Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. IX.

I. The last General Cause of our Errors.

II. That the Idea's of things are not always present to the Mind, as soon as 'tis desir'd.

III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error, and why.

IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies or Spirits, nor that God is a Spirit, as we conceive Spirits.

WE have hitherto spoken of Errors, * 1.1 for which we can assign some occasional Cause in the Nature of the Pure Understanding, or of the Mind consider'd, as acting of it self, and in the Nature of Idea's, that is, in the manner how the Mind perceives External Objects. There now remains only to explain a Cause, which may be call'd a Universal and General Cause of all our Errors; because we conceive no Error, but what depends in some measure on it. That Cause is, That Nothing having no Idea to represent it, the Mind is induc'd to believe, that things it has no Idea of, do not Exist.

It is certain, that the general Source of our Errors, as we have already often declar'd, is, because our Judgments have more Extension than our Perceptions. For when we consider some Object, we commonly behold it only on one side, and we are not contented with judging of so much as we have consider'd, but we also judge of the whole Object. Therefore it often happens that we are deceiv'd, because, though the thing be true on that part we have examin'd it, it commonly proves false on the other, and that which we believe to be true only proves likely. Moreover it is evident, that we should not judge absolutely of things as we do, if we did not think we had consi∣der'd them on all sides, or if we did not suppose them answerable to those we have examin'd. Therefore the

general Cause of our Errors, is, That having no Idea of the other sides of our Object, or of their difference from that which is present to our Mind; we fancy that those other sides are not, or at least we suppose that they have no particular difference.

This manner of proceeding seems pretty reasonable to us: For Nothing forming no Idea's in the Mind, we have some reason to believe, that those things which form no Idea's in the Mind, while they are examin'd, resemble Nothing. And that which con∣firms us in this Opinion, is, That we are perswaded, by a kind of Instinct, that the Idea's of things are due to our Nature, and that they are submitted to the Mind in such a manner, that they ought to present themselves before it, as soon as it desires it.

Nevertheless if we did but reflect on the present State of our Nature, * 1.2 we should not be so ready to believe, that we have all the Idea's of things as soon as we desire them. Man, as I may say, is only Flesh and Blood since the Fall. The least Impression of his Senses, and of his Passions, breaks the strongest Attention of his Mind; and the Course of the Spirits, and of the Blood, draws it away, and drives it con∣tinually towards Sensible Objects. It often strives in vain against the Torrent which drives it along; and 'tis but seldom that it makes any Opposition; for there is too much Delight in following it, and too much Fatigue to oppose it. Therefore the Mind is disgusted and sinks as soon as it makes the least Effort to take hold of, and to six upon some Truth: It is absolutely False in the State in which we are, that the Idea's of things are pre∣sent to our Mind whenever we have a Mind to consider them. Therefore we ought not to judge that things are not, only because we have no Idea's of them.

But though we should suppose Man to be ab∣solure Master of his Mind and of his Idea's, * 1.3 he would nevertheless be subject to Error by his Na∣ture: For the Mind of Man is limited, and a

Mind that is limited, is Naturally liable to Error. The reason of it is, the least things have many Relations among themselves, and nothing but an Infinite Mind can apprehend them. Therefore a limited Mind not being able to imbrace, or to apprehend all those Relations, whatever Effort it makes, is induc'd to believe, that those which it per∣ceives not, do not exist, particularly when we do not reflect on the Weakness and Limitation of our Mind, which is very usual. Thus the Limitation of the Mind alone, infers a Capability of falling into Error.

Nevertheless, if Men, even in the State of Weak∣ness and Depravations in which they are, did al∣ways make a good use of their Liberty, they would never be deceiv'd. And therefore all Men that fall into Error, are justly blam'd, and deserve to be punish'd: For if we would not be deceiv'd, we must only judge of what we see, and never make entire Judgments, but on such things which we are sure we have examin'd in all their parts, which we can do. But they had rather submit to Error, than to the Rule of Truth: They will decide without much difficulty and Examination. Therefore we need not wonder if they fall into many Errors, and very often make uncertain Judgments.

Men, for Example, * 1.4 have no other Idea's of Sub∣stance, than that of the Mind and Body; that is, Of a Substance that Thinks, and of a Substance that is Extended. And from thence they pretend to have a Right to conclude, that whatever Exists is Body or Spirit: Not that I pretend to affirm, that there is any Substance that is neither Body nor Spirit: For we ought never to affirm, that things Exist which we have no Knowledge of; since it is to be thought, that God who does not conceal his Works from us, would have given us some Idea's of them. Nevertheless I am of Opinion, that we ought not to determine any thing about the Number of Spe∣cies of Beings which God has Created, by the Idea's

we have of them; since it is absolutely possible that God may have Reasons to Conceal them from us, which we do not know; if it were only because those Beings having no Relation to us, it would be useless for us to know them: By the same reason as he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth of a Hand-worm, because it is not very material for the preservation of our Body, to have such a piercing Sight.

But though we think no body ought to Judge rash∣ly, that all Beings are Spirits or Bodies; we think ne∣vertheless, that it is directly contrary to Reason, that Philosophers in order to explain Natural Effects, should use other Idea's, than those that depend on Thought and Extension, since indeed they are the only we have, that are distinct or particular.

Nothing can be more unreasonable, than to imagin an Infinity of Beings upon bare Idea's of Logick; to impute an Infinity of Proprieties to them; and thus to endeavour to explain things we do not understand, by things which do not only conceive, but which is not possible for us to conceive. 'Tis just as if the Blind having a mind to speak of Colours among themselves, and to maintain a Thesis about them, should in order thereunto, make use of the Definitions which Philo∣sophers give them, and draw several Conclusions from the same. For as those Blind could only give pleasant and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours, because they could have no perfect Idea's of them, and yet would argue about them upon General and Logical Idea's: So Philosophers can never argue solidly upon the Effects of Nature, when to that end, they only make use of general Logical Idea's, of Act, Power, Being, Cause, Principle, Form, Quality, and the like. It is absolutely necessary for them only to rely on distinct and particu∣lar Idea's of Thought and Extension, and those they in∣clude, as Figure, Motion, &c. For it is in vain to pre∣tend to understand Nature, but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it; and it is better never to meditate, than upon Chimera's.

Nevertheless we cannot affirm that there are only Bodies and Spirits, Beings that think, and that are ex∣tended, because we may be deceiv'd in it. For though they are sufficient to Explain Nature, and conse∣quently we may conclude without fear of being de∣ceiv'd, that the Natural Things we have some know∣ledge of, depend on Extension and Thought; yet it is certainly possible, that there may be others of which we have no Idea, and of which we see no Effects.

Men therefore Judge rashly, when they Judge as an Infallible Principle, that all Substances are Bodies or Spirits. But they also infer a rash Conclusion from thence, when they conclude by the bare Testimony of Reason that God is a Spirit. It is true, that since we are Created after his Image and Likeness, and that Holy Writ teaches us in several Places that God is a Spirit, we ought to believe it, and to call him so: But Reason alone cannot teach it us. That tells us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfect; and that he is rather a Spirit than a Body, since our Soul is more perfect than our Body: But it does not assure us that there are no Beings besides more perfect than our Spirits; and more above our Spirits, than our Spirits are above our Bodies.

Now supposing that there were such Beings, (as it undeniably appears that it was in the power of God to Create such) it is clear that they would participate more of the likeness of God than we do. The same Reason teaches us, that God would sooner have the Perfections of their Beings than ours, which would only be Imperfections compar'd to them. Therefore we must not Judge rashly, that the word Spirit which we use to express what God is, and what we are, is an Equivocal Term, which signifies the same things, or things that are very like. God is more above Cre∣ated Spirits, than those Spirits are above Bodies; and we ought not so much to call God a Spirit to shew positively what he is, as to signifie that he is not Mate∣rial. He is a Being infinitely Perfect, no body can

question it. But as we must not imagin with the An∣thropomorphites, that he must have a Human Figure, because it seems to be most perfect, although we should suppose him Corporeal, neither must we imagin that the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts: And that his Spirit is like unto ours, because we know no∣thing that is more perfect than our Spirit. We must rather believe, that as he possesses the Perfections of Matter without being Material, since it is certain that Matter has a relation to some Perfections that are in God; he also possesses the Perfections of Created Spi∣rits, without being a Spirit in the manner as we con∣ceive Spirits: That his Name is, He that is; that is, the unlimited Being, the All-Being, the Infinite and Universal Being.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. The last General Cause of our Errors.
• * 1.2

  II. The Idea's of things are not present to the Mind as soon as 'tis desir'd.
• * 1.3

  III. All Et∣nite Minds are liable to Error.
• * 1.4

  IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies and Spirits created, nor that God is a Spirit as we con∣ceive Spi∣rits.