Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. XI.

Examples of some Errors of Morality which de∣pend on the same Principle.

THe Faculty of the Mind imagining and suppo∣sing Resemblances where-ever it perceives no Visible Differences, also engages most Men into Errors, which are yet more dangerous in Points of Morality. Here are some Examples of them.

A French Man meets an English Man, or an Ita∣lian: That Stranger has peculiar Humours: He has a Niceness of Mind; or if you please, he is Haugh∣ty and Troublesome. This will at first induce this French-man to Judge, that all English-men, or Ita∣lians, have the same Character of Mind with the Person they have convers'd with. He will Praise, or Blame them all in General: And if he meets with any other, he will fancy at first that he is like unto him he has already seen; and therefore will suf∣fer himself to be inclin'd to some Affection or secret Aversion towards him. In a word, he will Judge of all the Individuals of those Nations by this famous proof, that he has seen one or many that had cer∣tain Qualifications of Mind: Because he knew not whether the rest were different, supposing them all alike.

A Religious of some Order commits a fault: This is a sufficient Reason for those who know it to Con∣demn all the Individuals of that Order indifferent∣ly. They all wear the same Habit, and have the same Name, they are alike in that: This is e∣nough for the Common Sort of Men to Fancy that they are all alike. They suppose that they are all alike, because not being able to search into their Hearts, they cannot see positively whether they differ.

Calumuiators, who study how to Blast the Repu∣tation of their Enemies, commonly make use of this, and Experience teaches us that it succeeds for the most part. And indeed it is very suitable to the Capacity of the Common Sort of Mankind. For it is not difficult to find in numerous Communities, though never so Holy, some irregular Persons, or such as have Ill Sentiments; since in the Company of the Apostles, of which Jesus Christ himself was the Head, there was a Thief, a Traitor, an Hypocrite; in a word, a Judas.

The Jews without doubt, would have been very much to blame, to pass an Ill Judgment against the most Holy Society that ever was, because of the Avarice and Fault of Judas; and if they had Condemned them all in their Hearts, because they suffered that Ill Man among them; and Jesus Christ himself did not punish him, though he was sensible of his Crimes.

Therefore it is a manifest Fault against Reason, and Breach of Charity to pretend, That a Commu∣nity is in some Error, because some of their Members were so, although the Heads should dissemble it, or were the promoters of it themselves. It is true, that when all the Members will defend an Error, or Fault of their Brother, the whole Community may be thought Guilty; but that seldom or never happens; for it seems morally impossible that all the Members of an Order should have the same Sentiments.

Men therefore should never conclude thus from Par∣ticulars to Generals; but they cannot Judge simply of what they see, they always fly out into Excess. A Religious of such an Order is a Great Man, an Honest Man; they conclude that all the Order is composed of Great Men, of Good Men. Likewise a Religious of an Order has Ill Sentiments: Therefore all that Order is Corrupted, and has Ill Sentiments. But these last Judgments are far more dangerous than the first; because it is a Duty to Judge well of our Neigh∣bours, and the Malignity of Man occasions that Ill

Judgments, and Discourses held against the Reputa∣tion of others, make a stronger Impression upon the Mind than advantageous Judgments and Discourses do.

When a Worldly Man, who iudulges his Passions, fixes strongly upon his Opinion, and pretends in the heighth of his Inclination, that he is in the right to in∣dulge it, Men Judge reasonably that he is obstinate, and he owns it himself as soon as his Passion is over. So when a Pious Person, who is perswaded of what he says, and who has discover'd the Truth of Religi∣on, and the Vanity of Worldly Things, endeavours according to that Knowledge to reform the Vices of others, and reprehends them with some Zeal, Men of the World also take him to be an obstinate Man; and therefore they conclude that Devout Men are obstinate. They Judge moreover, that Good Men are far more obstinate than Vain, Ill Men; because the latter only defending their Ill Opinions according to the different Motions of the Blood, and Passi∣ons, they cannot continue long in their Sentiments: They come to themselves again. Whereas persons of Piety remain steddy; because their Foundation is un∣alterable, and does not depend on a thing so inconstant as the Circulation of the Blood.

Therefore ordinary Men conclude, that Pious Men are obstinate as well as the Vicious: Because they are as Passionate for Truth and Virtue, as Ill Men are for Vice and Falshood. Both speak almost in the same manner, to maintain their Sentiments; they are alike in that, though they differ in the main. This is sufficient for those who do not weigh the dif∣ference of Reasons, to Judge that they are alike in all things, because they are alike in that manner, which every Body is capable to Judge of.

Devout Persons are not then obstinate, they are only steddy, as they ought to be; But the Vicious and Libertines are always obstinate, though they should not persist one Hour in their Sentiments: Because Men are only obstinate when they defend a False

Opinion, although they should only defend it a little while.

This is the Case of some Philosophers, who have maintain'd Chimerical Opinions, which they lay aside at last. They would have those who defend constant Truths, whose certainty they see evidently, to part with them as bare Opinions, as they have done with those they had foolishly been prejudic'd with. And because it is difficult to have a deference for them in prejudice of Truth; as also because the Love we have Naturally for it, inclines us to defend it earnestly, they Judge us to be obstinate.

Those Men are to blame to defend their Chimera's obstinately; but the others are in the right to defend Truth with Vigour and Steddiness of Mind. The manner of both is the same, but their Sentiments are different; and it is that difference of Sentiment, which makes the one constant, and the others obstinate.