Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. IV.

That we do not see Objects by the Means of Idea's which were created with us. And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occa∣sion for them.

THE Third Opinion is, That of those who say all Idea's are created with us.

To discover the Improbability of this Opinion, it will be necessary to consider that there is many diffe∣rent things in the World of which we have Idea's. But to speak only of simple Figures, it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we con∣sider but one only, as the Ellipsis, we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of diffe∣rent Kinds of them, when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the other always continue the same.

So the heighth of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely, the base being always the same, we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them: And also, which I desire may be consider'd here, The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number, although we can ima∣gine but very few of them; and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of different Kinds. But what must chiefly

be observed is, That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of diffe∣rent Kinds is sufficient to prove, That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea's: And in short, If we comprehend not their Infinity, 'tis not the Defect of the Idea's, or that Infinity is not represented to us, but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind. If a Man should apply himself to consider the Pro∣perties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles, although he should eternally continue this sort of Study, he would never want new and particular Idea's, but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued.

What I have said of Triangles, may be applied to five, six, a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand sided Figures, and so on ad infinitum. Now if the sides of a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite Kinds, it is plain that four, five, or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are.

The Mind then sees all these things; it hath Idea's of them; and these Idea's would never fail it, although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only: And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden, or comprehended not their Infinity, 'tis only because its Extension is very much limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's: Do I say an infinite Number? It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures to be consider'd: So that since there is an infinite Num∣ber of different Figures, it's necessary that to know the Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's.

Now I ask, If it's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man? For my part it does not appear so to me; chiefly, since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner, as we shall soon see. For as God always acts by the most simple

ways, it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects, by admitting the Creation of an in∣finite Number of Beings, since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way.

But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's, which are necessary for it to see things, it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them: For instance, how it can represent the Sun to it self, whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body?

For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain, resembles not the Idea we have thereof, as has been elsewhere proved; and since the Soul per∣ceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceiva∣ble how it should exactly guess, amongst these infinite Number of Idea's that it has, which it must represent to it self, to imagine or to see the Sun: We cannot therefore say, That the Idea's of things were created with us, it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us.

Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment, as we perceive different things; this has been sufficiently refuted from what has been said in this Chapter. Besides it is necessary that at all times we actually have in our selves the Idea's of all things, since we are always able to think of all things; which we could not if we perceiv'd them already con∣fusedly; that is, If an infinite Number of Idea's were not present to our Minds; for we cannot will to think of Objects, of which we have no Idea.