Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. V.

That the Mind neither sees the Essence, nor Ex∣istence of Objects, in considering its own Per∣fections. That none but God sees them in that manner.

THE Fourth Opinion is, That the Mind stands in need of nothing besides it self, to perceive Ob∣jects; and that it can, in considering it self and its own Perfections, discover all things that are with∣out it.

It is certain that the Soul sees within it self, and without Idea's, all the Sensations and Passions it is capable of, as Pleasure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, its Love, its Hatred, Joy and Sadness, &c. because all the Sensations and Passions of the Soul represent nothing External which is like them; and because they are only Modifications, which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the Difficulty is, to know whether the Idea's which repre∣sent something that is without the Soul, and which resembles them in some measure, as the Idea's of a Sun, a House, a Horse, a River, &c. are only Modi∣fications of the Soul; insomuch that the Soul cannot stand in need of any thing besides it self, to represent to it self all External Things.

There are Persons who make no Scruple to affirm, That the Soul being made to think, it has in it self, I mean, in considering its own Perfections, whatever is necessary to perceive Objects; for indeed the Soul being nobler than all the things it conceives distinctly, it may be said, that it contains them in some measure Eminently, according to the Notions of the Schools; that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than they are in themselves. They pretend, that thus Superior things comprehend the Perfections of those that are Inferior. And thus being the Noblest of the

Creatures they know; they fancy they have in them∣selves, after a Spiritual Manner, all that is in the visible World. In a word, They will have the Soul to be like an Intelligible World, which comprehends in it self, whatever the Material and Sensible World com∣prehends; nay, Infinitely more.

But in my Opinion it is a great Presumption to maintain that Thought: If I am not mistaken, it is Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the Desire of resembling him who comprehends all Beings in himself, which Confounds the Mind, and inclines us to believe, we possess what we have not: Do not say that you are a Light to your self, says St. Austin; for there is none but God who is a Light to himself, and who can, in considering himself, see whatever he has produced, or can produce.

It is certain that there was none but God alone before the World was Created, and he could not pro∣duce it without Knowledge and without Idea's: Con∣sequently those Idea's which God had of the World, are not different from himself; and thus all Crea∣tures, even the most Material and most Terrestrial, are in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual, which we cannot apprehend. God therefore sees all Beings in himself, in considering his own Perfections which represent them to him. He also knows their Existence perfectly, for since the Existence of all things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Igno∣rant of their Existence. And thus God does not only see in himself the Essence of all things, but also their Existence.

But the case is different as to Created Spirits, they can neither see the Essence of things, nor their Ex∣istence within themselves: They cannot see their Essence within themselves, because being very much limited, they do not contain all Beings, like God whom we may call the Universal Being, or plainly He that is, as he calls himself. Since therefore the Humane Mind may know all Beings and Infinite Beings, and yet not contain them, it is a certain Proof, that it does

not see their Essence in it self. For the Mind does not only see sometimes one thing, and sometimes another successively, it also actually perceives Infinity though it does not comprehend it. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the same time, it is absolutely Impossible that it should see within it self what is not there. Therefore it does not see the Essence of things in considering its own Per∣fections, or by modifying it self diversly.

Neither does it see their Existence within it self, because the Existence of Beings do not depend upon its Will; and because the Idea's of those Beings may be present to the Mind, though they do not Exist; for every body may have the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in Nature: And though we rely on the report of the Senses to judge of the Existence of Objects; neverthe∣less Reason does not assure us, that we should always believe our Senses, since we find clearly that they de∣ceive us. When a Man's Blood, for instance, is very much inflam'd; or barely when he Sleeps, he some∣times beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which nevertheless are not present, and which perhaps never were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within it self, nor by it self, that the Mind sees the Existence of things, but that in this case it depends upon some other things.

Notes

• Dic quia tu tibi lu∣men non es. Serm. 8. De Verbis Do∣mini.