Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. VI.

That we see all things in God.

WE have examin'd in the preceding Chapter four different Manners in which the Humane Mind may see External Objects, which do not appear pro∣bable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone appears consonant to Reason, and the most proper to shew the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all their Thoughts.

In order to apprehend it rightly, we must remem∣ber what has been said in the preceding Chapter, that it is absolutely necessary that God should have in him∣self the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them; and that thus he sees all those Beings, by considering the Per∣fections which he includes in himself, and to which all Beings are related. Moreover, it is necessary to know that God is very strictly united to our Souls by his Presence, so that we may say that he is the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. These two things being supposed, it is certain that the Mind may see what there is in God, which represents Created Beings, since that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible, and most present to the Mind. Thus the Mind may see in God the Works of God, supposing God be will∣ing to discover to it what there is in him which re∣presents them. These are the Reasons which seem to prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite Number of Idea's in every Mind.

First, Although we do not absolutely deny, that God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Num∣ber of Beings, which represent Objects with every Mind he Creates; yet we ought not to believe that he does so. For it is not only consonant to Reason, but it also appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does by very difficult means, what may be done by a plain easie way: God does nothing in vain and without Reason: That which shews his Wisdom and his Power, is not to do little things by difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reason, and shews a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it is to do great things by plain easie Means. 'Tis thus that out of Extension only he produces whatever we see that is admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For those who will needs have Substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to perform their Functions, at the same time seem to argue that God wants Understanding, or that he cannot do those ad∣mirable

things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Soveraign Wisdom, by the smallness of their own Capacity. Then since God may make Humane Minds see all things, by willing barely that they should see what is in themselves; that is, what is in him that has a relation to those things, and which represents them, there is no pro∣bability that he would do it otherwise; and that he should produce, in order thereunto, as many In∣finities of Infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are Created Spirits.

But we must observe, that we are not to conclude, that Spirits see the Essence of God, because they can see all things in God in that manner: Since what they see is very Imperfect; but that God is very Perfect: They see Matter Divisible and Figured, &c. and there is nothing in God that is Divisible or Figured; for God is all Beings, because he is Infinite and Compre∣hends all; but he is no Being in particular. Never∣theless that which we see is but one, or several Beings in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfect Simplicity of God which includes all Beings. Besides that it may be said, that we do not so much see the Idea's of things, as the things which those Idea's re∣present; for when we see a Square, for instance, we do not say that we see the Idea of that Square, which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which is without us.

The Second Reason which may induce us to be∣lieve, that we see all Beings, because God Wills, that that which is in him, which represents them, should be discover'd to us; and not because we have as many Idea's created with us as we can see things; for this puts all created Spirits in an absolute Dependence upon God, and the greatest that can be: For this being so, we cannot only see nothing, but what God is willing we should see, but we can also see nothing, unless God himself shews it us. * 1.1 Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid à nobis, tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. 'Tis God himself which instructs and enlightens Philosophers in that Knowledge which

ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an imme∣diate Gift from Heaven: Deus enim illis manifestavit. * 1.2 It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the Father of Light or Knowledge. Pater Luminum. * 1.3 It is he that teaches Wisdom to Men: * 1.4 Qui docet homi∣nem scientiam. In a word, He is the true Light, which enlightens all those that come into this World: Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc Mundum. * 1.5

For in fine, It is pretty difficult distinctly to appre∣hend the Dependence which our Minds have on God in all their particular Actions, supposing they have all that which we distinctly know to be necessary for them in order to Act, or all the Idea's of things pre∣sent to their Mind, and truly that general and con∣fused word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence that Creatures have on God, does not awaken any distinct Idea in an attentive Mind; and yet it is very necessary Men should know distinctly, that they can do nothing without God.

But the strongest of all Reasons, is the manner how the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every body knows by Experience, that when we have a mind to think on any thing in particular, we first cast our Eyes on all Beings; and in the next place we apply our selves to the Consideration of the Object we design to think on. Now it is most certain that we see it already, though confusedly and in general: So that as we may desire to see all the Beings, some∣times one and sometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are present to our Mind; and it appears that all Beings can only be present to our Mind, be∣cause God is present to it, that is, He who includes all things in the Simplicity of his Being.

It seems moreover, That the Mind would not be capable of representing to it self universal Idea's of Kinds and Species, &c. unless it saw all Beings in∣cluded in one. For every Creature being a parti∣cular Being, we cannot say that we see any thing Created, when we see, for instance, a Triangle in

general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impossi∣ble to give a good Reason of the Manner how the Mind comes to know several abstracted and general Truths, unless it be by the presence of him that can direct the Mind in a World of different Manners.

In fine, The Best, the most Sublime, the most Solid, and the chief Proof of the Existence of God, or that which supposes the fewest things, is the Idea we have of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and that it has a very distinct Idea of God, which it can only have by the Union it has with him; since it cannot be conceiv'd that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as that we have of God, should be any thing that is Created.

But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive a Being, without considering whether it is Finite or Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we must needs retrench something of that general Notion of a Being, which consequently must precede. Thus the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity; and that Idea is so far from being form'd by the confused Mix∣ture of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as Philo∣sophers imagine; that on the contrary all those parti∣cular Idea's are only Participations of the general Idea of Infinity: As God does not derive his Being from the Creatures, but all Creatures only subsist by him.

The last Proof, which perhaps will be a Demon∣stration to those that are used to abstracted Arguments, is this, It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself: It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capa∣ble of any Reflection; and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for himself. Therefore it is necessary, that not only our Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind, should tend towards him: But more∣over, That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon it, should make us know any thing that

is in him; for whatever comes from God can only be for God. Should God Create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun: In my Opinion, God would Create that Spi∣rit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not for him.

God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his Works, unless that Spirit sees God in some measure, by beholding his Works. So that we may say, that unless we do see God in some measure, we should see nothing: In like manner, unless we do Love God, I mean, unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general, we should Love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing, nor Will any thing without him; since we cannot Love particular Goods, without determining towards those Goods, the motion of Love, which God gives us towards him. So that as we Love nothing but by the necessa∣ry Love we have for God, so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God: And all the particular Idea's we have of Creatures, are only Limi∣tations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations of the motion for the Creator.

I believe there are no Divines but what will grant, that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of: And St. Austin and some other Fathers af∣firm as an undeniable thing, That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners, and Eternal Truths. So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body. Thus St. Austin speaks: * 1.6 Ab illa incommutabili luce veritatis, etiam impius, dum ab ea avertitur, quo∣dammodo tangitur. Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem, & multa rectè riprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant, nisi in quibus vident, quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ʋbi autem eas vi∣dent? Neque enim in sua natura. Nam cùm procul du∣bio mente ista videantur, corumque mentes constet esse mu∣tabiles, has vero regula•• immutabiles, videat quisquis in eis & hoc videre potuerit — ubinam ergo sunt istae regulae

Scriptae, nisi in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur, unde lex omnis justa describitur—inqua videt quid operandum sit, etiam qui operatur injustitiam, & ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur.

There are many passages in St. Austin like unto this. by which he proves, that we see God even in this Life, by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth is uncreated, Immutable, Immense, Eternal, above all things. It is true by it self. It derives its Perfection from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfect; and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing but God can have all those Perfections. Therefore Truth is God. We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths. Therefore we see God. These are St. Austin's Reasons, ours differ a little from them; and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly, to second our Sentiment.

We believe that Truths, even those that are Eter∣nal; as that twice two are four, are not so much as ab∣solute Beings: So far are we from believing that they are in God. For it is visible, that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality, which is between twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths, as St. Austin says, but in seeing the Idea's of those Truths: For Idea's are real, but the Equality between the Idea's, which is Truth, has no reality. When for example, Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards; the Cloth and the Yards are real: But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Be∣ing; it is only a relation that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth. When we say that twice Two are Four. the Idea's of the Numbers are real; but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation. Thus according to our Sentiment we see God, when we see Eternal Truths; not that those Eternal Truths are God, but because the Idea's on which those Truths depend are in God; perhaps St. Austin understood it so. We also believe, that we know in God Change∣able and Corrubtible things, although St. Austin only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things; be∣cause

it is not necessary for that to place any Imper∣fection in God; since it suffices, as we have already said, that God should shew us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things.

But though I say, we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible, it must be observ'd, that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God, but only that it is from God who Acts in us; for God Knows sensible things, but he does not Feel them. When we perceive any thing that is sensible, Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception. Sensation is a Modification of our Soul, and it is God that Causes it in us: And he may Cause it, though he has it not, because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Sensation, it is in God, we see it, because it is his pleasure to discover it to us: And God joins Sensation to the Idea, when Objects are present, to the end that we may be∣lieve them as they are; and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in rela∣tion to them.

Lastly, We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God, but with some difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eter∣nal Truths, and even the Beings which God has made according to those Truths, or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the Word, or Wisdom of God which directs them, as we have shewn; But 'tis by the Impression they re∣ceive continually from the Will of God, which inclines them to him, and endeavours, as it were, to render their Will absolutely like unto his; that they know Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal Laws: How we must love Good, and fly from Evil: That we must love Justice more than all Riches: That it is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all those Laws is not different from the knowledge of that Impression, which they always feel in themselves, though they do not always follow it by the free choice of their Will; which they know to be

Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally strong in all.

It is by that Dependance, Relation, and Union of our Mind to the Word of God, and of our Will to his Love, that we are made after the Image and Likeness of God: And although this may be very much defac'd by Sin, yet it is necessary that it should subsist as long as we do. But if we bear the Image of the Word humbled upon Earth; and if we follow the Motions of the Holy Ghost, that Primitive Image of our first Creation, that Union of our Mind with the Word of the Father, and to the Love of the Father and of the Son, will be re-established, and render'd indelible. We shall be like God, if we are like the Man God. In fine, God will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more per∣fect manner than that by which it is necessary for us to subsist, that we should be in him, and he in us.

Here are some reasons which may perswade us, * 1.7 that Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Pre∣sence of him who Comprehends all in the Simplicity of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according to the Internal Conviction he shall receive of it, after having seriously consider'd it. But 'tis thought that there will be no probability in all the other ways of explaining these things; and that this last will appear more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God in all respects. For as it is he who makes them feel Grief, Pleasure, and all other Sensations, by the Na∣tural Union he has Establish'd between them and our Body, which is no other than his Decree and general Will. Thus it is he, who by the Natural Union which he has made between the Will of Man, and the Re∣presentation of the Idea's which the Immensity of the Divine Being includes, that makes them know what∣ever they do know; and that Natural Union is also nothing else but his general Will. So that none but he can direct us, by representing all things to us; as none but he can make us Happy, by making us taste all manner of Pleasures.

Let us therefore keep to this Opinion, That God is the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the

material World is the place of Bodies. That they receive all their Modifications from his Power: That they find all their Idea's in his Wisdom: And that it is by his Love that they are acted in all their regular Motions; and since his Power and Love are nothing but himself, let us believe with St. Paul, that he is not far from every one of us; and that it is in him we have Life, Motion, and a Being. * 1.8 Non longe est ab uno∣quoque nostrum, in ipso enim vivimus, movemur, & sumus.

Notes

• * 1.1

  2 ad Cor. 3.5.
• * 1.2

  Rom. 1.19
• * 1.3

  Jac. 1.17.
• * 1.4

  Psa. 53.
• * 1.5

  Joan 1.9.
• * 1.6

  L. 14. de Trin. c. 3.
• * 1.7

  See the Ex∣planations.
• * 1.8

  Act. A∣post. c. 17.28.