Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. III.

Of the Mutual Connexion between the Idea's of the Mind, and the Traces of the Brain; and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces, and between Idea's and Idea's.

AMong all Material Things, there is none more worthy the serious Study of Men, than the Structure of their Bodies, and the Correspondence between all the Parts that Compose it; and of all Spiritual Things, there is none of which the Know∣ledge is more Necessary than that of the Soul, and how it is Related indispensably to God, and naturally to the Body.

'Tis not sufficient to perceive, or know confusedly, that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another, and that they are attended by the Motion of the Ani∣mal Spirits; that the Traces being stirred up in the Brain, likewise stir up the Idea's in the Mind, and that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits, excite the Passions in the Will. 'Tis requisite therefore, as much as may be, to understand distinctly the cause of all those different Unions, and chiefly the Effects which they are capable of producing.

We must understand the cause of them, to the end we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is on∣ly

able to act within us, and to make us Happy or Miserable; and it becomes us to understand the Ef∣fects, because we should know our selves as much as in us lyes, and other Men, with whom we Converse: For then, we shall understand the ways and means of Conducting, Governing, and Preserving our selves, in the most Happy and Perfect condition, to which it is possible for us to attain, according to the Order of Nature, and the Rules of the Gospel; and we shall be able to live with other Men, when we know how to make use of them in our Necessities, and assist them in their Miseries.

I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter, a Sub∣ject of so vast and so large an Extent: Nor do I pre∣tend to it altogether in the whole Work. There are many things of which I am Ignorant as yet, and which I never hope to understand exactly; there are other things which I believe I know, but which I cannot for all that Explain: For there is no Wit, how mean soever it be, that by Meditation cannot discover more Truths, than the most Eloquent Man in the World can relate.

I. We are not to imagine, * 1.1 as the greatest part of Philosophers do, that the Soul becomes Corporeal, when it is united with the Body, and that the Body be∣comes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul. The Soul is not diffus'd into all the Parts of the Body, to give it Life and Motion, as the Imagination fan∣cies; nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its union with the Soul, as our deluding Senses would seem to convince us. Every Substance remains what it is, and as the Soul is not capable of Extension and Motion, neither is the Body capable of Sensation and Inclinations. All the Alliance of the Bo∣dy and Soul, which is known to us, consists in a Na∣tural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul, with the Traces or Phantoms of the Brain, and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Spirits.

So soon as the Soul receives some new Idea's, it im∣prints new Traces in the Brain; and so soon as the

Objects produce new Traces, the Soul receives new Idea's: Not that it considers those Traces, for it has no knowledge of them; nor that those Traces include those Idea's, because they have no Relation one with another: Nor, lastly, that the Soul receives her Idea's from those Traces; for, as we shall show in another place, it is not to be conceiv'd that the Soul can re∣ceive any thing from the Body, or that it becomes more Knowing, or more Enlightned, by adverting to it, as the Philosophers pretend, who would have it, that the Soul should perceive all Things, per conversio∣nem ad Phantasmata, by Conversion to the Phantasmes, or Traces of the Brain.

So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move, the Arm is moved, tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move; and so soon as the Ani∣mal Spirits are agitated, the Soul finds it self mov'd, tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body.

When I come to treat of the Passions, I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain, and the Motions of the Spirits, and of that between the Idea's and Emotions of the Soul, for that all the Passions depend upon it. My business here, is only to treat of the affinity between Idea's and Traces, and the Connexion of the Traces one with another.

There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces; * 1.2 the first, and most general, is the Identity of Time. For fre∣quently it suffices, that we had certain Thoughts, at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain, so that those Traces cannot be produced again, without renewing the same Thoughts. If the Idea of God present it self to my Mind, at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters, Iah, or with the sound of the Word it self, 'tis enough if the Traces, which those Characters have produc'd, be excited to make me think of God. And I cannot think of God, but there will be produc'd in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters, or Sounds, which accompany'd the Thought, which I

had of God; for the Brain, being never without Phantasmes, there are always such, as have some Re∣lation to what we think, tho' many times these Phan∣tasmes are very imperfect, and very confus'd.

The second Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces, and which always supposes the first, is the Will of Man: This Will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 necessary, that this con∣nexion of the Idea's, with the Traces, may be regulated and proper for Use. For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination, to agree between themselves, to affix their Idea's to Sensible Signs, not only this Connexion of Idea's wou'd be absolutely unprofitable for Society, but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect.

First, because Idea's are never strongly united with the Traces, but when the Spirits being agitated, they render those Traces deep and durable. So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions, if Men had no such Union to communicate their Senti∣ments, and participate of those of others, 'tis evident that the exact Union of their Idea's with certain Tra∣ces, would be very weak, because they do not sub∣ject themselves to those Exact and Regular Con∣nexions, but to render themselves Intelligible.

Secondly, the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Idea's, with the same Traces, being necessary to form a Connexion, that may be of long continuance, since the meeting, unless it be accompany'd with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits, suffices not to make strong Connexions; 'tis clear, that if Men should refuse to assent, it would be the greatest Chance in the World, if the same Traces, and Idea's, should meet together; so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Idea's with the same Traces, tho' this Will of Agree∣ment be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason, as an Impression of the Author of Nature, who has made us altogether one for another, and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind, as well as in Body.

The third Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces, is the Constant and Immutable Na∣ture or Will of the Creator. For example; There is

a Natural Connexion, and which depends not upon our Will; between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or Mountain, which we behold, and the Idea's of a Tree or Mountain; between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast, that suffer Pain, beget in our Brain, the Air of one who threatens us, or of whom we stand in fear, and the Idea's of Grief, of Strength, or Weakness; as also between the Sentiments of Com∣passion, of Fear, and Courage, which are excitedin us.

These Natural Bands are the strongest of all; they are generally alike in all Men, and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life: For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will; for if the Band or Connexion of Idea's, with certain Sounds and Characters, be but feeble, and very dif∣ferent, in several Countries, 'tis because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it, is, because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life, but only for living like Men that are to form, among themselves, a Rational Society.

Here we must observe, that the Connexion of Idea's that represent to us Spiritual Things, and such as are distinct from us, with the Traces of our Brain, is not, nor can be Natural; and by consequence, it is, or may be different in all Men, for that it has no other Cause than their Will, and the Identity of Time, of which I have spoken before. On the other side, the Connexion of the Idea's of all Mate∣rial Things, with certain particular Traces, is Natu∣ral; and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example, there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square, upon the sight of a Square, because that Connexion is Natural, but 'tis to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea, when they hear the Word Square pronoun∣ced, because that Connexion is entirely voluntary. The same thing may also be thought of all Traces, that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things.

But because the Traces, which have a Natural Con∣nexion with Idea's, do affect the Mind, and conse∣quently

render it attentive, the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths; that is, the mutual Relations that are between Bodies. On the other side, because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what is voluntary, do never vigorously strike the Mind, 'tis not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend, and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths; that is, the mutual Relations be∣tween things that fall not under the Imagination. But when these Relations are never so little com∣pounded, they appear absolutely Incomprehensible, especially to those that are not accustomed to them, in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of those abstracted Idea's with their Traces, by continu∣al Meditation; and tho' others have perfectly com∣prehended them, they forget them in a short time, be∣cause this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one.

It is so true, that all the trouble Men have to com∣prehend, and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things, proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Con∣nexion of their Idea's with the Traces of their Brain, that when they find a way to explain the Analogies of Spiritual Things, by the Relations of Material Things, they are easily apprehended, and imprinted after such a manner in the Mind, that we are not on∣ly strongly convinced of them, but they are also much more easily retain'd. The General Idea which we have given of the Mind, in the first Chapter of this Work, is, perhaps, a sufficient Proof of this.

On the contrary, when the Relation between Mate∣rial things are express'd in such a manner, that there is no Connexion requir'd between the Idea's of the Things, and the Traces of their Expressions, 'tis a difficult matter to apprehend them, and they are easi∣ly forgot.

For Example: They, who begin the Study of Alge∣bra, or the Analytic Art, cannot but with great difficulty apprehend the Algebraic Demonstrations; and when they have once understood them, they never remem∣ber

them long, because the Squares, for Example, the Parallelograms, Cubes, Solids, &c. being ex∣press'd by aa, a3, abc, &c. whose Traces have no Natural Connexion with their Idea's, the Mind is not able to six the Idea's of them, and examme their Re∣lations.

But they who begin plain Geometry, do presently, and clearly, conceive the Demonstrations that are explain'd to them, provided they distinctly under∣stand the Terms that are made use of, because the Idea's of a Square, a Circle, &c. are Naturally ty'd to Traces of the Figures which they see before their Eyes. It also frequently happens, that the Exposition of the Figure alone, which serves for the Demonstra∣tion, causes them sooner to apprehend it than the Discourses that explain it, because the Words not being united to the Idea's, but by an Arbitrary Insti∣tution, they do not excite those Idea's with sufficient quickness and clearness, to afford a ready apprehen∣sion of their Relations; for this is the principal Rea∣son, why it is so hard a matter to understand the Sciences.

It may be observ'd by the By, and from what has been already said, that those Writers who Coyn a great many new Words, and new Figures, to explain their Sentiments, many times spend their time to lit∣tle or no benefit; they think to render themselves In∣telligible, when indeed they make themselves Incom∣prehensible. We define all our Terms, and Cha∣racters, say they, and others ought to agree to them. 'Tis true, others agree to them in their Will, but their Nature is repugnant thereto. Their Idea's are not joyn'd to those new Terms, because there is requir'd both Use and great Practice for that. The Authors, perhaps, have been accustom'd to that Practice, but the Readers have not. When a Man goes about to Instruct the Mind, 'tis requisite to understand it, be∣cause he ought to follow Nature, and not to pro∣voke or hurt it.

Nevertheless, we ought not to condemn the Care that Mathematicians take in defining their Terms,

for 'tis evident they ought to define them, to prevent the trouble of Equivocal Words. But, as much as may be, they ought to make use of Terms that are received, or whose signification is not very remote from that which they go about to introduce; and this is that which Mathematicians do not always observe.

Nor do we pretend, by what we have said, to con∣demn Algebra; more especially, that which M. De∣scartes has re-establish'd. For tho' the Novelty of a few Expressions, in that Science, gives the Mind some little trouble at first, yet there is so little variety and confusion in the Expressions; and the Assistance, which the Mind receives by them, so far surpasses the diffi∣culty it meets with, that we can hardly think it possi∣ble to find a better way of expressing his Reason∣ing, or which better suits with the Nature of the Mind, so as to carry it farther into the Discovery of unknown Truths. The terms of that Science have no share at all in the Capacity of the Mind, they do not burthen the Memory; they wonderfully abridge all our Idea's and Reasonings, and render them in some measure sensible by Practice. In short, their Be∣nefit is much greater than that of Expressions, tho' Natural, or of Figures design'd by Triangles, Squares, and the like, which cannot be serviceable to the search∣ing after, and unfolding Truths, which are but a lit∣tle Mysterious. But let this suffice, for the connexion of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain. 'Tis necessa∣ry now to say something of the connexion of the Traces one with another, and by consequence, of that agreement which is between the Idea's that an∣swer to the Traces.

This connexion consists in this, * 1.3 that the Traces of the Brain are so well united together, that they can no longer be excited, but all those that were im∣printed at the same time will be also excited. For Example, when a Man happens to be at some pub∣lick Ceremony, if he observes all the circumstances of it, and all the principal Persons that were present, the Time, the Place, the Day, and all other particu∣lars,

'twill be enough that he remembers the Day, or some other circumstance of the Ceremony less remark∣able, to represent to himself all the rest. For this reason it is, that when we cannot call to mind the principal Name of a Thing, we sufficiently design it by making use of the Name, that signifies some cir∣cumstance of that Thing. As when we cannot call to mind the proper Name of a Church, we may make use of another Name, which signifies a Thing that has some Relation to it. We may say, 'tis that Church where there was such a Croud, where Mr.—Preaches, or whither we went last Sunday. And not being able to remember the proper Name of a Person, or it being more convenient to design it af∣ter another manner, we may denote it by saying, such a one that has a Face pitted with the Small-Pox, such a tall Man well Proportioned, or a little Crook∣back'd Man, according to the Inclinations we have for the Man, tho' he is to blame that makes use of Scornful Expressions.

Now the Mutual Connexion of the Traces, and consequently, of the Idea's one with another, is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick, but of an infinite number of other things of greater Impertance, as in Morality, Politicks, and generally in all Sciences, which have any Relation to Man, and by consequence, of many things which we shall treat of in the sequel of this Discourse.

The cause of this Connexion of several Traces, is the Identity of Time, when they were imprinted in the Brain; for 'tis sufficient, that several Traces were produc'd at the same time, to renew them altogether: For the Animal Spirits, finding the way of all the Traces open, that are made at the same time, they continue their way, because they pass more easily through it than other parts of the Brain. This is the cause of Memory, and of the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts.

These Connexions of the Traces, are not always accompanied with the Emotions of the Spirits, be∣cause all things which we see, do not appear to us

always either Good or Evil. These Connexions also, may alter and break off, because not being always requisite for the Preservation of Life, they ought not always to be the same.

But there are Traces in our Brains, that are Natu∣rally united one with another, as also with certain Emotions of the Spirits, because such a Connexion is necessary for the Preservation of Life; and their Con∣nexion cannot be broken off, or at least, not very easily, because it's convenient that it should be always the same. For Example, the Trace of a Precipice which a Man sees under himself, and from which he is in danger of falling, or of some great Body which is ready to fall upon us, and crush us to Death, is Naturally join'd to the Trace which represents Death, as also to an Emotion of the Spirits, which disposes us to fly, or desire an Escape. This Connexion of Traces never changes, because it is necessary that it should be always the same; and it consists in a Dis∣position of the Fibres of the Brain, which we have from our Birth.

All those Connexions which are not Natural, may, and ought to be broken, because the various Circum∣stances of Time and Place ought to alter them, so that they may be useful to the Preservation of Life. 'Tis convenient, for Example, that Partridges should fly from Men with Birding-Pieces in their Hands, especially at such times, and in such places, where Men are accustomed to Hunt after them; but it is not necessary that they should fly at other times, and in other places. Thus, for the Preservation of all Creatures, 'tis necessary that there should be certain Connexions of Traces, which may be easily form'd and destroy'd; and that there should be others, which may not be broken without great difficulty. And lastly, others which are never to be broken.

'Tis very useful, to enquire carefully into the diffe∣rent Effects, which these different Connexions are ca∣pable of producing; for they are very numerous, and of great importance for the Understanding of Man, and of all things, between him and which there is

any Relation. We shall find in the sequel of this Dis∣course, that these Things are the Principal Cause of our Errors: But 'tis time to return to what we pro∣mis'd to treat of, and to explain the different Changes that befal the Imagination of Men, by reason of their various Manner of Living.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Of the Union of the Soul with the Body.
• * 1.2

  Three consi∣derable Cau∣ses of the union be∣tween the Idea's and Traces.
• * 1.3

  II. Of the mutual con∣nexion of the Trac••.