A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

THE SECOND PART. Of the Grace of the Creator.

XXXII.

I Know but two Principles which determine di∣rectly, and by themselves, the motions of our Love, Knowledge, and Pleasure: Knowledge, by which we discern different goods, Pleasure, by which we taste them. But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure. Knowledge leaves us altogether to our selves, it makes no at∣tempt upon our liberty, it does not force us to love any thing, it does not produce in us a na∣tural or necessary love; it only puts us in a con∣dition of determining our selves, and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of

choice, or which is the same thing, of fixing the general impression of Love which God continual∣ly gives us upon particular goods. But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will, it transports it, as I may say, towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it; it produces in us a natural and necessary love; it diminishes our liberty, di∣stracts our reason, and does not leave us whol∣ly to our selves: A small attention to our in∣ward sentiments may convince of these differences.

XXXIII.

Thus Man before sin, having a perfect free∣dom, and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the moti∣ons of his Love; and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable, it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation, (as I have already said) nor by o∣ther Graces of Sentiment, which might have di∣minished his merit, and have engaged him to have loved by instinct, that good which ought to be loved only by Reason. But since sin, besides Knowledge, the Grace of sentiment has been ne∣cessary, that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence. For Man invincibly desiring to be happy, it is impossible he should continually sacri∣fice his Pleasure to his Knowledge; his Pleasure which renders him actually happy, & which subsists in himself (notwithstanding he never so much re∣sists it) to his knowledge which subsists not, but by a troublesome application of mind, which the least actual pleasure distracts; & which lastly, doth not promise actual happiness till after death; which to the imagination, seems to be a real Annihilation.

XXXIV.

Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man, for guiding him in the search after that which is good: It is the Effect of natural order: It supposes nei∣ther the Corruption, nor the Restoration of Na∣ture. But Pleasure which draws us to true happi∣ness is pure Grace; for naturally what is truly good, ought only to be loved by reason. Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace: But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature, because it is the Grace of the Creator. Let us endeavour to find out these causes.

XXXV.

In the order established by Nature, I only see two occasional causes, which distribute knowledge to Spirits, and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator. The one in us, which in some sort depends upon us; the other, which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us. The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills. The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind, in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body.

XXXVI.

The inward sentiment which we have of our selves, teaches us that our desires produce or ex∣cite knowledge in us, and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us; for all who apply themselves to truth, discover it proportionably to their attention. And if our prayer was not interrup∣ted,

if our attention was not disturbed, if we had any Idea of what we ask, and if we asked it with necessary perseverance, we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive. But our prayers are continually interrupted, if they be not preingaged [by pleasure.] Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas; and tho the truth we consult answers our request, yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers, or causes us presently to forget them.

XXXVII.

If it be considered, that Man before sin was animated with Charity, that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righte∣ousness, and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward; it may easily be apprehended, that the various de∣sires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes of the knowledge communicated to his mind: Otherwise, his distraction would not have been Voluntary, nor his attention Meritorious. Now Nature, although corrupted, is not destroy∣ed; God has not ceased to will that which he once willed, the same Laws still remain. Thus our different wills are still at this day the occasi∣onal or natural causes of the presence of Ideas to our minds. * 1.1 But because the union of the Soul with the Body is changed into a dependance by the natural consequence of sin, and the immutability of the will of God, as I have * elsewhere explain∣ed, our Bodies at present disturb our Ideas, and speaking so loudly in behalf of the goods which respect them, that the mind rarely asks,

and distractedly hears the inward TRUTH.

XXXVIII.

Experience further teaches us every moment, that our conversation with knowing Persons, is capable of instructing by exciting our attention; that Sermons, reading, converse, and many such like occasions, may raise in us good sentiments. The death of a friend doubtless is able to make us think of Death, if some great passion does not wholly imploy us. And when an able Preacher undertakes to demonstrate a very plain truth, and convince others of it, it must be granted that he may perswade his Auditors thereof, and even move their Conscience, excite their hope and fear, and such like passions in them, which disposes them less to resist the efficacy of the Grace of J. C. Men being made to live in society one with an∣other, it was necessary that they might mutual∣ly communicate their thoughts and motions. It was needful that they should be united by the Mind as well as the Body, and that speaking by the Voice to the Ears, and by writeing to the Eyes, they should communicate knowledge and understanding to attentive minds.

XXXIX.

Now Knowledge, what way soever it is pro∣duced in us, whether by our particular desires, or whether some accidents be the occasion there∣of, it may be called Grace, especially when it very much concerns our salvation, tho it should only be a consequence of the order of Nature; because since sin, God owes us nothing, and all the good we have, is only what J. C. has merited for us. For even our very Being subsists not but by

J. C. But this kind of Grace, tho merited by J. C. is not the Grace of J. C. 'Tis the Grace of the Creator; because J. C. not being ordina∣rily the occasional cause thereof, the cause of it must be sought for in the order of Nature.

XL.

There are a great many natural effects, which may reasonably be accounted Graces. For ex∣ample, two Persons at the same time have very different desires of Curiosity. The one would go to an Opera, & the other hear a fam'd Preach∣er. If they satisfie their curiosity, he who shall go to the Opera will find such objects, as consider∣ing the present disposition of his mind, will ex∣cite in him passions which will ruine him. The other on the contrary, may find in the Preacher so much clearness and strength, that the Grace of Conversion being given at this moment, may be very efficacious in him. This being supposed, a shower of rain or some other accident interveens, which keeps them at home; this rain doubtless is a natural effect, since it depends upon the natu∣ral Laws of the communication of motions. Ne∣vertheless, it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Ruine it prevents, and a Punishment to him, whose Conversion it hin∣ders.

XLI.

Grace being joyned with Nature, all the mo∣tions of our Souls and of our Bodies, have some relation to our Salvation. Such a man is saved for having, whilst he was in the state of Grace, made a step which happily caused him to break his neck. And is damn'd for having, at some

time, unluckily escaped the ruines of an house rea∣dy to fall. We know not what is beneficial for us, but we very well know nothing is so indiffe∣rent in its self, but that it has some relation to our salvation, by reason of the mixture & com∣bination of the effects which depend on the ge∣neral Laws of Nature with those of Grace.

XLII.

Since then Knowledge discovers the true good, the means of obtaining it, our duty towards God, in a word, the ways which we ought to follow; since it is sufficient also for those who are ani∣mated with charity to make them act well, me∣rit new Graces, vanquish certain temptations, as I shall elsewhere Explain; I think it may very deservedly be called by the name of Grace, tho J. C. be only the meritorious cause of it.

And since the outward Graces which act not immediately upon the mind, nevertheless enter into the order of predestination of Saints, I al∣so look upon them as true Graces. In a word, I think the name of Grace may be given to all natural effects, when they relate to salvation, when they are subservient to the Grace of J. C. and remove some impediments of its efficacy. Never∣theless, if any deny this, I have no design to dis∣pute upon words.

XLIII.

All these sorts of Graces, if we will allow un∣to them this name, being Graces of the Creator, the general Laws of these Graces, are the gene∣ral Laws of Nature. For it must be observed, that sin hath not destroyed nature, tho it has corrupted it; the general Laws of the communi∣cation

of motions are always the same, and those of the union of soul and body are not changed, excepting in this only, that what was but a uni∣on in respect of the mind, is changed into a de∣pendance, for reasons I have mentioned elsewhere. For at present we depend upon Bodies, to which by the institution of Nature we were only uni∣ted.

XLIV.

Now the Laws of Nature are always very sim∣ple and very general. For God acts not by par∣ticular wills, except when order requires a Mi∣racle. I have sufficiently proved this truth in the first discourse. Thus, when a stone falls upon the Head of a good man and kills him, it falls in consequence of the Laws of motions; this hap∣pens not, because God is just, and would by a par∣ticular will reward him: When a like accident knocks out the brains of a sinner, this is not be∣cause God would actually punish him. For God on the contrary, would save all men, but it becomes him not to change the simplicity of his Laws to suspend the punishment of a Criminal. In like manner, when knowledge is conveyed to the mind, it is because we have desires which are the occasional causes thereof; 'tis because we hear some knowing Person, and because our brain is suppo∣sed to receive the impressions of him that speaks. 'Tis not because God has any particular will in respect of us, but because he follows the general Laws of Nature which he has prescribed to him∣self. I see nothing mysterious in the distributi∣on of these kinds of Graces, and I shall not stand to draw the consequences which may be inferred from these Truths.

XLV.

It must be observed that J. C. who alone is the meritorious cause of the good things which God gives us according to the order of Nature, is sometimes the occasional cause of knowledge as well as of sentiment. Nevertheless I believe that this is very rare, because in truth it is not necessary. J. C. as much as is possible makes Na∣ture, serve Grace. For, besides that Reason teaches us, that order requires this, as being the most sim∣ple way; this sufficiently appears by his manage∣ment upon Earth, and by that order which he has founded, and still preserves in his Church. J. C. made use of preaching the Word for to en∣lighten the World, and sent forth his Disciples two by two to prepare the people to receive him. * 1.2 He hath appointed Apostles, Prophets, Evange∣lists, Doctours, Bishops, Priests, for the Edifica∣tion of the Church. Is not this to make Nature serviceable to Grace, and to communicate the knowledge of Faith to the minds of Men by the most simple and natural ways. In truth, it did not become J. C. upon Earth to enlighten Men by particular wills, since he might instruct them as inward Truth and eternal Wisdom, by the most simple and most fruitful Laws of Nature.

XLVI.

That which seems most dark in the order which God hath observed in founding his Church, is doubt∣less the times, the place, and other circumstances of the Incarnation of his Son, and the preaching of the Gospel. For why should J. C. for whom the world was created, be made man 4000. years after its creation? Why should he be born a∣mong

the Jews who was to reprove this misera∣ble Nation? Why chosen to be the Son of Da∣vid, when the House of David was fall'n from its Glory; and not the Son of any of the Emperours, who commanded all the Earth, since he came to convert and enlighten all the World? Why did he chuse low, mean, and ignorant persons for his Apostles and Disciples; Preach to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida and Corazin, who were resolved to continue in their incredulity, and pass by Tyre and Zidon, who would have been converted if they had had the same favour: Hinder St. Paul from Preaching the word of God in Asia, and com∣mand him to pass into Macedonia? These, and a thousand other circumstances which attended the preaching of the Gospel, doubtless are My∣steries, whereof 'tis not possible to give clear and evident reasons, neither is this my design. I would only lay down some principles, which may give some light to these and such like difficulties, or at least make it appear, that from them nothing can be concluded against, what I have hitherto said concerning the Order of Nature and of Grace.

XLVII.

It is certain that natural effects are combined and mixed after infinite ways with the effects of Grace. And that the order of Nature encreases or lessens the efficacy of the effects of the order of Grace, according to the different manners by which these two orders are mixed one with ano∣ther. The Death, which according to the gene∣ral Laws of Nature, sometimes happens to a good or evil Prince, to a good or an evil Bishop, cau∣ses

a great deal of good or evil to the Church; because such like accidents make great change in the consequence of effects which depend upon the order of Grace. Now God would save all men by the most simple ways. Therefore it may, and it ought to be said in general, that he hath chosen the times, the place, the manners, which in succession of time, and according to the ge∣neral Laws of Nature and Grace, will (caeteris paribus) cause the greatest number of the Pre∣destinated to enter into the Church. God does all for his Glory. Therefore, amongst all the pos∣sible combinations of Nature with Grace, he by the infinite extension of his knowledge, has cho∣sen that, which must make the Church most per∣fect, and most worthy of his Majesty and Wis∣dom.

XLVIII.

It seems to me, this already suffices to answer all difficulties relating to the circumstances of our Mysteries. For if it be said that J. C. ought to have been born of a Roman Emperour, and have wrought Miracles in the Capital City of the World, that so the Gospel might have been more easily spread in the farthest distant Countries; to this it may be answered boldly, that whatsoever men think thereof, this combination of Nature with Grace, would not have been so worthy of the Wisdom of God as that which he hath chosen.

I grant, that Religion would thus at first have been spread with more ease; but its establishment would not have been so divine and so extraor∣dinary, and consequently not such an invincible proof of its solidity and certainty. Thus, accor∣ding

to this combination, Religion perhaps would have been at present either destroyed, or less spread in the World. Moreover, when it is said that God acts by the most simple ways, an equality is always supposed in all things else, especially in the glory which must redound to God by his Work. Now the Church would not have been so perfect, nor so worthy of the greatness and holiness of God, if it had been form'd with so much ease. For the Beauty of the Heavenly Je∣rusalem, consisting in the different rewards due to the different combate of Christians, it was expe∣dient that the Martyrs should shed their Blood as well as J. C. to enter into the glory which they possess. In a word, this principle, that amongst all the infinite combinations of the orders of Na∣ture and Grace, God has chosen that which would produce an effect most worthy of his Majesty and Wisdom, is sufficient in general to answer all the difficulties which may be made concerning the cir∣cumstances of our Mysteries. In like manner, to justify the orders of Nature and Grace in them∣selves, its enough to know, that God being in∣finitely Wise, he does not form his designs, but upon the admirable relation of Wisdom and fruit∣fulness, which he sees in the ways capable to ex∣ecute them; as I have already shewn in the first Discourse.

XLIX.

Since the generality of men judge of God by themselves, they imagine that he first resolves upon a design, and afterwards consults his Wis∣dom how to bring it to effect; for our wills e∣very moment go before our reason, so that our de∣signs

are scarce ever perfectly reasonable. For God does not act as Men do. Behold how he acts, if I have well consulted the idea of an infinitely perfect being. God, by the infinite knowledge of his wis∣dom, and in the same wisdom, sees all possible works, and at the same time all ways of producing each of them. He sees all the relation of the means to their ends; he compares all things by an eternal, immu∣table, necessary foresight, and by the comparison which he makes of relations of the wisdom and fruitfulness which he discovers betwixt his designs and the ways of executing them, he freely forms the design. But the design being resolved upon, he necessarily chuses those general ways which are most worthy of his wisdom, greatness, and good∣ness: for since he does not resolve upon any thing, but by the knowledge he has of the ways of execu∣ting it, the choice of the design contains the choice of the ways.

L.

When I say, that God freely forms his de∣sign, I do not mean as if he cou'd chuse another which is less, and reject that which is more wor∣thy of his wisdom; for supposing that God will make any outward work worthy of himself, he is not indifferent in his choice: he must produce that which is the most perfect in respect of the simpli∣city of the ways by which he acts: he owes this to himself, to follow the rules of his wisdom: he must always act after the most wise and perfect manner. But, I say, God freely takes up his reso∣lution, because he invincibly and necessarily loves nothing but his own substance. Neither the Incar∣nation of the Word, much less the Creation of

the World, are necessary Emanations of his Na∣ture. God is altogether sufficient to himself. For a Being infinitely perfect may be conceiv'd alone, without having a necessary relation to his Crea∣tures.

LI.

Since God necessarily loves himself, he also ne∣cessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom. But seeing the Creatures make no part of his Being, he is so self-sufficient as that nothing can oblige him to produce them: he is very indifferent or free in respect of them. And it is upon this ac∣count that he made the World in time; for this circumstance makes it evident, that the Creatures are not necessary Emanations of the Divinity, but do essentially depend upon the Free-will of a Crea∣tor.

LII.

Nevertheless, behold an Objection which at first does surprize the mind: If it be true, That God necessary follows the Rules of his Wisdom, the World wou'd not have been created in time. For either the World is worthy, or unworthy of God. If it was better the World shou'd have been brought out of nothing, it ought to have been eter∣nal; if better it shou'd have remain'd in nothing, it ought not to have been made at all. God there∣fore is not obliged to follow the Rules this Wisdom prescribes, seeing the World was created in time. But the Answer to this Objection is not difficult: It is better the World shou'd be, than not: but it is better it shou'd not have been at all, than be eternal. The Creature must carry in it the essen∣tial mark of its dependance: If Spirits had been

eternal, they might have had some reason to have look'd upon themselves as Gods, or necessary Be∣ings; or at least capable to contribute something to the greatness and happiness of God, imagining that he cou'd not but have made them: they might likewise in some sort have compar'd themselves to the Divine Persons, thinking they were, like them, produc'd by a necessary emanation. Thus God was oblig'd, according to the Rules of his Wis∣dom, to leave unto the Creatures the character of their dependance: assuring them, nevertheless, that he has not made them to annihilate them, and that being constant to his designs, as his infinite Wisdom requires, they shall subsist eternally.

LIII.

This Difficulty may be further urg'd, after this manner: God necessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom; he necessarily does what is the best. Now, it was better at least, that the World shou'd have been created in time, than that it shou'd not have been created at all. Certainly it was expe∣dient, according to the Rules of Divine Wisdom, that the World shou'd have been produced with those circumstances according to which God had made it. Therefore the Creation of the World in time is absolutely necessary, God is not at all free in this respect, he cou'd not but have made it.

To resolve this Difficulty it ought to be obser∣ved, That tho' God follows the Rules which his Wisdom prescribes unto him, yet he doth not ne∣cessarily do that which is best, because he might do nothing: To act and not exactly to follow the Rules of Wisdom, is a defect. Thus, supposing

that God will act, he necessarily acts after the wi∣fest manner that can be. But, to be free in the production of the World, is a mark of abundance of fulness, and self-sufficiency. It is better the World shou'd be, than not be: the Incarnation of J. C. renders the Work of God worthy of its Author: This I grant. But seeing God is essen∣tially happy and perfect, seeing nothing but him∣self can be good, in relation unto him, or the cause of his perfection and happiness, he invinsibly loves only his own substance; and all that is without him, must indeed be made by an eternal and immu∣table action; but which has no other necessity, but upon supposition of the Divine Decrees.

See yet another Principle, of which I have al∣ready spoken, which may give some light to the Difficulties which may be made about the Circum∣stances of the Incarnation of J. C. and the Creation of the World.

LIV.

Reason and the Authority of the H. Books, teach us, that the first and principal of God's De∣signs is, the Establishment of his Church in J. C. The present World is not created to continue such as it is. The Lies and Errours, the Unrighteousness and Disorders which we see, sufficiently shew it must have an end. The future World, where Truth and Righteousness inhabit, is that Land whose Foundations cannot be shaken; and which, being the external Object of the Divine Love, shall subsist eternally. God has not created this visible World, but by little and little, to form thereof that invisible City of which S. John tells us so ma∣ny Wonders. And seeing J. C. shall be the chief

Beauty thereof, God always has had J. C. in view in the production of his Work. He hath made all for Man, and with respect to Man, * 1.3 as the Scripture teacheth us: but this Man, for whom God has made all, is, according to S. Paul, J. C. 'Tis to teach Men, that they are created, that they do not subsist, but in J. C. 'tis to bind them closely to J. C. 'tis to engage them to become like unto him, that God has represented J. C. and his Church in the chiefest of his Creatures. For it was neces∣sary God shou'd find J. C. in all his Work, that this Work might be the object of his Love and worthy of the Action by which it is produc'd.

LV.

If the manner after which the H. Scripture re∣lates the Creation of the first Man be considered, how his Wife was form'd of his Flesh and Bone, the Love he had for her, and even the Circum∣stances of their Sin, it will doubtless be granted, that God thought of the second Adam when he made the first: that he considered the Father of the World to come, when he created the Father of the present; and that he intended to make the first Man and the first Woman express Figures of J. C. and his Church. S. Paul suffers us not to doubt of this truth, when he assures us, that we are made of the Bone and Flesh of J. C. and that we are his Members, and that the Marriage of Adam and Eve was the Figure of J. C. and his Church.

LVI.

God might have form'd Men and Animals by ways as simple as the ordinary Generation is: But seeing this way figured J. C. and his Church; since,

it bore the Character of the Chief of God's De∣signs; since, it represented, as I may say, the well-beloved Son of his Father, that Son by whom the whole Creation subsists: God was obliged to pre∣fer it before all others, whereby to teach us, that as intelligible Beauties consist only in the relation they have to eternal Wisdom, so sensible Beauties must in some manner, much unknown to us, have some relation to the Truth incarnate.

LVII.

Doubtless there are many relations between the principal Creatures and J. C. who is their model and end. For all is full of J. C. all expresses and fi∣gures him, as far as the simplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit them: but I dare not enter in∣to the particulars of this. For, besides that I am afraid of deceiving my self, and that I don't suffi∣ciently know either Nature or Grace, the present or the future World, to discover the relations thereof: I am sensible, that Mens Imaginations are so witty and delicate, that one cannot, by Rea∣son, lead them to God, much less to J. C. without tyring them, and exciting their railery. The great∣est part of Christians are accustom'd to a Philoso∣phy, which rather loves to shelter its self in ficti∣ons as extravagant as those of the Poets, than have recourse to God: and some are so little acquaint∣ed with J. C. that a Man shou'd pass with them for a visionary, if he shou'd say the same things with S. Paul and not quote his words: For 'tis rather this great Name, than the Sight of the Truth, which engages them. The Authority of the Scripture hin∣ders them from blaspheming against that which they are ignorant of: but seeing they think but

little of it, they can't thereby be much enlight∣ned.

LVIII.

It is certain the Jews were a figure of the Church, and the most holy and famous amongst the Kings, Prophets and Patriarchs of this People, did repre∣sent the true Messias, our Saviour J. C. This truth can't be denied without undermining the Founda∣tions of Christian Religion, and making the most learned of the Apostles pass for the most igno∣rant of Men. J. C. not being yet come, it was necessary he shou'd at least be prefigured. He ought to be expected, he ought to be desired, he ought to disperse, by his Figures, some sort of Beauty in the World, to make it pleasing to his Father. Thus it was necessary he shou'd have been in some sense as ancient as the World; it was necessary he shou'd die presently after Sin in the person of A∣bel: Agnus occisus ab origine Mundi, principium & finis, Alpha & Omega, heri & hodie est, erat, ven∣turus est. These are the Qualifications which S. John gives to the Saviour of Men.

LIX.

Now, supposing that J. C. ought to be presigu∣red, it was expedient he shou'd chiefly be so by his Ancestors: and that their History, dictated by the H. Spirit, shou'd in all times be preserv'd, to the end that J. C. may still be compar'd with his Figures, and acknowledg'd as the true Mes∣sias. Of all the Nations of the Earth, God lo∣ving that best which had most relation with his Son, the Jews were to have been the Ancestors of J. C. according to the flesh, and to have received this favour of God, since they were the most

lively and most express Representations of his Son.

LX.

But, if this Difficulty be further urg'd, so as to demand a reason of the choice which God made of the Jews to be the principal Figures of J. C. I think I may and ought to affirm, first, That God, always acting by the most simple ways, and disco∣vering in the infinite Treasures of his Wisdom, all the possible Combinations of Nature with Grace, chose that which wou'd make the Church most ample, most perfect, and most worthy of his Ma∣jesty and Holiness, as I have already said. In the second place, I think I ought to answer, That God foreseeing what wou'd happen to the Jews, by a necessary consequence of natural Laws, had more relation to the design which he had of re∣presenting J. C. and his Church, than any thing which cou'd happen to any other Nation; it was expedient that he shou'd chuse this People rather than any other. For, in conclusion, the predesti∣nation to the Law is not like the predestination to Grace; and tho' there is nothing in Nature which may oblige God to dispense his Grace equally to all People; it seems to me, that Nature might me∣rit the Law, in the sence wherein I here under∣stand it.

LXI.

It is true, that all that happen'd to the Jews, who represented J. C. was not a necessary conse∣quence of the order of Nature; Miracles were necessary to render them the lively and express Images of the Church, but Nature must have fur∣nish'd the Fund and the Matter, and perhaps the

principal Stroaks in several things; Miracles fi∣nish'd the rest. But no other Nation wou'd have been so proper for so just and high a Design.

LXII.

It appears to me, that we are oblig'd to think, that God's Wisdom, foreseeing all the Consequen∣ces of all the possible Orders, and all their Combi∣nations, never works Miracles when Nature suf∣fices: and that thus, he was oblig'd to chuse the Combination of Natural Effects, which, saving him, as I may say, the expence of Miracles, might nevertheless very faithfully execute his Intentions.

For example, 'Tis necessary that all Sins shou'd be punish'd; but not always in this World. Sup∣posing, nevertheless, that it was expedient for the glory of J. C. and the establishment of Religion, that the Jews shou'd be punish'd in the face of the whole Earth, for putting to death the Saviour of the World: it was convenient that J. C. came into the World towards the end of Herod's Reign; supposing, that according to the necessary conse∣quence of the Order of Nature, that People shou'd be divided amongst themselves about that time; that Civil Wars and continual Seditions shou'd weaken them; and that, lastly, the Romans shou'd destroy and scatter them abroad, after the total destruction of their City and Temple.

It is true, there seems to have been something extraordinary in the desolation of the Jews. But, since it argues more Wisdom in God to produce such surprising Effects, by the most simple and ge∣neral Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills; I know not whether, on this occasion, we ought to have recourse to a Miracle. For my part, I don't

dispute of it here: this is a thing which is not ea∣sie, nor indeed very necessary to be cleared. I give this Example, for to make some application of my Principles and to make them the better un∣derstood.

It seems to me, that what I have hitherto said, of Nature and Grace, is sufficient to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons, concerning an infinite number of Difficulties, which disturb the Minds of those only who judge of God by them∣selves. For if we do faithfully consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, of a general Cause, of an infinite Wisdom; and if the Principles I have establish'd of this Idea be granted, I believe none will be surprized or offended with God's Con∣duct, and that instead of condemning or mur∣muring at it, Men will not forbear to admire and adore it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Search af∣ter Truth, 1. explic. That God is not the Author of our concupis∣cence.
• * 1.2

  Luke X. 1. Eph. IV. 12. & 12.
• * 1.3

  Heb. ch. II.