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XIV.
It is God who gives to the Soul of J. C. all Thoughts and Motions which it has in the forma∣tion of his Mystical Body. So that if on one hand the Wills of J. C. as natural and occasional Cau∣ses, determine the efficacy of God's general Will; on the other hand, it is God himself who deter∣mines the divers Wills of J. C. Thus it comes to the same thing; for assuredly the Wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of his Fa∣ther.
I confess that the particular wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of the Father, but this is not because the Father has particular wills which answer to those of the Son, and determine them: This is only because the wills of the Son are always conformable to Order in general, which is necessarily the rule of the divine wills, and of those which love God. For to love Order, is is to love God, it is to will what God wills; it is to be Just, Wise, Regular, in his love. The Soul of J. C. would form to the Glory of his Father the most Sacred, Magnificent and Perfect Temple that can be: Order requires this, for nothing can be made too great for God. All the divers desires of this Soul, ever intent upon the Execution of its design, come also to it from God or the Word to which it is united. But the occasional causes of all these thoughts, most certainly are its divers desires, for it thinks on what it will.
Now these divers desires are sometimes altoge∣ther free; probably the thoughts which excite these desires, do not always invincibly determine the Soul of J. C. to form and resolve to execute them. It is equally advantagious to the design of Jesus Christ, whether it be Peter or John who does that which the regularity of his work re∣quires: It is true, that the soul of Jesus Christ is not indifferent, as to what respects the glory of his Father, or that which Order necessarily re∣quires; but it is altogether free in every thing else, nothing out of God invincibly determines its love. Thus it ought not to be wonder'd if it
have particular wills, tho there are no such wills in God which determine those of the soul of Jesus Christ.
But I grant that the wills of Jesus Christ are not free, I grant that his knowledge determines him to will, and always to will after a certain manner, in the construction of his Church. But it must be Eternal Wisdom to which his soul is united, which determines these wills; if it is not necessary for this end, to suppose particular wills in God. It must be observ'd, that the wills of the soul of J. C. are particular, or have not any occasional cause which determines their efficacy, no, not the will of God. For the soul of J. C. not having an infinite capacity of thinking, his knowledge, and consequently his wills, are limi∣ted. Thus 'tis necessary that his wills be parti∣cular, since they change according to his divers thoughts and applications: For it seems to me that the soul of J. C. otherwise employ'd in con∣templating the beauties, and tasting the infinite sweetness of the true good, ought not according to the rule of Order, to think at the same time upon all the Ornaments which it designs to be∣stow upon his Church, and the different means of executing each of his intentions. J. C. desi∣ting to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father, he desires also to adorn it with infinite beauties, and that by such means as are most conformable to Order. It is therefore necessary that he continually change desires; infi∣nite wisdom is only able to prescribe general Laws for executing his designs. Now seeing the suture world must subsist eternally, and be infinite∣ly
more perfect than the present World, it was expedient that God should establish an intelligent occasional cause, and enlightned with divine wis∣dom, to the end that it might correct the defects which necessarily happen in works formed by ge∣neral Laws. The striking of Bodies upon one another, which determines the efficacy of the ge∣neral Laws of Nature, is an occasional cause with∣out Understanding and without Liberty. Thus, it cannot be, but there must be Defects and Mon∣sters in the World; which Defects it would be unworthy of the Wisdom of God to correct by particular wills.
But J. C. being an intelligent occasional cause, enlightned by Divine Wisdom, and capable of particular wills, as the particular necessities of his work require; it is plain that the future World will be infinitely more Perfect than the present; that the Church shall be without deformity, as Scripture teaches us, and that this work will be altogether worthy of the esteem of GOD him∣self.
After this manner it is, that the Eternal Wis∣dom renders, as I may say, to the Father that which it had taken from him; for not permit∣ting him to act by particular wills, it seems as if it rendred him impotent. But being incarnate, it left God to act as became him, by the more simple and general ways, * 1.1 and yet produced a work in which the most enlightned understanding shall never be able to observe the least defect.
XV.
After having proved by the Authority of Scrip∣ture, that the divers motions of the Soul of J. C. are the occasional causes, which determine the general efficacy of the Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son; 'tis neces∣sary further in general to prove by reason, that we ought not to believe that God in the Order of Grace acts by particular wills. For tho by Reason without Faith it cannot be demonstrated, that God has established the wills of a God man, as the occasional cause of his gifts, it may never∣theless be known that he does not distribute them to Men by particular wills, and that by two ways, a Priori and a Posteriori, that is to say by the Idea which we have of God, and by the effects of Grace; for there is nothing but proves this Truth. See the proof a Priori.
A wise Being must act wisely; God cannot falsifie himself: His actions must bear the Cha∣racter of his Attributes. Now God knows eve∣ry thing, and foresees every thing; his under∣standing has no bounds: Therefore his manner of acting must bear the character of an infinite understanding. Now to chuse occasional causes, and establish general Laws for executing any work, denotes a knowledge infinitely more extended than to change wills every moment, or to act by par∣ticular wills: God therefore executes his designs by general Laws, the efficacy of which is deter∣mined by the occasional causes. Certainly it re∣quires a more comprehensive understanding, to make a Watch, which according to the Laws of Mechanism shall go always and regularly, whe∣ther
a Man carries it about with him, or hangs it up, or gives it what shake he will; than to make one which cannot go truly, if he who made it does not every moment change something in it according to the different postures in which he puts it: For surely, when there are a great ma∣ny relations to compare and combine with one ano∣ther, there needs a greater understanding. To see all the consequences which may happen from a general Law, an insinite understanding is requi∣site; but nothing of all this is to be foreseen when one changes his wills every moment.
Therefore to establish general Laws, and chuse the most simple, and at the same time the most fruitful, is a way of acting worthy of him, whose Wisdom has no bounds. On the contrary, to act by particular wills, shews a limited understand∣ing, and which cannot compare the consequences, or effects of causes less fruitful. The same truth may further be demonstrated a Priori by some Attributes of God, as his immutibility, by which Mr. de Cartes proves, that every thing in motion describes a right line, and that there is always an equal quantity of motion in the World, and other Truths. But these proofs a Priori are too abstract to convince the generality of Men of the truth which I propose. It is expedient to prove it by the signs which I have heretofore gi∣ven for discerning the effects which are produced by particular wills, from those which are the con∣sequences of some general Law.
XVI.
God being infinitely wise, neither wills nor does any thing without end. Now Grace often falls
upon hearts so disposed that it is unfruitsul. Therefore it does not fall upon hearts by a par∣ticular will, but only by a necessary consequence of general Laws, for the same reason that rain falls upon the Sand and on the Sea, as well as on Sown ground.
Tho God may punish sinners, or make them more miserable than they are, he cannot design to make them more culpable or more criminal. Now Grace sometimes renders Persons more cul∣pable and more criminal, and God certainly knows that according to their actual dispositions, the Grace which he gives them will have this sad effect. There∣fore these Graces do not fall upon corrupted hearts by the particular will of God, but by a neces∣sary consequence of general Laws which he has established to produce better effects; for the same reason, that too much rain sometimes spoils and putrifies the Fruits of the earth, tho God by his general will, causes it to rain to make them grow and encrease.
XVII.
If God intended that certain Lands should be barren, he need only to cease to will that the rain should water them. In like manner, if God would that the hearts of some sinners should be hard∣ned, it would suffice that the rain of grace did not water them, he needed only to leave them to themselves, they would soon be corrupted.
Why should we attribute to God a particular will, to make so severe a use thereof, and so ir∣reconcileable with the price of the Blood of his Son? But some may say, God never had this design when he gave his Grace to sinners. This
doubtless will appear more reasonable, but if God gives his Grace by a particular will, he has a particular design. Now seeing his Grace has this sad effect, God is frustrated in his intention, since he gave it with a particular design to do good to this sinner. For I speak not here of the Graces, or rather of the Gifts, which St. Paul explains in 1 Cor. Chap. 12. Ver. 9. I speak of the Grace which God gives for the Conversion of him, to whom it is given; and not of those Graces which God vouchsafes for the profit of others, such as the gift of Prophecy, the discerning of Spirits, that of speaking with divers Tongues, of Healing diseases, and such like.
When rain falls in such abundance that the floods wash away the root of the Fruits, it ought to be judged that this rain comes by the necessary con∣sequence of the general Laws which God has e∣stablished for better effects. In the mean time it is certain, that God might have ordained it by a particular will. For God to punish Men might will, that rains designed to make the Earth Fruit∣ful, might render them barren upon some ac∣count. But it is not the same of the rain of Grace, since God could not dispence it, with a design of punishing Men, much less of rendring them more culpable and more criminal. Thus 'tis still much more certain, that the rain of Grace is dispen∣sed by general wills than the ordinary rain. Ne∣vertheless, most Men easily believe, that rains are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions; and there are few who do not feel some difficulty in believing that God by general wills, gives us all
those motions of Grace, the effects of which we hinder.
'Tis very probable that this difficulty comes, because we naturally think that God acts much after the same manner that we do; and that he has every moment particular wills towards men, something like those which we have in respect of our Friends. For tho we confess with the mouth, that there are infinite differences betwixt Gods manner of acting, and ours; nevertheless, since we usually judge others in respect to our selves, without reflecting thereon, few persons when they would speak of God, seriously consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect.
And because there is some appearance of no∣velty in that which I say, this causes some diffi∣culty to the understanding, which reasonably su∣spects all that is not ordinary.
I particularly esteem and honour all those, who in matter of Religion, have a secret aversion for all novelties. They do not offend me at all, when they oppose my Sentiments, when this is the mo∣tive; and since their prejudices are very reason∣able, tho they should even revile me, I should not cease to have a respect for them. For the disposition of their mind is infinitely more rea∣sonable, than that of certain People, who readily embrace all that which carries in it the chara∣cter of Novelty. Nevertheless, seeing I believe that Man ought to love and search after the Truth with all his strength, and communicate it to o∣thers, when he believes he has found it; I think having supposed all that Faith teaches us, I may or ought to discover that which may confirm it,
or cause it to be embraced by all men. I might justifie this Sentiment by the Practice of the Fathers and the Authority of St. Augustine himself, who often exhorts Men to understand the truth which they already believe in the obscurity of Faith. But I don't think there are any Persons so unreason∣able, as to blame my conduct, how much pre∣judiced soever they may be against my Sentiments. Therefore I beg of those who will give themselves the trouble of reading what I have written, not to suppose that I am deceived, to suspend their judgment, till they shall well comprehend my mean∣ing; not to condemn me in general terms, nor rashly to draw untoward consequences from my meaning.
In matters so obscure as those of Grace, the advantage is always on his side who makes the on-set; and it is not just to make use of it. Men ought to act with equity, and without prejudice compare all the consequences which may be drawn from different Sentiments, that at last they may embrace that which shall seem most conformable to the Goodness and Wisdom of God. For he is not equitable, who without Examination con∣demns an Opinion, by reason of some invidious consequences, which are always drawn from it, when the imagination is affrighted and prevented by contrary Sentiments.
XVIII.
I know, for example, that some persons have said that I make all Prayers useless, and that I take from Men that confidence which they ought to have in God; because God acting by general wills, we ought not according to them to hope for Hea∣ven
by particular assistances. I own, that if this consequence was contain'd in my Principles, they would be False, Heretical, and Impious. For he that takes away the Hope and Trust we ought to have in God, overturns Religion; and it is part∣ly upon this account that I cannot be of their mind, who do the most oppose my way of re∣conciling Grace with Liberty. But my Princi∣ples are so far from leading Men to despair, that they shew to the Just, and even to Sinners (af∣ter a way which to me seems most comforting) the means of obtaining from God the things of which they stand in need.
For if we are Just, our Prayers are Meritori∣ous, and if they be Meritorious, Order requires they should be heard. And because Order in re∣spect of God himself, is a Law infinitely more inviolable than the Laws which he hath establi∣shed for the construction of his work, he never fails to do that which Order prescribes unto him. Thus the prayers of the Just are never useless: This I have shewn in the 19. Article of the se∣cond Discourse. But if we be sinners, it is cer∣tain that our Prayers in themselves are useless. * 1.2 Nevertheless we ought not to despair: We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righ∣teous. He came to save Sinners. His Prayers are always and readily heard; let us Pray in his Name, or address to him himself. Our Prayers will solicite him to form some desires in our be∣half; and his desires are the occasional causes which infallibly determine the efficacy of the ge∣neral Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son.
This is what I have very largely proved in the second discourse. Thus I am so far from take∣ing away the confidence which we ought to have in God, that I do by the Authority of the Scrip∣ture, particularly shew what way we ought to take to obtain of God, the Graces which are necessa∣ry for us. I therefore beg of the Readers, that they will do me the justice, as to examine my Sentiments without prejudice; and I am willing they should afterwards judge of them according to their evidence. For I submit all my thoughts, not only to the censures of the Church, (which, by an Authority to which I am always ready to refer my self, has a right to make me quit them) but also to the judgement of particular persons, by whose Advice I shall endeavour to profit.
Ut inno∣tescat principa∣libus & potestatibus in coelestibus per Ecclesiam multisormis Sapientia Dei∣— 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
1 John 2.1. Mat. 9.13. John 11.42.