Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. VIII.

I. Of the Inventors of New Systems.

II. The last Error of Studious Persons.

WE have shew'd the State of the Imagination of Stu∣dious Persons, who abandon themselves wholly to the Authority of certain Authors: There are others, who are very much opposite to them. These are a sort of Persons that never respect any Authors, what∣ever esteem they have among the Learned: If they had a Value for them once, they have since chang'd their Minds, and now they set up themselves for Au∣thors. They would fain become the Inventors of some New Opinion, thereby to acquire some Reputation in the World; and they assure themselves, that if they can but say something that has not been said al∣ready, they shall not fail of Admirers.

These sort of Men have usually a strong Imagina∣tion, the Fibres of their Brain are of such a Nature, that they preserve a long time, the Traces that are im∣printed in them. Thus, when they have once ima∣gin'd a System that has some Probability, 'tis impossi∣ble to undeceive them of their Error: They retain, and tenderly preserve all things, that may be ser∣viceable,

in any manner, to confirm it. On the other side, they never take notice of the Objections which are made against it, or else they evade them by some frivolous distinction. Inwardly they please them∣selves with the sight of their Work, and with the Re∣putation which they hope to get by it. They only ap∣ply themselves to consider the Image of Truth, which their probable Opinions carry: They keep that Image fix'd before their Eyes, but they never stedfastly be∣hold those other sides of their Sentiments, which would discover the falshood of them.

Great Endowments are requir'd for the framing of any true System; it's necessary that there be a great vivacity and sharpness, besides a certain sublimeness and extension of Judgment, able to survey a great number of things at the same time. Men of mean parts, with all their vivacity, and all their delicacy, are too short sighted, to see what is necessary for the Composing of a System; they stoop at some little dif∣ficulties that discourage them, or at some glimmerings that dazle them: They have not a fight sharp enough to survey the whole Body of a large subject, all at a time.

But let the Extent and Penetration of the Mind, be never so great, if it be not withal exempt from Passion and Prejudice, there is little to be expected from it; Prejudices possess one part of the Mind, and infect the rest; Passions confound the Idea's a thousand ways, and represent to us, in Objects, whatever we desire to find there. That Passion also, which we have for Truth it self, sometimes deceives us, when it is too vehement; but the desire of ap∣pearing Learned, is that which drives us farthest off from attaining true Knowledge.

There is nothing more rate, than to meet with Persons capable of making new Systems; but it is not so rare a thing, to meet with such as have compos'd Systems after their own Fancies. There are few People, that Study much, who argue according to Common Notions, there is always some Irregulari••y in their Idea's; and this sufficiently shews, that they

rely upon some particular Systems, which is not known to us: 'Tis true, that all the Books which they Compose do not make it manifest; for when we settle our selves to Write any Book, which we design to Publish, we take heed, as near as is possible, of what is to be said; and this Attention alone, is oft∣times sufficient to convince us of our Error. Never∣theless, we see from time to time, some Books which prove sufficiently what we have said; for there are Authors, who pride themselves in observing, at the beginning of their Book, that they have invented some new System.

The Number of Inventors of New Systems, is also very much augmented, by Prejudices conceiv'd against some Authors; for it often happens, that because they have not met with any thing true or solid, in the Opinions of those Authors which they have read, they fall, in the first place, into a great dislike and scorn of all sorts of Books, and afterwards imagine a new Opinion, that carries some Probability, which they greedily embrace, and which becomes more deeply rooted in them, in such manner as we have set forth.

But when this extraordinary Zeal, which they have for their Opinion, grows cool, or the design of transmitting it to the Publick, has oblig'd them to examine it more exactly and seriously, they discover, and quit the falshood; but with this condition, that they will never embrace any others, and will con∣demn all those who pretend to have discover'd any Truth.

Therefore the last, * 1.1 and most dangerous Error of Studious Persons, is this, that they believe there is nothing can be certainly known: They have read ma∣ny Books, both Ancient and Modern, wherein they could not meet with Truth; they have had several curious Thoughts, which, upon a more strict Exami∣nation, they have found false. From whence they conclude, that all Men are like them, and that if they, who believe they have consider'd some Truths, would but a little more seriously consider them, they would

be convinc'd of their Errors, as well as themselves. This to them, is sufficient to condemn 'em without entring into any farther particular Examination; since, if they did not condemn 'em, it would in some measure be an acknowledgment, that they had more Wit than themselves; which they are not apt to think very probable.

Therefore they esteem, as obstinate, all those that hold any thing for certain; nor will they by any means hear talk of the Sciences as Evident Truths, which are beyond all contradiction, but only as Opinions of which it is not convenient to be ignorant: However these Persons ought to consider, that though they have read a great number of Books, yet they have not read all, or at least with that attention which is re∣quisite for the right understanding 'em; or if they had many curious thoughts which they sound false in the conclusion, it does not follow they had all the thoughts they might have had; and so it's possible that others have done better than they. For all this, it is not necessary that the others should have more Sense than they, if that be the business that offends 'em, for it's enough that they were only more Fortu∣nate; Nor is there any wrong done 'em by those who profess to know evidently what they are ignorant of, since they say at the same time, that several Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths; not for want of good Wits, but because these good Wits did not first light upon them.

Let 'em not then be offended, if others see more clearly than they, and speak as they see. Let 'em ap∣ply their Minds to what is propos'd to 'em, (if their Wit be more capable of Application, after all their Wandrings) and let 'em then judge: there's no body will hinder 'em; but let 'em be patient and hold their Tongues, if they resolve to examine nothing. Let 'em consider a little, whether the Answer, which they usually give to most Questions that are ask'd 'em, they know nothing of the ma••••••••, no Body has hithert•• attain'd it, be a Judicious Answer•• since that when they make that Answer, they must believe they know

all that other Men know, or all that other Men can know. For if they had not these thoughts of them∣selves, their Answer were still more impertinent. And why do they think it so difficult a thing to con∣fess they know nothing of it, when upon certain Oc∣casions they grant that they knew nothing at all? And wherefore must they conclude that all other Men are ignorant, because they are inwardly convinc'd that they themselves are ignorant?

There are these three sorts of Persons who apply themselves to Study. The first doat to little purpose upon some Author, or some false unuseful Science. The second are prepossest in their own Fancies. The last, which partake of the Qualifications of both the former, are they who imagine they know all that can be known; and who being persuaded that they know nothing of certainty, conclude in general, that no∣thing can be evidently known; and look upon all things that are propos'd to 'em as meer Opinions.

'Tis easie to see that all the Defects of these three sorts of Persons, depend upon the Properties of the Imagination, which we have explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters, but chiefly in the First, that all this befalls 'em only through Prejudices, in Opi∣nions that blind their Minds, and will not permit 'em to apprehend any other Objects than those of their Prepossessions. It may be said that their Prejudices act their Minds, as the Ministers of Princes do in re∣ference to their Masters. For as those Persons, do, as much as in 'em lies, never permit any but such as are devoted to their Interests, or such as they are no way afraid of, to speak to their Masters; so the Pre∣judices of these Men will not permit the Mind to behold with a fixed Eye the Idea's of Objects that are wholly pure and unmix'd; but they disguise 'em; they cover 'em with their Liveries, and present 'em in that manner all masqu'd; so that 'tis a difficult thing for 'em to undeceive themselves, and acknowledge their Errors.

Notes

• * 1.1

  II. A consi∣•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Er∣ror of Sta∣dions Per∣sons.