Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. II.

I. The Inclination for Good in General, is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will.

II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance.

III. First Example, Morality, little known to many Men.

IV. Second Example, The Immor∣tality of the Soul, disputed by some Men.

V. That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things, or such as have but little Re∣lation to us.

THat vast Capacity which the Will has for all Good in General, * 1.1 because it is only form'd by a Good which includes all Good in it self, cannot be satisfied by all the things which the Mind repre∣sents to it; and yet that continual Motion which God imprints in it towards Good cannot stand still. This Motion never ceasing, puts the Mind, of necessity, into a continual Agitation. The Will which seeks what it desires, obliges the Mind to represent all sorts of Objects to it self. The Mind accordingly does it, but the Soul does not relish them; or if it does, is not satisfied with them. The Soul does not relish them, by reason that often the Perception of the Mind is not accompanied with Pleasure; for it is through Plea∣sure that the Soul relishes its Good: And the Soul is not satisfied with it, by reason that nothing can stop the Motion of the Soul but him that gives it. What∣ever the Mind represents to it self as its Good, is Finite; and whatever is Finite, may withdraw our Love for a while, but it cannot fix it. When the Mind considers very new and uncommon Objects, or that have some relation to Infinity, the Will permits the Mind to examine them a while with some Atten∣tion, in hopes of finding what it is in search of, because whatever appears Infinite, bears the Cha∣racter of its real Good; but in time it grows weary

of it, as well as of the rest. Therefore the Will is always disquieted, because it is inclin'd to seek for that which it can never find, and which it always hopes to find: It Loves whatever is Great and Extra∣ordinary, and resembles Infinity; for not having found its real Good in Common and Familiar things, it hopes to find it in such as are unknown to it. We will demonstrate in this Chapter, that the Dis∣quiet of our Wills is one of the principal Causes of our Ignorance, and of the Errors into which we fall in many things: And in the two following we will explain what it is that produces in us the Inclination we have for every thing that has something Great or Extraordinary in it.

It is something evident by what has been said, * 1.2 First, That the Will seldom makes use of the Understand∣ing, unless on Objects that have some Relation to us, and that it very much neglects all others; for being ever earnestly desirous of Felicity, by the Impression of Nature, it only turns the Understanding towards such things as seem to be of use to us, and which do in some measure please us.

Secondly, That the Will does not permit the Un∣derstanding to apply it self long even to such things as it is delighted with: Because, as we have already said, all things that are created may indeed please us for a while, but we are soon disgusted with them; and then our Mind lays them by, to seek for that which can satisfie it elsewhere.

Thirdly, That the Will is excited thus to make the Mind run from Object to Object, because it never ceases to represent consusedly to it, or as at a distance, that which includes all Beings in it self, as we have declared in the Third Book. For the Will being de∣sirous, as it were, to draw its real Good near to it self, to be pleased with it, and to receive from it the Motion which animates it, it excites the Understand∣ing to represent that Good in some measure. But then it is no longer the General, the Universal, the Infinitely Perfect Being which the Mind perceives; it is something that is Bounded and Imperfect, which

not being able to stop the Motion of the Will, nor to please it long, it forsakes it to turn after some other Object.

And whereas the Attention and Application of the Mind are absolutely necessary to discover abstracted Truths, it is evident that the common sort of Man∣kind must live in a gross Ignorance, in respect even of such things as have some relation to them; and that it is impossible to express their Blindness in what re∣lates to abstracted Truths, and which have no sensible relation to them. But we must endeavour to prove these things by Examples.

Amongst all Sciences Morality has most relation to us: It teaches us all our Duty towards God, * 1.3 towards our Prince, towards our Friends and Relations, and generally towards all that are about us. Moreover it teaches us the way to be Eternally Happy; and all Men lie under an Essential Obligation, or rather Indispensible Necessity, to apply themselves wholly to it: And yet though there have been Men on Earth these Six Thousand Years, that Science is still very Imperfect.

That part of Morality which relates to our Duty towards God, and which undoubtedly is the chief, since it relates to Eternity, has hardly been known by the most Learned; and even in our days we find Men of Sence who are unacquainted with it; and yet it is the easiest part of Morality. For in the first place, Where lies the Difficulty to discover that there is a God? Whatever God has made proves it: Whatever Men or Beasts do, proves it: Whatever we think, whatever we see, whatever we feel, proves it. In a word, There is nothing but what proves the Existence of God, or that may prove it to attentive Minds, who apply themselves seriously to the Knowledge of the Author of all Things.

Secondly, It is evident, that there is a Necessity to follow the Commands of God to be Happy; for as he is Powerful and Just, we cannot disobey him with∣out being Punish'd, nor obey him without being Re∣warded. But what is it he exacts from us? That

we should Love him; That our Mind should be taken up with him; That our Hearts should be turned to∣wards him. For wherefore has he Created our Minds? Certainly he can do nothing but for him∣self: Therefore he has made us for himself only; and we are Indispensibly obliged not to apply elsewhere the Impression of that Love which he continually pre∣serves in us, in order that we should continually Love him.

These Truths are easily discovered with little Appli∣cation: And yet this only Principle of Morality, which teaches us, that to be Vertuous and Happy, it is ab∣solutely necessary to Love God above all Things and in all Things, is the Foundation of all Christian Mora∣lity. Neither does it require an extraordinary Appli∣cation of Mind, to draw from thence all the Conse∣quences we stand in need of, to settle the general Rules of our Conduct; though there are but very few that do it; and Men continually dispute upon Que∣stions of Morality, which are the Immediate and Ne∣cessary Consequences of a Principle which is so evident as that is.

The Professors of Geometry daily makes new Dis∣coveries, but if they do not bring it to a greater Per∣fection, it is because they have already drawn the most Useful and Necessary Consequences out of their Principles. But most Men seem Incapable of con∣cluding any thing out of the first Principle of Morality. All their Idea's vanish, and are dissipated as soon as they begin to think upon it; because they will not do it as they should do; and they will not do it, be∣cause they do not relish it, or because they are too soon tired with it after their having relish'd it. That Principle is abstracted, Metaphysical, meerly Intelligi∣ble; it is not obvious, it is not to be imagined; and therefore it does not appear solid to Carnal Minds, or to Minds that only see with the Eyes. Nothing is found in that Principle capable of putting a stop to the Disquiets of their Will, and afterwards to fix the Eyes of their Mind to consider it with some Attention. What Hopes then of their seeing it as they should

do, of their apprehending it rightly, and of their concluding directly from thence what they should Conclude?

If Men had but an Imperfect Apprehension of that Proposition of Geometry: That the sides of Tri∣angles that are alike, are proportionable one to an∣other; certainly they would not be great Geometri∣cians. But if besides the Confused and Imperfect Idea of that Fundamental Proposition of Geometry, they also had some Interest to wish, that the sides of Triangles that are alike were not proportion∣able; and that false Geometry were as convenient for their Perverse Inclinations as false Morality, they might very well be guilty of Paralogisms as ab∣surd in Geometry as in Morality, because their Errors would please them, and that Truth would only Puzzle, Disturb and Vex them.

Therefore we need not wonder at the Blindness of those that lived in the former Ages, whilst Ido∣latry reigned in the World, or of those that live in our Days, and that do not as yet enjoy the Benefit of the Light of the Gospel. It was necessary for Divine Wisdom to make it self sensible at last, to instruct such Men as only consult their Senses. Truth had spoken to their Minds for above the space of Four thousand Years, but whereas they never look'd Inwardly they did not understand it: It was ne∣cessary that it should speak to their Ears. The Light which directs all Men, did shine in their Darkness, without being able to expel it; they could not so much as look upon it. It was necessary that the Intelligible Light should put on a Veil to make it self visible: And that the Word should cloath it self with Flesh; and that the Wisdom of God which lay conceal'd, and was inaccessible to Carnal Men, should instruct them in a Carnal way, Carnaliter, says St. Bernard. The Majority of Men, * 1.4 and parti∣cularly the Poor (which are the most worthy Objects of the Mercy and Providence of the Creator,) who are obliged to work for their daily Bread, are very Ignorant and Stupid, They only Hear because they

have Ears, and they only see because they have Eyes. They are incapable of looking Inwardly by an Effort of Mind, there to Interrogate Truth in the Silence of their Senses and Passions. They cannot apply themselves to Truth, by reason that they cannot relish it: Moreover they seldom think of applying them∣selves to it, because Men seldom have any Thoughts of applying themselves to things that do not con∣cern them. Their unquiet and unsettled Will turns their Minds continually towards all the Objects that Please and Divert them by their Variety: For the Multiplicity and Diversity of Sensible Goods, hinder Men from discovering the Vanity of them, and still keep them in hopes of finding the real Good they desire in them.

Thus though the Councils which Jesus Christ as Man, as the way, as the Author of our Faith, gives us in the Gospel, are much more suitable to the Weakness of our Understanding, than those which the same Jesus Christ, as Eternal Wisdom, as Inward Truth, as Intelligible Light Inspires into the most secret Recesses of our Reason: Though Jesus Christ renders those Councils Agreeable by his Grace, Sensible by his Example, Convincing by his Miracles, yet Men are so stupid, and so in∣capable of Reflection, even upon things which are absolutely Necessary for them to know well, that they hardly ever think on them as they ought. Few Men observe the Beauty of the Gospel; Few Men conceive the Solidity and Necessity of the Coun∣cils of Jesus Christ; Few Meditate upon them; Few esteem them as their Necessary Food, or fortifie themselves with them; the Continual Agi∣tation of the Will, which is in search of the Taste of Good, * 1.5 not permitting the Mind to be intent upon Truths which seem to deprive it thereof. Take ano∣ther Example.

It concerns the Impious highly to make a very strict enquiry, whether their Soul is Mortal, as they appre∣hend it, or whether it is Immortal, as Faith and Rea∣son tells us. It is a thing of the utmost Consequence

for them to know; their Eternity is concerned in it, and the very Quiet of their Mind depends upon it. Why is it then they do not know it, or that they re∣main in doubt, unless it be that they are not capable of the least serious Application; and that their unse∣date and corrupted Will does not allow their Mind to look stedfastly on the Reasons which are contrary to these Opinions, which they desire should be true? For in fine, is it so difficult a task to distinguish the difference there is between the Soul and the Body, be∣tween what thinks, and what is extended? Do's it require so great an Attention of Mind to discover that a Thought is neither Round nor Square: That Ex∣tent is only capable of different Figures and different Motions, and not of Thought and Reasoning: And consequently, that what Thinks, and what is Extend∣ed, are two Beings directly opposite to one another? Yet that alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the Soul is Immortal, and that it cannot Perish, even though the Body were Annihilated.

When a Substance perishes, it is true that the Modes or Manners of Existence of that Substance perish with it. If a piece of Wax were annihilated, it is certain that the Forms of that Wax should also be annihi∣lated with it; because the Roundness for Example of the Wax, is in Effect nothing but the Wax it self of such a Shape, and therefore it cannot subsist without the Wax. But though God should destroy all the Wax in the World, it would not therefore follow, that any other Substance, nor that the Modes of any other Substance were Annihilated. All the Stones for example, would subsist with all their Modes; because Stones are Substances or Beings, and not Modi∣fications of the Wax.

In like manner, though God should Annihilate one half of some Bodies, it would not follow, that the other half should be Annihilated. This last half is United with the other, but it is not one with it. Thus one half being Annihilated, it follows indeed accord∣ing to Reason, that the other half has no longer any relation to it; but it do's not follow that it ceases to

be; because as its Being is different, it cannot be An∣nihilated by the Annihilation of the other. Therefore it is clear, that the Thought not being the Modification of Extension, our Soul is not Annihilated, though we should suppose that the Body were Annihilated by Death.

But there is no reason to believe, that even the Bo∣dy is Annihilated when it is destroy'd. The parts which Compose it are dissipated into Vapours, and reduc'd to Powder: They are no longer seen, nor are they any longer known; this is true, but it is no rea∣son to conclude, that they are no longer in Being; for the Mind perceives them still. Dividing a Grain of Mustard into Two, into Four, or Twenty parts, it would be Annihilated to our sight, because it would be no longer seen: But it would not be Annihilated in it self, nor yet to the Mind; for the Mind would see it, though it were divided into a Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Parts.

'Tis a common Notion among Men who consult their Reason more than their Senses, that nothing can be Annihilated by the common force of Nature; for as Naturally, nothing can be made out of nothing, nei∣ther can a Substance or Being become nothing. Bo∣dies may be corrupted, if we may call the Alterations they are liable to, Corruption; but they cannot be Annihilated. What is Round may become Square, What is Flesh may become Earth, Vapour, and what you please; for all sorts of Extensions are capable of all manner of Configurations: But the Substance of what is Round, and of what is Flesh, cannot perish. There are certain Laws Establish'd in Nature, according to which Bodies change their Forms successively; for those Successive Forms Compose the Beauty of the Universe, and Create an Admiration in us for its Au∣thor: But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihi∣lation of any Being, because Annihilation has nothing of Beauty or Good in it self, and because the Author of Nature loves his Work. Therefore Bodies may Alter, but they cannot Perish.

But if relying on the Testimony of the Senses, Men would maintain obstinately that the Reduction of Bo∣dies is a real Annihilation, by reason that the Parts into which they are reduc'd are Imperceptible: Let them remember at least, that Bodies can only be di∣vided into those Imperceptible Parts, because they are Extended. But if the Mind is not Extended, it will not be Divisible; and if it be not Divisible, it must be granted, that in that Sense it will not be Corruptible. But how could any Body imagin that the Mind were Extended and Divisible? We may by a right Line cut a Square into two Triangles, into two Paralelo∣grammes, or long Squares, into two Trapeza's: But by what Line can it be conceiv'd, that a Pleasure, a Pain, or a Desire can be Cut? And what Figure would re∣sult of that Division? Truly I cannot think, that Ima∣gination can be fruitful enough in false Idea's, to satisfie it self upon that Subject.

The Mind then is not Extended, consequently it is not Divisible: It is not liable to the same Alterations as the Body: Nevertheless, it must be granted that it is not Immutable by its Nature. If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures, and of different Con∣figurations, the Mind is capable of an infinite number of different Idea's, and different Modifications. As after our Death the substance of our Flesh will be reduc'd to Earth, to Vapours, and to an infinite number of other Bodies without being Annihilated: So our Souls without be∣ing again reduc'd to nothing, will have Thoughts, and Sentiments very different from those they had in Life. It is also necessary while we are alive, that our Body should be Compos'd of Flesh and Bones: It is also ne∣cessary in order to Live, that our Soul should have the Idea's and Sentiments it has, in relation to the Body to which it is united. But when the Soul shall be sepa∣rated from its Body, it will be at full Liberty to re∣ceive all sorts of Idea's and Modifications, very diffe∣rent from those it has at present; as our Body on its part, will be capable of receiving all sorts of Figures and Configurations, very different from those it is ne∣cessary it should have, to be the Body of a Living Man.

What I have said, does in my Opinion, sufficiently show, that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing so difficult to be apprehended. What then is the rea∣son that so many question it, unless it be, that they are unwilling to apply themselves as much as may be, to examin the Reasons which prove it, in order to be Convinc'd? And why is it that they are unwilling to do it, unless it be that their Will, being uneasie and inconstant, keeps their Understanding in a continual Agitation; insomuch that it is not at leisure distinctly to perceive those very Idea's which are most present to it, as those of Thought and of Extension? Just like a Man agitated by some Passion, turning his Eyes continually on all sides, for the most part does not distinguish the nearest Objects, and the most Ex∣pos'd to his Sight. For indeed the Question about the Immortality of the Soul, is one of the easiest Questi∣ons to resolve, when without Consulting our Imagi∣nation, we consider with some Attention of Mind, the clear and distinct Idea of Extension, and the Relation it can have to Thought.

If the Inconstancy and Levity of our Will does not permit our Understanding to penetrate into the Bot∣tom of things which are present to it, and which we are highly concern'd to know; it is easie to judge, that it will be more averse to let us meditate on those that are distant, and which have no relation to us. So that if we are very Ignorant of most of those things which it is very necessary for us to know, we shall not have a great Insight into those which seem absolutely vain and useless to us.

It will not be necessary for me to endeavour to prove this by tedious Examples, which have no con∣siderable Truths in them; for if we may be allow'd to be Ignorant of any thing, it is of those things which are of no Use. And I had rather not be believed, than to make the Reader lose his Time in reading things that are wholly useless.

Though there are not many persons who apply themselves seriously to things absolutely Vain and Use∣less, yet the number of them is but too great: But

there can never be too many of those who do not ap∣ply themselves to them, and who despise them, pro∣vided they do not pretend to Judge of them. It is no defect in a limited Mind, not to know certain things; it is only a defect to pretend to Judge of them. Ig∣norance is a necessary Evil, but we may, and ought to avoid Error. Therefore I do not condemn Men for being Ignorant of many things, but only for giving rash Judgments about those things.

When things have a great relation to us, are sensible, * 1.6 and fall easily within the Compass of our Imagination, we may say, that the Mind applies it self to them, and may have some knowledge of them. For when we know that things have a relation to us, we think upon them with some Inclination; and when we find that they concern us, we apply our selves to them with pleasure. So that we should be more Learned than we are in many things, if the uneasiness and tossing of our Will did not Disturb and Fatigue our Atten∣tion continually.

But when things are abstract, and not very sensible, it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them: Not that abstracted things are very intricate, but be∣cause the Attention and Sight of the Mind begins, and Ends commonly with the sensible Prospect of Objects; for we seldom think on any thing but what we see and feel, and only as long as we see and feel it.

It is most certain, that if the Mind could easily ap∣ply it self to clear and distinct Idea's, without being any-wise byass'd by Opinion; and if the uneasiness of the Will did not continually disturb its Application, we should meet no great difficulties in many Natural Questions, which we look upon as not to be Explain'd, and we might easily be deliver'd of our Ignorance and Errors in relation to them.

For Example; It is an undeniable Truth to any Man of Sense, that Creation and Annihilation are things which surpass the common force of Nature. Therefore if Men did remain Attentive to that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason, they would not so easily admit the Creation and Annihilation of an infi∣nite

Number of New Beings, as of Substantial Forms, real Qualities and Faculties. They would look into the distinct Idea's we have of Extension, Figure, and Motion, for the reason of Natural Effects; which is not always so difficult as People imagin; all things in Nature are so connected together, and prove each other.

The Effects of Fire, as those of Canon and of Mines, are very Surprising; and their cause not very well known. Nevertheless, if Men instead of rely∣ing on the Impressions of their Senses, and on some false or deceitful Experiments, did firmly fix on that bare Notion of the Mind alone: That it is not possi∣ble for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a violent Motion, since it can communicate no more moving Power than it has its self; it would be easie from that alone to conclude, that there is a Subtle and Invisible Matter, that it is very much agitated, and dispers'd inth all Bodies, and several other like things which would teach us the Nature of Fire, and also be of great use to us to discover other Truths yet more conceal'd.

For, since Canons and Mines have such great Mo∣tions, and all the Visible Bodies about them, are not in a sufficient Agitation to produce them; it is a cer∣tain proof that there are other Invisible and Insensible Bodies, which have at least as much Agitation as the Canon Ball: But with being very Subtle and Thin, may alone freely pass, and without breaking through the Pores of the Canon before it is Fir'd; that is, as Monsieur Descartes has explain'd it more at large, be∣fore their having surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Salt-petre, of which the Powder is Compos'd. But when the Fire is put to it, that is, when those subtle and extreamly agitated Particles, have surround∣ed the gross and solid Parts of the Salt-petre, and have thus Communicated their very strong and violent Mo∣tion to them, then all does Burst of necessity; because the Pores of the Canon, which left an open passage on all sides for the subtle Parts before mention'd, while they were alone, are not large enough to make way for the gross Parts of the Salt-petre, and some others

of which the Powder is Compos'd, when they have receiv'd into themselves the Agitation of the Subtle Parts which surrounds them.

For as the Water of Rivers which flows under Bridges does not shake them, by reason of the small∣ness of its Particles: Thus the very subtle and very thin Matter I have mention'd, passes continually through the Pores of all Bodies without making any sensible Alterations in them. But then likewise, as the said River is capable of breaking down a Bridge, when carrying along with it some great Flakes of Ice, or some other more solid Bodies, by forcing them against it with its own Motion; so subtle Matter is capable of producing the surprising Effects we see in Canons and in Mines; when having communicated to the Parts of the Powder which Float in the midst of it, its Motion which is infinitely more Violent, and more Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents; the said Parts of the Powder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the Bodies which enclose them, by reason they are too gross; so that they violently break them to force them a free Passage.

But Men do not easily apprehend those subtle small Particles, which they repute Chimera's, because they do not see them. Contemplatio ferè definit cum aspectu, says Bacon. The greater part even of Philosophers, invent some New Entity, rather than not to talk upon those matters which they are Ignorant of: And if any Body objects against their false and incomprehensible Suppositions, that Fire must needs be compos'd of Parts that are in very great Agitation, since it produces such Violent Motions, and that a thing cannot Com∣municate that which it has not; which is undoubtedly a most clear, and most solid Objection: They con∣found all by some frivolous Imaginary distinction, as that of Equivocal and Univocal Causes, in order to seem to say something, though in reality they say no∣thing. For it is a general Notion among Men of Sense and Learning, that there can be no real Equivocal Cause in Nature; and that it has been invented meerly by the Ignorance of Men.

Therefore Men must apply themselves more to the consideration of clear and distinct Notions, if they have a mind to understand Nature: They must check and stop the Inconstancy and Levity of their Will a little, if they design to penetrate deeply into things; for their Mind will ever be weak, superficial and dis∣cursive, while their Will remains Light, Inconstant and Roving.

It is true, it requires some Fatigue, and Men must constrain themselves to become Attentive, and to search into the bottom of things; for there is nothing to be got without pains. It is shameful for Men of Sense, and Philosophers, who are obliged by all manner of reasons to enquire into, and to defend Truth, to speak without knowing what they say, and to be satisfy'd with what they do not understand.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. The In∣clination for Good in General, is the Princi∣ple of the Disquiet of our Will.
• * 1.2

  II. And con∣sequently of our Ne∣gligence and Igno∣rance.
• * 1.3

  III. First Example, Morality little known a∣mong many Men.
• * 1.4

  Serm. 39. De Natali Domini.
• * 1.5

  IV. Second Example, The Immor∣tality of the Soul, disputed by some Per∣sons.
• * 1.6

  V That our Ignorance is exceed∣ing great in respect of abstract∣ed things, or such as have but little rela∣tion to us.