Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. I.

I. Of our Inclination to imitate others in all things; which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination.

II. Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination.

III. What a Strong Imagination is.

IV. That there are several sorts of it: Of Mad Men, and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant.

V. Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination.

VI. Of the Power they have to Perswade and Impose.

HAving Explain'd the Nature of Imagina∣tion, the Defects to which it is subject, and how our own Imagination leads us into Error, there nothing more remains for us to Discourse of in this Second Book, but of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginati∣ons, and that is, of the Prevailing Power which some Men have to engage others in their Errors.

Strong Imaginations are extreamly Contagious; they prevail over those that are weak; they make 'em stoop to their own Laws, and imprint upon 'em their own Characters. Therefore, because Men that have particular Idea's, and a Strong and Vigorous Imagina∣tion, most commonly exceed the Bounds of Reason, there are few more General Causes of Error than this pernicious Communication of the Imagination.

For the better understanding what this Contagion is, and how it is transmitted from one to another, we must consider that all Men have need of one another, and that they are made to compose, among themselves, several Bodies, of which the Parts should have a mu∣tual Correspondence one with another; for the up∣holding of which Union it is, that God has command∣ed 'em to be Charitable one toward another; but be∣cause Self-Love might by little and little extinguish Charity, and by that means dissolve the Bond of Civil Society, the Almighty judg'd it convenient that Men should be united together by Natural Ties, which might subsist when Charity fail'd, and which might defend it against the Efforts of Self-Love.

These Natural Ties which are common to us with Beasts, consist in a certain Disposition of the Brain, with which all Men are endued, to imitate those with whom they Converse, to make the same Judgments which they do, and to be subject to the same Passions of the Mind to which they are subject. And this same Disposition usually unites Men together much more close and firmly than Charity grounded upon Reason, which sort of Charity is very rare.

Unless a Man be endu'd with this same Disposition of the Brain, to partake of our Sentiments and our Pas∣sions, he is incapable of his own Nature to unite him∣self with us, and compose one Body. He is like those Stones of an irregular form, for which there is no room in a Building, because they cannot be joined to the rest.

Oderunt hilarem tristes, tristem{que} jocosi, Sedatum celeres, agilem gnavum{que} remissi.

It requires a larger Portion of Vertue than Men are aware of, not to break with those that no way sympathize with our Passions, but whose Sentiments are in all things contrary to ours. Nor is it altoge∣ther without Reason: For when a Man has good cause to be Sad or Joyful, 'tis in some measure an Af∣front not to correspond with him in his Sentiments. If he be Sad, 'tis not proper to appear before him with a brisk and jolly Air, which argues Gladness, and which strongly imprints the Motions of it in his Imagination; for this is to put him out of that Con∣dition which is most convenient and pleasing to him, Sadness being the most delightful of all the Passions to a Man in Misery.

All Men therefore have a certain Disposition of the Brain, * 1.1 which naturally inclines 'em to be affected after the same manner as some of those with whom they Converse. Now there are two Principal Causes that foment and increase this Disposition, the first is in the Soul, the second in the Body: The first consists in the Natural Propensity of Men to Grandeur and Advance∣ment. This Propensity it is, which imperceptibly ex∣cites us to imitate Persons of Quality, in their manner of Speaking, Walking, Dress, and Outward Air. This is the Original of New Modes, of the Instability of living Languages, and of certain general Cor∣ruptions of Manners. This is the chief Origine of all Extravagant and Fantastick Novelties, which are not supported by Reason, but Human Fancy and Pleasure.

The other Cause which much incline to imitate others, and which we ought chiefly to Discourse of here, consists in a certain Impression which Persons of a Strong Imagination make upon Feeble Minds, and upon Tender and Delicate Brains. * 1.2 I un∣derstand by a Strong and Vigorous Imagination that Constitution of the Brain which makes it capable of Traces extreamly deep, and fill the Receptacle of the Mind in such a manner, that it cannot attend to other things than such as the Images themselves represent to it.

There are two sorts of Persons who have a Strong Imagination in this Sense. * 1.3 The first receive these deep Traces by an Unvoluntary and Irregular Impression of the Animal Spirits; and the others, of whom we intend principally to Discourse here, receive 'em from a certain Disposition which is observ'd in the Sub∣stance of the Brains.

'Tis visible that the first are absolute Mad Men, seeing they are constrain'd by the Natural Connexion which is between their Idea's and their Traces, to think upon things not thought of by others with whom they Converse; which renders 'em incapable of speak∣ing to the purpose, and answering directly to Questi∣ons that are ask'd 'em.

There are an infinite number of this sort of People who only differ in the more or the less; and it may be said, that all such as are agitated with some violent Passion are of their number, since at the time of their Emotion, the Animal Spirits so forcibly imprint the Traces and Images of their Passion, that they are incapable of thinking upon any thing else.

But 'tis to be observ'd, that all these sort of Per∣sons are not capable of corrupting the Imagination of any Man, let his Mind be never so weak, and his Brain never so soft and delicate; and this for two Reasons. The first, Because they are not able to an∣swer conformably to the Idea's of others, they can perswade 'em to nothing; And secondly, Because the Disturbance of their Mind being altogether manifest, whatever they say is hearken'd to with contempt.

Nevertheless, 'tis true that Passionate Persons put us into Passions, and make Impressions in our Imagina∣tion like those with which they themselves are affected. But in regard their Transports are manifestly visible, we resist those Impressions, and get rid of 'em soon after. They rub out of themselves, when they are not fomented by the Cause that produc'd 'em, that is to say, when the Transported Persons are departed out of our presence, and when the sensible sight of the Characters, which Passion form'd in the Counte∣nance, produces no farther Alteration in the Fibres of

our Brain, nor any Agitation in our Animal Spirits.

I only Examine here that sort of Strong and Vigo∣rous Imagination which consists in a Disposition of the Brain proper to receive very deep Traces of more feeble and less active Objects.

'Tis no defect, to have a Brain proper for a Strong Imagination of Things, and for the Reception of the most distinct and lively Images of the most inconsi∣derable Objects, provided that the Mind be always Mistress of the Imagination, that these Images be imprinted by her Orders, and that they may be de∣fac'd when she pleases; for hence arises sagacity and strength of Wit. But when the Imagination over∣rules the Soul, and these Traces form themselves by the Disposition of the Brain, and by the Activity of the Objects and Spirits, without expecting the Or∣ders of the Will, this is a most Mischievous Vice, and a kind of Madness. We shall therefore endeavour to set forth the Character of those who have a Strong Imagination of this sort.

To that purpose it behoves us to remember that the Receptacle of the Mind is confin'd to narrow limits. 2. That it is fill'd with no Object more easily than with the Sensations of the Mind, and generally with the Perceptions of Objects that affect us very much. 3. That the deep Traces of the Brain are always ac∣companied with Sensations, or other Perceptions that vigorously affect us. For thereby 'tis easie to know the Genuine Characters of their Wit who have a Strong Imagination.

The first is, * 1.4 that these Persons are not capable of giving a sound Judgment of things that are a little difficult and perplext, because the Receptacle of the Mind being fill'd with Idea's that are by Nature con∣nex'd with those very deep Traces, they have not the Liberty to think of several things at the same time. But in Compound Questions, 'tis requisite that the Mind should survey with one quick and suddain mo∣tion the Idea's of many things, and discover, at one single view, the Correspondencies and Connexions that

are necessary for the resolving of those Questions.

All Men know by their own Experience, that they are not capable of applying themselves to the Search of any Truth, at such time as they are afflicted with any violent Pain, because then, there are in the Brain those deep Traces which take up the Capacity of the Mind. Thus, those Persons of whom we speak, ha∣ving deeper Traces of the same Objects, (as we sup∣pose) they cannot have so great an Extension of Mind, nor comprehend so many things together as the others. The first Defect of these Persons is to have a narrow Wit, and how much the narrower it is, so much the deeper Traces their Brain receives of inconsiderable Objects.

The second Defect is, they are Visionaries, yet after a Delicate Manner, and difficult to be dis∣cover'd. The Vulgar sort of Men believe 'em not to be such; there are none but just and clear Wits that perceive their Visions, and the Deviations of their Imagination.

Now that we may be able to conceive the Original of this Defect, 'tis necessary to remember what we have said at the beginning of the second Book: That as to those things which are acted in the Brain, the Senses and Imagination differ only in the more and less; that it is by reason of the largeness and deepness of the Traces, that the Mind becomes sensible of Objects; that it judges of 'em as present, and capable of affecting it, and so near it as to make it sensible of Pain and Pleasure. For when the Traces of an Ob∣ject are small, the Soul imagines only that same Ob∣ject; it does not judge it to be present, nor does it look upon it to be very great or very considerable; but as the Traces become deeper and greater, the Mind also judges that the Object becomes greater and more considerable, approaches nearer to us, and lastly is more apt to affect and injure us.

Those Visionaries of whom we here discourse, are not arriv'd to that Excess of Folly, to believe they see present before their Eyes those Objects which are Ab∣sent. The Traces of their Brain are not yet deep

enough; they are but half Mad; were they absolute∣ly so, 'twere in vain for us to talk of 'em here. See∣ing that all Men being sensible of their Errors, they would not suffer themselves to be deluded by 'em. They are not Visionaries in respect of the Senses, but only in reference to the Imagination. Madmen are Visionaries in reference to the Senses, because they see not Things as they are, and many times believe they see those Things which are not. However 'tis evi∣dent that Visionaries in reference to the Senses, and in reference to the Imagination, differ only in the more and less; neither is the Passing from one Condition to the other very difficult. Whence it comes to pass, that the Distemper of Mind in the latter, ought to be re∣presented by comparing it with the Distemper of the former, which is more manifest, and more strongly affects the Mind; since in things which differ no o∣therwise than in the more or less, those things that less sensibly affect us are always to be explain'd by those things that affect us more vehemently.

The second Defect of those who have a strong and vigorous Imagination, is, that they are Visionaries as to the Imagination, or barely Visionaries; for we call those Madmen, that are Visionaries in reference to the Senses. And thus we have enumerated the Vices of Visionary or Fantastick Wits.

These People exceed their Bounds in every thing; they extol mean and abject things; they magnifie small things, and bring remote things near to the sight. No∣thing appears to 'em what it really is. They admire every thing; they exclaim against every thing with∣out Discretion. If they are naturally dispos'd to be fearful; I mean, if their Animal Spirits are in small quantity, without vigor, without motion, they are afraid of every thing, they tremble at the shaking of a Leaf. But if they abound in Blood and Spirits, which is most usual, they feed themselves with vain Hopes, and give themselves up to their Imagination which is fruitful in Idea's, and according to the Pro∣verb, they build Castles in the Air, with extraordi∣nary joy and satisfaction. They are vehement in their

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Passions, obstinate in their Opinions, always full of, and highly satisfied in the Contemplation of them∣selves. When they have a fancy to be accounted fa∣mous Wits, and to set up for Authors, (for there are Authors of all sorts, as well Visionaries as others;) What Extravagancies, what Deliriums, what Ravings are they not guilty of! They never imitate Nature, every thing is affected, forced, and rapturous; they rather Skip and Leap than Walk, they speak in Mea∣sure, they utter nothing but Figures and Hyperboles. If they addict themselves to Godliness, and to follow it according to their own Fancies, they put on a Spi∣rit of Judaism and Pharisaic Hypocrisie; their Minds are altogether intent upon the outside of things, Ex∣ternal Ceremonies, and performances of no moment: They become scrupulous, fearful, and superstitious. If you will believe them, every thing belongs to Faith, and every thing is Essential, except what really belongs to Faith, and what is truly Essential. For many times their Minds being taken up with Duties of little moment, they neglect the more useful and more important Precepts of the Gospel, in reference to Justice, Mercy, and Faith. What needs any more? They that desire to be convinc'd of these Defects, and many others, need only to consider what passes in their daily Conversations.

But they that have a Strong and Vigorous Imagi∣nation are endu'd with other Qualities, which 'tis very necessary for us to explain in this Place. We have only spoken hitherto of their Defects, we are now to Discourse of their Vertues and Prerogatives; among which they have one that principally regards our sub∣ject; for by means of that Prerogative they rule over the Minds of the Vulgar, obtrude their Idea's upon 'em, and communicate to 'em all those false Impres∣sions with which they are affected.

This Prerogative consists in a strong and vigorous manner of expressing themselves, * 1.5 though it be not na∣tural. They who have a strong Imagination of things, express 'em vigorously, and perswade all those who are convin••••••, rather by outward shew, and sensible

Impression, than by the force of Reason. For the Brains of those who excel in Strength of Imagination, admitting deep Traces of the Subjects which they imagine, as we have said before, those Traces for the most part are not imprinted without a great Com∣motion of the Animal Spirits, which dispose the whole Body after a quick and lively manner to express the Cogitations of the Mind. Thus the Air of their Face, the Tone of their Voice, and Elegancy of Speech en∣livening their Expressions, they gain Attention of their Spectators and Hearers, and prepare 'em to receive Mechanically the Impression of the Image that vio∣lently moves 'em. For in short, those things that are deeply infus'd into our Mind, are usually as deeply infus'd by us into the Minds of others. He that is mov'd by a vehement Passion, still moves others with the same Passion; and though his Rhetoric be often Irregular, yet for all that, 'tis very perswasive: Be∣cause the External Air and Gesture, as being most sen∣sible, acts more vigorously upon the Imagination of Men, than the most solid Arguments, that are se∣dately pronounced, because those Ratiocinations nei∣ther flatter the Senses, nor strike the Imagination.

Persons then, who excel in Imagination, have the advantage to please, to affect, and perswade, because they form the most lively and sensible Images of their thoughts. But there are other Causes that contribute to their easie gaining upon the Mind: For they never Discourse but upon easie Subjects, and such as are within the reach of Vulgar Apprehensions: They never make use of other Expressions and Terms than such as only excite the Confus'd Notions of the Senses, which always most vehemently affect us: They never talk of Sublime and Difficult Matters but after a Ram∣bling manner, and by way of Common Places: For they dare not venture themselves to dive into Particu∣lars, and stick close to Principles; whither it be, be∣cause they do not understand those Matters; or whe∣ther they are afraid lest they should for want of Terms intangle themselves, and tire the Minds of those that are not accustom'd to a serious Attention.

From what has been said, it is easie to judge, that the Vie••s of an Irregular Imagination are extreamly Contagious and th•••• they very easily insinuate and dispe••••e themselves into the Minds of most People. But they who have a Strong Imagination, being usu∣ally En••••••es to Reason and good Sense, because of their want of Wit, and the Phantomes of their Brain, to which they are subject, it may be thence readily in∣ferr'd, that there are few Causes of our Errors more universal, than the Contagious Communication of the Disorders and Distempers of the Imagination. But we ought to prove these Truths by Examples and Ex∣periments Familiar to all the World.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Two Princi∣pal Causes that in∣crease our Inclination to imitate one another.
• * 1.2

  What a Strong Imagina∣tion is.
• * 1.3

  Two sorts of it.
• * 1.4

  Two consi∣derable De∣fects in those who have a Strong Ima∣gination.
• * 1.5

  That they who have a st••ong Ima∣gination castly per∣suade others.