Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. III.

That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's. The Cause of Mens Error, in reference to this Subject.

THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon, and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Ob∣jects make upon Bodies, although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them; they believe that 'tis in this, that Man is made after the Image of God, and participates of his Power, That even as God Created all things out of nothing,

and can reduce them to nothing again, and then Cre∣ate them anew; so Man can Create, and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases. But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which ex∣tol a Man, these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original, and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd.

This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having, to represent Objects, and of doing many other particular actions, is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance, as independance is commonly explain'd; it is also a Chimerical Participation, which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine. They depend much more than they think, upon the Goodness and Mercy of God: But this is not a place to explain these things. It's enough if we endeavour to shew, that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive.

No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings, since they have real Properties, since they differ from one another, and represent all different things; Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual, and very different from the Bodies which they represent. But it seems reasonable to doubt, whether Idea's, by whose means we see Bodies, are not more Noble than the Bo∣dies themselves: for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly, as we shall see hereafter. Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please, we shall be in danger of perswading our selves, to make more Noble and Perfect Beings, than the World which God hath Created. However, some do not re∣flect upon it, because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing, since it is not to be felt; or else if they look upon it as a Being, 'tis a very mean, contempti∣ble one, because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind.

But supposing it true, that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings, yet they are Beings, and Spiri∣tual Ones; and Men not having the power of Be∣lieving,

it follows that they cannot produce them; for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd, is a true Creation; and although Men en∣deavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion, by saying, that the production of Idea's pre∣supposes something else, but Creation nothing; yet the difficulty is not solv'd by this Subterfuge.

For we ought to consider, that it is not more diffi∣cult to produce something out of nothing, than to pro∣duce one thing out of another; which cannot at all contribute to its Production. For example, it is not more difficult to Create an Angel, than to produce him from a Stone; because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different, it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Production of Bread, Gold, &c. for a Stone, Gold, and Bread, are but the same thing differently configur'd, and are all Material.

It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone, than to pronuce him out of nothing; because to make an Angel out of a Stone; (so far as it can be done) the Stone must be annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; But simply to Create an Angel, nothing is to be annihilated. If therefore the Mind produces its Idea's from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects, it must always do the same thing, or a thing as difficult, or even more difficult than if it Created them; since Idea's being Spiritual, they cannot be produc'd of material Images, which have no proportion with them.

But if it be said, that an Idea is not a Substance, I consent to it, yet it is always something that is Spiri∣tual; and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit, although a Square be not a Substance, so it is also impossible to Form a Material Substance from a Spiritual Idea, although an Idea was no Substance.

But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Soveraign Power to Annihilate, and Create the Idea's of things, yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them; for even as a Painter, how skilful soever he be, could not represent an Animal

which he had never seen, and of which he never had any Idea: So that the Picture which he should make, should be like to this unknown Animal. Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object, if he knew it not before, that is, if he has not already had some Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will; and if he already had an Idea of it, he certainly knows this Object, and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew. It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's. It might be said perhaps, that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Idea's which it does not pro∣duce; and that those which it produces are particular, more clear and distinct; but it is always the same thing. For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person, so as to be sure that he hath perfected it, if he had had no distinct Idea of him; and even if the Person had not been present: Thus the Mind, for example, which could only have the Idea of a Being, or an Animal in general, could not re∣present to its self a Horse, nor Form a distinct Idea of one, and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse, if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second: Now if it had a first, it is un∣useful to Form a second; and the Question respects this first. Therefore, &c.

It's true, that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection, we can also imagin it, that is, perceive it in our selves, by tracing an Image of it in the Brain; yet it must be first observ'd, that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image: But it will be too long to explain it here. Secondly, So far is the se∣cond Idea which accompanies this Image, from being more distinct and more exact than the other, that on the contrary, it is not so Exact, because it resembles the first, which was only a pattern for the second. For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding; but only that they ap∣ply them more to the Mind; for the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct, but only so

far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection: The Image of a Square for example, which the Ima∣gination Traces in the Brain, is not exact and perfect, but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square, which we conceive by pure Intellection. It is this Idea which regulates this Image, 'tis the Mind which Con∣ducts the Imagination; and which Obliges it, if we may so say, to behold from time to time, whether the Image it Paints, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whose Angles are alike. In a word, whether what it Imagins, is like to what it Conceives.

After what has been said, I do not believe it can be doubted, but those are deceived, who affirm, the Mind is able to Form the Idea's of Objects; since they at∣tribute the Power of Creation to the Mind, and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order, although it has no knowledge of what it does; for that is not Con∣ceivable: But the cause of their Error is, that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect, when both are joined together, supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them. That makes all the World conclude, that a Bowl put in Mo∣tion, and meeting another, is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it; as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm, and other the like prejudices; because it always happens, that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it: As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will, and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion.

But when an Effect does not so often follow some∣thing which is not the Cause of it, there is neverthe∣less a great many Men, who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens.; yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error. For instance, if a Comet appears, and after this Comet a Prince Dies: Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon, and they are eaten with Worms: The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child, and something extraordinary happens to this Child: All this is enough to perswade a great many Men, that the Comet, the Moon, and

the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars, are the Causes of these Effects, and others like them; and the rea∣son why all the World does not believe it, is, that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes.

But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Ob∣jects present to their Minds as soon as they wish it, and it happening many times in a day, almost all con∣clude, that the Will which accompanies the producti∣on, or rather the presence of Idea's, is truly the Cause of them: Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to; and they imagin the Idea's no longer Exist, when the Mind sees them no longer; and that they revive again anew, when they are again represented to the Mind.

'Tis for these Reasons some Judge, that External Objects emit Images which resemble them, as we have mention'd in the precedent Chapter: For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves, but only by their Idea's, they judge the Object produces the Idea; because as soon as it is present they see it; and as soon as absent they see it no longer; and because the pre∣sence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us.

Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this, that the Idea's of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them, they should only con∣clude, that according to the Order of Nature, their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea's. Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind, and much less, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to con∣clude, that Objects emit Species resembling them, be∣cause the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present; but only that the Object is for the most part necessary, in order to the Idea's being pre∣sent to the Mind. And lastly, that a Bowl put into Motion, is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way, since the first had not the power of Motion in its self. They can only determin, that the meeting of two Bowls is

an occasion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Universal Cause of all things, in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first; that is, to speak more clearly, in willing that the last should ac∣quire so much more Motion as the first lost; for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them, as we shall shew else∣where.

Notes

• Tanto me∣liora esse judico qua oculis cer∣no, quanto pro sui na∣tura vici∣niora sunt iisquae ani∣mointelligo Aug. 63. de Vera Religione.
• See Ch. 3. Of the Se∣cond Part of Method.