Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. X.

Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality.

I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy.

II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights.

WE have spoken in the three preceding Chapters of the Inclination we have towards the pre∣servation of our Being, and how it occasions our falling into many Errors: We will now speak of that which we have for Well-being, that is for Plea∣sure, and for all things that make us happier and more contented, or that we think capable of doing so; and we will endeavour to discover the Errors that pro∣ceed from that Inclination.

There are Philosophers who do what they can to perswade Men, that Pleasure is not a Good, and that

Pain is not an Evil: That we may be Happy in the midst of the most violent Pains and Unhappy amidst the greatest Pleasures. As these Philosophers are very Pathetick and Fanciful, they without much difficulty prevail upon the Minds of Weak People, who easily receive the Impression which those that speak produce in them: For Stoicks are a little Visionary, and Visio∣naries are Vehement; and so they easily Imprint in others the false Sentiments they are possess'd with. But whereas there is no Conviction against Experi∣ence, and our Inward Sentiments, those pompous magnificent Reasons vanish, with all their Lustre, as soon as the Soul is affected with some sensible Plea∣sure or Pain: And those who have plac'd all their Con∣fidence in that false perswasion of their Mind, are de∣priv'd of Wisdom and Power at the least Attack of Vice; and find that they have been deceiv'd, and that they are vanquish'd.

Since Philosophers cannot give their Disciples the power of overcoming their Passions; at least, * 1.1 they should not seduce or perswade them that they have no Enemies to Encounter. They should speak the Truth; Pleasure is always a Good, and Pain ever an Evil: But it is not always advantagious to enjoy Pleasure; for it is sometimes profitable to suffer Pain.

But in order the better to Explain my meaning, it is fit to know,

1. That God only is powerful enough to act in us, and to make us sensible of Pleasure and Pain. For it is evident to all Men that consult their Reason, and despise the Testimony of their Senses, that it is not the Objects which we feel, that Act Effectively in us, and that it is not our Soul neither which causes plea∣sure and pain in it self in respect to them.

2. That Good is commonly to be given, only in order to the performance of some good Action, or to reward it; and that commonly Evil is only to be in∣slicted in order to prevent an Ill Action, or to punish it: And therefore since God always acts agreeable to Order, and according to the Rules of Justice, all Plea∣sures either Incline us to some good Action, or reward

us for it; and all Pains serve to prevent some ill Acti∣on, or to punish us for the Committing of it.

3. That there are Actions that are good in one sense, and bad in another. For instance, it is an Ill Action to expose ones self to Death, when God forbids it. But it is a Good One when God Commands it. For all our Actions are Good or Ill, because God has Com∣manded, or forbidden them by his first general Will, which is the Order and Institution of Nature; or by his other particular Will and Commandments, which are necessary for the re-establishment of Nature.

Therefore I say that Pleasure is always Good; but that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it.

1. Because that instead of engaging us to him who is only capable of causing it, it weans us from him to Unite us to that which seems falsly to cause it. It sets us at a Distance from God, to Unite us to a Vile Creature. For although true Philosophers sometimes think that Pleasure is not occasion'd by outward Ob∣jects, and that that may in some measure Incline them to Acknowledge and Love God in all things; never∣theless since the Introduction of Sin, the Reason of Man is so Weak, and his Senses and Imagination have so much Power over his Mind, that they soon Corrupt his Heart. When we do not lay aside, according to the Advice of the Gospel, all things that do not of themselves incline us to God. For the best Philosophy cannot Cure the Mind, nor resist the disorder of Vo∣luptuousness.

2. Since Pleasure is a Reward, it is a piece of In∣justice to produce Motions in our Body which oblige God, in consequence of his first Will, to make us feel Pleasure, when we do not deserve any; either because the Action we do is Useless or Criminal, or because that being full of Sin, we ought not to desire a Re∣ward of him. Man before the Fall might justly en∣joy sensible Pleasures in his Regular Actions: But since the Fall there are no sensible Pleasures altogether In∣nocent, nor any but such as are capable of injuring us when we enjoy them; for often the bare tasting of them is sufficient to make us Slaves to them.

3. Because God being Just, he must needs at some time or other punish the Violence that is offer'd to him, when Men oblige him to recompence with Pleasure the Criminal Actions which they Commit against him. When our Soul shall be no longer united to our Bodies, God will no longer lye under the Obligation which he has laid upon himself, to give us Sensa∣tions to answer to the Motions of the Mind; and he will still remain under the Obligation of satisfying his Justice: And therefore that will be the time of his Vengeance and Wrath. Then without changing the Order of Nature, and remaining always Immuta∣ble in his first Will, he will punish the unjust pleasures of the Voluptuous, with Pains that never will have an End.

4. Because that the certainty we have in this Life that the said Justice must be perform'd, agitates the Mind with mortal Disquiets, and flings it into a kind of Despair, which renders the Voluptuous miserable, even in the midst of the greatest Pleasures.

5. Since commonly dismal Remorses accompany the most Innocent Pleasures, because we are convinc'd that we deserve none; and those Remorses deprive us of a certain Inward Joy, which is found even in actions of Penitence.

Thus though Pleasure is a Good, it must be granted that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it for these Reasons; and for others like these, which it is very necessary to know, and which are easily deduced from these; and it is always very advantageous to suffer Pain, though it be really an Evil.

Nevertheless, all Pleasure is a Good, and actually makes those Happy that enjoy it, while they enjoy it, and as long as they enjoy it; and all Grief or Pain is an Evil, and actually makes the person that suffers it unhappy, while he suffers it, and as long as he suf∣fers it. It may be said that the Righteous and Holy are the most unhappy Men in this Life, and the most worthy of Compassion. Si in vita tantum in Christo speramus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus, says Saint Paul; for those that Weep, and suffer

Persecution for Justice, are not Happy because they suffer Persecution for Justice; but because the King∣dom of Heaven is theirs, and a great Reward is in store for them in Heaven; that is, Because they shall be Happy. Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just, Virtuous, and Perfect, because they are in the Order that God has prescrib'd, and Per∣fection consists in following him: but they are not Happy because they Suffer. A time will come when they will Suffer no more; and then they will be Hap∣py, as well as Just and Perfect.

However, I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life, by the strength of their Hope and Faith, which render those future Felicities, as it were, present to their Mind. For it is certain, that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively, it draws it nearer to the Mind, and gives it a taste thereof before-hand: And thus it makes us Happy in some measure, since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure, which makes us Happy.

Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good, and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier; since it is not true, and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune. We must tell them, that those Plea∣sures are good in themselves, and capable to make them Happy in some measure: Nevertheless, they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementi∣oned; but they cannot avoid them of themselves: Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclinati∣on which they cannot overcome, and those tran∣sitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid, satisfie it in some measure: Thus they are in a miserable Ne∣cessity of losing themselves, unless they are assisted. It is necessary to tell them these things, that they may distinctly know their Weakness, and the want they have of a Redeemer.

We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ, and not like the Stoicks, who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds. They must conti∣nually

be told, that they must hate and despise them∣selves, and not look for an Establishment or Happi∣ness on Earth: That they must daily carry their Cross, or the Instrument of their suffering, and that they must lose their Life at present, in order to preserve it Eternally. They must be taught, that they are ob∣lig'd to act contrary to their desire, to make 'em sen∣sible of their inability to good. For Men wou'd be invincibly Happy, and they cannot be actually so, unless they do what they please. Perhaps being con∣vinced of their present Evils, and knowing their fu∣ture sufferings, they may humble themselves on Earth: Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven, and seek a Mediatour; be afraid of sensible Objects, and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence. And it may be they may thus ob∣tain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace, and without which there is no Power, no Health, nor no Salvation to be expected.

We are inwardly convinc'd that Pleasure is Good, * 1.2 and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False, for Plea∣sure is really Good. We are Naturally Convinc'd, that Pleasure is the Character of Good, and that Natural Conviction is certainly true; for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good, and very Lovely. But we are not convinc'd, that either sensible Ob∣jects, or our Souls themselves, are capable of pro∣ducing Pleasure in us; for there is no reason to be∣lieve it, and there are a Thousand against it. There∣fore sensible Objects are neither Good, nor Lovely. Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life, we ought to use them: But as they are not capable of Acting in us, we ought not to Love them. The Soul must only Love him that is Good, who only is capable to make it Happier, and more perfect. There∣fore it should only Love that which is above it, since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below, or equal to it.

But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect, when it always attends it, we fancy

that they are Sensible Objects which act in us, be∣cause at their approach we have new Sensations, and because we do not see him that produces them really in us. We taste a Fruit, and we find a Sweet∣ness; we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit; we conclude that it causes it, and even that it contains it. We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit; we do not so much as think on him, nor perhaps on our selves: Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness, nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul; we impute both the Cause and the Effect, to that Fruit which we eat.

What I have said of Sensations which have a rela∣tion to the Body, is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it, as those which are found in pure Intelligences.

The Mind considers it self; it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection; or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires. At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy; at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow. It straight fancies, that it is the sight of its Happiness which pro∣duces in it self that Sentiment of Joy, because the said Sentiment always attends that sight. It also imagines, that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in it self that Sentiment of Grief, since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight. The real Cause of those Sentiments, which is God alone, does not appear before it: It does not so much as think on God; for he acts in us without our know∣ing it.

God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy, when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be, that we may remain in it, that our Disquiet may cease, and that we may fully enjoy our Happi∣ness, without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else. But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us, when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be, so that we may not remain in it, and that we might

earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us. For God pushes us continually toward Good, when we are Sensible that we do not possess it; and he fixes us powerfully upon it, when we find that we possess it fully. So that it seems evident to me, that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief, as well as the Sensible ones, are no voluntary Productions of the Mind.

Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason, that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss, and which disguises it self to our Mind, under Sensible Appearances. We must Adore it, we must Love it; but we must also Fear it, for since it fills us with Pleasures, it may also overwhelm us with Grief. We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice, by a Sensi∣ble Love, by a Love worthy of God, when we Love him because we know that he is Amiable: And that Love is worthy of us, because that being Reasonable, we ought to Love that which Reason informs us to be worthy of our Love. But we Love Sensible Things, by a Love that is unworthy of us, and which they are also unworthy of: For being Reasonable, we Love them without any Reason to Love them, since we do not clearly know that they are Lovely; and on the contrary, we know they are not so. But Pleasures Seduce us, and make us Love them; the Blind and Irregular Love of Pleasure, being the real Cause of those False Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. We must shun Plea∣surethough it make u•• Happy.
• * 1.2

  II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible De∣lights.