Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

About this Item

Title
Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.
Author
Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715.
Publication
London :: Printed for J. Dunton ... and S. Manship ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A51655.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A51655.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 9, 2024.

Pages

Page 187

CHAP. V.

Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination.

THis same False and unworthy Respect, which Men have for the Ancients, produces a great number of most pernicious Effects, which it is convenient to observe.

The first is, that want of using their own Judg∣ment, does, by little and little, really disable Men from making any use of it at all. For it is not to be ima∣gin'd, that they who grow old over the Volumes of Plato and Aristotle, make use of their Judgment; they commonly spend so much time in the Reading of those Books, only to endeavour to know the Sen∣timents of their Authors; and their principal aim is, to know certainly what Opinions they held, without ever troubling themselves much, whither they be consentaneous to Reason or no, as we shall prove in the following Chapter. Thus the Science, and Philosophy which they learn, is properly a Science of Memory, and not a Science of Judgment: They only under∣stand Histories, and Matters of Fact, not evident Truths; and they are rather Historians than true Phi∣losophers.

The second Effect, which the Reading of the An∣cients produces in the Imagination, is, that it puts a strange confusion into all their Idea's who apply themselves to it. There are two different ways to read Authors; the one very good, and very prosita∣ble; the other very useless, and even dangerous 'Tis very profitable to read, when we meditate upon what we read: When Men endeavour to find out, by some effect of their Wit, how to resolve the Questions which they meet with in the Titles of the Chapters, before they begin to read them: When they digest, and compare the Idea's of things one with another:

Page 188

In a word, when they make use of their Reason. On the other side, there is no Profit in Reading, when Men understand not what they read; but 'tis dan∣gerous for Men to read, and conceive what they read, when they never examine it sufficiently, to make a good Judgment of it; especially, if they have Memo∣ry enough to retain what they have conceiv'd, and do not unwarily assent to what they have read and understood. The first way enlightens the Mind, it fortifies it, and enlarges its Capacity: The second contracts its Extension, and by little and little, renders it both weak, obscure and confus'd.

Now the greatest part of those who boast of know∣ing the Opinions of others, never Study but after the second Manner; and so the more Reading they have, the more their Judgment becomes Feeble and Con∣fus'd. The Reason is, because the Traces of their Brains are confounded one with another, being very numerous; and because Reason has not digested 'em in order; which hinders the Mind from imagining and representing clearly to it self the Things which it stands in need of. When the Mind goes about to open certain Traces, meeting with others more fa∣miliar, it never seeks another Passage. For the Ca∣paciousness of the Brain not being Infinite, 'tis impos∣sible but the great number of Traces form'd irre∣gularly, must interfere one with another, and cause a Confusion among the Idea's: 'Tis for this very Rea∣son, that Persons that have great Memories are in∣capable of judging such things as require much at∣tention.

But that which is chiefly to be observed is this, that the Knowledge they acquire, who Read without Meditation, are only to retain the Opinions of o∣thers. In a word, that all Sciences that depend upon the Memory, are properly these kinds of Knowledge that puff Men up, because they make a great noise, and infuse a World of Vanity into those that possess them. Thus, they who are learned after that man∣ner, being usually full of Pride and Presumption, pre∣tend they have a Right to Judge of every thing, tho'

Page 189

they are very uncapable; which causes them to fall into a great number of Errors.

But this false Knowledge does more mischief still; for these Persons fall not alone into Error, they draw along with them almost all the Minds of the Vulgar sort, and a very great Number of young People, who believe all their Decisions as so many Articles of Faith. These falsely Learned, having often prevail'd over them, with the weight of their profound Learn∣ing, and having deafned them, as well with extraor∣dinary Opinions, as with the Names of ancient and unknown Authors, have gain'd so powerful an Autho∣rity over them, that they respect and admire, as Ora∣cles, whatever they utter, and no less unadvisedly, embrace all their Sentiments. Persons also, much much Ingenious, and more Judicious, who had never known them before, or could not be inform'd by others what they are, hearing them talk at such a rate, and with so haughty, so imperious, and grave an Air, would have much ado to refrain their respect and esteem for what they say, because it is a difficult thing to forbear paying somewhat to Air and Deport∣ment: For, as it often happens, that a Man who is fierce and daring, abuses others who are stronger, but more prudent and moderate than himself; so they, who maintain Things which are neither true nor pro∣bable, put their Adversaries to Silence, by speaking after an imperious, haughty, and grave manner, which surprizes them. Now these People, of whom we speak, have a high Conceit of themselves, and de∣spise other Men, as being fortify'd with a certain Air of Pride, intermix'd with Gravity, and a Counterfeit Modesty, which prepossesses, and wins those that hear them.

For it is to be observ'd, that all the different Airs of Persons of different Conditions, are only the Natu∣ral consequences of that Esteem which every Man has of himself, in reference to others, as it is easie to per∣ceive, if we never so little consider it. Thus the Air of Fierceness and Brutality, is that of a Man, that magnifies himself, and little values the Merit of others.

Page 190

The Modest Air, is that of a Man, who has a low Conceit of himself, a high Esteem for others. The Grave Air, is that of a Man, who has a high Conceit of himself, and greatly Ambitious of others Esteem. And the Simple Air, is that of one who has no great Conceit either of himself, or of any body else. So that all the different Airs, which are almost Infinite, are only the Effects which the different Degrees of Esteem that Men have of themselves, or of those with whom they Converse, naturally produce in our looks, and over all the Exterior parts of our Bo∣dies. We have in the Fourth Chapter, explain'd the Correspondence between the Nerves that raise the Passions within us, and those which demonstrate them outwardly, by the Air which they Imprint upon the Face.

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