Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. VI.

That Studious Persons are usually prejudic'd in favour of some Author, so that their Principal Aim is to know what he believ'd, without minding what he ought to believe.

THere is another fault of great consequence, where∣into great Students usually fall; which is, That they Dote upon some certain Author. If there be any thing true and good in the Book, they cry it up even to excess; every thing is true, the whole is good, every thing in it is to be admir'd. They please themselves with admiring what they understand not, and they would have all the World admire it as well as themselves. They assume Honour to themselves, from the Praises which they give to those obscure Authors, because thereby they perswade others that they understand them perfectly well; and this affords them no small occasion of Vanity. They va∣lue

themselves above other Men, because they believe they understand a Piece of Impertinency in an Old Author, or in a Man that, perhaps, never understood himself. How many Learned Men have Sweated, to Illustrate some obscure Passages of the Ancient Philo∣sophers and Poets; and how many great Wits are there, who make it their whole delight to Criticize upon a Word, or the Sentiment of an Author: But 'tis convenient to bring some Instance for what I alledge.

The Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul, is, without all doubt, a Question of great Im∣portance. The Philosophers are not to be blam'd, for using all their endeavours to resolve it; and tho' they compile large Volumes, to prove, tho' weakly enough, a Truth that may be demonstrated in a few Words, or in a few Pages at most, yet they are excu∣sable. But who can refrain from laughing, to see them put themselves to such a World of Trouble, to decide what Aristotle thought of it: 'Tis, in my Opinion, a thing of little benefit to those that live now, to know whether there were ever such a Man who was call'd Aristotle; whether that Man ever wrote those Books which go under his Name; whe∣ther he meant such or such a thing, in such a part of his Works; it can neither make a Man more Wise, or more Happy: But 'tis of great Importance to know, whether what he has said be true or false in it self.

'Tis to no purpose then, to know what Aristotle be∣liev'd touching the Immortality of the Soul, tho' it be of great moment to know that the Soul is Immortal. However, we are not afraid to assert, that several Learned Men have put themselves to more trouble, to know the Opinion of Aristotle, upon this subject, than the Truth of the Thing in it self, since there are some who have compos'd whole Folio's, on purpose to un∣fold what that Philosopher believ'd of it, but never did so much to know what he ought to have believ'd of it.

But tho' so great a number of People have tir'd their Brains, to resolve what was Aristotle's Opinion, they labour'd all to no purpose, since they cannot as yet agree about this trifling Question; which shews, that the Followers of Aristotle are very Unfortunate, to have a Man so obscure to enlighten them; and who himself affected obscurity, as he testifies in a Letter which he wrote to Alexander.

The Opinion then, of Aristotle, touching the Immor∣tality of the Soul, has been at several times a very great Question, and very considerable among Studi∣ous Persons; but because it may not be thought that I talk at Random, and without any Foundation, I am oblig'd to recite in this place a passage out of La Cerda, somewhat long, and somewhat tedious, wherein that Au∣thor has heap'd together as many different Authorities upon that subject, as upon a Question of great mo∣ment. His words are these that follow, upon the second Chapter of Tertullian, de Resurrectione Carnis.

Quaestio haec in scholis utrimque validis suspicionibus agitatur, num animam immortalem, mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles. Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseve∣raverunt Aristotelem posuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos. Hi sunt è Graecis & Latinis interpretibus Am∣monius uterque, Olympiodorus, Philoponus, Simplicius, Avicenna, uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. de examine va∣nitatis Cap. 9. Theodorus, Metochytes, Themistius, S. Tho∣mas 2. contra gentes cap. 79. & Phys. lect. 12. & praete∣rea 12. Metap. lect. 3. & quodlib. 10. qu. 5. art. 1. Al∣bertus, tract. 2. de anima cap. 20. & Tract. 3. cap. 13. Aegidius lib. 3. de anima ad cap. 4. Durandus in 2. dist. 18. qu. 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes, & late Eu∣gubinus l. 9. de perenni Philosophia cap. 18. & quod plu∣ris est, discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus, magistri men∣tem & ore & calamo novisse peritus qui poterat.

In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres, nec in∣firmi Philosophi; Justinus in sua Parainesi, Origenes in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & ut fertur Nazianz. in disp. contra Eu∣nom. & Nyssenus l. 2. de anima cap. 4. Theodoretus de cu∣randis Graecorum affectibus l. 3. Galenus in historia Phi∣losophicâ, Pomponatius l. de immortalitate animae, Simon

Portius l. de mente humana; Caietanus 3. de anima cap. 2. In eum sensum, ut caducum animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles, sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aphodis auditore, qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristotelicam mentem; quamvis Eugubinus cap. 21. & 22. eum excu∣set. Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander morta∣litatem, nempe ex 12. Metaph. inde S. Thomas, Theodo∣rus, Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt.

Porro Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo; sed putasse in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem. Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque. Nam cum hic adscri∣bat Aristoteli mortalitatem animae, tamen l. de anima c. 6. pro contrario opinione immortalitatis citat. Eadem men∣te fuit Plutarchus, pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in l. 5. de placitis Philosop. Nam cap. 1. mortalitatem tribuit, & cap. 25. immortalitatem. Ex Scholasticis etiam, qui in neutram partem Aristotelem con∣stantem judicant, sed dubium & ancipitem, sunt Scotus in 4. dist. 43. qu. 2. art. 2. Harveus quodlib. 1. qu. 11. & 1. senten. dist. 1. qu. 1. Niphus in Opusculo de immortalitate animae cap. 1. & recentes alii interpretes: quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem, sed scholii lex vetat, ut autoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam.

We give ye all these Citations for true, upon the Credit of the Commentator, believing it would be loss of time to justifie them; and because we have not all the Books from whence they were Extracted. Nor do we add any new ones, because we do not envy him the Honour of having well collected them, and for that it would be still more loss of time, had we a desire to do it, tho' we should only, for that pur∣pose, turn over the Indices of the Commentators up∣on Aristotle.

We see then, by this passage of La Cerda, that Studious Men, who pass for able Scholars, have put themselves to the Trouble to know what Aristotle be∣liev'd of the Immortality of the Soul, and that there were some of them that never scrupled to Write Books on purpose, upon this subject; among whom was Pomponatius: For the principal Aim of that Au∣thor, in his Book, is to shew that Aristotle believ'd the

Soul to be Mortal. And, perhaps, there are some People, who do not only enquire what Aristotle be∣liev'd upon this subject, but also, look upon it as a Question of great Importance to know, whether, for Example, Tertullian, Plutarch, or others, believ'd or not, that the Opinion of Aristotle was, that the Soul was Mortal, as we have great reason to believe of La Cerda himself, if we consider the last part of the Passage which we have cited, viz. Porro Tertullianum, &c.

If it be not very Profitable to know what Aristotle thought, concerning the Immortality of the Soul, nor what Tertullian and Plutarch thought what Aristotle be∣liev'd, however, the main of the Question about the Immortality, or Mortality of the Soul, is, at least, a Truth very necessary to be known. But there are an infinite number of things, the knowledge of which is very unnecessary, and of which, by consequence, 'tis to yet less purpose to know what the Ancients thought of them: Nevertheless, they put themselves to a World of trouble, to guess at the Sentiments of Philo∣sophers upon subjects of the like Nature. We meet with Books full of these Inquisitions, and these are the Trisles that have rais'd so many Wars among the Learned. These vain and impertinent Questions, these frivolous Genealogies of unprofitable Opinions, are the Important subjects of the Criticisms of the Learned: They imagine themselves the Absolute Masters of the Genealogical History of substantial Forms, and the World is Ingrateful if it does not ac∣knowledge their Merit. How do these things dis∣play the Weakness and Vanity of Human Wit! When Reason does not, that regulates our Studies; our Stu∣dies not only grow incapable of perfecting Reason, but even darken, corrupt, and absolutely pervert it. But 'tis necessary here to observe, that in Questions concerning Faith, they are no way to blame, who search what St. Austin, for Example, or any other Fa∣thers of the Church, have believ'd concerning those things; as neither are they, who enquire whither St. Austin believ'd what they believ'd who preceded

him, because we cannot attain to Matters of Faith, but by Tradition, Reason not being able to discover them. The most Ancient Belief being the most true, 'tis requisite to know what was that Belief of the An∣cients, which cannot be done but by examining the Opinions of several Persons, who succeeded each other at different times. But in things that depend upon Reason, the case is alter'd, and there is a necessity for Men to trouble themselves what the Ancients be∣liev'd, that we may know what is needful for our selves to believe concerning them: Nevertheless, I know not through what confusion of the Mind, cer∣tain People are affrighted, if we speak otherwise in Philosophy than Aristotle; but are never mov'd, if we speak otherwise in Divinity than the Gospel, the Fa∣thers, and the Councils. It seems to me, that they who make the loudest noise against the Novelties of Philosophy, which ought to be esteem'd; are they that favour and defend Innovations in Divinity, with the greatest obstinacy, and which ought to be detested. For 'tis not their Language which we blame, as being Authorized by Custom, tho' altogether unknown to Antiquity, but the Errors which they disperse abroad, or which they maintain under the Protection of their confus'd and equivocal Terms.

In Matters of Divinity, we shou'd follow Antiquity, because we ought to love Truth, and because Truth is found in Antiquity: 'Tis necessary that all Curiosity shou'd cease, whence once we have sound out the Truth, but in Matters of Philosophy 'tis quire the con∣trary: we ought to love Novelty, for the same reason that we ought always to love the Truth; we must search after it, and have an uncessant Curiosity for it. If we thought that Aristotle, and Plato, were Infal∣lible, it wou'd be sufficient for us to apply our selves to understand them, but Reason will not permit us to believe it; for, on the contrary, it requires that we shou'd believe them more ignorant than the New Phi∣losophers, since the World is now grown older by two thousand Years, and has more Experience than it had in Aristotle's and Plato's Days, as we have already

said; and because the New Philosophers may not on∣ly know all the Truths which the Ancients have left behind them, but may likewise discover many others: Nevertheless, Reason forbids us to believe these New Philosophers upon their own Words, rather than the Ancients. It requires, on the contrary, that we should diligently examine their Thoughts, and refuse our Assent, till it is impossible for us, any longer, to doubt the certainty of their Truth; without being ridicu∣lously prepossed with their great Learning, or other Qualities of their Wit.