Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.

BOOK IV. Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind.

CHAP. I.

I. It's necessary the Mind have Inclinations, as well as the Body Motions.

II. God acts the Humane Mind only for himself.

III. Mens Minds are only inclin'd to Particular Good, through the Motion they have to Good in General.

IV. The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclina∣tions, which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book.

IT would not be necessary to Treat of Natural Inclinations, as we are going to do in this Fourth Book; nor of the Passions, as we shall do in the following; in order to discover the Causes of the Errors of Mankind, if the Understanding did not de∣pend on the Will in the Perception of Objects: But

whereas it is the Will that directs it, which makes it resolve, and applies it to some Objects rather than others; it is absolutely necessary to apprehend its Inclinations well, to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors to which we are liable.

If God, * 1.1 when he Created this World, had produced Matter infinitely extended, without giving it any Mo∣tion, there would have been no difference in Bodies. All this visible World would still have been a meer Mass of Matter, or of Extension, which indeed might serve to discover the Grandeur and Power of its Au∣thor; but there would not be that Succession of Forms, and that Variety of Bodies, which compose all the Beauty of the Universe, and which incline Mens Minds to admire the Infinite Wisdom of the Governour thereof.

Therefore I am of Opinion, That the Inclinations of the Mind are in the Spiritual World, what Motion is in the Material World; and that if the Mind were without Inclinations, or if it never had any Desire, we should not meet with that Variety in the Order of Spiritual Things; which not only makes the World admire the Profoundness of the Wisdom of God, ap∣prove the Variety of Material Objects; but also his Mercy, his Justice, his Goodness, and generally all his other Attributes. Thus then the Difference of In∣clinations produces in the Mind, an Effect much like unto that which the Difference of Motions produces in the Body; and the Inclinations of Mens Minds, and the Motions of Bodies together, constitute all the Beauty of Created Beings. Thus all Spirits must have some Inclinations, as well as Bodies have diffe∣rent Motions. But let us endeavour to discover what Inclinations they ought to have.

Were not our Nature Corrupted, it would not be necessary to seek out by Reason, as we are going to do, what the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits ought to be: It would be sufficient, in order there∣unto, to consult our selves, and we should discover, by the Inward Sentiments we have of what passes within us, all the Inclinations we ought Naturally to

have. But, whereas we know by Faith, that Sin has destroy'd the Order of Nature, and that Reason in∣forms us, that our Inclinations are Irregular, as it will appear in the Sequel, we are obliged to go another way to work: Since we cannot trust to what we feel, we are obliged to explain things in a more Sublime Manner; but which, without doubt, will seem to have but little Solidity in it, to those who only esteem what relates to the Senses.

It is an undeniable Truth, * 1.2 that God can have no other Principal End for his Operations but himself; and that he may have several Ends less Principal, which tend all towards the Preservation of the Beings which he has created. He can have no Principal End but himself, because he cannot Err; nor place his Final End in Beings which are not Perfect. But he may propose as a less Principal End the Preservation of Cre∣ated Beings; because as they all participate of his Goodness, they are necessarily Good, and even very Good according to Scripture, Valde bona. Therefore God Loves them, and moreover it is his Love which preserves them; for all Beings only subsist because God Loves them. Diligis omnia quae sunt, says the Wise Man, Nihil odisli eorum quae fecisti: Nec enim odiens aliquid constituisti & fecisti. Quomodo autem posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu voluisses, aut quod à to vocatum non esset conserveretur. In effect it is not possi∣ble to conceive, that things which do not please a Being which is infinitely Perfect and Powerful, should subsist, since all things only subsist by his Will. There∣fore God wills his Glory as his principal End, and the Preservation of his Creatures for his Glory.

The Natural Inclinations of Humane Minds, being certainly continual Impressions of the Will of him that has created them, and does preserve them: It is, in my Opinion, necessary that those Inclinations should be intirely like unto those of their Creator and Pre∣server. Therefore Naturally they can have no prin∣cipal End but his Glory; nor no other Second End but their own Preservation and that of others; but always in relation to him from whom they have their

Being. For it seems undeniable to me, that since God cannot desire that the Will he has created should Love an Inferior Good more than a Greater, that is, That it should Love that which is less Lovely, more than that which is more Lovely: He can create nothing without inclining it towards himself, or command∣ing it to Love him above all things; though he may create it Free, and with a Power to withdraw and to stray from him.

Whereas there is properly but one Love in God, * 1.3 which is the Love of himself: And that God can Love nothing but by that Love, since he can Love nothing but in relation to himself: So God likewise Imprints but one Love in us, which is the Love of Good in General; and we can Love nothing but by that Love, since we can Love nothing but what is, or seems to be Good. It is the Love of Good in Ge∣neral, which is the Principle of our particular Affe∣ctions, since that Love really is nothing but our Will; For as I have said already in another place, The Will is nothing but the continual Impression of the Author of Nature, which inclines the Mind of Man towards Good in General. Certainly we must not imagine that this Power we have of Loving proceeds from us, or is at our Disposition. Nothing but the Power of not Loving well, or rather of misplacing our Affections, is at our own Disposition; by reason that being Free, we may apply, and actually do apply to particular Objects, and consequently to false Objects, the Good Love which God does not cease to imprint in us, while he does not cease to preserve us.

But not only our Will, or our Love for Good in General, proceeds from God; but Inclinations for particular Goods which are common to all Men, though not equally strong in all Men, as our Inclination for the Preservation of our Being, and of those that are united to us by Nature, are also Impressions of the Will of God upon us; for in this place I give promis∣cuously the Name of Natural Inclinations to all the Impressions of the Author of Nature, which are com∣mon to all Minds.

I said but even now, that God loved his Creatures, * 1.4 and also that it was his Love which gave them to exist, and did preserve their Being: Therefore as God continually imprints in us a Love like unto his, since it is his Will which makes and which regulates ours; he likewise gives us all those Natural Incli∣nations which are not at our Choice, and which in∣cline us of necessity to the Preservation of our Being, and of those we live with.

For, though Sin has Corrupted all things, it has not destroy'd them. Although our Natural Inclina∣tions do not always propose God as their End by the Free Choice of our Will, God is always their Object in the Institution of Nature: For God who produces and preserves them in us, only produces and preserves them for himself. All Sinners tend towards God by the Impression they receive from God, though they withdraw from him by the Error and Distraction of their Mind. They love Good, for we can never love otherwise, since God makes us Love; but they Love ill Objects, Ill only, because God, who gives even Sinners the Power of Loving, forbids their Loving them, because since the Fall they withdraw their Affection from him. For Men imagining that Crea∣tures occasion in them the Pleasure they injoy upon their account, incline their Affections violently to∣wards the Body, and fall into an absolute Forget∣fulness of God, who does not appear before their Eyes.

We have still then the same Natural Inclinations, or the same Impressions of the Author of Nature which Adam had before the Fall. We have even the same Inclinations which the Blessed have in Heaven, for God neither Creates nor Preserves any Creatures, without giving them a Love like unto his. He Loves himself, he Loves us, he Loves all his Creatures: Therefore he Inclines all Humane Minds to Love him, to Love themselves, and to Love all Creatures.

But were as all our Inclinations are only Impressions of the Author of Nature, which incline us to Love him and all things for his sake; they cannot be right

unless we love God with all our Power, and all things for his sake, by the Free Choice of our Will: For we cannot, without Injustice, abuse the Love God gives us for himself, by applying it to any thing but himself, or which has no relation to himself.

Thus we are now sensible, not only what our Na∣tural Inclinations are, but also what they ought to be; in order to be well regulated, and according to the Institution of their Author. For all the Disorder of our Inclinations consists, in that we place our final End in our selves; and that instead of doing all things in relation to God, we do all things in relation to our selves.

We have then, in the first place, an Inclination for good in General, which is the Principle of all our Natural Inclinations, of all our Passions, and of all the Free Actions of our Will.

Secondly, We have an Inclination for the Preserva∣tion of our Being, and of our Happiness.

Thirdly, We have all an Inclination for the other Creatures, when they are of use to us, or to those we Love. Moreover, we have several other parti∣cular Inclinations which depend on these; but we shall speak of them elsewhere. We only design in this Fourth Book, to refer the Errors of our Incli∣nations to these three Heads, viz. To the Inclination we have to Good in General, To Self-Love, And to the Love of our Neighbour.

CHAP. II.

I. The Inclination for Good in General, is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will.

II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance.

III. First Example, Morality, little known to many Men.

IV. Second Example, The Immor∣tality of the Soul, disputed by some Men.

V. That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things, or such as have but little Re∣lation to us.

THat vast Capacity which the Will has for all Good in General, * 1.5 because it is only form'd by a Good which includes all Good in it self, cannot be satisfied by all the things which the Mind repre∣sents to it; and yet that continual Motion which God imprints in it towards Good cannot stand still. This Motion never ceasing, puts the Mind, of necessity, into a continual Agitation. The Will which seeks what it desires, obliges the Mind to represent all sorts of Objects to it self. The Mind accordingly does it, but the Soul does not relish them; or if it does, is not satisfied with them. The Soul does not relish them, by reason that often the Perception of the Mind is not accompanied with Pleasure; for it is through Plea∣sure that the Soul relishes its Good: And the Soul is not satisfied with it, by reason that nothing can stop the Motion of the Soul but him that gives it. What∣ever the Mind represents to it self as its Good, is Finite; and whatever is Finite, may withdraw our Love for a while, but it cannot fix it. When the Mind considers very new and uncommon Objects, or that have some relation to Infinity, the Will permits the Mind to examine them a while with some Atten∣tion, in hopes of finding what it is in search of, because whatever appears Infinite, bears the Cha∣racter of its real Good; but in time it grows weary

of it, as well as of the rest. Therefore the Will is always disquieted, because it is inclin'd to seek for that which it can never find, and which it always hopes to find: It Loves whatever is Great and Extra∣ordinary, and resembles Infinity; for not having found its real Good in Common and Familiar things, it hopes to find it in such as are unknown to it. We will demonstrate in this Chapter, that the Dis∣quiet of our Wills is one of the principal Causes of our Ignorance, and of the Errors into which we fall in many things: And in the two following we will explain what it is that produces in us the Inclination we have for every thing that has something Great or Extraordinary in it.

It is something evident by what has been said, * 1.6 First, That the Will seldom makes use of the Understand∣ing, unless on Objects that have some Relation to us, and that it very much neglects all others; for being ever earnestly desirous of Felicity, by the Impression of Nature, it only turns the Understanding towards such things as seem to be of use to us, and which do in some measure please us.

Secondly, That the Will does not permit the Un∣derstanding to apply it self long even to such things as it is delighted with: Because, as we have already said, all things that are created may indeed please us for a while, but we are soon disgusted with them; and then our Mind lays them by, to seek for that which can satisfie it elsewhere.

Thirdly, That the Will is excited thus to make the Mind run from Object to Object, because it never ceases to represent consusedly to it, or as at a distance, that which includes all Beings in it self, as we have declared in the Third Book. For the Will being de∣sirous, as it were, to draw its real Good near to it self, to be pleased with it, and to receive from it the Motion which animates it, it excites the Understand∣ing to represent that Good in some measure. But then it is no longer the General, the Universal, the Infinitely Perfect Being which the Mind perceives; it is something that is Bounded and Imperfect, which

not being able to stop the Motion of the Will, nor to please it long, it forsakes it to turn after some other Object.

And whereas the Attention and Application of the Mind are absolutely necessary to discover abstracted Truths, it is evident that the common sort of Man∣kind must live in a gross Ignorance, in respect even of such things as have some relation to them; and that it is impossible to express their Blindness in what re∣lates to abstracted Truths, and which have no sensible relation to them. But we must endeavour to prove these things by Examples.

Amongst all Sciences Morality has most relation to us: It teaches us all our Duty towards God, * 1.7 towards our Prince, towards our Friends and Relations, and generally towards all that are about us. Moreover it teaches us the way to be Eternally Happy; and all Men lie under an Essential Obligation, or rather Indispensible Necessity, to apply themselves wholly to it: And yet though there have been Men on Earth these Six Thousand Years, that Science is still very Imperfect.

That part of Morality which relates to our Duty towards God, and which undoubtedly is the chief, since it relates to Eternity, has hardly been known by the most Learned; and even in our days we find Men of Sence who are unacquainted with it; and yet it is the easiest part of Morality. For in the first place, Where lies the Difficulty to discover that there is a God? Whatever God has made proves it: Whatever Men or Beasts do, proves it: Whatever we think, whatever we see, whatever we feel, proves it. In a word, There is nothing but what proves the Existence of God, or that may prove it to attentive Minds, who apply themselves seriously to the Knowledge of the Author of all Things.

Secondly, It is evident, that there is a Necessity to follow the Commands of God to be Happy; for as he is Powerful and Just, we cannot disobey him with∣out being Punish'd, nor obey him without being Re∣warded. But what is it he exacts from us? That

we should Love him; That our Mind should be taken up with him; That our Hearts should be turned to∣wards him. For wherefore has he Created our Minds? Certainly he can do nothing but for him∣self: Therefore he has made us for himself only; and we are Indispensibly obliged not to apply elsewhere the Impression of that Love which he continually pre∣serves in us, in order that we should continually Love him.

These Truths are easily discovered with little Appli∣cation: And yet this only Principle of Morality, which teaches us, that to be Vertuous and Happy, it is ab∣solutely necessary to Love God above all Things and in all Things, is the Foundation of all Christian Mora∣lity. Neither does it require an extraordinary Appli∣cation of Mind, to draw from thence all the Conse∣quences we stand in need of, to settle the general Rules of our Conduct; though there are but very few that do it; and Men continually dispute upon Que∣stions of Morality, which are the Immediate and Ne∣cessary Consequences of a Principle which is so evident as that is.

The Professors of Geometry daily makes new Dis∣coveries, but if they do not bring it to a greater Per∣fection, it is because they have already drawn the most Useful and Necessary Consequences out of their Principles. But most Men seem Incapable of con∣cluding any thing out of the first Principle of Morality. All their Idea's vanish, and are dissipated as soon as they begin to think upon it; because they will not do it as they should do; and they will not do it, be∣cause they do not relish it, or because they are too soon tired with it after their having relish'd it. That Principle is abstracted, Metaphysical, meerly Intelligi∣ble; it is not obvious, it is not to be imagined; and therefore it does not appear solid to Carnal Minds, or to Minds that only see with the Eyes. Nothing is found in that Principle capable of putting a stop to the Disquiets of their Will, and afterwards to fix the Eyes of their Mind to consider it with some Attention. What Hopes then of their seeing it as they should

do, of their apprehending it rightly, and of their concluding directly from thence what they should Conclude?

If Men had but an Imperfect Apprehension of that Proposition of Geometry: That the sides of Tri∣angles that are alike, are proportionable one to an∣other; certainly they would not be great Geometri∣cians. But if besides the Confused and Imperfect Idea of that Fundamental Proposition of Geometry, they also had some Interest to wish, that the sides of Triangles that are alike were not proportion∣able; and that false Geometry were as convenient for their Perverse Inclinations as false Morality, they might very well be guilty of Paralogisms as ab∣surd in Geometry as in Morality, because their Errors would please them, and that Truth would only Puzzle, Disturb and Vex them.

Therefore we need not wonder at the Blindness of those that lived in the former Ages, whilst Ido∣latry reigned in the World, or of those that live in our Days, and that do not as yet enjoy the Benefit of the Light of the Gospel. It was necessary for Divine Wisdom to make it self sensible at last, to instruct such Men as only consult their Senses. Truth had spoken to their Minds for above the space of Four thousand Years, but whereas they never look'd Inwardly they did not understand it: It was ne∣cessary that it should speak to their Ears. The Light which directs all Men, did shine in their Darkness, without being able to expel it; they could not so much as look upon it. It was necessary that the Intelligible Light should put on a Veil to make it self visible: And that the Word should cloath it self with Flesh; and that the Wisdom of God which lay conceal'd, and was inaccessible to Carnal Men, should instruct them in a Carnal way, Carnaliter, says St. Bernard. The Majority of Men, * 1.8 and parti∣cularly the Poor (which are the most worthy Objects of the Mercy and Providence of the Creator,) who are obliged to work for their daily Bread, are very Ignorant and Stupid, They only Hear because they

have Ears, and they only see because they have Eyes. They are incapable of looking Inwardly by an Effort of Mind, there to Interrogate Truth in the Silence of their Senses and Passions. They cannot apply themselves to Truth, by reason that they cannot relish it: Moreover they seldom think of applying them∣selves to it, because Men seldom have any Thoughts of applying themselves to things that do not con∣cern them. Their unquiet and unsettled Will turns their Minds continually towards all the Objects that Please and Divert them by their Variety: For the Multiplicity and Diversity of Sensible Goods, hinder Men from discovering the Vanity of them, and still keep them in hopes of finding the real Good they desire in them.

Thus though the Councils which Jesus Christ as Man, as the way, as the Author of our Faith, gives us in the Gospel, are much more suitable to the Weakness of our Understanding, than those which the same Jesus Christ, as Eternal Wisdom, as Inward Truth, as Intelligible Light Inspires into the most secret Recesses of our Reason: Though Jesus Christ renders those Councils Agreeable by his Grace, Sensible by his Example, Convincing by his Miracles, yet Men are so stupid, and so in∣capable of Reflection, even upon things which are absolutely Necessary for them to know well, that they hardly ever think on them as they ought. Few Men observe the Beauty of the Gospel; Few Men conceive the Solidity and Necessity of the Coun∣cils of Jesus Christ; Few Meditate upon them; Few esteem them as their Necessary Food, or fortifie themselves with them; the Continual Agi∣tation of the Will, which is in search of the Taste of Good, * 1.9 not permitting the Mind to be intent upon Truths which seem to deprive it thereof. Take ano∣ther Example.

It concerns the Impious highly to make a very strict enquiry, whether their Soul is Mortal, as they appre∣hend it, or whether it is Immortal, as Faith and Rea∣son tells us. It is a thing of the utmost Consequence

for them to know; their Eternity is concerned in it, and the very Quiet of their Mind depends upon it. Why is it then they do not know it, or that they re∣main in doubt, unless it be that they are not capable of the least serious Application; and that their unse∣date and corrupted Will does not allow their Mind to look stedfastly on the Reasons which are contrary to these Opinions, which they desire should be true? For in fine, is it so difficult a task to distinguish the difference there is between the Soul and the Body, be∣tween what thinks, and what is extended? Do's it require so great an Attention of Mind to discover that a Thought is neither Round nor Square: That Ex∣tent is only capable of different Figures and different Motions, and not of Thought and Reasoning: And consequently, that what Thinks, and what is Extend∣ed, are two Beings directly opposite to one another? Yet that alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the Soul is Immortal, and that it cannot Perish, even though the Body were Annihilated.

When a Substance perishes, it is true that the Modes or Manners of Existence of that Substance perish with it. If a piece of Wax were annihilated, it is certain that the Forms of that Wax should also be annihi∣lated with it; because the Roundness for Example of the Wax, is in Effect nothing but the Wax it self of such a Shape, and therefore it cannot subsist without the Wax. But though God should destroy all the Wax in the World, it would not therefore follow, that any other Substance, nor that the Modes of any other Substance were Annihilated. All the Stones for example, would subsist with all their Modes; because Stones are Substances or Beings, and not Modi∣fications of the Wax.

In like manner, though God should Annihilate one half of some Bodies, it would not follow, that the other half should be Annihilated. This last half is United with the other, but it is not one with it. Thus one half being Annihilated, it follows indeed accord∣ing to Reason, that the other half has no longer any relation to it; but it do's not follow that it ceases to

be; because as its Being is different, it cannot be An∣nihilated by the Annihilation of the other. Therefore it is clear, that the Thought not being the Modification of Extension, our Soul is not Annihilated, though we should suppose that the Body were Annihilated by Death.

But there is no reason to believe, that even the Bo∣dy is Annihilated when it is destroy'd. The parts which Compose it are dissipated into Vapours, and reduc'd to Powder: They are no longer seen, nor are they any longer known; this is true, but it is no rea∣son to conclude, that they are no longer in Being; for the Mind perceives them still. Dividing a Grain of Mustard into Two, into Four, or Twenty parts, it would be Annihilated to our sight, because it would be no longer seen: But it would not be Annihilated in it self, nor yet to the Mind; for the Mind would see it, though it were divided into a Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Parts.

'Tis a common Notion among Men who consult their Reason more than their Senses, that nothing can be Annihilated by the common force of Nature; for as Naturally, nothing can be made out of nothing, nei∣ther can a Substance or Being become nothing. Bo∣dies may be corrupted, if we may call the Alterations they are liable to, Corruption; but they cannot be Annihilated. What is Round may become Square, What is Flesh may become Earth, Vapour, and what you please; for all sorts of Extensions are capable of all manner of Configurations: But the Substance of what is Round, and of what is Flesh, cannot perish. There are certain Laws Establish'd in Nature, according to which Bodies change their Forms successively; for those Successive Forms Compose the Beauty of the Universe, and Create an Admiration in us for its Au∣thor: But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihi∣lation of any Being, because Annihilation has nothing of Beauty or Good in it self, and because the Author of Nature loves his Work. Therefore Bodies may Alter, but they cannot Perish.

But if relying on the Testimony of the Senses, Men would maintain obstinately that the Reduction of Bo∣dies is a real Annihilation, by reason that the Parts into which they are reduc'd are Imperceptible: Let them remember at least, that Bodies can only be di∣vided into those Imperceptible Parts, because they are Extended. But if the Mind is not Extended, it will not be Divisible; and if it be not Divisible, it must be granted, that in that Sense it will not be Corruptible. But how could any Body imagin that the Mind were Extended and Divisible? We may by a right Line cut a Square into two Triangles, into two Paralelo∣grammes, or long Squares, into two Trapeza's: But by what Line can it be conceiv'd, that a Pleasure, a Pain, or a Desire can be Cut? And what Figure would re∣sult of that Division? Truly I cannot think, that Ima∣gination can be fruitful enough in false Idea's, to satisfie it self upon that Subject.

The Mind then is not Extended, consequently it is not Divisible: It is not liable to the same Alterations as the Body: Nevertheless, it must be granted that it is not Immutable by its Nature. If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures, and of different Con∣figurations, the Mind is capable of an infinite number of different Idea's, and different Modifications. As after our Death the substance of our Flesh will be reduc'd to Earth, to Vapours, and to an infinite number of other Bodies without being Annihilated: So our Souls without be∣ing again reduc'd to nothing, will have Thoughts, and Sentiments very different from those they had in Life. It is also necessary while we are alive, that our Body should be Compos'd of Flesh and Bones: It is also ne∣cessary in order to Live, that our Soul should have the Idea's and Sentiments it has, in relation to the Body to which it is united. But when the Soul shall be sepa∣rated from its Body, it will be at full Liberty to re∣ceive all sorts of Idea's and Modifications, very diffe∣rent from those it has at present; as our Body on its part, will be capable of receiving all sorts of Figures and Configurations, very different from those it is ne∣cessary it should have, to be the Body of a Living Man.

What I have said, does in my Opinion, sufficiently show, that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing so difficult to be apprehended. What then is the rea∣son that so many question it, unless it be, that they are unwilling to apply themselves as much as may be, to examin the Reasons which prove it, in order to be Convinc'd? And why is it that they are unwilling to do it, unless it be that their Will, being uneasie and inconstant, keeps their Understanding in a continual Agitation; insomuch that it is not at leisure distinctly to perceive those very Idea's which are most present to it, as those of Thought and of Extension? Just like a Man agitated by some Passion, turning his Eyes continually on all sides, for the most part does not distinguish the nearest Objects, and the most Ex∣pos'd to his Sight. For indeed the Question about the Immortality of the Soul, is one of the easiest Questi∣ons to resolve, when without Consulting our Imagi∣nation, we consider with some Attention of Mind, the clear and distinct Idea of Extension, and the Relation it can have to Thought.

If the Inconstancy and Levity of our Will does not permit our Understanding to penetrate into the Bot∣tom of things which are present to it, and which we are highly concern'd to know; it is easie to judge, that it will be more averse to let us meditate on those that are distant, and which have no relation to us. So that if we are very Ignorant of most of those things which it is very necessary for us to know, we shall not have a great Insight into those which seem absolutely vain and useless to us.

It will not be necessary for me to endeavour to prove this by tedious Examples, which have no con∣siderable Truths in them; for if we may be allow'd to be Ignorant of any thing, it is of those things which are of no Use. And I had rather not be believed, than to make the Reader lose his Time in reading things that are wholly useless.

Though there are not many persons who apply themselves seriously to things absolutely Vain and Use∣less, yet the number of them is but too great: But

there can never be too many of those who do not ap∣ply themselves to them, and who despise them, pro∣vided they do not pretend to Judge of them. It is no defect in a limited Mind, not to know certain things; it is only a defect to pretend to Judge of them. Ig∣norance is a necessary Evil, but we may, and ought to avoid Error. Therefore I do not condemn Men for being Ignorant of many things, but only for giving rash Judgments about those things.

When things have a great relation to us, are sensible, * 1.10 and fall easily within the Compass of our Imagination, we may say, that the Mind applies it self to them, and may have some knowledge of them. For when we know that things have a relation to us, we think upon them with some Inclination; and when we find that they concern us, we apply our selves to them with pleasure. So that we should be more Learned than we are in many things, if the uneasiness and tossing of our Will did not Disturb and Fatigue our Atten∣tion continually.

But when things are abstract, and not very sensible, it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them: Not that abstracted things are very intricate, but be∣cause the Attention and Sight of the Mind begins, and Ends commonly with the sensible Prospect of Objects; for we seldom think on any thing but what we see and feel, and only as long as we see and feel it.

It is most certain, that if the Mind could easily ap∣ply it self to clear and distinct Idea's, without being any-wise byass'd by Opinion; and if the uneasiness of the Will did not continually disturb its Application, we should meet no great difficulties in many Natural Questions, which we look upon as not to be Explain'd, and we might easily be deliver'd of our Ignorance and Errors in relation to them.

For Example; It is an undeniable Truth to any Man of Sense, that Creation and Annihilation are things which surpass the common force of Nature. Therefore if Men did remain Attentive to that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason, they would not so easily admit the Creation and Annihilation of an infi∣nite

Number of New Beings, as of Substantial Forms, real Qualities and Faculties. They would look into the distinct Idea's we have of Extension, Figure, and Motion, for the reason of Natural Effects; which is not always so difficult as People imagin; all things in Nature are so connected together, and prove each other.

The Effects of Fire, as those of Canon and of Mines, are very Surprising; and their cause not very well known. Nevertheless, if Men instead of rely∣ing on the Impressions of their Senses, and on some false or deceitful Experiments, did firmly fix on that bare Notion of the Mind alone: That it is not possi∣ble for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a violent Motion, since it can communicate no more moving Power than it has its self; it would be easie from that alone to conclude, that there is a Subtle and Invisible Matter, that it is very much agitated, and dispers'd inth all Bodies, and several other like things which would teach us the Nature of Fire, and also be of great use to us to discover other Truths yet more conceal'd.

For, since Canons and Mines have such great Mo∣tions, and all the Visible Bodies about them, are not in a sufficient Agitation to produce them; it is a cer∣tain proof that there are other Invisible and Insensible Bodies, which have at least as much Agitation as the Canon Ball: But with being very Subtle and Thin, may alone freely pass, and without breaking through the Pores of the Canon before it is Fir'd; that is, as Monsieur Descartes has explain'd it more at large, be∣fore their having surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Salt-petre, of which the Powder is Compos'd. But when the Fire is put to it, that is, when those subtle and extreamly agitated Particles, have surround∣ed the gross and solid Parts of the Salt-petre, and have thus Communicated their very strong and violent Mo∣tion to them, then all does Burst of necessity; because the Pores of the Canon, which left an open passage on all sides for the subtle Parts before mention'd, while they were alone, are not large enough to make way for the gross Parts of the Salt-petre, and some others

of which the Powder is Compos'd, when they have receiv'd into themselves the Agitation of the Subtle Parts which surrounds them.

For as the Water of Rivers which flows under Bridges does not shake them, by reason of the small∣ness of its Particles: Thus the very subtle and very thin Matter I have mention'd, passes continually through the Pores of all Bodies without making any sensible Alterations in them. But then likewise, as the said River is capable of breaking down a Bridge, when carrying along with it some great Flakes of Ice, or some other more solid Bodies, by forcing them against it with its own Motion; so subtle Matter is capable of producing the surprising Effects we see in Canons and in Mines; when having communicated to the Parts of the Powder which Float in the midst of it, its Motion which is infinitely more Violent, and more Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents; the said Parts of the Powder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the Bodies which enclose them, by reason they are too gross; so that they violently break them to force them a free Passage.

But Men do not easily apprehend those subtle small Particles, which they repute Chimera's, because they do not see them. Contemplatio ferè definit cum aspectu, says Bacon. The greater part even of Philosophers, invent some New Entity, rather than not to talk upon those matters which they are Ignorant of: And if any Body objects against their false and incomprehensible Suppositions, that Fire must needs be compos'd of Parts that are in very great Agitation, since it produces such Violent Motions, and that a thing cannot Com∣municate that which it has not; which is undoubtedly a most clear, and most solid Objection: They con∣found all by some frivolous Imaginary distinction, as that of Equivocal and Univocal Causes, in order to seem to say something, though in reality they say no∣thing. For it is a general Notion among Men of Sense and Learning, that there can be no real Equivocal Cause in Nature; and that it has been invented meerly by the Ignorance of Men.

Therefore Men must apply themselves more to the consideration of clear and distinct Notions, if they have a mind to understand Nature: They must check and stop the Inconstancy and Levity of their Will a little, if they design to penetrate deeply into things; for their Mind will ever be weak, superficial and dis∣cursive, while their Will remains Light, Inconstant and Roving.

It is true, it requires some Fatigue, and Men must constrain themselves to become Attentive, and to search into the bottom of things; for there is nothing to be got without pains. It is shameful for Men of Sense, and Philosophers, who are obliged by all manner of reasons to enquire into, and to defend Truth, to speak without knowing what they say, and to be satisfy'd with what they do not understand.

CHAP. III.

I. Curiosity is natural and necessary.

II. Three Rules to moderate it.

III. Explanation of the first of these Rules.

AS long as Men have an Inclination for a Good which surpasses their Power, * 1.11 and do not possess it, they will have a secret propension for whatever looks new and extraordinary: They will ever run after such things as they have not as yet considered, in hopes of finding what they enquire after; and their Mind not being able to satisfie it self wholly without the enjoyment of that Good for which they are made; they will ever remain uneasie, and in a continual Agitation, until it appears to them in its Glory.

This disposition of Human Minds is certainly very suitable to their Condition; for it is infinitely better to be uneasie, and in search of the Happiness one does not possess, than to remain in a false Repose, and to be pleas'd with falshood, and a delusive Happiness,

wherewith Men are commonly deluded. We ought to have a sense of Truth, and of our Happiness: Therefore those Things that are new and extraordi∣nary must excite us: There is a certain kind of Cu∣riosity which is not only allowable, but absolutely ne∣cessary; for whereas common and ordinary things can never afford true Felicity, and the ancient Opinions of Philosophers are very uncertain: It is necessary we should be curious for New Discoveries, and always uneasie in the Enjoyment of common Felicities.

Should a Geometrician give us New Propositions contrary to those of Euclide, Should he undertake to prove, that that Science is full of Errors, as Hobbs en∣deavour'd to do in a Book, written against the Pride of Geometricians, I own that there would be no rea∣son to complain of that kind of Novelty; because, that when we have found out the Truth we ought to stick to it, since we are only endu'd with Curiosity in order to find it out? Neither are Geometricians often guilty of being Curious of New Opinions of Geome∣try. They would soon be tir'd with a Book contain∣ing nothing but Propositions contrary to those of Eu∣clide; for being fully convinc'd of the Truth of those Propositions by unanswerable Demonstrations, our Curiosity ceases in that Point: Which is an infallible Argument, that the only reason of the Inclination of Men after Novelty, is because they do not evidently see the Truth of those things they naturally desire to know, nor possess Infinite Felicity, which they are na∣turally desirous to possess.

Therefore it is necessary that Novelty should Excite Men, and that they should Love it: But however, * 1.12 there are Exceptions to be made, and they must ob∣serve certain Rules which it is easie to infer from what we have been saying, that the Inclination we have for Novelty is only given us in order to seek out Truth, and our real Felicity.

There are Three, the first of which is, That Men must not be fond of Novelty in things relating to Faith which are not submitted to Reason

The Second, That Novelty is not a sufficient Rea∣son to induce us to believe that things are Good or True: That is, We must not fancy that Opinions are true because they are new; nor that any thing can be capable to content us, because it is new or extraordi∣nary, or because we have not possess'd it before.

The Third, That when we are satisfy'd that Truths are so conceal'd that it is morally impossible to discover them, and that Benefits are so little, and so inconside∣rable that they cannot satisfie us, we must not suffer our selves to be excited by the Novelty of them, nor to be seduc'd by false hopes. But it is necessary to ex∣plain these Rules more at large; and shew how by a neglect of 'em we fall into an infinite number of Errors.

We often meet with Minds of very different Hu∣mours: * 1.13 Some believe every thing blindly: Others will never believe without seeing evidently. The first having hardly ever made any use of their Understand∣ing, do without considering, believe whatever is said to them; the others, who will trust to nothing but their Understanding, indifferently condemn all sorts of Au∣thorities. The first are commonly stupid and weak Persons, like Children and Women; the others are proud and profane Dispositions, like Hereticks and Philosophers.

It is very difficult to find Persons who keep a Me∣dium between those two Extreams, and who never look for Evidence in matters relating to Faith through a vain Agitation of Mind, or who sometimes believe false Opinions without Evidence, in things relating to Nature, through an indiscreet Deference, and low Submission of Mind. If they are Persons of Piety, who submit to the Authority of the Church in all things, their Faith extends sometimes, if I may use the Ex∣pression, even to Opinions that are meerly Philosophi∣cal; and they often look upon them with the same Respect as is only due to the Truths of Religion. A false Zeal makes them too easily condemn those that are not of their Opinion. They harbour injurious Suspicions against those that make New Discoveries.

It is sufficient to be esteem'd by them as Libertines, to deny that there are substantial Forms, that Animals are sensible of Pain and Pleasure, and other Philoso∣phical Opinions, which they look upon as Truth with∣out any evident Reason, only because they imagin there are necessary Relations between those Opinions and the Truths of Faith.

But if they are Persons that are too bold, their Pride induces them to despise the Authority of the Church; they never submit willingly to it. They delight in difficult rash Opinions: They affect to pass for migh∣ty Wits; and upon that account they speak of Divine Mysteries without Respect, and with a kind of Haugh∣tiness: They despise all as Credulous, who speak mo∣destly of certain receiv'd Opinions. Finally, they are very much inclin'd to doubt of every thing, and are directly oppos'd to those who are too easily inclin'd to submit to the Authority of Men.

It is obvious, that these two Extreams are bad, and those who will not admit Evidence in Natural Questi∣ons are blameable, as well as those who would have Evidence in Mysteries of Faith. But yet those who Expose themselves to be mistaken in Philosophical Questions in being too Credulous, are without doubt more excusable than the others who run the hazard of falling into some Heresie or other in doubting Rashly. For it is less dangerous to fall into a World of Errors in Philosophy for want of examining them, than to fall into one Heresie for want of submitting with Hu∣mility to the Authority of the Church.

The Mind is at quiet when it meets Evidence, and is in continual Agitation when it finds none. Because Evidence is the Character of Truth. Thus the Error of Libertines, and of Hereticks, proceeds from their doubting of the Truth of the Decisions of the Church, because they are not Evident, and they hope that the Truths of Faith may be demonstrated. Now their Love for Novelty is Irregular, since that possessing the Truth in the Faith of the Church, they ought not to seek farther: Besides, the Truths of Faith being far above the reach of their Understanding, they would

not be able to discover them, supposing that accor∣ding to their False Opinion, the Church were guilty of Error.

But if there are many who deceive themselves in refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church, there are as many who are deceiv'd in submitting to the Authority of Men. We must submit to the Au∣thority of the Church, because it can never submit Blindly to the Authority of Men, because they are always liable to Mistakes. What the Church teaches us, is Infinitely above the reach of Reason: What Men teach us, is submitted to our Reason: So that as it is a Crime, and an Insupportable Vanity, to en∣deavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by our Reason, without regarding the Authority of the Church: So it is a great Indiscretion, and a despicable poorness of Spirit, to rely blindly on the Authority of Men, in Things which relate to Reason.

Nevertheless, most of those that are esteem'd Learned Men in the World, have only acquir'd that Reputation, by knowing the Opinions of Aristotle, of Plato, of Epicurus, and of some other Philosophers by Heart, by submitting blindly to their Sentiments, and by defending them with Obstinacy. In order to ob∣tain the Reputation of Learning in the Universities, it is sufficient to be acquainted with the Sentiments of some Philosopher: Provided they will Swear In Verba Magistri, they soon become Doctors. Most Communities stick to a peculiar Doctrine, which the Members are not allow'd to deviate from. What is True in some, is often False in others. They are sometimes Proud of defending the Doctrine of their Order, against Reason and Experience; and they think themselves oblig'd to wrest the Truth, or their Authors to reconcile them: This produces a World of Frivolous Distinctions, which are so many by ways, that lead Infallibly to Error.

If any Truth is discover'd, even in our days, Ari∣stotle must have seen it; or if Aristotle be against it, the Discovery must be False. Some make that Philo∣sopher speak one way, others another; for all those

who pretend to Learning, make him speak their Lan∣guage: He is made the Author of all sorts of Imper∣tinencies, and few Discoveries are made, which are not found Enigmatically in some corner or other of his Books. In a word, he is ever contradicting himself, if not in his Works, yet at least in the Mouths of those that teach him. For though Philosophers protest, and even pretend to teach his Doctrine, it is difficult to meet two that agree about his Sentiments: For indeed Aristotle's Books are so Obscure, and fill'd with such rambling general Terms, that one may with some Appearance of Truth, impute to him the Opinions of those that are most opposite to his. It is easie to make him say whatever one has a mind to in some of his Works, because he hardly says any thing in them, though he makes a great deal of Noise; as Children suppose the Sounds of the Bells to say what they please, because they make a great deal of Noise and say nothing.

I must confess that it seems very Rational to fix and to stop the Mind on some particular Opinions, to hinder it from running out into Extravagancies. But what then? Must it needs be done by Falshood and Error? Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the Mind? Let Men examine how difficult it is to find Persons of Sense pleased with the reading of Aristotle, and that can perswade themselves they have acquir'd any true Science, even after having grown old on his Books; and it will appear plainly, that nothing but Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mind; and that Disputes, Aversions, Errors and even Heresies, are entertain'd and encourag'd by an Ill Manner of Study. Truth consists in Individuality, it is not capa∣ble of Variety; and nothing besides it can reconcile Peoples Minds: Falshood and Error only serve to di∣vide and agitate them.

I do not question but there are some who do verily believe, that he they call the Prince of Philosophers, is no-wise in an Error, and that Real and Solid Philo∣sophy are only to be found in his Works. There are some who fancy, that though it is Two thousand

Years since Aristotle wrote, no body has yet been able to discover that he was guilty of any Error; and con∣sequently being in some respects Infallible, they may boldly follow him, and quote him as such. But I do not think it worth my while to answer such Persons, because their Ignorance is so gross, that it only deserves Contempt. I only desire them to tell me, whether Aristotle, or any of his Disciples, have ever deduced any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philosophy which may be called his; or if they, or any of them, have done it themselves, let them declare it, let them explain it, and let them prove it; and we do engage our selves, never more to speak of Aristotle without an Elogy; we will no longer say, that his Principles are Useless, since they have served to prove one Truth; but there is no reason to expect it. They were long since challeng'd to do it, and particularly by Monsieur Descartes in his Metaphysical Meditations about Forty Years ago, even with a Promise to demon∣strate the Falsity of that Pretended Truth: And there is no great likelihood to believe, that any body will ever presume to do, what Monsieur Descartes greatest Enemies, and the most Zealous Defenders of Ari∣stotle's Philosophy, have not hitherto dar'd to under∣take.

Therefore I hope I may presume to say, that it is a strange Blindness, Poorness of Mind, and Stupidity of Spirit, thus to submit to the Authority of Aristotle, of Plato, or of any other Philosopher whatever: That People lose their time in reading them, when their only Design is to get their Opinions by Heart; and those that teach them make their Disciples lose theirs likewise. Therefore give me leave to say with St. Austin, * 1.14 That those are Foolishly Curious, who send their Sons to the College, in order to learn the Sentiments of their Master. That Philosophers cannot instruct us by their own Authority, and if they pretend to do it they are Unjust: That it is a kind of Folly and Impiety to Swear their Defence Solemnly: And finally, those Injustly confine Truth, who out of Interest oppose the new Opinions of Philosophy which may be

True, to preserve those which are sufficiently known to be False or Useless.

CHAP. IV.

A Continuation of the same Subject.

I. Explana∣tion of the Second Rule of Curiosity.

II. Expla∣nation of the Third.

THE Second Rule that must be observ'd, is, * 1.15 That Novelty must never serve as a Reason to believe that things are True. We have already said several times, that Men must not rest in Error, and in the False Felicities they enjoy: That it is necessary they should Search after the Evidence of Truth, and the real Felicity they do not possess; and consequently that they should look after such things as are New and Extraordinary. But therefore it does not follow that they should always stick to them, nor believe, with∣out reason, that Opinions are True, because they are New; and that those are real Felicities which they have not as yet enjoy'd. Novelty should only induce them to examine new things with care; they must not despise them, because they do not know them; nor rashly believe that they contain what they wish and hope for.

But this often comes to pass: Men after having ex∣amin'd the Ancient and Common Opinions, have not discover'd the Light of Truth in them: After having had a Taste of the usual Felicities of the World, they have not found that Solid Satisfaction in them, which should accompany the Possession of a real Good: So that their Desires and their Eagerness are not allay'd by the usual Opinions and common Felicities. For which reason, when they hear any thing that is New and Extraordinary, the Idea of Novelty puts them in hopes at first, That it is the thing they are in Search of. And whereas it is Natural to Flatter our selves, and

to believe that Things are as we wish they might be; their Hopes increase proportionably to their Desires: And in fine, they Insensibly change into Imaginary Assurances. In the next place, They joyn the Idea of Novelty, and the Idea of Truth, so close together, that the one never offers it self without the other; and that which is most New, appears to them to be more True, and better than that which is more Usual and Common; in which they are very different from those, who out of Aversion to Heresie, have joyn'd the Idea of Novelty to that of False∣ness, imagining that all New Opinions are False and Dangerous.

Therefore we may say that this usual Disposition of the Mind, and of the Heart of Men, in relation to that which bears the Character of Novelty, is one of the most general Causes of Errors, for it seldom leads them to Truth; whenever it does, it is by Chance and good Luck: And finally, It always directs them from their real Happiness, by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and False Felicities that the World abounds with: And this is the most Dangerous Error into which they can fall.

The Third Rule against the Excessive Desires of Novelty is, * 1.16 That when we are certain that some Truths are so Mysterious, that it is Morally Impossible to discover them, and that some Felicities are so In∣considerable that they can never make us Happy, we ought not to suffer our selves to be Excited by the Novelty of them.

Every body may know by Faith, by Reason and Experience, that created Goods can never fill the In∣sinite Capacity of the Will. Faith teaches us, That all the Things of this World are only Vanity; and that our Happiness neither consists in Honours or Riches. Reason assures us, That since it is not in our Power to bound our Desires, and that we are Natu∣rally inclin'd to Love all Felicities, we can never be Happy, without Possessing that which Includes them all. Our own Experience makes us Sensible, that we are not Happy in the Possession of those Goods which

we do enjoy, since we still wish for more. Finally, We daily see that the Great Felicities which the most Powerful Princes and Kings enjoy on Earth, are not capable to satisfie their Desires; that they are even more Uneasie and more Unhappy than others; and that being Seated on the highest Spoke of the Wheel of Fortune, they are the more liable to be precipitated and shook by its Motion, than those that are under∣neath them, or nearer to the Center. For they never fall but from on high; their Wounds are always great; and all the Grandeur they are attended with, and which they annex to their own Being, serves only to Swell and Aggrandize them, to make them more Sensible of a greater number of Wounds, and expose them the more to the Strokes of Fortune.

So that Faith, Reason and Experience, convincing us that the Delights and Pleasures of the Earth, which we have not as yet tasted, could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them: We must be very care∣ful, according to that Third Rule, not to suffer our selves to be Foolishly Flatter'd with vain Hopes of Happiness, which increasing by degrees proportionably to our Passion and to our Desires, would change at last into a False Assurance: For when we have a Violent Passion for any Good, we always look upon it to be very great, and we perswade our selves Insensibly, that the Possession of it will make us Happy.

Therefore we must resist those Vain Desires, since our Endeavours to satisfie them would be in vain. But particularly, because that by abandoning our selves to our Passions, and by employing our time to gratifie them, we lose God and all things with him. We only wander from one False Felicity to another; We always live in False Hopes; We dissipate our Spirits, and are agitated a Thousand different ways; We meet Oppositions every where, because the Advan∣tages we seek for are desired by many, and cannot be possessed by many. For as St. Paul teaches us, * 1.17 Those that have a mind to grow Rich, fall into Temptations, and into a Snare of the Devil, and into divers useless per∣nicious

Desires, which precipitate Men into the Abyss of Perdition and Damnation; for Covetousness is the Root of all Evil.

And as we ought not to seek after the Goods of the World which are new, because we are assur'd that we shall not find the Happiness we look for; neither ought we to have the least Desire of knowing new Opinions upon a great number of difficult Questions, because we are inform'd, that the Mind of Man is not capable of discovering the Truth of them. Most of the Questions that are treated of in Morality, and particularly in Natural Philosophy, are of that kind; and therefore it behoves us to be very diffident of many Books that are daily written upon those Obscure Intricate Matters. For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain may be resolv'd, there are still so few Truths discover'd, and so many others to know, before we can come to those the said Books treat of, that we cannot read them without adven∣turing to lose considerably.

Yet Men do not regulate themselves thus, they do quite the contrary: They do not examine whether what is said to them is possible: Do but promise them extraordinary Things, as the Reparation of Natural Heat, of Radical Moisture, of Vital Spirits, or other things they do not understand, and you will straight excite their Vain Curiosity. It is sufficient in order to blind and to gain them to propose Paradoxes to them; to use obscure Words, Terms of Influence, and the Authority of some unknown Authors; or else to perform some very sensible and extraordinary Ex∣periment, although it has no manner of relation to the thing proposed, for it is enough to Surprise them, in order to Convince them.

If a Physician, a Chy••urgion, an Empirick, quote Passages in Greek and Latin, and make use of new and extraordinary Terms, they pass immediately for great Men; Men give them a Power over Life and Death; they are believ'd like Oracles; they fancy themselves far above the common Level of Mankind, and think they penetrate into the bottom of things. And when

some are so Indiscreet as to intimate, that they are not satisfied with five or six words which really signifie and prove nothing; they fancy that those People have not commom Sense, and that they deny first Prin∣ciples. And indeed the first Principles of those Men, are four or five Scraps of Latin out of some Author, or some Greek Passage, if they are better Scholars.

Moreover, It is necessary that Learned Physicians should sometimes speak a Language which their Patients do not understand, in order to gain some Reputation, and to be obey'd.

A Physician who only understands Latin, may be esteem'd in a Village; because Latin is both Greek and Arabick to Peasants: But unless a Physician can at least read Greek, to learn some of Hypocrates's Aphorisms, he must not expect to pass for a Learned Man in Cities where most People understand Latin. For which reason even the most Learned Physicians knowing this Humour of Men, are oblig'd to speak like Quacks and Illiterate Men; and one must not always judge of their Capacity and Sense, by what they say in their Visits.

CHAP. V.

I. Of the Second Natural Inclination, or of Self-Love.

II. It is divided into the Love of Being and of Well-Being, or of Greatness and Pleasure.

THe Second Inclination which the Author of Nature imprints continually in our Will, * 1.18 is the Love of our selves, and of our own Preservation.

We have already said, That God loves all his Works; and that it is only the Love he bears them that preserves them; and which Wills, That all cre∣ated Spirits should have the same Inclinations with him. Therefore it is his Will, that they should all

have a Natural Inclination for their Preservation, and that they should Love themselves. Thus it is lawful and reasonable to Love our selves, since we are Ami∣able, since God himself Loves us, and since it is his Pleasure that we should Love our selves: But this is no reason that we should Love our selves more than God, since God is Infinitely more Amiable than we are. It is Unjust to place our Final End in our selves, and not to Love our selves in relation to God; be∣cause, as we have no Goodness, nor any Subsistance of our selves, but only what we participate of the Goodness and Being of God, we are not Amiable of our selves, but only in relation to him.

Nevertheless, The Inclination we should have for God is lost by Sin; and all that remains of it is an Infinite Capacity in our Will for all Felicities, or for Good in General, and a strong Inclination to possess them which can never be destroy'd: But the Inclina∣tion we ought to have for our Preservation or Self-Love, has increased it self to that degree, that it is at last become absolute Master of the Will. It has more∣over chang'd and transform'd into its own Nature the Love of God, or the Inclination which we have for Good in General, and the Love which we ought to have for other Men. For we may say now, That we only Love our selves, since we Love nothing but in relation to our selves; whereas we ought only to Love God, and all things in relation to God.

If Faith and Reason teach us, that God is the only Sovereign Good, and that he alone can make us per∣fectly Happy; we may easily conclude that we must Love him, and we are easily enough inclin'd to it: But without Grace it is still Self-Love that Induces us to Love him. Pure Charity is so much above our Strength, that we are so far from Loving God for himself, that Humane Reason cannot easily conceive, that we can Love him otherwise than in relation to our selves, and that we have any other Final End but our own Satisfaction. Self-love then is the absolute Master of our Will, since the Disorder of Sin, and the Love of God and of our Neighbour, are now only the

Consequences of it; since we no longer Love any thing, but because that in Loving it, we expect some Advantage, or that we actually receive some Pleasure by it.

This Self-love may be divided into two Kinds, * 1.19 viz. Into the Love of Greatness, and into the Love of Plea∣sure; or else into the Love of our Being, and of the Perfection of our Being; and into the Love of our Well-being, or of Felicity.

By the Love of Greatness we affect Power, Pre∣ferment, Independency, and that our Being should sub∣sist of it self. We desire in some respect to have a Necessary Being: In one Sense we are desirous to be like Gods; for none but God has properly a Being which is necessarily Existent; since that whatever is Dependent exists only by the Will of him on whom it depends. Therefore Men wishing the Necessity of their Being, also desire a Power over others. But by the Love of Pleasure they desire not only a Being, but a Well-being; because Pleasure is a manner of Being, which is best and most Advantageous to the Soul.

We must note, that Greatness, Excellence and In∣dependence of the Creature, are not kinds of Being which make us Happy of themselves; since it often happens, that Men become Miserable in proportion to their growing Great. But as for Pleasure, it is a kind of Being which we cannot receive actually, with∣out actually becoming more Happy. Greatness and Independence for the most part are not in us, and commonly they only consist in the relation we have to those things which are about us. But Pleasures are in the very Soul, and they are real Modes by which it is modified, and which by their own Nature are capable of satisfying it. Therefore we look upon Ex∣cellence, Greatness and Independence, as things that are proper for the Preservation of our Being, and even sometimes as very useful, according to the Order of Nature, for the Preservation of the Well-being: But Pleasure is always a manner of Being of the Mind, which by it self makes it Happy and satisfies it; so

that Pleasure is a Well-being, and the Love of Plea∣sure the Love of Well-being.

Now the Love of Well-being is so Powerful, that it sometimes proves Stronger than the Love of Being; and Self-Love makes us sometimes desire not to be, because we have not a Well-being. This is the Case of all the Damned, who according to the Word of Jesus Christ, had better not to be, than to be so Unhappy as they are; because these Wretches being declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodness Centers, and who is the Sole Cause of Pleasure and of Pain which we are capable of; it is impossible they should enjoy any Satisfaction; they are and will be Eternally Unhappy, because their Will will ever re∣main in the same Disposition, and in the same Irre∣gularity. So that Self-Love includes two Loves, the Love of Greatness, of Power, of Independence and generality of all things which seem to be proper for the Preservation of our Being; and the Love of Plea∣sure, and of all things that are necessary for our Well∣being, that is, To be Happy and Satisfied.

Those two Loves may be divided several ways: Whether because we are composed of two different parts of Soul and Body, according to which they may be divided; or because they may be distinguish'd or specified by the different Objects that are useful for our Preservation. However we will not inlarge upon that, because, as we do not design to make a Treatise of Morality, it is not necessary to make an Inquiry into, and an exact Division of all the things we look upon as our Felicities. It was only necessary to make this Division, to relate the cause of our Errors in some order.

Therefore we shall first speak of those Errors which are caused by our Inclination for Greatness, and for all those things that makes our Being Independant of others: And afterwards we shall treat of those which proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleasure, and for all those things which render our Being the best it can be for us, or that contents us most.

CHAP. VI.

I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons.

II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons.

III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypo∣crites.

IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes.

WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect, as Science and Virtue; * 1.20 or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful, as Dignities and Riches, seem in some mea∣sure to make us Independent. All those that are be∣neath us, have a Respect for us and fear us; they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preser∣vation; and they dare neither Prejudice us, nor op∣pose our Desires. Therefore Men constantly endea∣vour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others. For they never consider that both their Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God above, and not on Men; and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy, does not con∣sist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men, as Weak and as Miserable as them∣selves; but in an humble Submission to the Will of God, who being Just, will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed.

But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Vertue, Dignities and Riches; they also use their utmost Efforts, in order to persuade others that they do really possess them. And if it may be said, that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so; it may also be said, that they often take less care to be Virtuous, than to appear so: For as the Author of the Book Entituled, Reflectiones Morales, fays agreeably, Virtue would not go far, unless it were accom∣panied with Vanity.

The Reputation of being Rich, Learned and Vir∣tuous, produces in the Imagination of those that are about us, or that are more nearly related to us, very convenient Dispositions for us: It makes them fall at our Feet; it makes them act in our Favour; it In∣spires them with all the Motions that tend to the Pre∣servation of our Being, and to the Increase of our Grandeur. Thus Men preserve their Reputation, as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World.

All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue, Learn∣ing, Dignities and Riches, and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages. We will now endeavour to show by some Examples, how those Inclinations may engage them into Error. Let us begin by the Inclina∣tion that Men have for Virtue, or for the Appearance of Virtue.

Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous, commonly imploy their Mind and Time to understand Religion, and to exercise themselves in good Works: They only desire with St. Paul, to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified, to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature. They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly, and to know their Duty; after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness. And there∣fore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences, which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation.

No Fault can be found with that Conduct, it is In∣finitely to be valued; * 1.21 Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly; and they often repent their not having followed it more. But this is un∣approvable, that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane, very Certain and Useful, which disingage the Mind from Sensible Things, and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel; some Pious Persons, without having examin'd them, con∣demn them too freely, either as being Useless, or Un∣certain.

It is true, that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless: Men are partly in the right, to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use. No body is oblig'd to study them; and it is better to despise them, than to suffer ones self to be deceiv'd or blinded by them. Nevertheless we may affirm, That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths: The Universal Knowledge, or the Existence of a God, is absolutely necessary, since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God. It is necessary to know, that it is his Will which makes, and which regulates Nature; That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will: In a word, That all things whatever depend on God.

It is also necessary to know what Truth is, the means to distinguish it from Error, the Distinction be∣tween the Mind and Body, the Consequences that may be drawn from it, as the Immortality of the Soul, and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty.

The Knowledge of Man, or of ones self, is a Science that cannot be reasonably despis'd; it contains a World of things which are absolutely necessary to be known to have some Justness and Penetration of Mind: And we may say, That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infi∣nitely above Matter, because he knows that he is, which Matter does not know; those who know Man, are far above Stupid Ignorant Persons, by reason that they know what they are, which the others do not know.

But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable, because it raises us above others; it is much more so, because it humbles us before God. That Know∣ledge makes us perfectly Sensible of the Dependence we have on him in all things, and even in our most common Actions: It plainly discovers the Corruption of our Nature: It disposes us to apply our selves to him who alone can cure us; to rely wholly on him, and not to trust or rely on our selves: And thus it gives many Dispositions of Mind, which are

very proper to submit our selves to the Grace of the Gospel.

We ought at least to have a Superficial Tincture, and a general Knowledge of the Mathematicks and of Nature. We ought to learn those Sciences in our Youth; they disingage the Mind from Sensible Things, and hinder it from becoming Weak and Effeminate: They are useful enough in Life; they incline us towards God; the Knowledge of Nature does it of it self; and that of the Mathematicks by the Disgust it Inspires in us of the False Impressions of our Senses.

Virtuous Persons must not despise those Sciences, nor look upon them as Uncertain and Useless, unless they are certain that they have studied them enough to judge Solidly of them: There are many others which they may boldly Despise; Let them Condemn the Poets to the Flames, Heathen Philosophers, Rabbies, some Historians, and a great Number of Authors, which make the Pride and Knowledge of some of the Learned; we shall be little troubled at it. But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature, as being contrary to Religion; since Nature being regulated by the Will of God, the true Knowledge of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power, Grandeur and Wisdom of God. For it seems that God has form'd the Universe in order, that we should Study it, and that by that Study we should learn to Know and to Respect the Author of it. So that those who Condemn the Study of Nature, seem to oppose the Will of God; unless they pretend that Sin has rendred Man Incapable of that Study. It is also Vain for them to tell us, That the Knowledge of Men only serves to make them Proud and Vain, because those who have the Reputation of having a perfect Knowledge of Man, though they often know him Ill, are commonly Intolerably Proud: For it is evident, That no Man can know himself well, without being Sensible of his Weakness and Miseries.

Neither are they Persons of a real and solid Piety, that usually condemn what they do not understand; * 1.22 but rather Superstitious and Hypocrites. The Super∣stitious out of a servile Fear, and through a baseness and weakness of Mind are startled at the sight of a lively penetrating Wit. Do but, for Example, give them Natural Reasons for Thunder, and for its Ef∣fects, and they look upon you strait as an Atheist. But the Hypocrites out of a Hellish Malice, transform themselves into Angels of Light. They make use of the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenc'd by all the World to oppose Truths, which are but little known, and little valu'd, out of private Interest. They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth; and often in their Hearts, Laugh at what all the World Respects; they establish in the Opinion of Men, a Reputation, which is so much the more solid and to be fear'd, as the thing they abuse is the more Sacred.

Therefore those Persons are the strongest, and most formidable Enemies of Truth. Indeed, they are pretty rare, but a small number of them is capable of doing a great deal of harm. The appearance of Truth and of Virtue, often does more mischief, than Truth and Virtue do good; for one cunning Hypocrite is capable to overthrow what several truly Wise and Virtuous Persons have rais'd with a great deal of Pain and Labour.

Monsieur Descartes, for instance, has demonstrative∣ly prov'd the Existence of a God, the Immortality of our Souls, several other Metaphysical Questions, a great number of Physical Ones; and this Age is infi∣nitely oblig'd to him for the Truths he has discover'd. Yet here starts up an * 1.23 inconsiderable Man, a hot and vehement Exclaimer, respected by some People for the Zeal he expresses for their Religion: He Writes Inju∣rious Books against him, and accuses him of the high∣est Crimes. Descartes is a Catholick, he has studied under the Jesuits; he has often mention'd them with Re∣verence. That is sufficient for that malicious Man to perswade People that are Enemies to our Religion,

and easily mov'd in matters so Nice as those of Religion, that he is an Emissary of the Jesuits, and has dange∣rous Designs: Because the least appearances of Truth upon matters of Faith, have more Force upon Peoples Minds, than real and effective Truths of Physical or Meraphysical things have, which are little valu'd. Monsieur Descartes has written about the Existence of God. That is matter enough for that Calumniator to exercise his false Zeal upon, and to oppose all the Truths his Enemy defends. He accuses him of being an Atheist, and of teaching Atheism cunningly and se∣cretly, like that infamous Atheist call'd Vanino, who was Burnt at Thoulouse; who Cloak'd his Malice and Impiety by Writing for the Existence of a God; for one of the Reasons urg'd by him to prove his Enemy an Atheist, is, That he did Write against Atheists, as Vanino did, in order to cover his Impiety.

Thus it is easie for a Man to oppress Truth, when he is seconded by the appearances of Truth, and has acquir'd a great Ascendent over weak Minds. Truth delights in Mildness, and in Peace; and as strong as it is, it yields sometimes to the Pride and Haughtiness of Falshoods, which Dresses and Arms it self with her Appearances. Truth is very sensible that Error can never harm it; and if it remains sometimes as if it were prescrib'd and in Obscurity, it is only to wait for more favourable occasions to show its self; for at last it appears, for the most part, stronger and brighter than ever, in the very place where it is oppress'd.

I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monsieur Descar∣tes, that a Man of a different Religion from his, that an Ambitious Man, who design'd to rise upon the Ruins of Persons that are above him, that a Railer without Judgment, that Voetius should speak with Contempt of what he neither did, nor could under∣stand. But I am surpris'd to find, that Persons who are neither Enemies to Monsieur Descartes, nor to his Religion, should entertain Sentiments of Aversion and Contempt against him, upon the account of the Ca∣lumnies they have read in Books written by the Ene∣mies of his Person, and of his Religion.

The Book written by that Heretick intitled, Despe∣rata causa Papatus, sufficiently shews his Impudence, his Ignorance, and his Passion, and his desire to appear Zealous, in order thereby to acquire some Reputation among those of his Party. Therefore he is not a Man to be credited upon his Word. For as there is no reason to believe all the Fables he has Collected in that Book against our Religion, so neither is there any to Credit the Injurious Accusations he has invented against his Enemy.

Rational Men will not suffer themselves to be per∣swaded, that Monsieur Descartes is a dangerous Man, because they have read 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in some Book or other, or because they have been 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so by Persons, whose Pie∣ty they have a Respect for. It is not lawful to believe Men upon their b••re Word, when they accuse others of the most Enormous Crimes. It is not a sufficient proof to believe a thing, because we hear it affirm'd by a Man who speaks with Zeal and Gravity. For it is impossible for any Person to relate Falsities, and Foolish Stories, in the same manner as he would relate good things, particularly if he has suffer'd himself to be impos'd upon out of Simplicity and Weakness.

It is easie to discover the Truth or Falsity of the Accusations that are form'd against Descartes; his Writings are Extant, and easie to be understood, by those that are capable of Attention. Therefore I would advise People to Read his Works, in order to get better Proofs against him than bare Report, and I do not question but after they have read and exa∣min'd them, they will no longer Accuse him of Atheism; and that on the contrary, they will pay him the Respect that is due to a Man, who has plainly and evidently demonstrated, not only the Existence of a God, and the Immortality of the Soul, but also a World of other Truths, which were unknown until his time.

CHAP. VII.

Of the desire of Science, and of the Judgments of pretenders to Learning.

THe Mind of Man has without doubt, very little Capacity and Extent, and yet he desires to know every thing. All Human Sciences cannot satifie his Desires; and yet his Capacity is so confin'd, that he cannot perfectly apprehend any one particular Science. He is in a continual Agitation, and desires always to know; whether he be in hopes of finding what he looks for, as we have said in the preceding Chapter, or whether he perswades himself that his Soul and Mind are extended by the vain possession of some ex∣traordinary Knowledge. The unruly desire of Hap∣piness and Grandeur, makes him study all manner of Sciences, hoping to find his Felicity in the Science of Morality; and looking for this false Greatness in spe∣culative Sciences.

What is the reason that some Persons spend all their Life in reading of Rabbi's, and other Books Written in Foreign, Obscure, and Corrupted Languages; and by Authors without Judgment and Knowledge: But that they perswade themselves, that when they are skill'd in the Oriental Languages, they are greater and higher than those who are Ignorant of them? And what is it that can encourage them in their in∣grateful, painful, useless Labour, unless it be the Hope of some Preferment, and the Prospect of some new Grandeur? Indeed they are look'd upon as extraor∣dinary Men; they are Complimented upon their pro∣found Learning; People are better pleas'd to hear them than others: And though it may be said, that they are commonly the least Judicious, if it were only for employing all their Life in a very useless Study, which can neither make them Wiser nor Happier: Nevertheless, most People fancy that they have a great

deal more Sense and Judgment than others: And as they are more Larn'd in the Etymology of Words, they also fancy that they are Learn'd in the Nature of Things.

The same reason induces Astronomers to spend all their Time and Estate to get an exact Knowledge of Things; which are not only useless, but also impossi∣ble to know. They endeavour to find an exact Regu∣larity in the Course of the Planets, which is not in Nature; and to Form Astronomical Schemes to fore∣tel Effects, of which they do not know the Causes. They have made the Selenography, or Geography of the Moon, as if People design'd to Travel thither: They have already divided it among those that are Famous in Astronomy: There are few of them that have not already some Province or other in that Country, as a Recompence for their great Labour; and I question whether they are not Proud of having been in Favour with him that has so magnificently distributed those Kingdoms among them.

What is the reason that Rational Men apply them∣selves so much to this Science, and yet remain in gross Errors, in respect to Truths which they ought to know, unless they Fancy, thas it is a great thing to know what passes in the Heavens? The knowledge of the Vast Things that passes above, seems to them more Noble, Greater, and more worthy of their great Wit, than the knowledge of Vile Abjects, Corruptible Things, as Sublunary Bodies are in their Opinion. The Nobleness of a Science is deriv'd from the No∣bleness of its Objects: It is a great Principle! There∣fore the knowledge of the Motion of unalterable and incorruptible Bodies, is the highest and most sublime of all Sciences. And for that reason, it appears to them worthy of the Greatness and Excellency of their Mind.

Thus Men suffer themselves to be blinded by a false Idea of Grandeur, which pleases and moves them. As soon as their Imagination is struck by it, they fall down before that Phantasm, they Reverence it; it destroys and blinds their Reason, which should be the

Judge of it. Men seem to Dream when they Judge of the Objects of their Passions, to have no Eyes, and to want Common Sense. For in fine, where lies the Excellency of the knowledge of the Motions of the Planets; and have we not a sufficient knowledge of it already, since we know how to regulate our Months and our Years? What does it concern us to know, whether Saturn is surrounded by a Ring, or by a great number of little Moons; and why should we Dispute about it? Why should any one be proud of having foretold the greatness of an Eclipse; which perhaps he has hit better upon than another, because he has had more Luck? There are persons appointed by the King's Order to observe the Stars, let us rely upon their Observations. They may reasonably apply themselves to it; for they do it out of Duty: It is their business. They do it with Success; for they employ all their Time about it with Art, Application, and all the Exactness imaginable: They want nothing in order to succeed in it. Therefore we ought to be fully satisfy'd upon a matter which concerns us so little, when they impart their Discoveries to us.

Anatomy is a very good Study, since it is a thing of great use, and since we ought to delight in the Know∣ledge of things that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 necessary. We may and ought to apply our selve to whatever may contribute any thing towards our Happiness, or rather to Ease our Infirmities ••nd Miseries. But to pass whole Nights in peeping through a Telescope to discover some Spot, or some new Planet in the Heavens, to the pre∣judice of our Health, to the impairing our Estate, to the neglecting the Care of our Affairs, only to Visit the Stars Regularly, and to measure their Size and Si∣tuation; is in my Opinion, absolutely to forget what we are at present, and what we shall be hereafter.

Let no Body urge, that it is in order to discover the Greatness of him that has form'd all these great Ob∣jects. The least Fly discovers more the Power and Wisdom of God to those that consider it with Atten∣tion, and without being prejudic'd by its smallness, than all what the Astronomers know of the Heavens.

Nevertheless, Men are not made to consider Flies, neither do I approve the Pains some People have ta∣ken to instruct us how Lice, and all kinds of Animals are Form'd; and how the Transformations of diffe∣rent Worms into Flies, and Butterflies, are effected. It is lawful for Men to amuse themselves about these things, when they have nothing else to do, to divert themselves: But Men ought not to employ all their time about it, unless they are insensible of their Mi∣series.

They ought continually to apply themselves to the knowledge of God and of themselves; to labour Seriously to overcome their Errors and Prejudices, their Passions and Inclinations for Sin; earnestly to search after the Truths that are most necessary for them to know. For those are the most Judici∣ous, that take most Care to discover the most solid Truths.

The main Cause which engages Men in false Stu∣dies, is, that they have fix'd the Idea of Learning to a Vain, Useless Knowledge, instead of fixing it to solid and necessary Sciences. For when a Man re∣solves upon Learning, and when the Spirit of Poly∣mathy begins to move him; he seldom examins what Sciences are most necessary for him, either to behave himself like an Honest Man, or to improve his Rea∣son: He only looks upon those that pass for Learned Men in the World, and examins what renders them considerable. All the most solid and necessary Sciences being pretty Common, the Persons that possess them, are neither admired nor respected for them; for Com∣mon things are look'd upon without Attention or Emotion, though never so excellent and admirable in themselves. So that those who aim at Learning, sel∣dom fix on those Sciences that are necessary for the Conduct of this Life, and for the Perfection of the Mind. Those Sciences do not Excite in them that Idea of Sciences which they have Form'd to them∣selves; for those are not the Sciences they have ad∣mir'd in others, and which they desire others should admire in them.

The Gospel and Morality, are Sciences that are too Common, and too Ordinary; they desire to learn the Criticisms of some Terms that are met with in Anci∣ent Philosophers, or in Grecian Poets. Languages, and particularly those that are not in use in their Country, as Arabick, and that of the Rabbies, or the like, appear to them most worthy of their Applica∣tion, and of their Study. If they read the Bible, it is not to learn Religion or Piety: Points of Chrono∣logy, of Geography, and the difficulties of Grammar, take up all their Minds: They desire the knowledge of those things with more Zeal, than the wholsome Truths of the Gospel: They are desirous to possess that Science themselves which they have foolishly ad∣mir'd in others, and which Fools will not fail to ad∣mire in them.

The same appears in things that relate to the Know∣ledge of Nature, they seldom Study that which is most useful in it, but that which is least Common, Anatomy is too mean for them, but Astronomy is a more exalted Study. Common Experiments are not worthy their Application; but those extraordinary and surprising Experiments, which can never Improve us, are what they most carefully observe.

The most Obscure and Ancient Histories are those they are Proud to be acquainted with. They are Ig∣norant of the Genealogy of the Princes that Reign at this time; and they make it their business to study the Descent of those that have been Dead Four Thousand Years ago. They neglect the most Noted Histories of their time, and apply themselves carefully to the Study of the Fables and Fictions of the Poets. They hardly hnow their own Relations; but if you please, they will quote you many Authorities to prove, that a Roman Citizen was Related to an Emperor, and other like things.

They hardly know the Names of the Dresses that are worn in their days, and yet lose their time in stu∣dying those of the Greeks and Romans. The Animals of their own Country are little known by them, and yet they will lavishly employ whole Years in the Com∣posure

of large Volumes, about the Animals menti∣on'd in the Bible; to seem to have guess'd better than others what unknown Terms signisie. Such a Book is the delight of its Author, and of the Learned that Read it; for being full of Greek, Hebrew, and Ara∣bick Passages. &c. of Quotations of Rabbi's, and other obscure and extraordinary Authors, it satissies the Va∣nity of the Author, and the Foolish Curiosity of the Readers; who will think themselves more Learned than others, when they can proudly affirm, that there are Six different Words in Scripture which signifie a Lion, or the like.

They are often Ignorant of the Map of their own Country, or of the City where they are Born, while they study the Map of Ancient Greece, of Italy, of the Gauls in Julius Caesar's Time, or the Streets and publick Places of Ancient Rome. Labor Stultorum, says the Wise Man, affliget eos, qui nesciunt in urbem pergere. They do not know the Way to their own Town, and they Fatigue themselves Foolishly in useless Discoveries. They neither know the Laws, nor Customs of the Places where they Live; but they carefully Study Ancient Rights, the Laws of the Twelve Tables, the Customs of the Lacedemonians, or of the Chinese, or the Ordinances of the Great Mogol. Finally, they are desirous to know all Extraordinary distant things, which others do not know, because they have Fool∣ishly fix'd the Idea of Learning on those things; and that it is sufficient to be thought Learned, only to know what others are Ignorant of, though at the same time they are Ignorant of the most necessary and most excellent Truths. The Truth is, that the Knowledge of all those things, and the like, is call'd Science, Learning and Doctrin; Use will have it so: But there is a Science which is only Folly and Vanity ac∣cording to Scripture; Doctrina Stultorum fatuitas. I have not hitherto observ'd, that the Holy Ghost, which gives so many Elogies to Science in holy Writ, says any thing to the advantage of that false Science, which I have now mention'd.

CHAP. VIII.

I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned.

II. Of the Conversation of Pretenders to Learning.

III. Of their Works.

IF the irregular Desire of becoming Learned, * 1.24 often renders Men more Ignorant, then the Desire of be∣ing thought Learned does not only increase their Ig∣norance, but it seems to turn their Brains: Many Men stray from Common Sense, by endeavouring to surpass it, and talk at random, being only delighted with Paradoxes. They keep at such a distance from Common Thoughts, in order to be thought extraor∣dinary Persons, that they really succeed in it, and that no Body looks upon them without Admiration, or without Contempt.

They are look'd upon sometimes with Admiration; when being preferr'd to some Dignity which conceals their Ignorance, they are thought to be as much above others by their Genius and Learning, as they are by their Rank, or by their Birth. But for the most part they are look'd upon with Contempt, and sometimes as Mad Men, when they are more strictly examin'd, and that their Greatness does not conceal them from the Eyes of others.

The pretenders to Learning evidently discover what they are in the Books they Write, and in their usual Conversations. Perhaps it will be proper to say something about it.

As it is only Vanity, * 1.25 and the desire of appearing more than others, which ingages them to Study, as soon as they are ingag'd in Conversation, the Passion and Desire of Greatness awakens them anew, and Transports them. They take their Flight so high of a sudden, that we lose sight of them; and very often they know not where they are themselves. They are so much afraid of not being above those that hear them, that they are offended if they think they follow

others. They are startled as soon as any body desires the least Explanation, and fly into a Passion upon the least Opposition. In fine, They say things that are so New, and so Extraordinary, but so far from common Sense, that the most Prudent have much ado to forbear Laughing, while the rest are Amaz'd.

Their first Heat being over, if any Man that has so much Constancy and Firmness of Mind, as not to have been confounded by them, shows them that they are mistaken; they nevertheless persist obstinately in their Errors. The Air of those they have Confounded Confounds them: The Sight of so many Approvers, whom they have convinc'd by Impression, Convinces them by a rebound: Or if that Sight does not Con∣vince them, yet it Influences them to that degree, that they still maintain their False Sentiments. Vanity does not allow them to Retract. They always seek out some Reason to defend themselves: Moreover, they never speak with so much Heat and Eagerness, as when they have nothing to say: They imagine that People design to Affront them, and to make them Despicable, whenever they urge any Reasons against them; and the more Convincing and Judicious they are, the more they Exasperate their Pride and Aversion.

The best way to Vindicate Truth against them, is not to Dispute; since it is better both for them and for us, to leave them in their Errors, than to gain their Aversion. We must not wound their Heart in order to cure their Mind, since the Wounds of the Heart are more Dangerous than those of the Mind: Besides, It happens sometimes, that we have to do with Men of true Learning, which we might despise for want of conceiving their Thoughts. Therefore the best way is, to desire those who speak in a deci∣sive manner, to Explain themselves as distinctly as they can, without allowing them to change the Sub∣ject, or to use obscure equivocal Terms; and if they are Persons of Sence and Learning something will be learn'd by them; but if they are only Pretenders to Learning, they will soon Confound themselves by

their own Words, and have no reason to blame any body besides themselves. Perhaps it may instruct us in some Respects, and may also serve to divert us, if we may be allow'd to divert our selves with the Weakness of others, when we endeavour to remedy it. But that which is most considerable, is, That thereby we may hinder the Weak who hearken'd to them with Admiration, from submitting to Error in following their Decisions.

For it is observable, That the Number of Fools, or of those that suffer themselves to be guided like Machines, and by the Impression of the Senses, being Infinitely greater than that of those who have an In∣telligible Mind, and who are perswaded by Reason: When one of those Learned Men speaks of and decides any thing, there are always a greater Number of those that Believe him upon his Word, than of those that Suspect him. But whereas those Pretenders to Learning, remove themselves as far as they can from common Thoughts, both out of a Desire to meet some Opposers to Impose upon, in order to be cry'd up and to appear Learned, and out of a Spirit of Contradicti∣on; their Decisions are commonly False and Obscure, and it is difficult to hearken to them without falling into some Error.

Now this Method of discovering the Errors of others, or the Solidity of their Sentiments, is pretty Difficult to be put in Practice: The Reason of it is this, That Pretenders to Learning are not the only Persons who would seem to be Ignorant of nothing, most Men have that Defect, particularly those that have some Reading, and that have Studied, which is the reason that they will always speak and ex∣plain their Sentiments, without giving a sufficient Attention to others. The most Complaisant and most Reasonable among them, despising the Senti∣ments of others in their Hearts, only seem to be Attentive, while People may easily discern in their Eyes, that they do not observe what is said, and that their Mind is wholly taken up with what they design to prove to us, without thinking of answering us.

This is what often makes Conversations very dull; for as nothing is more Pleasing, and because the greatest Honour People can do us, is to consider our Reasons, and approve our Opinions, so nothing can be more Offensive, than to see that People do not apprehend them; nor so much as take the least care that they may do it. For in fine, There is no Pleasure in speaking to and conversing with Statues; and who are only Statues in relation to us, because they have no value for us, and who have no thoughts to please us, but only to please themselves in endeavouring to show their Parts. But if Men knew how to give a handsom Attention and answer well, Conversation would not only be very Agreeable, but also very Useful; whereas every body striving to be thought Learned, they only hear one another; they act sometimes Uncharitably, and seldom or never dis∣cover Truth.

But the Blunders that are committed by the said Pretenders to Learning in Conversation, are excusable in some Respects. It may be urg'd in Favour of them, That Men are but little attentive to what is spoken at that time; That the most Exact are some∣times guilty of it; and that they do not desire their Words should be collected like those of Scaliger, and of Cardinal du Perron.

There is some Reason in these Excuses, and we are willing to believe, that such kind of Faults deserve some Indulgence. People are desirous to speak in Conversation, but there are unhappy days in which they do not hit things right. We are not always in a Humour to think and to express our selves well; and Time is so short on certain Occasions, that the least Cloud, and the least absence of Mind, makes those which have the greatest Interest and Penetration of Min, stumble unluckily into Extravagant Absur∣dities.

But if the Faults which the Pretenders to Learning commit in Conversation are excusable, the Faults they are guilty of in their Books, after mature Deli∣beration, are by no means pardonable, especially if

they are frequent, and are not aton'd by some good thing. For those who write an ill Book, make abun∣dance of People lose their time in reading of it; be∣sides their falling into the same Errors they are guilty of; and this occasions many more, which is a thing of very ill Consequence.

But though it be a greater Fault than People imagine, to compose an ill Book, or only an useless one, it is a Fault that sooner meets with Reward than Punishment: For there are Crimes which Men do not punish, whether it be that they are in Fashion, or because their Reason is not commonly so steady, to condemn as Criminals, whom they look upon to be Men of better Sense than they are them∣selves.

Authors are commonly look'd upon as Extraordi∣nary Men, who soar much above others; and so they are respected instead of being punish'd. Therefore there is no likelihood that Men should ever erect a Tribunal, to Examine and Condemn all such Books as only serve to Corrupt Reason.

So that we must never expect to see the Repub∣lick of Letters better regulated than other Repub∣licks are, since both are compos'd by Men. More∣over it is very necessary, in order to remove Error, to allow the Republick of Letters more Liberty than others, in which Novelty is always very Dan∣gerous: For should the World Incroach upon the Liberty of Learned Men, and Condemn all Novelties without Discernment, it would confirm us in our Errors.

Therefore there is no reason to find fault with my speaking against the Government of the Repub∣lick of Letters; and with ••my endeavouring to show, that often those great Men which are admir'd by others for their Profound Learning, are at the bottom only Vain Proud Men, without Judgment, and with∣out any true Science. I am oblig'd to speak thus of them, least People should blindly submit to their Deci∣sions, and follow their Errors.

The Proofs of their Vanity, * 1.26 of their Want of Judg∣ment, and of their Ignorance, are apparent in their own Works. Those who will give themselves the Trouble to examine them, with an Intent to Judge of them by the Rule of Common Sense, and without Prejudice of Esteem for those Authors, will find that most of the Designs of their Study are grounded upon an unjudicious Vanity; and that their principal End is, not to perfect their Reason, and much less to regulate the Motions of their Heart; but only to Confound others, in order to appear more Learned than they.

This is the Reason, as we have already observed, that they always fix upon odd extraordinary Subjects; and that they only use odd and extraordinary Ex∣pressions to explain themselves; and quote none but odd and extraordinary Authors. They seldom explain themselves in their own Language, it is too common; nor yet with a clear, plain, easie Latin; they do not speak to be understood, but to be admir'd. They seldom apply themselves to Subjects which are useful for the Conduct of Life, that seems too com∣mon to them: They neither endeavour to be useful to others, nor to themselves, but only to be thought Learned. They give no Reasons for what they say, or else they are such Mysterious and Incomprehen∣sible ones, as neither themselves nor any body else conceives with Evidence: They have no clear Reasons; and if they had they would not use them. Those Reasons do not surprise the Mind, they look too plain and too common, every body is capable of them. They rather chuse to relate Authorities to prove, or to seem to prove their Thoughts; for often the Au∣thorities they alledge, prove nothing by the Sense they contain; they only prove because they are Greek or Arabick. But it will not be amiss to speak of their Quotations, it will in some respect discover the Dispo∣sition of their Minds.

It is very evident, in my Opinion, that nothing but False Learning, and the Spirit of Polimathy, could make Quotations so much in vogue as they have

been hitherto, and as they are still among some of the Learned; for it is not very difficult to find Au∣thors, who quote large Passages every Moment with∣out any reason for it; either because the things they advance are so clear that no body doubts them; or because they are so Obscure, that the Authority of their Authors cannot prove them: Or lastly, Because the Quotations they alledge, can add no Ornament to what they say.

It is repugnant to Common Sense, to introduce a large Greek Passage, to prove that the Air is Transpa∣rent, because it is a thing that is known by every body: To use the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that there are Intelligences which move the Hea∣vens, because it is evident that Aristotle could know nothing of it: Or to mix Forteign Languages, Arabick and Persian Proverbs in French and Latin Books, com∣pos'd for every bodies use; because those Quotations can add no Ornaments to them, or else they are Fan∣rastical Ornaments, which disoblige a great many People, and can oblige but very few.

Nevertheless most of those that would be thought Learned, take so much delight in those kind of Quo∣tations, that they are not asham'd sometimes to in∣troduce them in Languages they do not understand; and they strain hard to force an Arabick Passage into their Books, which perhaps they cannot read. Thus they puzzle themselves to compass a thing which is contrary to Common Sense, yet pleases their Vanity, and makes them cry'd up by Fools.

They have also another Defect which is very considerable, and that is, They take little care to show, they have read with Choice and Judgment, they only desire to appear to have read much, and particularly Obscure Books, in order to be thought great Scholars; Books that are Scarce and Dear, least People should think they want any thing; Wicked and Impious Books which Honest Men dare not read: Just like those that brag of Crimes which others dare not commit. Therefore they will rather quote you very Dear, very Scarce, very Ancient, and very

Obscure Books, than such as are more Common and more Intelligible; and Books of Astrology, of the Caballa, and of Magick, than good Books; as if they were not Sensible, that Reading being the same thing as Conversation, they should endeavour to show that they have taken care to read good Books, and such as are most Intelligible, and not such as are bad and Obscure.

For as it would argue a Depravation of Mind, to be fond of Conversing commonly with Men we do not understand, without an Interpreter, when it is in our Power to inform our selves otherwise of what we desire to know: So it is Ridiculous to read only such Books as cannot be understood without a Dicti∣onary, when the same things may be learn'd in those that are more Intelligible. And as it is a Sign of Madness, to affect the Company and Conversation of Impious Persons; so it is the Character of a corrupted Heart, to delight in the reading of ill Books. But it is an Extravagant piece of Pride, to be willing to perswade, that one has read even those that one has not read, which nevertheless is pretty frequent: For there are Persons that are but Thirty Years of Age, that quote more Ill Books in their Works, than they could have read in several Ages; and yet they will perswade others, they have read them with great Exactness. But most of the Books of certain Learned Men, are only compil'd by dint of Dictionaries, and they have hardly read any thing beyond the Contents of the Books they quote, or some Common Places collected out of different Authors.

I dare not particularly enlarge upon those things, nor give Examples of them, for fear of offending Per∣sons so Haughty and so Splenatick as those Pretenders to Learning are; for there is no Delight in being abus'd in Greek and Arabick. Moreover, It is not very Material, in order to render what I say the more Sensible, to give particular Proofs of it; Men being naturally enough inclin'd to find Fault with the Conduct of others, and to apply what has been said. In the mean time let them please themselves with

that vain Phantasm of Grandeur; and let them give each other the Applauses which we refuse to give them. We have perhaps already disturb'd them too much in an Injoyment, which seems so Sweet and so Delightful to them.

CHAP. IX.

How the Inclination we have for Honours and Riches leads us to Error.

HOnours and Riches, as well as Virtue and Sciences, which we have been speaking of, are the Prin∣cipal things that raise us above other Men; for our Being seems to Agrandize and become Independent by the Possession of these Advantages. So that the Love we bear our selves, carrying it self naturally to Honours and Riches, we may affirm at least, that all People have some Inclination towards them. Let us explain in few words, how these Inclinations hinder us from finding out Truth, and engage us into False∣hood and Error.

We have shown in divers Places, that a great deal of Time, Pains, Assiduity, and Industry of Mind, are required to discover Truths that are compos'd and surrounded with Difficulties, and which depend on many Principles. From thence it is easie to conclude, That Publick Persons, who have great Imployments, great Estates to govern, and great Affairs to manage, and who much Covet Honours and Riches, are not very fit to Search after these Truths; and that they often are guilty of Error, in relation to Things that are not easily known, when they set up for Judges of them.

1. Because they have but very little Time to imploy in Search of Truth.

2. That commonly they do not delight in it.

3. Since they are not very capable of Attention, because the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Idea's of such things as they desire, and to which they are oblig'd to apply themselves.

4. Because they think they know every thing, and are not easily perswaded that their Inferiours can have a greater share of Reason than they have; for though they are willing to learn some things of them, they are unwilling to be instructed by them in solid and necessary Truths: They fly out into a Passion when any Body contradicts and undeceives them.

5. Since all their Imaginations are commonly ap∣plauded, though never so false and opposite to Com∣mon Sense; and that Men Laugh at those that are not of their Opinion, though they maintain undeniable Truths. The sordid Flatteries of those that are about them confirm them in their Errors, and in the false Esteem they have of themselves, and so encourages them to judge boldly of all things.

6. Because they seldom fix on any but sensible No∣tions, which are fitter for Common Conversations, and to preserve the Esteem of Men, than the pure Idea's of the Mind, which serve to discover Truth.

7. Since those who aspire to any Dignity, endea∣vour as much as they can to suit themselves to the Ca∣pacity of others; because nothing Excites the Envy and Aversion of Men so much as too uncommon Sen∣timents. It is very difficult for those whose Mind and Heart is taken up with the Thoughts and Desires of making their Fortune, to discover difficult Truths; and when they do find out any, they often abandon them out of Interest, because the Defence of those Truths does not suit with their Ambition. Men must often Wink at Injustice to become Magistrates; a so∣lid and uncommon Piety often hinders a Man from obtaining the Goods of Fortune; and the generous Love of Truth often deprives Men of the Pulpit; where Truth ought to be Taught.

All these Reasons joyn'd together, make Men that are much above others by their Dignities, Nobility, and Riches, or such who only think of rising and ma∣king

their Fortune, very liable to Error, and little ca∣pable of discovering hidden Truths. For among those things that are necessary to avoid Error in Questions that are somewhat difficult, there are two principal ones that are not commonly met with in the persons we are speaking of, viz. Attention of Mind to Pene∣trate into the Bottom of Things; and Wisdom enough not to Judge of them Rashly. Even those that are chosen to Teach others, and whose Business it is to Inform themselves, in order to instruct those that are committed to their Care, commonly become liable to Error, as soon as they become Publick Persons: Either because that having very little time, they are incapa∣ble of Attention, and applying themselves to things which require a great deal of time; or because that being earnestly desirous to appear great Scholars, they boldly decide all things without the least Considerati∣on, and will hardly suffer any Body to Oppose, and to Instruct them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality.

I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy.

II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights.

WE have spoken in the three preceding Chapters of the Inclination we have towards the pre∣servation of our Being, and how it occasions our falling into many Errors: We will now speak of that which we have for Well-being, that is for Plea∣sure, and for all things that make us happier and more contented, or that we think capable of doing so; and we will endeavour to discover the Errors that pro∣ceed from that Inclination.

There are Philosophers who do what they can to perswade Men, that Pleasure is not a Good, and that

Pain is not an Evil: That we may be Happy in the midst of the most violent Pains and Unhappy amidst the greatest Pleasures. As these Philosophers are very Pathetick and Fanciful, they without much difficulty prevail upon the Minds of Weak People, who easily receive the Impression which those that speak produce in them: For Stoicks are a little Visionary, and Visio∣naries are Vehement; and so they easily Imprint in others the false Sentiments they are possess'd with. But whereas there is no Conviction against Experi∣ence, and our Inward Sentiments, those pompous magnificent Reasons vanish, with all their Lustre, as soon as the Soul is affected with some sensible Plea∣sure or Pain: And those who have plac'd all their Con∣fidence in that false perswasion of their Mind, are de∣priv'd of Wisdom and Power at the least Attack of Vice; and find that they have been deceiv'd, and that they are vanquish'd.

Since Philosophers cannot give their Disciples the power of overcoming their Passions; at least, * 1.27 they should not seduce or perswade them that they have no Enemies to Encounter. They should speak the Truth; Pleasure is always a Good, and Pain ever an Evil: But it is not always advantagious to enjoy Pleasure; for it is sometimes profitable to suffer Pain.

But in order the better to Explain my meaning, it is fit to know,

1. That God only is powerful enough to act in us, and to make us sensible of Pleasure and Pain. For it is evident to all Men that consult their Reason, and despise the Testimony of their Senses, that it is not the Objects which we feel, that Act Effectively in us, and that it is not our Soul neither which causes plea∣sure and pain in it self in respect to them.

2. That Good is commonly to be given, only in order to the performance of some good Action, or to reward it; and that commonly Evil is only to be in∣slicted in order to prevent an Ill Action, or to punish it: And therefore since God always acts agreeable to Order, and according to the Rules of Justice, all Plea∣sures either Incline us to some good Action, or reward

us for it; and all Pains serve to prevent some ill Acti∣on, or to punish us for the Committing of it.

3. That there are Actions that are good in one sense, and bad in another. For instance, it is an Ill Action to expose ones self to Death, when God forbids it. But it is a Good One when God Commands it. For all our Actions are Good or Ill, because God has Com∣manded, or forbidden them by his first general Will, which is the Order and Institution of Nature; or by his other particular Will and Commandments, which are necessary for the re-establishment of Nature.

Therefore I say that Pleasure is always Good; but that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it.

1. Because that instead of engaging us to him who is only capable of causing it, it weans us from him to Unite us to that which seems falsly to cause it. It sets us at a Distance from God, to Unite us to a Vile Creature. For although true Philosophers sometimes think that Pleasure is not occasion'd by outward Ob∣jects, and that that may in some measure Incline them to Acknowledge and Love God in all things; never∣theless since the Introduction of Sin, the Reason of Man is so Weak, and his Senses and Imagination have so much Power over his Mind, that they soon Corrupt his Heart. When we do not lay aside, according to the Advice of the Gospel, all things that do not of themselves incline us to God. For the best Philosophy cannot Cure the Mind, nor resist the disorder of Vo∣luptuousness.

2. Since Pleasure is a Reward, it is a piece of In∣justice to produce Motions in our Body which oblige God, in consequence of his first Will, to make us feel Pleasure, when we do not deserve any; either because the Action we do is Useless or Criminal, or because that being full of Sin, we ought not to desire a Re∣ward of him. Man before the Fall might justly en∣joy sensible Pleasures in his Regular Actions: But since the Fall there are no sensible Pleasures altogether In∣nocent, nor any but such as are capable of injuring us when we enjoy them; for often the bare tasting of them is sufficient to make us Slaves to them.

3. Because God being Just, he must needs at some time or other punish the Violence that is offer'd to him, when Men oblige him to recompence with Pleasure the Criminal Actions which they Commit against him. When our Soul shall be no longer united to our Bodies, God will no longer lye under the Obligation which he has laid upon himself, to give us Sensa∣tions to answer to the Motions of the Mind; and he will still remain under the Obligation of satisfying his Justice: And therefore that will be the time of his Vengeance and Wrath. Then without changing the Order of Nature, and remaining always Immuta∣ble in his first Will, he will punish the unjust pleasures of the Voluptuous, with Pains that never will have an End.

4. Because that the certainty we have in this Life that the said Justice must be perform'd, agitates the Mind with mortal Disquiets, and flings it into a kind of Despair, which renders the Voluptuous miserable, even in the midst of the greatest Pleasures.

5. Since commonly dismal Remorses accompany the most Innocent Pleasures, because we are convinc'd that we deserve none; and those Remorses deprive us of a certain Inward Joy, which is found even in actions of Penitence.

Thus though Pleasure is a Good, it must be granted that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it for these Reasons; and for others like these, which it is very necessary to know, and which are easily deduced from these; and it is always very advantageous to suffer Pain, though it be really an Evil.

Nevertheless, all Pleasure is a Good, and actually makes those Happy that enjoy it, while they enjoy it, and as long as they enjoy it; and all Grief or Pain is an Evil, and actually makes the person that suffers it unhappy, while he suffers it, and as long as he suf∣fers it. It may be said that the Righteous and Holy are the most unhappy Men in this Life, and the most worthy of Compassion. Si in vita tantum in Christo speramus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus, says Saint Paul; for those that Weep, and suffer

Persecution for Justice, are not Happy because they suffer Persecution for Justice; but because the King∣dom of Heaven is theirs, and a great Reward is in store for them in Heaven; that is, Because they shall be Happy. Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just, Virtuous, and Perfect, because they are in the Order that God has prescrib'd, and Per∣fection consists in following him: but they are not Happy because they Suffer. A time will come when they will Suffer no more; and then they will be Hap∣py, as well as Just and Perfect.

However, I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life, by the strength of their Hope and Faith, which render those future Felicities, as it were, present to their Mind. For it is certain, that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively, it draws it nearer to the Mind, and gives it a taste thereof before-hand: And thus it makes us Happy in some measure, since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure, which makes us Happy.

Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good, and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier; since it is not true, and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune. We must tell them, that those Plea∣sures are good in themselves, and capable to make them Happy in some measure: Nevertheless, they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementi∣oned; but they cannot avoid them of themselves: Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclinati∣on which they cannot overcome, and those tran∣sitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid, satisfie it in some measure: Thus they are in a miserable Ne∣cessity of losing themselves, unless they are assisted. It is necessary to tell them these things, that they may distinctly know their Weakness, and the want they have of a Redeemer.

We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ, and not like the Stoicks, who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds. They must conti∣nually

be told, that they must hate and despise them∣selves, and not look for an Establishment or Happi∣ness on Earth: That they must daily carry their Cross, or the Instrument of their suffering, and that they must lose their Life at present, in order to preserve it Eternally. They must be taught, that they are ob∣lig'd to act contrary to their desire, to make 'em sen∣sible of their inability to good. For Men wou'd be invincibly Happy, and they cannot be actually so, unless they do what they please. Perhaps being con∣vinced of their present Evils, and knowing their fu∣ture sufferings, they may humble themselves on Earth: Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven, and seek a Mediatour; be afraid of sensible Objects, and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence. And it may be they may thus ob∣tain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace, and without which there is no Power, no Health, nor no Salvation to be expected.

We are inwardly convinc'd that Pleasure is Good, * 1.28 and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False, for Plea∣sure is really Good. We are Naturally Convinc'd, that Pleasure is the Character of Good, and that Natural Conviction is certainly true; for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good, and very Lovely. But we are not convinc'd, that either sensible Ob∣jects, or our Souls themselves, are capable of pro∣ducing Pleasure in us; for there is no reason to be∣lieve it, and there are a Thousand against it. There∣fore sensible Objects are neither Good, nor Lovely. Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life, we ought to use them: But as they are not capable of Acting in us, we ought not to Love them. The Soul must only Love him that is Good, who only is capable to make it Happier, and more perfect. There∣fore it should only Love that which is above it, since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below, or equal to it.

But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect, when it always attends it, we fancy

that they are Sensible Objects which act in us, be∣cause at their approach we have new Sensations, and because we do not see him that produces them really in us. We taste a Fruit, and we find a Sweet∣ness; we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit; we conclude that it causes it, and even that it contains it. We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit; we do not so much as think on him, nor perhaps on our selves: Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness, nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul; we impute both the Cause and the Effect, to that Fruit which we eat.

What I have said of Sensations which have a rela∣tion to the Body, is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it, as those which are found in pure Intelligences.

The Mind considers it self; it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection; or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires. At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy; at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow. It straight fancies, that it is the sight of its Happiness which pro∣duces in it self that Sentiment of Joy, because the said Sentiment always attends that sight. It also imagines, that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in it self that Sentiment of Grief, since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight. The real Cause of those Sentiments, which is God alone, does not appear before it: It does not so much as think on God; for he acts in us without our know∣ing it.

God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy, when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be, that we may remain in it, that our Disquiet may cease, and that we may fully enjoy our Happi∣ness, without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else. But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us, when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be, so that we may not remain in it, and that we might

earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us. For God pushes us continually toward Good, when we are Sensible that we do not possess it; and he fixes us powerfully upon it, when we find that we possess it fully. So that it seems evident to me, that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief, as well as the Sensible ones, are no voluntary Productions of the Mind.

Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason, that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss, and which disguises it self to our Mind, under Sensible Appearances. We must Adore it, we must Love it; but we must also Fear it, for since it fills us with Pleasures, it may also overwhelm us with Grief. We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice, by a Sensi∣ble Love, by a Love worthy of God, when we Love him because we know that he is Amiable: And that Love is worthy of us, because that being Reasonable, we ought to Love that which Reason informs us to be worthy of our Love. But we Love Sensible Things, by a Love that is unworthy of us, and which they are also unworthy of: For being Reasonable, we Love them without any Reason to Love them, since we do not clearly know that they are Lovely; and on the contrary, we know they are not so. But Pleasures Seduce us, and make us Love them; the Blind and Irregular Love of Pleasure, being the real Cause of those False Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Love of Pleasure, in relation to Speculative Sciences.

I. How it hinders us from disco∣vering Truth.

II. Some Examples.

THE Inclination we have for Sensible Pleasures being disorder'd, is not only the Source of the Dangerous Errors we fall into in cases of Morality,

and the general Causes of the Depravation of our Manners; it is also one of the Principal Causes of the Disorder of our Reason, and it engages us Insen∣sibly into very gross Errors, but less dangerous upon Subjects that are meerly Speculative; because the said Inclination hinders us from having a sufficient Attention for things that do not affect us, to apprehend them, and to judge well of them.

We have already spoken in several places, of the Difficulty Men find in applying themselves to Sub∣jects that are a little uncommon, because the Matter we treated of then requir'd it. We spoke of it to∣wards the end of the first Book, in showing that the Sensible Idea's affecting the Soul more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind, it often applied it self more to the Manner than the Thing it self. We spoke of it in the Second, because in treating of the Delicacy of the Fibers of the Brain, we show'd whence the Softness of certain Effeminate Minds did proceed. Finally, We spoke of it in the Third, in mentioning of the Atten∣tion of the Mind, when we were about proving, that our Soul had but little Attention to Things that were meerly Speculative; but a great deal more to such as affect it, and make it Sensible of Pleasure or Grief.

Our Errors have commonly several Causes which contribute all to their Rise: So that we must not imagine, that it is for want of Order that we some∣times repeat almost the same things, and that we im∣pute several Causes to the same Errors; it is because there are really many. I speak still of occasional Causes; for we have often declar'd, that there are no other Real and True, but the ill use of our Liberty, which we do not always make use of so much as we might, as we have explain'd at the beginning of this Work.

No body ought to blame us, if in order to make Men plainly conceive, how for Example the Sensible Manner in which things are cover'd, does Surprise and makes us liable to fall into Error; we have been oblig'd to say before-hand in the other Books, that we

had an Inclination for Pleasures, which seems necessary to be repeated in this, which treats of Natural Incli∣nations, and the same of some other things in other places. All the Harm it will occasion is, that there will be no necessity to say many things here, which we should have been oblig'd to explain, if it had not been done elsewhere.

All things that are in Man, are so dependant on one another, that we find our selves often over∣whelm'd, under the number of things we are to treat of at one and the same time, to explain perfectly what we conceive. We are sometimes necessitated not to divide things that are joyn'd by Nature one to ano∣ther, and to proceed contrary to the order we had pre∣scrib'd, when that order occasions nothing but Con∣fusion, as it happens of necessity on some occasions. Yet for all this it is impossible to give others an Idea of all we think of: All that we can commonly pre∣tend to, is to put others in a way to discover with Pleasure and Ease, what we have discover'd with great Labour and Pains. And whereas it is Impossible to discover any thing without Attention, we must par∣ticularly study the Means to make others Attentive. 'Tis what we have endeavour'd to do, though we ac∣knowledge we have perform'd it weakly, and we own our Faults the more willingly, to the end that the said Confession may excite those who shall read this, to render themselves Attentive of their own accord, in order to remedy the same, and to penetrate to the bottom of these Subjects, which without doubt deserve to be well consider'd.

The Errors, into which the Inclination we have for Pleasure, and generally for all things that affect us, engage us, are Infinite; because the said Inclina∣tion dissipates the Sight of the Mind, and it applies it continually on the confus'd Idea's of the Senses, and the Imagination; and it inclines us to judge of all things rashly, by the bare relation they have to us. * 1.29

We never see Truth, until we see things as they are; and we never see them as they are, unless we

see them in him that contains them after an Intelligible manner. When we see things our selves, we only see them very Imperfectly, or rather we only see our own Sentiments, and not the Things we are desirous to see, and which we falsely imagine we do see.

It requires a great deal of Application to see things as they are in themselves; because it is now impossible for Man to unite himself to God without Pain and Labour: To see things in our selves, requires no Application on our part, since we feel what touches us even against our Will. Naturally we find no anti∣cipating Pleasure in the Union we have with God, the pure Idea's of things do not move us. Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleasure, does neither apply nor unite us to God; on the contrary, it weans and removes us from him: For that Inclination in∣duces us continually to consider things by their Sensible Idea's, because those False and Impure Idea's affect us. The Love of Pleasure, and the actual Injoy∣ment of Pleasure, which revives and increases our Love for it, removes us continually from Truth, to cast us into Error.

Therefore those that are desirous to draw near to Truth, to be guided by its Light, must begin by lay∣ing aside Pleasure: They must carefully avoid what∣ever affects and agreeably divides the Mind; for the Senses and Passions must be silenc'd, in order to hear the Word of Truth; it being necessary to withdraw our Affections from the World, and to condemn all Sensible Things, as well for the Perfection of the Mind, as for the Conversion of the Heart. When our Pleasures are great, when our Sentiments are lively, we are not capable of the plainest Truths, and we do not so much as grant common Notions, unless they contain something that is Sensible. When our Pleasures, or other Sensations are moderate, we can discover some plain easie Truths: But if it were possible for us wholly to lay aside Pleasures and Sensations, we should be capable of discovering with ease the most conceal'd Truths, and the most difficult

that are known: For the more we remove from that which is not God, the nearer we draw to God himself, we avoid Error, and we discover Truth. But since the Fall, since the unruly Love of anticipating Plea∣sures, which rules predominantly, the Mind is become so weak, that it can penetrate into nothing, and so Material and Dependant on the Senses, that it cannot reach difficult things which do not affect it. It does not even perceive common Notions, and often con∣cludes for want of Attention, that they are False and Obscure. It cannot distinguish the Truth of things from their Usefulness, the relation they have among one another, from the relation they have to us; and it often believes that those are the Truest that are the most Useful, the most Agreeable, and that affect it most. In fine, That Inclination Infects and Con∣founds all the Perceptions we have of Objects, and consequently all the Judgments we make of them. Here are some Examples.

It is a common Notion that Virtue is preferable to Vice; that it is better to be Chaste, * 1.30 than Intemperate and Voluptuous. But our Inclination for Pleasure, confounds that Idea to that degree on some occasions, that we have but a glimpse of it left; and it is impossible to draw the Consequences from thence, which are necessary for the Conduct of Life. The Soul is so taken up with the Pleasures it hopes for, that it supposes them Innocent, and aims at nothing but the Means to enjoy them.

Every body knows, that it is better to be Just than Rich: That Justice exalts a Man more than the Possession of the most Sumptuous Buildings, which often serve less to discover the Grandeur of the Owner, than the Greatness of his Injustices and Crimes. But the Pleasure which Inadvertent People receive in the Vain Ostentation of their False Gran∣deur, sufficiently fills up the small Capacity of their Mind, to conceal and obscure so evident a Truth from them. They foolishly imagine that they are great Men, because they have great Houses.

Specious Algebra is certainly the finest, I mean the most Fruitful and most Certain of all Sciences; with∣out it the Mind has neither Penetration nor Extent; and with it, it is capable of knowing almost every thing that can be known with Certainty and Evi∣dence. As Imperfect as that Science has been, it has made all those Famous that have learn'd it, and that have known how to Practice it: They have thereby discover'd Truths which seem'd almost In∣comprehensible to other Men. It is so well propor∣tion'd to Humane Minds, that without distracting their Capacity with useless things in what they seek after, it conducts them Infallibly to what they aim at. In a word, It is an Universal Science, and as it were the Key of all other Sciences; yet as valuable as it is in it self, it has nothing in it that is taking in order to Charm Men, by this reason only, that it is not Sensible. It has been buried absolutely in Forgetful∣ness for several Ages. There are at this very time, many Men who do not know the name of it; and among a Thousand Persons, you will hardly meet one or two who understand any thing in it: The most Learned that have reviv'd it in our days, have not carried it very far, and have not handled it with that Order and Clearness it deserves. Being Men as well as others, they have at last been disgusted with those pure Truths which are not attended by Sensible Plea∣sure; and the Disquietness of their Will being Cor∣rupted by Sin, the Inconstancy of their Mind, which depends on the Agitation and Circulation of the Blood, has not allow'd them to consider any longer those Great, those Vast, and those Plentiful Truths, which are the Immutable and Universal Rules, of all Transitory and particular Truths, that may be known with Exactness.

Metaphysics is also an abstracted Scie••••••, which does not affect the Senses, the Study the•• of afford the Soul no manner of Pleasure; for which reaso•• the said Science is very much neglected; and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 often meet Men that are so Stupid, as boldly to d•••• common Notions. There are some that deny 〈◊〉〈◊〉

one may, or ought to affirm a thing is, by what is in∣cluded in the clear and distinct Idea one has of it: That Nothing has no Proprieties; That a thing can∣not be reduc'd to nothing without Miracle; That no body can move it self by its own Force; That an Active Body can communicate no more Motion to any Body it encounters, than it has of it self, and the like. They have never consider'd those Axioms with Stedi∣ness and Clearness enough, to discover the Truth of them distinctly; and they have sometimes made Ex∣periments, which have falsely convinc'd them, that some of those Axioms were not true. They have seen on some occasions, that two Visible Bodies meeting each other, ceas'd both to move after the Blow: They have seen in others, that the Bodies which were hit, had more Motion than the Visible Bodies that did hit them: And this Sensible Sight of some Experiments, whose reasons they see not, makes them decide things against certain Principles, which pass for com∣mon Notions in the Minds of all those that are capable of any Attention. Ought they not to consider, that Motions may be communicated from Visible Bodies to Invisible ones, when the Bodies that are in motion meet; or from the Invisible to the Visible on other occasions? When a Body is Suspended by a Cord, the Knife wherewith that Cord is cut, does not give the Motion to that Body, it is an Invisible Matter that does it. When a Coal of Fire is flung into a heap of Gun-powder, it is not the motion of the Coal, but an invisible Matter, which scatters all the parts of that Powder, and which gives it a motion capable of blowing up a House. There are a Thousand ways by which invisible Matter communicates its Motion to gross visible Bodies: At least it is not evident that it cannot be done, as it is evident that the moving force of Bodies can neither be increas'd nor diminish'd by the usual force of Nature.

So Men see that the Wood that is slung into the Fire, ceases to be what it is; and that all the Sensible Qualities they observe in it dissipate themselves; and from thence they think they are in the right, to con∣clude,

that it is possible for a thing to return to its former nothing: They do no longer see the Wood, and they only see a few Ashes which succeed it; and from thence they judge that the major part of the Wood ceases to be, as if the Wood could not be redu•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 invisible parts At least it is not so evident that this 〈…〉〈…〉 that the force which gives a being to all things, is not subject to change; and that by the ordinary force of Nature, what is, cannot be reduced to nothing, as what is not, cannot begin to be. But few Men know what it is to look within themselves, there to hear the Voice of Truth, according to which they ought to judge of all things; their Eyes regulate their Decisions: They judge according to what they feel, and not according to what they conceive, for they feel with Pleasure, and conceive with Pain.

Ask all Men in the World, Whether one may affirm, without fear of being deceiv'd, that the whole is greater than a part, and I am confident that there is not one, but will answer immediately as he ought to do. Ask them in the next place, Whether we may likewise, without fear of being deceiv'd, affirm of a thing, that which we conceive clearly to be included within the Idea which represents it; and you will find, that few will grant it without Hesitation, that more will deny it, and that the major part of them will not know what to answer. Yet this Metaphysical Axiom, That we may affirm of a thing, which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it, is more evident than this Axiom, That the whole is greater than its part; because this last Axiom is not an Axiom, but only a Conclusion in respect to the first. One may prove that the whole is greater than part by this first Axiom; but this first can be proved by no other: It is absolutely the first, and the Foundation of all clear and evident Know∣ledge. Why then does no body hesitate upon the Conclusion, and yet many question the Principle from which it is deriv'd; unless it be because the Idea's of the whole and of part are Sensible; and

that our Eyes inform us, that the whole is larger than part of it; and that our Eyes do not see the Truth of the first Axiom of all Sciences?

As there is nothing in this Axiom, that naturally fixes or applies the Mind, we must be willing to con∣sider it constantly and willingly, in order to make an evident Discovery of the Truth thereof. But Men seldom think on Objects which do not affect their Senses; and when they do, it has no Prevalency with them.

For to continue our said Example, they think it evident, that the whole is greater than its part; that a Mountain of Marble is possible, and that a Moun∣tain without a Vale is impossible; and that it is not equally evident that there is a God. Nevertheless we may say, that the Evidence is equal in all those Pro∣positions, since they are all equally distant from the first Principle.

This is the first Principle: We must attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it: We clearly conceive that there is more Extent in the Idea we have of the whole, than in the Idea we have of its part: That a possible Existence is contain'd in the Idea of a Mountain of Marble, the Impossible Existence in the Idea of a Mountain without a Vale; and the ne∣cessary Existence in the Idea we have of God, I mean, of an Infinitely perfect Being. Therefore the whole is larger than part of it: Therefore a Mountain of Marble may be Existent: Therefore a Mountain without a Vale cannot be Existent: Therefore God or an Infinitely Perfect Being does necessarily Exist. It is visible that these Conclusions are equally distant from the first Principle of all Sciences: They are then equally evident in themselves: It is then as evident that God does Exist, as that the whole is greater than its part. But whereas the Idea's of Infinite, of Perfections, of necessary Existence, are not Sen∣sible, like the Idea's of the whole and of its part, Men fancy they do not perceive what they are not sensi∣ble of; and though these Conclusions are equally

Evident in themselves, they are not however equally receiv'd.

There are Men who endeavour to perswade us, that they have no Idea of an infinitely perfect Being. But I do not know what induces them to answer positive∣ly, when they are ask'd whether an infinitely perfect Being is Round or Square, or something like it: For they ought to answer, that they know nothing of it, if it be true that they have no Idea of it.

There are others who grant, that those Reason well who conclude, that God is not an Impossible Being, from this, that we see the Idea of God includes no Contradiction, or an impossible Existence; and they will not allow us to conclude in the same manner, that God Exists necessarily, from this that we conceive a necessary Existence in the Idea we have of him.

Finally, There are others who pretend that this proof of the Existence of God is a Sophism; and that the Argument only concludes, supposing it is true that God Exists, as if it were not prov'd. This is our proof: We ought to attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which repre∣sents it. This is the general Principle of all Sciences. Necessary Existence is included in the Idea which re∣presents a Being infinitely Perfect; they grant it. And Consequently we must say, that the infinitely perfect Being Exists. Yes, say they, supposing that he Exists.

But let us make such an Answer to such an Argu∣ment, to the End that the World may Judge of the Solidity of their Answer. Here is an Argument like it. We ought to attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which re∣presents it: That is the Principle. We clearly con∣ceive four Angles included in the Idea which represents a Square, or we conceive clearly that possible Ex∣istence is included in the Idea of a Marble Tower: Therefore a Square has Four Angles: Therefore a Marble Tower is possible. I say those Conclusions are true, supposing that the Square has Four Angles; just as they answer that God Exists, supposing he does

Exist: That is to say in a word, The Conclusions of those Demonstrations are true, supposing they are true.

I own, that if I should make such an Argument as this, we must attribute that to a thing which we con∣ceive clearly to be included in the Idea which repre∣sents it, for we clearly conceive the necessary Exi∣stance included in the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect, consequently a Body infinitely Perfect Exists. It is true, I say, that should I make such an Argument, People would be in the right to answer, that it would not conclude the Actual Existence of a Body infinite∣ly Perfect; but only supposing that there were such a Body, it would have its Existence in it self. The rea∣son of it is, that the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect is a Fiction of the Mind, or a Compounded Idea; which consequently may be False or Contradictory, as indeed it is: For we cannot clearly conceive a Body infinitely Perfect; since a particular Finite Being, as a Body is, cannot be conceiv'd to be Universal and Infinite.

But the Idea of God, or of a general Being, of an unlimited Being, of an infinite Being, is not a Ficti∣on of the Mind. It is not a Compounded Idea which includes any Contradiction; nothing can be plainer, though it Comprehends all that is, and whatever may be. Now that plain and natural Idea of Being or In∣finity, includes a necessary Existence; for it is evi∣dent, that Being (I do not say such a Being) has Ex∣istence in it self; and that Being cannot actually not be Being, since it is impossible and contradicto∣ry, that Real Being should be without an Existence. It may chance that Bodies may not be, because Bodies are such Beings as participate of Being, and depend on it. But unlimited Being is necessary; it is Indepen∣dent; it derives what it is from it self. All that is proceeds from it. If there is any thing, it is, since all proceeds from it: But though there were nothing in particular, it would be; because it is of it self, and we cannot conceive it clearly as not Being, un∣less we look upon it as Being in particular, or like

such a Being; and that we thus consider all other Idea's besides that of Being. For those that do not see that God is, commonly do not consider Being, but such a Being; and consequently a Being that may be, and may not be.

Moreover, that we may yet more distinctly appre∣hend this proof of the Existence of God, and answer some Objections that might be made, more clearly, we must remember that when we see a Creature, we do not see it in it self, nor by it self; for we only see it, as it has been prov'd in the Third Book, by the sight of some Perfections that are in God, which re∣present it. Thus we may see the Essence of that Creature, without seeing its Existence; we may see in God that which represents it, without its Existing. Therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea which represents it, it not being necessary that it should be, to the End it may be seen. But the Case is very different in the insinitely perfect Being; It can only be seen in it self; for nothing that is Finite can represent Infinity So that we cannot see God, unless he Exists: It is impossible to see the Essence of a Be∣ing infinitely Perfect, without seeing the Existence of it: We cannot see it barely as a possible Being: No∣thing Comprehends it; and if we think on it, it must be.

But it is useless to propose these kind of Demonstra∣tions to the common sort of Mankind. These De∣monstrations may be call'd Personal, by reason that they do not generally convince all Men. We must use more sensible ones in order to Convince them; and indeed they are not wanting: For no Truth has more Proofs than that of the Existence of God. This was only urg'd to shew, that refin'd Truths making hardly any Impressions on our Senses, are taken for Illu∣sions and Chimera's; whereas, when gross palpable Truths affect the Senses, forcing the Soul to consider them, we are easily perswaded that they have a great deal of reality; for since the Fall they make strong Impressions on our Mind.

'Tis for the same reason, that there is no prospect to hope, that the common part of Mankind will ever submit to this Demonstration to prove, that Animals are not sensible, viz. that being Innocent, which all the World grants, and I suppose it, if they were capa∣ble of Sensation, it would happen that under a God infinitely Just and Almighty, an Innocent should suffer Grief, which is a pain, and the punishment of Sin. Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom, Sub justo Deo, quisquam nisi mereatur, miser esse non potest; which St. Austin makes use of with a great deal of Reason against Julian, to prove Original Sin, and the Corruption of our Nature. They Fancy that there is neither Force nor Solidity in this Axiom, and in some others which prove, that Beasts are not sensible, because as we have already said, those Axioms are refin'd, and include nothing that is sensible or palpable, or make any Impression upon our Senses.

The sensible Actions and Motions of Beasts, towards the preservation of that Life, are Reasons, which though only probable, affect us more; and which consequently, incline us much more powerfully to believe that they are sensible of Pain or Grief, when they cry out being struck ••••an that refin'd Reason of the pure Mind, though most certain and evident in it self. For it is certain, that most Men have no other reason to believe that Animals have Souls, * 1.31 but the sensible Sight of all what Beasts do for the preserva∣tion of their Life.

That is apparent enough from this, that most Peo∣ple do not imagin there is a Soul in an Egg, although the Transformation of an Egg into a Chicken, is in∣finitely more difficult than the bare preservation of the Chicken, when it is absolutely form'd. For as more Ingenuity is requi d to make a Watch out of a piece of Iron, than to make it go when it is finish'd, it would be more reasonable to admit a Soul in an Egg, in or∣der to Form a Chicken, than to make that Chicken live when it is perfectly Form'd. But Men do not see the admirable manner how a Chicken is Form'd,

as they always sensibly see in what manner they seek for those things that are necessary for their preservati∣on. Therefore they are not inclin'd to believe that there are Souls in Eggs, by some sensible Impression of necessary Motions to Transform Eggs into Chickens; but they allow Animals Souls, by reason of the sensi∣ble Impression of the External Actions of those Ani∣mals for preservation of their Life; although the rea∣son I have here alledg'd, is stronger to give Souls to Eggs than to Chickens.

The second Reason, which is, that Matter is inca∣pable of feeling, and of desiring, is certainly demon∣strative against those who say, that Animals are sensible, notwithstanding their Soul is Corporeal. But Men will Eternally Confound and Intangle those Reasons, rather than own a thing contrary to Proofs that are not only probable, but very sensible and feel∣ing: And there is no way to convince them absolutely, but in opposing sensible proofs to their sensible proofs; and in shewing them visibly, that all the parts of Ani∣mals are only Machinal; and that they may move without a Soul by the meer Impression of Objects, and by their peculiar Constitution; as Monsieur Des∣cartes has begun to do it in his Treatise of Man. For all the most certain and evident reasons of the Under∣standing alone will never perswade them the contrary of the obscure Proofs they have by the Senses: And we only expose our selves to the Laughter of Persons of a superficial Understanding, that are not capable of much Attention, when we undertake to convince them by Reasons above the common Level, that Ani∣mals have no Feeling.

Therefore it behoves us well to remember, that the Violent Inclinations we have for Divertisements, Plea∣sures, and generally, for all that does affect us, throws us into a great number of Errors: Because the Capa∣city of our Mind being Bounded, that Inclination withdraws our Mind continually from the Attention we should give to the clear and distinct Idea's of the Understanding, which are proper to discover Truth, to apply it to the false, obscure, and deceitful Idea's

of our Senses; which Influence the Will more by the hope of Good and Pleasure, than they Instruct the Mind by their Light and Evidence.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Effects which the thought of Future Bliss and Sufferings is capable of producing in the Mind.

IF it happens often that the little Pleasures and slight Pains which we actually feel, nay more, which we have a Prospect of, strangely disturb our Imagination, and hinder us from judging of things according to their true Idea's; we have no reason to believe that the prospect of Eternity cannot act upon our Mind. But it will be necessary to consider what it may be ca∣pable of producing there.

We must observe in the First Place, that the hopes of an Eternity of Pleasures does not Act so powerfully upon the Mind, as the fear of an Eternity of Tor∣ments. The Reason of it is, Men do not Love Pleasure so much, as they Hate Pain. Moreover, by the Internal Knowledge they have of their Disorders, they are sensible that they deserve Hell; and they see nothing in themselves to Merit such great Rewards, as to participate of the Felicity of God himself. They are sensible when they please, and even sometimes against their Will, that far from deserving Rewards, they are worthy of the greatest Chastisements; for their Conscience never leaves them; but they are in the like manner continually convinc'd, that God is willing to shew his Mercy upon Sinners, after having satisfy'd his Justice upon his Son. Therefore the Just themselves have more Lively Apprehensions of the Eternity of Torments, than Hopes of an Eternity of Pleasures. The prospect of Pain then consequently, is more prevailing than the prospect of Reward; and

here is partly that which it is capable of producing, not alone, but as a principal Cause.

It produces an infinite number of Scruples in the Mind, and confirms them so much, that it is almost impossible to get rid of them. It Extends, as it were, even Faith to prejudices, and makes us pay the Wor∣ship which is only due to God, to Imaginary Powers. It obstinately fixes the Mind on vain or dangerous Su∣perstitions. It makes Men earnestly and zealously Embrace Human Traditions, and Practices that are useless for Salvation, Judaick and Pharisaick Devoti∣ons, which have been invented by servile Fear. Final∣ly, it sometimes throws Men into a blindness of De∣spair: Insomuch, that looking confusedly on Death as an Annihilation, they foolishly hasten to make away with themselves, to be freed of the Mortal Disquiets which possess and frighten them.

There is often more Charity than Self-Love, in the Scrupulous, as well as in the Superstitious; but there is nothing but Self-love in the desperate: For taking the thing rightly, those must needs Love themselves extreamly, who chuse rather not to be, than to be un∣easie. Women, Young People, and Weak Minds are the most subject to Scruples and Superstitions, and Men are more liable to Despair.

It is easie to know the reason of these things. For it is Visible, that the Idea of Eternity being the great∣est, the most terrible, and the most frightful of all those that surprise the Mind, and strike the Imagina∣tion, it is necessary it should be attended with a long Train of Accessory Idea's, to make together a consi∣derable Effect upon the Mind, because of the Rela∣tion they have to that great and terrible Idea of Eter∣nity.

Whatever has any relation to Infinity cannot be Little, or if it is Little in itself, it receives an immense greatness by that Relation, which cannot be compar'd to any thing that is Finite. Therefore whatever has any relation, or even what we fancy to have any relation, either to an unavoidable Eternity of Tor∣ments, or Delights which is propos'd to us, must needs

frighten those Minds that are capable of any Reflection or Thought.

The Fibers of the Brains of Women, or young People, and of weak Minds, being, as I have said elsewhere, Soft and Flexible, receive deep Marks of one of these two: And when they have abundance of Spirits, and are more capable of Thought and Just Reflection, they receive by the Vivacity of their Ima∣gination a very great number of false Impressions and Accessary Idea's, which have no Natural Rela∣tion to the Principal Idea. Nevertheless that Rela∣tion, though Imaginary, maintains and fortifies those False Impressions, and Accessary Idea's which it has created.

When two Lawyers are ingag'd in some great Cause, which wholly takes up their Mind, and yet do not understand the Case, they often have vain Fears, being in dread that certain things may Pre∣judice them which the Judges have no regard to, and which experienced Lawyers do not fear. The Affair being of very great Consequence to them, the Motion it produces in their Brains diffuses it self, and is com∣municated to distant traces which have naturally no relation to it. It fares just in the same manner with the Scrupulous, they unreasonably form to themselves Subjects of Fear and Disquiet; and instead of examin∣ing the Will of God in the Holy Scriptures, and of relying on those whose Imagination is not tainted; their Mind is wholly taken up with an Imaginary Law, which disorderly Motions of Fear impress on their Brains. And though they are inwardly con∣vinc'd of their Weakness, and that God does not re∣quire from them certain Duties which they prescribe to themselves, since they hinder them from serving him; they cannot forbear preferring their Imagination to their Understanding, and from submitting rather to certain Confused Sentiments which frighten and plunge them into Error, than to the Evidence of Rea∣son, which gives them Assurance, and leads them again into the right way to Heaven.

We meet often with a great deal of Charity and Virtue in Persons that are afflicted with Scruples; but there is not near so much in those that are addicted to some Superstitions, and who imploy themselves chiefly about some Judaick or Pharisaick Practices. God will be ador'd in Spirit and in Truth; He is not satisfied with Gestures and External Civilities, as kneel∣ing in his Presence, and being Praised by the Motion of the Lips, when the Heart has no share in it. Men indeed are satisfied with those Marks of Respect, but 'tis because they cannot search into the Heart; for even Men would be serv'd in Spirit and in Truth. God requires our Mind and our Heart; he has only made it for himself, and he only preserves it for him∣self: But there are many People, who unfortunately for themselves refuse him those things, over which he has absolute Right. They harbour Idols in their Hearts, which they adore in Spirit and in Truth, and to whom they Sacrifice themselves. But whereas the True God threatens them in the Secret of their Con∣sciences, with an Eternity of Torments to punish the Excess of their Ingratitude; yet they will not quit their Idolatry; they bethink themselves of performing some good Works externally: They Fast like others, they give Alms, they say Prayers, they continue for some time in the like Exercises; and whereas they are troublesom to those that want Charity, they leave them commonly to imbrace certain little Practices or easie Devotions, which agreeing with Self-Love, ne∣cessarily and insensibly overthrows all the Morals of Jesus Christ. They are Faithful, Earnest and Zealous Defenders of those Humane Traditions, which Igno∣rant Persons perswade them to be very Useful, and such things as the Idea of Eternity that frightens them, does continually represent, they eagerly defend, as absolutely necessary for their Salvation.

It is not so with the Just: They hear the Threat∣nings of their God, as well as the Impious; but the confused Noise of their Passions, does not hinder them from hearkning to his Counsels. The false Rays of Humane Tradition do not blind them so far, as to

make them Insensible of the Light of Truth. They put their Confidence in the Promises of Jesus Christ, and they follow his Councils; for they know that the Promises of Men are as Vain as their Counsels. Nevertheless we may say, That that Fear which the Idea of Eternity creates in their Mind, produces sometimes so great a Disorder in their Imagination, that they dare not absolutely Condemn those Humane Traditions; and that sometimes they approve them by their Example, because they have some Appearance of Wisdom in their Superstition, and in their False Humi∣lity; like those Pharisaical Traditions mentioned by St. Paul. * 1.32

But that which is particularly worthy of Considera∣tion, and which does not so much relate to the Cor∣ruption of Manners, as to the Disorder of the Mind, is, That the Fear we have before mentioned, extends to the Faith, as well as the Zeal, of those that are affected with it; even to Things that are False, and Unworthy the Holiness of our Religion. There are many People who do believe, and that with an Ob∣stinate Faith, That the Earth is Immovable in the Center of the World: That Animals are Sensible of real Pain: That there are Forms or Accidents really distinct from Matter: And a World of the like False or Uncertain Opinions, because they fancy that they should oppose the Faith in denying it. They are frighten'd by the Expressions of the Holy Bible, which speaks to our Capacity, and consequently makes use of the common Manner of Speaking, without any Design to Instruct us in Natural Philosophy. They do not only believe what the Spirit of God will teach them, but also all the Opinions of the Jews. They do not see, for Example, that Joshua speaks before his Soldiers, as Copernicus himself, Galileus and Descartes would speak to the Vulgar part of Mankind; and that though he had been of the Opinion of these last Philosophers, he would not have commanded the Earth to stand still, because he could not have made his Army Sensible, by unintelligible words, of the Miracle which God perform'd for his People. Those

who are of Opinion that the Sun is Immovable, never∣theless tell their Servants, their Friends, and even those that are of their Opinion, that the Sun Rises or Sets: They always speak like other Men, when their Principal Design is not to Philosophise. Did Joshua perfectly understand Astronomy; or if he did, did his Souldiers understand it? Or if both he and his Souldiers were skill'd in it, can any body think that they design'd to Philosophise while they only thought of Fighting? Therefore Joshua spoke as he ought to do, although both he and his Souldiers had believ'd what the most Eminent Astronomers believe at this time. Nevertheless those words of that great Captain, Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and what is said afterwards, that the Sun stood still according to his Command, perswade many People, that the Opinion of the Motion of the Earth, is not only a dangerous Opinion, but that it is also absolutely Heretical, and not to be maintain'd. They have heard that some Pious Persons, for whom we ought to have a great deal of Respect and Deference, condemn'd that Opi∣nion. They have a confused Knowledge of some∣thing that happen'd upon that Subject to a Famous Astronomer of our Age, and that seems sufficient for them to believe Obstinately, that Faith extends even to that Opinion. A certain confus'd Sentiment, excited and entertain'd by a Motion of Fear, which they hardly perceive, makes them harbour Diffidences against those that follow Reason in things which relate to Reason. They look upon them as Hereticks: They are Uneasie and Troubled whenever they hear them speak; and their Secret Apprehensions create in their Minds the same Respect, and the same Sub∣mission for their own vulgar Opinions, and for many other Notions of Philosophy, as for Truths which are the Objects of Faith.

CHAP. XIII.

I. Of the Third Natural Inclination, which is the Friendship we have for other Men.

II. It Induces us to approve our Friends Thoughts, and to de∣ceive them by False Praises.

OF all our Inclinations taken in General, and in the Sense I have explain'd it in the first Chapter, there only remains that which we have for those we Live with, and for all the Objects that are about us; of which I shall hardly say any thing, because that relates more to Morality and Policy, than to our Sub∣ject. As that Inclination is always joyn'd with the Passions, it would perhaps be sitter to speak of it in the following Book: But Order is not of so much Consequence in that Point.

In order rightly to apprehend the Causes and Effects of that Natural Inclination, * 1.33 it is fit to know that God Loves all his Works, and that he Unites them strictly one to another for their Mutual Preservation. For con∣tinually loving the Works he produces, since they are produc'd by his Love, he also continually Imprints in our Hearts a Love for his Works, since he continually produces a Love in our Hearts like unto his. And to the end the Natural Love we have for our selves may not Annihilate it self, and overmuch weaken that which we have for the Things that are not in us: And on the contrary, That those two Loves which God puts in us, may maintain and strengthen each other, he has united us in such a manner to all things that are about us, and particularly with the Beings of the same Species with us, that their Sufferings Afflict us Naturally, their Joy Rejoyces us, and their Gran∣deur, their Fall, their Diminution, seems to Augment or to diminish our own Being. The new Dignities of our Relations and Friends, the new Acquisitions of those that have most relation to us, the Conquests and

Victories of our Prince, and even the new Discoveries of the new World, seem to add something to our Sub∣sistance. Being united to all these things, we rejoyce at their Grandeur and Extension; we could even wish that this World had no Limits; and that thought of some Philosophers, that the Works of God have no Bounds, does not only seem worthy of God, but also very agreeable to Man, who feels a Secret Joy at his being a part of Infinity, because as little as he is in himself, he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite, by defusing himself into the Infinite Beings that are about him.

It is true, that the Union which we have with all the Bodies that move in those great Spaces, is not very strict, and therefore it is not Sensible to most Men: And there are some who matter the new Discoveries that are made in the Heavens so little, that one might believe they are no-wise united to it by Nature; if it were not known that it is either for want of Know∣ledge, or because they are too much engag'd to other things.

The Soul, though united to the Body it Animates, does not always feel the Motions of it; or if it does, it does not always apply it self to them. The Passion which moves it, being sometimes greater than the Sen∣sations which affects it, it seems to be more powerfully engag'd to the Object of its Passion than to its own Body: For it is principally by the Passions that the Soul defuses it self upon External Objects, that it feels it is really united to every thing about it; as it is chiefly by Sensation that it defuses it self in its own Body, and is Sensible that it is united to all the Parts that Compose it. But whereas one cannot conclude that the Soul of a Passionate Person is not united to his Body, because he is prodigal of his Life, and takes no Care for the Preservation of it: So there is no reason to imagine, that we are not naturally engag'd to all things, because there are some for which we are not concern'd.

Would you for Example know, whether Men are united to their Prince, or their Country? Seek out

some who understand their Interest, and have no parti∣cular Affairs to take up their Mind: Then you will see how Earnest they are for News, their Disquiet for Battles, their Joy for Victories, their Affliction in Defeats: There you will clearly see, that Men are strictly united to their Prince and their Country.

In like manner, Would you know whether Men are united to China, Japan, or the Planets and fix'd Stars? Seek out some, or else imagine some, whose Country and Family enjoy a profound Peace, that have no particular Passions, and that do not actually feel the Union that unites them to things that are nearer us than the Heavens; and you will find, that if they have any Knowledge of the Greatness and Nature of those Stars, they will rejoyce at the Discovery of any of them; they will consider them with Pleasure; and if they are Ingenious, they will willingly take the Trouble to observe and Calculate their Motions.

Those who are busied with Assairs, seldom mind whether any Comet appears, or whether there is an Eclipse: But those who are not so closely united to the things that are near them, are very fond of these sort of Events; because there is nothing to which we are not united, though we do not always feel it; as we do not always feel that our Soul is united, I do not say to our Arm, or to our Hand, but to our Heart, and to our Brain.

The strongest Natural Union which God has put between us and his Works, is that which united us with those Men we live with: God has commanded us to Love them like our selves; and that the Love of Choice, by which we love them, may be Firm and Constant, he upholds and strengthens it continually, by a Natural Love which he imprints in us. In order thereunto he has laid upon us some Invisible Tyes which necessarily oblige us to Love them; to watch their Preservation like our own; to look upon them as necessary parts to the whole which we compose with them, and without which we cannot Subsist.

There is nothing more Admirable than those Na∣tural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclina∣tions

of the Minds of Men, between the Motions of their Bodies, and between these Inclinations and Mo∣tions. All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can never be sufficiently admir'd, and which can never be apprehended: At the sight of any Pain which Sur∣prises, or that is felt, for example, we cry out; that Cry which often comes out before we are aware of it, by the Disposition of the Machine, Infallibly strikes the Ears of those that are near enough to afford us the Assistance we stand in need of: It penetrates through them, and makes it self understood to People of all Nations, and of all Qualities whatever; for that Cry is of all Languages and of all Qualities, as indeed it ought to be: It moves the Brain, and in a Moment changes the whole Disposition of the Body of those that are struck by it: Morcover, it makes them run to assist before they are aware of it: But it is not long without acting upon the Mind, and without obliging them to be willing to relieve them, and of thinking of Means to secure those that have made that Natural Prayer; provided always the said Prayer, or rather this pressing Command be Just and according to the Rules of Society: For an Indiscreet Cry, made with∣out a Cause, or out of a vain Fear, produces Indigna∣tion and Scorn in the Assistants, instead of Compassion, because in crying without a cause, we abuse things establish'd by Nature for our Preservation. That In∣discreet Cry naturally produces Aversion, and the Desire of revenging the Abuse that has been offer'd to Nature, I mean to the Order of things, provided he that made it, did it voluntarily: But it ought only to produce the Passion of Laughter, mix'd with some Com∣passion, without Aversion and a Desire of Revenge; when it proceeds from Fear, that is, from a false Appearance of a pressing Necessity, which has induced any one to cry out: For Laughter or Jest is necessary to repel their Fear, and to correct them; and Com∣passion is necessary to Succor them as Weak: It is impossible to conceive any thing better order'd.

I do not pretend to explain by Example, which are the Springs, and the Relations which the Author of

Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all Animals, to maintain the Consent and Union which is necessary for their Preservation. I only make some Reflections upon those Springs that People may think upon them, and may carefully inquire, not how those Springs move, nor how their Motion is communicated by the Air, by the Light, and by all the little Bodies that surround us, for that is almost Incomprehensible and is not necessary, but at least to know what are the Effects of it: One may by different Observations, discover the Bonds that unite us one to another, but it is impossible to know how that is done: We easily see how a Watch points out the Hour; but it requires time to discover the Reasons of it; and there are so many different Springs in the Brain of the least Animal, that nothing can equal it in the most studied Machines.

If it is not possible perfectly to apprehend the Springs of our Machine, neither is it absolutely ne∣cessary; but it is absolutely necessary in order to govern our selves, to know the Effects which those Springs are capable of producing in us. It is not ne∣cessary to know how a Watch is made to use it; but if Men will use it, to regulate their time, it is at least necessary to know that it points at the hours. Nevertheless there are some so little capable of Re∣flection, that one might almost compare them to in∣animated Machines; they do not feel in themselves the Springs which slacken at the sight of Objects; they are often agitated without perceiving their own Motions; they are Slaves without feeling their Bonds: Finally, They are guided a Thousand different ways, without knowing the Hand of him that guides them: They think themselves the only Authors of all their Motions; and not distinguishing what passes within them, as a Consequence of a Free Act of their Will, from that which is produced there by the Impression of the Bodies which are about them, they think they guide themselves while they are guided by some other. But this is not a proper place to explain these things.

The Relations which the Author of Nature has put between our Natural Inclinations, in order to Unite us together, seems yet more worthy of our Application and Enquiries, than those that are between Bodies, or between Minds in relation to Bodies. For all things are regulated there in such a manner, that the In∣clinations which seem to be most opposite to Society, are the most useful, when they are somewhat moderated.

The desire, for Instance, which all Men have for Grandeur, tends to the Dissolution of all Societies. Nevertheless, that desire is temper'd in such a man∣ner, by the Order of Nature, that it serves more for the good of the Publick, than many other feeble Languishing Inclinations. For it gives Emulation, it Excites Men to Vertue, it Buoyes up their Cou∣rage in the Services they do their Country; and so many Victories would not be won, did not Soldiers, and particularly Officers aspire to Glory, and to Im∣ployments. Thus all those who Compose Armies, designing only their own Interest, do notwithstand∣ing procure the Good of their Country. Which shews, that it is very advantageous for the Publick Good, that all Men should have a secret desire of Grandeur, provided it be moderated.

But should all private Persons appear to be what they really are; should they freely tell others that they de∣sign to be the principal Parts or Members of the Body they Compose, and never to be the least, it would not be the way to Unite them together. All the Members of a Body cannot be the Head and Heart of it: There must be Feet and Hands, little ones as well as great ones, Men to Obey as well as to Command; and should every Body say openly, that they will Com∣mand and never Obey, as indeed every Body wishes Naturally, it is visible that all Bodies Politick would destroy themselves, and Disorder and Injustice would Reign every where.

Therefore it was necessary, that those who have most Sense, and are the fittest to become the Noble Parts of that Body, and to Command the rest, should be Naturally Civil; that is, they should be in∣duc'd

by a secret Inclination, to shew others by their Behaviour, and Affable and Gentile Expressions, that they think themselves unworthy of being thought on, and that they believe they are the least of Men: But that those they speak to are worthy of all sorts of Ho∣nours, and that they have a great Esteem and Vene∣ration for them. In fine, to supply the defect of Cha∣rity, and the Love of Order, it has been necessary that those who Command others, should have the Art of deceiving 'em by an Imaginary Humiliation, which only consists in Civilities and Words, in order to enjoy that preheminence without Envy which is necessary in the whole Body. For thus all Men do in some mea∣sure possess the Grandeur they desire: The great ones possess it in reality, * 1.34 and the little ones, and the weak only possess it in Imagination; being perswaded in some measure by the Compliments of others, that they are not look'd upon as they are, that is, as the least of Men.

It is easie to conclude by the by, from what we have said, That it is a great Breach of Civility to speak often of ones self, especially, advantageously, though one did possess all sorts of good Qualifications; since it is not allowable to speak to those we Converse with as if we were above them, unless it be on certain oc∣casions, and when there are External and Sensible Cha∣racters which Elevate us above them. For Contempt is the greatest of all Injuries: It is that which is most capable of destroying Society; and we must not ex∣pect, that a Man to whom we have given a hint, that we look upon him to be below us, will ever join with us, because Men cannot endure to be thought the meanest part of the Body they Compose.

The Inclination of Men for Compliments, is there∣fore very proper to Counterpoise that which they have for Esteem and Preferment, and to soften the Internal Pain which those feel that are the meanest parts of the Body Politick; and it is most certain, that the mix∣ture of those two Inclinations does produce very good Effects to maintain Society.

But there is a strange Corruption in those Inclina∣tions, as well as in the Friendship, Compassion and Good Will of the others, which tend to Unite Men together. That which ought to maintain Civil Socie∣ty, often causes the Communication and Establishment of Error.

Of all the Inclinations that are necessary for Civil Society, * 1.35 those which throw us most into Error are Friendship, Favour, Gratitude, and all the other In∣clinations which induce us to speak too advantageously of others when they are present.

We do not limit our Love to the Persons of our Friends, but we also Love whatever does any way be∣long to them: And as they commonly express some Passion in the Defence of their Opinions, they insensi∣bly incline us to believe them, to approve them, and even to defend them with more Obstinacy and Passion than they do themselves: Because it would often look ill in them to maintain their own Opinions with Heat; But no Body can find fault with us if we defend them, In them it would be Self-Love, in us 'tis Generosity.

We have an Affection for other Men upon several accounts; for they may please and serve us in several ways. The resemblance of Humours, of Inclinations, of Imployments; their Air, their Behaviour, their Virtue, their Estate, the Affection or Esteem they ex∣press for us, the Services they have done us, or that we expect from them, and several other particular reasons, do determin us to Love them. Therefore when any of our Friends, I mean some Person that has the same Inclinations that appears well, that speaks agreeably, whom we think Virtuous, or of great Quality, who expresses an Affection and Esteem for us, that has done us some Service, or from whom we ex∣pect any; or finally, whom we Love for some other particular reason: If any such Person, I say, chances to advance some Proposition, we suffer our selves strait to be perswaded by them, without consulting our Reason. We maintain his Opinion without ex∣amining whether it be Consonant to Truth, and often

even contrary to our own Conscience, according to the Obscurity and Confusion of our Mind, according to the Corruption of our Heart, and according to the advantage we expect to derive from our false Gene∣rosity.

It is not necessary to bring particular Examples of those things in this place; for People are seldom an hour in any Company without observing several, if they will reflect a little upon them. Favours and Laughters, according to the old saying, do but seldom side with Truth; but almost always with those they Love. He that speaks is Obliging and Civil: There∣fore he is in the right. If what he says is barely like∣ly, it is look'd upon as True; and if what he urges, is absolutely ridiculous and impertinent, it will at least become very probable. If it is a Man that Loves me, who has an Esteem for me, who has done me some Service, and is desirous and capable of doing me more, who has maintain'd my Opinion on other Oc∣casions, I should be ungratesul and imprudent in op∣posing his, or even in failing to applaud him. Thus Truth is abus'd, and is made subservient to Interest; and thus we embrace each others false Opinions.

An honest Man can never be offended when any one that instructs and informs him, provided it be done ac∣cording to the Rules of Civility: And when our Friends take Offence at our representing modestly to them, that they are deceiv'd, we must allow them to Love themselves and their Errors; since they will have it so, and because we have not the Power to Command them, nor to change their Mind.

But a real Friend must never approve the Errors of his Friend. For we ought to consider, that we do them more harm than we are aware of, when we in∣judiciously defend their Opinions. Our Applauses swell their Hearts, and confirm their Errors; they be∣come Incorrigible; they Act and Decide as if they were become Infallible.

Whence comes it that the Richest, the most Power∣ful, the Noblest, and generally all those that are Ele∣vated

above others, think themselves very often In∣fallible; and behave themselves as if they had a great deal more Reason than those that are of a mean and low Condition, unless it be because all their thoughts are indifferently and basely approv'd? So the Appro∣bation we give our Friends, perswades them by de∣grees that they have more Sense than others; which makes them Proud, Bold, Imprudent, and capable of falling into the present Errors without perceiving it.

Therefore our Enemies are often kinder to us, and inform our Understanding more by their Oppositions, than our Friends by their Approbations; because our Enemies oblige us to stand upon our Guard, and to be Attentive to what we urge; which alone is capable to make us sensible of our Errors. But our Friends Lull us asleep, and gives us a false Confidence, which makes us vain and ignorant. Men therefore must never ad∣mire their Friends, and submit to their Sentiments out of kindness, as they must never oppose those of their Enemies out of Malice, but must lay aside the Spirit of Flattery or Contradiction to become sincere, and approve Evidence and Truth where-ever they find it.

We ought also to be fully perswaded, that most Men are inclin'd to Flatter and Compliment us, out of a kind of Natural Inclination, to appear Witty, to gain the good Will of others, and in hopes of some return; or finally, out of a kind of Scorn and Rail∣lery; and we ought never to suffer our selves to be impos'd upon, by whatever can be said to us. Do we not daily see that Persons who know not each other, nevertheless extol one another to the Skies, the very first time they see and speak to one another? And what is more common than to see some who give hy∣perbolical praises, and express extraordinary motions of admiration to a Person that has spoken in publick; even in the presence of those with whom they have laugh'd at him a little before. Whenever People Cry out, and grow Pale with admiration, and seem as it were astonish'd at what they hear, it is not a good proof that he that speaks says Wonders; but rather

that he speaks to Flatterers, that he has Friends, or perhaps Enemies who Laugh at him. It is because he speaks in an engaging Way, that he is Rich and Pow∣erful, or if you will have it so, it is a pretty good proof that what he says is grounded upon the Con∣fused and Obscure Notions of the Senses, but very moving and very agreeable, or that he has a Lively Imagination, since praises are given to Friendship, Riches, Dignities, Probabilities, and very seldom to Truth.

It may be expected perhaps, that having treated in general of the Inclinations of the Mind, I should de∣scend to an exact Account of all the particular Moti∣ons they resent at the sight of Good and Evil, viz. That I should explain the Nature of Love, Hatred, Joy and Sadness, and of all Intellectual Passions both general and particular, as well Simple as Compound∣ed. But I have not engag'd to Explain all the diffe∣rent motions the Mind is capable of.

I am willing it should be known that my principal Design in all that I have written hitherto about a Search after Truth, has been to make Men sensible of their Weakness and Ignorance; and that we are all liable to Error and Sin. I have said it, and say it again, perhaps some will remember it: My Design never was to give a particular Account of the Nature of the Mind: But I have been oblig'd to say some∣thing about it, to explain Errors in their Original, and in order; in a word, to make my self more Intelligi∣ble: And if I have gone beyond the Bounds I had pro∣pos'd, it is because I thought I had some new things to say, which seem'd to me of Consequence, and which I thought might be read with Pleasure. Per∣haps I was mistaken; but that presumption was ne∣cessary to encourage me to write them. For how can one speak, without hopes of being hearken'd un∣to? The Truth is, I have said many things which do not seem to belong so much to the Subject I am treat∣ing of, as that particular of the Motions of the Soul: I own it, but it is not my Intention to oblige my self

to any thing, when I prescribe a Method to my self. I lay down a Rule to guide me, but I reserve to my self the power of turning aside from it as I walk, if I meet with any thing that deserves to be consider'd. I may leave the way sometimes to rest my self, pro∣vided I do not lose my self. Those who have not a Mind to stop with me, may go on, if they please, 'tis but turning over the Leaf: But if they are offended at it, let them know there are many who believe those places which I have pitch'd upon to rest in, make them find the Way the easier and more delightful.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. It's ne∣cessary the Mind have Inclinati∣ons, as well as the Body Notions.
• * 1.2

  II. The Principal End of the Actions of God is him∣self, and he only acts Mens Minds for himself.
• * 1.3

  III. Human Minds are meerly prone to particular Good, through the Ten∣dency they have to Good in General.
• * 1.4

  IV. The Source of the Chief Natural Inclinati∣ons, which will make up the Di∣vision of this fourth Book.
• * 1.5

  I. The In∣clination for Good in General, is the Princi∣ple of the Disquiet of our Will.
• * 1.6

  II. And con∣sequently of our Ne∣gligence and Igno∣rance.
• * 1.7

  III. First Example, Morality little known a∣mong many Men.
• * 1.8

  Serm. 39. De Natali Domini.
• * 1.9

  IV. Second Example, The Immor∣tality of the Soul, disputed by some Per∣sons.
• * 1.10

  V That our Ignorance is exceed∣ing great in respect of abstract∣ed things, or such as have but little rela∣tion to us.
• * 1.11

  I. Curiosity is natural and neces∣sary.
• * 1.12

  II. Three Rules to moderate Curiosity.
• * 1.13

  II. Parti∣cular ex∣planation of the first of those Rules.
• * 1.14

  Quis tam Stulte cu∣riosus est qui filium suum mit∣tat in Scho∣lam, ut quid Ma∣gister cogi∣tet discat? Aug. de Magistro.
• * 1.15

  I. Second Rule of Curlosity.
• * 1.16

  II. Third Rule of Curiosity.
• * 1.17

  Chap. 6. to Tim.
• * 1.18

  I. Of the Second Na∣tural In∣clination, or of Self-Love.
• * 1.19

  II. Self-love is divided into the Love of our Being and Well-being, or of Great∣ness and Pleasure.
• * 1.20

  I. Of the Inclinati∣on we have for all that raises us a∣bove other Persons.
• * 1.21

  II. Of the false Judg∣ments of some Pious Persons.
• * 1.22

  III. Of the false Judg∣ments of the Super∣stitious and Hypocrites.
• * 1.23

  Voetius.
• * 1.24

  I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned.
• * 1.25

  II. Of the Conversa∣tions of pretenders to Learning
• * 1.26

  III. Of the Books of Pretenders to Learn∣ing.
• * 1.27

  I. We must shun Plea∣surethough it make u•• Happy.
• * 1.28

  II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible De∣lights.
• * 1.29

  I. How it hinders us from dis∣covering Truth.
• * 1.30

  II. Some Examples.
• * 1.31

  I speak ac∣cording to the Com∣mon Opini∣on, which is, that the Chicken is form'd from the Egg, tho perhaps it only re∣ceives its Nutriment from it.
• * 1.32

  Col. 2.22, 23.
• * 1.33

  I. Of the Third Na∣tural In∣clination, which is the Friend∣ship we have for other Men.
• * 1.34

  I speak as a Man; for the true Grandeur of the Earth does not consist in a turn of imagi∣nation.
• * 1.35

  II. That In∣clination induces us to ap∣prove the thoughts of our Friends, and to de∣ceive them by false Praises.