Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. VI.

I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons.

II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons.

III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypo∣crites.

IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes.

WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect, as Science and Virtue; * 1.1 or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful, as Dignities and Riches, seem in some mea∣sure to make us Independent. All those that are be∣neath us, have a Respect for us and fear us; they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preser∣vation; and they dare neither Prejudice us, nor op∣pose our Desires. Therefore Men constantly endea∣vour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others. For they never consider that both their Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God above, and not on Men; and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy, does not con∣sist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men, as Weak and as Miserable as them∣selves; but in an humble Submission to the Will of God, who being Just, will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed.

But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Vertue, Dignities and Riches; they also use their utmost Efforts, in order to persuade others that they do really possess them. And if it may be said, that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so; it may also be said, that they often take less care to be Virtuous, than to appear so: For as the Author of the Book Entituled, Reflectiones Morales, fays agreeably, Virtue would not go far, unless it were accom∣panied with Vanity.

The Reputation of being Rich, Learned and Vir∣tuous, produces in the Imagination of those that are about us, or that are more nearly related to us, very convenient Dispositions for us: It makes them fall at our Feet; it makes them act in our Favour; it In∣spires them with all the Motions that tend to the Pre∣servation of our Being, and to the Increase of our Grandeur. Thus Men preserve their Reputation, as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World.

All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue, Learn∣ing, Dignities and Riches, and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages. We will now endeavour to show by some Examples, how those Inclinations may engage them into Error. Let us begin by the Inclina∣tion that Men have for Virtue, or for the Appearance of Virtue.

Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous, commonly imploy their Mind and Time to understand Religion, and to exercise themselves in good Works: They only desire with St. Paul, to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified, to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature. They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly, and to know their Duty; after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness. And there∣fore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences, which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation.

No Fault can be found with that Conduct, it is In∣finitely to be valued; * 1.2 Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly; and they often repent their not having followed it more. But this is un∣approvable, that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane, very Certain and Useful, which disingage the Mind from Sensible Things, and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel; some Pious Persons, without having examin'd them, con∣demn them too freely, either as being Useless, or Un∣certain.

It is true, that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless: Men are partly in the right, to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use. No body is oblig'd to study them; and it is better to despise them, than to suffer ones self to be deceiv'd or blinded by them. Nevertheless we may affirm, That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths: The Universal Knowledge, or the Existence of a God, is absolutely necessary, since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God. It is necessary to know, that it is his Will which makes, and which regulates Nature; That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will: In a word, That all things whatever depend on God.

It is also necessary to know what Truth is, the means to distinguish it from Error, the Distinction be∣tween the Mind and Body, the Consequences that may be drawn from it, as the Immortality of the Soul, and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty.

The Knowledge of Man, or of ones self, is a Science that cannot be reasonably despis'd; it contains a World of things which are absolutely necessary to be known to have some Justness and Penetration of Mind: And we may say, That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infi∣nitely above Matter, because he knows that he is, which Matter does not know; those who know Man, are far above Stupid Ignorant Persons, by reason that they know what they are, which the others do not know.

But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable, because it raises us above others; it is much more so, because it humbles us before God. That Know∣ledge makes us perfectly Sensible of the Dependence we have on him in all things, and even in our most common Actions: It plainly discovers the Corruption of our Nature: It disposes us to apply our selves to him who alone can cure us; to rely wholly on him, and not to trust or rely on our selves: And thus it gives many Dispositions of Mind, which are

very proper to submit our selves to the Grace of the Gospel.

We ought at least to have a Superficial Tincture, and a general Knowledge of the Mathematicks and of Nature. We ought to learn those Sciences in our Youth; they disingage the Mind from Sensible Things, and hinder it from becoming Weak and Effeminate: They are useful enough in Life; they incline us towards God; the Knowledge of Nature does it of it self; and that of the Mathematicks by the Disgust it Inspires in us of the False Impressions of our Senses.

Virtuous Persons must not despise those Sciences, nor look upon them as Uncertain and Useless, unless they are certain that they have studied them enough to judge Solidly of them: There are many others which they may boldly Despise; Let them Condemn the Poets to the Flames, Heathen Philosophers, Rabbies, some Historians, and a great Number of Authors, which make the Pride and Knowledge of some of the Learned; we shall be little troubled at it. But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature, as being contrary to Religion; since Nature being regulated by the Will of God, the true Knowledge of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power, Grandeur and Wisdom of God. For it seems that God has form'd the Universe in order, that we should Study it, and that by that Study we should learn to Know and to Respect the Author of it. So that those who Condemn the Study of Nature, seem to oppose the Will of God; unless they pretend that Sin has rendred Man Incapable of that Study. It is also Vain for them to tell us, That the Knowledge of Men only serves to make them Proud and Vain, because those who have the Reputation of having a perfect Knowledge of Man, though they often know him Ill, are commonly Intolerably Proud: For it is evident, That no Man can know himself well, without being Sensible of his Weakness and Miseries.

Neither are they Persons of a real and solid Piety, that usually condemn what they do not understand; * 1.3 but rather Superstitious and Hypocrites. The Super∣stitious out of a servile Fear, and through a baseness and weakness of Mind are startled at the sight of a lively penetrating Wit. Do but, for Example, give them Natural Reasons for Thunder, and for its Ef∣fects, and they look upon you strait as an Atheist. But the Hypocrites out of a Hellish Malice, transform themselves into Angels of Light. They make use of the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenc'd by all the World to oppose Truths, which are but little known, and little valu'd, out of private Interest. They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth; and often in their Hearts, Laugh at what all the World Respects; they establish in the Opinion of Men, a Reputation, which is so much the more solid and to be fear'd, as the thing they abuse is the more Sacred.

Therefore those Persons are the strongest, and most formidable Enemies of Truth. Indeed, they are pretty rare, but a small number of them is capable of doing a great deal of harm. The appearance of Truth and of Virtue, often does more mischief, than Truth and Virtue do good; for one cunning Hypocrite is capable to overthrow what several truly Wise and Virtuous Persons have rais'd with a great deal of Pain and Labour.

Monsieur Descartes, for instance, has demonstrative∣ly prov'd the Existence of a God, the Immortality of our Souls, several other Metaphysical Questions, a great number of Physical Ones; and this Age is infi∣nitely oblig'd to him for the Truths he has discover'd. Yet here starts up an * 1.4 inconsiderable Man, a hot and vehement Exclaimer, respected by some People for the Zeal he expresses for their Religion: He Writes Inju∣rious Books against him, and accuses him of the high∣est Crimes. Descartes is a Catholick, he has studied under the Jesuits; he has often mention'd them with Re∣verence. That is sufficient for that malicious Man to perswade People that are Enemies to our Religion,

and easily mov'd in matters so Nice as those of Religion, that he is an Emissary of the Jesuits, and has dange∣rous Designs: Because the least appearances of Truth upon matters of Faith, have more Force upon Peoples Minds, than real and effective Truths of Physical or Meraphysical things have, which are little valu'd. Monsieur Descartes has written about the Existence of God. That is matter enough for that Calumniator to exercise his false Zeal upon, and to oppose all the Truths his Enemy defends. He accuses him of being an Atheist, and of teaching Atheism cunningly and se∣cretly, like that infamous Atheist call'd Vanino, who was Burnt at Thoulouse; who Cloak'd his Malice and Impiety by Writing for the Existence of a God; for one of the Reasons urg'd by him to prove his Enemy an Atheist, is, That he did Write against Atheists, as Vanino did, in order to cover his Impiety.

Thus it is easie for a Man to oppress Truth, when he is seconded by the appearances of Truth, and has acquir'd a great Ascendent over weak Minds. Truth delights in Mildness, and in Peace; and as strong as it is, it yields sometimes to the Pride and Haughtiness of Falshoods, which Dresses and Arms it self with her Appearances. Truth is very sensible that Error can never harm it; and if it remains sometimes as if it were prescrib'd and in Obscurity, it is only to wait for more favourable occasions to show its self; for at last it appears, for the most part, stronger and brighter than ever, in the very place where it is oppress'd.

I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monsieur Descar∣tes, that a Man of a different Religion from his, that an Ambitious Man, who design'd to rise upon the Ruins of Persons that are above him, that a Railer without Judgment, that Voetius should speak with Contempt of what he neither did, nor could under∣stand. But I am surpris'd to find, that Persons who are neither Enemies to Monsieur Descartes, nor to his Religion, should entertain Sentiments of Aversion and Contempt against him, upon the account of the Ca∣lumnies they have read in Books written by the Ene∣mies of his Person, and of his Religion.

The Book written by that Heretick intitled, Despe∣rata causa Papatus, sufficiently shews his Impudence, his Ignorance, and his Passion, and his desire to appear Zealous, in order thereby to acquire some Reputation among those of his Party. Therefore he is not a Man to be credited upon his Word. For as there is no reason to believe all the Fables he has Collected in that Book against our Religion, so neither is there any to Credit the Injurious Accusations he has invented against his Enemy.

Rational Men will not suffer themselves to be per∣swaded, that Monsieur Descartes is a dangerous Man, because they have read 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in some Book or other, or because they have been 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so by Persons, whose Pie∣ty they have a Respect for. It is not lawful to believe Men upon their b••re Word, when they accuse others of the most Enormous Crimes. It is not a sufficient proof to believe a thing, because we hear it affirm'd by a Man who speaks with Zeal and Gravity. For it is impossible for any Person to relate Falsities, and Foolish Stories, in the same manner as he would relate good things, particularly if he has suffer'd himself to be impos'd upon out of Simplicity and Weakness.

It is easie to discover the Truth or Falsity of the Accusations that are form'd against Descartes; his Writings are Extant, and easie to be understood, by those that are capable of Attention. Therefore I would advise People to Read his Works, in order to get better Proofs against him than bare Report, and I do not question but after they have read and exa∣min'd them, they will no longer Accuse him of Atheism; and that on the contrary, they will pay him the Respect that is due to a Man, who has plainly and evidently demonstrated, not only the Existence of a God, and the Immortality of the Soul, but also a World of other Truths, which were unknown until his time.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. Of the Inclinati∣on we have for all that raises us a∣bove other Persons.
• * 1.2

  II. Of the false Judg∣ments of some Pious Persons.
• * 1.3

  III. Of the false Judg∣ments of the Super∣stitious and Hypocrites.
• * 1.4

  Voetius.