Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. IV.

I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error,

II. The Reasons why they rather choose to follow Autho∣thority, than make use of their Judgment.

THE Differences that are in the various Manners of Mens Living, are almost Infinite. There are a great Number of different Conditions, Employ∣ments, and Societies. These Differences are the rea∣son, that almost all Men pursue different Designs, and argue upon different Principles. It would be very difficult to meet with several Persons, who have absolutely the same Prospects in one, and the same Community, wherein particular Persons ought to be all of the same Spirit, and have the same Designs: Their different Employs and Conversation, do neces∣sarily give a different Turn and Humour in the way of Managing the Execution of those Things in which they agree: This shews, that it would be an impossible Undertaking to particularize the Moral Causes of Error. But besides, it would be of no use to do it here, 'tis our business only to speak of such Manners of Living, as betray Men into the greatest Number of Errors, and to such as are of the highest Importance. When we shall have Explained those, we shall have open'd a Way sufficient to ena∣ble the Mind to proceed farther, and every body may be able to Survey, at once, and very easily, the most bidden Causes of several particular Errors, which

cannot be explain'd but with a great deal of Time and Labour. When the Mind sees clearly, it delights it self with pursuing Truth, which it does with an in∣expressible swiftness. * 1.1 The Employment which seems most necessary to be treated of in this place, because it produces the most considerable changes in the Ima∣gination of Men, and which lead us most into Error, is the Employment of Studious Persons, who make more use of their Memory than Wit. For Expe∣rience always shews us, that they who apply them∣selves most eagerly to the Reading of Books, and to Search after Truth, are those who have lead us into the greatest number of Errors.

'Tis the same thing with those that Study, as with those that Travel. When a Traveller, by misfortune, has taken the wrong Road, the farther he advances, the more remote he is from the Place whither he de∣signs to go; and the more diligent and hasty he is to arrive to the end of his Journey, the more he wanders out of the way. In like manner, those ardent de∣sires which Men have for Truth, cause 'em to preci∣pitate themselves into the Reading of Books, where they think to find it; or to frame to themselves a Chimerical Systeme of things which they desire to know, for which they have a strong fancy, and which they endeavour by the vain Efforts of Wit to make others relish, to the end they may receive the Honour which is usually due to the Inventors of Systemes. Now let us explain these two Defects.

'Tis a difficult thing to apprehend, how it comes to pass, that Men of Sense should rather choose to make use of other Persons Judgment in the Search of Truth, than of that which God has bestow'd upon 'em. Without doubt, there is infinitely much more plea∣sure and honour for a Man to guide himself with his own than other Men's Eyes; nor does any Man who has good Eyes ever dream of shutting 'em, or of put∣ting 'em out, in hopes of one to guide him; never∣theless 'tis the same thing with the use of Judgment as with the use of the Eyes; for as the Judgment is ••••••nitely above the Eyes, the use of it is accompa∣nied

with satisfactions far more solid, and which con∣tent it after another manner, than Light and Colours do the Sight. However Men always make use of their own Eyes to be their Guides; but they seldom or never make use of their own Judgment to discover the Truth.

But there are several Causes which contribute to this same Perturbation of the Mind. * 1.2 First, the Na∣tural Sloath of Men, that will not give themselves the Trouble of Meditation.

Secondly, Their Inability of Meditating, into which they are fallen, for want of applying themselves to it in their Youth, as has been shew'd in the Ninth Chapter.

In the third place, the little Love Men have for Abstracted Truths; which are the foundation of every thing that is to be known here below.

In the fourth place, the Satisfaction that Men re∣ceive from the Knowledge of Probabilities, which are very agreeable and very sensible, because they are built upon Taking Notions.

In the fifth place, that foolish Vanity which makes us covet to be esteem'd Learned: For we call those Learned who have Read most. The knowledge of Opinions is of more use in Conversation, and to be able to puzzle the Minds of the Common Sort, than the knowledge of true Philosophy which is attain'd by Meditation.

In the sixth place, because Men, without any Rea∣son, imagine, that the Ancients were more enlightened than we can be; and that there is nothing farther for us to Search after, but what they have already been successful in finding out.

In the seventh place, a certain false Respect, inter∣mix'd with foolish Curiosity, causes us more to ad∣mire Things that are most remote, the most ancient, and that come from Countreys unknown; and even the most obscure Books. * 1.3 Thus was Heraclitus here∣tofore admir'd for his Obscurity. Men enquire for old Medals, though all defac'd with Rust, and pre∣serve, as the Apple of their Eye, the Lanthorn, or

Slipper of some ancient Philosophers, though almost eaten up with Worms; their Antiquity enhaunces their Price. Some apply themselves to Read the Rab∣bies, because they wrote in a strange Language, very corrupt and very obscure. Men have a high Esteem for Ancient Opinions, because Time has remov'd 'em at a great distance from us. And doubtless, had Nimrod wrote the History of his own Reign, all the most refin'd Politicks, all the Sciences, had been con∣tain'd in it; even as there are some who discover, that Homer and Virgil had the Knowledge of all the Secrets of Nature. Antiquity is to be respected, they crie. How! could Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, those Great Men, be deceiv'd? They never consider that Aristotle, Plato, and Epicurus, were Men as we are, and of the same Mould and Shape; and that now the World is grown Two thousand years older; * 1.4 that it has more Experience, that it ought to be more en∣lighten'd; and that it is the Age of the World and Experience that enable us to discover the Truth.

In the Eighth place, because that when a new Opi∣nion or an Author of the time is cried up, it seems that their Fame ecclipses ours, because it shines too near it; but they are afraid of no such Injury from the Honour which they pay the Ancients.

In the Ninth place, because Truth and Novelty can never concur together in Matters of Faith. For Men not being willing to make a distinction between Truths that depend upon Reason, and those that de∣pend upon Tradition, never consider that they ought to be apprehended after a very different manner. They confound Novelty with Errors, and Antiquity with Truth. Luther, Calvin, and others have intro∣duc'd Innovations, and have been mistaken, therefore Galileo, Harvey, and Descartes are mistaken in their Discoveries. The Impannation of Luther is new, and likewise false; therefore the Circulation of Harvey is false, because it is new. For this Reason it is, that they indifferently, bestow that Odious name of Inno∣vators, both upon Hereticks and new Philosophers. The Idea's and Words of Truth and Antiquity, of

Falshood and Novelty have been joined together There's no remedy; the Common sort never sepa∣rate 'em, and Men of Sense find difficulty enough in it.

In the Tenth place, because we live in a Time wherein the Knowledge of the Ancient Opinions is still in vogue; and because there are none but those that make use of their Judgment, who can by Force of their Reason wrest themselves from the Contagion of Depraved Customs. When we are in the Throng and the Croud, 'tis a hard matter not to give way to the Impetuosity of the Torrent that carries us along with it.

In the last place, because Men act only upon tho score of Interest; and this is the Reason, that even they who deceive themselves, and who perceive the vanity of these sorts of Studies, cease not to apply themselves to 'em for all that; because Honours, Dignities, and Benefices are annexed to 'em; and for that they are always more capable of 'em, who excel in those sorts of Studies, than those that are ignorant of 'em.

All these Reasons, in my Opinion, sufficiently shews us why Men blindly follow the ancient Opi∣nions, as True; and why, without any Judgment, they reject the new ones, as False: In a word, why they make none or very little use of their Judgment. There are, without question, a great number of Rea∣sons more particular which contribute to it; but if those which we have produced, be but attentively consider'd, there will be no cause of surprize to see how some People are prejudic'd with the Authority of the Ancients.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. That Stu∣dicus Per∣sons are the mst subject to Error.
• * 1.2

  II. Reasons why they rather choose to follow Au∣thority than make use of their own Judge∣ment.
• * 1.3

  Clarus ob obscuram Linguam Lueres.
• * 1.4

  Veritas filia tem∣poris non autherita∣tis.