A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

The First Part. Of Liberty.

I.

THere is nothing more uncomely, than the substance of Spirits, if they are sepa∣rated from God: For what is a Mind without Understanding and Reason, without Motion and Love? In the mean time the Word and Wisdom of God is the Universal Reason of Spirits; it is the Love by which God loves himself, which gives to the Soul all the motion that it has towards happiness: The Mind cannot know the Truth, but by its natural and necessary union with Truth its self; it cannot be reasonable, but by reason: in short, it cannot, in some sence, be a Mind and Understanding, but because its Substance is enlightned, penetra∣ted

and perfected by the Light of God him∣self.

I have elsewhere explain'd these Truths. * 1.1 As the substance of the Soul is not capable of loving that which is good, but by its natural and necessary union with the eternal and substantial Love of the Soveraign Good; so it moves not towards that which is good, but so far forth as God carries it: it is not Will, but by the motion which God conti∣nually imprints upon it; it lives not, but by chari∣ty; it wills not, but by the love of good, which God imparts unto it, tho' it abuses it. For in truth, as God neither makes nor preserves Minds, but for himself, so he carries them towards him∣self as long as he preserves their being: he com∣municates the love of happiness to them, as far as they are capable. Now this natural and con∣tinual motion of the Soul towards good in gene∣ral, towards good undetermined, that is, towards God, is that which I here call the Will; because it is this motion which makes the Soul capable of loving different goods.

II.

This natural motion of the Soul towards good in general is invincible; for it is not in our power to chuse not to be happy. We necessarily love that we clearly know, and sensibly feel to be the true good. All minds love God by the necessity of their nature: and if they love any thing but God by the free choice of the will, it is not because they do not seek after God, or the cause of their hap∣piness, but because having a confused sence, that Bodies about them make them happy, they look upon them as their Goods, and by a natural and

ordinary consequence, love them, and unite them∣selves to them.

III.

But the love of all these particular goods, is not naturally invincible. Man, considered as God made him, may hinder himself from loving those goods which do not fill the whole capacity he has of loving. Seeing there is a good which contains all others, Man may sacrifice to the love of this good all other loves; for God having made minds for himself, he cannot engage them invincibly to love any thing but himself, or with relation to himself. The inward sentiment which we have of our selves, teaches us, that we may, for exam∣ple, refuse any fruit, tho we are inclin'd to receive it. Now this power of loving, or not loving particular goods, this non-invincibility, which is in that motion, which carries the minds to love that which does not seem to them to contain all goods; this power, this non-invincibility, is that which I call liberty. Thus, by putting the definition in the place of the thing defin'd, this expression, Our will is free, signifies, that the natural motion of our Soul towards good in general, is not invincible, in respect of any particular good. We do also to this word free, joyn the Idea of voluntary: but hereafter I shall take this word in the sense which I have observ'd, because this is most natural and most ordinary.

IV.

The word good is equivocal, it may signifie ei∣ther pleasure which makes Men formally happy, or else the true or apparent cause of pleasure.

I shall in this Discourse always take the word good in the second sense; because in truth plea∣sure is imprinted upon the Soul, to the end that she may love the cause of her happiness, that by the motion of her love she may be carried to∣wards it, and be straitly united thereunto, and so be continually happy. When the Soul loves no∣thing but her pleasure, she truly loves nothing but her self: for pleasure is only a condition or mo∣dification of the Soul which renders her actually happy. Now, since the Soul cannot be to her self the cause of her happiness, she is unjust, she is un∣grateful, she is blind, if she loves her pleasure, without paying that love and respect which is due to the true cause which produces it in her. Since there is none but God, who can immediately and by himself act upon the Soul, and make her feel pleasure by the actual efficacy of his Almighty Will, there is none but he who can be truly good. Nevertheless, I call the creatures which are the ap∣parent causes of those pleasures which they occasion in us, by the name of goods. For I would not avoid the ordinary way of speaking, but as far as it is necessary clearly to express my self. All the crea∣tures, tho good in themselves and perfect in re∣spect of God's designs, are not good in respect to us, I mean, they are not our good, because they are not the true causes of our pleasure or our hap∣piness.

V.

The natural motion which God continually im∣prints upon the Soul, to engage it to love him, or (to use a term which expresses several Ideas, and which can neither be equivocal nor confused, after

the definition I have given thereof) the will is de∣termined towards particular goods, either by clear and distinct knowledge, or by a confused senti∣ment which shews us these goods. If the mind neither sees nor tastes any particular good, the mo∣tion of the Soul continues, as it were, undeter∣min'd, it tends towards good in general. But this motion receives a particular determination, as soon as the mind has an idea or sentiment of any particular good: for the Soul being incessantly moved towards good indetermin'd, she must be moved as soon as any object seems to be good to her.

VI.

Now, when the good which is present to the Understanding and Senses, does not altogether fill these two faculties; when it appears under the idea of a particular good, which does not contain all goods; and when it is tasted by a sentiment which does not fill all the capacity of the Soul, she must still further desire the sight and enjoyment of some other good; she may suspend the judgment of her love; she need not to rest in the actual en∣joyment, but may by her desires seek after some new object. And seeing her desires are the occa∣sional cause of her knowledge, she may, by the natural and necessary union of all Spirits with him, who contains the ideas of all goods, discover the true good; and in the true good, a great many other particular goods, different from what she saw and tasted before. Thus, being acquainted with the vacuity and vanity of sensible goods at∣tending to the secret reproaches of reason, and to the remorse of her conscience, to the complaints

and threatnings of the true good, who will not that we should sacrifice him to apparent and ima∣ginary goods; she may (by the motion which God imprints continually upon her, after good in ge∣neral, or the soveraign good, that is, towards himself) stop her carrier after any good whatso∣ever. She may resist all sensible perswasives, seek and find other objects; compare them betwixt themselves, and with the indeleble idea of the so∣veraign good; and love none of them with a de∣termined love. And if this soveraign good makes it self to be tasted, she may prefer it to all parti∣cular goods; tho the sweetness which they seem to transfer into the Soul be very great and ve∣ry agreeable. These Truths must be further ex∣plain'd.

VII.

The Soul is carried towards good in general; she desires to possess all goods, and would never confine her love; there is no good which appears so to her, that she refuses to love: Therefore, while she actually enjoys any particular good, she has yet a motion to go further; she still desires some other thing, by the natural and invincible im∣pression God puts into her; and to change or di∣vide her love, it is sufficient to present unto her ano∣ther good, than that which she enjoys, and to make her taste the sweetness of it. Now the Soul may ordinarily seek and discover new goods; she may also come near and enjoy them. For, in short, these desires are the natural or occasional causes of her knowledge. Objects discover themselves to her, and approach unto her proportionally, as she desires to know them. An ambitious per∣son,

who considers the splendour of some dignity, may also think of the slavery, of the constraint, of the real ills which accompany humane great∣ness. He may calculate, weigh and compare all things together, if his passion does not blind him: For, I confess, there are times, when the passions entirely rob the mind of its liberty; and they al∣ways do diminish it. Thus, seeing any dignity how great so ever it may appear, is not accounted by a Man free and reasonable, as the universal and infinite good; and since the will generally reaches to all goods, this Man, who is perfectly free and reasonable, may seek and find others, seeing he may desire them: for 'tis his desires which disco∣ver and present them unto him. He may examine and compare them with that which he enjoys. But because he can meet with none but particular goods upon earth, he may and ought here below continually and without intermission seek and en∣quire; or, rather, that he may not change every moment, he ought generally to neglect all these transient goods, and desire only those which are immutable and eternal.

VIII.

Nevertheless, seeing Men do not love to search, but to enjoy, seeing the labour of examination is at present very troublesome; but rest and enjoy∣ment always very pleasant, the Soul ordinarily stops as soon as she has found any good; she fixes upon it, that she may enjoy it. She deceives her self, because by deceiving her self, and judging that she has found that she seeks, her desire is chang'd into pleasure; and pleasure renders her more happy than desire. But her happiness can∣not

last long. Her pleasure being ill grounded, unjust, and deceitful, it presently troubles and disquiets her, because she would be truly and so∣lidly happy. Thus the natural love of good a∣wakens and produces new desires in her: These confused desires represent new objects. Seeing the Soul loves pleasure, she runs after those which communicate it, or seems to communicate it; and because she loves repose, she takes up with them. She does not at first examine the defects of the pre∣sent good, whilst it prevents her by its sweetness; she considers it rather on the fair side; she applies her self to that which charms her; thinks of no∣thing but enjoying it. And the more she enjoys it, the more she loves it; the nearer she approaches to it, the more she considers it. But now the more she considers it, the more defects she discovers in it: and since she desires to be invincibly happy, she cannot for ever be deceived. When she is hun∣gry, thirsty, and tired with seeking, she present∣ly satiates, and fills her self with the first good she meets; but she presently disgusts the nourishment for which Man was not made. Thus the love of the true good still excites in her new desires after new objects; and being in continual change, all her life and all her happiness upon earth, consists only in a continual circulation of thoughts, desires, and pleasures. Such is the condition of a Soul which makes no use of its liberty, which suffers its self to be lead, at all adventures, by the motion which transports her, and by the fortuitous im∣pression of objects which determine her. This is the condition of one whose mind is so weak, that he always takes false goods for the true; and a

heart so corrupted, that he sells and blindly gives himself up to all that affects him, or the good which makes him actually feel the most sweet and agree∣able pleasures.

IX.

But a Man perfectly free, such as we conceive Adam, immediately after his creation, clearly knows, that God only is his good, or the true cause of the pleasures which he enjoys. Tho he feels sweetness by the approach of objects which are a∣bout him, he does not love them, he only loves God; and if God forbids him to unite himself to bodies, he is ready to forsake what pleasure so ever he finds therein. He will not take up, but in the enjoyment of the soveraign good: to him he will sacrifice all others; and how much so ever he desires to be happy, or to enjoy pleasures, no plea∣sure is too strong for his knowledge. Not but that pleasures may blind him and disturb his reason, and fill the capacity which he has of thinking: for the mind being finite, all pleasure may distract and divide it. But the reason is, because (tho plea∣sures be under the Command of his Will) he was not cautious to keep himself from being in∣toxicated therewith: because the only invincible pleasure is that of the blessed, or that which the first Man would have found in God, if God would have prevented or hindred his fall; not only be∣cause this pleasure fills all the faculties of the Soul, without troubling Reason or engaging it in the love of false goods; but also nothing opposes the enjoyment of this pleasure, neither the desire of perfection, nor that of happiness. For whilst we love God, we are perfect; whilst we love him, we

are happy; and when we love him with pleasure, we are perfect and happy both together. Thus the most perfect liberty is that of minds, to which no motion towards particular goods is ever invin∣cible; it is that of Man before sin, before concu∣piscence had disturbed his understanding and cor∣rupted his heart. And the most imperfect liber∣ty is that of a mind, to which every motion, af∣ter any particular good, how little so ever it ap∣pears, is always and in all circumstances invin∣cible.

X.

Now, betwixt these two sorts of liberty, there are infinite degrees more or less perfect, which is not commonly observed. Men ordinarily imagine, that liberty is equal in all Men, and that it is a faculty essential to their minds, the nature of which continues always the same, tho its action varies according to the different objects: Men, who don't reflect, suppose a perfect equality in all things where they do not sensibly observe an ine∣quality. They comfort and excuse themselves from all application, by giving to all things an abstract∣ed form, whose essence consists in a kind of indi∣visibility. But they deceive themselves: liberty is not such a faculty as they imagine. There are no two persons equally free, in respect of the same ob∣jects. Children are less than Men, who have the full use of their reason; and there are no two Men who have their reason equally firm and assured in respect of the same objects. They who have violent passions, and are not accustomed to resist them, are less free than they who have generously opposed them and are naturally moderate: There

are no two Men equally moderate, equally sensible, as to the same objects, and who have equally con∣tended for the preservation of their liberty. There are also persons so enslav'd to sin, that they do less resist, and less think of resisting whilst they are awake, than good Men do whilst they sleep: for, according to the Word of Truth, He that commits sin, is the servant of sin.

XI.

It is true, according to the institution of nature, all Men are equally free: for God does not invin∣cibly engage minds to love any particular good. But concupiscence corrupts the heart and reason: and Man, having lost the power of obliterating the traces of sensible pleasures, and stopping the motions of his concupiscence, this liberty, equal in all Men, if they had not sinned, is become un∣equal, according to the different degrees of their knowledge, and their concupiscence which diffe∣rently acts in them. For even concupiscence its self, which is equal in all Men, as they have lost the power which they had over their bodies, is unequal a thousand ways, by reason of the diver∣sity which is to be found in the conformation of their bodies, in the multitude and motion of the animal spirits, and in the almost infinite relations and connexions which are made, by their concerns in the World.

XII.

Still further, to discern more distinctly the ine∣quality which is to be found in different persons, it must be observed, that any Man who is perfectly reasonable and free, and who would be truly hap∣py, may and ought, when any pleasant object pre∣sents

its self, suspend his love, and carefully exa∣mine whether this object be the true good, or whe∣ther the motion which carries him after it, do exactly agree with that which carries after the true good. Otherwise he would love by instinct, and not by reason; and if he could not suspend the judgment of his love before he had examined it, he would not be perfectly free. But if he should clearly see, that this pleasant object should be tru∣ly good for him; and if this evidence joyn'd to the sentiment be such, that he could not suspend his judgment, then tho perfectly free, yet he is not so in respect of this good; he invincibly loves it, because pleasure and knowledge do agree in re∣commending it: But since there is none but God who can act in us, or be our good, since the mo∣tion which thrusts us forward towards the crea∣tures, does not agree with that which carries us towards God: any Man, who is perfectly reason∣able and free, may hinder himself from judging that sensible objects are goods: he may and ought to suspend the judgment which governs, or ought to govern his love; for he can never evidently see that sensible goods are true goods, because he can never evidently see that which is not.

XIII.

This power of suspending the judgment, which actually governs the love; this power which is the principle of our liberty, and by which it is that pleasures are not invincible, is much lessened since sin, tho not altogether annihilated. And that we may have this power, when any object tempts us, it is necessary, besides some love of order, to have presence of mind, or be sensible of remorse of

conscience; for a Child, or a Man asleep, has not actually this power. But all Men are not equally inlightned; the minds of sinners are full of dark∣ness. Consciences are not equally tender; the heart of sinners is hardened. The love of order and actual graces are unequal in all Men. There∣fore all Men are not equally free: they have not an equal power of suspending their judgment; plea∣sure determines, and carries them towards some objects, rather than others. Such an one can su∣spend his judgment, or stop his consent, tho the present object may make him feel a very lively and sensible pleasure: And another has so little a mind, and a heart so corrupted, that, to him the least pleasure is invincible, the least affliction insupport∣able. Not being accustomed to withstand sensible invitations, his disposition is such, that he'll not so much as think of resisting them. So that, at this time, he has no power of suspending his consent; seeing he has not so much as the power of re∣flecting thereon: In respect of this object, he's like a Man that is asleep, or one who has lost his mind.

XIV.

The weaker reason is, the more sensible the Soul becomes, and judges more rashly and falsly of sensible goods or evils. When a Man is in a slumber, if a straw or feather doth but tickle him, he instantly awakes, as much affrighted, as if a serpent had bitten him. He looks upon this little uneasiness, and judges of it, as one of the greatest afflictions; to him it seems insupportable. His rea∣son being weakened by his slumber, he cannot suspend his judgment; the least goods or evils

are almost always invincible to him. The senses act in him, and they always judge rashly: This must be so for many reasons. When reason is not so weak, little pleasures are not invincible, nor little evils insupportable: we do not always pur∣sue after that wherein we find most pleasure. For there are pleasures so little, that reason despises them; for reason always supposes some love of order: It causes Men to be not so much affrighted at the sight of little evils; to resolve, for exam∣ple, on having a Vein opened, and to endure it; not to judge so rashly, to suspend, to examine; and the stronger reason is, the more it will suspend the judgment, notwithstanding the sensible attra∣ctives and horrours. Now, nothing is more cer∣tain, than that all Men do not equally partake of reason, tho all do partake thereof; that all are not equally sensible, at least, of the same objects; that they are not equally born, educated, assisted by the grace of J. C. and that, upon these accounts, they are not all equally free, or capable, to suspend the judgment of their love, in respect of the same objects.

XV.

Now it ought to be observ'd, that the principal duty of Spirits is, to preserve and encrease their liberty; because it is only by the good use they shall make thereof, that they may merit their hap∣piness, if they be assisted by the grace of J. C. and, at least, lessen their misery, if they be left to themselves. That which diminishes our liberty, or that which makes pleasures with respect to us invincible, is because the light of our reason is clouded; and we have lost the power which we

ought to have over our bodies. Man therefore ought to inform his reason by continual medita∣tions; he ought to consider his duties, that he may fulfil them; and his weaknesses, that he may have recourse unto him who is all our strength. And since we have lost the power of stopping the im∣pressions which are made upon the body by the pre∣sence of objects, and which afterwards corrupt the understanding and heart, we ought to fly these objects; we ought to use that power which we have remaining; we must be continually careful to purisie our imagination, and even labour with all our strength to obliterate the traces which false goods have imprinted thereon; since these traces excite in us such desires as distract our liberty. By this means, a Man, whose liberty is almost anni∣hilated, in respect of whom, all pleasures, how little so ever, are invincible, may acquire such a strength and liberty, that he will not be inferiour to the greatest Souls, assistances being supposed e∣qual. For at the time at least when these pleasures do not solicite to evil, he may seek to avoid them; he may fortifie himself by some reason, which, by proposing future pleasures, may counter balance those which he does not actually enjoy. For as there is no person who has not some love of order, so there's no Man who may not vanquish a weak and light pleasure by a strong solid reason, by a rea∣sonable fear of some evil, or by the hope of greater good. In short, there's none who may not at least, by the ordinary succours of grace, over∣come certain pleasures and avoid others. Now these pleasures, before invincible, or how ever ea∣gerly pursued, being conquered or avoided, a Man

may prepare himself to encounter others, at least before they attempt him. For the sweetness which he tastes after the victory, encourages him to the fight; the joy of a good conscience, and the grace of J. C. give courage; and even the fear of being overcome is not unusal: for it may make him re∣pair to him, in whom we may do all things; it makes us wisely avoid dangerous occasions. Thus, by this exercise, we always gain; for, to conclude, if we be overcome, we thereby become more hum∣ble, more wise, more circumspect, and some times also even more zealous in the fight, and better able to vanquish or resist.

XVI.

As in the study of Sciences, they who do not consent to the false light of probability, and ac∣custom themselves to suspend their judgment till the light of truth shall appear, seldom fall into errour; whereas the common sort of Men are de∣ceived every moment by their rash judgments. In like manner, in the government of Manners, they who use to sacrifice their pleasures to the love of order, and daily mortifie their senses and their passions, especially in things which may appear to be of the least consequence (which all the World may do) will acquire, even in the most important things, a facility of suspending the judgment which governs the love. Pleasure does not surprise them like other Men, or at least does not carry them down the stream, without thinking thereon. On the contrary, when they feel it, it seems to give them notice to take care of themselves, and con∣sult Reason, or the Rules of the Gospel. They have a more tender and delicate Conscience, than

they, who according to the Language of the Scrip∣ture, drink in sin like water: they are sensible of the secret reproaches of reason, and the wholsom ad∣vertisements of inward truth. So that the habit of resisting weak and light pleasures, is some progress towards the vanquishing the more violent, or at least towards the suffering some pain and shame, when a Man is overcome; which, in a short time, will give an horrour and disgust thereof. Thus liberty encreasing by little and little, and perfect∣ed by the use made of it, and the assistance of Grace, may, at last, be able to fulfil even the most difficult Commandments; because by ordinary gra∣ces, which are every moment given to Christians, we may overcome common temptations, we may, in an ordinary way, avoid the greater, and by the assistance of the grace of J. C. there is none which we may not vanquish.

XVII.

It is true, that when the case is so, that a Man is surprised by pleasure, he is not in a condition so much as to think of resisting it; 'tis true, I say, that this Man cannot actually fulfil the Command∣ment, which forbids him to enjoy it, for this plea∣sure is to him invincible.

Thus, supposing this person had this impotence by a natural necessity, his sin not being free, it would make him no more culpable; I mean, no more worthy to be punish'd with grief, than if he had been irregular in his sleep. Likewise, if this impotence should have been the necessary conse∣quence of sins, even freely committed before his conversion, it will not be imputed to him, because of his charity. But since he ought and might re∣sist

pleasure, contend for the preservation and en∣crease of his liberty, have recourse unto him by Prayer, in whom we may do all things; this sin, tho actually committed by a kind of necessity, renders him culpable and worthy to be punish'd; if not upon the account of this sin, yet at least for the negligence, which is the principle of it. The commandment of God is not absolutely impossible; even the sinner himself ought and may, for rea∣sons already mentioned, put himself in a condi∣tion to observe it: because Men ought, and may continually labour to augment and perfect their li∣berty, not only by the assistance of the grace of J. C. but also by their own natural strength, or by the ordinary graces; for, in short, Nature may be made serviceable to Grace a thousand ways.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Book III. of the Searchaf∣ter Truth, and in the Ex∣plication of the Nature of Ideas.