Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. VIII.

I. The Intimate Presence of the Wandering Idea of Being in General, is the Cause of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind, and of the greatest part of the Chimera's of common Philo∣sophy, which hinder many Philosophers from dis∣covering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philosophy.

II. Example concerning the Essence of Matter.

THE clear, intimate, necessary Presence of God, (I mean the Unlimited, Infinite, and General Being) with the Mind of Man, acts with more Force upon it, than the Presence of all Finite Objects. It is impossible that it should absolutely lay aside that general Idea of Being, because it cannot subsist out of God. Perhaps some might urge, that it may wander from it, because it may think on those particular Beings; but they would be mistaken: For when the Mind considers any Being in particular, it is not so far from removing from God, that it rather draws near, if I may so speak, to some of his Perfections, in removing from all others: However it removes from them in such a manner, that it never wholly loses the sight of them, and it is for the most part in a Condi∣tion to seek them out, and to draw near to them. They are always present to the Mind, but the Mind only perceives them in an inexplicable Confusion, because of its smallness, and the greatness of its Idea of Being. We may chance sometimes not to think on our selves; but I believe we cannot subsist one Mo∣ment without thinking on Being; and even at that very time when we fancy we think on nothing, we are of necessity full of the wandering and general Idea of Being. But whereas those things that are very usual in us, and which do not concern us, do not excite the Mind with any force, nor oblige

it to make any Reflection upon them; this Idea of Being, so Great, so Vast, so Real, and so Positive as it is, is yet familiar to us, and touches us so little, that we almost believe we do not see it; that we do not reflect upon it; that we afterwards judge there is but little Reality in it; and that it is only form'd by the confus'd mixture of all particular Idea's: Though on the contrary, it is in that alone, and by that alone, that we perceive all Beings in particular.

Although that Idea, which we receive by the im∣mediate Union we have with the Word of God, does never deceive us in it self, like those which we receive from it by means of the Union we have with our Body, which represent things to us different from what they are: Yet I am not afraid to say, that we make so ill a use of the best things, that the indelible Presence of that Idea is one of the principal Causes of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind; and con∣sequently of that Abstracted and Chimerical Philo∣sophy, which explains all Natural Effects by general Terms of Act, Power, Cause, Effect, Sustantial Forms, Faculties, occult Qualities, Sympathy, Anti∣pathy, &c. for it is certain that all those Terms, and many others, never excite any Idea's in the Mind, but such as are Wandering and General; that is, of those Idea's which present themselves to the Mind of their own accord, without Pain, or any Application on our part.

Let Men read with all Attention imaginable, all the Definitions and Explications which are given of Sub∣stantial Forms: Let them carefully inquire wherein the Essence of all those Entities does consist, which Philosophers fancy as they please, and in so great a Number, that they are oblig'd to make several Divi∣sions and Sub-divisions of them; and I am confident that they will never stir up any other Idea's in their Mind of all those things, than that of Being, and of Cause in General.

For this is what commonly happens to Philosophers: They see some new Effect; they immediately ima∣gine a new Being to produce it. Fire warms; there∣fore

there is some Being in the Fire which produces that Effect that is different from the matter which composes the Fire: And whereas Fire is capable of several different Effects; as of separating Bodies, of reducing them to Ashes and into Earth; of drying them, hardning them, softning them, dilating them, purifying them, &c. they liberally allow Fire as many Faculties or real Qualities, as it is capable of producing different Effects.

But those that reflect on the Definitions they give of those Faculties, will easily discover that they are only Logical Definitions, and that they excite no other Idea's than that of Being, and of Cause in General, which the Mind compares with the Effect which is produced: So that Men are not the more Learned, after having studied them very much; for all they get by that kind of Study, is, that they imagine they know better than others, what they notwithstanding do not know near so well; not only because they admit many Beings which never were, but also be∣cause being prejudiced, they make themselves incapa∣ble of conceiving, how it can be possible that matter alone, as that of Fire, being moved against Bodies differently disposed, should produce all the different Effects which we see Fire does produce.

It is Notorious to all those that have read a little, that most of the Books of Sciences, particularly those that treat of Natural Philosophy, Physick, Chymistry, and all the particular things of Nature, are full of Arguments grounded upon Elementary Qualities, Se∣cond Causes, as Attractive, Retentive, Digestive, Expulsive, and such like; upon others they call oc∣cult; upon Specifick Vittues, and upon several Beings which Men compose out of the General Idea of Being, and that of the Cause of the Effect which they see; which seems not possible to happen, unless by the Faculty they have of considering the Idea of the Being in General, which is ever present to their Mind, by the Infinite Presence of him that includes all Beings.

If common Philosophers would content themselves with publishing their Natural Philosophy barely as a Logick, which would furnish proper Terms to speak of the things of Nature; and if they would let those alone that fix distinct and particular Idea's to those Terms in order to be understood, no body would find fault with their proceeding. But they even pre∣tend to explain Nature by general and abstracted Idea's, as if Nature were Abstracted. And they will needs have it, that their Master Aristotle's Natural Philosophy is a real Natural Philosophy, which through∣ly explains things, and not meerly a Logick; though it contains nothing that is tolerable, besides some wan∣dering Definitions, and some Terms that are so general, that they may serve for all sorts of Philosophy. Lastly, They are so strangely conceited with all those Ima∣ginary Beings, and wandering undetermined Idea's, which naturally arise within their Mind, that they are Incapable of fixing their Mind long enough to consider the real Idea's of things, * 1.1 so as to discover the Solidity and Evidence of them. And this is the true Cause of the extream Ignorance they are in, as to the true Principles of Natural Philosophy. It is convenient to give some Proofs of it.

Most Philosophers do partly agree, That we ought to look upon that as the Essence of a thing, which we acknowledge to be the first in that thing, that which is Inseparable from it, and on which the Properties that agree to it do depend. So that to discover wherein the Essence of Matter does consist, we must look upon all the Properties that are agreeable to it, or which are included in the Idea we have of it; as Hardness, Soft∣ness, Fluidity, Motion, Rest, Figure, Divisibility, Impenetrability and Extension, in order to consider which of all these Attributes is Inseparable from it. Therefore since Fluidity, Hardness, Softness, Motion, Rest, may be separated from Matter, since there are several Bodies that are without Hardness, Fluidity, or Softness, that are not in motion; or lastly, that are not in Rest: It follows clearly, that all those Attributes are not Essential to it.

But there still remains four which we do conceive to be Inseparable from Matter, viz. Figure, Divi∣sibility, Impenetrability and Extension: So that in order to see which is the Attribute that is to be taken for the Essence, we must no longer think of dividing them, bu•• only to examine which is the first, and which supposes no other. It is easily apprehended, that Figure, Divisibility, and Impenetrability, supposes Ex∣tension, and that Extension supposes nothing; but as soon as it is given, Divisibility, Impenetrability, and Figure are given. Therefore we must conclude, That Extension is the Essence of Matter, supposing it has only the Attributes we have mentioned, or others like them; and I do not believe that any body in the World can question it, after serious Conside∣ration.

But the Difficulty is to know, whether Matter has not some other Attributes different from Extension, and from those that depend on it: So that Extension it self is not Essential to it, but supposes something that may be the Subject and Principle of it.

Several Persons, after having attentively consider'd the Idea they had of Matter by all its known Attri∣butes; and after having likewise meditated on the Effects of Nature, as much as the Powers and Capa∣city of the Mind will permit, have been strongly per∣swaded that Extension supposes nothing in Matter; whether it be that they have not had a distinct and particular Idea of that thing which may be believed to precede Extension, or whether they have seen no Effect to prove that thing.

For, as to be perswaded, that a Watch has no being different from the Matter whereof it is composed, it is sufficient to know, how the different disposition of the Wheels, can produce all the Motions of a Watch, without having any distinct Idea of that which might be the cause of those Motions, though several Logical ones might be given: So because those Persons have no distinct Idea of that thing which might be in mat∣ter, if Extension were taken from it; because they see no Attribute to discover it; and because, if Ex∣tension

be given, all the Attributes which we con∣ceive to belong to Matter, are given; and also that Matter is the cause of no Effect, but such as we may conceive Extension differently configur'd, and diversly agitated may produce; from whence they perswade themselves that Extension is the Essence of the Matter.

But whereas Men have no certain Demonstration, that there is no Intelligence or new Being created in the Wheels of a Watch: So no body can, without a particular Revelation, assert as a Geometrical Demon∣stration, that there is nothing in a Stone besides Ex∣tension diversly consigur'd: For Extension may abso∣lutely be joyn'd with something else which we do not conceive, because we have no Idea of it: Though it seems very unreasonable to believe and affirm it; since it is unreasonable to affirm what we neither know or conceive.

Nevertheless though we should suppose, that there is something besides Extension in Matter, that would not hinder (if rightly observ'd) Extension from being the Essence of it, according to the Desinition we have given of that word. For it is absolutely necessary that whatever is in the World, should be either a Being, or the manner of a Being; an attentive Mind cannot deny it. Now Extension is not the manner of a Being; therefore 'tis a Being. But whereas Matter is not a Composition of several Beings, like Man, who is composed of Body and Mind; since Matter is but one Being only, it is evident that Matter is only Extension.

Now to prove that Extension is not the manner of a Being, but that it is really a Being, we must ob∣serve that the manner of a Being cannot be conceiv'd, unless the Being, of which it is the manner, be con∣ceiv'd at the same time: It is impossible, for Example, to conceive Roundness without conceiving Extension, because the manner of a Being, is nothing but the Being it self so modified: The roundness of Wax, for instance, being nothing but the Wax it self so modified, it's evident that we cannot possibly conceive the man∣ner without the Being. Therefore if Extension were

the manner of a Being, we could not conceive this Extension without that Being, of which this Extension should be the manner. Nevertheless it is easily con∣ceiv'd by it self. Therefore it is not the manner of any Being, and consequently it is a Being it self. Thus it proves the Essence of Matter, since Matter is only one Being, and not a Compound of divers Beings as abovesaid.

But many Philosophers are so wedded to general Idea's, and Logical Entities, that their Mind is more taken up with them, than with those that are Parti∣cular, Distinct and Physical. This is sufficiently appa∣rent, in that their Arguments upon Natural Things, are only grounded upon Notions of Logick, Act and Power, and of an Infinite Number of Imaginary Entities, which they do not distinguish from those that are Real. Therefore those Men finding a wonderful Facility of seeing according to their own way, what they have a mind to see, fancy that they see better than others; and that they see distinctly that Exten∣sion supposes something, and that it is only a Propriety of Matter, of which it may even be divested.

Nevertheless, when they are desir'd to explain that thing, which they pretend to see in Matter besides Extension, they do it in different ways, which all shew that they have no other Idea of it than that of Being, or of Substance in General. This appears clearly to those that observe, that the said Idea in∣cludes no particular Attributes which are proper to Matter. For in removing Extension from Matter, they take away all the Attributes and all the Pro∣prieties which we distinctly conceive do belong to it, although one should leave that thing which they fancy to be the Essence of it: It is visible that they could neither make a Heaven nor Earth of it, nor any thing that we see. And on the contrary, in removing what they fancy to be the Essence of Matter, provided Ex∣tension be left, we leave all the Attributes and all the Proprieties, which we conceive to be distinctly in∣cluded in the Idea of Matter: For it is certain, that with Extension alone may be form'd a Heaven, an

Earth, and all the visible World, besides an infinite Number of others. Therefore, that something which they suppose besides Extension, having no Attributes, which can be distinctly conceiv'd to belong to it, and which are clearly included in the Idea we have of it, is nothing real, if we believe Reason; and it can be of no use to explain Natural Effects. And what they urge, that it is the Subject, and the Principle of Ex∣tension is spoken at random, without conceiving di∣stinctly what they say; that is, without having any other Idea thereof, than a General or Logical one, as of Subject and Principle.

So that one might still imagine a new Subject, and a new Principle of that Subject of Extension, and thus on ad Infinitum; because the Mind represents to it self general Idea's of Subject, and of Principles, as it pleases.

Indeed it's very probable, that Men would never have obscur'd the Idea they have of Matter so much, unless they had had some Reasons for it; and several maintain Sentiments contrary to ours, through Prin∣ciples of Divinity. Without doubt Extension is not the Effence of Matter, if that be contrary to Faith, we grant it. We are, Thanks be to God, fully per∣swaded of the Weakness and Limitation of the Hu∣mane Mind. We very well know, that it has too little Extent to measure an Insinite Power; That God can do Infinitely more than we can conceive; That he only gives us Idea's to know things that happen according to the Order of Nature, but he conceals the rest from us. Therefore we are ever ready to submit our Mind to Faith; but there must be better Proofs than those that are commonly alledg'd, to destroy the Reasons abovesaid, because the manner of Explaining the Mysteries of Faith is not of Faith, and they are believ'd, even without apprehending that the manner of them can ever be clearly explain'd.

We believe, for Example, the Mystery of the T••••nity, though the Humane Mind cannot conceive it; and nevertheless we believe, that things which do not dister from the same Third, do not di••••er among them∣selves;

though this Proposition seems to destroy it. For we are perswaded that we must never make use of our Mind, unless on Subjects that are proportion'd to its Capacity; and we must not look fixedly on Mysteries, for fear of being dazled by them, according to this Advertisement of the Holy Ghost: Qui scru∣tator est Majestatis opprimetur à Gsoria.

Nevertheless, if it were thought proper, for the Satisfaction of some Men, to explain how far the Opinion we have of Matter, agrees with what Faith teaches us about Transubstantion, we might perhaps do it clearly and distinctly enough, and without offending the Decisions of the Church; but we are of Opinion, that we may very well forbear making that Explication, especially in this Work.

For we must observe, that the Holy Fathers have mostly spoken of that Mystery, as of an Incomprehen∣sible Mystery; that they have not Philosophis'd to explain it; and that commonly they have only us'd Comparisons that have not much Exactness in them; fitter to discover the Doctrine, than to give an Expla∣nation that might satisfie the Mind: So that Tradi∣tion is for those who do not Philosophise upon that Mystery, and who submit their Mind to Faith, with∣out puzzling themselves to no purpose in those dissicult Questions.

Therefore it would be unreasonable to desire Philo∣sophers to give clear and easie Explanations of the manner how the Body of Jesus Christ is in the Eucha∣rist; for that would be to desire them to tell No∣velties in Divinity. And should Philosophers Impru∣dently answer that Question, they could not avoid the Condemnation either of their Philosophy, or of Divi∣nity: For if their Explanations were Obscure, the Principles of their Philosophy would be despis'd; and thould their Answer prove clear or easie, Men would reasonably suspect the Novelty of their Divinity.

Since then Novelty, in Point of Divinity, bears the Character of Error, and that Men have a Right to despise Opinions, only because they are new, and have no Foundation in Tradition; we ought not to under∣take

to give easie and intelligible Explanations of things, which the Fathers and the Councils have not fully explain'd; and it is sufficient to believe the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, without pretending to explain the manner of it. For otherwise we should spread Seeds of new Disputes and Quarrels, of which there are but too many already; and the Enemies of Truth would not fail to make a malicious use of it to oppress their Adversaries.

Disputes in Point of Explanations of Divinity, seem to me to be the most Useless and the most Dangerous; and they are the more to be fear'd, by reason that even Pious Persons think themselves oblig'd to break the Bonds of Charity with those that are not of their Opi∣nion. We have but too many Instances of it, and the reason of it is plain enough. Therefore it is always the best and safest way, not to be over-hasty in speak∣ing of things of which we have no Evidence, and which others are not disposed to conceive.

Neither must obscure and uncertain Explanations of the Mysteries of Faith, serve us as a Rule and Prin∣ciple to reason in Philosophy, in which nothing but Evidence ought to perswade us. We must not change the clear and distinct Idea's of Extension, Figure, and Local Motion, for these general and confuse Idea's of Principles, or of the Subject of Extension, of Form, and of Quiddities, of real Qualities, and of all those Mo∣tions of Generation, of Corruption, of Alteration, and the like, which differ from Local Motion. Real Idea's produce a Real Science, but the general Idea's of Lo∣gick will never produce any thing but a rambling, superficial and barren Science. Therefore it behoves us to consider attentively, those distinct and particular Idea's of things, in order to discover the Proprieties they include; and thus to study Nature, instead of losing our selves in Chimera's, which only exist in the Opinion of some Philosophers.

Notes

• * 1.1

  II. Of the Essence of Matter. If that De∣finition is receiv'd of the word Essence, all the rest is absolutely demonstra∣ted: If it be not re∣ceiv'd, it only re∣mains a question of Name, to know wherein consists the Essence of the Matter, or rather it cannot be question'd.