A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

The Second Discourse. Of the Laws of Grace in particular, and of the Occasional Causes, which Govern and Determin their Efficacy.

First Part. Of the Grace of Jesus Christ.

Additions. * 1.1

I Have proved in the First Discourse, the ne∣cessity of Occasional Causes in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature; and I don't think that which I have writ∣ten can be distinctly understood, but it must be granted. But now I am about to prove by those arguments which Faith supplies, that Je∣sus Christ is this cause. Since this is of the grea∣test consequence, clearly to understand the prin∣ciples of Religion, and to make us draw near with confidence to the true Propitiatory, or the occasional cause, which never fails to determine

the efficacy of the general Law of Grace: I think I may require the Reader to Meditate up∣on this Second Discourse with all diligence, and without prejudice.

I.

Since there is none but God who acts imme∣diately and by himself upon Spirits, & who produ∣ces in them all the different Modifications whereof they are capable; it is he alone who enlightens our minds, and inspires us with certain sentiments which determine our divers wills. Thus there is none but God who can as the * 1.2 true cause, produce grace in our Souls. For the principle of all the regular motions of our love, is necessari∣ly, either knowledge which teaches us, or a sen∣timent which convinces us that God is our hap∣piness; since we never begin to love any object, if we do not either clearly see by the light of Reason, or confusedly feel by the taste of plea∣sure that the object is good, I mean capable of rendring us more happy than we are.

II.

But seeing all men are engaged in Original sin, and all even by their nature infinitely be∣low God; it is only J. Christ who by the dig∣nity of his Person, and the holiness of his Sa∣crifice, could have access to his Father, reconcile us to him, and merit his favours for us. Thus it is J. C. only, who cou'd be the Meritorous cause of Grace. These truths are agreed on. But we do not seek after the cause which Pro∣duces Grace by its proper efficacy, nor that which merits it by his sacrifice and good works, we seek after that which regulates, and determines,

the efficacy of the general cause, that which may be called the second, particular, and occasional.

III.

For that the general cause may act by general Laws or Wills, and that his action may be regu∣lar, constant, and uniform; it is absolutely neces∣sary, that there be an occasional cause which deter∣mines the efficacy of these Laws, and serves to e∣stablish them. If the percussion of bodies, or some such thing, did not determine the EFFICACY of general LAWS of the Communication of motions, it would be necessary that God should move bodies by particular wills. The Laws of the union of the Soul and Body, are made efficaci∣ous only by the changes which happen in each of these substances. For if God should make the Soul feel a pungent pain, tho the body was not pricked, or if the brain shou'd not be moved as if the body was pricked, he wou'd not act by the general Laws of the union between Soul and body, but by a particular will. If it shou'd rain upon the Earth any other ways but by the ne∣cessary consequence of the general Laws of the com∣munication of motions, the rain and the fall of each drop that composes it, would be the effect of a particular will: Insomuch that if order did not require that it should rain, this will would be al∣together unworthy of God. It is therefore neces∣sary that in the order of Grace, there be some occasional cause which establishes these Laws, and determines the efficacy of them; and this is that cause which we must endeavour to find out.

IV.

Tho we never so little consult the Idea of In∣telligible

order, or consider the sensible order which appears in the works of God, we clearly disco∣ver that the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of the general Laws, and establish them, must necessarily have relation to the design for which God appoints these Laws.

For example, we see by experience that God has not, and Reason convinces us that he ought not, to have made the motions of the Planets the occa∣sional causes of the union of soul and body. He could not have willed that our Arm shou'd be mo∣ved after such and such a manner, nor the soul suf∣fer the pain of the Tooth-ach, at the time of the Moons conjunction with the Sun, if this conjuncti∣on does not act upon the body. The design of God being to unite the Soul to the Body, he cou'd not give to the Soul the sentiments of grief, but when some changes happen in the body which are contrary to it. Thus we ought not to seek any where else but in the Soul, and in the Body the occasional causes of their union.

V.

Hence it follows, that God having a design to form his Church by J. C. could not according to this design seek any where else but in J. C. and the Creatures united by reason to J. C. the occasional causes which serve to establish the ge∣neral Laws of Grace, by which the spirit of J. C. is shed upon his Members, and communicates unto them his Life and Holiness. Thus Grace is not showered down upon our hearts according to the divers scituation of the Stars, nor according to the meeting of several bodies; nor even ac∣cording to the different motion of the animal

spirits which give unto us motion and life. No bo∣dies can excite in us any motions and sentiments, but what are purely natural; for all that comes to the soul by the body, is only for the body. The Angels themselves are not made occasional causes of inward grace. They are as well as we Members of that body of which J. C. alone is the Head, they are Ministers of J. C. for the salvation of the Saints. I grant that they may produce some change in the bo∣dies which surround us, and even in that which we animate; and that thus they may remove some im∣pediments of the efficacy of Grace. But certain∣ly they cannot distribute to men such a precious gift; they have not immediate power over the minds of men, which by their nature are equal to them. To conclude, St Paul teaches us, * 1.3 to be∣lieve that God has not subjected to them the future World, or the Church of J. C. Thus the occa∣sional cause of Grace cannot be found but in J. C. or in man.

VI.

But seeing it is certain that grace is not grant∣ed to all those that desire it, nor as soon as they desire it, and it is often given to those who do not ask it; it follows, that even our desires are not the occasional cause of Grace. For this kind of causes always have readily their effect, and without them the effect is never produced. For example, the striking of bodies upon one another being the occasional cause of the change which happens in their motion, if two bodies do not meet one another their motions are not changed; and if they be changed, we may be assured that they did. The general Laws by which Grace is

poured into our hearts, do find nothing in our wills which may determine their efficacy; like as the general Laws which govern the rains, are not founded upon the dispositions of the places where it rains. For whither Lands lye Fallow, or whi∣ther they be cultivated, it rains indifferently in all places, even upon Sands and in the Sea.

VII.

We are then brought to maintain, that since none but J. C. cou'd merit grace, there is like∣wise none but he who cou'd give the occasions of the general Laws according to which it is given to men. For the principle of the foundation of gene∣ral Laws, or that which determines their efficacy, being necessarily either in us, or in J. C. since it is cer∣tain it is not in us, for the reasons above men∣tioned, it must needs be found in J. C. Thus it was necessary that God after sin should have no regard to our wills: Being all in disorder, we cou'd no more be the occasion of Gods giving us Grace. A Mediator therefore was necessary not only to give us access to God, but also to be the natural or occasional cause of those favours we hope to receive from him.

VIII.

Since God designed to make his Son the Head of his Church, it was convenient he should make him the natural or occasional cause of Grace, which sanctifies it; for it is from the Head that Life and motion ought to be given to the mem∣bers. And it was even with this foresight that God permitted sin, for if man had continued in his Innocence, without being assisted by the Grace of J. C. seeing his wills wou'd have merited Grace,

and even Glory, God should have established in man the occasional cause of his perfection and happiness: The inviolable Law of order requires this; so that J. C. wou'd not have been the Head of his Church, or such an Head whose influences the Members wou'd have had no need of.

IX.

If our soul had been in our body, before it was form'd, and all the parts which compose it disposed of according to our different wills, with how many divers sentiments and motions wou'd she have been affected, by all the effects which she would have known ought to have followed from her wills, especially if she had had an extream desire to have made a more Vigorous and better form'd body? * 1.4 Now the Holy Scripture does not only say that J. C. is the Head of the Church, but it also teaches us that he begot it, that he form'd it, that he nourishes it, that he suffered in it; that he merits in it, that he acts and influences it with∣out ceasing. The zeal which J. C. has for the glory of his Father, and the love he bears to his Church, inspires him continually with a de∣sire of making it the most ample, the most mag∣nisicent, and the most perfect, he can possibly. Thus seeing the soul of J. C. has not an infinite capacity, and yet desires to give infinite beauties and ornaments to his Church, we have all the reason to believe that there is a continual suc∣cession of thoughts and desires in his Soul, in re∣spect of his Mystical body which he continually forms.

X.

Now these continual desires of the Soul of Je∣sus, which sanctifie the Church, and render it worthy of the Majesty of his Father, God hath made the occasional causes of the efficacy of the general Laws of Grace: For Faith teaches us that God hath given to his Son an absolute power over Men, by making him the Head of his Church; and this cannot be conceived if the different wills of J. C. be not followed by their effects. For it is visible, I should have no power over mine arm, if it should move it self whether I would or no, and if when I desire to move it, it should remain as if it was dead and without motion.

XI.

J. C. has merited his Sovereign power over men, and this quality of Head of the Church, by the Sacrifice he offered upon Earth; and after his Resurrection he took full possession of this right. * 1.5 'Tis upon this account, that he is now So∣vereign Priest of future good things, and that by his many intercessions, he continually prays unto the Father in the behalf of men. * 1.6 And see∣ing his desires are occasional causes, his prayers are always heard; his Father denies him nothing, as the Scripture teaches us. Nevertheless he must pray and desire that he may obtain: For the occasional, physical, natural causes (for all these words signifie the same thing) have no power of themselves to do any thing; and all creatures, even J. C. himself considered as man, are in them∣selves nothing but weakness and impotence.

Additions.

I don't think that hitherto there is any diffi∣culty,

if it be not in this last Article, where I say, that J. C. prayeth unto his Father; for there are some Persons whom this very much offends. For I speak as St. Paul to the Romans, and to the Hebrews, and as Jesus Christ himself: I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comfor∣ter: which is to be understood of J. C. after his resurrection, according to these words of St. John; The spirit was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified.

For the Spirit fell not upon the Apostles till Ten days after J. C. was entered into the Holy of Holies, a Sovereign Priest of true good things.

In all these Articles, I speak only of J. C. as to his humanity, according to which he recei∣ved all power in Heaven and Earth; because all his prayers or his desires, which certainly are in his power, (or otherwise he has no power) are executed in consequence of his qualities, as So∣vereign Priest of the House of God, King of Is∣rael, Architect of the Eternal Temple, Medi∣ator betwixt God and men, Head of the Church; or to speak like the Philosophers, (for whom I chiefly write this Treatise) the occasional, natu∣ral, or distributive cause of Grace: The cause which Determines the Efficacy of the general Law by which God wou'd save all men in his Son.

XII.

J. C. having then successively divers thoughts in relation to the divers dispositions, whereof Souls in general are capable, these divers thoughts are accompanyed with certain desires in relation to the Sanctification of these Souls. Now these de∣sires

being the occasional causes of Grace, they must pour it down upon those persons in particu∣lar whose dispositions resemble that upon which the Soul of J. C. actually thinks: And this Grace must be so much the stronger and more abundant, as these desires of J. C. are greater and more last∣ing.

XIII.

When a person considers any part of his bo∣dy, which is not form'd as it ought to be, he has naturally certain desires in relation to this part, and the use he desires to make of it in com∣mon life; and these desires are followed by certain insensible motions of the animal Spirits, which tend to give that proportion or disposition to this part which we desire it shou'd have. When the Bo∣dy is altogether form'd, and the flesh firm, the motions change nothing in the construction of the parts; they can only give them certain disposi∣tions which are called Corporeal habits. But when the body is not altogether form'd, and the flesh is very soft and tender, these motions which ac∣company the desires of the Soul, do not only give the body certain particular dispositions, but may also change the construction thereof. This sufficiently appears by Children in the Womb, for they are not only moved with the same pas∣sions as there Mothers, but they also receive the marks of these passions in their bodies, from which yet the Mothers are always free.

XIV.

The Mystical body of J. C. is not yet a perfect man, * 1.7 it will not be so till the end of the world J. C. forms it continually; for it is from the Head

the whole body joyned together receives nourish∣ment by the efficacy of his influence, according to the measure which is proper to every one, to the end it may be form'd and edified in love. These are the truths which St Paul teaches us. Now since the soul of J. C. has no other action but the divers motions of its heart, 'tis necessary that these desires be succeeded by the influence of grace, which only can form J. C. in his Members, and give them that beauty and proportion which must be the eter∣nal object of the divine Love.

XV.

The divers motions of the soul of J. C. being the occasional causes of Grace, we ought not to be sur∣prised, if it be sometimes given to great sinners, or those who make no use of it. For the soul of J. C. designing to raise a Temple of vast extent, and infinite beauty, may desire that Grace may be given to the greatest sinners; and if in this moment J. C. thinks actually, for example, upon Covetous persons, the Covetous shall receive Grace. Or else, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain merit for the construction of his Church, which is not ordinarily acquired, but by those who suffer cer∣tain persecutions, of which the passions of men are the natural principle: In a word, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain character, for bring∣ing to pass certain effects in his Church, may in ge∣neral apply himself to them, & by this application bestow upon them the Grace which sanctifies: In like manner, as the mind of an Architect thinks in general upon square stones, for example, when these sort of stones are actually necessary for his building.

XVI.

But as the soul of J. C. is not a general cause, there is reason to think that it often has particu∣lar desires in respect of certain particular persons. When we pretend to speak exactly of God, we ought not to consult our selves, and make him act as we do; we ought to consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, and make him act accord∣ing to this Idea, but when we speak of the action of the soul of Jesus, we may consult our selves, we may suppose it to act as particular causes would act, which yet are joyned to eternal wisdom. We have reason, for example, to believe that the calling of St. Paul was the effect of the efficacy of a par∣ticular desire of J. Christ. We may also look up∣on the desires of the soul of J. C. which generally re∣late to all the minds of one certain character, as par∣ticular desires, tho they comprehend many persons; because these desires change every moment, as those of particular causes do. But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same, because his wills must be firm, and constant, seeing his wis∣dom is infinite; as I have shewn in the first Dis∣course.

Additions.

I think I have demonstrated, that J. C. as man, is the occasional cause of Grace. Now, since God acts not, if Order doth not require, or some oc∣casional cause determine him thereunto; and that, in respect of Grace, altogether free, Order never requires that God shou'd give it, seeing it cannot be merited: 'Tis evident, that all the difficulties which we find in the distribution of Grace, must be ascribed to J. C. as man. This is that which

I have already done in a general way; for it was not at all necessary, that I should particu∣larly justifie the wisdom and goodness of God, which was my only design in the construction of his Church, as I did at first advertise.

But that the minds, least able to discern the usefulness of the principles laid down, may not fail to apprehend it; I shall endeavour, as clear∣ly as possibly I can, to shew the consequences which may be drawn from these principles.

There are many difficulties in vindicating Gods Conduct in his way of distributing the rain of Grace, as well as in that by which he sends down the ordinary rain, the chief of which are, that it is not always proportioned to the need of sinners, and that even in respect to the just, tho it answer their necessities, yet it does not always hinder them from falling into disorder.

God is wise, he wills the conversion of sinners, he has sworn so by his Prophet. A Being infi∣nitely wise proportions the means to the end. How then can it be that the Grace which the sinner re∣ceives shou'd not be strong enough to make him quit his sin? Or to take away all equivocation, Why shou'd not such an Infant be Baptised? Why should there be so many Nations who know not J. C.? It is easily comprehended by what I have said in the first Discourse, that this is a conse∣quence of the simplicity of Gods ways, and must proceed from the occasional cause which God has established for the executing his design after such a manner, as best resembles his Divine Attri∣butes.

For if it rains upon the High-ways, upon the Sand, upon the Sea, as well as upon the Sown Lands; it is because these rains are necessary con∣sequences of the simplicity of those ways which God has established for making the Earth Fruit∣ful.

But whence does it proceed that J. C. who is an intelligent occasional cause, abandons so many sinners and so many nations? Or to come to the greatest difficulty, Whence is it that J. C. forsakes even the just, the members of his body, who are straight united to him by charity? For as to sinners, and they who do not call upon him, it may be said that he neglects them as unwor∣thy of his care. But whence comes it to pass, that he gives to the just, exposed to temptation, such a Grace, which he well foresaw, notwith∣standing his assistance wou'd be overcome? This Grace was altogether sufficient, I grant, and that it only depended upon the just to make it effi∣cacious. But why did not J. C. give it more force, since he foresaw the fall of one of his well-be∣loved Children? If my principle can clear up these difficulties, without injuring the love of J. C. to∣wards men, as well as it defends the wisdom and goodness of God, against the reasonings of Li∣bertines, certainly the consequences thereof will be very advantageous to Religion. This is that which I am about to examine.

J. C. may be considered according to two re∣spects, one as Architect of the Eternal Temple; the other, as Head of the Church. I have part∣ly explained the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect because this manifested the fruitful∣ness

and necessity of my principle. But I wou'd not speak of the way by which he acts as Head of the Church, by reason of the difficulty of the fall of the just, which supposes certain things where∣of I thought not then to speak. That I may ex∣plain more particularly the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect upon the materials which do not as yet make part of his Temple, and as Head in re∣spect of the Just who are members of his Body, I am obliged to say what I think concerning the holy Soul of J. C. which regulates all his desires, with re∣spect nevertheless to the divine Law, the immutable and necessary order; for the wills of J. C. are al∣ways agreeable to those of his Father. Tho several of the * 1.8 Fathers and those especially who wrote against the Arrians, as Athanasius, were contented to attri∣bute to Jesus Christ, as God, the knowledge of all things, and expounded concerning J. C. as man, that which St. Mark reports, The Day of the Lord knoweth no Man, no not the Son of Man himself; and some of them feared not even to say, that Ignorance is one of the defects of Humane Nature which J. C. took for our sakes: Nevertheless I am far from this thought. For I am perswaded that J. C. as man knows all Sciences, and hath a perfect knowledge of all things; that he not only knows all the Beings which God hath created, with all their Modifications, and all their relations; but also upon much greater rea∣son, all those which God can create: In a word, all that which God contains in the immensity of his Be∣ing. I say that J. C. knows upon much greater rea∣son, all possible Creatures than the existence and re∣lation of those which God hath made; because he knows the first by the right which his union with the Word,

which contains them as the Word, gives him; where∣as he knows not the other but by a kind of a Reve∣lation as I shall shew hereafter.

I believe then that J. C. as man, knows all things; but it ought to be observ'd that there is a great dif∣ference between knowing all things habitually, and knowing all things actually; between knowing all things and thinking of all things; which is almost always confounded. There is no man but knows that two and two make four, and yet there are but few who actually think of it. A Geometrician knows his En∣clid, but he is often a long time without thinking of any of the propositions of this Author. A man knows a truth, or Science, when by his Labour, or otherwise, he has gain'd a right thereunto; insomuch, that he can no sooner think of these things, but they imme∣diately present themselves to his mind very clearly, without putting him to any trouble.

Now the soul of J. C. is personally united to the Word, and the Word, as the Word, con∣tains all possible being with their relations; he contains all immutable, necessary, & eternal truths. J. C. as man, can no sooner think of any truths, but they are instantly discovered to his mind. J. C. therefore knows all Sciences; he knows all possible things, since he may without any effort of mind, see all that the Word contains as the Word. For the same reason J. C. knows all the divine Perfections, since the Word is a substan∣tial representation of the divine Nature, and the Father communicates to his Son all his Substance. He knows even the Existence, the Modifications, the relations of the Creatures; but by a kind of revelation which the Father gives to him when∣soever

he desires him; according to those words of J. C. himself, I know, O Father that thou al∣ways hearest me. For since the creatures are not the necessary emanations of the Divinity, the Word as the Word, does truly represent their Nature or Essence, but not their Existence; for their Exi∣stence depends upon the free will of the Creator, which the Word, meerly as the Word, does not contain, seeing the Divine Decrees are common to all the three Persons. Thus the Existence of the Creatures cannot be known but by a kind of Revelation. J. C. therefore as man, knows all things. In him are hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God, but he does not actually think upon all things; and this is evi∣dent: For the soul of J. C. has not the capacity of an infinite mind. And those who maintain that there are no succession of thoughts in J. C. and that he always knows whatsoever he does know, thinking to attribute to the soul of J. C. a sort of immutability which is due only to God, they necessarily make him liable to very great ignorance. See the proof of this: It is certain that natural effects are combined amongst themselves, and with those of Grace, after an infinitely infinite manner, and that these combinations are every moment changed after infinite ways, by reason of the mu∣tability of Mens wills, and the irregular course of the animal Spirits, which change all our traces and all our Ideas, in consequence of the Laws of Union of Soul and Body.

Now the capacity of thinking, which the Soul of J. C. has as Man, is finite. Therefore if he knew, or always actually thought upon that which

he knows, he must necessarily be ignorant of an infinite number of things.

Furthermore, it is certain that the properties of numbers are not only infinite but infinitely in∣finite: That in respect of Figures, there may be, for example, an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds, each of their sides being capa∣ble of being lengthned or shortned to infinity. Now to say that J. C. knows not the properties of such Triangles, or the relation of one of their sides, or its Square, or its Cube, or its Quadra∣ta-quadrate, &c. with other Sides, or their Squares, or their Cubes, or their Quadrata-quadrates, &c. this is to suppose that J. C. is ignorant of that which the Geometricians know. But if it be maintained that J. C. as Man, always actually knows every thing that he knows, it is necessary that he be ignorant of an infinite number of the properties of these Triangles. Nevertheless let us suppose, that Natural effects are not combi∣ned with the effects of Grace; and that likewise all the thoughts of men, their circumstances, their combinations, were something finite, which the mind of man might discern all at once; certainly to suppose that the Soul of J. C. does always think of them, is to give unto him a very useless and troublesome knowledge. It is troublesome, for that which renders the soul of J. C. happy, is the contemplation of the perfection of the Sovereign good. Now the knowledge of all the Chimaeraes which do, have, and shall pass in our minds, ac∣cording to this supposition, continually distract∣ing the capacity of the soul of J. C. (otherwise entertain'd in beholding the Beauties and tasting

the sweetness of the chief Good) would not be ve∣ry agreeable to him. For it must be observed, that it is one thing to see God, and another thing to see the Creatures and their modifications in God. I think I have demonstrated that we see all in God in this life, but this is not to see God, or to enjoy him. Thus it cannot be said, that J. C. sees all our thoughts, without dividing his capacity of thinking; because he sees them all in God. This actual knowledge therefore, which some wou'd give to J. C. is troublesome; for it is very irksome to think actually upon those things, upon which we do not desire to think of. A Geometrician who should have found out the Squaring of a Circle, or any other more surprising Truth, wou'd be very miserable, should it be always present to his mind. J. C. has an Object more worthy of his application, than the modification of the Creatures; therefore always to have an actual knowledge of our thoughts and needs, pass'd, and future, would be very trou∣blesome.

Moreover, it would be altogether useless to him, and to us. Certainly it is sufficient that J. C. thinks of assisting me, when I shall have need; without thinking thereof for two or three Thousand years, or rather from all Eternity: For J. C. must ac∣tually think thereof from all Eternity, if there be no succession of thoughts in his soul.

As in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, (which I composed for those Persons who are not over cre∣dulous) I resolved not to propose any Principles which might be contested; and since if I had sup∣posed that the soul of J. C. had actually known all things, my supposition might have been opposed,

by the reasons which I have produced, and per∣haps by others better: I have therefore only sup∣posed, that J. C. has a clear Idea of the soul, and the modifications of which it is capable, to produce a noble effect in the Temple which he builds to the glory of his Father; that which Reason and Faith do demonstrate. Thus I suppose J. C. to act in consequence of this only supposition, in the XIII, XIV, XV, XVI. Articles, where I compare him to an Architect, and to a Soul which should have power to form all the parts of its Body. For as an Architect may form a Design, and build an Edi∣fice, without concerning himself from whence the materials come he employs therein; so J.C. by his union with the Word, may form his designs, and desires, without thinking on the actual dispositions of all men. He hath admonished them by his Counsels in his Gospel, to put themselves in such a condition, that Grace may not be useless to them. It becomes him not to order his desires, (the distributive causes of his Graces) accor∣ding to the negligence, or wickedness of men, but according to the condition wherein he finds the Work he is to build, according to the designs he continually forms; according to the beauty where∣with he intends to Adorn his Church.

Now this way, after which, I suppose J.C. might act, wou'd be sufficient to justifie Gods Conduct, and make it in general comprehended; whence it is that the rain of Grace is sent down without effect upon hardned hearts, at such unseasonable times, after such an unequal manner, and almost always so little answerable unto the concupiscence of those who receive it: For this reason I ought not to en∣ter

particularly upon the fall of the Just, under an Head who has so much love for sinners. Neverthe∣less I shall at present endeavour to explain it to sa∣tisfie the most difficult.

Whilst J.C. acts as Architect, he only regulates his desires according to his designs. It is indifferent to him to have in his Temple, Paul, or John; if both the one and the other resemble the Idea which determines his desires: As it is indifferent to an Architect, who needs only a square stone, or a pillar, to have that which is on the right hand, or on the left, if they be altogether alike. Thus the desire of J. C. bestowing Grace which moves men to come unto him, and cast themselves in his hands, those who come first, and are most watchful, are they whom he employs in his building.

But men having once followed the motion of Grace, I think it is certain that J. C. is advertised of their dispositions; and that when he has plac'c them in his Temple, or made them parts of his Body, no need, no temptation, happens to them, which he has not notice of, and which he doth not provide for. When Bread is once become part of our flesh, it cannot be touched without hurting us. When a stone is wrought and laid in the building, it cannot be broken without offending the Archi∣tect. J. C. considered as Head of the Church, is therefore advertised of all our necessities, even be∣fore he particularly desires to know them. Here∣in his Father prevents his Charity; It seems to me, that order requires this. Perhaps he may even actually know the effect, which the assistance he gives us, will have, even before it be given; and this is that which makes all the difficulty.

For J. C. loves the just, he tenderly cherishes those who are united unto him by Charity. Now he has notice of a Temptation which solicits one of his Members, and he may give him Victori∣ous Graces. If therefore he foresaw, that with such assistance, the Just, tho he might have overcome, would nevertheless be vanquished; Why did he not augment this assistance? He desires the just should be Victorious; Why therefore doth he not proportion the means to the end, if he ac∣tually knew the relation of the means to the end?

For my part, I had rather believe that J. C. as man, or the occasional cause of Grace, doth not actually know the future determination of the will of the just, to whom he gives assistance, than think that he in any sense, wants Goodness and Charity for his Members. I grant that J.C. as man, may know all the future determination of our wills, as I know that two and two are four. But I doubt whether he actually thinks thereon. and I do not believe that he always thinks thereon, that he may regulate the distribution of Graces ac∣cording to this knowledge. These are my Reasons.

J. C. does not see in the Word, precisely as the Word, whether the just will follow, or will not follow the motion of his Grace: He cannot know it, unless God discover it to him by a sort of revelation, as I have already said. Now it seems to me, that he ought not always to demand what effect his Grace will have; because it seems clear to me, that Order, which is his Rule, and his Law, doth not require that he shou'd proportion his gifts to mens future negligence, but only to their necessities for his own proper designs.

J.C. must act as man, or as the occasional cause, that God may build up his Church by the most simple ways. Now none but God can dive in mens hearts, and see the free determinations of their wills. J. C. therefore before he acts, ought not to desire of his Father to reveal to him, whether the just being tempted, will, or will not be van∣quished, by such or such a degree of Grace: For thus his action would not bear the Character of an occasional cause. If God should by himself, give unto the just Grace to vanquish Temptations, being by nature Searcher of Hearts, his Conduct ought to comport with this Character; and if the just should be vanquished, it might be believed, that God designed to forsake him. But Order requiring that J. C. as Man, should act as Man, his action is not to bear the Character of Search∣er of Hearts: For God intending to make his wis∣dom his fore-sight, the infinite extension of his knowledge, to appear in the construction of his great work; he was obliged to form it by the most simple ways. For in conclusion, what marvel would it be, if J. C. should make a beautiful work, and save even all men, if on the one side he acted by particular wills, and on the other, his action did not carry in it the character of an Occasional cause, but of an infinite Wisdom, certainly GOD ought not to appoint an Occasional Cause, if this Occasional cause must act as God, and not as man? He ought to do all immediately by him∣self. But how shou'd we have justified his wis∣dom and goodness, seeing so many Monsters a∣mong Bodies, so many irregularrities among Spi∣rits, so much disproportion in his action, in re∣lation

to his Attributes, so much rain upon the Sand and in the Sea, so many Graces given to hard∣ned Hearts; Graces which serve only to make them more culpable and more criminal, * 1.9 which yet cou'd not have been given, with a design so unworthy of Gods goodness, who desires the Conversion of sinners, and to whom the wicked were never ne∣cessary?

If that which I have said of the fall of the just, and the manner after which Jesus Christ forms his Church, be clearly understood; perhaps it would be found to be probable enough: But I think I ought to say, that this is no ways necessary in or∣der to defend my principles, and the manner by which I have justified the wisdom and goodness of God. For it may be that God has given to J. C. as man, a particular kind of knowledge and power in relation to his design, by establishing him the occasional cause of the general Law of Grace. To make my thought understood by a compari∣son, let us imagine that as soon as Adam was form∣ed, God acquainted the Angels, that he had uni∣ted a Spirit to a Body, to the end that it might take care thereof, without informing them any thing of the Laws of this union. According to this sup∣position, the Angels reasoning according to their Ideas, would doubtless have imagined, that the first man had no sentiment of Objects; and that, to eat and nourish himself, he studied to know the consiguration of the parts of the fruits of Paradise, the relation they might have with those of his Body, thereby to judge whether they would have been proper for his nourishment. In all pro∣bality they would have believed, that to walk,

Adam had thought on the Nerves which answer∣ed to his Legs, and that he had continually con∣veyed to them such a quantity of Animal spirits to remove them; and thus they would have judg∣ed of other Functions by which Mans life is pre∣served. We very near do the same thing as to the manner in which J. C. forms his Church: We will needs judge thereof according to our Ideas, and yet perhaps we understand nothing thereof. God united the Soul to the Body of the first Man, after a much more wise and real manner, than the Angels themselves could imagine: For God advertised him by sentiments, after a short and undoubted manner, of what he ought to do; and this without dividing, as little as might be, the ca∣pacity which he had of thinking upon his Sovereign good: For then his Senses kept silence whenso∣ever he desired it. Man may still walk and me∣ditate, both together, but the first man upon all occasions, might, and also ought, without with∣drawing himself from the presence of God, to give unto his Body all that which was necessary for it. Why may not God at present therefore, give un∣to J. C. certain kinds of compendious knowledge, whereof we have no Idea, that he may thereby bet∣ter facilitate the construction of his Church, so that the relation which he has to us, may not divide the capacity which he has of seeing God and enjoying his happiness? God appointed cer∣tain general Laws of the union of Soul and Bo∣dy, that the first Man might preserve his Life without applying himself over-much to particular Objects. Why may not God, by making his Son the Head of the Church, have established such

like general Laws? It may be this ought to have been so, that God might act in such a manner as agrees best with the divine attributes; and perhaps that apparent irregularity with which Grace is given unto men, is in part a consequence of this marvelous invention of eternal wisdom. Assu∣redly, it may be the first Adam was even in this a figure of the second, and that J.C. besides his know∣ledge and desires, which we cannot deny to him, without impiety, hath still compendious ways, worthy of an infinite wisdom, by which, as we by our sentiments and passions, he acts in his mystical body, without being diverted from his Sovereign good, which he loves too much to lose the sight of, or remove himself from its presence. There are several passages in Scripture may countenance this opinion, but I might well be accounted rash, should I pretend to establish it as a point which ought to be believed. That which I say may be true, but I ought not to assert it as true, before I am well con∣vinced of it my self. If this be not, it may be, or some such like thing; as for my part, I have not justified the Wisdom and Goodness of God, but by leaving to J. C. as Architect of the Eternal Temple, that we cannot take from him without of∣fering violence to Reason and good Sense. But I am glad to know that there are several ways of an∣swering those who oppose the Quality which I give to J. C. of an occasional cause, which determines the efficacy of the good will of God in respect to men; and that all the Objections which can be made against me in this, can upon no other ac∣count be hard to be resolved, but because we are ignorant of a great many things which it would

be necessary to know for the clearing them up.

XVII.

The divers desires of the Soul of J. C. giving Grace, hence we clearly apprehend whence it is, that it is not equally given to all men, and that it falls upon certain persons at one time more than at another. Since the Soul of J. C. does not think at the same time of sanctifying all men, it has not at the same time all the desires of which it is capable. Thus, J. C. does not act upon his Members after a particular manner, but by successive influences; like as our Soul does not at the same time remove all the Muscles of our Bodies: For the Animal Spirits go equally and successively into our Mem∣bers, according to the different impressions of Objects, the divers motions of our passions, and different Desires which we freely form in our selves.

XVIII.

It is true, that all the just continually receive the influence of the Head that gives them life, and that when they act by the Spirit of J. C. they merit and receive new graces, tho it be not necessary that the Soul of J. C. has any particular desires which may be the occasional causes of them; for the order, which requires that all Merit be reward∣ed, is not in God an Arbitrary Law; it is a Neces∣sary Law, which depends not upon any occasional cause. But tho he that has done a Meritorious Ac∣tion, may be rewarded for it, and yet the soul of J. C. have actually no desires in respect of him; nevertheless, it is certain that he has not merited Grace, but by the dignity and holiness which the Spirit of J. C. communicated to him: For men

are not acceptable to God, and do nothing that is good, * 1.10 but so far as they are united to his Son by Charity.

Additions.

Altho I say order requires that the Just Merit Grace, it must not be understood of all Graces, but only of those which are absolutely necessary for the van∣quishing unavoidable temptations. But God is faith∣ful who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, says St. Paul. Now Order requires that God should be faithful. Quis autem dicat eum qui jam coepit credere, ab illo in quem credit non me∣reri, says St. Augustine de Praedest. Sanct. Ch. 2. The just therefore may merit Grace, by the assi∣stance of Grace; but he cannot in strictness merit those Graces which are not absolutely necessary for him. This depends upon the good will of J. C. as he is the occasional cause of the order of Grace. And in strictness, good works perhaps merit only the reward of happiness: But it is not necessary that I should stand to explain the different ways of understanding merit.

XIX.

Moreover, it must be confest, that they who ob∣serve the councels of J. C. by the esteem which they have for them, and by the fear they have of future Punishments, do solicite, as I may say, by their obedience, the love of J. C. to think of them, tho as yet they should act only by self-love. But all their actions are not occasional causes, neither of Grace, since they are not infallibly attended therewith, nor even of the motions of the Soul of J. C. in their behalf, since these same motions ne∣ver fail of giving it. Thus, the desires of J. C.

alone have infallibly their effect, as occasional cau∣ses; because God having made J. C. Head of the Church, it is only by him that the Grace which sanctifies the Elect ought to be given.

XX.

Now we may consider in the Soul of J. C. two sorts of desires, actual, transient, and particular desires, the efficacy of which continue but a little time, constant and permanent desires, which con∣sist in a firm and lasting disposition of the soul of J. C. in relation to certain effects which tend to the execution of his design in general.

If our soul by its different motions did commu∣nicate to our bodies all that which is necessary to form and make it grow, we might distinguish there∣in two kinds of desires; for it would send into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits that give it certain dispositions, in respect of the present Objects, or actual thoughts of the mind, by actual and transi∣ent desires. But it would give to the Heart and the Lungs the natural motions, which serve for respiration and circulation of the Blood by stable and permanent desires. It would also by such like desires digest its nourishment, and distribute it to all the parts which have need thereof; because this sort of action is at all times necessary for the preservation of the body.

XXI.

By these actual, transient, and particular desires of the soul of J. C. Grace is given to persons who are not prepared, and after a manner which hath something singular and extraordinary in it. But it is given regularly by permanent desires to those who worthily receive the Sacraments. For the

Grace which we receive by the Sacraments, is not given meerly by the Merit of our Action, tho we receive with fit dispositions; it is because of the merits of J.C. which are freely applyed to us in consequence of his permanent desires. We receive by the Sacraments much more Grace than our pre∣paration can deserve, and it is even sufficient for the receiving some influence thereby that we do not put any impediment: But it is also to abuse that which is most holy in Religion, to receive them un∣worthily.

Additions.

Since J. C. as man, does not act, but by his de∣sires, and the Grace of the Sacraments is perma∣nent; it is evident, that the Grace which he com∣municates to those who receives them worthily, comes not from J. C. as the occasional cause. If there be not in J. C. a permanent desire, or a con∣stant will to do good unto those who come unto the Sacraments, there would be no great mistery in them.

XXII.

Among the actual and transient desires of the Soul of Jesus, there are certainly some which are more lasting and frequent than others; and the knowledge of the desires is of very great use in morality. Doubtless J. C. thinks oftner upon them who observe his councels, than on other men. The motions of love which he has for the Faithful, are more frequent and lasting, than those which he hath for the Libertine and the Wicked.

And since all the Faithful are not equally dispo∣sed to enter into the Church of the predestinated, the desires of the Soul of J. C. are not in respect

of them all equally lively, frequent & abiding. Man more earnestly desires those fruits which are more proper to nourish his Body, he thinks oftner upon Bread and Wine, than on those Meats which are difficultly digested. J. C. having a design to form his Church, ought therefore to concern himself more for those who may easily enter therein, than for those who are very far from it.

Thus the H. Scripture teaches us, that the hum∣ble, the poor, the penitent, receive greater Gra∣ces, than other men; because they who dispise Honours, Riches, and Pleasures, are much fitter for the Kingdom of God. They who according to the example of J. C. have learnt to be meek and humble in heart, shall find rest to their souls. The yoak of J. C. which the Proud can't bear, will become easie and light by the assistance of Grace: For God hears the Prayers of the Humble, he will comfort them, he will justifie them, he will save them, he will heap Blessings upon them; but he will bring down the Haughtiness of the Proud.

Blessed are the Poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven: But Cursed are the Rich, for they have received their Consolation in this World. How hard is it, says J C. for the Rich to enter into the Kingdom of GOD! It is easier for a Camel to pass thro' the eye of a Needle. Which cannot be without a Miracle.

As for them, who, like David, humble their souls with Fasting, put on Sack-cloath: In a word, af∣flict themselves at the sight of their Sins, and the Holiness of God, will become fit objects for the compassion of J. C. for God never will dispise

an humble and a contrite Heart. We always dis∣arm his wrath, when we prefer the interests of God before our own, and take vengeance upon our selves.

XXIII.

Since the will of J. C. is altogether agreeable to Order, of which all men have naturally some Idea, it may further be discern'd by Reason, that the soul of J. C. has more thoughts and desires, in re∣spect of some Persons, than others. For Order re∣quires, that J. C. should bestow more Graces; for example, upon those who are called to H. Orders, than those whose vocation necessarily engages them in the business of the World. In a word, upon those who make the principal parts of the body of the Church Militant, than they who have not the oversight of any, or are engaged in the Ecclesiasti∣cal Function, and raise themselves above others by ambition or interest. For if it be fit that J. C. give Graces unto these in respect of the Persons whom they govern, yet they don't deserve such as may sanctify them in that state which they have chosen by self-love. They may have the gift of Prophecy, without having that of Charity, as Scrip∣ture teaches us.

XXIV.

We have proved, that the different desires of the soul of J. C. are the occasional causes of Grace, and we have endeavoured to discover something of these desires. Let us now see of what kind of Grace they are the occasional causes. For tho J. C. be the Meritorious cause of all graces, it is not ne∣cessary he should be the occasional cause of the gra∣ces of knowledge, and certain outward Graces,

which prepare the heart for conversion, but cannot effect it; for J. C. is always the occasional or neces∣sary cause, according to the order established by God, in respect of all Graces which conduce to men salvation.

XXV.

Distinctly to understand what is the grace, which J. C. as Head of his Church, bestows upon his Members, we must know what is the concupiscence which the first man has communicated to all his Po∣sterity. For the second Adam came to cure the dis∣orders which the first had caused, and there is such a relation between the Sinful and Earthly Adam, and the Innocent and Heavenly Adam, that St. * 1.11 Paul looks upon the first communicating sin to his Of∣spring, by his disobedience, as the figure of the se∣cond giving to Christians by his obedience, righte∣ousness, and holiness.

XXVI.

Order requires that the soul should govern the body, and that she should not be distracted whither she will or no, with all those sentiments, and all those motions which turn her to sensible Ob∣jects.

Thus the first man, before sin, was so much Master of his sences, and his passions, that they were silent whensoever he desired it; nothing was able to turn him from his duty against his will, and all the plea∣sures which then prevented his reason, did only re∣spectfully after a gentle & easie manner, advertise him of what he was to do for the preservation of his life. But after sin, he lost all at once the pow∣er he had over his body, so that not being able to stop the motions, nor effuse those traces which sen∣sible

Objects made in the principal part of his brain, his soul by the Order of Nature, and as a punishment of his disobedience, became mise∣rably subject to the Law of Concupiscence, to that Carnal Law which continually fights against the mind, and every moment inspires it with the Love of sensible goods, and rules over it by passions so strong, and lively, and yet at the same time, so sweet and agreeable, that it cannot; nay, will not, make all necessary endeavours to break the bonds which captivates it. For the infecti∣on of sin is communicated to all the Children of Adam, by an infallible consequence, of the Or∣der of Nature, as I have else where Explain∣ed.

XXVII.

The Heart of Man is always a slave to plea∣sure, and when Reason teaches us it is not con∣venient to enjoy it, yet we do not avoid it, but that we may find another more sweet or solid. We willingly sacrifice lesser pleasures to greater; but the invincible impression which we have for our own happiness, permits us not all our lives long to deprive our selves of that sweetness which we taste, when we suffer our selves to follow our passions.

Additions.

In the third discourse you will see how this ought to be understood.

XXVIII.

It is certain, that pleasure makes him happy who enjoys it; at least, while he does enjoy it. Thus men being made to be happy, pleasure al∣ways gives a touch to the will, and moves it to∣wards

that object which causes it, or seems to cause it: The contrary must be said of grief. Now Con∣cupiscence consists only in a continual succession of sentiments & motion which prevent reason, & which are not subject thereunto of pleasures, which coming from the objects about us, inspire us with the love of them; of griefs, which making the exercise of vertue harsh and painful, give us an abhorrence of them.

It therefore became the second Adam, that he might cure the disorders of the first, to produce in us pleasures and aversions contrary to those of con∣cupiscence; pleasures with respect the true goods, and horrors or aversions in respect of sensible goods. Thus the grace whereof J. C. is the oc∣casional cause, and which, as Head of the Church, he continually bestows upon us, is not the Grace of knowledge, (tho he has merited this Grace, and tho he may sometimes communicate it, as I shall shew by and by,) but it is the Grace of senti∣ments. It is this previous delectation which pro∣duces and entertains the love of God in our hearts; for pleasure naturally produces and entertains the love of those objects, which cause, or seem to cause it: It is likewise the horror which sometimes ac∣companies sensible objects, which gives us an aver∣sion to them, and makes us capable of governing the motions of our love by our knowledge

XXIX.

The Grace of sentiment should be opposed to concupiscence, pleasure to pleasure, horror to hor∣ror, that the influences of J. C. might be directly opposed to the influence of the first man. The re∣medy that it may cure the disease must be con∣trary thereto. For the Grace of knowledge can∣not

heal an Heart wounded with pleasure; to this end this pleasure must either cease, or another succeed in its room. Pleasure is the weight of the soul which naturally enclines it towards it self; sensible pleasures weigh it down towards the Earth. That the soul may determine it self, either these pleasures must be dissipated, or the delectation of Grace raise her towards Heaven, and put her almost in Equilibrio. 'Tis thus that the new Man opposes the old, that the influences of our Head resists the influences of our Father Adam, that J. C. overcomes all our domestick Enemies.

Since Man had no concupiscence before his sin, it was not necessary he should be carried to the love of good by a previous delectation. He clear∣ly knew that God was his good, it was not ne∣cessary that he should feel it. There was no need that he should be drawn by pleasure to love him, whom to love nothing hindred, and who he knew was perfectly worthy of his love; but after sin the Grace of delectation was necessary to him, to counter-ballance the continual effort of concupis∣cence. Thus, knowledge is the Grace of the Creator, delectation the Grace of the Redeem∣er. Knowledge is communicated by J. C. as E∣ternal Wisdom: Delectation is given by him as Wisdom Incarnate. Knowledge in its original was no more than Nature, Delectation was al∣ways pure Grace. Knowledge after Sin was not granted to us, but through the Merits of J. C. Delectation is given to us through the Merits, and by the Efficacy of the power of J. C. In short, Knowledge is sent down upon our minds, accord∣ing to our different desires and applications, as I

shall Explain: But the Delectation of Grace is not shed upon our Hearts, but according to the various desires of the Soul of J. C.

Additions.

That the Healing Grace of J. C. consists in a preventing Delectation, is a thing so much out of doubt with St. Augustine, that F. Deschamps, who has so Learnedly confuted Jansenius, and is so opposite unto him, agrees with him in this Point; tho they differ from one another as to the manner in which Grace acts in us. See Jansenius de Grat. Chr. Lib. IV. c. 1. and Deschamps Lib III. Disp. III. c. 16. & 19.

I cannot perswade my self to continue the Expli∣cation of those things which to me seem clear of them∣selves. Insomuch, that what follows either needs it not, or is not particular to me. My Principles are sufficiently confirm'd by what has been said, and if they be clearly understood, I dont think there will be any difficulty in what follows.

XXX.

It is true, that pleasure produces Knowledge, because the soul gives more attention to the Ob∣jects from which she receives more pleasure. Since the generallity of men dispise or neglect the truths of Religion, because these abstracted truths do not affect them, it may be said that this delecta∣tion of Grace doth instruct them; for making these truths sensible, they learn them more ea∣sily by the attention which they bring to them. * 1.12 'Tis upon this account that St. John says the uncti∣on we receive from J. C. teaches us all things, and that they who have this unction have no need to be instructed.

It is true, that concupiscence, such as we feel, is not necessary in order to merit. Jesus Christ, whose sufferings were infinite, was not at all sub∣ject to it. But altho he was absolute Master of his Body, he willingly suffered the most trouble∣some motions and sentiments to be excited there∣in, that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him. Of all the sentiments, that of Grief is the most contrary to a soul which desires and deserves to be happy, and yet he wil∣lingly suffered the most tormenting. Pleasure makes him actually happy, who actually enjoys it, and yet he willingly depriv'd himself thereof.

Thus as we ought, he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours; but these his Sacrifices differed from those of the greatest Saints, because he wil∣lingly excited in himself all those painful senti∣ments, which in the rest of Men are the necessa∣ry consequences of sin; and that thus these Sa∣crifices being altogether voluntary in him, were more Pure, and more Meritorious.

XXXI.

Nevertheless, it must be observed that this Unction doth not of its self produce knowledge; it only excites our attention, which is the na∣tural or occasional cause of our knowledge.

Thus we see, that they who have the most Charity, have not always the most Knowledge. All men not being equally capable of attention, the same unction doth not equally instruct all those who receive it. Thus, tho knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a supernatural in∣fusion, and it may often be produced by Cha∣rity;

nevertheless, this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect, because Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men, but proportionally as it causes the soul to desire the knowledge of that which she loves. For to conclude, the various desires of the soul are the natural or occasional causes of the dis∣coveries we make in any subject whatsoever: But these truths I must explain more at length in the Second Part of this Discourse.

THE SECOND PART. Of the Grace of the Creator.

XXXII.

I Know but two Principles which determine di∣rectly, and by themselves, the motions of our Love, Knowledge, and Pleasure: Knowledge, by which we discern different goods, Pleasure, by which we taste them. But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure. Knowledge leaves us altogether to our selves, it makes no at∣tempt upon our liberty, it does not force us to love any thing, it does not produce in us a na∣tural or necessary love; it only puts us in a con∣dition of determining our selves, and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of

choice, or which is the same thing, of fixing the general impression of Love which God continual∣ly gives us upon particular goods. But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will, it transports it, as I may say, towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it; it produces in us a natural and necessary love; it diminishes our liberty, di∣stracts our reason, and does not leave us whol∣ly to our selves: A small attention to our in∣ward sentiments may convince of these differences.

XXXIII.

Thus Man before sin, having a perfect free∣dom, and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the moti∣ons of his Love; and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable, it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation, (as I have already said) nor by o∣ther Graces of Sentiment, which might have di∣minished his merit, and have engaged him to have loved by instinct, that good which ought to be loved only by Reason. But since sin, besides Knowledge, the Grace of sentiment has been ne∣cessary, that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence. For Man invincibly desiring to be happy, it is impossible he should continually sacri∣fice his Pleasure to his Knowledge; his Pleasure which renders him actually happy, & which subsists in himself (notwithstanding he never so much re∣sists it) to his knowledge which subsists not, but by a troublesome application of mind, which the least actual pleasure distracts; & which lastly, doth not promise actual happiness till after death; which to the imagination, seems to be a real Annihilation.

XXXIV.

Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man, for guiding him in the search after that which is good: It is the Effect of natural order: It supposes nei∣ther the Corruption, nor the Restoration of Na∣ture. But Pleasure which draws us to true happi∣ness is pure Grace; for naturally what is truly good, ought only to be loved by reason. Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace: But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature, because it is the Grace of the Creator. Let us endeavour to find out these causes.

XXXV.

In the order established by Nature, I only see two occasional causes, which distribute knowledge to Spirits, and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator. The one in us, which in some sort depends upon us; the other, which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us. The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills. The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind, in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body.

XXXVI.

The inward sentiment which we have of our selves, teaches us that our desires produce or ex∣cite knowledge in us, and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us; for all who apply themselves to truth, discover it proportionably to their attention. And if our prayer was not interrup∣ted,

if our attention was not disturbed, if we had any Idea of what we ask, and if we asked it with necessary perseverance, we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive. But our prayers are continually interrupted, if they be not preingaged [by pleasure.] Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas; and tho the truth we consult answers our request, yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers, or causes us presently to forget them.

XXXVII.

If it be considered, that Man before sin was animated with Charity, that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righte∣ousness, and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward; it may easily be apprehended, that the various de∣sires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes of the knowledge communicated to his mind: Otherwise, his distraction would not have been Voluntary, nor his attention Meritorious. Now Nature, although corrupted, is not destroy∣ed; God has not ceased to will that which he once willed, the same Laws still remain. Thus our different wills are still at this day the occasi∣onal or natural causes of the presence of Ideas to our minds. * 1.13 But because the union of the Soul with the Body is changed into a dependance by the natural consequence of sin, and the immutability of the will of God, as I have * elsewhere explain∣ed, our Bodies at present disturb our Ideas, and speaking so loudly in behalf of the goods which respect them, that the mind rarely asks,

and distractedly hears the inward TRUTH.

XXXVIII.

Experience further teaches us every moment, that our conversation with knowing Persons, is capable of instructing by exciting our attention; that Sermons, reading, converse, and many such like occasions, may raise in us good sentiments. The death of a friend doubtless is able to make us think of Death, if some great passion does not wholly imploy us. And when an able Preacher undertakes to demonstrate a very plain truth, and convince others of it, it must be granted that he may perswade his Auditors thereof, and even move their Conscience, excite their hope and fear, and such like passions in them, which disposes them less to resist the efficacy of the Grace of J. C. Men being made to live in society one with an∣other, it was necessary that they might mutual∣ly communicate their thoughts and motions. It was needful that they should be united by the Mind as well as the Body, and that speaking by the Voice to the Ears, and by writeing to the Eyes, they should communicate knowledge and understanding to attentive minds.

XXXIX.

Now Knowledge, what way soever it is pro∣duced in us, whether by our particular desires, or whether some accidents be the occasion there∣of, it may be called Grace, especially when it very much concerns our salvation, tho it should only be a consequence of the order of Nature; because since sin, God owes us nothing, and all the good we have, is only what J. C. has merited for us. For even our very Being subsists not but by

J. C. But this kind of Grace, tho merited by J. C. is not the Grace of J. C. 'Tis the Grace of the Creator; because J. C. not being ordina∣rily the occasional cause thereof, the cause of it must be sought for in the order of Nature.

XL.

There are a great many natural effects, which may reasonably be accounted Graces. For ex∣ample, two Persons at the same time have very different desires of Curiosity. The one would go to an Opera, & the other hear a fam'd Preach∣er. If they satisfie their curiosity, he who shall go to the Opera will find such objects, as consider∣ing the present disposition of his mind, will ex∣cite in him passions which will ruine him. The other on the contrary, may find in the Preacher so much clearness and strength, that the Grace of Conversion being given at this moment, may be very efficacious in him. This being supposed, a shower of rain or some other accident interveens, which keeps them at home; this rain doubtless is a natural effect, since it depends upon the natu∣ral Laws of the communication of motions. Ne∣vertheless, it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Ruine it prevents, and a Punishment to him, whose Conversion it hin∣ders.

XLI.

Grace being joyned with Nature, all the mo∣tions of our Souls and of our Bodies, have some relation to our Salvation. Such a man is saved for having, whilst he was in the state of Grace, made a step which happily caused him to break his neck. And is damn'd for having, at some

time, unluckily escaped the ruines of an house rea∣dy to fall. We know not what is beneficial for us, but we very well know nothing is so indiffe∣rent in its self, but that it has some relation to our salvation, by reason of the mixture & com∣bination of the effects which depend on the ge∣neral Laws of Nature with those of Grace.

XLII.

Since then Knowledge discovers the true good, the means of obtaining it, our duty towards God, in a word, the ways which we ought to follow; since it is sufficient also for those who are ani∣mated with charity to make them act well, me∣rit new Graces, vanquish certain temptations, as I shall elsewhere Explain; I think it may very deservedly be called by the name of Grace, tho J. C. be only the meritorious cause of it.

And since the outward Graces which act not immediately upon the mind, nevertheless enter into the order of predestination of Saints, I al∣so look upon them as true Graces. In a word, I think the name of Grace may be given to all natural effects, when they relate to salvation, when they are subservient to the Grace of J. C. and remove some impediments of its efficacy. Never∣theless, if any deny this, I have no design to dis∣pute upon words.

XLIII.

All these sorts of Graces, if we will allow un∣to them this name, being Graces of the Creator, the general Laws of these Graces, are the gene∣ral Laws of Nature. For it must be observed, that sin hath not destroyed nature, tho it has corrupted it; the general Laws of the communi∣cation

of motions are always the same, and those of the union of soul and body are not changed, excepting in this only, that what was but a uni∣on in respect of the mind, is changed into a de∣pendance, for reasons I have mentioned elsewhere. For at present we depend upon Bodies, to which by the institution of Nature we were only uni∣ted.

XLIV.

Now the Laws of Nature are always very sim∣ple and very general. For God acts not by par∣ticular wills, except when order requires a Mi∣racle. I have sufficiently proved this truth in the first discourse. Thus, when a stone falls upon the Head of a good man and kills him, it falls in consequence of the Laws of motions; this hap∣pens not, because God is just, and would by a par∣ticular will reward him: When a like accident knocks out the brains of a sinner, this is not be∣cause God would actually punish him. For God on the contrary, would save all men, but it becomes him not to change the simplicity of his Laws to suspend the punishment of a Criminal. In like manner, when knowledge is conveyed to the mind, it is because we have desires which are the occasional causes thereof; 'tis because we hear some knowing Person, and because our brain is suppo∣sed to receive the impressions of him that speaks. 'Tis not because God has any particular will in respect of us, but because he follows the general Laws of Nature which he has prescribed to him∣self. I see nothing mysterious in the distributi∣on of these kinds of Graces, and I shall not stand to draw the consequences which may be inferred from these Truths.

XLV.

It must be observed that J. C. who alone is the meritorious cause of the good things which God gives us according to the order of Nature, is sometimes the occasional cause of knowledge as well as of sentiment. Nevertheless I believe that this is very rare, because in truth it is not necessary. J. C. as much as is possible makes Na∣ture, serve Grace. For, besides that Reason teaches us, that order requires this, as being the most sim∣ple way; this sufficiently appears by his manage∣ment upon Earth, and by that order which he has founded, and still preserves in his Church. J. C. made use of preaching the Word for to en∣lighten the World, and sent forth his Disciples two by two to prepare the people to receive him. * 1.14 He hath appointed Apostles, Prophets, Evange∣lists, Doctours, Bishops, Priests, for the Edifica∣tion of the Church. Is not this to make Nature serviceable to Grace, and to communicate the knowledge of Faith to the minds of Men by the most simple and natural ways. In truth, it did not become J. C. upon Earth to enlighten Men by particular wills, since he might instruct them as inward Truth and eternal Wisdom, by the most simple and most fruitful Laws of Nature.

XLVI.

That which seems most dark in the order which God hath observed in founding his Church, is doubt∣less the times, the place, and other circumstances of the Incarnation of his Son, and the preaching of the Gospel. For why should J. C. for whom the world was created, be made man 4000. years after its creation? Why should he be born a∣mong

the Jews who was to reprove this misera∣ble Nation? Why chosen to be the Son of Da∣vid, when the House of David was fall'n from its Glory; and not the Son of any of the Emperours, who commanded all the Earth, since he came to convert and enlighten all the World? Why did he chuse low, mean, and ignorant persons for his Apostles and Disciples; Preach to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida and Corazin, who were resolved to continue in their incredulity, and pass by Tyre and Zidon, who would have been converted if they had had the same favour: Hinder St. Paul from Preaching the word of God in Asia, and com∣mand him to pass into Macedonia? These, and a thousand other circumstances which attended the preaching of the Gospel, doubtless are My∣steries, whereof 'tis not possible to give clear and evident reasons, neither is this my design. I would only lay down some principles, which may give some light to these and such like difficulties, or at least make it appear, that from them nothing can be concluded against, what I have hitherto said concerning the Order of Nature and of Grace.

XLVII.

It is certain that natural effects are combined and mixed after infinite ways with the effects of Grace. And that the order of Nature encreases or lessens the efficacy of the effects of the order of Grace, according to the different manners by which these two orders are mixed one with ano∣ther. The Death, which according to the gene∣ral Laws of Nature, sometimes happens to a good or evil Prince, to a good or an evil Bishop, cau∣ses

a great deal of good or evil to the Church; because such like accidents make great change in the consequence of effects which depend upon the order of Grace. Now God would save all men by the most simple ways. Therefore it may, and it ought to be said in general, that he hath chosen the times, the place, the manners, which in succession of time, and according to the ge∣neral Laws of Nature and Grace, will (caeteris paribus) cause the greatest number of the Pre∣destinated to enter into the Church. God does all for his Glory. Therefore, amongst all the pos∣sible combinations of Nature with Grace, he by the infinite extension of his knowledge, has cho∣sen that, which must make the Church most per∣fect, and most worthy of his Majesty and Wis∣dom.

XLVIII.

It seems to me, this already suffices to answer all difficulties relating to the circumstances of our Mysteries. For if it be said that J. C. ought to have been born of a Roman Emperour, and have wrought Miracles in the Capital City of the World, that so the Gospel might have been more easily spread in the farthest distant Countries; to this it may be answered boldly, that whatsoever men think thereof, this combination of Nature with Grace, would not have been so worthy of the Wisdom of God as that which he hath chosen.

I grant, that Religion would thus at first have been spread with more ease; but its establishment would not have been so divine and so extraor∣dinary, and consequently not such an invincible proof of its solidity and certainty. Thus, accor∣ding

to this combination, Religion perhaps would have been at present either destroyed, or less spread in the World. Moreover, when it is said that God acts by the most simple ways, an equality is always supposed in all things else, especially in the glory which must redound to God by his Work. Now the Church would not have been so perfect, nor so worthy of the greatness and holiness of God, if it had been form'd with so much ease. For the Beauty of the Heavenly Je∣rusalem, consisting in the different rewards due to the different combate of Christians, it was expe∣dient that the Martyrs should shed their Blood as well as J. C. to enter into the glory which they possess. In a word, this principle, that amongst all the infinite combinations of the orders of Na∣ture and Grace, God has chosen that which would produce an effect most worthy of his Majesty and Wisdom, is sufficient in general to answer all the difficulties which may be made concerning the cir∣cumstances of our Mysteries. In like manner, to justify the orders of Nature and Grace in them∣selves, its enough to know, that God being in∣finitely Wise, he does not form his designs, but upon the admirable relation of Wisdom and fruit∣fulness, which he sees in the ways capable to ex∣ecute them; as I have already shewn in the first Discourse.

XLIX.

Since the generality of men judge of God by themselves, they imagine that he first resolves upon a design, and afterwards consults his Wis∣dom how to bring it to effect; for our wills e∣very moment go before our reason, so that our de∣signs

are scarce ever perfectly reasonable. For God does not act as Men do. Behold how he acts, if I have well consulted the idea of an infinitely perfect being. God, by the infinite knowledge of his wis∣dom, and in the same wisdom, sees all possible works, and at the same time all ways of producing each of them. He sees all the relation of the means to their ends; he compares all things by an eternal, immu∣table, necessary foresight, and by the comparison which he makes of relations of the wisdom and fruitfulness which he discovers betwixt his designs and the ways of executing them, he freely forms the design. But the design being resolved upon, he necessarily chuses those general ways which are most worthy of his wisdom, greatness, and good∣ness: for since he does not resolve upon any thing, but by the knowledge he has of the ways of execu∣ting it, the choice of the design contains the choice of the ways.

L.

When I say, that God freely forms his de∣sign, I do not mean as if he cou'd chuse another which is less, and reject that which is more wor∣thy of his wisdom; for supposing that God will make any outward work worthy of himself, he is not indifferent in his choice: he must produce that which is the most perfect in respect of the simpli∣city of the ways by which he acts: he owes this to himself, to follow the rules of his wisdom: he must always act after the most wise and perfect manner. But, I say, God freely takes up his reso∣lution, because he invincibly and necessarily loves nothing but his own substance. Neither the Incar∣nation of the Word, much less the Creation of

the World, are necessary Emanations of his Na∣ture. God is altogether sufficient to himself. For a Being infinitely perfect may be conceiv'd alone, without having a necessary relation to his Crea∣tures.

LI.

Since God necessarily loves himself, he also ne∣cessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom. But seeing the Creatures make no part of his Being, he is so self-sufficient as that nothing can oblige him to produce them: he is very indifferent or free in respect of them. And it is upon this ac∣count that he made the World in time; for this circumstance makes it evident, that the Creatures are not necessary Emanations of the Divinity, but do essentially depend upon the Free-will of a Crea∣tor.

LII.

Nevertheless, behold an Objection which at first does surprize the mind: If it be true, That God necessary follows the Rules of his Wisdom, the World wou'd not have been created in time. For either the World is worthy, or unworthy of God. If it was better the World shou'd have been brought out of nothing, it ought to have been eter∣nal; if better it shou'd have remain'd in nothing, it ought not to have been made at all. God there∣fore is not obliged to follow the Rules this Wisdom prescribes, seeing the World was created in time. But the Answer to this Objection is not difficult: It is better the World shou'd be, than not: but it is better it shou'd not have been at all, than be eternal. The Creature must carry in it the essen∣tial mark of its dependance: If Spirits had been

eternal, they might have had some reason to have look'd upon themselves as Gods, or necessary Be∣ings; or at least capable to contribute something to the greatness and happiness of God, imagining that he cou'd not but have made them: they might likewise in some sort have compar'd themselves to the Divine Persons, thinking they were, like them, produc'd by a necessary emanation. Thus God was oblig'd, according to the Rules of his Wis∣dom, to leave unto the Creatures the character of their dependance: assuring them, nevertheless, that he has not made them to annihilate them, and that being constant to his designs, as his infinite Wisdom requires, they shall subsist eternally.

LIII.

This Difficulty may be further urg'd, after this manner: God necessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom; he necessarily does what is the best. Now, it was better at least, that the World shou'd have been created in time, than that it shou'd not have been created at all. Certainly it was expe∣dient, according to the Rules of Divine Wisdom, that the World shou'd have been produced with those circumstances according to which God had made it. Therefore the Creation of the World in time is absolutely necessary, God is not at all free in this respect, he cou'd not but have made it.

To resolve this Difficulty it ought to be obser∣ved, That tho' God follows the Rules which his Wisdom prescribes unto him, yet he doth not ne∣cessarily do that which is best, because he might do nothing: To act and not exactly to follow the Rules of Wisdom, is a defect. Thus, supposing

that God will act, he necessarily acts after the wi∣fest manner that can be. But, to be free in the production of the World, is a mark of abundance of fulness, and self-sufficiency. It is better the World shou'd be, than not be: the Incarnation of J. C. renders the Work of God worthy of its Author: This I grant. But seeing God is essen∣tially happy and perfect, seeing nothing but him∣self can be good, in relation unto him, or the cause of his perfection and happiness, he invinsibly loves only his own substance; and all that is without him, must indeed be made by an eternal and immu∣table action; but which has no other necessity, but upon supposition of the Divine Decrees.

See yet another Principle, of which I have al∣ready spoken, which may give some light to the Difficulties which may be made about the Circum∣stances of the Incarnation of J. C. and the Creation of the World.

LIV.

Reason and the Authority of the H. Books, teach us, that the first and principal of God's De∣signs is, the Establishment of his Church in J. C. The present World is not created to continue such as it is. The Lies and Errours, the Unrighteousness and Disorders which we see, sufficiently shew it must have an end. The future World, where Truth and Righteousness inhabit, is that Land whose Foundations cannot be shaken; and which, being the external Object of the Divine Love, shall subsist eternally. God has not created this visible World, but by little and little, to form thereof that invisible City of which S. John tells us so ma∣ny Wonders. And seeing J. C. shall be the chief

Beauty thereof, God always has had J. C. in view in the production of his Work. He hath made all for Man, and with respect to Man, * 1.15 as the Scripture teacheth us: but this Man, for whom God has made all, is, according to S. Paul, J. C. 'Tis to teach Men, that they are created, that they do not subsist, but in J. C. 'tis to bind them closely to J. C. 'tis to engage them to become like unto him, that God has represented J. C. and his Church in the chiefest of his Creatures. For it was neces∣sary God shou'd find J. C. in all his Work, that this Work might be the object of his Love and worthy of the Action by which it is produc'd.

LV.

If the manner after which the H. Scripture re∣lates the Creation of the first Man be considered, how his Wife was form'd of his Flesh and Bone, the Love he had for her, and even the Circum∣stances of their Sin, it will doubtless be granted, that God thought of the second Adam when he made the first: that he considered the Father of the World to come, when he created the Father of the present; and that he intended to make the first Man and the first Woman express Figures of J. C. and his Church. S. Paul suffers us not to doubt of this truth, when he assures us, that we are made of the Bone and Flesh of J. C. and that we are his Members, and that the Marriage of Adam and Eve was the Figure of J. C. and his Church.

LVI.

God might have form'd Men and Animals by ways as simple as the ordinary Generation is: But seeing this way figured J. C. and his Church; since,

it bore the Character of the Chief of God's De∣signs; since, it represented, as I may say, the well-beloved Son of his Father, that Son by whom the whole Creation subsists: God was obliged to pre∣fer it before all others, whereby to teach us, that as intelligible Beauties consist only in the relation they have to eternal Wisdom, so sensible Beauties must in some manner, much unknown to us, have some relation to the Truth incarnate.

LVII.

Doubtless there are many relations between the principal Creatures and J. C. who is their model and end. For all is full of J. C. all expresses and fi∣gures him, as far as the simplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit them: but I dare not enter in∣to the particulars of this. For, besides that I am afraid of deceiving my self, and that I don't suffi∣ciently know either Nature or Grace, the present or the future World, to discover the relations thereof: I am sensible, that Mens Imaginations are so witty and delicate, that one cannot, by Rea∣son, lead them to God, much less to J. C. without tyring them, and exciting their railery. The great∣est part of Christians are accustom'd to a Philoso∣phy, which rather loves to shelter its self in ficti∣ons as extravagant as those of the Poets, than have recourse to God: and some are so little acquaint∣ed with J. C. that a Man shou'd pass with them for a visionary, if he shou'd say the same things with S. Paul and not quote his words: For 'tis rather this great Name, than the Sight of the Truth, which engages them. The Authority of the Scripture hin∣ders them from blaspheming against that which they are ignorant of: but seeing they think but

little of it, they can't thereby be much enlight∣ned.

LVIII.

It is certain the Jews were a figure of the Church, and the most holy and famous amongst the Kings, Prophets and Patriarchs of this People, did repre∣sent the true Messias, our Saviour J. C. This truth can't be denied without undermining the Founda∣tions of Christian Religion, and making the most learned of the Apostles pass for the most igno∣rant of Men. J. C. not being yet come, it was necessary he shou'd at least be prefigured. He ought to be expected, he ought to be desired, he ought to disperse, by his Figures, some sort of Beauty in the World, to make it pleasing to his Father. Thus it was necessary he shou'd have been in some sense as ancient as the World; it was necessary he shou'd die presently after Sin in the person of A∣bel: Agnus occisus ab origine Mundi, principium & finis, Alpha & Omega, heri & hodie est, erat, ven∣turus est. These are the Qualifications which S. John gives to the Saviour of Men.

LIX.

Now, supposing that J. C. ought to be presigu∣red, it was expedient he shou'd chiefly be so by his Ancestors: and that their History, dictated by the H. Spirit, shou'd in all times be preserv'd, to the end that J. C. may still be compar'd with his Figures, and acknowledg'd as the true Mes∣sias. Of all the Nations of the Earth, God lo∣ving that best which had most relation with his Son, the Jews were to have been the Ancestors of J. C. according to the flesh, and to have received this favour of God, since they were the most

lively and most express Representations of his Son.

LX.

But, if this Difficulty be further urg'd, so as to demand a reason of the choice which God made of the Jews to be the principal Figures of J. C. I think I may and ought to affirm, first, That God, always acting by the most simple ways, and disco∣vering in the infinite Treasures of his Wisdom, all the possible Combinations of Nature with Grace, chose that which wou'd make the Church most ample, most perfect, and most worthy of his Ma∣jesty and Holiness, as I have already said. In the second place, I think I ought to answer, That God foreseeing what wou'd happen to the Jews, by a necessary consequence of natural Laws, had more relation to the design which he had of re∣presenting J. C. and his Church, than any thing which cou'd happen to any other Nation; it was expedient that he shou'd chuse this People rather than any other. For, in conclusion, the predesti∣nation to the Law is not like the predestination to Grace; and tho' there is nothing in Nature which may oblige God to dispense his Grace equally to all People; it seems to me, that Nature might me∣rit the Law, in the sence wherein I here under∣stand it.

LXI.

It is true, that all that happen'd to the Jews, who represented J. C. was not a necessary conse∣quence of the order of Nature; Miracles were necessary to render them the lively and express Images of the Church, but Nature must have fur∣nish'd the Fund and the Matter, and perhaps the

principal Stroaks in several things; Miracles fi∣nish'd the rest. But no other Nation wou'd have been so proper for so just and high a Design.

LXII.

It appears to me, that we are oblig'd to think, that God's Wisdom, foreseeing all the Consequen∣ces of all the possible Orders, and all their Combi∣nations, never works Miracles when Nature suf∣fices: and that thus, he was oblig'd to chuse the Combination of Natural Effects, which, saving him, as I may say, the expence of Miracles, might nevertheless very faithfully execute his Intentions.

For example, 'Tis necessary that all Sins shou'd be punish'd; but not always in this World. Sup∣posing, nevertheless, that it was expedient for the glory of J. C. and the establishment of Religion, that the Jews shou'd be punish'd in the face of the whole Earth, for putting to death the Saviour of the World: it was convenient that J. C. came into the World towards the end of Herod's Reign; supposing, that according to the necessary conse∣quence of the Order of Nature, that People shou'd be divided amongst themselves about that time; that Civil Wars and continual Seditions shou'd weaken them; and that, lastly, the Romans shou'd destroy and scatter them abroad, after the total destruction of their City and Temple.

It is true, there seems to have been something extraordinary in the desolation of the Jews. But, since it argues more Wisdom in God to produce such surprising Effects, by the most simple and ge∣neral Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills; I know not whether, on this occasion, we ought to have recourse to a Miracle. For my part, I don't

dispute of it here: this is a thing which is not ea∣sie, nor indeed very necessary to be cleared. I give this Example, for to make some application of my Principles and to make them the better un∣derstood.

It seems to me, that what I have hitherto said, of Nature and Grace, is sufficient to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons, concerning an infinite number of Difficulties, which disturb the Minds of those only who judge of God by them∣selves. For if we do faithfully consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, of a general Cause, of an infinite Wisdom; and if the Principles I have establish'd of this Idea be granted, I believe none will be surprized or offended with God's Con∣duct, and that instead of condemning or mur∣muring at it, Men will not forbear to admire and adore it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Before this 2d. Dis. read 3d. C. of 2d. P. of Search af∣ter Truth, and the Expli. of the same C. where the Au∣thor op∣poses the Efficacy of pre∣tended second causes.
• * 1.2

  By the true cause I under∣stand the Cause which Acts by its own strength.
• * 1.3

  Heb. 11.5.
• * 1.4

  Eph. I. 22, 23. IV. 16. Col. 11.19. Act. IX. 5. Col I. 24. 1 Cor. XII. 27. &c.
• * 1.5

  Ioh. VII. 39.
• * 1.6

  Heb. 7.25, Rom. 8.34. 1 Joh. II. 1. Joh. XI. 42.
• * 1.7

  Eph. IV. 13.
• * 1.8

  Athan. Orat. 4. in Aria∣nos. S. I∣ren. Lib. V. S. Ba∣sil Ep. 391. ad Amphil. S. Greg. Naz. O∣rat. 36. S. Cyr. of Alex. Thres. lib. 9. C. 4. The∣od. Tom. 4. p. 731.
• * 1.9

  Ezek. 33.2. Eccles. 15.12.
• * 1.10

  John 15.4.
• * 1.11

  Rom. V. 14, 17, 18, 19. 1 Cor. 15 48.
• * 1.12

  1 Joh. 11.72.
• * 1.13

  Search af∣ter Truth, 1. explic. That God is not the Author of our concupis∣cence.
• * 1.14

  Luke X. 1. Eph. IV. 12. & 12.
• * 1.15

  Heb. ch. II.