Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. IV.

A Continuation of the same Subject.

I. Explana∣tion of the Second Rule of Curiosity.

II. Expla∣nation of the Third.

THE Second Rule that must be observ'd, is, * 1.1 That Novelty must never serve as a Reason to believe that things are True. We have already said several times, that Men must not rest in Error, and in the False Felicities they enjoy: That it is necessary they should Search after the Evidence of Truth, and the real Felicity they do not possess; and consequently that they should look after such things as are New and Extraordinary. But therefore it does not follow that they should always stick to them, nor believe, with∣out reason, that Opinions are True, because they are New; and that those are real Felicities which they have not as yet enjoy'd. Novelty should only induce them to examine new things with care; they must not despise them, because they do not know them; nor rashly believe that they contain what they wish and hope for.

But this often comes to pass: Men after having ex∣amin'd the Ancient and Common Opinions, have not discover'd the Light of Truth in them: After having had a Taste of the usual Felicities of the World, they have not found that Solid Satisfaction in them, which should accompany the Possession of a real Good: So that their Desires and their Eagerness are not allay'd by the usual Opinions and common Felicities. For which reason, when they hear any thing that is New and Extraordinary, the Idea of Novelty puts them in hopes at first, That it is the thing they are in Search of. And whereas it is Natural to Flatter our selves, and

to believe that Things are as we wish they might be; their Hopes increase proportionably to their Desires: And in fine, they Insensibly change into Imaginary Assurances. In the next place, They joyn the Idea of Novelty, and the Idea of Truth, so close together, that the one never offers it self without the other; and that which is most New, appears to them to be more True, and better than that which is more Usual and Common; in which they are very different from those, who out of Aversion to Heresie, have joyn'd the Idea of Novelty to that of False∣ness, imagining that all New Opinions are False and Dangerous.

Therefore we may say that this usual Disposition of the Mind, and of the Heart of Men, in relation to that which bears the Character of Novelty, is one of the most general Causes of Errors, for it seldom leads them to Truth; whenever it does, it is by Chance and good Luck: And finally, It always directs them from their real Happiness, by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and False Felicities that the World abounds with: And this is the most Dangerous Error into which they can fall.

The Third Rule against the Excessive Desires of Novelty is, * 1.2 That when we are certain that some Truths are so Mysterious, that it is Morally Impossible to discover them, and that some Felicities are so In∣considerable that they can never make us Happy, we ought not to suffer our selves to be Excited by the Novelty of them.

Every body may know by Faith, by Reason and Experience, that created Goods can never fill the In∣sinite Capacity of the Will. Faith teaches us, That all the Things of this World are only Vanity; and that our Happiness neither consists in Honours or Riches. Reason assures us, That since it is not in our Power to bound our Desires, and that we are Natu∣rally inclin'd to Love all Felicities, we can never be Happy, without Possessing that which Includes them all. Our own Experience makes us Sensible, that we are not Happy in the Possession of those Goods which

we do enjoy, since we still wish for more. Finally, We daily see that the Great Felicities which the most Powerful Princes and Kings enjoy on Earth, are not capable to satisfie their Desires; that they are even more Uneasie and more Unhappy than others; and that being Seated on the highest Spoke of the Wheel of Fortune, they are the more liable to be precipitated and shook by its Motion, than those that are under∣neath them, or nearer to the Center. For they never fall but from on high; their Wounds are always great; and all the Grandeur they are attended with, and which they annex to their own Being, serves only to Swell and Aggrandize them, to make them more Sensible of a greater number of Wounds, and expose them the more to the Strokes of Fortune.

So that Faith, Reason and Experience, convincing us that the Delights and Pleasures of the Earth, which we have not as yet tasted, could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them: We must be very care∣ful, according to that Third Rule, not to suffer our selves to be Foolishly Flatter'd with vain Hopes of Happiness, which increasing by degrees proportionably to our Passion and to our Desires, would change at last into a False Assurance: For when we have a Violent Passion for any Good, we always look upon it to be very great, and we perswade our selves Insensibly, that the Possession of it will make us Happy.

Therefore we must resist those Vain Desires, since our Endeavours to satisfie them would be in vain. But particularly, because that by abandoning our selves to our Passions, and by employing our time to gratifie them, we lose God and all things with him. We only wander from one False Felicity to another; We always live in False Hopes; We dissipate our Spirits, and are agitated a Thousand different ways; We meet Oppositions every where, because the Advan∣tages we seek for are desired by many, and cannot be possessed by many. For as St. Paul teaches us, * 1.3 Those that have a mind to grow Rich, fall into Temptations, and into a Snare of the Devil, and into divers useless per∣nicious

Desires, which precipitate Men into the Abyss of Perdition and Damnation; for Covetousness is the Root of all Evil.

And as we ought not to seek after the Goods of the World which are new, because we are assur'd that we shall not find the Happiness we look for; neither ought we to have the least Desire of knowing new Opinions upon a great number of difficult Questions, because we are inform'd, that the Mind of Man is not capable of discovering the Truth of them. Most of the Questions that are treated of in Morality, and particularly in Natural Philosophy, are of that kind; and therefore it behoves us to be very diffident of many Books that are daily written upon those Obscure Intricate Matters. For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain may be resolv'd, there are still so few Truths discover'd, and so many others to know, before we can come to those the said Books treat of, that we cannot read them without adven∣turing to lose considerably.

Yet Men do not regulate themselves thus, they do quite the contrary: They do not examine whether what is said to them is possible: Do but promise them extraordinary Things, as the Reparation of Natural Heat, of Radical Moisture, of Vital Spirits, or other things they do not understand, and you will straight excite their Vain Curiosity. It is sufficient in order to blind and to gain them to propose Paradoxes to them; to use obscure Words, Terms of Influence, and the Authority of some unknown Authors; or else to perform some very sensible and extraordinary Ex∣periment, although it has no manner of relation to the thing proposed, for it is enough to Surprise them, in order to Convince them.

If a Physician, a Chy••urgion, an Empirick, quote Passages in Greek and Latin, and make use of new and extraordinary Terms, they pass immediately for great Men; Men give them a Power over Life and Death; they are believ'd like Oracles; they fancy themselves far above the common Level of Mankind, and think they penetrate into the bottom of things. And when

some are so Indiscreet as to intimate, that they are not satisfied with five or six words which really signifie and prove nothing; they fancy that those People have not commom Sense, and that they deny first Prin∣ciples. And indeed the first Principles of those Men, are four or five Scraps of Latin out of some Author, or some Greek Passage, if they are better Scholars.

Moreover, It is necessary that Learned Physicians should sometimes speak a Language which their Patients do not understand, in order to gain some Reputation, and to be obey'd.

A Physician who only understands Latin, may be esteem'd in a Village; because Latin is both Greek and Arabick to Peasants: But unless a Physician can at least read Greek, to learn some of Hypocrates's Aphorisms, he must not expect to pass for a Learned Man in Cities where most People understand Latin. For which reason even the most Learned Physicians knowing this Humour of Men, are oblig'd to speak like Quacks and Illiterate Men; and one must not always judge of their Capacity and Sense, by what they say in their Visits.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. Second Rule of Curlosity.
• * 1.2

  II. Third Rule of Curiosity.
• * 1.3

  Chap. 6. to Tim.