without this sin, have found a Thou∣sand means to make the future Church as Beautiful as it shall be; but since God acts always as wisely as is possible, and according to the character of the divine attributes, since he invincibly loves his Wisdom: There cou'd be no such means for Men to Merit the Glory which one day they shall possess, as that which suffers them to be ingulf'd in sin, that mercy might be shewn to them all in Jesus Christ. For the Glo∣ry which the Elect shall obtain, by the Grace of Je∣sus Christ, in resisting their Concupiscence, will be greater, and also more worthy of God than any other. See the 34, and 35. Articles. St. Aug. de cor. & grat. & C. 10.

XXXIII.

If I had a clear Idea of the Blessed Spirits which have no body, perhaps I might clearly answer a difficulty which arises in respect of them. For it may be objected, either that there is little varie∣ty

in the merits and recompences of Angels, or else that it was adviseable that God should unite Spirits to bodys, on which they do at present so much depend. I confess that I do not see any great diversity of rewards which ought to answer the merits of substances purely intelligible, espe∣cially if they have merited their reward by one single act of Love. They not being united to a body which might occasion God to give them, ac∣cording to certain most simple and general Laws a succession of different sentiments or thoughts; I can see no diversity in their combats, nor in their victories. But perhaps there may be an order esta∣blished which to me is unknown: And upon this account, I ought not to speak of it. It is enough for me to have setled a principle, whence we may conclude that it became God to create Bodys, and to unite Spirits unto them, that by the most simple Laws of the Union of these two substances, he might in a general, constant, and uniform way give us, that great variety of sentiments and motions, which is the principle of our different Merits and Re∣wards.

XXXIV.

To conclude, God ought to have all the Glory of the Beauty and Perfection of the future World. This Work which infinitely surpasses all others, must be a work of pure mercy: The Creatures ought not to boast of having any other part therein but that which the grace of Jesus Christ hath given them. In a word, * 1.14 it was adviseable that God shou'd suffer all men to be engaged in Sin, that he might have mercy upon them all in Jesus Christ.

XXXV.

Thus since the first man was able by the strength of his Love to persevere in original righteousness, it was not necessary that God shou'd keep him to his duty by preventing pleasures, he having no concu∣piscence to overcome; it was not fit that God shou'd prevent his free will by the delectation of his grace. In short, having all that was necessary for meriting his reward, God who does nothing that is useless, ought to have left him to himself, tho he foresaw his fall; since he intended to raise him up in Je∣sus Christ, to confound free will, and to make his mercy Illustrious. Let us endeavour at present to find out the ways by which God executes his eternal purpose of Sanctifying his Church.

XXXVI.

For tho in the establishment of the future World, God acts by ways very different from those by which he preserves the present; nevertheless we ought not to imagine, that this difference is such, as that the Laws of grace do not carry in them the character of the cause which has established them. Since God himself is the Author of the Order of Grace, and of that of Nature; it is necessary that these two Orders agree with one another, in re∣spect of all that which they have in them relating to the Wisdom, and other Attributes of their Author. Thus, since God is a general cause whose wisdom has no limits, it is necessary for reasons which I have already mentioned, that in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature, he should act as a ge∣neral cause; that having for his end his own glory, by the raising of his Church, he should establish the most simple and general Laws; and which

compared with their effect have the greatest propor∣tion of Wisdom and Fruitfulness.

XXXVII.

The more any Agent has of knowledge, the more extensive is his will. A mind much limited, eve∣ry moment takes up new resolutions; and when he undertakes to execute any one of them, he uses several means, some of which are always useless. In a word, a stinted mind does not sufficiently compare the means with the end, the strength and the Action with the effect which they shou'd pro∣duce. On the contrary, anextensive and penetra∣ting spirit compares and weighs all things: He does not take up his resolutions but by the know∣ledge which he has of the means of executing them; and when he sees that these means wisely relate to their effect, he employs them. The more simple any Machines are, and the more different their ef∣fects, the more Spiritual they are, and more worthy of Esteem. The great number of the Laws of any State, often shews the want of penetration, and comprehension of mind in the Law-Makers: It being rather experience of the want of 'em, than a wise foreknowledge which has ordained them. God whose Wisdom has no bounds, must make use of the most simple and most fruitful ways in the formation of the future World, as well as for the conservation of the present. He ought not to mul∣tiply his wills, which are the executing laws of his purposes, but so far as necessity obliges him there∣unto: He must act by general wills, and thus e∣stablish a constant and regular order, according to which he foresaw by the infinite comprehension of his Wisdom, that such an admirable work as his

is might be form'd. Let us see the consequences of this principle, and the application which may be made thereof, for the explaining those diffi∣culties which may appear sufficiently entangled.

Additions.

I don't think that any one can read this Article, and those which go before with attention, without granting, that seeing God cannot be false to him∣self, nor act by those ways which do not agree with his Attributes, he is obliged to perform his designs by the most simple means, the most general, uniform, and constant ways. Therefore I shall net spend time to prove this in particular by the Idea of a being in∣finitely perfect, and by all the natural effects of cau∣ses which we know. Besides all that I am to say, I have proved this principle several ways in the Search after Truth, by overthrowing the pretended efficacy of second causes; in the Med. Christ. from the fourth to the eighth inclusively; and also in the Explications which are at the end of this Treatise. But let us see if the use which I am about to make of this principle, for explaining the truth which faith teaches us, does not at once demonstrate both this prin∣ciple and these truths.

XXXVIII.

The H. Scripture teaches us on the one side, that God wills that all men shou'd be saved, and come to the knowledge of the Truth; and on the other, that he doth all that he wills; and yet neverthe∣less Faith is not given to all the World, and that the number of those who Perish, is even greater than of the Predestinated, how shall we make this agree with his Power?

Additions.

It is because his Wisdom renders him unable. For since it is that which obliges to him to act by the most simple ways, it is not possible that all men shou'd be saved, by reason of this simplicity of his ways.

XXXIX.

God from all eternity foresaw Original Sin, and the infinite number of Persons whom this sin wou'd carry down to Hell. Nevertheless he created the first Man in an Estate from which he knew he wou'd fall; and also made such a relation between this Man and his Posterity, as must communicate to them his sin, and render them all worthy of his Aversion, and his Anger. How does this agree with his goodness?

Additions.

It is because God more loves his Wisdom, than his work. For since his Wisdom prescribes unto him the ways which best suit with his Attributes, and since his ways require that Adam being otherwise able to persevere, should not have had preventing Grace; that which did happen, ought to have happened to him.

XL

God often communicates his Graces, tho they have not the effect for which his goodness obliges us to think they were given. He makes some persons to encrease in Piety till towards the end of their life, and then sin reigns over them to their death; and throws them into Hell: He makes the dew of grace to fall upon hardn'd hearts, as well as upon prepared Souls; men resist it and render it useless for their Salvation. In a word,

God unmakes and renews continually, it seems as if he will'd and will'd not the same thing. How can this agree with his Wisdom?

Additions.

It is because since God ought not to Sanctify men by particular wills, he does not give Grace to such an one upon such an occasion, to the end that it should have such a certain effect and nothing more. It be∣comes limited Vnderstandings to act after this man∣ner. But God having an infinite understanding, it be∣came him to establish general Laws for the executing of his designs: This is what I have already so often said, and shall further say in the following Arti∣cles.

XLI.

Behold, as I think, the great difficulties; all the Oeconomy of Religion, the Idea which we have of a good, wise, and powerful God; constant in his designs, regular in his actions; a thousand places of Scripture supplying us with many more against that which we see come to pass every day in the order of Grace: and tho very able men have an∣swered them, yet it seems to me they cannot be so easily resolved by their principles, as by that I shall lay down.

XLII.

As for my self, I have always believed that God in truth wills in general, that all men should be sa∣ved. Both Reason and Scripture has always hin∣dred me from doubting thereof. And tho some Authors, for whom I have a great respect, have in the foregoing Ages publish't divers explications of this Truth, I never could easily admit of those which seem'd without any necessity to set bounds

to the infinite goodness and mercy of God. Thus consulting the Idea which all men have of God, I entertained the Sentiment, which I at present ex∣pose to the censure of all those, who examine it with Attention, and judge of it with Equi∣ty.

Additions.

We tempt God, when we desire him to do that which he ought not to do; that is to say, that he should act after a particular manner, and not in consequence of general Laws; otherwise, what harm wou'd it be for one to cast himself headlong, as Satan desired J. G. to do? If it be as wise for to sustain an heavy bo∣dy in the Air, as to make it fall upon the Earth; we should not tempt him, we should not engage him to do a thing unworthy of him, when trusting in his goodness we should throw our selves out of the windows. In a word provided a man has always a good design, he can never want prudence.

XLIII.

God being obliged alway to act, as becomes him, by simple, general, constant, and uniform ways; in a word, such as are agreable to the Idea which we have of a general cause, whose Wisdom has no bounds; it became him to establish certain Laws in the Order of Grace, as I have prov'd he has done in that of Nature. Now these Laws by reason of their simplicity, have necessarily woful conse∣quences in respect of us; but these consequences do not oblige that God should change these Laws for those that are more Compounded. For these Laws have a greater proportion of Wisdom and Fruitful∣ness to the work which they produce, than all those which he could ordain for the same purpose; since

he always acts after the most wise and perfect man∣ner. It is true, that God might prevent these sad consequences by an infinite number of particular wills; but his Wisdom which he loves more than his Work, the immutable and necessary order, which is the rule of his will, do not permit it. The effect which wou'd happen from each of his wills, wou'd not be worth the Action which shou'd produce it. And consequently we ought not to find fault, because God does not confound the or∣der and simplicity of his Laws by miracles; which wou'd indeed be very convenient for our neces∣sities, but very much opposite to the Wisdom of God, which it is not lawful to tempt.

XLIV.

Thus, seeing we ought not to be displeased, that the rain falls into the Sea where it is useless, and not upon Sown-grounds where it is necessary; because the laws of the communication of motions are very simple, fruitful, and perfectly worthy of the wisdom of the Author; and that according to these Laws it is not possible that the rain should fall rather upon the Land than the Seas; so that we ought not to complain of that apparant irregulari∣ty, whereby Grace is given to men. It is the re∣gularity wherewithal God acts, it is the simplicity of the Laws which he observes, it is the wisdom and uniformity of his Conduct, which is the cause of this seeming irregularity. It is necessary, ac∣cording to the Laws of Grace, which God has esta∣blished in favour of the Elect, and for the building of his Church, that this Heavenly rain should fall sometimes upon hardned Hearts, as well as upon prepared Souls. If therefore Grace is given some∣times

to no purpose, it is not because God acts without design; much less that he acts with an intention, to render Men more culpable by the abuse of his favours. It is because the simplici∣ty of the general Laws permits not, that this grace, inefficacious in respect of a corrupted heart, shou'd fall upon another heart where it wou'd be effica∣cious. This Grace not being given by a parti∣cular will, but in consequence of the immutabi∣lity of the general order of Grace, it is suffici∣ent that this order shou'd produce a work pro∣portionable to the simplicity of his Laws, to the end it might be worthy of the wisdom of its Author: For to conclude, the order of Grace wou'd be less Perfect, less Admirable, less Amia∣ble, if it was more Composed.

XLV.

If God should have given Grace by particular wills, without doubt for the Conversion of a sin∣ner who had four degrees of Concupiscence, he would not have resolved to have given but three degrees of Spiritual pleasure, supposing that these degrees of grace had not been sufficient to con∣vert him. He wou'd have deferred his boun∣ty, till the sinner should not have been in the pre∣sence of the Object that tempted him: Or ra∣ther he wou'd have given this same grace of three degrees of strength to such an one, whose Con∣cupiscence should have been less active. For what an odd design would it be to give three degrees of Spiritual delight to one, to whom four are ne∣cessary; and refuse them to him, whom they wou'd have Converted? Does this agree with the I∣dea which we have of the wisdom and goodness

of God? Is this to love Men? Is this to will that all shall be saved? Is this to do all that can be done for them? Yet God crys out by his Prophet; Inhabitans of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, * 1.15 judge between me and my Vineyard. What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore had I not reason then to look for good Grapes, when it brought forth wild Grapes? What wisdom is it by particular wills to give so many inefficacious Graces to sinners; supposing that God wills their Conver∣sion as Scripture teaches us, and that he has not that fatal design of rendring them by his gifts, more Culpable and blame Worthy?

XLVI.

But if Grace be given to men by most sim∣ple and general Laws, all these great difficulties vanish away. The order of Grace which God hath establish't having more Wisdom and fruit∣fulness in respect to the work which it produces than any other; God was obliged to chuse it for the establishment of his Church. Thus we may be assured, that God truly wills the salvation of all men; that he hath done all for them that he cou'd do, acting as he ought to do, that if there had been any order of Grace as simple and more fruitful; as worthy of his wisdom and more useful to men, he wou'd have chosen it; and that thus he saves as many persons as he can save, acting according to those adorable rules which his wisdom prescribes.

Additions.

Men must in my opinion, be much out of humour to take it ill, that they find the Wisdom and Good∣ness

of God thus justified, by the principle I have laid down. For to like it well, that so many Nations should perish, meerly because God would not afford them the light of his Gospel, and to take it ill that God should do in this what his Wisdom prescribes; that Wisdom which to him is an inviolable Law, that Wisdom which he loves, and which he ought to love infinitely more than his work; this assuredly is an extraordinary disposition of mind. To desire that God shou'd every moment by particular wills, give Gra∣ces useless to those who receive them, and to those who he foresaw would become more culpable, and more cri∣minal by the contempt of them; this is to desire that a wise Being should not proportion the means to the end, or that God should not wish well to them to whom he has applyed the Blood of Jesus Christ; this is to desire to maintain paradoxes.

XLVII.

Let men therefore love and adore not only the good will of God, by which the Elect are Sanctify∣ed, but also the secret judgments of his Justice, by which there are so many Reprobates. It is the same order of Wisdom, the same laws of grace which produce such different effects; God is equally ado∣rable, and amiable in all that he does, his Conduct is always full of wisdom and of goodness: Wo be to the wicked who condemn it without knowing any thing of it, who desire that the immutable or∣der of divine wisdom should accommodate its self to their Passions and Interests.

XLVIII.

The wise and diligent Husbandmen Labour, Manure, and Sow their Lands with a great deal of trouble and expence. They carefully observe the

most proper seasons for their different cultures, and only depend upon God for the success of their la∣bours. They give up their work to the order of Nature, well knowing that it is to no purpose to tempt God, and presume that in favour to us, he should change the order which his wisdom pre∣scribes unto him.

XLIX.

Jesus Christ came to teach us to imitate their ex∣ample. As he has an immense charity for us, and would save us all, as far as the simplicity of the ge∣neral Laws of Nature and Grace can permit him; so he has forgotten nothing to bring us into the way which leads to Heaven. There is not any thing more opposite to the efficacy of Grace, than sen∣sual pleasures and the sentiments of pride: For nothing so much corrupts the mind and hardens the heart. But has not Jesus Christ in his Person sacrificed and annihelated all greatness, and all sensible pleasures? Was not his life, a continual example of Humility and Penance? How was he born, how did he dye, how did he converse a∣mong men? All the world knows it. What is the sum of his Doctrine; or whither tended all his Councels? Is it not to Humility and Peni∣tence, to a general privation of all things that flatter the senses, of all that corrupts the purity of the Imagination, of all that maintains and for∣tifies the concupiscence of Pride? That which he has said, that which he has done, that which he has suffered, has been to prepare us by his doctrine, by his example, by his merits, to re∣ceive the Heavenly showers of grace, in such a manner as that they may operate best in us. Since

he cou'd not, or ought not, * 1.16 to change the laws of Nature, tempt God, nor trouble the order and simplicity of his ways, he has done for men all that he could, to inspire them with the most ex∣tensive, the most diligent, and the most ardent cha∣rity.

L.

I fear not to say, that the Charity of Jesus Christ is immense and incomprehensible, after that which the Scripture says of it. And tho all men do not receive the effects of it, it would be rash∣ness to set bounds thereto. He died for all men, * 1.17 even for those who daily perish. Why do not sinners enter into the Order of Grace, why do they not follow the Councels of Jesus Christ, why do they not prepare themselves to receive the rain of Heaven? They cannot merit it, 'tis true, but they may promote its efficacy in respect of themselves. Can they not by Self-love, or by the fears of Hell, avoid a great many occasions of sinning, deprive themselves of pleasures, at least of those which as yet they have not tasted, and to which consequently as yet they are not enslaved? They may also remove some impedi∣ments of the efficacy of Grace, and prepare the soil of the heart, so that it may become fruit∣ful, when God shall send his rain according to the general laws he hath prescribed. But they desire that God should save them without any pains of theirs; like to those idle and sloathful Husbandmen, who without bestowing the ordi∣nary labours upon their field, presume that God ought to send them such fructifying and plenti∣ful Rains as may spare their pains. False and

Sottish Confidence! God causes it to rain upon fallow Lands, as well as upon those that are Culti∣vated. But let the Proud and the Voluptuous know, that the rain of Grace shall fall much less upon them, than upon other men; and that in the mean time they put themselves in such a conditi∣tion, that to convert them, they have need of much more.

LI.

Since God does not ordinarily confer his grace but by general Laws, we clearly see the necessi∣ty of the counsels of Jesus Christ. It appears that we ought to follow his wise counsels, that God may save us by the most simple ways, and that gi∣ving us as little grace, as may be, he may ope∣rate much in us. It clearly appears, that man on his part ought to labour continually; that he ought to till the ground before the heats of Concupiscence has dried and hardened it, or at least as soon as the rain has taken away this driness and hardness; that he ought carefully to observe the moments when he is at liberty from his passions, that he may make his advantage thereof; that he ought, as much as in him lies, to weed out all that may Choak the seed of the Word; and not foolishly imagine that he shall be Converted, after he has made his fortune in the World, or shall be ready to quit it. For, besides that it depends not on the Husband∣men, to cause it to rain according to their necessities, after a piece of ground has a long time lain fal∣low, the Briars and Thorns have taken such deep root, that they who have not accustomed them∣selves to labour, have neither strength, nor even desire to cultivate it.

LII.

But if God should act in the order of Grace by particular wills, if he should efficaciously cause in all men their good motions, and all their good works with a particular design; I do not see how it could be maintained that he acts by the most simple Laws. When I consider all the turnings by which men come whither God leads them; for I doubt not at all, but that God often gives to a man more than an Hundred good thoughts in one day. Neither can I any more comprehend, how his Wisdom and Goodness can be made to agree with all those inefficacious graces which the Malice of men resists: For God being good and wise, is it not evident that he must proportion his assistance to our needs, if he granted them with a particular design of encouraging us?

Additions.

It appears by these Articles, that my principle does still perfectly well agree with the Counsels of Jesus Christ, and that as the Husbandmen ought on their part to Cultivate, Plow, and Sow their Lands; so men on theirs should endeavour to remove the impedi∣ments of the efficacy of Grace: But that as the la∣bours of men, are not the cause of rain, so Grace like∣wise is not given to natural merits; since its distribu∣tion depends upon certain general Laws, like as the or∣dinary rain is the natural consequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions.

LIII.

God causes the weeds to grow with the Corn till the day of Harvest, he makes it to rain on the just and on the unjust, because grace falling on men by general Laws, is often given to such as make no

use thereof; whereas if others had received it, they wou'd have been converted by it. If Jesus Christ had preached to the Tyrians and Sydonians, as well as to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida, & Corazin, they wou'd have Repented in Sackcloath and Ashes. If the rain which falls upon the Sands, was shed upon well-managed Land, it would have rendred it fruit∣ful. But whatsoever is regulated by general Laws, does not agree with particular designs. That these Laws be wisely established, it is sufficient that being extreamly simple, they bring to perfection the great work for which God appointed them.

LIV.

But tho I do not think that God has infinite par∣ticular designs in reference to each of the Elect, so that he every day gives a great number of good thoughts and good motions by particular wills: Yet nevertheless I deny not, but they are all prede∣stinated by the good will of God towards them; for which they ought to be eternally thankful. See how I explain these things.

LV.

God discovers in the infinite treasures of his wis∣dom, an infinite number of possible works, and at the same time the most perfect way of producing each of them. Amongst others he considers his Church, J. C. who is the Head thereof, and all persons who in consequence of certain general laws must compose it. In short, having in mind Jesus Christ and all his members, he established his laws for his own glory. This being so, is it not evident that J. C. who is the principle of all that glory that comes to God from his work, is the first of the pre∣destinated? That all the Elect also are truly and

freely beloved and predestinated in J. C. because they may honour God in him; that lastly they are all infinitely obliged to God, who without consider∣ing their merit, hath established the general Laws of Grace, which must sanctify the Elect, and bring them to that glory which they shall eternally pos∣sess.

Additions.

Man is a strange creature, he is as full of pride, as he is worthy of contempt. He is not satisfied with God, if God does not go out of his way to please him: He looks upon himself as the Centre of the Ʋniverse; he refers all things to his own particular, even God himself, and his Eternal Attributes. God is not good but as he is good to him, and even the incarnation of J. C. is a work useless and ill managed, if it do not deliver him from his miseries.

But on Gods side, what excess of bounty! It seems as if God, to render himself Amiable to those who are most in love with themselves, favours this prejudice by his way of speaking unto men. God so loved the World, says J. C. himself, that he gave his only begotten Son, to the end that all that believe in him shou'd have eternal life. What! is J. C. in the eternal designs of God made Man only for mens sal∣vation? No doubtless. On the contrary, men were made for Jesus Christ. They are the materials wherewith he is to build the Eternal Temple, and this Temple is only for God. This is the design of the uncreated Wisdom. J. C. is the Head of the Church; now the Members are for the Head, and not the Head for the Members. J. C. is the first in all things, In omnibus primatum tenens: But he himself is for God; Om∣nia vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem

Dei. Let us be satisfied that God who has no need of us, was pleased to create us in Jesus Christ for his own glory. He might have left us in our nothing; yet he has loved us in J. C. before the creation of the world. But let us not flatter our selves; it is because we have J. C. as our Head, that we can render unto him divine Honours. For God cannot act but for his own glo∣ry; Omnia propter semetipsum operatus est Domi∣nus. But he cannot find it except in himself: Be∣cause a prophane World, a Temple, a Worship, a Priest∣hood which is not consecrated by the eternal Spirit, has no proportion with the Holiness of God.

God after sin might have reduced us to nothing, and yet on the contrary he hath made us his adopted Sons in J. C. He will give us a part in the inheritance of his well beloved Son. How thankful should we be for such an extream kindness! It is true, that they who shall be thus happy are not chosen by an absolute and rash will; it is because the simplicity of the general Laws of the order of Grace is favourable unto them, and that here∣in God acts after such a manner as may be most worthy of him. But what! shall not God be amiable to men, if he does not forsake his wisdom to love them with a blind love? Should Nothing exalt its self, and not be content with its Creator, if he does not without reason prefer it before the rest of his creatures? shall he not ra∣ther put himself in the condition of so many sinners & na∣tions abandon'd to error, whom God leaves therein without help, he who has sworn by his Prophets that hedesires their Conversion and Sanctification? God desires the Salva∣tion of a sinner, and yet he suffers him to dye in his sin; God searches the hearts, and turns them as he pleases, and without injuring their liberty, and yet all the World is full of disorders. Who can resist God but God

himself? But on the other hand, who can be displeased that God loves his Wisdom more than his Work? Let all those who love order, adore and love his Conduct, who makes it his inviolable Law; let them love and a∣dore his goodness, who being fully sufficient to himself, has vouchsafed to form a design of making them eternal∣ly happy.

LVI.

It may be said perhaps that these Laws are so sim∣ple and so fruitful, that God must needs prefer them before all others; and that loving only his glory, his Son must needs become incarnate; & that thus he has done nothing only for his Elect. I confess, that God hath done nothing only for his Elect; * 1.18 for St Paul teaches us that he has made his Elect for Christ, and J. Christ for himself. If to render God Amiable to men, he must be made to act on∣ly for us, or after such a manner as is not the most wise; I had rather say nothing, than talk at this rate. Reason teaches me to render God Amiable, by considering him infinitely perfect, and represent∣ing him so full of Charity for his Creatures, that he hath made none of them with a design to render 'em miserable. For if all be not so happy as to enjoy his presence, it is because order requiring that so great a good should be merited, all men do not me∣rit it, for Reasons which I have already mention∣ed: Is not this to render God Amiable, to re∣present him such, that even the Reprobate cannot but adore his conduct, and repent of their negli∣gence?

Additions.

Altho Predestination be not founded but upon the pre∣science of God, and the freedom of grace, (as may be

seen in St Aust. de dono Pers. from the 17. C. to the end) nevertheless the greatest part of men, to the Idea which answers to this word, fix a divine decree so abso∣lute, that one seems to them to oppose free grace, when he maintains that God was obliged; by reason of his wisdom, which he loves invincibly, to choose those whom he hath chosen. As the Palagians suppose that the reason of Gods choice is to be found in the natural merits of men; and St. Augustine with the whole Church having maintained that this depends upon the will of God, ma∣ny imagine that he opposes predestination, who asserts that the choice of the Elect depends upon the will of God, tho it be a will enlightned and conducted by eternal Wisdom. To say that the reason of Gods choice is in man, is to be a Pelagian, and maintain that grace is given to merits: But to assert that the reason of this choice, is in the eternal wisdom, which is the Law of God, or the rule of his proceedings. This is to cry out with St. Paul. O altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae, & Scientiae Dei! But many men do not understand these words in this sence, they pretend that one is chosen, and another reprobated, meerly because God wills it, and that his will is his only reason; and that it is upon this account that the Elect are more especially obliged to God. It is in condescension to this disposition of mind which I have observed in a great many honest men, that I have composed this Article. But they who will Meditate a little may easily see what are my thoughts there∣of.

LVII.

In the mean time, to satisfie those who suppose that God has predestinated every one of the Elect by a particular will, it may be said without injuring the sentiment which I have Proposed, that God, be∣fore

he created Souls to unite them to bodys, fore∣saw all that should happen to them, according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace, and all that they should do in all possible circumstances. Thus according to this supposition, it being in his power to create the Soul of Paul, or that of Peter, and to unite it to such a body which he foresaw would be the body of one of the predestinated; he resolved from all Eternity to create the Soul of Paul, thro' the good will he had for him, and to predestinate him by this choice to Eternal Life. Whereas he creates the Soul of Peter, and unites it to another body by a kind of necessity, by reason of the Laws of Union of Souls with Bodies, which he has very wisely established; for as soon as Bodies are made, he has obliged himself to unite Souls un∣to them; which was advantageous for all before sin. Now the Body of Peter being begotten by an Hea∣then Father, or by a Father who has no care to Educate his Children; or lastly, Peter by Birth finding himself engaged in times, places, and em∣ployments, which led him to that which is e∣vil, he will infallibly be amongst the reprobate. In the mean time Peter will be useful to the de∣signs of God, for tho he himself does not make one of the Predestinated, yet some of his po∣sterity may. He will promote the Beauty and Greatness of the Church of Jesus Christ, by the many relations he will have to the Elect. In short, he will not be miserable, but proportio∣nably to the ill use which he shall have made of his liberty: For God does not punish [with grief] any but voluntary irregularities. This is all I can say to satisfie the inclination of some

persons: But I do not clearly see that any one ought to stop here.

LVIII.

They who pretend that God has particular de∣signs and wills for all the particular effects which are produced in consequence of general Laws, do ordinarily make use of the authority of Scripture, whereon to found their opinion. Now seeing Scrip∣ture is made for all the World, for the simple as well as for the learned, it is full of Anthropologies. It gives to God not only a Body, a Throne, a Chariot, an Equipage, the passions of Joy, of Sad∣ness, of Anger, Repentance, and other motions of the soul; but also attributes unto him those ways of acting which are usual among men, that it may speak to the Vulgar after the most sensible manner. If J. C. was made Man, this was partly to satisfie the inclination of men, who love that which re∣sembles them, and attend to that which affects them. It is to persuade them by this true and re∣al kind of Anthropology, of those truths which they would not have been able to comprehend. Thus St. Paul to accommodate himself to all men, speaks of the Sanctification and predestination of the Saints, as if God continually acted in them by particular wills. And even J. C. himself speaks of his Father, as if he did by such wills adorn the the Lilies, and preserve even the hairs of the heads of his Disciples; because in truth the goodness of God towards his Creatures being extream, these expressions give a great Idea thereof, and render God amiable even to those minds which are most gross, and have most of self love in them. Never∣theless, since by the Idea which we have of God,

and by those passages of Scripture which agree with this Idea, we correct the sence of some other places, which ascribe unto God members or passi∣ons like unto ours: So when we wou'd speak ex∣actly of the manner of Gods acting in the order of Nature, or grace, we ought to explain the passages which make him act as a man, or a particular cause by that Idea which we have of his wisdom and his goodness, and by other places of Scripture which are agreable to this Idea. For in conclusion, if the Idea which we have of God, permits, nay obli∣ges to say, that he does not cause every drop of rain to fall by particular wills, tho this sentiment is authorized by the natural sence of some places of Scripture, there is the like necessity to think, that notwithstanding certain authorities of the same Scripture, God does not give to some sinners by particular wills, all those good motions which are of no effect to them, and yet to several others wou'd be effectual; because otherwise it seems im∣possible to me, to make the Holy Scripture agree either with reason, or with its self, as I think I have proved.

LIX.

If I thought, that what I have already said was not sufficient to convince considering persons, that God acts not by particular wills, as particu∣lar causes or limited understandings do, I should proceed to shew, that there are few truths whereof more proofs may be given, supposing it granted that God governs the World, and that the Nature of HEATHEN PHILOSOPHERS is but a Chimaera. For in truth nothing is done in the World, which doth not prove this sentiment, Mi∣racles

only excepted; which nevertheless wou'd not be Miracles different from the effects which are called natural, if it was true that God ordinarily acts by particular wills; since Miracles are not such, but because they happen not according to general Laws. Thus do Miracles suppose these Laws, and prove the sentiment which I have laid down, but as for ordinary effects, they clearly and directly demonstrate general Laws or Wills. For exam∣ple, if a stone be let fall upon the head of one that passes by, the stone will always fall with equal swift∣ness, without distinguishing either the piety or the quality, the good or evil dispositions of the passen∣ger. If any other effect be examined, we shall see the same constancy, in the action of the cause which produces it. But no effect proves that God acts by particular wills, tho men often imagine that God works Miracles every moment for their sakes. Since the way by which they wou'd have God to act, is agreable to ours; since it flatters self-love which refers all things to its self; since it comports well with the ignorance we are in of the combinati∣on of occasional causes, which produce extraordi∣nary effects, it naturally enters into the mind, when we do not sufficiently study Nature, and consult with attention enough, the abstracted I∣dea of an infinite Wisdom, of an Universal Cause, of a Being infinitely perfect.

Additions.

Let me be permitted to desire of the Reader, that he do meditate some time upon this, first Discourse, before he reads that which follows.

The Second Discourse. Of the Laws of Grace in particular, and of the Occasional Causes, which Govern and Determin their Efficacy.

First Part. Of the Grace of Jesus Christ.

Additions. * 1.19

I Have proved in the First Discourse, the ne∣cessity of Occasional Causes in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature; and I don't think that which I have writ∣ten can be distinctly understood, but it must be granted. But now I am about to prove by those arguments which Faith supplies, that Je∣sus Christ is this cause. Since this is of the grea∣test consequence, clearly to understand the prin∣ciples of Religion, and to make us draw near with confidence to the true Propitiatory, or the occasional cause, which never fails to determine

the efficacy of the general Law of Grace: I think I may require the Reader to Meditate up∣on this Second Discourse with all diligence, and without prejudice.

I.

Since there is none but God who acts imme∣diately and by himself upon Spirits, & who produ∣ces in them all the different Modifications whereof they are capable; it is he alone who enlightens our minds, and inspires us with certain sentiments which determine our divers wills. Thus there is none but God who can as the * 1.20 true cause, produce grace in our Souls. For the principle of all the regular motions of our love, is necessari∣ly, either knowledge which teaches us, or a sen∣timent which convinces us that God is our hap∣piness; since we never begin to love any object, if we do not either clearly see by the light of Reason, or confusedly feel by the taste of plea∣sure that the object is good, I mean capable of rendring us more happy than we are.

II.

But seeing all men are engaged in Original sin, and all even by their nature infinitely be∣low God; it is only J. Christ who by the dig∣nity of his Person, and the holiness of his Sa∣crifice, could have access to his Father, reconcile us to him, and merit his favours for us. Thus it is J. C. only, who cou'd be the Meritorous cause of Grace. These truths are agreed on. But we do not seek after the cause which Pro∣duces Grace by its proper efficacy, nor that which merits it by his sacrifice and good works, we seek after that which regulates, and determines,

the efficacy of the general cause, that which may be called the second, particular, and occasional.

III.

For that the general cause may act by general Laws or Wills, and that his action may be regu∣lar, constant, and uniform; it is absolutely neces∣sary, that there be an occasional cause which deter∣mines the efficacy of these Laws, and serves to e∣stablish them. If the percussion of bodies, or some such thing, did not determine the EFFICACY of general LAWS of the Communication of motions, it would be necessary that God should move bodies by particular wills. The Laws of the union of the Soul and Body, are made efficaci∣ous only by the changes which happen in each of these substances. For if God should make the Soul feel a pungent pain, tho the body was not pricked, or if the brain shou'd not be moved as if the body was pricked, he wou'd not act by the general Laws of the union between Soul and body, but by a particular will. If it shou'd rain upon the Earth any other ways but by the ne∣cessary consequence of the general Laws of the com∣munication of motions, the rain and the fall of each drop that composes it, would be the effect of a particular will: Insomuch that if order did not require that it should rain, this will would be al∣together unworthy of God. It is therefore neces∣sary that in the order of Grace, there be some occasional cause which establishes these Laws, and determines the efficacy of them; and this is that cause which we must endeavour to find out.

IV.

Tho we never so little consult the Idea of In∣telligible

order, or consider the sensible order which appears in the works of God, we clearly disco∣ver that the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of the general Laws, and establish them, must necessarily have relation to the design for which God appoints these Laws.

For example, we see by experience that God has not, and Reason convinces us that he ought not, to have made the motions of the Planets the occa∣sional causes of the union of soul and body. He could not have willed that our Arm shou'd be mo∣ved after such and such a manner, nor the soul suf∣fer the pain of the Tooth-ach, at the time of the Moons conjunction with the Sun, if this conjuncti∣on does not act upon the body. The design of God being to unite the Soul to the Body, he cou'd not give to the Soul the sentiments of grief, but when some changes happen in the body which are contrary to it. Thus we ought not to seek any where else but in the Soul, and in the Body the occasional causes of their union.

V.

Hence it follows, that God having a design to form his Church by J. C. could not according to this design seek any where else but in J. C. and the Creatures united by reason to J. C. the occasional causes which serve to establish the ge∣neral Laws of Grace, by which the spirit of J. C. is shed upon his Members, and communicates unto them his Life and Holiness. Thus Grace is not showered down upon our hearts according to the divers scituation of the Stars, nor according to the meeting of several bodies; nor even ac∣cording to the different motion of the animal

spirits which give unto us motion and life. No bo∣dies can excite in us any motions and sentiments, but what are purely natural; for all that comes to the soul by the body, is only for the body. The Angels themselves are not made occasional causes of inward grace. They are as well as we Members of that body of which J. C. alone is the Head, they are Ministers of J. C. for the salvation of the Saints. I grant that they may produce some change in the bo∣dies which surround us, and even in that which we animate; and that thus they may remove some im∣pediments of the efficacy of Grace. But certain∣ly they cannot distribute to men such a precious gift; they have not immediate power over the minds of men, which by their nature are equal to them. To conclude, St Paul teaches us, * 1.21 to be∣lieve that God has not subjected to them the future World, or the Church of J. C. Thus the occa∣sional cause of Grace cannot be found but in J. C. or in man.

VI.

But seeing it is certain that grace is not grant∣ed to all those that desire it, nor as soon as they desire it, and it is often given to those who do not ask it; it follows, that even our desires are not the occasional cause of Grace. For this kind of causes always have readily their effect, and without them the effect is never produced. For example, the striking of bodies upon one another being the occasional cause of the change which happens in their motion, if two bodies do not meet one another their motions are not changed; and if they be changed, we may be assured that they did. The general Laws by which Grace is

poured into our hearts, do find nothing in our wills which may determine their efficacy; like as the general Laws which govern the rains, are not founded upon the dispositions of the places where it rains. For whither Lands lye Fallow, or whi∣ther they be cultivated, it rains indifferently in all places, even upon Sands and in the Sea.

VII.

We are then brought to maintain, that since none but J. C. cou'd merit grace, there is like∣wise none but he who cou'd give the occasions of the general Laws according to which it is given to men. For the principle of the foundation of gene∣ral Laws, or that which determines their efficacy, being necessarily either in us, or in J. C. since it is cer∣tain it is not in us, for the reasons above men∣tioned, it must needs be found in J. C. Thus it was necessary that God after sin should have no regard to our wills: Being all in disorder, we cou'd no more be the occasion of Gods giving us Grace. A Mediator therefore was necessary not only to give us access to God, but also to be the natural or occasional cause of those favours we hope to receive from him.

VIII.

Since God designed to make his Son the Head of his Church, it was convenient he should make him the natural or occasional cause of Grace, which sanctifies it; for it is from the Head that Life and motion ought to be given to the mem∣bers. And it was even with this foresight that God permitted sin, for if man had continued in his Innocence, without being assisted by the Grace of J. C. seeing his wills wou'd have merited Grace,

and even Glory, God should have established in man the occasional cause of his perfection and happiness: The inviolable Law of order requires this; so that J. C. wou'd not have been the Head of his Church, or such an Head whose influences the Members wou'd have had no need of.

IX.

If our soul had been in our body, before it was form'd, and all the parts which compose it disposed of according to our different wills, with how many divers sentiments and motions wou'd she have been affected, by all the effects which she would have known ought to have followed from her wills, especially if she had had an extream desire to have made a more Vigorous and better form'd body? * 1.22 Now the Holy Scripture does not only say that J. C. is the Head of the Church, but it also teaches us that he begot it, that he form'd it, that he nourishes it, that he suffered in it; that he merits in it, that he acts and influences it with∣out ceasing. The zeal which J. C. has for the glory of his Father, and the love he bears to his Church, inspires him continually with a de∣sire of making it the most ample, the most mag∣nisicent, and the most perfect, he can possibly. Thus seeing the soul of J. C. has not an infinite capacity, and yet desires to give infinite beauties and ornaments to his Church, we have all the reason to believe that there is a continual suc∣cession of thoughts and desires in his Soul, in re∣spect of his Mystical body which he continually forms.

X.

Now these continual desires of the Soul of Je∣sus, which sanctifie the Church, and render it worthy of the Majesty of his Father, God hath made the occasional causes of the efficacy of the general Laws of Grace: For Faith teaches us that God hath given to his Son an absolute power over Men, by making him the Head of his Church; and this cannot be conceived if the different wills of J. C. be not followed by their effects. For it is visible, I should have no power over mine arm, if it should move it self whether I would or no, and if when I desire to move it, it should remain as if it was dead and without motion.

XI.

J. C. has merited his Sovereign power over men, and this quality of Head of the Church, by the Sacrifice he offered upon Earth; and after his Resurrection he took full possession of this right. * 1.23 'Tis upon this account, that he is now So∣vereign Priest of future good things, and that by his many intercessions, he continually prays unto the Father in the behalf of men. * 1.24 And see∣ing his desires are occasional causes, his prayers are always heard; his Father denies him nothing, as the Scripture teaches us. Nevertheless he must pray and desire that he may obtain: For the occasional, physical, natural causes (for all these words signifie the same thing) have no power of themselves to do any thing; and all creatures, even J. C. himself considered as man, are in them∣selves nothing but weakness and impotence.

Additions.

I don't think that hitherto there is any diffi∣culty,

if it be not in this last Article, where I say, that J. C. prayeth unto his Father; for there are some Persons whom this very much offends. For I speak as St. Paul to the Romans, and to the Hebrews, and as Jesus Christ himself: I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comfor∣ter: which is to be understood of J. C. after his resurrection, according to these words of St. John; The spirit was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified.

For the Spirit fell not upon the Apostles till Ten days after J. C. was entered into the Holy of Holies, a Sovereign Priest of true good things.

In all these Articles, I speak only of J. C. as to his humanity, according to which he recei∣ved all power in Heaven and Earth; because all his prayers or his desires, which certainly are in his power, (or otherwise he has no power) are executed in consequence of his qualities, as So∣vereign Priest of the House of God, King of Is∣rael, Architect of the Eternal Temple, Medi∣ator betwixt God and men, Head of the Church; or to speak like the Philosophers, (for whom I chiefly write this Treatise) the occasional, natu∣ral, or distributive cause of Grace: The cause which Determines the Efficacy of the general Law by which God wou'd save all men in his Son.

XII.

J. C. having then successively divers thoughts in relation to the divers dispositions, whereof Souls in general are capable, these divers thoughts are accompanyed with certain desires in relation to the Sanctification of these Souls. Now these de∣sires

being the occasional causes of Grace, they must pour it down upon those persons in particu∣lar whose dispositions resemble that upon which the Soul of J. C. actually thinks: And this Grace must be so much the stronger and more abundant, as these desires of J. C. are greater and more last∣ing.

XIII.

When a person considers any part of his bo∣dy, which is not form'd as it ought to be, he has naturally certain desires in relation to this part, and the use he desires to make of it in com∣mon life; and these desires are followed by certain insensible motions of the animal Spirits, which tend to give that proportion or disposition to this part which we desire it shou'd have. When the Bo∣dy is altogether form'd, and the flesh firm, the motions change nothing in the construction of the parts; they can only give them certain disposi∣tions which are called Corporeal habits. But when the body is not altogether form'd, and the flesh is very soft and tender, these motions which ac∣company the desires of the Soul, do not only give the body certain particular dispositions, but may also change the construction thereof. This sufficiently appears by Children in the Womb, for they are not only moved with the same pas∣sions as there Mothers, but they also receive the marks of these passions in their bodies, from which yet the Mothers are always free.

XIV.

The Mystical body of J. C. is not yet a perfect man, * 1.25 it will not be so till the end of the world J. C. forms it continually; for it is from the Head

the whole body joyned together receives nourish∣ment by the efficacy of his influence, according to the measure which is proper to every one, to the end it may be form'd and edified in love. These are the truths which St Paul teaches us. Now since the soul of J. C. has no other action but the divers motions of its heart, 'tis necessary that these desires be succeeded by the influence of grace, which only can form J. C. in his Members, and give them that beauty and proportion which must be the eter∣nal object of the divine Love.

XV.

The divers motions of the soul of J. C. being the occasional causes of Grace, we ought not to be sur∣prised, if it be sometimes given to great sinners, or those who make no use of it. For the soul of J. C. designing to raise a Temple of vast extent, and infinite beauty, may desire that Grace may be given to the greatest sinners; and if in this moment J. C. thinks actually, for example, upon Covetous persons, the Covetous shall receive Grace. Or else, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain merit for the construction of his Church, which is not ordinarily acquired, but by those who suffer cer∣tain persecutions, of which the passions of men are the natural principle: In a word, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain character, for bring∣ing to pass certain effects in his Church, may in ge∣neral apply himself to them, & by this application bestow upon them the Grace which sanctifies: In like manner, as the mind of an Architect thinks in general upon square stones, for example, when these sort of stones are actually necessary for his building.

XVI.

But as the soul of J. C. is not a general cause, there is reason to think that it often has particu∣lar desires in respect of certain particular persons. When we pretend to speak exactly of God, we ought not to consult our selves, and make him act as we do; we ought to consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, and make him act accord∣ing to this Idea, but when we speak of the action of the soul of Jesus, we may consult our selves, we may suppose it to act as particular causes would act, which yet are joyned to eternal wisdom. We have reason, for example, to believe that the calling of St. Paul was the effect of the efficacy of a par∣ticular desire of J. Christ. We may also look up∣on the desires of the soul of J. C. which generally re∣late to all the minds of one certain character, as par∣ticular desires, tho they comprehend many persons; because these desires change every moment, as those of particular causes do. But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same, because his wills must be firm, and constant, seeing his wis∣dom is infinite; as I have shewn in the first Dis∣course.

Additions.

I think I have demonstrated, that J. C. as man, is the occasional cause of Grace. Now, since God acts not, if Order doth not require, or some oc∣casional cause determine him thereunto; and that, in respect of Grace, altogether free, Order never requires that God shou'd give it, seeing it cannot be merited: 'Tis evident, that all the difficulties which we find in the distribution of Grace, must be ascribed to J. C. as man. This is that which

I have already done in a general way; for it was not at all necessary, that I should particu∣larly justifie the wisdom and goodness of God, which was my only design in the construction of his Church, as I did at first advertise.

But that the minds, least able to discern the usefulness of the principles laid down, may not fail to apprehend it; I shall endeavour, as clear∣ly as possibly I can, to shew the consequences which may be drawn from these principles.

There are many difficulties in vindicating Gods Conduct in his way of distributing the rain of Grace, as well as in that by which he sends down the ordinary rain, the chief of which are, that it is not always proportioned to the need of sinners, and that even in respect to the just, tho it answer their necessities, yet it does not always hinder them from falling into disorder.

God is wise, he wills the conversion of sinners, he has sworn so by his Prophet. A Being infi∣nitely wise proportions the means to the end. How then can it be that the Grace which the sinner re∣ceives shou'd not be strong enough to make him quit his sin? Or to take away all equivocation, Why shou'd not such an Infant be Baptised? Why should there be so many Nations who know not J. C.? It is easily comprehended by what I have said in the first Discourse, that this is a conse∣quence of the simplicity of Gods ways, and must proceed from the occasional cause which God has established for the executing his design after such a manner, as best resembles his Divine Attri∣butes.

For if it rains upon the High-ways, upon the Sand, upon the Sea, as well as upon the Sown Lands; it is because these rains are necessary con∣sequences of the simplicity of those ways which God has established for making the Earth Fruit∣ful.

But whence does it proceed that J. C. who is an intelligent occasional cause, abandons so many sinners and so many nations? Or to come to the greatest difficulty, Whence is it that J. C. forsakes even the just, the members of his body, who are straight united to him by charity? For as to sinners, and they who do not call upon him, it may be said that he neglects them as unwor∣thy of his care. But whence comes it to pass, that he gives to the just, exposed to temptation, such a Grace, which he well foresaw, notwith∣standing his assistance wou'd be overcome? This Grace was altogether sufficient, I grant, and that it only depended upon the just to make it effi∣cacious. But why did not J. C. give it more force, since he foresaw the fall of one of his well-be∣loved Children? If my principle can clear up these difficulties, without injuring the love of J. C. to∣wards men, as well as it defends the wisdom and goodness of God, against the reasonings of Li∣bertines, certainly the consequences thereof will be very advantageous to Religion. This is that which I am about to examine.

J. C. may be considered according to two re∣spects, one as Architect of the Eternal Temple; the other, as Head of the Church. I have part∣ly explained the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect because this manifested the fruitful∣ness

and necessity of my principle. But I wou'd not speak of the way by which he acts as Head of the Church, by reason of the difficulty of the fall of the just, which supposes certain things where∣of I thought not then to speak. That I may ex∣plain more particularly the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect upon the materials which do not as yet make part of his Temple, and as Head in re∣spect of the Just who are members of his Body, I am obliged to say what I think concerning the holy Soul of J. C. which regulates all his desires, with re∣spect nevertheless to the divine Law, the immutable and necessary order; for the wills of J. C. are al∣ways agreeable to those of his Father. Tho several of the * 1.26 Fathers and those especially who wrote against the Arrians, as Athanasius, were contented to attri∣bute to Jesus Christ, as God, the knowledge of all things, and expounded concerning J. C. as man, that which St. Mark reports, The Day of the Lord knoweth no Man, no not the Son of Man himself; and some of them feared not even to say, that Ignorance is one of the defects of Humane Nature which J. C. took for our sakes: Nevertheless I am far from this thought. For I am perswaded that J. C. as man knows all Sciences, and hath a perfect knowledge of all things; that he not only knows all the Beings which God hath created, with all their Modifications, and all their relations; but also upon much greater rea∣son, all those which God can create: In a word, all that which God contains in the immensity of his Be∣ing. I say that J. C. knows upon much greater rea∣son, all possible Creatures than the existence and re∣lation of those which God hath made; because he knows the first by the right which his union with the Word,

which contains them as the Word, gives him; where∣as he knows not the other but by a kind of a Reve∣lation as I shall shew hereafter.

I believe then that J. C. as man, knows all things; but it ought to be observ'd that there is a great dif∣ference between knowing all things habitually, and knowing all things actually; between knowing all things and thinking of all things; which is almost always confounded. There is no man but knows that two and two make four, and yet there are but few who actually think of it. A Geometrician knows his En∣clid, but he is often a long time without thinking of any of the propositions of this Author. A man knows a truth, or Science, when by his Labour, or otherwise, he has gain'd a right thereunto; insomuch, that he can no sooner think of these things, but they imme∣diately present themselves to his mind very clearly, without putting him to any trouble.

Now the soul of J. C. is personally united to the Word, and the Word, as the Word, con∣tains all possible being with their relations; he contains all immutable, necessary, & eternal truths. J. C. as man, can no sooner think of any truths, but they are instantly discovered to his mind. J. C. therefore knows all Sciences; he knows all possible things, since he may without any effort of mind, see all that the Word contains as the Word. For the same reason J. C. knows all the divine Perfections, since the Word is a substan∣tial representation of the divine Nature, and the Father communicates to his Son all his Substance. He knows even the Existence, the Modifications, the relations of the Creatures; but by a kind of revelation which the Father gives to him when∣soever

he desires him; according to those words of J. C. himself, I know, O Father that thou al∣ways hearest me. For since the creatures are not the necessary emanations of the Divinity, the Word as the Word, does truly represent their Nature or Essence, but not their Existence; for their Exi∣stence depends upon the free will of the Creator, which the Word, meerly as the Word, does not contain, seeing the Divine Decrees are common to all the three Persons. Thus the Existence of the Creatures cannot be known but by a kind of Revelation. J. C. therefore as man, knows all things. In him are hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God, but he does not actually think upon all things; and this is evi∣dent: For the soul of J. C. has not the capacity of an infinite mind. And those who maintain that there are no succession of thoughts in J. C. and that he always knows whatsoever he does know, thinking to attribute to the soul of J. C. a sort of immutability which is due only to God, they necessarily make him liable to very great ignorance. See the proof of this: It is certain that natural effects are combined amongst themselves, and with those of Grace, after an infinitely infinite manner, and that these combinations are every moment changed after infinite ways, by reason of the mu∣tability of Mens wills, and the irregular course of the animal Spirits, which change all our traces and all our Ideas, in consequence of the Laws of Union of Soul and Body.

Now the capacity of thinking, which the Soul of J. C. has as Man, is finite. Therefore if he knew, or always actually thought upon that which

he knows, he must necessarily be ignorant of an infinite number of things.

Furthermore, it is certain that the properties of numbers are not only infinite but infinitely in∣finite: That in respect of Figures, there may be, for example, an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds, each of their sides being capa∣ble of being lengthned or shortned to infinity. Now to say that J. C. knows not the properties of such Triangles, or the relation of one of their sides, or its Square, or its Cube, or its Quadra∣ta-quadrate, &c. with other Sides, or their Squares, or their Cubes, or their Quadrata-quadrates, &c. this is to suppose that J. C. is ignorant of that which the Geometricians know. But if it be maintained that J. C. as Man, always actually knows every thing that he knows, it is necessary that he be ignorant of an infinite number of the properties of these Triangles. Nevertheless let us suppose, that Natural effects are not combi∣ned with the effects of Grace; and that likewise all the thoughts of men, their circumstances, their combinations, were something finite, which the mind of man might discern all at once; certainly to suppose that the Soul of J. C. does always think of them, is to give unto him a very useless and troublesome knowledge. It is troublesome, for that which renders the soul of J. C. happy, is the contemplation of the perfection of the Sovereign good. Now the knowledge of all the Chimaeraes which do, have, and shall pass in our minds, ac∣cording to this supposition, continually distract∣ing the capacity of the soul of J. C. (otherwise entertain'd in beholding the Beauties and tasting

the sweetness of the chief Good) would not be ve∣ry agreeable to him. For it must be observed, that it is one thing to see God, and another thing to see the Creatures and their modifications in God. I think I have demonstrated that we see all in God in this life, but this is not to see God, or to enjoy him. Thus it cannot be said, that J. C. sees all our thoughts, without dividing his capacity of thinking; because he sees them all in God. This actual knowledge therefore, which some wou'd give to J. C. is troublesome; for it is very irksome to think actually upon those things, upon which we do not desire to think of. A Geometrician who should have found out the Squaring of a Circle, or any other more surprising Truth, wou'd be very miserable, should it be always present to his mind. J. C. has an Object more worthy of his application, than the modification of the Creatures; therefore always to have an actual knowledge of our thoughts and needs, pass'd, and future, would be very trou∣blesome.

Moreover, it would be altogether useless to him, and to us. Certainly it is sufficient that J. C. thinks of assisting me, when I shall have need; without thinking thereof for two or three Thousand years, or rather from all Eternity: For J. C. must ac∣tually think thereof from all Eternity, if there be no succession of thoughts in his soul.

As in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, (which I composed for those Persons who are not over cre∣dulous) I resolved not to propose any Principles which might be contested; and since if I had sup∣posed that the soul of J. C. had actually known all things, my supposition might have been opposed,

by the reasons which I have produced, and per∣haps by others better: I have therefore only sup∣posed, that J. C. has a clear Idea of the soul, and the modifications of which it is capable, to produce a noble effect in the Temple which he builds to the glory of his Father; that which Reason and Faith do demonstrate. Thus I suppose J. C. to act in consequence of this only supposition, in the XIII, XIV, XV, XVI. Articles, where I compare him to an Architect, and to a Soul which should have power to form all the parts of its Body. For as an Architect may form a Design, and build an Edi∣fice, without concerning himself from whence the materials come he employs therein; so J.C. by his union with the Word, may form his designs, and desires, without thinking on the actual dispositions of all men. He hath admonished them by his Counsels in his Gospel, to put themselves in such a condition, that Grace may not be useless to them. It becomes him not to order his desires, (the distributive causes of his Graces) accor∣ding to the negligence, or wickedness of men, but according to the condition wherein he finds the Work he is to build, according to the designs he continually forms; according to the beauty where∣with he intends to Adorn his Church.

Now this way, after which, I suppose J.C. might act, wou'd be sufficient to justifie Gods Conduct, and make it in general comprehended; whence it is that the rain of Grace is sent down without effect upon hardned hearts, at such unseasonable times, after such an unequal manner, and almost always so little answerable unto the concupiscence of those who receive it: For this reason I ought not to en∣ter

particularly upon the fall of the Just, under an Head who has so much love for sinners. Neverthe∣less I shall at present endeavour to explain it to sa∣tisfie the most difficult.

Whilst J.C. acts as Architect, he only regulates his desires according to his designs. It is indifferent to him to have in his Temple, Paul, or John; if both the one and the other resemble the Idea which determines his desires: As it is indifferent to an Architect, who needs only a square stone, or a pillar, to have that which is on the right hand, or on the left, if they be altogether alike. Thus the desire of J. C. bestowing Grace which moves men to come unto him, and cast themselves in his hands, those who come first, and are most watchful, are they whom he employs in his building.

But men having once followed the motion of Grace, I think it is certain that J. C. is advertised of their dispositions; and that when he has plac'c them in his Temple, or made them parts of his Body, no need, no temptation, happens to them, which he has not notice of, and which he doth not provide for. When Bread is once become part of our flesh, it cannot be touched without hurting us. When a stone is wrought and laid in the building, it cannot be broken without offending the Archi∣tect. J. C. considered as Head of the Church, is therefore advertised of all our necessities, even be∣fore he particularly desires to know them. Here∣in his Father prevents his Charity; It seems to me, that order requires this. Perhaps he may even actually know the effect, which the assistance he gives us, will have, even before it be given; and this is that which makes all the difficulty.

For J. C. loves the just, he tenderly cherishes those who are united unto him by Charity. Now he has notice of a Temptation which solicits one of his Members, and he may give him Victori∣ous Graces. If therefore he foresaw, that with such assistance, the Just, tho he might have overcome, would nevertheless be vanquished; Why did he not augment this assistance? He desires the just should be Victorious; Why therefore doth he not proportion the means to the end, if he ac∣tually knew the relation of the means to the end?

For my part, I had rather believe that J. C. as man, or the occasional cause of Grace, doth not actually know the future determination of the will of the just, to whom he gives assistance, than think that he in any sense, wants Goodness and Charity for his Members. I grant that J.C. as man, may know all the future determination of our wills, as I know that two and two are four. But I doubt whether he actually thinks thereon. and I do not believe that he always thinks thereon, that he may regulate the distribution of Graces ac∣cording to this knowledge. These are my Reasons.

J. C. does not see in the Word, precisely as the Word, whether the just will follow, or will not follow the motion of his Grace: He cannot know it, unless God discover it to him by a sort of revelation, as I have already said. Now it seems to me, that he ought not always to demand what effect his Grace will have; because it seems clear to me, that Order, which is his Rule, and his Law, doth not require that he shou'd proportion his gifts to mens future negligence, but only to their necessities for his own proper designs.

J.C. must act as man, or as the occasional cause, that God may build up his Church by the most simple ways. Now none but God can dive in mens hearts, and see the free determinations of their wills. J. C. therefore before he acts, ought not to desire of his Father to reveal to him, whether the just being tempted, will, or will not be van∣quished, by such or such a degree of Grace: For thus his action would not bear the Character of an occasional cause. If God should by himself, give unto the just Grace to vanquish Temptations, being by nature Searcher of Hearts, his Conduct ought to comport with this Character; and if the just should be vanquished, it might be believed, that God designed to forsake him. But Order requiring that J. C. as Man, should act as Man, his action is not to bear the Character of Search∣er of Hearts: For God intending to make his wis∣dom his fore-sight, the infinite extension of his knowledge, to appear in the construction of his great work; he was obliged to form it by the most simple ways. For in conclusion, what marvel would it be, if J. C. should make a beautiful work, and save even all men, if on the one side he acted by particular wills, and on the other, his action did not carry in it the character of an Occasional cause, but of an infinite Wisdom, certainly GOD ought not to appoint an Occasional Cause, if this Occasional cause must act as God, and not as man? He ought to do all immediately by him∣self. But how shou'd we have justified his wis∣dom and goodness, seeing so many Monsters a∣mong Bodies, so many irregularrities among Spi∣rits, so much disproportion in his action, in re∣lation

to his Attributes, so much rain upon the Sand and in the Sea, so many Graces given to hard∣ned Hearts; Graces which serve only to make them more culpable and more criminal, * 1.27 which yet cou'd not have been given, with a design so unworthy of Gods goodness, who desires the Conversion of sinners, and to whom the wicked were never ne∣cessary?

If that which I have said of the fall of the just, and the manner after which Jesus Christ forms his Church, be clearly understood; perhaps it would be found to be probable enough: But I think I ought to say, that this is no ways necessary in or∣der to defend my principles, and the manner by which I have justified the wisdom and goodness of God. For it may be that God has given to J. C. as man, a particular kind of knowledge and power in relation to his design, by establishing him the occasional cause of the general Law of Grace. To make my thought understood by a compari∣son, let us imagine that as soon as Adam was form∣ed, God acquainted the Angels, that he had uni∣ted a Spirit to a Body, to the end that it might take care thereof, without informing them any thing of the Laws of this union. According to this sup∣position, the Angels reasoning according to their Ideas, would doubtless have imagined, that the first man had no sentiment of Objects; and that, to eat and nourish himself, he studied to know the consiguration of the parts of the fruits of Paradise, the relation they might have with those of his Body, thereby to judge whether they would have been proper for his nourishment. In all pro∣bality they would have believed, that to walk,

Adam had thought on the Nerves which answer∣ed to his Legs, and that he had continually con∣veyed to them such a quantity of Animal spirits to remove them; and thus they would have judg∣ed of other Functions by which Mans life is pre∣served. We very near do the same thing as to the manner in which J. C. forms his Church: We will needs judge thereof according to our Ideas, and yet perhaps we understand nothing thereof. God united the Soul to the Body of the first Man, after a much more wise and real manner, than the Angels themselves could imagine: For God advertised him by sentiments, after a short and undoubted manner, of what he ought to do; and this without dividing, as little as might be, the ca∣pacity which he had of thinking upon his Sovereign good: For then his Senses kept silence whenso∣ever he desired it. Man may still walk and me∣ditate, both together, but the first man upon all occasions, might, and also ought, without with∣drawing himself from the presence of God, to give unto his Body all that which was necessary for it. Why may not God at present therefore, give un∣to J. C. certain kinds of compendious knowledge, whereof we have no Idea, that he may thereby bet∣ter facilitate the construction of his Church, so that the relation which he has to us, may not divide the capacity which he has of seeing God and enjoying his happiness? God appointed cer∣tain general Laws of the union of Soul and Bo∣dy, that the first Man might preserve his Life without applying himself over-much to particular Objects. Why may not God, by making his Son the Head of the Church, have established such

like general Laws? It may be this ought to have been so, that God might act in such a manner as agrees best with the divine attributes; and perhaps that apparent irregularity with which Grace is given unto men, is in part a consequence of this marvelous invention of eternal wisdom. Assu∣redly, it may be the first Adam was even in this a figure of the second, and that J.C. besides his know∣ledge and desires, which we cannot deny to him, without impiety, hath still compendious ways, worthy of an infinite wisdom, by which, as we by our sentiments and passions, he acts in his mystical body, without being diverted from his Sovereign good, which he loves too much to lose the sight of, or remove himself from its presence. There are several passages in Scripture may countenance this opinion, but I might well be accounted rash, should I pretend to establish it as a point which ought to be believed. That which I say may be true, but I ought not to assert it as true, before I am well con∣vinced of it my self. If this be not, it may be, or some such like thing; as for my part, I have not justified the Wisdom and Goodness of God, but by leaving to J. C. as Architect of the Eternal Temple, that we cannot take from him without of∣fering violence to Reason and good Sense. But I am glad to know that there are several ways of an∣swering those who oppose the Quality which I give to J. C. of an occasional cause, which determines the efficacy of the good will of God in respect to men; and that all the Objections which can be made against me in this, can upon no other ac∣count be hard to be resolved, but because we are ignorant of a great many things which it would

be necessary to know for the clearing them up.

XVII.

The divers desires of the Soul of J. C. giving Grace, hence we clearly apprehend whence it is, that it is not equally given to all men, and that it falls upon certain persons at one time more than at another. Since the Soul of J. C. does not think at the same time of sanctifying all men, it has not at the same time all the desires of which it is capable. Thus, J. C. does not act upon his Members after a particular manner, but by successive influences; like as our Soul does not at the same time remove all the Muscles of our Bodies: For the Animal Spirits go equally and successively into our Mem∣bers, according to the different impressions of Objects, the divers motions of our passions, and different Desires which we freely form in our selves.

XVIII.

It is true, that all the just continually receive the influence of the Head that gives them life, and that when they act by the Spirit of J. C. they merit and receive new graces, tho it be not necessary that the Soul of J. C. has any particular desires which may be the occasional causes of them; for the order, which requires that all Merit be reward∣ed, is not in God an Arbitrary Law; it is a Neces∣sary Law, which depends not upon any occasional cause. But tho he that has done a Meritorious Ac∣tion, may be rewarded for it, and yet the soul of J. C. have actually no desires in respect of him; nevertheless, it is certain that he has not merited Grace, but by the dignity and holiness which the Spirit of J. C. communicated to him: For men

are not acceptable to God, and do nothing that is good, * 1.28 but so far as they are united to his Son by Charity.

Additions.

Altho I say order requires that the Just Merit Grace, it must not be understood of all Graces, but only of those which are absolutely necessary for the van∣quishing unavoidable temptations. But God is faith∣ful who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, says St. Paul. Now Order requires that God should be faithful. Quis autem dicat eum qui jam coepit credere, ab illo in quem credit non me∣reri, says St. Augustine de Praedest. Sanct. Ch. 2. The just therefore may merit Grace, by the assi∣stance of Grace; but he cannot in strictness merit those Graces which are not absolutely necessary for him. This depends upon the good will of J. C. as he is the occasional cause of the order of Grace. And in strictness, good works perhaps merit only the reward of happiness: But it is not necessary that I should stand to explain the different ways of understanding merit.

XIX.

Moreover, it must be confest, that they who ob∣serve the councels of J. C. by the esteem which they have for them, and by the fear they have of future Punishments, do solicite, as I may say, by their obedience, the love of J. C. to think of them, tho as yet they should act only by self-love. But all their actions are not occasional causes, neither of Grace, since they are not infallibly attended therewith, nor even of the motions of the Soul of J. C. in their behalf, since these same motions ne∣ver fail of giving it. Thus, the desires of J. C.

alone have infallibly their effect, as occasional cau∣ses; because God having made J. C. Head of the Church, it is only by him that the Grace which sanctifies the Elect ought to be given.

XX.

Now we may consider in the Soul of J. C. two sorts of desires, actual, transient, and particular desires, the efficacy of which continue but a little time, constant and permanent desires, which con∣sist in a firm and lasting disposition of the soul of J. C. in relation to certain effects which tend to the execution of his design in general.

If our soul by its different motions did commu∣nicate to our bodies all that which is necessary to form and make it grow, we might distinguish there∣in two kinds of desires; for it would send into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits that give it certain dispositions, in respect of the present Objects, or actual thoughts of the mind, by actual and transi∣ent desires. But it would give to the Heart and the Lungs the natural motions, which serve for respiration and circulation of the Blood by stable and permanent desires. It would also by such like desires digest its nourishment, and distribute it to all the parts which have need thereof; because this sort of action is at all times necessary for the preservation of the body.

XXI.

By these actual, transient, and particular desires of the soul of J. C. Grace is given to persons who are not prepared, and after a manner which hath something singular and extraordinary in it. But it is given regularly by permanent desires to those who worthily receive the Sacraments. For the

Grace which we receive by the Sacraments, is not given meerly by the Merit of our Action, tho we receive with fit dispositions; it is because of the merits of J.C. which are freely applyed to us in consequence of his permanent desires. We receive by the Sacraments much more Grace than our pre∣paration can deserve, and it is even sufficient for the receiving some influence thereby that we do not put any impediment: But it is also to abuse that which is most holy in Religion, to receive them un∣worthily.

Additions.

Since J. C. as man, does not act, but by his de∣sires, and the Grace of the Sacraments is perma∣nent; it is evident, that the Grace which he com∣municates to those who receives them worthily, comes not from J. C. as the occasional cause. If there be not in J. C. a permanent desire, or a con∣stant will to do good unto those who come unto the Sacraments, there would be no great mistery in them.

XXII.

Among the actual and transient desires of the Soul of Jesus, there are certainly some which are more lasting and frequent than others; and the knowledge of the desires is of very great use in morality. Doubtless J. C. thinks oftner upon them who observe his councels, than on other men. The motions of love which he has for the Faithful, are more frequent and lasting, than those which he hath for the Libertine and the Wicked.

And since all the Faithful are not equally dispo∣sed to enter into the Church of the predestinated, the desires of the Soul of J. C. are not in respect

of them all equally lively, frequent & abiding. Man more earnestly desires those fruits which are more proper to nourish his Body, he thinks oftner upon Bread and Wine, than on those Meats which are difficultly digested. J. C. having a design to form his Church, ought therefore to concern himself more for those who may easily enter therein, than for those who are very far from it.

Thus the H. Scripture teaches us, that the hum∣ble, the poor, the penitent, receive greater Gra∣ces, than other men; because they who dispise Honours, Riches, and Pleasures, are much fitter for the Kingdom of God. They who according to the example of J. C. have learnt to be meek and humble in heart, shall find rest to their souls. The yoak of J. C. which the Proud can't bear, will become easie and light by the assistance of Grace: For God hears the Prayers of the Humble, he will comfort them, he will justifie them, he will save them, he will heap Blessings upon them; but he will bring down the Haughtiness of the Proud.

Blessed are the Poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven: But Cursed are the Rich, for they have received their Consolation in this World. How hard is it, says J C. for the Rich to enter into the Kingdom of GOD! It is easier for a Camel to pass thro' the eye of a Needle. Which cannot be without a Miracle.

As for them, who, like David, humble their souls with Fasting, put on Sack-cloath: In a word, af∣flict themselves at the sight of their Sins, and the Holiness of God, will become fit objects for the compassion of J. C. for God never will dispise

an humble and a contrite Heart. We always dis∣arm his wrath, when we prefer the interests of God before our own, and take vengeance upon our selves.

XXIII.

Since the will of J. C. is altogether agreeable to Order, of which all men have naturally some Idea, it may further be discern'd by Reason, that the soul of J. C. has more thoughts and desires, in re∣spect of some Persons, than others. For Order re∣quires, that J. C. should bestow more Graces; for example, upon those who are called to H. Orders, than those whose vocation necessarily engages them in the business of the World. In a word, upon those who make the principal parts of the body of the Church Militant, than they who have not the oversight of any, or are engaged in the Ecclesiasti∣cal Function, and raise themselves above others by ambition or interest. For if it be fit that J. C. give Graces unto these in respect of the Persons whom they govern, yet they don't deserve such as may sanctify them in that state which they have chosen by self-love. They may have the gift of Prophecy, without having that of Charity, as Scrip∣ture teaches us.

XXIV.

We have proved, that the different desires of the soul of J. C. are the occasional causes of Grace, and we have endeavoured to discover something of these desires. Let us now see of what kind of Grace they are the occasional causes. For tho J. C. be the Meritorious cause of all graces, it is not ne∣cessary he should be the occasional cause of the gra∣ces of knowledge, and certain outward Graces,

which prepare the heart for conversion, but cannot effect it; for J. C. is always the occasional or neces∣sary cause, according to the order established by God, in respect of all Graces which conduce to men salvation.

XXV.

Distinctly to understand what is the grace, which J. C. as Head of his Church, bestows upon his Members, we must know what is the concupiscence which the first man has communicated to all his Po∣sterity. For the second Adam came to cure the dis∣orders which the first had caused, and there is such a relation between the Sinful and Earthly Adam, and the Innocent and Heavenly Adam, that St. * 1.29 Paul looks upon the first communicating sin to his Of∣spring, by his disobedience, as the figure of the se∣cond giving to Christians by his obedience, righte∣ousness, and holiness.

XXVI.

Order requires that the soul should govern the body, and that she should not be distracted whither she will or no, with all those sentiments, and all those motions which turn her to sensible Ob∣jects.

Thus the first man, before sin, was so much Master of his sences, and his passions, that they were silent whensoever he desired it; nothing was able to turn him from his duty against his will, and all the plea∣sures which then prevented his reason, did only re∣spectfully after a gentle & easie manner, advertise him of what he was to do for the preservation of his life. But after sin, he lost all at once the pow∣er he had over his body, so that not being able to stop the motions, nor effuse those traces which sen∣sible

Objects made in the principal part of his brain, his soul by the Order of Nature, and as a punishment of his disobedience, became mise∣rably subject to the Law of Concupiscence, to that Carnal Law which continually fights against the mind, and every moment inspires it with the Love of sensible goods, and rules over it by passions so strong, and lively, and yet at the same time, so sweet and agreeable, that it cannot; nay, will not, make all necessary endeavours to break the bonds which captivates it. For the infecti∣on of sin is communicated to all the Children of Adam, by an infallible consequence, of the Or∣der of Nature, as I have else where Explain∣ed.

XXVII.

The Heart of Man is always a slave to plea∣sure, and when Reason teaches us it is not con∣venient to enjoy it, yet we do not avoid it, but that we may find another more sweet or solid. We willingly sacrifice lesser pleasures to greater; but the invincible impression which we have for our own happiness, permits us not all our lives long to deprive our selves of that sweetness which we taste, when we suffer our selves to follow our passions.

Additions.

In the third discourse you will see how this ought to be understood.

XXVIII.

It is certain, that pleasure makes him happy who enjoys it; at least, while he does enjoy it. Thus men being made to be happy, pleasure al∣ways gives a touch to the will, and moves it to∣wards

that object which causes it, or seems to cause it: The contrary must be said of grief. Now Con∣cupiscence consists only in a continual succession of sentiments & motion which prevent reason, & which are not subject thereunto of pleasures, which coming from the objects about us, inspire us with the love of them; of griefs, which making the exercise of vertue harsh and painful, give us an abhorrence of them.

It therefore became the second Adam, that he might cure the disorders of the first, to produce in us pleasures and aversions contrary to those of con∣cupiscence; pleasures with respect the true goods, and horrors or aversions in respect of sensible goods. Thus the grace whereof J. C. is the oc∣casional cause, and which, as Head of the Church, he continually bestows upon us, is not the Grace of knowledge, (tho he has merited this Grace, and tho he may sometimes communicate it, as I shall shew by and by,) but it is the Grace of senti∣ments. It is this previous delectation which pro∣duces and entertains the love of God in our hearts; for pleasure naturally produces and entertains the love of those objects, which cause, or seem to cause it: It is likewise the horror which sometimes ac∣companies sensible objects, which gives us an aver∣sion to them, and makes us capable of governing the motions of our love by our knowledge

XXIX.

The Grace of sentiment should be opposed to concupiscence, pleasure to pleasure, horror to hor∣ror, that the influences of J. C. might be directly opposed to the influence of the first man. The re∣medy that it may cure the disease must be con∣trary thereto. For the Grace of knowledge can∣not

heal an Heart wounded with pleasure; to this end this pleasure must either cease, or another succeed in its room. Pleasure is the weight of the soul which naturally enclines it towards it self; sensible pleasures weigh it down towards the Earth. That the soul may determine it self, either these pleasures must be dissipated, or the delectation of Grace raise her towards Heaven, and put her almost in Equilibrio. 'Tis thus that the new Man opposes the old, that the influences of our Head resists the influences of our Father Adam, that J. C. overcomes all our domestick Enemies.

Since Man had no concupiscence before his sin, it was not necessary he should be carried to the love of good by a previous delectation. He clear∣ly knew that God was his good, it was not ne∣cessary that he should feel it. There was no need that he should be drawn by pleasure to love him, whom to love nothing hindred, and who he knew was perfectly worthy of his love; but after sin the Grace of delectation was necessary to him, to counter-ballance the continual effort of concupis∣cence. Thus, knowledge is the Grace of the Creator, delectation the Grace of the Redeem∣er. Knowledge is communicated by J. C. as E∣ternal Wisdom: Delectation is given by him as Wisdom Incarnate. Knowledge in its original was no more than Nature, Delectation was al∣ways pure Grace. Knowledge after Sin was not granted to us, but through the Merits of J. C. Delectation is given to us through the Merits, and by the Efficacy of the power of J. C. In short, Knowledge is sent down upon our minds, accord∣ing to our different desires and applications, as I

shall Explain: But the Delectation of Grace is not shed upon our Hearts, but according to the various desires of the Soul of J. C.

Additions.

That the Healing Grace of J. C. consists in a preventing Delectation, is a thing so much out of doubt with St. Augustine, that F. Deschamps, who has so Learnedly confuted Jansenius, and is so opposite unto him, agrees with him in this Point; tho they differ from one another as to the manner in which Grace acts in us. See Jansenius de Grat. Chr. Lib. IV. c. 1. and Deschamps Lib III. Disp. III. c. 16. & 19.

I cannot perswade my self to continue the Expli∣cation of those things which to me seem clear of them∣selves. Insomuch, that what follows either needs it not, or is not particular to me. My Principles are sufficiently confirm'd by what has been said, and if they be clearly understood, I dont think there will be any difficulty in what follows.

XXX.

It is true, that pleasure produces Knowledge, because the soul gives more attention to the Ob∣jects from which she receives more pleasure. Since the generallity of men dispise or neglect the truths of Religion, because these abstracted truths do not affect them, it may be said that this delecta∣tion of Grace doth instruct them; for making these truths sensible, they learn them more ea∣sily by the attention which they bring to them. * 1.30 'Tis upon this account that St. John says the uncti∣on we receive from J. C. teaches us all things, and that they who have this unction have no need to be instructed.

It is true, that concupiscence, such as we feel, is not necessary in order to merit. Jesus Christ, whose sufferings were infinite, was not at all sub∣ject to it. But altho he was absolute Master of his Body, he willingly suffered the most trouble∣some motions and sentiments to be excited there∣in, that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him. Of all the sentiments, that of Grief is the most contrary to a soul which desires and deserves to be happy, and yet he wil∣lingly suffered the most tormenting. Pleasure makes him actually happy, who actually enjoys it, and yet he willingly depriv'd himself thereof.

Thus as we ought, he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours; but these his Sacrifices differed from those of the greatest Saints, because he wil∣lingly excited in himself all those painful senti∣ments, which in the rest of Men are the necessa∣ry consequences of sin; and that thus these Sa∣crifices being altogether voluntary in him, were more Pure, and more Meritorious.

XXXI.

Nevertheless, it must be observed that this Unction doth not of its self produce knowledge; it only excites our attention, which is the na∣tural or occasional cause of our knowledge.

Thus we see, that they who have the most Charity, have not always the most Knowledge. All men not being equally capable of attention, the same unction doth not equally instruct all those who receive it. Thus, tho knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a supernatural in∣fusion, and it may often be produced by Cha∣rity;

nevertheless, this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect, because Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men, but proportionally as it causes the soul to desire the knowledge of that which she loves. For to conclude, the various desires of the soul are the natural or occasional causes of the dis∣coveries we make in any subject whatsoever: But these truths I must explain more at length in the Second Part of this Discourse.

THE SECOND PART. Of the Grace of the Creator.

XXXII.

I Know but two Principles which determine di∣rectly, and by themselves, the motions of our Love, Knowledge, and Pleasure: Knowledge, by which we discern different goods, Pleasure, by which we taste them. But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure. Knowledge leaves us altogether to our selves, it makes no at∣tempt upon our liberty, it does not force us to love any thing, it does not produce in us a na∣tural or necessary love; it only puts us in a con∣dition of determining our selves, and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of

choice, or which is the same thing, of fixing the general impression of Love which God continual∣ly gives us upon particular goods. But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will, it transports it, as I may say, towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it; it produces in us a natural and necessary love; it diminishes our liberty, di∣stracts our reason, and does not leave us whol∣ly to our selves: A small attention to our in∣ward sentiments may convince of these differences.

XXXIII.

Thus Man before sin, having a perfect free∣dom, and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the moti∣ons of his Love; and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable, it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation, (as I have already said) nor by o∣ther Graces of Sentiment, which might have di∣minished his merit, and have engaged him to have loved by instinct, that good which ought to be loved only by Reason. But since sin, besides Knowledge, the Grace of sentiment has been ne∣cessary, that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence. For Man invincibly desiring to be happy, it is impossible he should continually sacri∣fice his Pleasure to his Knowledge; his Pleasure which renders him actually happy, & which subsists in himself (notwithstanding he never so much re∣sists it) to his knowledge which subsists not, but by a troublesome application of mind, which the least actual pleasure distracts; & which lastly, doth not promise actual happiness till after death; which to the imagination, seems to be a real Annihilation.

XXXIV.

Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man, for guiding him in the search after that which is good: It is the Effect of natural order: It supposes nei∣ther the Corruption, nor the Restoration of Na∣ture. But Pleasure which draws us to true happi∣ness is pure Grace; for naturally what is truly good, ought only to be loved by reason. Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace: But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature, because it is the Grace of the Creator. Let us endeavour to find out these causes.

XXXV.

In the order established by Nature, I only see two occasional causes, which distribute knowledge to Spirits, and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator. The one in us, which in some sort depends upon us; the other, which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us. The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills. The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind, in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body.

XXXVI.

The inward sentiment which we have of our selves, teaches us that our desires produce or ex∣cite knowledge in us, and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us; for all who apply themselves to truth, discover it proportionably to their attention. And if our prayer was not interrup∣ted,

if our attention was not disturbed, if we had any Idea of what we ask, and if we asked it with necessary perseverance, we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive. But our prayers are continually interrupted, if they be not preingaged [by pleasure.] Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas; and tho the truth we consult answers our request, yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers, or causes us presently to forget them.

XXXVII.

If it be considered, that Man before sin was animated with Charity, that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righte∣ousness, and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward; it may easily be apprehended, that the various de∣sires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes of the knowledge communicated to his mind: Otherwise, his distraction would not have been Voluntary, nor his attention Meritorious. Now Nature, although corrupted, is not destroy∣ed; God has not ceased to will that which he once willed, the same Laws still remain. Thus our different wills are still at this day the occasi∣onal or natural causes of the presence of Ideas to our minds. * 1.31 But because the union of the Soul with the Body is changed into a dependance by the natural consequence of sin, and the immutability of the will of God, as I have * elsewhere explain∣ed, our Bodies at present disturb our Ideas, and speaking so loudly in behalf of the goods which respect them, that the mind rarely asks,

and distractedly hears the inward TRUTH.

XXXVIII.

Experience further teaches us every moment, that our conversation with knowing Persons, is capable of instructing by exciting our attention; that Sermons, reading, converse, and many such like occasions, may raise in us good sentiments. The death of a friend doubtless is able to make us think of Death, if some great passion does not wholly imploy us. And when an able Preacher undertakes to demonstrate a very plain truth, and convince others of it, it must be granted that he may perswade his Auditors thereof, and even move their Conscience, excite their hope and fear, and such like passions in them, which disposes them less to resist the efficacy of the Grace of J. C. Men being made to live in society one with an∣other, it was necessary that they might mutual∣ly communicate their thoughts and motions. It was needful that they should be united by the Mind as well as the Body, and that speaking by the Voice to the Ears, and by writeing to the Eyes, they should communicate knowledge and understanding to attentive minds.

XXXIX.

Now Knowledge, what way soever it is pro∣duced in us, whether by our particular desires, or whether some accidents be the occasion there∣of, it may be called Grace, especially when it very much concerns our salvation, tho it should only be a consequence of the order of Nature; because since sin, God owes us nothing, and all the good we have, is only what J. C. has merited for us. For even our very Being subsists not but by

J. C. But this kind of Grace, tho merited by J. C. is not the Grace of J. C. 'Tis the Grace of the Creator; because J. C. not being ordina∣rily the occasional cause thereof, the cause of it must be sought for in the order of Nature.

XL.

There are a great many natural effects, which may reasonably be accounted Graces. For ex∣ample, two Persons at the same time have very different desires of Curiosity. The one would go to an Opera, & the other hear a fam'd Preach∣er. If they satisfie their curiosity, he who shall go to the Opera will find such objects, as consider∣ing the present disposition of his mind, will ex∣cite in him passions which will ruine him. The other on the contrary, may find in the Preacher so much clearness and strength, that the Grace of Conversion being given at this moment, may be very efficacious in him. This being supposed, a shower of rain or some other accident interveens, which keeps them at home; this rain doubtless is a natural effect, since it depends upon the natu∣ral Laws of the communication of motions. Ne∣vertheless, it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Ruine it prevents, and a Punishment to him, whose Conversion it hin∣ders.

XLI.

Grace being joyned with Nature, all the mo∣tions of our Souls and of our Bodies, have some relation to our Salvation. Such a man is saved for having, whilst he was in the state of Grace, made a step which happily caused him to break his neck. And is damn'd for having, at some

time, unluckily escaped the ruines of an house rea∣dy to fall. We know not what is beneficial for us, but we very well know nothing is so indiffe∣rent in its self, but that it has some relation to our salvation, by reason of the mixture & com∣bination of the effects which depend on the ge∣neral Laws of Nature with those of Grace.

XLII.

Since then Knowledge discovers the true good, the means of obtaining it, our duty towards God, in a word, the ways which we ought to follow; since it is sufficient also for those who are ani∣mated with charity to make them act well, me∣rit new Graces, vanquish certain temptations, as I shall elsewhere Explain; I think it may very deservedly be called by the name of Grace, tho J. C. be only the meritorious cause of it.

And since the outward Graces which act not immediately upon the mind, nevertheless enter into the order of predestination of Saints, I al∣so look upon them as true Graces. In a word, I think the name of Grace may be given to all natural effects, when they relate to salvation, when they are subservient to the Grace of J. C. and remove some impediments of its efficacy. Never∣theless, if any deny this, I have no design to dis∣pute upon words.

XLIII.

All these sorts of Graces, if we will allow un∣to them this name, being Graces of the Creator, the general Laws of these Graces, are the gene∣ral Laws of Nature. For it must be observed, that sin hath not destroyed nature, tho it has corrupted it; the general Laws of the communi∣cation

of motions are always the same, and those of the union of soul and body are not changed, excepting in this only, that what was but a uni∣on in respect of the mind, is changed into a de∣pendance, for reasons I have mentioned elsewhere. For at present we depend upon Bodies, to which by the institution of Nature we were only uni∣ted.

XLIV.

Now the Laws of Nature are always very sim∣ple and very general. For God acts not by par∣ticular wills, except when order requires a Mi∣racle. I have sufficiently proved this truth in the first discourse. Thus, when a stone falls upon the Head of a good man and kills him, it falls in consequence of the Laws of motions; this hap∣pens not, because God is just, and would by a par∣ticular will reward him: When a like accident knocks out the brains of a sinner, this is not be∣cause God would actually punish him. For God on the contrary, would save all men, but it becomes him not to change the simplicity of his Laws to suspend the punishment of a Criminal. In like manner, when knowledge is conveyed to the mind, it is because we have desires which are the occasional causes thereof; 'tis because we hear some knowing Person, and because our brain is suppo∣sed to receive the impressions of him that speaks. 'Tis not because God has any particular will in respect of us, but because he follows the general Laws of Nature which he has prescribed to him∣self. I see nothing mysterious in the distributi∣on of these kinds of Graces, and I shall not stand to draw the consequences which may be inferred from these Truths.

XLV.

It must be observed that J. C. who alone is the meritorious cause of the good things which God gives us according to the order of Nature, is sometimes the occasional cause of knowledge as well as of sentiment. Nevertheless I believe that this is very rare, because in truth it is not necessary. J. C. as much as is possible makes Na∣ture, serve Grace. For, besides that Reason teaches us, that order requires this, as being the most sim∣ple way; this sufficiently appears by his manage∣ment upon Earth, and by that order which he has founded, and still preserves in his Church. J. C. made use of preaching the Word for to en∣lighten the World, and sent forth his Disciples two by two to prepare the people to receive him. * 1.32 He hath appointed Apostles, Prophets, Evange∣lists, Doctours, Bishops, Priests, for the Edifica∣tion of the Church. Is not this to make Nature serviceable to Grace, and to communicate the knowledge of Faith to the minds of Men by the most simple and natural ways. In truth, it did not become J. C. upon Earth to enlighten Men by particular wills, since he might instruct them as inward Truth and eternal Wisdom, by the most simple and most fruitful Laws of Nature.

XLVI.

That which seems most dark in the order which God hath observed in founding his Church, is doubt∣less the times, the place, and other circumstances of the Incarnation of his Son, and the preaching of the Gospel. For why should J. C. for whom the world was created, be made man 4000. years after its creation? Why should he be born a∣mong

the Jews who was to reprove this misera∣ble Nation? Why chosen to be the Son of Da∣vid, when the House of David was fall'n from its Glory; and not the Son of any of the Emperours, who commanded all the Earth, since he came to convert and enlighten all the World? Why did he chuse low, mean, and ignorant persons for his Apostles and Disciples; Preach to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida and Corazin, who were resolved to continue in their incredulity, and pass by Tyre and Zidon, who would have been converted if they had had the same favour: Hinder St. Paul from Preaching the word of God in Asia, and com∣mand him to pass into Macedonia? These, and a thousand other circumstances which attended the preaching of the Gospel, doubtless are My∣steries, whereof 'tis not possible to give clear and evident reasons, neither is this my design. I would only lay down some principles, which may give some light to these and such like difficulties, or at least make it appear, that from them nothing can be concluded against, what I have hitherto said concerning the Order of Nature and of Grace.

XLVII.

It is certain that natural effects are combined and mixed after infinite ways with the effects of Grace. And that the order of Nature encreases or lessens the efficacy of the effects of the order of Grace, according to the different manners by which these two orders are mixed one with ano∣ther. The Death, which according to the gene∣ral Laws of Nature, sometimes happens to a good or evil Prince, to a good or an evil Bishop, cau∣ses

a great deal of good or evil to the Church; because such like accidents make great change in the consequence of effects which depend upon the order of Grace. Now God would save all men by the most simple ways. Therefore it may, and it ought to be said in general, that he hath chosen the times, the place, the manners, which in succession of time, and according to the ge∣neral Laws of Nature and Grace, will (caeteris paribus) cause the greatest number of the Pre∣destinated to enter into the Church. God does all for his Glory. Therefore, amongst all the pos∣sible combinations of Nature with Grace, he by the infinite extension of his knowledge, has cho∣sen that, which must make the Church most per∣fect, and most worthy of his Majesty and Wis∣dom.

XLVIII.

It seems to me, this already suffices to answer all difficulties relating to the circumstances of our Mysteries. For if it be said that J. C. ought to have been born of a Roman Emperour, and have wrought Miracles in the Capital City of the World, that so the Gospel might have been more easily spread in the farthest distant Countries; to this it may be answered boldly, that whatsoever men think thereof, this combination of Nature with Grace, would not have been so worthy of the Wisdom of God as that which he hath chosen.

I grant, that Religion would thus at first have been spread with more ease; but its establishment would not have been so divine and so extraor∣dinary, and consequently not such an invincible proof of its solidity and certainty. Thus, accor∣ding

to this combination, Religion perhaps would have been at present either destroyed, or less spread in the World. Moreover, when it is said that God acts by the most simple ways, an equality is always supposed in all things else, especially in the glory which must redound to God by his Work. Now the Church would not have been so perfect, nor so worthy of the greatness and holiness of God, if it had been form'd with so much ease. For the Beauty of the Heavenly Je∣rusalem, consisting in the different rewards due to the different combate of Christians, it was expe∣dient that the Martyrs should shed their Blood as well as J. C. to enter into the glory which they possess. In a word, this principle, that amongst all the infinite combinations of the orders of Na∣ture and Grace, God has chosen that which would produce an effect most worthy of his Majesty and Wisdom, is sufficient in general to answer all the difficulties which may be made concerning the cir∣cumstances of our Mysteries. In like manner, to justify the orders of Nature and Grace in them∣selves, its enough to know, that God being in∣finitely Wise, he does not form his designs, but upon the admirable relation of Wisdom and fruit∣fulness, which he sees in the ways capable to ex∣ecute them; as I have already shewn in the first Discourse.

XLIX.

Since the generality of men judge of God by themselves, they imagine that he first resolves upon a design, and afterwards consults his Wis∣dom how to bring it to effect; for our wills e∣very moment go before our reason, so that our de∣signs

are scarce ever perfectly reasonable. For God does not act as Men do. Behold how he acts, if I have well consulted the idea of an infinitely perfect being. God, by the infinite knowledge of his wis∣dom, and in the same wisdom, sees all possible works, and at the same time all ways of producing each of them. He sees all the relation of the means to their ends; he compares all things by an eternal, immu∣table, necessary foresight, and by the comparison which he makes of relations of the wisdom and fruitfulness which he discovers betwixt his designs and the ways of executing them, he freely forms the design. But the design being resolved upon, he necessarily chuses those general ways which are most worthy of his wisdom, greatness, and good∣ness: for since he does not resolve upon any thing, but by the knowledge he has of the ways of execu∣ting it, the choice of the design contains the choice of the ways.

L.

When I say, that God freely forms his de∣sign, I do not mean as if he cou'd chuse another which is less, and reject that which is more wor∣thy of his wisdom; for supposing that God will make any outward work worthy of himself, he is not indifferent in his choice: he must produce that which is the most perfect in respect of the simpli∣city of the ways by which he acts: he owes this to himself, to follow the rules of his wisdom: he must always act after the most wise and perfect manner. But, I say, God freely takes up his reso∣lution, because he invincibly and necessarily loves nothing but his own substance. Neither the Incar∣nation of the Word, much less the Creation of

the World, are necessary Emanations of his Na∣ture. God is altogether sufficient to himself. For a Being infinitely perfect may be conceiv'd alone, without having a necessary relation to his Crea∣tures.

LI.

Since God necessarily loves himself, he also ne∣cessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom. But seeing the Creatures make no part of his Being, he is so self-sufficient as that nothing can oblige him to produce them: he is very indifferent or free in respect of them. And it is upon this ac∣count that he made the World in time; for this circumstance makes it evident, that the Creatures are not necessary Emanations of the Divinity, but do essentially depend upon the Free-will of a Crea∣tor.

LII.

Nevertheless, behold an Objection which at first does surprize the mind: If it be true, That God necessary follows the Rules of his Wisdom, the World wou'd not have been created in time. For either the World is worthy, or unworthy of God. If it was better the World shou'd have been brought out of nothing, it ought to have been eter∣nal; if better it shou'd have remain'd in nothing, it ought not to have been made at all. God there∣fore is not obliged to follow the Rules this Wisdom prescribes, seeing the World was created in time. But the Answer to this Objection is not difficult: It is better the World shou'd be, than not: but it is better it shou'd not have been at all, than be eternal. The Creature must carry in it the essen∣tial mark of its dependance: If Spirits had been

eternal, they might have had some reason to have look'd upon themselves as Gods, or necessary Be∣ings; or at least capable to contribute something to the greatness and happiness of God, imagining that he cou'd not but have made them: they might likewise in some sort have compar'd themselves to the Divine Persons, thinking they were, like them, produc'd by a necessary emanation. Thus God was oblig'd, according to the Rules of his Wis∣dom, to leave unto the Creatures the character of their dependance: assuring them, nevertheless, that he has not made them to annihilate them, and that being constant to his designs, as his infinite Wisdom requires, they shall subsist eternally.

LIII.

This Difficulty may be further urg'd, after this manner: God necessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom; he necessarily does what is the best. Now, it was better at least, that the World shou'd have been created in time, than that it shou'd not have been created at all. Certainly it was expe∣dient, according to the Rules of Divine Wisdom, that the World shou'd have been produced with those circumstances according to which God had made it. Therefore the Creation of the World in time is absolutely necessary, God is not at all free in this respect, he cou'd not but have made it.

To resolve this Difficulty it ought to be obser∣ved, That tho' God follows the Rules which his Wisdom prescribes unto him, yet he doth not ne∣cessarily do that which is best, because he might do nothing: To act and not exactly to follow the Rules of Wisdom, is a defect. Thus, supposing

that God will act, he necessarily acts after the wi∣fest manner that can be. But, to be free in the production of the World, is a mark of abundance of fulness, and self-sufficiency. It is better the World shou'd be, than not be: the Incarnation of J. C. renders the Work of God worthy of its Author: This I grant. But seeing God is essen∣tially happy and perfect, seeing nothing but him∣self can be good, in relation unto him, or the cause of his perfection and happiness, he invinsibly loves only his own substance; and all that is without him, must indeed be made by an eternal and immu∣table action; but which has no other necessity, but upon supposition of the Divine Decrees.

See yet another Principle, of which I have al∣ready spoken, which may give some light to the Difficulties which may be made about the Circum∣stances of the Incarnation of J. C. and the Creation of the World.

LIV.

Reason and the Authority of the H. Books, teach us, that the first and principal of God's De∣signs is, the Establishment of his Church in J. C. The present World is not created to continue such as it is. The Lies and Errours, the Unrighteousness and Disorders which we see, sufficiently shew it must have an end. The future World, where Truth and Righteousness inhabit, is that Land whose Foundations cannot be shaken; and which, being the external Object of the Divine Love, shall subsist eternally. God has not created this visible World, but by little and little, to form thereof that invisible City of which S. John tells us so ma∣ny Wonders. And seeing J. C. shall be the chief

Beauty thereof, God always has had J. C. in view in the production of his Work. He hath made all for Man, and with respect to Man, * 1.33 as the Scripture teacheth us: but this Man, for whom God has made all, is, according to S. Paul, J. C. 'Tis to teach Men, that they are created, that they do not subsist, but in J. C. 'tis to bind them closely to J. C. 'tis to engage them to become like unto him, that God has represented J. C. and his Church in the chiefest of his Creatures. For it was neces∣sary God shou'd find J. C. in all his Work, that this Work might be the object of his Love and worthy of the Action by which it is produc'd.

LV.

If the manner after which the H. Scripture re∣lates the Creation of the first Man be considered, how his Wife was form'd of his Flesh and Bone, the Love he had for her, and even the Circum∣stances of their Sin, it will doubtless be granted, that God thought of the second Adam when he made the first: that he considered the Father of the World to come, when he created the Father of the present; and that he intended to make the first Man and the first Woman express Figures of J. C. and his Church. S. Paul suffers us not to doubt of this truth, when he assures us, that we are made of the Bone and Flesh of J. C. and that we are his Members, and that the Marriage of Adam and Eve was the Figure of J. C. and his Church.

LVI.

God might have form'd Men and Animals by ways as simple as the ordinary Generation is: But seeing this way figured J. C. and his Church; since,

it bore the Character of the Chief of God's De∣signs; since, it represented, as I may say, the well-beloved Son of his Father, that Son by whom the whole Creation subsists: God was obliged to pre∣fer it before all others, whereby to teach us, that as intelligible Beauties consist only in the relation they have to eternal Wisdom, so sensible Beauties must in some manner, much unknown to us, have some relation to the Truth incarnate.

LVII.

Doubtless there are many relations between the principal Creatures and J. C. who is their model and end. For all is full of J. C. all expresses and fi∣gures him, as far as the simplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit them: but I dare not enter in∣to the particulars of this. For, besides that I am afraid of deceiving my self, and that I don't suffi∣ciently know either Nature or Grace, the present or the future World, to discover the relations thereof: I am sensible, that Mens Imaginations are so witty and delicate, that one cannot, by Rea∣son, lead them to God, much less to J. C. without tyring them, and exciting their railery. The great∣est part of Christians are accustom'd to a Philoso∣phy, which rather loves to shelter its self in ficti∣ons as extravagant as those of the Poets, than have recourse to God: and some are so little acquaint∣ed with J. C. that a Man shou'd pass with them for a visionary, if he shou'd say the same things with S. Paul and not quote his words: For 'tis rather this great Name, than the Sight of the Truth, which engages them. The Authority of the Scripture hin∣ders them from blaspheming against that which they are ignorant of: but seeing they think but

little of it, they can't thereby be much enlight∣ned.

LVIII.

It is certain the Jews were a figure of the Church, and the most holy and famous amongst the Kings, Prophets and Patriarchs of this People, did repre∣sent the true Messias, our Saviour J. C. This truth can't be denied without undermining the Founda∣tions of Christian Religion, and making the most learned of the Apostles pass for the most igno∣rant of Men. J. C. not being yet come, it was necessary he shou'd at least be prefigured. He ought to be expected, he ought to be desired, he ought to disperse, by his Figures, some sort of Beauty in the World, to make it pleasing to his Father. Thus it was necessary he shou'd have been in some sense as ancient as the World; it was necessary he shou'd die presently after Sin in the person of A∣bel: Agnus occisus ab origine Mundi, principium & finis, Alpha & Omega, heri & hodie est, erat, ven∣turus est. These are the Qualifications which S. John gives to the Saviour of Men.

LIX.

Now, supposing that J. C. ought to be presigu∣red, it was expedient he shou'd chiefly be so by his Ancestors: and that their History, dictated by the H. Spirit, shou'd in all times be preserv'd, to the end that J. C. may still be compar'd with his Figures, and acknowledg'd as the true Mes∣sias. Of all the Nations of the Earth, God lo∣ving that best which had most relation with his Son, the Jews were to have been the Ancestors of J. C. according to the flesh, and to have received this favour of God, since they were the most

lively and most express Representations of his Son.

LX.

But, if this Difficulty be further urg'd, so as to demand a reason of the choice which God made of the Jews to be the principal Figures of J. C. I think I may and ought to affirm, first, That God, always acting by the most simple ways, and disco∣vering in the infinite Treasures of his Wisdom, all the possible Combinations of Nature with Grace, chose that which wou'd make the Church most ample, most perfect, and most worthy of his Ma∣jesty and Holiness, as I have already said. In the second place, I think I ought to answer, That God foreseeing what wou'd happen to the Jews, by a necessary consequence of natural Laws, had more relation to the design which he had of re∣presenting J. C. and his Church, than any thing which cou'd happen to any other Nation; it was expedient that he shou'd chuse this People rather than any other. For, in conclusion, the predesti∣nation to the Law is not like the predestination to Grace; and tho' there is nothing in Nature which may oblige God to dispense his Grace equally to all People; it seems to me, that Nature might me∣rit the Law, in the sence wherein I here under∣stand it.

LXI.

It is true, that all that happen'd to the Jews, who represented J. C. was not a necessary conse∣quence of the order of Nature; Miracles were necessary to render them the lively and express Images of the Church, but Nature must have fur∣nish'd the Fund and the Matter, and perhaps the

principal Stroaks in several things; Miracles fi∣nish'd the rest. But no other Nation wou'd have been so proper for so just and high a Design.

LXII.

It appears to me, that we are oblig'd to think, that God's Wisdom, foreseeing all the Consequen∣ces of all the possible Orders, and all their Combi∣nations, never works Miracles when Nature suf∣fices: and that thus, he was oblig'd to chuse the Combination of Natural Effects, which, saving him, as I may say, the expence of Miracles, might nevertheless very faithfully execute his Intentions.

For example, 'Tis necessary that all Sins shou'd be punish'd; but not always in this World. Sup∣posing, nevertheless, that it was expedient for the glory of J. C. and the establishment of Religion, that the Jews shou'd be punish'd in the face of the whole Earth, for putting to death the Saviour of the World: it was convenient that J. C. came into the World towards the end of Herod's Reign; supposing, that according to the necessary conse∣quence of the Order of Nature, that People shou'd be divided amongst themselves about that time; that Civil Wars and continual Seditions shou'd weaken them; and that, lastly, the Romans shou'd destroy and scatter them abroad, after the total destruction of their City and Temple.

It is true, there seems to have been something extraordinary in the desolation of the Jews. But, since it argues more Wisdom in God to produce such surprising Effects, by the most simple and ge∣neral Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills; I know not whether, on this occasion, we ought to have recourse to a Miracle. For my part, I don't

dispute of it here: this is a thing which is not ea∣sie, nor indeed very necessary to be cleared. I give this Example, for to make some application of my Principles and to make them the better un∣derstood.

It seems to me, that what I have hitherto said, of Nature and Grace, is sufficient to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons, concerning an infinite number of Difficulties, which disturb the Minds of those only who judge of God by them∣selves. For if we do faithfully consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, of a general Cause, of an infinite Wisdom; and if the Principles I have establish'd of this Idea be granted, I believe none will be surprized or offended with God's Con∣duct, and that instead of condemning or mur∣muring at it, Men will not forbear to admire and adore it.

The Third Discourse. Of Grace, and the Manner by which it Acts in us.

The First Part. Of Liberty.

I.

THere is nothing more uncomely, than the substance of Spirits, if they are sepa∣rated from God: For what is a Mind without Understanding and Reason, without Motion and Love? In the mean time the Word and Wisdom of God is the Universal Reason of Spirits; it is the Love by which God loves himself, which gives to the Soul all the motion that it has towards happiness: The Mind cannot know the Truth, but by its natural and necessary union with Truth its self; it cannot be reasonable, but by reason: in short, it cannot, in some sence, be a Mind and Understanding, but because its Substance is enlightned, penetra∣ted

and perfected by the Light of God him∣self.

I have elsewhere explain'd these Truths. * 1.34 As the substance of the Soul is not capable of loving that which is good, but by its natural and necessary union with the eternal and substantial Love of the Soveraign Good; so it moves not towards that which is good, but so far forth as God carries it: it is not Will, but by the motion which God conti∣nually imprints upon it; it lives not, but by chari∣ty; it wills not, but by the love of good, which God imparts unto it, tho' it abuses it. For in truth, as God neither makes nor preserves Minds, but for himself, so he carries them towards him∣self as long as he preserves their being: he com∣municates the love of happiness to them, as far as they are capable. Now this natural and con∣tinual motion of the Soul towards good in gene∣ral, towards good undetermined, that is, towards God, is that which I here call the Will; because it is this motion which makes the Soul capable of loving different goods.

II.

This natural motion of the Soul towards good in general is invincible; for it is not in our power to chuse not to be happy. We necessarily love that we clearly know, and sensibly feel to be the true good. All minds love God by the necessity of their nature: and if they love any thing but God by the free choice of the will, it is not because they do not seek after God, or the cause of their hap∣piness, but because having a confused sence, that Bodies about them make them happy, they look upon them as their Goods, and by a natural and

ordinary consequence, love them, and unite them∣selves to them.

III.

But the love of all these particular goods, is not naturally invincible. Man, considered as God made him, may hinder himself from loving those goods which do not fill the whole capacity he has of loving. Seeing there is a good which contains all others, Man may sacrifice to the love of this good all other loves; for God having made minds for himself, he cannot engage them invincibly to love any thing but himself, or with relation to himself. The inward sentiment which we have of our selves, teaches us, that we may, for exam∣ple, refuse any fruit, tho we are inclin'd to receive it. Now this power of loving, or not loving particular goods, this non-invincibility, which is in that motion, which carries the minds to love that which does not seem to them to contain all goods; this power, this non-invincibility, is that which I call liberty. Thus, by putting the definition in the place of the thing defin'd, this expression, Our will is free, signifies, that the natural motion of our Soul towards good in general, is not invincible, in respect of any particular good. We do also to this word free, joyn the Idea of voluntary: but hereafter I shall take this word in the sense which I have observ'd, because this is most natural and most ordinary.

IV.

The word good is equivocal, it may signifie ei∣ther pleasure which makes Men formally happy, or else the true or apparent cause of pleasure.

I shall in this Discourse always take the word good in the second sense; because in truth plea∣sure is imprinted upon the Soul, to the end that she may love the cause of her happiness, that by the motion of her love she may be carried to∣wards it, and be straitly united thereunto, and so be continually happy. When the Soul loves no∣thing but her pleasure, she truly loves nothing but her self: for pleasure is only a condition or mo∣dification of the Soul which renders her actually happy. Now, since the Soul cannot be to her self the cause of her happiness, she is unjust, she is un∣grateful, she is blind, if she loves her pleasure, without paying that love and respect which is due to the true cause which produces it in her. Since there is none but God, who can immediately and by himself act upon the Soul, and make her feel pleasure by the actual efficacy of his Almighty Will, there is none but he who can be truly good. Nevertheless, I call the creatures which are the ap∣parent causes of those pleasures which they occasion in us, by the name of goods. For I would not avoid the ordinary way of speaking, but as far as it is necessary clearly to express my self. All the crea∣tures, tho good in themselves and perfect in re∣spect of God's designs, are not good in respect to us, I mean, they are not our good, because they are not the true causes of our pleasure or our hap∣piness.

V.

The natural motion which God continually im∣prints upon the Soul, to engage it to love him, or (to use a term which expresses several Ideas, and which can neither be equivocal nor confused, after

the definition I have given thereof) the will is de∣termined towards particular goods, either by clear and distinct knowledge, or by a confused senti∣ment which shews us these goods. If the mind neither sees nor tastes any particular good, the mo∣tion of the Soul continues, as it were, undeter∣min'd, it tends towards good in general. But this motion receives a particular determination, as soon as the mind has an idea or sentiment of any particular good: for the Soul being incessantly moved towards good indetermin'd, she must be moved as soon as any object seems to be good to her.

VI.

Now, when the good which is present to the Understanding and Senses, does not altogether fill these two faculties; when it appears under the idea of a particular good, which does not contain all goods; and when it is tasted by a sentiment which does not fill all the capacity of the Soul, she must still further desire the sight and enjoyment of some other good; she may suspend the judgment of her love; she need not to rest in the actual en∣joyment, but may by her desires seek after some new object. And seeing her desires are the occa∣sional cause of her knowledge, she may, by the natural and necessary union of all Spirits with him, who contains the ideas of all goods, discover the true good; and in the true good, a great many other particular goods, different from what she saw and tasted before. Thus, being acquainted with the vacuity and vanity of sensible goods at∣tending to the secret reproaches of reason, and to the remorse of her conscience, to the complaints

and threatnings of the true good, who will not that we should sacrifice him to apparent and ima∣ginary goods; she may (by the motion which God imprints continually upon her, after good in ge∣neral, or the soveraign good, that is, towards himself) stop her carrier after any good whatso∣ever. She may resist all sensible perswasives, seek and find other objects; compare them betwixt themselves, and with the indeleble idea of the so∣veraign good; and love none of them with a de∣termined love. And if this soveraign good makes it self to be tasted, she may prefer it to all parti∣cular goods; tho the sweetness which they seem to transfer into the Soul be very great and ve∣ry agreeable. These Truths must be further ex∣plain'd.

VII.

The Soul is carried towards good in general; she desires to possess all goods, and would never confine her love; there is no good which appears so to her, that she refuses to love: Therefore, while she actually enjoys any particular good, she has yet a motion to go further; she still desires some other thing, by the natural and invincible im∣pression God puts into her; and to change or di∣vide her love, it is sufficient to present unto her ano∣ther good, than that which she enjoys, and to make her taste the sweetness of it. Now the Soul may ordinarily seek and discover new goods; she may also come near and enjoy them. For, in short, these desires are the natural or occasional causes of her knowledge. Objects discover themselves to her, and approach unto her proportionally, as she desires to know them. An ambitious per∣son,

who considers the splendour of some dignity, may also think of the slavery, of the constraint, of the real ills which accompany humane great∣ness. He may calculate, weigh and compare all things together, if his passion does not blind him: For, I confess, there are times, when the passions entirely rob the mind of its liberty; and they al∣ways do diminish it. Thus, seeing any dignity how great so ever it may appear, is not accounted by a Man free and reasonable, as the universal and infinite good; and since the will generally reaches to all goods, this Man, who is perfectly free and reasonable, may seek and find others, seeing he may desire them: for 'tis his desires which disco∣ver and present them unto him. He may examine and compare them with that which he enjoys. But because he can meet with none but particular goods upon earth, he may and ought here below continually and without intermission seek and en∣quire; or, rather, that he may not change every moment, he ought generally to neglect all these transient goods, and desire only those which are immutable and eternal.

VIII.

Nevertheless, seeing Men do not love to search, but to enjoy, seeing the labour of examination is at present very troublesome; but rest and enjoy∣ment always very pleasant, the Soul ordinarily stops as soon as she has found any good; she fixes upon it, that she may enjoy it. She deceives her self, because by deceiving her self, and judging that she has found that she seeks, her desire is chang'd into pleasure; and pleasure renders her more happy than desire. But her happiness can∣not

last long. Her pleasure being ill grounded, unjust, and deceitful, it presently troubles and disquiets her, because she would be truly and so∣lidly happy. Thus the natural love of good a∣wakens and produces new desires in her: These confused desires represent new objects. Seeing the Soul loves pleasure, she runs after those which communicate it, or seems to communicate it; and because she loves repose, she takes up with them. She does not at first examine the defects of the pre∣sent good, whilst it prevents her by its sweetness; she considers it rather on the fair side; she applies her self to that which charms her; thinks of no∣thing but enjoying it. And the more she enjoys it, the more she loves it; the nearer she approaches to it, the more she considers it. But now the more she considers it, the more defects she discovers in it: and since she desires to be invincibly happy, she cannot for ever be deceived. When she is hun∣gry, thirsty, and tired with seeking, she present∣ly satiates, and fills her self with the first good she meets; but she presently disgusts the nourishment for which Man was not made. Thus the love of the true good still excites in her new desires after new objects; and being in continual change, all her life and all her happiness upon earth, consists only in a continual circulation of thoughts, desires, and pleasures. Such is the condition of a Soul which makes no use of its liberty, which suffers its self to be lead, at all adventures, by the motion which transports her, and by the fortuitous im∣pression of objects which determine her. This is the condition of one whose mind is so weak, that he always takes false goods for the true; and a

heart so corrupted, that he sells and blindly gives himself up to all that affects him, or the good which makes him actually feel the most sweet and agree∣able pleasures.

IX.

But a Man perfectly free, such as we conceive Adam, immediately after his creation, clearly knows, that God only is his good, or the true cause of the pleasures which he enjoys. Tho he feels sweetness by the approach of objects which are a∣bout him, he does not love them, he only loves God; and if God forbids him to unite himself to bodies, he is ready to forsake what pleasure so ever he finds therein. He will not take up, but in the enjoyment of the soveraign good: to him he will sacrifice all others; and how much so ever he desires to be happy, or to enjoy pleasures, no plea∣sure is too strong for his knowledge. Not but that pleasures may blind him and disturb his reason, and fill the capacity which he has of thinking: for the mind being finite, all pleasure may distract and divide it. But the reason is, because (tho plea∣sures be under the Command of his Will) he was not cautious to keep himself from being in∣toxicated therewith: because the only invincible pleasure is that of the blessed, or that which the first Man would have found in God, if God would have prevented or hindred his fall; not only be∣cause this pleasure fills all the faculties of the Soul, without troubling Reason or engaging it in the love of false goods; but also nothing opposes the enjoyment of this pleasure, neither the desire of perfection, nor that of happiness. For whilst we love God, we are perfect; whilst we love him, we

are happy; and when we love him with pleasure, we are perfect and happy both together. Thus the most perfect liberty is that of minds, to which no motion towards particular goods is ever invin∣cible; it is that of Man before sin, before concu∣piscence had disturbed his understanding and cor∣rupted his heart. And the most imperfect liber∣ty is that of a mind, to which every motion, af∣ter any particular good, how little so ever it ap∣pears, is always and in all circumstances invin∣cible.

X.

Now, betwixt these two sorts of liberty, there are infinite degrees more or less perfect, which is not commonly observed. Men ordinarily imagine, that liberty is equal in all Men, and that it is a faculty essential to their minds, the nature of which continues always the same, tho its action varies according to the different objects: Men, who don't reflect, suppose a perfect equality in all things where they do not sensibly observe an ine∣quality. They comfort and excuse themselves from all application, by giving to all things an abstract∣ed form, whose essence consists in a kind of indi∣visibility. But they deceive themselves: liberty is not such a faculty as they imagine. There are no two persons equally free, in respect of the same ob∣jects. Children are less than Men, who have the full use of their reason; and there are no two Men who have their reason equally firm and assured in respect of the same objects. They who have violent passions, and are not accustomed to resist them, are less free than they who have generously opposed them and are naturally moderate: There

are no two Men equally moderate, equally sensible, as to the same objects, and who have equally con∣tended for the preservation of their liberty. There are also persons so enslav'd to sin, that they do less resist, and less think of resisting whilst they are awake, than good Men do whilst they sleep: for, according to the Word of Truth, He that commits sin, is the servant of sin.

XI.

It is true, according to the institution of nature, all Men are equally free: for God does not invin∣cibly engage minds to love any particular good. But concupiscence corrupts the heart and reason: and Man, having lost the power of obliterating the traces of sensible pleasures, and stopping the motions of his concupiscence, this liberty, equal in all Men, if they had not sinned, is become un∣equal, according to the different degrees of their knowledge, and their concupiscence which diffe∣rently acts in them. For even concupiscence its self, which is equal in all Men, as they have lost the power which they had over their bodies, is unequal a thousand ways, by reason of the diver∣sity which is to be found in the conformation of their bodies, in the multitude and motion of the animal spirits, and in the almost infinite relations and connexions which are made, by their concerns in the World.

XII.

Still further, to discern more distinctly the ine∣quality which is to be found in different persons, it must be observed, that any Man who is perfectly reasonable and free, and who would be truly hap∣py, may and ought, when any pleasant object pre∣sents

its self, suspend his love, and carefully exa∣mine whether this object be the true good, or whe∣ther the motion which carries him after it, do exactly agree with that which carries after the true good. Otherwise he would love by instinct, and not by reason; and if he could not suspend the judgment of his love before he had examined it, he would not be perfectly free. But if he should clearly see, that this pleasant object should be tru∣ly good for him; and if this evidence joyn'd to the sentiment be such, that he could not suspend his judgment, then tho perfectly free, yet he is not so in respect of this good; he invincibly loves it, because pleasure and knowledge do agree in re∣commending it: But since there is none but God who can act in us, or be our good, since the mo∣tion which thrusts us forward towards the crea∣tures, does not agree with that which carries us towards God: any Man, who is perfectly reason∣able and free, may hinder himself from judging that sensible objects are goods: he may and ought to suspend the judgment which governs, or ought to govern his love; for he can never evidently see that sensible goods are true goods, because he can never evidently see that which is not.

XIII.

This power of suspending the judgment, which actually governs the love; this power which is the principle of our liberty, and by which it is that pleasures are not invincible, is much lessened since sin, tho not altogether annihilated. And that we may have this power, when any object tempts us, it is necessary, besides some love of order, to have presence of mind, or be sensible of remorse of

conscience; for a Child, or a Man asleep, has not actually this power. But all Men are not equally inlightned; the minds of sinners are full of dark∣ness. Consciences are not equally tender; the heart of sinners is hardened. The love of order and actual graces are unequal in all Men. There∣fore all Men are not equally free: they have not an equal power of suspending their judgment; plea∣sure determines, and carries them towards some objects, rather than others. Such an one can su∣spend his judgment, or stop his consent, tho the present object may make him feel a very lively and sensible pleasure: And another has so little a mind, and a heart so corrupted, that, to him the least pleasure is invincible, the least affliction insupport∣able. Not being accustomed to withstand sensible invitations, his disposition is such, that he'll not so much as think of resisting them. So that, at this time, he has no power of suspending his consent; seeing he has not so much as the power of re∣flecting thereon: In respect of this object, he's like a Man that is asleep, or one who has lost his mind.

XIV.

The weaker reason is, the more sensible the Soul becomes, and judges more rashly and falsly of sensible goods or evils. When a Man is in a slumber, if a straw or feather doth but tickle him, he instantly awakes, as much affrighted, as if a serpent had bitten him. He looks upon this little uneasiness, and judges of it, as one of the greatest afflictions; to him it seems insupportable. His rea∣son being weakened by his slumber, he cannot suspend his judgment; the least goods or evils

are almost always invincible to him. The senses act in him, and they always judge rashly: This must be so for many reasons. When reason is not so weak, little pleasures are not invincible, nor little evils insupportable: we do not always pur∣sue after that wherein we find most pleasure. For there are pleasures so little, that reason despises them; for reason always supposes some love of order: It causes Men to be not so much affrighted at the sight of little evils; to resolve, for exam∣ple, on having a Vein opened, and to endure it; not to judge so rashly, to suspend, to examine; and the stronger reason is, the more it will suspend the judgment, notwithstanding the sensible attra∣ctives and horrours. Now, nothing is more cer∣tain, than that all Men do not equally partake of reason, tho all do partake thereof; that all are not equally sensible, at least, of the same objects; that they are not equally born, educated, assisted by the grace of J. C. and that, upon these accounts, they are not all equally free, or capable, to suspend the judgment of their love, in respect of the same objects.

XV.

Now it ought to be observ'd, that the principal duty of Spirits is, to preserve and encrease their liberty; because it is only by the good use they shall make thereof, that they may merit their hap∣piness, if they be assisted by the grace of J. C. and, at least, lessen their misery, if they be left to themselves. That which diminishes our liberty, or that which makes pleasures with respect to us invincible, is because the light of our reason is clouded; and we have lost the power which we

ought to have over our bodies. Man therefore ought to inform his reason by continual medita∣tions; he ought to consider his duties, that he may fulfil them; and his weaknesses, that he may have recourse unto him who is all our strength. And since we have lost the power of stopping the im∣pressions which are made upon the body by the pre∣sence of objects, and which afterwards corrupt the understanding and heart, we ought to fly these objects; we ought to use that power which we have remaining; we must be continually careful to purisie our imagination, and even labour with all our strength to obliterate the traces which false goods have imprinted thereon; since these traces excite in us such desires as distract our liberty. By this means, a Man, whose liberty is almost anni∣hilated, in respect of whom, all pleasures, how little so ever, are invincible, may acquire such a strength and liberty, that he will not be inferiour to the greatest Souls, assistances being supposed e∣qual. For at the time at least when these pleasures do not solicite to evil, he may seek to avoid them; he may fortifie himself by some reason, which, by proposing future pleasures, may counter balance those which he does not actually enjoy. For as there is no person who has not some love of order, so there's no Man who may not vanquish a weak and light pleasure by a strong solid reason, by a rea∣sonable fear of some evil, or by the hope of greater good. In short, there's none who may not at least, by the ordinary succours of grace, over∣come certain pleasures and avoid others. Now these pleasures, before invincible, or how ever ea∣gerly pursued, being conquered or avoided, a Man

may prepare himself to encounter others, at least before they attempt him. For the sweetness which he tastes after the victory, encourages him to the fight; the joy of a good conscience, and the grace of J. C. give courage; and even the fear of being overcome is not unusal: for it may make him re∣pair to him, in whom we may do all things; it makes us wisely avoid dangerous occasions. Thus, by this exercise, we always gain; for, to conclude, if we be overcome, we thereby become more hum∣ble, more wise, more circumspect, and some times also even more zealous in the fight, and better able to vanquish or resist.

XVI.

As in the study of Sciences, they who do not consent to the false light of probability, and ac∣custom themselves to suspend their judgment till the light of truth shall appear, seldom fall into errour; whereas the common sort of Men are de∣ceived every moment by their rash judgments. In like manner, in the government of Manners, they who use to sacrifice their pleasures to the love of order, and daily mortifie their senses and their passions, especially in things which may appear to be of the least consequence (which all the World may do) will acquire, even in the most important things, a facility of suspending the judgment which governs the love. Pleasure does not surprise them like other Men, or at least does not carry them down the stream, without thinking thereon. On the contrary, when they feel it, it seems to give them notice to take care of themselves, and con∣sult Reason, or the Rules of the Gospel. They have a more tender and delicate Conscience, than

they, who according to the Language of the Scrip∣ture, drink in sin like water: they are sensible of the secret reproaches of reason, and the wholsom ad∣vertisements of inward truth. So that the habit of resisting weak and light pleasures, is some progress towards the vanquishing the more violent, or at least towards the suffering some pain and shame, when a Man is overcome; which, in a short time, will give an horrour and disgust thereof. Thus liberty encreasing by little and little, and perfect∣ed by the use made of it, and the assistance of Grace, may, at last, be able to fulfil even the most difficult Commandments; because by ordinary gra∣ces, which are every moment given to Christians, we may overcome common temptations, we may, in an ordinary way, avoid the greater, and by the assistance of the grace of J. C. there is none which we may not vanquish.

XVII.

It is true, that when the case is so, that a Man is surprised by pleasure, he is not in a condition so much as to think of resisting it; 'tis true, I say, that this Man cannot actually fulfil the Command∣ment, which forbids him to enjoy it, for this plea∣sure is to him invincible.

Thus, supposing this person had this impotence by a natural necessity, his sin not being free, it would make him no more culpable; I mean, no more worthy to be punish'd with grief, than if he had been irregular in his sleep. Likewise, if this impotence should have been the necessary conse∣quence of sins, even freely committed before his conversion, it will not be imputed to him, because of his charity. But since he ought and might re∣sist

pleasure, contend for the preservation and en∣crease of his liberty, have recourse unto him by Prayer, in whom we may do all things; this sin, tho actually committed by a kind of necessity, renders him culpable and worthy to be punish'd; if not upon the account of this sin, yet at least for the negligence, which is the principle of it. The commandment of God is not absolutely impossible; even the sinner himself ought and may, for rea∣sons already mentioned, put himself in a condi∣tion to observe it: because Men ought, and may continually labour to augment and perfect their li∣berty, not only by the assistance of the grace of J. C. but also by their own natural strength, or by the ordinary graces; for, in short, Nature may be made serviceable to Grace a thousand ways.

THE SECOND PART. Of Grace.

XVIII.

THE inequality which is to be found in the liberty of different persons, being clearly un∣derstood, it will not, in my opinion, be difficult to comprehend, how Grace acts in us, if to the word Grace, we joyn clear and particular Ideas; and if

the difference between the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer be observ'd. I have already said, in the foregoing Discourse, that there is this difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure, that Knowledge leaves us intirely to our selves, but Pleasure makes an attempt upon our Liberty: For Knowledge is without us; it does not touch or modifie our Souls; it does not push us on towards the Objects it discovers; it only makes us capable to determine our selves, or to consent, with freedom and reason, to the impres∣sion which God gives us towards Happiness. The knowledge of our Duty, the clear Idea of Or∣der, separated from all sentiment, the dry, ab∣stracted, altogether pure and intelligible sight of good, that is to say, without taste or foretaste, leaves the Soul in a perfect liberty: But Pleasure is in the Soul; it touches and modifies it. Thus it lessens our liberty, it makes us love good rather by the love of Instinct and unaccountable Passion, than by the love of Choice and Reason; it tran∣sports us, as I may say, towards sensible Objects. Nevertheless, this is not to be understood, as if Pleasure was the same thing with Love, or the motion of the Soul to good; but because it pro∣duces it, or determines it towards the object which renders us happy. Since none but those Truths, whereof we have clear Ideas, can be demonstrated, and since we have none such of our inward senti∣ments, it is impossible, that I should demonstrate that which I here maintain, as the consequences which depend upon common Notions, are demon∣strated. Every one therefore must consult the in∣ward sentiment which he has within himself, if

he would be convinc'd of the difference there is betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure; he must also carefully observe, that ordinarily Knowledge is accompanied with Pleasure, from which neverthe∣less it ought to be separated, that we may judge solidly thereof.

XIX.

If then it be true, that Pleasure naturally pro∣duces Love, and that it is as it were a weight, which makes the Soul incline to the good, which causes it or seems to cause it, it is visible, that the Grace of J.C. or the Grace of Sentiment, is efficacious in its self. For tho the preventing dele∣ctation, when it is weak, may not wholly convert the Hearts of those who have very lively Passions, nevertheless it always has its effect, in that it al∣ways carries Men towards God; it is always effica∣cious in some sense, but it has not always all the effect which it might have, because concupiscence opposes it.

XX.

For example, In one of the Scales of a Balance there is a Weight of ten Pounds, and a Weight of six Pounds only in the other; this last Weight truly weighs: for if enough be put therein, or taken out of the other Scale; or, lastly, if the Balance be hung nearer the Scale which has more weight in it, this weight of six Pound will turn the Balance: But tho this Weight weighs, it is plain, that its effect always depends upon the Weights which resist it, and the manner after which they resist it. Thus the Grace of Sentiment is always efficacious in its self, it always lessens the effort of Concupiscence, because Pleasure natu∣rally

excites Love for the cause which produces it, or seems to produce it. But tho this Grace be al∣ways efficacious in its self, it depends, or, rather, its effect depends upon the actual dispositions of him to whom it is given. The Weights of Con∣cupiscence resist it, and sensible Pleasures which tie us to the Creatures, (which seem to produce them in us) hinder the Pleasures of Grace from u∣niting us strictly to him, who is only capable to act in us and render us happy.

XXI.

But it is not the same of the Grace of Know∣ledge, or of the Grace of the Creator. It is not efficacious of its self; it does not transport the Soul; it does not give it any motion; it leaves it freely to its self. But tho it be not efficacious of its self, it fails not to be attended with many ef∣fects, when it is great, and animated with some grace of sentiment, which gives it vigour and strength; or else when it finds no contrary plea∣sure, which do much resist it. This is the diffe∣rence betwixt the Grace of the Creator, and the Grace of the Redeemer; betwixt Knowledge, and Pleasure; betwixt the Grace which doth not sup∣pose Concupiscence, and the Grace which is given to counter-balance the Pleasures of Concupiscence. The one is sufficient to a Man perfectly free and fortified by Charity; the other is efficacious in a weak Man, to whom Pleasure is necessary, that he may be drawn to the love of the true good.

XXII.

But the strength and efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the action of Concu∣piscence, with the light of Reason, and especially

with the degree of Liberty that Person hath to whom it is given. And it ought not to be imagined, that God dispenses it by particular Wills, with a design it should produce in us certain effects and nothing more: For when it is said, that Grace al∣ways produces in the Heart the effect for which God gave it, we are deceived, if we suppose, that God acts, like Men, with particular designs. God dispenses his Grace with a general intention, that it may sanctifie all those who receive it, or as the occasional cause determines him to dispense it; ne∣vertheless, he sees very well, that in some Persons it will not have all the effect it will have in others, not only by reason of the inequality of strength in respect of Grace, but also the inequality of re∣sistance in respect of Concupiscence.

XXIII.

Since Concupiscence has not altogether de∣stroy'd Humane Liberty, the Grace of J.C. as ef∣ficacious as it is, is not absolutely invincible; Sen∣sible Pleasure may be overcome whilst it is weak. The judgment of Love may be suspended when a Man is not hurried along by some violent Pas∣sion; and when he yields to the courtship of this false Pleasure, he is to be blamed for the ill use of his liberty. In like manner the delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible, the good Mo∣tions which it inspires, and which separate us from the false good we love, may be oppos'd. This Grace does not so sill the Soul, as to draw it along towards the true good, without choice, without understanding, without free consent. Thus when a Man resigns himself to its motion, when a Man goes faster, as I may say, than it invincibly

drives, when he sacrifices the pleasures which lessen its efficacy; or, in short, when he acts by rea∣son, or loves the true good as he ought to love it, he then merits by the good use which he makes of his Liberty.

XXIV.

It is true, that the delectation of Grace, consi∣dered in its self, and without respect to the plea∣sures of Concupiscence which are contrary there∣unto, is always invincible; because this Holy Pleasure being agreeable to the light of Reason, nothing can hinder its effect in a Man perfectly free: When the Mind clearly sees by the light of Reason, that God is its happiness, and has a lively sense thereof by the taste of pleasure; it is impossible but that it should love him. For the Mind desires to be happy, and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable motions of its love; it suffers no remorse opposite to its present happiness, and is not restrain'd by plea∣sures contrary to that which it enjoys. The de∣lectation of Grace therefore is not invincible: The love also which it produces is not Merito∣rious, if it be not greater than this delight; I mean, the love which is meerly the natural or necessary effect of the delectation of Grace, has nothing Meritorious in it, tho this love be always good in its self: For he that goes no faster than he is driven, or rather, no further than he re∣ceives present pay for, has no right to be reward∣ed. When a Man loves God no farther than he is drawn, or only because he is drawn, he does not love him by reason, but by instinct; he does not love him as he desires, and ought to be belov∣ed.

But when he loves God by Choice, by Rea∣son, by the Knowledge which he has of his Ami∣ableness, then he Merits: He Merits when he advances, as I may say, towards the true good, after pleasure has only determined the motion of love.

XXV.

This reason alone demonstrates, either that the first Man was not carried to the love of God by the blind instinct of pleasure; or at least, that this pleasure was not so lively as that which he felt from the sight of his natural perfections, or in the actual use of sensible goods: For 'tis evi∣dent, that this pleasure would have rendred him impeccable; this pleasure would have put him in∣to a state like to that of the Blessed, who do no longer Merit; not because they are not now in the Condition of Travellers; (for Spirits always Merit, when they do Actions in themselves Me∣ritorious, and God being just, it is necessary they should be rewarded for them) but they Merit no more, because the pleasure which they find in God is equal to their love, because they are altogether wrap't up in him; and [because] being deliver∣ed from all kind of grief and every motion of Concupiscence, they have no longer any thing to sacrifice to God.

XXVI.

For that which renders a man impeccable, does not altogether make him incapable of Meriting: J.C. was impeccable, yet, nevertheless he Merited his own glory and that of the Church, of which he is the Head. Since he was perfectly free, he loved the Father, not by the instinct of Pleasure,

but by Choice and Reason; he loved him because he saw, by intuition, how lovely he was. For the most perfect Liberty, is, that of a Mind which has all possible Knowledge, and is not determined by any Pleasure: For all Pleasure, preventing or other, naturally produces some love; and if Pleasure be not resisted, it efficaciously determines the motions of the soul towards the agreeable object: But Knowledge, how great soever it be conceived, leaves the mind perfectly free; sup∣posing that this Knowledge be considered singly and without any Pleasure.

XXVII.

Seeing J.C. is nothing but the Word, or Rea∣son Incarnate, certainly he ought not to love the true good with a blind love, with the love of in∣stinct, with the love of sentiment; he ought to love him with reason. He must not love a Be∣ing infinitely Amiable, and which he knows to be perfectly worthy of his love; as Men love those goods which are not Amiable, and which they can∣not know to be worthy of their love: He ought not to love the Father with a love any wise like unto that by which Men love the vilest Creatures, by which they love Bodies. His love, that it may be pure, or at least perfectly Meritorious, shou'd by no means, be produced by preventing Pleasures: For Pleasure, may and ought to be the reward of lawful love, as it really is at pre∣sent in the Saints and in J.C. himself. But it cannot be the principle of Merit; it should not prevent Reason if it be not very much weakned. Now Reason in J.C. was no wise weakned: So∣vereign Reason in him supported Created Rea∣son.

J.C. not being subject to the motions of Concupiscence, he had no need of preventing de∣lectation, to counter-ballance the sensible plea∣sures which surprize us; perhaps he would not taste even the Pleasure of joy, or the Pleasures which naturally follow'd the knowledge which he had of his Virtue and Perfections; to the end, that being deprived of all sorts of Pleasures, his Sacrifice might be more Holy, more Pure, and more dis-interested. Lastly, it may be, besides the privation of all preventing Pleasures and o∣thers, he inwardly suffered those Horrible deser∣tions, which souls filled with Charity, cannot bet∣ter express than by being forsaken of God; ac∣cording to those words of J.C. upon the Cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? But if you will have J.C. to be carried on even by preventing Pleasures, to the love of the Father, it is necessary to say, according to the Principles which I have laid down, either that he loved him with more zeal than he tasted Pleasure; (since natural love, which the instinct of Pleasure pro∣duces is not at all Meritorious) or, at least, that he Merited by the sensible griefs, and by the con∣tinual Sacrifice he freely and voluntarily offered unto God. * 1.35 For it became him to Suffer, that he might enter into his Glory, as the Scripture teaches us.

XXVIII.

If the delectation of Grace, without respect to any contrary Pleasure, infallibly turns the Consent of the Will, the same cannot be said of the Plea∣sures of Concupiscence. These Pleasures consi∣dered in themselves, and without respect to actu∣al

Pleasures, are not always invincible. The light of Reason Condemns them, remorse of Consci∣ence gives us an Horror of them; a Man may ordinarily suspend his Consent. Thus the Grace of J.C. is stronger than Concupiscence: It may be called Victorious Grace, because it is always Master of the Heart, when its Impression is equal to that of Concupiscence. For when the Ballance of our Heart is in Equilibrio, by the equal weights of two contrary Pleasures, the most solid and most reasonable always turns it; because, Knowledge always favours its efficacy, and Remorse of Con∣science opposes the action of False Pleasure.

XXIX.

From all which has been said, it may be con∣cluded, that we always Merit when we love the true-good by Reason; and we do not Merit at all when we love it by Instinct. We always Me∣rit when we love the true good by Reason; be∣cause, Order requires that the true good should be loved after this manner, and because Knowledge alone does not transport or invincibly carry us towards the good which it discovers. We do no wise Merit when we love the true good by Instinct, or so far as Pleasure invincibly tran∣sports or determines the Mind; because, Order requires that the true good, or the good of the Mind, should be loved by Reason, by a Free love, by a love of Choice and Discretion; and, because the love which Pleasure alone produces, is a Blind, Natural and Necessary love. I confess that when a Man goes further than he is carri∣ed by Pleasure, he Merits; but this is because he acts by Reason, and as Order requires he shou'd

act, for that love which he has above the Plea∣sure, is a Pure and a Reasonable love.

XXX.

In like manner it must be Concluded, that a Man always demerits when he loves false goods by the instinct of Pleasure; provided that he loves them more than he is invincibly engaged to love them. For when we have naturally so little Li∣berty and Capacity of Mind, that Pleasure invin∣cibly transports us; tho we be irregular, and our love be bad and against Order, we do not de∣merit: For to demerit, I mean to deserve to be punish'd, a Man must run after false goods with more earnestness, or go farther than Plea∣sure invincibly carrys him. For it must be ob∣served, that there is a great deal of difference, betwixt a Good action and a Meritorious Action, betwixt an irregular action, and an action which deserves to be punished; the love of a Just Per∣son is often irregular in sleep, and yet deserves not to be punished. Whatsoever is conformed to Order, is good, and all that is contrary there∣unto, is bad; but nothing Merits or Demerits, but the good or ill use of Liberty, or that where∣in we have some share. Now a Man makes a good use of his Liberty, when he follows his Know∣ledge, when he goes on, as I may say, freely and of himself towards the true good; whether he be at first determined by the preventing de∣lectation, or by the light of Reason: When he sacrifices sensible Pleasures to his duty, and con∣quers grief by the love of Order. On the con∣trary, he makes an ill use of his Liberty when his Pleasure is his Reason; when he sacrifices his

duty to his passions, his perfection to his present happiness, his love of Order to Self-love; and does all this at the time when he is not really for∣ced thereunto. I shall still explain this more clear∣ly.

XXXI.

When two Objects present themselves to the mind of Man, and he will chuse one of them, I confess that he will never fail to determine him∣self on that side where he shall find most Reason and Pleasure, on that side, where he'll see most good. Since the soul cannot will or love, but by the love of good, (the will being nothing but the love of good, or the natural motion of the soul towards good) she infallibly loves that which has most conformity with that which she loves invinci∣bly. But it is certain, that when sensible Plea∣sures, or some such like thing, does not disturb the Mind, a Man may always suspend the judgment of his love, and not determine himself especially in respect of false goods; for the soul can have no evidence, that false goods are true goods, nor that the love of these false goods does perfectly agree with the motion which carrys us towards the true good. Thus, when a Man loves false goods, at the time when his senses and passions do not altogether disturb his Reason; he deme∣rits, because then he may and ought to suspend the judgment of his love. For if he had staid a while to have examined what he ought to have done, this false good would soon have appeared much the same as it is; Remorse of Conscience, and perhaps even the delectation of Grace, would have changed all the dispositions of his mind and

heart: For the condition of a Traveller has no∣thing fixed, a thousand different objects present themselves continually to his mind, and the life of Man upon Earth is only a continual succession of thoughts and desires.

XXXII.

It seems, at first, that in respect of the true good, Man cannot suspend the judgement of his love; for we cannot suspend our judgment, but when the evidence is not full. Now we cannot but see that it is most evident, that God is the true good, and that also none but he can be good to us; we know that he is infinitely more Ami∣able, than we can comprehend: But it must be observed, that tho we cannot suspend the judg∣ment of our Reason in respect of speculative truths, when the evidence is full; yet we may suspend the judgment of our love, in respect of good, what evidence soever there is in our Ideas.

For, when Sentiments fight against Reason, when Taste opposes Knowledge, when we sensi∣bly find that to be bitter and ungrateful, which Reason clearly represents as sweet and agreeable, we may chuse whether we will follow our Rea∣son or our Senses. We may act, and indeed of∣ten do act, against our Knowledge; because when we attend to Sentiment, Knowledge is lost, if we do not use violence to retain it; and because we ordinarily attend more to Sentiment than to Know∣ledge, because Sentiment is more lively and agree∣able than the most evident Knowledge.

XXXIII.

It is pleasure which makes minds actually hap∣py: Upon this account we ought to enjoy Plea∣sure,

when we love the true good, the mind thinks upon God, if it draws near to him by its love and tastes no other sweetness. On the contra∣ry, God sometimes fills it with bitterness and de∣solation, He forsakes, He rejects it, as I may say, not that it should cease to love him, but rather that its love may be more Humble, more Pure, and more Meritorious: In short, He commands it to do some things which makes it actually Mise∣rable. But if it draws near to Bodies, it finds it self happy, proportionably happy as it is uni∣ted to them; certainly that is a temptation, what Knowledge soever one may have, for we invinci∣bly desire to be happy. So that a Man Merits very much if fixing upon his Knowledge, he de∣nies himself, notwithstanding all uncomfortable desertions; if he sacrifices his actual happiness to the love of the true good, if living by Faith and trusting in the Promises of God, he conti∣nues inviolably true to his duty. It therefore plainly appears that J. C. might Merit his Glo∣ry, tho he most evidently knew the true good; because having a great love for his Father, he intirely submitted himself to his orders, without being carried thereto by preventing Pleasures: Because altogether complying with his Knowledge, he suffered very great Asslictions, and sacrificed all the most lively and sensible Pleasures to the love of God. For he took a Body, as we have, that he might have a * 1.36 victim to offer unto God; and by his Body, as the occasional or natural cause, receiving a great number of divers senti∣ments, he might sacrifice himself as an Holocaust, in Honour of the true good, by suffering afflicti∣ons,

and the privation of sensible Pleasures.

XXXIV.

That I may not leave in some Persons an im∣perfect Idea of the Grace of J. C. I think I ought further to say, that it doth not consist in delec∣tation alone, for all Grace of sentiment is the Grace of J. C. Now of this sort of Grace there are se∣veral kinds, and of each kind infinite degrees. God sometimes gives disgust and bitterness to the ob∣jects of our passions; he weakens their sensible perswasives, or causes us to have an horror of them, and this kind of grace of sentiment has the same effect as delectation. It re-establishes and fortifies our Liberty, it puts us almost in E∣quilibrio, so that by this means we are in a con∣dition of following our Knowledge in the moti∣on of our love. For to put a Ballance in a per∣fect Equilibrio, or to change the inclination, it is not necessary to increase the Weights which are too weak; it is sufficient to take something from those which weigh too much. Thus there are Graces of Sentiment of several kinds, and each kind is capable of infinite degrees; for there are Pleasures, Horrors, and Disgusts, greater and les∣ser to infinity. That which I have hitherto said of delectation, may be easily applyed to other kinds of Graces of Sentiment: I only took plea∣sure or delectation as a particular example that I might explain my self more clearly, and with∣out equivocation. If there be any other princi∣ple of our determinations to good, besides the Grace of Sentiment and that of Knowledge, I confess to me they are altogether unknown; and it is upon this account that I have explained the

effects which are necessary to the conversion of the heart, only by these two Principles, lest I should have been accused, of having spoken in general terms and such as only excite confused I∣deas, which I have avoided with all possible care. But tho I have explained my self only in such terms as all Men understand, since there is no person who knows not, that Knowledge and Sen∣timent of good are the principles of our deter∣minations; nevertheless I don't pretend to oppose those, who not making use of these clear Ideas say in general, that God works in the souls of Men their Conversion by a particular action, dif∣ferent perhaps from all that I have said here * 1.37 and elsewhere, that God doth in us. Since I experience nothing in my self but Motion towards good in general, and Knowledge or Sentiment which de∣termines this Motion; I ought to suppose nothing else, if by this alone, I can give a reason of all that which the Scripture and the Councils have defined, concerning the subjects of which I treat. In a word, I am sure, that Knowledge and Sen∣timent, are the Principles of our determinations, but I declare, that I know not whether there may be something else, of which I have no know∣ledge.

XXXV.

Beside Grace, efficacious in it self, and the Grace the effect of which depends intirely upon the good dispositions of the Mind, besides the Grace of Sentiment and the Grace of Knowledge; the Just also have Habitual Grace, which makes them agreeable to God, and puts them in a con∣dition of doing actions Meritorious of Salvation.

This Grace is Charity, the Love of God, the Love of Order; Love which is not properly Cha∣rity, if it be not stronger and greater than all other Loves. As it is Pleasure which ordinari∣ly produces the love of the object which cause it or seems to cause it; so it is the delectation of Grace which produces the love of God: It is the enjoyment of sensible pleasures, which en∣creases Concupiscence: It is also the Grace of Sentiment which augments Charity. Concupis∣cence diminishes by the privation of sensible Pleasures, and then Charity is easily preserved and encreased. Charity also diminishes by the privation of the actual Grace of J. C. and Con∣cupiscence is easily encreased and fortified: For these two loves of Charity and Concupiscence, continually engage one another, and strengthen themselves by the weakness of their Enemy.

XXXVI.

All that proceeds from Charity, is agreeable to God, but Charity does not always act in the just themselves. To the end it may act, it ought, at least, to be enlightned; for Knowledge is ne∣cessary to determine the motion of Love. Thus the Grace necessary for every good work rela∣ting to Salvation, is the Grace of Sentiment in those who begin their Conversion; it is the Grace of Knowledge, it is some motion of Faith and Hope in those who are animated by Charity. For the Just may do good works without the Grace of delectation, yet they have always need of some actual succours to determine the motion of their Charity. But tho Charity without Delectation is sufficient to vanquish many temptations, never∣theless,

the Grace of Sentiment is necessary in many occasions. For Men cannot, without the continual assistance of the second Adam, resist the continual action of the first: They cannot per∣severe in righteousness, if they be not often as∣sisted by the particular Grace of J. C. which pro∣duces, augments, and sustains Charity, against the continual efforts of Concupiscence.

XXXVII.

The effects of Pleasure, and all the sentiments of the Soul, depend a thousand ways, upon the actual dispositions of the Mind. The same weight has not always the same effects: Its action depends upon the machine by which it is applyed with re∣spect to the contrary weights. If a ballance be unequally hung, the force of the weights being un∣equally apply'd, the weaker may turn the stronger. It is the same of the weights of pleasure, they act one upon another, and determine the motion of the Soul, as they are differently applyed. Plea∣sure must have more effect in one who has al∣ready a love to the Object which causes the plea∣sure, than in him who has an aversion to it, or who loves the opposite goods. Pleasure forcibly determines him who clearly sees, or lively ima∣gines the advantages of the good which seems to produce it; and it acts weakly upon the mind of him who knows this good only confusedly, or contemns it.

In conclusion, pleasure acts with all its force in him who blindly follows that which flatters Con∣cupiscence; and may perhaps have no effect in him who has attain'd to some habit of suspending the Judgment of his love.

XXXVIII.

Now the different degrees of Knowledge, Cha∣rity, Concupiscence, and the degrees of Liberty being every moment combin'd after infinite ways, with the different degrees of actual pleasures; and these pleasures not having their effect, but accor∣ding to the relation which they have to the dis∣positions of the mind and heart: It is plain, that no finite mind can judge, with any assurance, what effect any particular Grace will produce in us: For besides the Combination of all that which concurs to make it efficacious, or to produce its effect, contains something infinite. This Combi∣nation is not like the springs and machines, whose effects are always infallible and necessary. Thus, no spirit can discover what passes in the heart of man; but God being infinitely wise, it is plain that he clearly knows all the effects which may result from the mixture and combination of all things, and that diving into the heart of man, he insallibly discovers, even the effects which de∣pends upon the free act, or rather consent of our wills. Nevertheless, I confess that I cannot con∣ceive how God can discover the Consequences of those Actions which have not their infallibility from his absolute degrees. But I cannot prevail with my self, to engage in Metaphysicks at the expence of morality, and to maintain Opinions contrary to my inward sentiment, as undeniable Truths; or to speak to the ear a certain Lan∣guage, which in my Opinion, says nothing clear∣ly to the mind. I know very well that Objecti∣ons may be made, which I may not be able clear∣ly and evidently to Answer; but this perhaps

may be, because even these Objections themselves may be full of obscurity and darkness: Because they are grounded upon our ignorance of the pro∣perties of the Soul; because, as I have * 1.38 else∣where proved, we have not a clear Idaea of what we are; and because that which is in us which suffers its self to be overcome by those deter∣minations which are not invincible, is altoge∣ther unknown to us. To Conclude, if I can∣not clearly Answer these Objections, * 1.39 I can An∣swer them by other which yet seem more diffi∣cult to resolve. I can from the principles op∣posite to mine, draw more hard and invidious Consequences than those which are pretended to follow from that Liberty which I suppose to be in us. But I will not enter particularly upon this, because I take no pleasure in walking in the dark, and leading others into precipices.

The First Explication OF THE TREATISE OF Nature and Grace.

What it is to Act by General Wills, and what by Particular.

I.

I Say that God acts by General Wills, when he acts in consequence of the General Laws he has established: For Example, I say that God acts in me by General Wills, when he makes me feel pain by the prick of a pin; because in consequence of the general and efficaci∣ous Laws of the Union of Soul and Body, which he hath established, he makes me feel grief or pain when my body is indisposed. In like manner, when one bowl strikes upon a second; I say, God moves this last by a General Will, because

he moves it in consequence of the general and effi∣cacious Laws of the communication of motions; God having in general appointed, that whensoever two bodies strike upon one another, the motion should be divided betwixt them in certain pro∣portions, and 'tis by the efficacy of this General Will, that bodies should move one another.

II.

On the contrary, I say that God acts by parti∣cular wills, when the efficacy of his will is not determined by any general law to produce the effect. Thus, supposing that God makes me feel the pain of the pricking of a pin, tho there hap∣pens not in my body, or in any other Creature, any change which determines him to act in me according to general Laws; I say, that then God acts by particular wills.

Likewise, supposing that a body begins to move without being struck upon by another, or without any change happening in the will of any Spirits, or any other Creature which determines the effi∣cacy of any general Laws; I say then, that God moves this body by a particular will.

III.

According to these definitions, it appears that I am so far from denying providence, that on the contrary, I suppose that it is God who acts all in all; that the nature of the Pagan Philosophers is a Chimaera, and that properly speaking, that which is called Nature, is nothing else but the general Laws which God has establish'd for the making or pre∣serving his Work after the most simple ways, by an action always uniform, constant, perfectly wor∣thy of infinite wisdom, and the universal cause.

That which I here suppose, tho certain, for rea∣sons which I have elsewhere given, is not absolute∣ly necessary to prove what I intend: For if it be suppos'd that God has communicated his power to Creatures, and that bodies which are about us, have a real and true force, by which they may act up∣on our soul, and render it happy or miserable by pleasure or grief; and that bodies in motion have in themselves a certain entity, which is called a Quality imprinted, which they give to those they meet, and give it with that readiness and unifor∣mity which they suppose, it will be equally easie for me to prove that which I design; for then the efficacy of the action of the Concourse of the general cause will be necessarily determined by the action of the particular cause. God, for example, will be oblig'd according to these principles, to afford his concourse to a body at the moment wherein it strikes upon others: But this body may communicate motion to them, and this is certainly to act by vertue of a general Law. Ne∣vertheless, I don't reason according to this suppo∣sition, because I believe it altogether false; as I have shewed in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth, in the Explication of the same Chapter, and else∣where. These Truths supposed, I here subjoyn the Marks by which it may be known, whether an effect be produc'd by a general will, or by a particular.

Marks, by which it may be judged, whether an effect is produced by a General, or by a Particular Will.

IV.

When we see an effect immediately follow the action of an occasional cause, we ought to judge that this effect is produced by the efficacy of a general will. A Body is immediately moved af∣ter it is struck; the striking of bodies upon one another is the occasional cause: therefore this body is mov'd by a general will. A Stone falls upon the head of a Man and kills him; and this stone falls as others do, I mean, that its mo∣tion is continued almost according to Arithme∣tical Proportion, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, &c. This suppo∣sed, I say that it is moved by the efficacy of a general will, or according to the Laws of the communication of motion, as it is easie to demon∣strate.

V.

When we see an effect produc'd, and yet the occasional cause which is known to us, is not con∣cern'd therein, we have reason to think that this effect is produc'd by a paticular will, suppo∣sing that this effect be not visibly unworthy of its cause, as I shall shew hereafter. For exam∣ple, when a body is mov'd without being struck upon by another, it is very probable that this body is moved by a particular will; neverthe∣less we are not altogether assur'd thereof: For supposing there should be a general Law, that bodies should be moved according to the diffe∣rent wills of Angels, or any other such like, it is plain that this body might be moved tho it was not struck; since the particular will of any An∣gel, according to this supposition, might deter∣mine the will of the general cause to move it.

Thus we may be often assured that God acts by general wills; but we can never be assur'd, that he acts by particular wills, even in the best at∣tested miracles.

VI.

Since we don't sufficiently know the divers com∣binations of occasionalc auses, to discover whe∣ther such and such effects happen in consequence of their actions; since we are not, for example, knowing enough to discern, whether such a show∣er of rain be produc'd by the necessary conse∣quence of the communication of motions, or by a particular will; we ought to judge that an ef∣fect is produced by a general will, when it is plain that the cause is not designed for a parti∣cular end: For the wills of intelligent beings have necessarily some end; general wills, one general end; and particular, a particular end: Nothing is more evident.

For example, tho I can't discover, whether the rain which falls in a meadow, falls there in conse∣quence of general laws, or by the particular will of God: I have reason to think, that it falls there in by a general will; if I see that it falls as well upon the neighbouring Lands, or into the River which runs by this Meadow, as upon the Mea∣dow its self. For if GOD caused it to rain upon this Meadow, by a particular good will which he has for the owner thereof, this rain would not fall into the River where it is useless; since it could not fall therein without a cause, or a will in God, which necessarily has some end.

VII.

But it is still much more reasonable to think,

that an effect is produced by a general will, when the effect is contrary, or else useless to the design which faith or reason teaches us the cause proposes to himself.

For Example, the end which God proposes in the divers sensations which he gives to the soul, when we taste different fruits, is that we should eat those which are proper to nourish the body, and reject others; I suppose this to be so. There∣fore, when God gives us a grateful sentiment at the time when we eat poison, or fruits that are poisoned, he does not act in us by particular wills. We ought to judge thus; for this grate∣ful sentiment is the cause of our death, and God does give us our sentiments, that he may pre∣serve our life by a suitable Nourishment. I say again, I suppose it thus; for I onely speak in re∣lation to Grace, which God gives us doubtless for our Conversion; so that it is plain, that God does not dispence it to men by particular wills, since it often renders us more culpable, and more crimi∣nal, and God cannot have such a fatal Design. God therefore does not give us a grateful senti∣ment by particular wills, when we eat poison'd fruit. But since poison'd fruits excite in our brain motions like unto those which good fruits pro∣duce there, God gives us the same sentiments, by the general Laws which unite the soul to the body, to the end that she may take care of its preserva∣tion.

In like manner God does not give to those who have lost an arm, sentiments of grief relating to this arm, but by a general will; for it is useless to the body of this man for his soul to suffer grief

in relation to an arm which he has not. The same may be said of the motions which are produced in the body of a Man which commits any crime: In short, supposing we are obliged to think that God sends rain upon the Earth to make it Fruitful, we cannot think that he distributes it by particular wills, since it rains upon the Sands and the Sea, as well as upon Cultivated ground; and it often rains so much upon sound Land that the Corn thereby is spoiled, and Mens labours made use∣less.

Thus it is certain, that the rain which is use∣less and hurtful to the Fruits of the Earth, are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions, which God hath established to produce in the World the best ef∣fects; supposing that which I here repeat, that God intended not that the rain should make the Earth to become barren.

VIII.

In short, when any thing happens which is very singular, there's reason to think that it is not pro∣duced by a general will; nevertheless it is impos∣sible to be assur'd thereof: For Example, * 1.40 In a Procession of the H. Sacrament, it rains up∣on the Company, but not upon the Altar-Cloath, or those that carry it; there is reason to think that this happens by a particular will of the universal cause. Nevertheless we cannot be cer∣tain thereof, since an occasional intelligent cause may have this particular design, and thus deter∣mine the efficacy of the general Law to execute it.

IX

When the marks which preceed are not suffici∣ent ground for judging whether any effect be, or be not produced by a general will, yet we ought to think that it is produced by a general will, if it be evident that an occasional cause is establi∣shed for such like effects.

For example, it rains to very good purpose in a Field; we don't inquire whether it rains upon the High-ways: We know not whe∣ther it be hurtful to the neighbouring grounds, or no; we also suppose, that it does nothing but good, and that the circumstances which accompa∣ny it are altogether agreeable to the design for which God would have it rain. Nevertheless, I say, that we ought to suppose this rain produced by a general will, if we know that God has e∣stablished an occasional cause for such like effects: For we ought not without necessity to have re∣course unto Miracles. We should suppose that God acts by the most simple ways; and tho the own∣er of the Field ought to give thanks to God for this favour, yet it ought not to be imagined that God has vouchsafed it to him after a Miraculous manner, by a particular will.

The Master of the Field is bound to give thanks to God for the good which he has received; since God foresaw and intended the good effect of this rain, when he established the general Laws where∣of it is a necessary consequence. On the contra∣ry, if rain be sometimes hurtful to our Lands, since God did not establish the Laws which make it rain to render them unfruitful, (a great drought being enough to make them barren) it is plain

that we ought to thank God and adore the wis∣dom of his providence, even then when we do not feel the effects of the Laws which he hath appointed for our benefit.

X.

In short, tho we should not be assured by the circumstances which accompany certain effects, that there is an occasional cause established to pro∣duce them; it is sufficient to know that they are very common, and relate to the principal design of the general cause, to judge that they are not produced by a particular will.

For example, the Rivers which water the Earth relate to the principle of Gods designs, which is, that men should not want necessaries for life; This I suppose. Moreover, Rivers are very com∣mon, therefore we ought to think that they are formed by some general Laws. For as there is more wisdom required in executing designs by sim∣ple and general ways, than by ways compound∣ed and particular, (as I think I have sufficiently proved elsewhere) we ought to give this Ho∣nour to God, as to believe that his manner of acting is general, uniform, constant, agreeable to the Idea which we have of his infinite wisdom.

These are the marks by which it may be judg∣ed, whether an effect be or be not produced by a general will. I shall now prove that God dis∣pences Grace to Men by general Laws, and that J. C. was the occasional cause of determining their efficacy. I begin with the Proofs drawn from H. Scripture.

XI.

St. Paul teaches us, * 1.41 that J. C. is the Head of

the Church, that he continually dispences to her the Spirit which quickens her, that he forms the Members thereof, and animates them as the Soul does the Body; or, to speak yet more clear∣ly, the H. Scriptures teaches us two things.

First, That J. C. Prays continually for his Mem∣bers. * 1.42

Second, That his Prayers and Desires are al∣ways heard.

Whence I conclude, that he is appointed by God the occasional cause of Grace, and also that Grace is never given unto Sinners but by his means.

Occasional causes, do always and very readily produce their Effect. The Prayers or divers Desires of J. C. relating to the formation of his Body, do always readily obtain their Effect. God refuses nothing to his Son, as J. C. himself has taught us.

The occasional causes don't produce their effect by their own efficacy, but by the efficacy of the general cause.

It is also by the efficacy of the power of God, that the soul of J. C. operates in us; it is not by the efficacy of the humane will: For this rea∣son 'tis that St. Paul represents J. C. as Praying continually to his Father; for he is obliged to Pray, that he may obtain.

The occasional causes are established by God to determine the efficacy of his general wills; and J. C. according to the Scripture was appointed by God after his Resurrection to Govern the Church which he had purchased with his own blood. For J. C. was the Meritorious cause of all Graces, by

his sacrifice; but after his Resurrection he enter'd into the H. of Holies, a Sovereign Priest of good things to come, that he might appear in the pre∣sence of God, and shed upon us the Graces which he had merited for us. Thus he himself applyes and distributes his gifts as the occasional cause. He disposes of all things in God's House, as a well beloved Son in the House of his Father.

I think I have demonstrated, in the Search af∣ter Truth, that God only is the true cause, or acts by his own proper efficacy, and that he doth not communicate his Power unto Creatures, but by ma∣king them the occasional causes of producing cer∣tain effects. I have proved, for example, that Men have no power to produce any motion in their bodies, but because God hath made their wills the occasional causes of these motions; and that fire has no power to cause pain in me, but because God hath made the striking of one body upon another the occasional cause of the communication of mo∣tions, and the violent shaking of the nerves of my Flesh the occasional cause of my Pain. I may here suppose a Truth which I have largely proved, in Chap. III. Part 2. of Book IV. of the Search, &c. And in the Explication of the same Chapter, and which they, for whom I chiefly write, do not de∣ny.

Now 'tis certain by Faith, that Power is gi∣ven to J. C. for forming his Church; * 1.43 Data est mihi omnis potestas in Coelo & in terra: This cannot be understood of J. C. according to his Divinity, for in this respect he never received a∣ny thing. 'Tis certain therefore, that J. C. ac∣cording to his humanity, is the occasional cause

of Grace; supposing it proved, that God only can act upon Minds, and that second causes have no efficacy of their own; which they who would understand my Sentiments, and judge of them, ought first to examine.

XII.

I say moreover, that no Person is sanctified but by the efficacy of the Power which God has communicated to J. C. by establishing him the occasional cause of Grace: For if any sinner was Converted by Grace, of which J. C. was not the occasional cause, but only the meritorious; the sin∣ner having not received his new Life by the in∣fluence of J. C. he would not be a Member of the Body of which J. C. is the Head, after that man∣ner in which St. Paul expresses it, * 1.44 in these words of the Epistle to the Ephesians. — That we may grow up into him in all things who is the Head, Christ; from whom the whole Body fitly joyned together, and compacted by that which which every joynt supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh encrease of the body unto the edi∣fying it self in love. Which words do not meer∣ly say that J. C. is the Meritorious cause of all Graces, but do more distinctly express that Chri∣stians are the Members of the Body of which J. C. is the Head; and that it is in him we encrease and live a life altogether new, and that it is by his inward operation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that his Church is form'd, that he was appointed by God, the only occasional cause, who by his divers de∣sires and applications distributes those Graces which God as the true cause sends down upon men.

'Tis for this reason St. * 1.45 Paul says, that Chri∣stians are united to J. C. as to their root: Radica∣ti & super aedificati in ipso. 'Tis for this reason like∣wise, that J. C. compares himself to a Vine, and his Disciples to the Branches, who receive their life in him: Ego sum vitis, vos palmites. 'Tis for this reason that St. Paul assures, that J. C. lives in us, and we in him; that we are risen in our Head; that our Life is hid with God in J. C. In a word, that we already have eternal life in J. C.

These and several other Expressions clearly shew, that J. C. is not only the meritorious, but also the occasional, physical or natural cause of Grace; and that as the Soul informs, animates, and perfects the Body, so J. C. as the occasional Cause, distributes to his Members those Graces, which, by his sacrifice, he hath merited for his Church.

For my part, I cannot comprehend, how any one can doubt of these Reasons, nor upon what foundation a Truth so very edifying, and as an∣cient as the Religion of J. C. can be treated as a dangerous Novelty. I grant my Expressions may be new, but this is because they appear'd to me very proper, distinctly to explain a truth, which I could only have confusedly demonstrated by too general terms. The words, Occasional Causes, and General Laws, appear to me necessary, to make those Philosophers, for whom I wrote the Trea∣tise of Nature and Grace, distinctly comprehend that which the generality of Men are content to know only confusedly. Since new Expressions are not dangerous, but when they cover something which is equivocal, or may occasion some thought,

contrary to Religion, to arise in the mind, I do not think that any candid persons, and who are skill'd in St. Paul's Divinity, will be offended, be∣cause I explain my self after a particular manner, since it tends only to make us adore the Wis∣dom of God, and to unite us strictly unto J. C.

Objection I.

XIII.

It is objected against what I have said, That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Testament received Grace in consequence of the desires of the Soul of Jesus, since this Holy Soul was not as yet: and thus, tho J. C. be the meritorious cause of all Graces, he is not the occasional which distributes them to Men.

Answer.

In respect of Angels, I answer, That there is some probability that Grace was given to them once only. So that if we consider things in this respect, I confess, that nothing oblig'd the Wis∣dom of God, to establish an occasional cause for the sanctification of Angels. But if these blessed Spirits be considered as Members of the Body whereof J. C. is Head, or if it be supposed, that they were unequally assisted, I believe there is rea∣son to think, that the diversity of their Graces came from him who-is Head of Angels as well as Men, and that in this capacity, he, by his sacrifice, not only merited all Graces which God gave to his Creatures, but also diversly applied these same Graces to them by his different desires.

Since it cannot be denied, that J. C. along time before he was born or could merit, was the meri∣torious cause of Graces which were given to the

Angels and Saints of the Old Testament, it must, in my opinion, be granted, that, by his Prayers, he might have been the occasional cause of the same Graces a long time before they were ask'd. For there is no necessary relation between occasional causes and the time of their producing their ef∣fects; and tho ordinarily these sorts of causes do produce their effects at the very time of their acti∣on, nevertheless, since their action is not effica∣cious in its self, seeing its efficacy depends upon the will of the universal cause, it is not necessary that it should actually exist, that they may produce their effects.

Suppose, for example, That J. C. to day asks of his Father, that such an one may receive such an assistance at certain times of his life, the Pray∣er of J. C. will infallibly determine the efficacy of the general Will of God, which is to save all Men in his Son. This person shall receive these assistances, tho the Soul of J. C. actually thinks of quite another thing, and tho it should never more think of that which it desired for him. Now, the Prayer of J. C. which is already pass'd, is not more present to his Father than the future; for whatsoever happens in all times is equally present to God. Thus, since God loves his Son, and knows, that his Son will have such desires, in re∣spect of his Ancestors, and the People of his own Nation, and also in respect of Angels, who were to enter into the Spiritual Edifice of his Church, and compose the Body of which he is the Head; he seems to have been obliged to accomplish the desires of his Son before they were made, to the end that the Elect, who were before his birth, and

whom he purchased by the merit of his sacrifice, should as particularly belong to him as others, and he should be their Head as truly as he is ours.

I confess, it is convenient, that meritorious and occasional causes should go before their effects, rather than follow them; and even order its self requires, that these causes and their effects do exist at the same time. For 'tis clear, that all merit should be presently rewarded, and that every oc∣casional cause should actually produce its effect, provided that nothing hinder but that this may and ought to be so. But since Grace was absolute∣ly necessary to the Angels and to the Patriarchs, it could not be differ'd. As for the Glory and Reward of the Saints of the Old Testament, see∣ing it might be delay'd, it was expedient, that God should suspend its accomplishment till J. C. was ascended into Heaven and made an High-Priest over the House of God, and began to use the so∣veraign power of an occasional cause of all Graces, which he had merited by his Labours upon Earth. Thus we believe, that the Patriarchs did not en∣ter into Heaven, till J. C. himself, their Head, their Mediator, and their Fore-runner, was there∣in entred. Nevertheless, tho it should be grant∣ed, that God should not have appointed an occa∣sional cause for all Graces given to the Angels and the Patriarchs, I do not see how it can be conclu∣ded, that at present J. C. does not dispense to the Body of the Church that Spirit which gives it increase and nourishment; that he prays not for it, or that his Desires or Prayers do not infallibly obtain their effect; or, in a word, that he is not

the occasional cause which applies those Graces to to Men which he has merited for them.

Before J. C. God gave Grace by particular Wills. This I grant, if it be desired; the necessity of Or∣der requires it; the occasional Cause could not re∣gularly be so soon establish'd; the Elect were but very few: But at present, when the rain of Grace is generally sent upon all the World; when it falls not as heretofore upon a very few Men of one chosen Nation; when J. C. may or ought to be establish'd the occasional cause of the goods which he has merited for his Church, what reason is there to believe, that God should still work Miracles as often as he gives good Sentiments? For, certain∣ly, all that God does by particular Wills is a Mi∣racle, since it happens not by the general Laws which he has established, and whose efficacy is de∣termin'd by occasional causes. But how can we think, that, to save Men, he should work all those Miracles which are useless to their salvation; I mean, that he should give all those Graces which they resist, because they are not proportioned to the actual strength of their concupiscence?

St. John teaches us, that Christians receive of J. C. * 1.46 abundant Graces, because, says he, the Law was given by Moses, but true Grace by Jesus Christ. For, in truth, the Graces which were before J. C. ought not to be compared to those which he di∣stributed after his triumph. If they were miracu∣lous, it must be thought they were very rare: E∣ven the Grace of the Apostles, before the Holy Spirit was given to them, was not to be compared with those which they received, when the Sove∣raign Priest of good things to come, being entred

by his Blood into the Holy of Holies, by the strength of his Prayers obtain'd, and by the dignity of his Person, sent the Holy Spirit to animate and san∣ctifie his Church. The strange Blindness of the Jews, their gross and carnal Sentiments, their frequent relapses into Idolatry after so many Mi∣racles, do sufficiently shew, they had scarce any love for true goods; and the fearfulness of the Apostles, before they received the Holy Spirit, is a sensible mark of their weakness. Thus Grace, in this time, was very rare; because, as yet, our Nature was not made in J. C. the occasional cause of our Graces: as yet J. C. was not fully consecra∣ted a Priest, according to the Order of Melchise∣dech, and his Father had not yet given him that im∣mortal and glorious Life, * 1.47 which is the particular character of his Priesthood. For it was necessary that J. C. should enter into the Heavens, and re∣ceive the glory and power of being the occasional cause of all goods, before he sent the Spirit, ac∣cording to the words of St. John, * 1.48 The Spirit was not yet given, because J. C. was not yet glorified: And according to these words of Christ himself, It is expedient for you, that I go: For if I go not, the Comforter will not come: But if I go, I will send him unto you. Now, it is not to be imagined, that J. C. considered as God, is the Head of the Church. He has obtain'd this honour as Man: the Head and the Members ought to be of the same nature. It is as Man, that J. C. interceeds for Men: it is as Man, that he has received of God soveraign power over his Church. For since God does not inter∣ceed at all, he, as God, has not received that Name which is above every Name: he is equal to

the Father, and absolute Master of all things by right of his birth.

These Truths are evident, and J. C. himself assures us of them, * 1.49 since he says, that his Father gave him power to judge Men, because he was the Son of Man. Thus we must not think, that those Expressions of Scripture, which teach us, that J. C. is the Author of Grace, ought to be un∣derstood of J. C. considered according to his Di∣vine Person. For if this was so, I confess I should not have demonstrated, that he is the occasional cause of it; he would have been only the true cause thereof. But since it is certain, that the three Persons of the Trinity are equally the true causes of Grace, (seeing all the outward Operations of God are common to the three Persons) my Ar∣guments cannot be denied, since the Holy Scrip∣ture says of the Son, and not of the Father, nor of the Spirit, that he is the Head of the Church, and that under this character he communicates Life to all the Members which compose it.

Object. II.

XIV.

It is God who gives to the Soul of J. C. all Thoughts and Motions which it has in the forma∣tion of his Mystical Body. So that if on one hand the Wills of J. C. as natural and occasional Cau∣ses, determine the efficacy of God's general Will; on the other hand, it is God himself who deter∣mines the divers Wills of J. C. Thus it comes to the same thing; for assuredly the Wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of his Fa∣ther.

Answer.

I confess that the particular wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of the Father, but this is not because the Father has particular wills which answer to those of the Son, and determine them: This is only because the wills of the Son are always conformable to Order in general, which is necessarily the rule of the divine wills, and of those which love God. For to love Order, is is to love God, it is to will what God wills; it is to be Just, Wise, Regular, in his love. The Soul of J. C. would form to the Glory of his Father the most Sacred, Magnificent and Perfect Temple that can be: Order requires this, for nothing can be made too great for God. All the divers desires of this Soul, ever intent upon the Execution of its design, come also to it from God or the Word to which it is united. But the occasional causes of all these thoughts, most certainly are its divers desires, for it thinks on what it will.

Now these divers desires are sometimes altoge∣ther free; probably the thoughts which excite these desires, do not always invincibly determine the Soul of J. C. to form and resolve to execute them. It is equally advantagious to the design of Jesus Christ, whether it be Peter or John who does that which the regularity of his work re∣quires: It is true, that the soul of Jesus Christ is not indifferent, as to what respects the glory of his Father, or that which Order necessarily re∣quires; but it is altogether free in every thing else, nothing out of God invincibly determines its love. Thus it ought not to be wonder'd if it

have particular wills, tho there are no such wills in God which determine those of the soul of Jesus Christ.

But I grant that the wills of Jesus Christ are not free, I grant that his knowledge determines him to will, and always to will after a certain manner, in the construction of his Church. But it must be Eternal Wisdom to which his soul is united, which determines these wills; if it is not necessary for this end, to suppose particular wills in God. It must be observ'd, that the wills of the soul of J. C. are particular, or have not any occasional cause which determines their efficacy, no, not the will of God. For the soul of J. C. not having an infinite capacity of thinking, his knowledge, and consequently his wills, are limi∣ted. Thus 'tis necessary that his wills be parti∣cular, since they change according to his divers thoughts and applications: For it seems to me that the soul of J. C. otherwise employ'd in con∣templating the beauties, and tasting the infinite sweetness of the true good, ought not according to the rule of Order, to think at the same time upon all the Ornaments which it designs to be∣stow upon his Church, and the different means of executing each of his intentions. J. C. desi∣ting to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father, he desires also to adorn it with infinite beauties, and that by such means as are most conformable to Order. It is therefore necessary that he continually change desires; infi∣nite wisdom is only able to prescribe general Laws for executing his designs. Now seeing the suture world must subsist eternally, and be infinite∣ly

more perfect than the present World, it was expedient that God should establish an intelligent occasional cause, and enlightned with divine wis∣dom, to the end that it might correct the defects which necessarily happen in works formed by ge∣neral Laws. The striking of Bodies upon one another, which determines the efficacy of the ge∣neral Laws of Nature, is an occasional cause with∣out Understanding and without Liberty. Thus, it cannot be, but there must be Defects and Mon∣sters in the World; which Defects it would be unworthy of the Wisdom of God to correct by particular wills.

But J. C. being an intelligent occasional cause, enlightned by Divine Wisdom, and capable of particular wills, as the particular necessities of his work require; it is plain that the future World will be infinitely more Perfect than the present; that the Church shall be without deformity, as Scripture teaches us, and that this work will be altogether worthy of the esteem of GOD him∣self.

After this manner it is, that the Eternal Wis∣dom renders, as I may say, to the Father that which it had taken from him; for not permit∣ting him to act by particular wills, it seems as if it rendred him impotent. But being incarnate, it left God to act as became him, by the more simple and general ways, * 1.50 and yet produced a work in which the most enlightned understanding shall never be able to observe the least defect.

XV.

After having proved by the Authority of Scrip∣ture, that the divers motions of the Soul of J. C. are the occasional causes, which determine the general efficacy of the Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son; 'tis neces∣sary further in general to prove by reason, that we ought not to believe that God in the Order of Grace acts by particular wills. For tho by Reason without Faith it cannot be demonstrated, that God has established the wills of a God man, as the occasional cause of his gifts, it may never∣theless be known that he does not distribute them to Men by particular wills, and that by two ways, a Priori and a Posteriori, that is to say by the Idea which we have of God, and by the effects of Grace; for there is nothing but proves this Truth. See the proof a Priori.

A wise Being must act wisely; God cannot falsifie himself: His actions must bear the Cha∣racter of his Attributes. Now God knows eve∣ry thing, and foresees every thing; his under∣standing has no bounds: Therefore his manner of acting must bear the character of an infinite understanding. Now to chuse occasional causes, and establish general Laws for executing any work, denotes a knowledge infinitely more extended than to change wills every moment, or to act by par∣ticular wills: God therefore executes his designs by general Laws, the efficacy of which is deter∣mined by the occasional causes. Certainly it re∣quires a more comprehensive understanding, to make a Watch, which according to the Laws of Mechanism shall go always and regularly, whe∣ther

a Man carries it about with him, or hangs it up, or gives it what shake he will; than to make one which cannot go truly, if he who made it does not every moment change something in it according to the different postures in which he puts it: For surely, when there are a great ma∣ny relations to compare and combine with one ano∣ther, there needs a greater understanding. To see all the consequences which may happen from a general Law, an insinite understanding is requi∣site; but nothing of all this is to be foreseen when one changes his wills every moment.

Therefore to establish general Laws, and chuse the most simple, and at the same time the most fruitful, is a way of acting worthy of him, whose Wisdom has no bounds. On the contrary, to act by particular wills, shews a limited understand∣ing, and which cannot compare the consequences, or effects of causes less fruitful. The same truth may further be demonstrated a Priori by some Attributes of God, as his immutibility, by which Mr. de Cartes proves, that every thing in motion describes a right line, and that there is always an equal quantity of motion in the World, and other Truths. But these proofs a Priori are too abstract to convince the generality of Men of the truth which I propose. It is expedient to prove it by the signs which I have heretofore gi∣ven for discerning the effects which are produced by particular wills, from those which are the con∣sequences of some general Law.

XVI.

God being infinitely wise, neither wills nor does any thing without end. Now Grace often falls

upon hearts so disposed that it is unfruitsul. Therefore it does not fall upon hearts by a par∣ticular will, but only by a necessary consequence of general Laws, for the same reason that rain falls upon the Sand and on the Sea, as well as on Sown ground.

Tho God may punish sinners, or make them more miserable than they are, he cannot design to make them more culpable or more criminal. Now Grace sometimes renders Persons more cul∣pable and more criminal, and God certainly knows that according to their actual dispositions, the Grace which he gives them will have this sad effect. There∣fore these Graces do not fall upon corrupted hearts by the particular will of God, but by a neces∣sary consequence of general Laws which he has established to produce better effects; for the same reason, that too much rain sometimes spoils and putrifies the Fruits of the earth, tho God by his general will, causes it to rain to make them grow and encrease.

XVII.

If God intended that certain Lands should be barren, he need only to cease to will that the rain should water them. In like manner, if God would that the hearts of some sinners should be hard∣ned, it would suffice that the rain of grace did not water them, he needed only to leave them to themselves, they would soon be corrupted.

Why should we attribute to God a particular will, to make so severe a use thereof, and so ir∣reconcileable with the price of the Blood of his Son? But some may say, God never had this design when he gave his Grace to sinners. This

doubtless will appear more reasonable, but if God gives his Grace by a particular will, he has a particular design. Now seeing his Grace has this sad effect, God is frustrated in his intention, since he gave it with a particular design to do good to this sinner. For I speak not here of the Graces, or rather of the Gifts, which St. Paul explains in 1 Cor. Chap. 12. Ver. 9. I speak of the Grace which God gives for the Conversion of him, to whom it is given; and not of those Graces which God vouchsafes for the profit of others, such as the gift of Prophecy, the discerning of Spirits, that of speaking with divers Tongues, of Healing diseases, and such like.

When rain falls in such abundance that the floods wash away the root of the Fruits, it ought to be judged that this rain comes by the necessary con∣sequence of the general Laws which God has e∣stablished for better effects. In the mean time it is certain, that God might have ordained it by a particular will. For God to punish Men might will, that rains designed to make the Earth Fruit∣ful, might render them barren upon some ac∣count. But it is not the same of the rain of Grace, since God could not dispence it, with a design of punishing Men, much less of rendring them more culpable and more criminal. Thus 'tis still much more certain, that the rain of Grace is dispen∣sed by general wills than the ordinary rain. Ne∣vertheless, most Men easily believe, that rains are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions; and there are few who do not feel some difficulty in believing that God by general wills, gives us all

those motions of Grace, the effects of which we hinder.

'Tis very probable that this difficulty comes, because we naturally think that God acts much after the same manner that we do; and that he has every moment particular wills towards men, something like those which we have in respect of our Friends. For tho we confess with the mouth, that there are infinite differences betwixt Gods manner of acting, and ours; nevertheless, since we usually judge others in respect to our selves, without reflecting thereon, few persons when they would speak of God, seriously consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect.

And because there is some appearance of no∣velty in that which I say, this causes some diffi∣culty to the understanding, which reasonably su∣spects all that is not ordinary.

I particularly esteem and honour all those, who in matter of Religion, have a secret aversion for all novelties. They do not offend me at all, when they oppose my Sentiments, when this is the mo∣tive; and since their prejudices are very reason∣able, tho they should even revile me, I should not cease to have a respect for them. For the disposition of their mind is infinitely more rea∣sonable, than that of certain People, who readily embrace all that which carries in it the chara∣cter of Novelty. Nevertheless, seeing I believe that Man ought to love and search after the Truth with all his strength, and communicate it to o∣thers, when he believes he has found it; I think having supposed all that Faith teaches us, I may or ought to discover that which may confirm it,

or cause it to be embraced by all men. I might justifie this Sentiment by the Practice of the Fathers and the Authority of St. Augustine himself, who often exhorts Men to understand the truth which they already believe in the obscurity of Faith. But I don't think there are any Persons so unreason∣able, as to blame my conduct, how much pre∣judiced soever they may be against my Sentiments. Therefore I beg of those who will give themselves the trouble of reading what I have written, not to suppose that I am deceived, to suspend their judgment, till they shall well comprehend my mean∣ing; not to condemn me in general terms, nor rashly to draw untoward consequences from my meaning.

In matters so obscure as those of Grace, the advantage is always on his side who makes the on-set; and it is not just to make use of it. Men ought to act with equity, and without prejudice compare all the consequences which may be drawn from different Sentiments, that at last they may embrace that which shall seem most conformable to the Goodness and Wisdom of God. For he is not equitable, who without Examination con∣demns an Opinion, by reason of some invidious consequences, which are always drawn from it, when the imagination is affrighted and prevented by contrary Sentiments.

XVIII.

I know, for example, that some persons have said that I make all Prayers useless, and that I take from Men that confidence which they ought to have in God; because God acting by general wills, we ought not according to them to hope for Hea∣ven

by particular assistances. I own, that if this consequence was contain'd in my Principles, they would be False, Heretical, and Impious. For he that takes away the Hope and Trust we ought to have in God, overturns Religion; and it is part∣ly upon this account that I cannot be of their mind, who do the most oppose my way of re∣conciling Grace with Liberty. But my Princi∣ples are so far from leading Men to despair, that they shew to the Just, and even to Sinners (af∣ter a way which to me seems most comforting) the means of obtaining from God the things of which they stand in need.

For if we are Just, our Prayers are Meritori∣ous, and if they be Meritorious, Order requires they should be heard. And because Order in re∣spect of God himself, is a Law infinitely more inviolable than the Laws which he hath establi∣shed for the construction of his work, he never fails to do that which Order prescribes unto him. Thus the prayers of the Just are never useless: This I have shewn in the 19. Article of the se∣cond Discourse. But if we be sinners, it is cer∣tain that our Prayers in themselves are useless. * 1.51 Nevertheless we ought not to despair: We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righ∣teous. He came to save Sinners. His Prayers are always and readily heard; let us Pray in his Name, or address to him himself. Our Prayers will solicite him to form some desires in our be∣half; and his desires are the occasional causes which infallibly determine the efficacy of the ge∣neral Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son.

This is what I have very largely proved in the second discourse. Thus I am so far from take∣ing away the confidence which we ought to have in God, that I do by the Authority of the Scrip∣ture, particularly shew what way we ought to take to obtain of God, the Graces which are necessa∣ry for us. I therefore beg of the Readers, that they will do me the justice, as to examine my Sentiments without prejudice; and I am willing they should afterwards judge of them according to their evidence. For I submit all my thoughts, not only to the censures of the Church, (which, by an Authority to which I am always ready to refer my self, has a right to make me quit them) but also to the judgement of particular persons, by whose Advice I shall endeavour to profit.

The Second Explication, Where 'tis proved that J. C. is figured every where in the Scriptures, and that even by the Events which were before the Sin of the First Man; to teach us that the Prin∣ciple of God's designs, is the Incarnation of His Son.

MOses, in the second Chapter of Genesis, thus relates the Marriage of the first Man:

The great Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept, and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from Man, made he a Woman, and brought her unto the Man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. Therefore shall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and cleave unto his Wife, and they shall be one flesh. St. Paul assures us, that this Carnal Marriage is a great Mystery, that it is the Figure of the Spiritual Marriage of J. C. with his Church, and also that married persons ought to conform themselves to J. C. and his Church in the Duties which they are to pay to one another: See his words in the Epistle to the Ephesians, Chap. V. Wives, submit your selves unto your own Husbands,

as unto the Lord. For the Husband is the Head of the Wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church: and he is the Saviour of the Body. Therefore as the Church is subject unto Christ, so let the Wives be to their own Husbands in every thing. Husbands, love your Wives, even as Christ also loved the Church, and gave him∣self for it, that he might sanctifie and cleanse it with the washing of Water by the Word. That he might pre∣sent it to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing: but that it should be holy and without blemish. So ought Men to love their Wives, as their own Bodies: he that loveth his Wife, loveth himself. For no Man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church: For we are Members of his Body, of his Flesh, and of his Bones. For this cause shall a Man leave his Father and Mother, and shall be joyned unto his Wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great Mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church. We are the Members of the Body of J. C. formed of his Flesh and of his Bone, as Eve was of Adam. The Man shall leave Father and Mother and be joyned to his Wife, and with her shall make but one Body. This is a great Myste∣ry, and I explain it of J. C. and his Church. * 1.52 Sacramentum hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo & in Ecclesia.

The Letter, which kills, because it does not raise the Mind up towards him who only gives Life, applies that solely to the first Adam, which is said chiefly to figure the second. But St. Paul, inspired with the same Spirit that Moses was, clear∣ly explain'd the Mystery, which the other had only darkly proposed. He assures us, that what

seems to have been written of the first Man, and the first Woman, ought to be understood of J. C. and his Church. The first Marriage is a great Se∣cret, for it figures the greatest of our Mysteries, the Eternal Covenant betwixt J. C. and his Church: a Secret hid in God from all eternity, and revealed to Men in the fulness of times. This is the Mystery which hath been hid from Ages and Generations, but is now made manifest to his Saints: To whom God would make known what is the Riches of the Glory of this Mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ, in you the hope of glory, Col. I. 26, 27. I confess, that ordinary Marriages are indissoluble: that marri∣ed persons leave their Father and Mother, and make together one strict Society, and one Body: but these words of the first Man, Wherefore Man shall leave Father and Mother, may be applied to them; for J. C. proves, by the same words, that the Husband ought not to forsake his Wife, be∣cause it is God who has joyned them together. But I maintain, that God has joyned them, to figure the greatest of our Mysteries; that Marriages can∣not be broken, because J. C. will never forsake his Church of which he is the Spouse; that the Mar∣riage of Christians is a * 1.53 Sacrament, which dis∣penses Grace to those who are contracted, because it figures J. C. who communicates Spirit and Fruit∣fulness to his Church: In a word, that the first Marriage, and all which have been since, are tran∣sient figures of the eternal and indissoluble Mar∣riage of J. C. with Men.

Now, the first Marriage was celebrated before Sin: God cast Adam into an ecstatical and myste∣rious sleep; he formed out of one of his sides, or (to speak as the Scripture) he built up his Wise, which he designed to give him; he inspired into him words prophetical of J. C. and, as yet, Adam had not sinned: for, doubtless, all that the Scrip∣ture relates concerning the first Man, before his sin, doth much more sensibly and expresly repre∣sent J. C. than that which is written of him after his fall. Doth not this shew, that J. C. and his Church, is the first and chief of God's designs, since 'tis evident, that the Figure must be for the sake of the Reality, and not the Reality for the Figure?

When God created the first Man, he made him according to his Image, because he thought of him who is the Image of the invisible God; he anima∣ted him with his Breath, * 1.54 because he then had the design of uniting his Word to our Nature, which he foresaw would become altogether earth∣ly and carnal by sin; he made him Lord of all Ani∣mals, because he intended to subject all things to J. C. God, by the sleep, into which he cast the first Man, express'd the death, or sleep of his Son upon the Cross; and by the Woman, whom he drew out of his Flesh and his Bones, the Spouse which J. C. received after he awoke, (or was risen) and which he purchased by his Blood. If Adam sinned, it was not according to St. Paul, because he was tempted, but through his fondness to his Wife, 1 Tim. II. 14. J. C. likewise was not subject to sin, and if he was made sin, as the Scripture speaks, * 1.55 it was in love to his Church. If Adam sinned, and

communicated his sin to all his Posterity, he is, even in this (tho in a contrary sence) the figure of J. C. who only dispences Grace to Men. Where: fore, as by one Man, Sin entered into the World, and Death by Sin; * 1.56 and Death passed upon all Men. — Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even o∣ver them who had not sinned after Adam's trans∣gression; who is the * 1.57 figure of him who was to come.

These words, who is the figure of him, who was to come, in the place where they are, put it out of doubt, that the first Adam represented the se∣cond, even by Concupiscence it self; and the Death which he communicated to all Men, toge∣ther with his Son. Hence it is, that St Paul makes so many Antitheses betwixt the Earthly Man, and the Man from Heaven. The first Man, was made a living Soul; * 1.58 the second Adam, a quick∣ning Spirit. The first Man, is of the Earth, Earth∣ly; the second Man, is the Lord from Heaven.

God, by the first Man and Woman, did not on∣ly represent J. C. and his Church; but also by the place into which he put them, by their po∣sterity, especially those of them whose actions the Scripture doth largely recite. The Earthly Pa∣radise, represented the Church; J. C. keeps and Cultivates it. The River divided into Four Streams to water this very Delightful and Fruit∣ful place, is the Eternal wisdom, which enligh∣tens, and animates the Church. I also came out as a Brook from a River, and as a Conduit * 1.59 into a Garden. I said, I will water my best Garden, and will water abundantly my Garden-bed. It is written of the true Solomon, that his wisdom ran down abundantly; as the Rivers at the beginning

of Harvest. Who filleth all things with wisdom, * 1.60 as Physon, and as Tygris in the time of the new fruits. He maketh the understanding to abound like Euphra∣tes. — He maketh the doctrine of Knowledge, ap∣pear as the Light, and as Geon in the time of Vin∣tage. The Tree planted in the middle of the Garden, which brought forth a Fruit able to make Men Immortal, is also the Eternal Wisdom, according to the words of the Proverbs of Solo∣mon, She is a Tree of Life, * 1.61 to them that lay hold upon her, and happy is every one that retaineth her. He who shall overcome the World, shall be nourished with this Fruit; for certainly, these words of St. John, To him that overcomes, * 1.62 it shall be given to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God, are to be understood of no other Trees but this. As for the other Tree, which teaches good and evil, and whose Fruits Eve found so Beautiful to the Eye, and Pleasant to the Taste; it represents sensible objects, which at present, excite in us such a strong Concupiscence, and give Death to those, who suffer themselves to be surprized by their Charms: 'Tis plain, that all these relations would not be so exact, if they were no more than imaginary.

EVE had two Sons, Cain and Abel; * 1.63 they both offered their Sacrifice: God rejected that of Cain's, and received that of Abel's. Cain was troubled hereat, and slew his Brother; the blood of Abel which was spilt cryed for Vengeance. God declared, that Cain should be a Fugitive all his Life, and that he would hinder him from be∣ing slain. Doth not this sufficiently represent the Synagogue, who being the Elder, yet offer∣ed

not unto God a Sacrifice acceptable unto him: That the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ was only Worthy of GOD: That Jesus Christ was slain in Abel, by the Jews who were his Brethren, according to the Flesh: That for their Punishment, the Jews should be Vagabonds and Fugitives upon the Earth, as Cain was; and that God will not quite Destroy them, tho their Crime was such, that they might say, more truely than Cain, All they who meet me will slay me.

If we examine after matters of Fact, and those especially, whose Circumstances the Scripture more particularly recites, we shall see Jesus C. expected and figured every where; Expected, be∣canse of the promise which God had made, that the seed of the Woman, should break the Ser∣pents Head, Gen. III. 15. And Figured, because the Spirit of God, takes pleasure in represent∣ing unto Men, him who was to be their Medi∣ator, and render all the Work of God perfect∣ly worthy of its Author.

I confess, that in these things we may be ea∣sily deceived, and that none but the Spirit of God can make us distinctly and without fear of error, see the reality of these Figures. But these Figures are so lively, and so express, that he must be strangely Stupid, who is not Affected with them; and very rash, who looks upon those as Ridiculous Persons and Visionaries, who according to the Example of the Apostles and Holy Doctors, seek Jesus Christ in the Scrip∣tures, as he himself has Commanded us in these

words, Search the Scriptures, for they are they, * 1.64 which Testify of me. For, in short, all that is in the Old Testament, relates to Jesus Christ and his Church. * 1.65 — All these things happened to them in Figures.

The Third Explication,

Where 'tis prov'd, that the chief of Gods de∣sign is J. C. and his Church; that God true∣ly loves Men; that he sincerely desires to save all; that his Conduct is worthy of his Wisdom, Goodness, Immutability, and other Attributes: What is the order of the de∣crees which contain the Predestination of the Saints.

I. BY this Term, [GOD,] I understand a Be∣ing infinitely Perfect.

II. A Being infinitely Perfect, Perfectly knows himself.

III. By the knowledge which he has of his Be∣ing, he sees the Essences of all things; he sees all possible Creatures, or all that which he is a∣ble to Produce: He is Wise by Himself a∣lone.

IV. The Being infinitely Perfect, necessarily loves Himself; He can will nothing but by his will; I mean the love which he bears to him∣self: Therefore he can do nothing but for him∣self.

V. The Being infinitely Perfect, is Almighty; He can do all that he knows, supposing he can will it with a practical will.

VI. By a practical will, I mean a decree, or will executive of a design concluded upon; which supposes in God the knowledge and choice of the ways of acting which are most worthy of himself. For there are Simple, Fruitful, Gene∣ral, Uniform, and Constant; and there are Com∣pounded, Barren, Particular, Irregular, and Un∣constant Ways of Actions. The first are to be preferred before the latter; for they shew Wis∣dom, Goodness, Constancy, Immutability, in him that makes use of them: The other denotes the want of Understanding, Malignancy, Inconstancy, Lightness of Mind.

VII. It is visible, that there is something use∣less in his action, who does that by compound∣ed ways, which may be brought to pass by sim∣ple; and he wants knowledge, who hath more Practical wills, when one sufficeth.

VIII. The Conduct of a Good, Wise, Con∣stant and Immutable Being, must carry in it, Wis∣dom, Goodness, Constancy and immutability; Order requires this.

IX. The Wisdom of GOD renders him Impo∣tent in this sence, that it permits him not to will certain things, nor to act after certain ways. It permits him not to will certain things; for if God had made but one animal, he could not have made it monstrous, or given it useless or ill pro∣portioned members, that being contrary to his wisdom which he loves invincibly. It would not permit him also to act after certain ways; for,

supposing that a work equally Perfect, might be produced by ways unequally Simple, Uniform, Constant, &c. God is impotent in this sence, that he cannot chuse the ways of acting which are less worthy of his Wisdom, or which less resem∣ble his Goodness, his Immutability, or his other Attributes.

X. Thus God is Almighty, because he does every thing that he undertakes to do; and be∣cause there is nothing without him which can re∣sist him, or hinder him from executing his de∣sign.

'Tis not because there is nothing, how irregu∣lar soever, which he cannot do; or, no ways of acting which he cannot observe: But let us sup∣pose God to act.

XI. God cannot act but for himself; if he will act, 'tis because he resolves to do something wor∣thy of himself; but no Creature can give unto God an Honour worthy of him: All the Honour that meer Creatures can give, cannot be worth the action by which he produces them.

It is unworthy of God, to maintain that there is any thing in the Creature which can determine him to act; God therefore will do nothing, for he acts only for himself.

XII. God cannot receive any Honour worthy of himself, but from himself. No Person can Honour himself. God therefore can never be Ho∣noured with an Honour worthy of him.

XIII. Nevertheless, I am sensible that I do actually exist. Therefore I can give unto God an Honour worthy of him: Therefore I am

Eternal, Uncreated, Divine, I am not made, and God can make nothing.

XIV. Further, I know that I offend God, and that I cannot satisfie him for my offences. Now God would not be offended, and would be fully satisfied. Therefore I am not the work of god; for if I was, God only acting for his glory, he would have been deceived in his designs.

XV. Nothing can satisfie God but God himself. Now one and the same Person cannot make satis∣faction to himself. God therefore can never be satisfied for our offences.

The wicked therefore are not the work of God, they subsist whether he will or no; they cannot be annihilated. Behold consequences altogether false! But see them cleared up in two words, by my Principles, or rather the Principles of Christian Religion.

XVI. God cannot be Honoured with an Ho∣nour worthy of himself. He cannot be fully sa∣tisfied for our offences, if he himself does not undertake for them. Now no person Honours himself, or satisfies himself: Therefore there is in God a plurality of Persons. This is also that which Faith teaches us.

XVII. I am Created, therefore I can render to God an Honour worthy of himself. God is of∣fended, therefore he may be fully satisfied. A Divine Person united to my nature, may sanctifie my devotions, and render them worthy of God. A Divine Person united to a criminal — nature may justifie and satisfie for it. This is the soluti∣on wherewith Faith supplies Reason when she is Non-plus'd; for Faith and Reason mutually su∣stain one another.

XVIII. It is clear therefore, that tho Man had not sinned, a Divine Person would have been united to the work of God, to sanctisie it, and render it worthy of its Author; since it is necessary it should subsist as I may say, in a Divine Person, to the end it might be worthy of him.

XIX. Men offend God, they cannot satisfie him for their offences; God foresaw and permitted this: Therefore he had in view the satisfaction of his Son, which is full and entire; therefore the work of God repair'd is more worthy of God, and Honours him more than the same work be∣fore its corruption. God therefore, who acts for his glory, must necessarily have permitted sin, which he foresaw would come to pass. All this is clear, and I have proved it elswhere, but I speak too much of it; for, at present, 'tis suffi∣cient, that the first and chief design of God was J. C. and his Church; that the present World was for the future, that the natural order was for the su∣pernatural: And I prove it thus.

XX. God made all things for his glory, He loves that the most, which most Honours him: Now Jesus Christ Honours him more than all Crea∣tures put together, since J. C. is a Victim, and a Sovereign Priest, who infinitely Honours God. Therefore the chief of Gods designs, is J. C. and the Church, which is his Body, which, with J. C. offers but one Victim, and one Worship. For all Creatures have access unto God, and pay their Obligations unto him, only in J. C. Therefore the Present World is for the Future; the Natu∣ral Order, for the Supernatural: this Succession of Generations, to supply the living Temple, which

J. C. raises to the glory of his Father, with Ma∣terials. Every thing passes away, every thing tends to destruction, every thing vanishes; but Gods chief design (the Object in which he is well pleased) shall remain for ever.

XXI. The great design therefore of God, is, to build to his own Honour a Spiritual Tem∣ple, of which J. C. is the chief Corner-stone, the Architect, the Sovereign Priest, and Victim. His design is, that this Temple should be as Large and Perfect as it can be, as far as its greatness and Perfection can consist with one another. Thus God wills, that all Men should enter into this Spi∣ritual Building; for thereby it would become more ample. God would that all Men should be saved, 1 Tim. II. 4. He hath also sworn by his Prophet, that he wills not the Death, but the Conversion of the Wicked. God also desires, that Men shou'd merit the highest degrees of glory, His will is our Sanctification, 1 Thess. IV. 3. His Temple would thus be more Perfect. Certainly, if God loves Men, and the beauty of his work, these Truths cannot be denyed. Now all Men are not saved; there either are none at all, or very few Saints, but are capable of the highest Rewards, and of a more Illustrious Glory, than that which they possess; and no Creature, even Man himself, can∣not hinder God from Converting and Sanctify∣ing him, if God undertakes his Conversion and Sanctification; for God is the absolute Master of Hearts. Therefore there must necessarily be something in God himself, which hinders him from executing his wills, or rather from forming cer∣tain designs, or decrees.

XXII. God in his infinite Wisdom, saw all pos∣sible works, and all possible ways of executing them. He doth not blindly resolve upon any de∣sign, but always compares the means with the end; He loves his Wisdom, and he consults it always. Now there are some ways of acting, more Sim∣ple, more Uniform, more Regular than others; and the Conduct of a Wise, and Immutable Be∣ing must carry in it the Character of Wisdom, and immutability. Therefore the Wisdom of God resists his wills, in this sense, that all his wills are not Practical wills. I do thus further explain my self.

XXIII. God loves all Men. He would save all; he would sanctifie all; he would make a beautiful work; he would make his Church as large and perfect as it can be: But God loves his Wisdom infinitely more; he loves it invincibly; he loves it with a natural and necessary love. He cannot therefore dispense with himself from acting after the wisest manner, and which is most worthy of himself; or from following that Conduct which suits best with his Attributes. Now, God acting by the most simple ways, and most worthy of his wisdom, his work cannot be more beautiful and more ample than it is. For if God, by ways equal∣ly simple, could have made his Church more am∣ple and more perfect than it is, he would not, act∣ing as he hath done, have made a work most wor∣thy of himself; he would also have hated Men be∣fore he had established his Decrees, and conse∣quently before their sin, or even their existence was known. Therefore the Wisdom of God for∣bidding him to compound his ways, not permitting

him to work Miracles every moment, and obliging him to act after the most general, constant and uni∣form manner; he doth not save all Men, tho he truly desires to save all. For, to conclude, tho he loves all his Creatures, he doth nothing for them, but that which his wisdom permits him to do; and tho he would have the most large and most perfect Church that can be, yet he doth not make it absolutely the most large and perfect; but only the most simple and most perfect that can be, with respect to the ways which are most wor∣thy of himself. For, once more, God doth not resolve upon his designs, but by comparing his ways with the work which they are to effect. For when he sees a greater relation of wisdom and fruit∣fulness betwixt certain ways and their work, than all others and their work, then (I speak after the manner of Men) he takes up his Design, he chuses his Ways, he establishes his Decrees.

XXIV. Thus the Order of the Divine Decrees, which include the Predestination of the Saints, is not, that God first wills to save such and such, and afterwards consults his wisdom to find out the ways which may put his designs into execution: This is to make God act like Men, who often repent of their undertakings, because they do not compare all the means with the end. God consults his wis∣dom for all things; he wills and designs nothing without his knowledge; he wills not, that such and such shall be saved rather than others, if he did not see in himself some reasons for this; in him∣self, I say, not in them. So that the Principle of Predestination, is the Wisdom and Knowledge of God. O Altitudo divitiarum sapientiae & scientiae

Dei! 'Tis not his will separated from his wis∣dom: for he neither doth nor wills any thing with∣out it; that is, without his Son. Much less is it the Elect, which determine him to predestinate them, or to form designs, which include their pre∣destination. This is altogether impertinent; and 'tis needless for me to spend time in demonstra∣ting it.

XXV. 'Tis evident, by the Truths which I have laid down, that Reason furnishes us with no other means of reconciling Scripture with it self; or this Proposition, God would save all Men; with this, All Men are not saved. For assuredly, God would save all Men, even the wicked: This he swears by the mouth of the Prophet Ezekiel. Now, God is the Master of Hearts; he can give such Grace to the wicked as will certainly convert him, since he knows what degree of Grace, and when it ought to be given, that it may work the conversion of the sinner. Who can hinder him from doing what he will? What Creature can resist him? Is't not evident, that it is his wisdom which obliges him to act after so simple and so general a manner, that Grace is not always given to the sinner, so strong, and at such seasonable moments, as through∣ly to convert, or to contribute to the conversion of him who receives it?

For, if God acts by particular wills, since he is wise, and wills the conversion of a sinner, certainly 'tis impossible, but that all Grace should be effica∣cious, and have all the effect for which God gave it: it could never be resisted, never render'd use∣less: For an intelligent Being proportions always

the means to the end, the action to the work, or effect which he undertakes to produce.

XXVI. In short, 'tis plain, that Predestination, as I have explained it, has nothing harsh in it: For no person can take it ill, that God should love his wisdom infinitely more than his work; for it is altogether his gracious gift, seeing it is the greater relation of wisdom and fruitfulness, which God sees betwixt his ways and his future Church, which determines him to form the decrees, which include the Predestination of the Saints, and not our natural merits which engage him to prede∣stinate us to Grace and Glory. It doth not sup∣pose in God any respect of Persons; for tho Gods choice proceeds not from our merits, yet it is not the effect of an indifferent or rash will of God, but of the depth of his Wisdom and Knowledge which governs all his wills. Lastly, Predestina∣tion, thus understood, doth not lead to despair; for God often sends the showers of Grace in such abundance, that we frequently render it useless: And it will condemn our negligence, for it de∣pends on us to avoid many things which resist the efficacy of grace; God not giving us his grace by particular wills, to the end, that it should have such an effect in us, and nothing more.

Objection.

The Predestination of the Saints is a Mystery: The Judgments of God are hidden, even to the most enlightned understandings, and 'tis an in∣sufferable rashness to endeavour to give a reason of them. The Fathers upon this subject of God's

choice of the Elect, always cryed out with St. Paul, O the Height! We ought to imitate them, and hold our peace.

Answer.

I Answer, that we are permitted to Explain, even the Mysteries, provided we do it according to the Analogy of Faith; and suppose the Do∣ctrines received by the Church as unquestiona∣ble. The Fathers have done so: There is no greater Mystery than of the Trinity; and yet St. Augustine has Composed 15. Books upon this subject, St. Hilary 12. St. Thomas, and all the School Divines, were not afraid to speak and write there∣of. But it is certain, that Predestination is not a Mystery in this sence, as if the mind of Man can discover nothing thereof: for all the Di∣vine Decrees, do necessarily agree with Order, Reason, the Eternal Law, of which all Men have some knowledge. There's no un∣derstanding all the particulars of the Predestination of the Saints: * 1.66 I confess it. Yet all they who know how to enter into them∣selves and consult universal Rea∣son, which enlightens all atten∣tive minds, clearly see, that God acts not by Caprice, that his de∣signs don't prevent his knowledge, that the Predestination and choice of the Elect supposes the presci∣ence of all good works, which they ought to do by the assistance of Grace; that

it is the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, which causes one to be cho∣sen and another rejected. This is that which St. Paul says; this is that which the Fathers say; and this is also that which I Assert. I don't say that one is chosen and another rejected, simply and meerly because God wills it; for I am a∣fraid of making God like unto Man, who guides himself by Humour, and hath no regard to his own work. It is not enough to shew that God is powerful, and that he doth what he will with his Creatures. We ought, if possible, to justifie his wisdom and his goodness: We ought to re∣present him as amiable and adorable, as much at least as we make him terrible. You cry out with St. Paul, O the Height! but let us go on, and add of the riches of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God; for it is the depth of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God, which is the principle of the Predestina∣tion of Saints; it is not a blind, rash, and imperious will, such as is often observed in the great ones of the Earth.

But Men will make God such an one as they would be themselves; because they prefer Power to Wisdom, God shall always be just and wise e∣nough for them, provided he be Powerful and So∣vereign. Men love Independance; it is a sort of Servitude to them to submit to Reason; to them it is a kind of impotence not to be able to do that which she forbids. They fear therefore to make God Impotent instead of making him Wise. They place God above all Reason; according to them he observes none, he absolutely does all that which he pleases; and for this reason meer∣ly

and solely because any thing pleases him; it is just, wise, and good to be done; Principles which certainly overturn the very Foundation of Religion, as I have * 1.67 elsewhere explained.

Will Men never reflect that the Word of God is Sovereign and Universal Reason; that this Rea∣son is Co-eternal and Substantial with God; that he necessarily, invincibly, inviolably, loves it: that tho he be obliged to follow it, he neverthe∣less continues independent: And that thus all that God wills, is Just, Wise, Regular; because God cannot act but according to his knowledge, because he cannot love but according to Order, because he cannot despise his Wisdom, and fal∣sifie himself?

But what! must it be permitted to reason up∣on Gods way of proceeding? Yes doubtless, pro∣vided we reason upon clear Ideas, and always have regard for the Truths which Faith teaches us. 'Tis this infinitely wise Conduct which we cannot too much examine, and too much admire, nothing is more comforting and instructing both together; but we lose our time when we exa∣mine Mens ways of proceeding, for they almost always follow the motions of their passions: He who loves Order, cannot make it his pass-time to see them do so, he cannot be instructed in his duty, by hearing their discourses.

Let it suffice that the Historians make Heroes of their Benefactors, & great Men of their Friends; let all their characters flatter, but Christians ought to propose to themselves other Models. Let them be perfect, as their Heavenly Father is perfect;

let them imitate his Conduct, but I must Answer the principal Objection.

The Fathers, 'tis said, and St. Augustine chief∣ly, permit us not to seek after the reason of the choice which God makes of the Elect. I main∣tain that this is not true, and that the only thing which St. Augustine requires, is, that Gods choice should not be founded upon natural Merits; so far he is from desiring that we should not have recourse to the Wisdom and Knowledge of God to give an account of his choice. But to make this well understood, we must know that the e∣nemies of Grace, and free Predestination, always used this argument which enters naturally into the mind, and which in my opinion cannot e an∣swered by reason, but by the principles which I have laid down. Thus they reason.

There is no choice to be made, where is no inequality or difference: Now God in the distri∣bution of his Graces, chuses some rather than o∣thers.

Therefore there are some Persons whom God judges more worthy of Grace, and more fit to re∣ceive it than others. God wills that all Men should be saved; he wills that all should come to the knowledge of the Faith: Now all are not saved, even the Gospel has not been preached to all. Therefore there is some inequality, or some dif∣ference among Men; for if there was a perfect equality among them, since God would enlighten them all, all would, at least, have the gift of Faith. Now this difference can only come from the good or ill use of Liberty: Therefore 'tis Man who makes himself in this sense to differ

from another * 1.68, and in some sort merits Grace. For surely tis just, or at least more reasonable, that God should give his Grace to those who are better disposed to receive it, and more likely to make a good use of it than others; to those who actually use their Liberty better, who make some essays towards acquiring Virtue, and who have more love for Order, the Truth and Justice, than to those who make no use of their Liber∣ty, and blindly follow the motions of their pas∣sions. Therefore Grace does not prevent our wills, for God acts always with the most wisdom and reason that can be: Before he assists us, he expects that we should make that use of our Liberty, which we ought and may. 'Tis upon this account that he made us free, our Salvation is in our own hands; * 1.69 the necessity of a prevent∣ing Grace ruins free will, and renders the exhor∣tations and councils of J. C. useless. 'Tis Grace must make us act, but 'tis in our power to will, to pray, and to begin.

These Reasonings are so plausible, and so ea∣sily enter into the mind, that Men are naturally Pelagians. A Man speaks the Language of the Church, when he is upon his guard, when he actually feels his own weakness, and remembers that Grace is not given according to his merits. But when nature speaks, he scarce ever fails to speak those things which favour and exalt it. The Greek Fathers, who lived before Pelagius's Heresy, or who were not cautious enough against this error, have often spoke so as to seem to main∣tain it; this is a thing sufficiently known. St. Augustine himself, before he throughly understood

the matter of Grace, thought it was in our po∣wer to believe and will, but in Gods only to give strength to perform † 1.70 And * 1.71 St. Jerome himself writing against the Palagians, says, Ʋbi autem misericordia & gratia est, liberum ex parte cessat arbitrium, quod in eo tantum est ut velimus at{que} cupiamus, & placitis tribuamus assensum. Jam in Domini potestate est, ut id quod cupimus, quod la∣boramus ac nitimur, illius ope & auxillio implere va∣leamus. Since we always feel that we are free, and do not always actually think upon the proofs which Scripture gives us of the necessity of Grace, 'tis difficult to keep our selves from saying no∣thing in behalf of Liberty against Grace; since we know and are assured, that God always acts with Reason and Wisdom, we desire to find e∣ven in the Elect themselves, some reason of their Election.

Since it can't be said, that the councils and exhortations of God are useless, we think with∣out reflecting that it altogether depends upon us to follow them. In short, on what side soever we look upon the sentiments of the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians, we find them agreeable enough to Reason; and because they pleasantly court our Pride and Self love, 'tis difficult not to let fall some words in their favour. Hence it is that we find many passages in the Fathers which may be used as a foundation for the errors concerning Grace; insomuch, that there are those who with∣out ceremony reckon some of the Greek Fathers among the Hereticks: For there are Men who judge of the Sentiments of Authors, when they seem to contradict one another, only by report∣ing

the passages in them. They do not consider that all that is said thro prejudice, according to the opinion of those to whom a man speaks, and without having seriously examined what is said, signifies nothing; but on the contrary, it is suffi∣cient once to say a truth against common preju∣dice to discover his opinion. For my part, I be∣lieve that the Greeks and Latines do not much differ one from the other, and that if they of∣ten speak very differently, 'tis because they were not equally cautious against the same errors, and had not equally examined them.

Therefore the enemies of Grace believing them∣selves so strong in reasons, accus'd St. Augustine as denying Liberty, making all depend upon fate, attributing unto God respect of persons, and ren∣dring all Preaching and Councils useless. They continually demanded of him a reason of God's choice, since he would not grant the reason of it to be an inequality or difference of wills, since it could not be an inequality of natures: But St. Augustine on his part, stuck to the Scriptures. He answer∣ed that Grace was not given according to Merits, that Man could not make himself differ from a∣nother, that he was unable not only to do good without the assistance of Grace, but that he could not will it; that the heart of Man is in the hands of God, that he disposes of it as he pleases, and that of our selves we are not able to think a good thought. In short, that he was not obliged to give an account of the reason of the choice of the Elect, because the Judgments of God are un∣searchable.

But tho St. Augustine says in an hundred pla∣ces,

that the Judgments of God are unsearcha∣ble, to silence the enemies of Grace, who would have the reason of our being chosen in our selves; he no where says, that these Judgments are not agreeable to the reason and wisdom which all Men consult, when their senses and their passions keep silence. The judgments of God are impenitrable, because 'tis impossible to know them in particu∣lar; but we ought not to be afraid of asserting that they are Just, Wise, Reasonable, full of Goodness & Equity; St Augustine himself sometimes seeks and gives Reasons of them: He was always disposed to receive those which could be reconciled with Faith, and he rejects not those of his ad∣versaries, but because they supposed, that Grace was given according to Merits; that which Re∣ligion and Christian morality can by no means grant. See how St. Augustine speaks, * 1.72 Ex duo∣bus ita{que} parvulis originali peccato obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur, & ex duobus aetate jam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur, ut vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vo∣cetur; inscrut abilia sunt judicia Dei: Ex duobus autem piis, cur huic donetur perseverantia us∣que in finem, illi autem non donetur, inscrutabiliora sunt judicia Dei. According to St. Augustine, the most unsearchable judgments of God are those by which perseverance is granted to some just Persons, and not to all. In the mean time St. Au∣gustine himself gives a reason of them in his let∣ter to Vitalis and elsewhere; and is so far from blaming them who examine Gods way of proceed∣ing with humility, and according to the Analo∣gy of Faith, that on the contrary he is very rea∣dy

to receive the reasons of others upon this sub∣ject, provided they agree with the Scripture. Prop∣ter hujus timoris utilitatem, ne regenerati & pie vi∣vere incipientes, tanquam securi alta sapiamus, qui∣dem non perseveraturi perseveraturis Dei permissione vel pravisiones ac dispositione miscentur, quibus ca∣dentibus territi, cum timore & tremore gradiamur viam justam. Sed de hac re, id est, cur quidem non permansuri in fide, & sanctitate christiana, tamen accipiant ad tempus hanc gratiam, & dimittantur hic vivere donec cadant, cum possint rapi de hac vita, ne malitia mutet intellectum eorum, quod de sancto immatura aetate defuncto Scriptum est in Libro Sa∣pientiae; quaerat quisquis ut potuerit, & si invenerit praeter hanc quae a me reddita est & aliam pro••abi∣lem rationem, a recta fidei non recedens, teneat eam, & ego cum illo, si me non latuerit † 1.73.

'Tis to make us fear, least being regenerated and beginning to live piously, we become secure and high-minded, that by Gods permission and prescience, some who will not persevere, are mix't with those who will; that thus we being afrighted by their fall, may walk in the way of righteousness with fear and trembling. But it will be said, why do they who will not per∣sist in the Faith, receive it, and continue there∣in till they fall? Why doth not God take away their Lives, before the wickedness of their hearts corrupts their minds, as 'tis written in the book of wisdom, of a Saint dying in his Infancy? Let every one seek after the best reasons of this, and if he shall find any other besides this which I have given, which renders a reason, that is probable, and according to the Analo∣gy

of Faith, let him embrace it, and if it shall be imparted to me, I shall embrace it with him.

The Author of the calling of the Gentiles, * 1.74 ob∣serves the same way of proceeding, that St. Au∣gustine doth. He every where says that the Judg∣ments of God are unsearchable, because he op∣poses the same errors; and that Faith doth not suffer us to give a reason of Gods choice of Men, from the difference of their natural Merits * 1.75. If, for example, he asks himself whence it is, that all Children are not Baptized? He is not afraid to say, that if this came from any ill use of the general Grace given to the Parents, that, * 1.76 if all received Baptism, the Parents were too negligent, not fearing lest their Children should be surprized with Death: He says, that such answers would give some ground to believe, that the grace of Baptism was due to the innocence of age, and to deny original sin. When the question is about excluding natural merits, he cries out, that the Judgments of God are unsearchable; but yet, he nevertheless doth not fail to give some gene∣ral Reasons thereof, upon other occasions. * 1.77 His principle is, that a Reason of all the Designs and Works of God cannot be given. Tertia Defini∣tio temperanter, & sobrie protestatur, non omnem vo∣luntatis Dei comprehendi posse rationem, & multas divinorum operum causas ab humana intelligentia esse subductas. An undeniable principle! But neither he, nor St. Augustine, nor, I believe, any of the Fathers, ever maintain'd that the Judgments of God were so unsearchable, as that it should be a crime to seek, and give some general Reasons

of them. They never forbad Men, to represent God Amiable, and Adorable, by justifying his Conduct, by that Idea which we have of a Being infinitely Perfect, and by the Truths Faith teach us; That which I have endeavoured, in The Treatise of Nature and Grace.

The Last Explication, The frequent Miracles of the Old Law, do by no means shew, That God often acted by par∣ticular Wills.

I Do not well understand, how Persons, who grant that God does all, and that therefore he communicates not his power to Creatures, but by making them the occasional causes of producing certain effects, can Imagine that the Conduct which he observed in respect of the Jews, should be con∣trary to that, which I think I have demonstrated several ways, viz. That God acts not by particu∣lar wills, but when the necessity of Order requires him.

They are always saying, as a thing extraor∣dinary, that the Old Testament is full of Mira∣cles, that God had promised to the Jews, Plen∣ty and Prosperity, proportionably to their sideli∣ty and obedience; and that it was not possible, that nature and morality should be so exactly combin'd together, that the Holy-Land should abound in fruits, proportionably as its Inhabitants did in virtue and good works. For my part, I

willingly grant all this: But I do not yet see how this opposes my sentiments; if it be not sup∣posed, that I acknowledge no other general Laws by which God executes his designs, but those of the communication of motions. How troublesome is it for a Man not to be able to explain his thoughts but by words, which popular use has introduced, and which every one interprets according to his prejucices and temper; and above all, to have for ones judges such Persons, who, tho they are nim∣ble and quick, yet often want equity and pene∣tration of mind!

Certainly they do not do me justice, who say that I think Manna fell every day of the Week among the Israelites except Saturday, by a neces∣sary consequence of the Laws of the communi∣cation of motions. He who is of this opinion, must needs be very foolish and impious; I am perswaded that the greatest part of the miracu∣lous effects of the Ancient Law, was done in con∣sequence of some general Laws, since the gene∣ral cause ought not to execute his purpose by particular wills, and for many more Reasons which I might add to those already mentioned.

But I am far from believing, that these extra∣ordinary effects were only the consequences of the natural Laws of the communication of moti∣ons. I grant that they may be looked upon as Miracles, and that there are more such in the World than we imagine: But I must explain my self after what manner, that I may not be thought to have changed.

J. C. as Man, received all Power in Heaven and in Earth, because God executes all the de∣sires

of his holy Soul by the general Law of Grace, by which he would save all Men in his Son. The Father has given to the Son, after this manner, all the Nations of the World, as Materials which he is to employ in the Building of his Church, as I have said elsewhere. Supposing then that J. C. for the executing of his designs, desires a certain degree of Grace for one of his Members, or rather that he desired that the fire which sa∣crificed St. Lawrance should lose its heat; it is certain this would be what we call a Miracle; nevertheless God would not work this Miracle by a particular will, but in consequence of the ge∣neral Law, the efficacy of which is determined by the actual desires of the Soul of J. C.

According to the general Laws of the commu∣nications of motions, heavy bodys fall towards the Earth; my arm is heavy, yet nevertheless I lift it up to Heaven whensoever I desire it. Certainly God who determines the motion of the Animal spirits, for the lifting up my arm according to my desires, does not then act but in consequence of the general Law of the union of the Soul and Body, by which Law I have power to move my arm; nevertheless, this motion wou'd be accoun∣ted miraculous, if we did not own some other na∣tural Laws, than those of the communication of motions.

Now I think I am able to demonstrate by the Authority of the Holy Scripture, that the An∣gels have received from God Power over the pre∣sent World, and that thus God executes their desires, and by them his own designs, according to certain general Laws; so that all which ap∣pears

miraculous in the Old Testament, does no wise prove that God may often act by particular wills.

St. Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews intend∣ing to exalt J. C. above Angels, says, that God had not subjected the World to come to them, as he had to J. C. He believed then, as a thing whereof those to whom he wrote had no doubt, that God had subjected the present World to An∣gels. If the Angels had had power over nothing, it would have been much more easy for St. Paul to have exalted J. C. above them.

Writing to the Ephesians, he assures us, that even the Devils exercise their power over Infi∣dels, * 1.78 he calls them as J. C. had done, the Princes of this World; that is to say, of those who live in the darkness of Idolatry, tenebrarum harum. If the Devils themselves exercise power over I∣dolaters, if they are Princes of this World, shall the Angels have no power over it?

The Arch-Angel Michael is called in Daniel, the Prince of the Jews, because he fought for them against the Prince of the Persians. Can a∣ny one fight without Strength and Power?

The Angels are sent as the Ministers of God to Minister to those who are to be the Heirs of Salvation. A weak Ministry! if God had not com∣municated to them his Power. A useless mission! if God had not established the general Law, whose efficacy is determined by their desires.

There are in the Old Testament a great many Passages which clearly prove that the Angels had care of the Israelites, they rewarded the observers of the Law and punished others; it is not neces∣sary

that I should relate them. But it is more to the purpose, to shew, that even from those passages which attribute to God certain effects, without making any mention of Angels, it cannot be con∣cluded, that God produced these effects by him∣self without the Ministry of Angels; because the Angels acting only by the power of God, and doing nothing but what was good, the Holy Scrip∣ture attributes to God himself, that which he did by their means.

The greatest example of this may be drawn from the manner after which the Law was given to the Jews. To read only the Old Teastament, it seems as if God had by himself spoken to Mo∣ses in the Burning-Bush, and that he gave him the Law upon Mount Sinai, without the Ministry of Angels. 'Tis God always who speaks, even JEHOVAH, that Name which is not given to Crea∣tures. And yet St. Stephen assures us, that God sent Moses to deliver his People, under the con∣duct and power of the Angel which had appear∣ed unto him in the Burning-Bush; and that he conversed also with the same Angel upon Mount Sinai.

St. Paul delivers the same thing in two of his Epistles; and 'tis upon this account, that intend∣ing in his Epistle to the Hebrews, to exalt the New Law above the Old, he begins this Epistle with a continual comparison of J. C. the Minister of Grace, with the Angels, the Ministers of the Jewish Law.

It is evident if the Law had not been given by Angels, that which St. Stephen and St. Paul assures us of, would be absolutely false. But the Angels

having given it, that which Moses says, doth not ever the less cease to be true. For God always, as the true cause, executes that which his Crea∣tures do as the occasional causes, to whom God communicates his Power according to certain Laws. And because 'tis God only who enlightens Spirits by the manifestation of necessary and im∣mutable order, (which is the inviolable rule of his own will) it is truly he who speaks to us, and commands us, when he who speaks to us from him, does not do it till he has consulted the E∣ternal Laws which his wisdom contains, that which the Blessed Angels never fail to do.

J.C. as Man, is Head of the Church, & dispences to his Members Grace which Sanctifies them. But because he has not this Power, but in consequence of a general Law which God has established in him, to execute by him his great design, the E∣ternal Temple; 'tis very truly said that God alone gives inward Grace, tho he does not in truth give it but by the Ministry of J.C. who, as Man, determines by his prayers, or his desires, the efficacy of the Divine will: And 'tis upon this account that Scripture often attributes to God alone the conversion of hearts.

In like manner, the Angels had power to lead, to conduct, and punish the Israelites; they may at present give us the outward preparations of Grace, they may remove out of our way occa∣sions of Sin and Scandal; yet all that they do, may in general be attributed to God, as the true cause, for they act only by the Power which God has given them.

Thus, I believe, that the defeat of Senacharib, the Plague which David brought upon the Peo∣ple for numbring them, the rain of Manna which fell so regularly in the Wilderness; and a thou∣sand such like effects, were miraculous. But I believe then, since Scripture assures us thereof in several places, that God did not do the greatest part of these Miracles but by the action; that is to say, the desires of the Angels which God chose to conduct his People, after he had inform∣ed himself by his wisdom, that this way would be better than any other, in relation to his prin∣cipal work: And that it would spare, as I may say, a great number of particular wills. I be∣lieve also that these desires were govern'd (as well as the Divine wills) by the necessary and immutable order, the inviolable rule of all under∣standings; by the light of the Word, the foun∣tain of all Wisdom, and of all Laws both Tem∣poral and Eternal, according to these words: Fons sapientiae Verbum in excelsis, & ingressus il∣lius Manada Aeterna.

To be convinced of that which I have said, supposing that God does all, it is enough to en∣deavour clearly to understand the sence of any one of those passages which attribute to the An∣gels, the Power of defending or punishing the Israelites. See one of these passages: God, or ra∣ther the Angel, or Prince of the Angels, St. * 1.79 Mi∣chael, says in Gods stead to Moses, after he had given him the Law; Behold I send an Angel be∣fore thee to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee to the place which I have prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for he will

not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him, By this passage 'tis evident, that an Angel con∣ducted the People, and had power to punish them if they did not obey him; now 'tis supposed that God does all. The Angel, their Conducter, had not his Power, but because God made it, as I may say, a Law to himself to obey him; like as I have not the power to remove mine Arm, but because God has established the Laws of union betwixt the Soul and Body. And the Angel does nothing actually, but because God actually executes his desires, and thereby his Eternal purposes; as I do not actually move mine Arm, but because God only does what I actually desire, and what I think to do.

Thus the Miracles of the Old Testament are only consequences of the general Laws which God made to communicate his Power to the Arch-An∣gel Michael, or the Angel that guided them. Sena∣charib's Army was defeated by the Angel, the re∣venger of Gods glory: Manna was bread made by the hands of Angels, nevertheless God did these Miracles, but by general wills; for if they had been performed by particular wills, the An∣gels could not have wrought them by a power which God gave them of conducting his peo∣ple.

Thus St. Michael and his Angels were to the Jews, that which J.C. is to the Christians. The Angels gave the old Law, J.C. is the Angel of the new Law, as the Prophet Malachy calls him, Chap. III. 1. The new Convenant promises true goods; therefore the Mediator of this Covenant must be the occasional or distributive cause of

that Grace, which gives a right to the posses∣sion of these goods. But the Old Covenant pro∣mised only Temporal goods, because the Angel, the Minister of the Law, could only bestow these goods: All that relates to Eternity, both goods and evils, ought to be reserved to J.C. The Angels who are pure Spirits, ought according to Order to have power over Bodies, inferiour sub∣stances, and by them, upon the minds of Men: For since sin, the Soul depends upon the Body, they may prepare for Grace, as in St. John, and remove the occasions of falling.

Lastly, the Angel, or rather the Arch-Angel St. Michael represented J.C. as the Old Law re∣presents the New; the Synagogue, the Church; Temporal goods, Eternal: Thus it appears, that to prove the New Covenant more excellent than the Old, St. Paul was obliged to prove (as he has done in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews) that J.C. who is the Minister thereof, is infinitely exalted above the Angels.

It must therefore be granted from the arguments which I have drawn from the Idea of a Being infi∣nitely Perfect, & from a thousand & a thousand ex∣periences that God executes his designs by general Laws. But it is not easie to demonstrate, that God acts upon such and such occasions by parti∣cular wills, tho the H. Scripture, which accom∣modates its self to our weakness, represents God sometimes as a Man, and often makes him act like Men. For tho all that which I have said of An∣gels, should be absolutely false, I might neverthe∣less suppose, and should even have all reason to believe, that God wrought the Miracles of the

Old Law, by certain general Laws, tho I had no knowledge of them; for we ought not to reject a truth clearly known, because of some objecti∣ons which may be drawn from our ignorance of many things.

Thus God forms and preserves the purely ma∣terial World, by the Laws of the communicati∣on of motions, and makes the Bodies themselves the occasional causes, which determine these Laws; for 'tis the striking of bodies upon one another, which determine their efficacy: A Body is never mo∣ved, but when another strikes upon it, and a Body is always moved when it is struck upon.

God preserves the life of Men, and likewise Civil Society, by the general Laws of the Union of Soul and Body; and makes something in these two substances, the occasional causes, which de∣termine the efficacy of these Laws. Mine Arm is moved according to my desires: my Soul suffers pain, when a Thorn pricks me.

God builds up his great Work by the general Laws of Grace, according to which he would save all Men in his Son; and because all Men are born sinners, God draws the occasional causes, which determine the efficacy of his general Laws only from J.C. who is the Head, which influen∣ces his Members, the Mediator betwixt God and Men, the Sovereign Priest of good things, the true Solomon, who has received Wisdom without mea∣sure, to make a Work, whereof the Jewish Tem∣ple was but the figure, how Magnificent soever it was.

To Conclude, God governed the Jews by ge∣neral Laws, the efficacy of which was determi∣ned

by the Action of St. Michael, and his Angels. In truth, intelligent Beings are necessary to con∣duct Men, to reward and punish them, that by the Laws of the communication of motions, the Hail knocks down the Fruit, which the Rain had made to grow; this is not properly a disorder: Bodies are not capable of good or evil, of hap∣piness, or misery: But to adjust Rewards and Merits one with another, intelligent Beings are necessary. In a word, God has established all Powers, second Causes, visible and invisible Hie∣rarchies, immediately by himself, or by the me∣diation of other powers, that he may execute his designs by general Laws, whose efficacy is determi∣ned by the action of these same Powers. For he acts not like the Kings of the Earth, who give out their Orders, and do nothing else. God, in general, doth all that which second causes do, Matter has not in it self any moving virtue, upon which depends its efficacy; and there is no ne∣cessary connexion betwixt the wills of spirits, and the effects which they produce. God doth all, but he acts by Creatures, because he was pleased to communicate his power to them, that he might accomplish his work, by ways most worthy of himself.

Thus has God done all things with Wisdom: I say with Wisdom; for an infinite Wisdom is requisite to understand all the consequences of general Laws, to rank and combine them one with another after the exactest manner, and fore∣see, that from thence would proceed a work wor∣thy of himself. 'Tis an evidence of limited un∣derstandings, to be able to do nothing but by com∣pounded

ways. But a God who knows all things, ought not to disturb the simplicity of his ways; an immutable Being must always be uniform in his conduct; a General Cause ought to act by particular wills. God's Conduct must carry in it the Character of his Attributes, if the immu∣table and necessary order of Justice do not oblige him to change: For Order is an inviolable Law, in respect of God himself; He invincibly loves it, and will always prefer it to the Arbitrary Laws, by which he executes his Designs.

THE END.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Eph. 1.21.22, 23. c. 2.21, 22. c. 4.13.16. Col. 1.15.16, 17, 18, 19. Eccl. 24.14. 1 Pet. 1.20. Eph. 1.4. Joan. 17.5, 24. Apoc. 13.8. Psal. 72.17. Eph. 2.10 Rom. 8.29.
• * 1.2

  Before his works of Old.
• * 1.3

  I was set up from e∣verlast∣ing, from the be∣gining, or ever the earth was. Funda∣vit me, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a∣pud Sept.
• * 1.4

  Ought to have gone.
• * 1.5

  Sensum altissima mysteria perscru∣tantem.
• * 1.6

  Search after Truth, in the last C. of Method.
• * 1.7

  The last Article.
• * 1.8

  Apocal. XXI. 23.
• * 1.9

  Col. I. 18. II. 19. Eph. I. 22, 23.
• * 1.10

  Eph. II. 20, &c.
• * 1.11

  Heb. IV. V, &c. X, &c.
• * 1.12

  Phil. III. 9, 10, 11, &c.
• * 1.13

  Luke XXIV. 26.
• * 1.14

  Rom. XI. 32. Gal. III. 22.
• * 1.15

  Isa. V. 3, 4.
• * 1.16

  See the last Ex∣plication of the Search after Truth.
• * 1.17

  1 Cor. 8.11.
• * 1.18

  1 Cor. 3.23.
• * 1.19

  Before this 2d. Dis. read 3d. C. of 2d. P. of Search af∣ter Truth, and the Expli. of the same C. where the Au∣thor op∣poses the Efficacy of pre∣tended second causes.
• * 1.20

  By the true cause I under∣stand the Cause which Acts by its own strength.
• * 1.21

  Heb. 11.5.
• * 1.22

  Eph. I. 22, 23. IV. 16. Col. 11.19. Act. IX. 5. Col I. 24. 1 Cor. XII. 27. &c.
• * 1.23

  Ioh. VII. 39.
• * 1.24

  Heb. 7.25, Rom. 8.34. 1 Joh. II. 1. Joh. XI. 42.
• * 1.25

  Eph. IV. 13.
• * 1.26

  Athan. Orat. 4. in Aria∣nos. S. I∣ren. Lib. V. S. Ba∣sil Ep. 391. ad Amphil. S. Greg. Naz. O∣rat. 36. S. Cyr. of Alex. Thres. lib. 9. C. 4. The∣od. Tom. 4. p. 731.
• * 1.27

  Ezek. 33.2. Eccles. 15.12.
• * 1.28

  John 15.4.
• * 1.29

  Rom. V. 14, 17, 18, 19. 1 Cor. 15 48.
• * 1.30

  1 Joh. 11.72.
• * 1.31

  Search af∣ter Truth, 1. explic. That God is not the Author of our concupis∣cence.
• * 1.32

  Luke X. 1. Eph. IV. 12. & 12.
• * 1.33

  Heb. ch. II.
• * 1.34

  Book III. of the Searchaf∣ter Truth, and in the Ex∣plication of the Nature of Ideas.
• * 1.35

  Luke 24.26. Acts 17.3.
• * 1.36

  Heb. 8.3.
• * 1.37

  First Explicat. of the Search af∣ter Truth.
• * 1.38

  Expli. of the 7. Ch. lib. 2, part. 3.
• * 1.39

  First Explicat,
• * 1.40

  Supposing there was a∣ny Reason for the Author's high Esteem of that Cere∣mony, the Example serves his Purpose well enough.
• * 1.41

  Col. 2.19.
• * 1.42

  Heb. 7.25. 9.24 John 11.42.
• * 1.43

  Mat. 28.18.
• * 1.44

  Chap. 4.16. See Col. 11.19.
• * 1.45

  Coloss. 2.7.
• * 1.46

  John 1.17.
• * 1.47

  Heb. 5.5, 10. Heb. 7.16, 17.
• * 1.48

  John 7.39. John 16.7.
• * 1.49

  John 5.22, to 27.
• * 1.50

  Ut inno∣tescat principa∣libus & potestatibus in coelestibus per Ecclesiam multisormis Sapientia Dei∣— 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.51

  1 John 2.1. Mat. 9.13. John 11.42.
• * 1.52

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.53

  Because it figures Jesus C. it may be called a SACRA∣MENT in the large & unrestrain'd Sense, but not according to the strict and limited Sense of the Word; as it signifies an Outward, Visible sign, which not only signifies but dispences Grace.
• * 1.54

  Tertul. de Resur∣rect. Car∣nis. Cy∣ril. Alex. Thes. p. 153. A. thanas. Orat. 3. in Aria∣nos.
• * 1.55

  2 Cor. 5.21.
• * 1.56

  Rom. 5.12.14.
• * 1.57

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.58

  1 Cor. 15.45.47.
• * 1.59

  Vulg. Lat. de Paradiso. ••ccl. 24.30.31.
• * 1.60

  Eccl 24.25, 26, 27
• * 1.61

  Prov. 3.18.
• * 1.62

  Apoc. 11.7.
• * 1.63

  Gen. 4.
• * 1.64

  John. 5.39.
• * 1.65

  1 Cor. 10 11.
• * 1.66

  Praedestinatio fine praesci∣entia esse non potest, Prosp∣resp. ad Cap. XV. Gall. Non tamen Electio praecedit ju∣stificationem, sed electio∣nem justificatio; nemo e∣nim elegitur, nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est quia elegit nos ante mundi constituti∣onem, non video quomodo sit dictum nisi praescientiâ, Aug. l. 1. ad Simp. quaest. 2.
• * 1.67

  In the Explicat. of the na∣ture of I∣deas, To. 3. of the Search.
• * 1.68

  Vid. Prosp. adversus Col. c. 6.
• * 1.69

  See St. Augustine lib. 1. ad. Bonif. c. 19. & lib. 2. c. 8. & elswhere
• † 1.70

  No∣strum est enim cre∣dere, illi∣us autem dare cre∣dentibus & volen∣tibus fa∣cultatem bene o∣perandi. Lib. Re∣tractat. Cap. 23.
• * 1.71

  Lib. 3.
• * 1.72

  De bo∣no perse∣ver. c. 9.
• † 1.73

  Epist. 107. de Cor. & Grat. c. 23.
• * 1.74

  Lib. 1. c. 13. & seq
• * 1.75

  Lib. 2. c. 23.
• * 1.76

  C. 24.
• * 1.77

  Lib. 2. c. 30.
• * 1.78

  Eph. 2.2.
• * 1.79

  Exod. 23.20.