Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. III.

I. Curiosity is natural and necessary.

II. Three Rules to moderate it.

III. Explanation of the first of these Rules.

AS long as Men have an Inclination for a Good which surpasses their Power, * 1.1 and do not possess it, they will have a secret propension for whatever looks new and extraordinary: They will ever run after such things as they have not as yet considered, in hopes of finding what they enquire after; and their Mind not being able to satisfie it self wholly without the enjoyment of that Good for which they are made; they will ever remain uneasie, and in a continual Agitation, until it appears to them in its Glory.

This disposition of Human Minds is certainly very suitable to their Condition; for it is infinitely better to be uneasie, and in search of the Happiness one does not possess, than to remain in a false Repose, and to be pleas'd with falshood, and a delusive Happiness,

wherewith Men are commonly deluded. We ought to have a sense of Truth, and of our Happiness: Therefore those Things that are new and extraordi∣nary must excite us: There is a certain kind of Cu∣riosity which is not only allowable, but absolutely ne∣cessary; for whereas common and ordinary things can never afford true Felicity, and the ancient Opinions of Philosophers are very uncertain: It is necessary we should be curious for New Discoveries, and always uneasie in the Enjoyment of common Felicities.

Should a Geometrician give us New Propositions contrary to those of Euclide, Should he undertake to prove, that that Science is full of Errors, as Hobbs en∣deavour'd to do in a Book, written against the Pride of Geometricians, I own that there would be no rea∣son to complain of that kind of Novelty; because, that when we have found out the Truth we ought to stick to it, since we are only endu'd with Curiosity in order to find it out? Neither are Geometricians often guilty of being Curious of New Opinions of Geome∣try. They would soon be tir'd with a Book contain∣ing nothing but Propositions contrary to those of Eu∣clide; for being fully convinc'd of the Truth of those Propositions by unanswerable Demonstrations, our Curiosity ceases in that Point: Which is an infallible Argument, that the only reason of the Inclination of Men after Novelty, is because they do not evidently see the Truth of those things they naturally desire to know, nor possess Infinite Felicity, which they are na∣turally desirous to possess.

Therefore it is necessary that Novelty should Excite Men, and that they should Love it: But however, * 1.2 there are Exceptions to be made, and they must ob∣serve certain Rules which it is easie to infer from what we have been saying, that the Inclination we have for Novelty is only given us in order to seek out Truth, and our real Felicity.

There are Three, the first of which is, That Men must not be fond of Novelty in things relating to Faith which are not submitted to Reason

The Second, That Novelty is not a sufficient Rea∣son to induce us to believe that things are Good or True: That is, We must not fancy that Opinions are true because they are new; nor that any thing can be capable to content us, because it is new or extraordi∣nary, or because we have not possess'd it before.

The Third, That when we are satisfy'd that Truths are so conceal'd that it is morally impossible to discover them, and that Benefits are so little, and so inconside∣rable that they cannot satisfie us, we must not suffer our selves to be excited by the Novelty of them, nor to be seduc'd by false hopes. But it is necessary to ex∣plain these Rules more at large; and shew how by a neglect of 'em we fall into an infinite number of Errors.

We often meet with Minds of very different Hu∣mours: * 1.3 Some believe every thing blindly: Others will never believe without seeing evidently. The first having hardly ever made any use of their Understand∣ing, do without considering, believe whatever is said to them; the others, who will trust to nothing but their Understanding, indifferently condemn all sorts of Au∣thorities. The first are commonly stupid and weak Persons, like Children and Women; the others are proud and profane Dispositions, like Hereticks and Philosophers.

It is very difficult to find Persons who keep a Me∣dium between those two Extreams, and who never look for Evidence in matters relating to Faith through a vain Agitation of Mind, or who sometimes believe false Opinions without Evidence, in things relating to Nature, through an indiscreet Deference, and low Submission of Mind. If they are Persons of Piety, who submit to the Authority of the Church in all things, their Faith extends sometimes, if I may use the Ex∣pression, even to Opinions that are meerly Philosophi∣cal; and they often look upon them with the same Respect as is only due to the Truths of Religion. A false Zeal makes them too easily condemn those that are not of their Opinion. They harbour injurious Suspicions against those that make New Discoveries.

It is sufficient to be esteem'd by them as Libertines, to deny that there are substantial Forms, that Animals are sensible of Pain and Pleasure, and other Philoso∣phical Opinions, which they look upon as Truth with∣out any evident Reason, only because they imagin there are necessary Relations between those Opinions and the Truths of Faith.

But if they are Persons that are too bold, their Pride induces them to despise the Authority of the Church; they never submit willingly to it. They delight in difficult rash Opinions: They affect to pass for migh∣ty Wits; and upon that account they speak of Divine Mysteries without Respect, and with a kind of Haugh∣tiness: They despise all as Credulous, who speak mo∣destly of certain receiv'd Opinions. Finally, they are very much inclin'd to doubt of every thing, and are directly oppos'd to those who are too easily inclin'd to submit to the Authority of Men.

It is obvious, that these two Extreams are bad, and those who will not admit Evidence in Natural Questi∣ons are blameable, as well as those who would have Evidence in Mysteries of Faith. But yet those who Expose themselves to be mistaken in Philosophical Questions in being too Credulous, are without doubt more excusable than the others who run the hazard of falling into some Heresie or other in doubting Rashly. For it is less dangerous to fall into a World of Errors in Philosophy for want of examining them, than to fall into one Heresie for want of submitting with Hu∣mility to the Authority of the Church.

The Mind is at quiet when it meets Evidence, and is in continual Agitation when it finds none. Because Evidence is the Character of Truth. Thus the Error of Libertines, and of Hereticks, proceeds from their doubting of the Truth of the Decisions of the Church, because they are not Evident, and they hope that the Truths of Faith may be demonstrated. Now their Love for Novelty is Irregular, since that possessing the Truth in the Faith of the Church, they ought not to seek farther: Besides, the Truths of Faith being far above the reach of their Understanding, they would

not be able to discover them, supposing that accor∣ding to their False Opinion, the Church were guilty of Error.

But if there are many who deceive themselves in refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church, there are as many who are deceiv'd in submitting to the Authority of Men. We must submit to the Au∣thority of the Church, because it can never submit Blindly to the Authority of Men, because they are always liable to Mistakes. What the Church teaches us, is Infinitely above the reach of Reason: What Men teach us, is submitted to our Reason: So that as it is a Crime, and an Insupportable Vanity, to en∣deavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by our Reason, without regarding the Authority of the Church: So it is a great Indiscretion, and a despicable poorness of Spirit, to rely blindly on the Authority of Men, in Things which relate to Reason.

Nevertheless, most of those that are esteem'd Learned Men in the World, have only acquir'd that Reputation, by knowing the Opinions of Aristotle, of Plato, of Epicurus, and of some other Philosophers by Heart, by submitting blindly to their Sentiments, and by defending them with Obstinacy. In order to ob∣tain the Reputation of Learning in the Universities, it is sufficient to be acquainted with the Sentiments of some Philosopher: Provided they will Swear In Verba Magistri, they soon become Doctors. Most Communities stick to a peculiar Doctrine, which the Members are not allow'd to deviate from. What is True in some, is often False in others. They are sometimes Proud of defending the Doctrine of their Order, against Reason and Experience; and they think themselves oblig'd to wrest the Truth, or their Authors to reconcile them: This produces a World of Frivolous Distinctions, which are so many by ways, that lead Infallibly to Error.

If any Truth is discover'd, even in our days, Ari∣stotle must have seen it; or if Aristotle be against it, the Discovery must be False. Some make that Philo∣sopher speak one way, others another; for all those

who pretend to Learning, make him speak their Lan∣guage: He is made the Author of all sorts of Imper∣tinencies, and few Discoveries are made, which are not found Enigmatically in some corner or other of his Books. In a word, he is ever contradicting himself, if not in his Works, yet at least in the Mouths of those that teach him. For though Philosophers protest, and even pretend to teach his Doctrine, it is difficult to meet two that agree about his Sentiments: For indeed Aristotle's Books are so Obscure, and fill'd with such rambling general Terms, that one may with some Appearance of Truth, impute to him the Opinions of those that are most opposite to his. It is easie to make him say whatever one has a mind to in some of his Works, because he hardly says any thing in them, though he makes a great deal of Noise; as Children suppose the Sounds of the Bells to say what they please, because they make a great deal of Noise and say nothing.

I must confess that it seems very Rational to fix and to stop the Mind on some particular Opinions, to hinder it from running out into Extravagancies. But what then? Must it needs be done by Falshood and Error? Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the Mind? Let Men examine how difficult it is to find Persons of Sense pleased with the reading of Aristotle, and that can perswade themselves they have acquir'd any true Science, even after having grown old on his Books; and it will appear plainly, that nothing but Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mind; and that Disputes, Aversions, Errors and even Heresies, are entertain'd and encourag'd by an Ill Manner of Study. Truth consists in Individuality, it is not capa∣ble of Variety; and nothing besides it can reconcile Peoples Minds: Falshood and Error only serve to di∣vide and agitate them.

I do not question but there are some who do verily believe, that he they call the Prince of Philosophers, is no-wise in an Error, and that Real and Solid Philo∣sophy are only to be found in his Works. There are some who fancy, that though it is Two thousand

Years since Aristotle wrote, no body has yet been able to discover that he was guilty of any Error; and con∣sequently being in some respects Infallible, they may boldly follow him, and quote him as such. But I do not think it worth my while to answer such Persons, because their Ignorance is so gross, that it only deserves Contempt. I only desire them to tell me, whether Aristotle, or any of his Disciples, have ever deduced any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philosophy which may be called his; or if they, or any of them, have done it themselves, let them declare it, let them explain it, and let them prove it; and we do engage our selves, never more to speak of Aristotle without an Elogy; we will no longer say, that his Principles are Useless, since they have served to prove one Truth; but there is no reason to expect it. They were long since challeng'd to do it, and particularly by Monsieur Descartes in his Metaphysical Meditations about Forty Years ago, even with a Promise to demon∣strate the Falsity of that Pretended Truth: And there is no great likelihood to believe, that any body will ever presume to do, what Monsieur Descartes greatest Enemies, and the most Zealous Defenders of Ari∣stotle's Philosophy, have not hitherto dar'd to under∣take.

Therefore I hope I may presume to say, that it is a strange Blindness, Poorness of Mind, and Stupidity of Spirit, thus to submit to the Authority of Aristotle, of Plato, or of any other Philosopher whatever: That People lose their time in reading them, when their only Design is to get their Opinions by Heart; and those that teach them make their Disciples lose theirs likewise. Therefore give me leave to say with St. Austin, * 1.4 That those are Foolishly Curious, who send their Sons to the College, in order to learn the Sentiments of their Master. That Philosophers cannot instruct us by their own Authority, and if they pretend to do it they are Unjust: That it is a kind of Folly and Impiety to Swear their Defence Solemnly: And finally, those Injustly confine Truth, who out of Interest oppose the new Opinions of Philosophy which may be

True, to preserve those which are sufficiently known to be False or Useless.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. Curiosity is natural and neces∣sary.
• * 1.2

  II. Three Rules to moderate Curiosity.
• * 1.3

  II. Parti∣cular ex∣planation of the first of those Rules.
• * 1.4

  Quis tam Stulte cu∣riosus est qui filium suum mit∣tat in Scho∣lam, ut quid Ma∣gister cogi∣tet discat? Aug. de Magistro.