Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

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Title
Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.
Author
Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715.
Publication
London :: Printed for J. Dunton ... and S. Manship ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A51655.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A51655.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 9, 2024.

Pages

CHAP V.

OF THE SENSES.

I. Two ways of Explaining how they are corrupted by Sin.

II. That 'tis not our Senses, but our Liberty, which is the true Cause of our Errors.

III. A Rule not to be deceiv'd in the Ʋse of our Senses.

WHen we seriously Examine the Senses and Passions of Man, we find 'em so proportion'd to the end for which they are given us, that we are not of their Opinion, who say, they are wholly corrupted by Ori∣ginal Sin; But to shew that 'tis not without Reason that we dissent from them, 'tis necessary to explain in what Order the Faculties and Passions of our first Pa∣rent were, whilst in a State of Righteousness, and the Changes and Disorders which happen'd in them after his Sin; These things may be conceiv'd two ways, the first of which is this:

It appears, * 1.1 if we consider the Genuine Order of things, that the Soul is sensible of greater pleasure, proportionably to the greatness of the Goods which it enjoys. Pleasure is an Instinct of Nature, or to speak more intelligibly, 'tis an Impression of God himself inclining us towards some Good, which must be so much the stronger, as the Good is greater. According to this Principle, I think we cannot doubt, but that our first Parent coming out of the Hands of God, and before his Sin, found the greatest pleasure in the most solid Goods. Since therefore he was Created to Love God, and since God was his true Good, it may

Page 26

said, that he was inclined to delight in God, who in∣duc'd him to his Love by a Sensation of Pleasure, and gave him such Internal Satisfactions in his Duty, as counterbalanc'd the greatest Pleasures of Sense, and such as, since the Fall, Men are insensible of, without a particular Grace.

Nevertheless, as he had a Body, which God would have him preserve, and look upon, as part of himself, he also made him perceive such Pleasures by his Sen∣ses, as we taste in the use of things, that are proper for the Preservation of Life.

We dare not decide, whether the first Man, before his Fall, could avoid agreeable, or disagreeable Sen∣sations, in the very moment that the Principal part of his Brain was mov'd by the Actual use of Sensible Things; perhaps, he had this Command over him∣self, because of his Submission to God, yet the con∣trary appears more probable, for tho' Adam could stay the Emotions of the Spirits and Blood, and the Shaking of the Brain, which Objects excited in him, because not being yet disordered, his Body was neces∣sarily subject to his Mind: Yet 'tis not likely that he could forbear having Sensations of Objects, at such time as he had not stopt the Motions which they pro∣duc'd in some part of his Body, to which his Soul was immediately United; for the Union of the Soul and Body, consisting chiefly in a Mutual Relation between the Sensations of the Soul, and the Mo∣tions of the Organs of the Body, it appears that it would have been rather Arbitrary than Natural, if Adam could have been Insensible, when the chief part of his Body receiv'd some Impression from External Objects; but I forbear making my self a Party in these two Opinions.

The first Man then took Pleasure in that which added Perfection to his Body, even as in that which did so to his Soul; and because he was in a perfect State, he found the Pleasure of the Soul much greater than that of the Body; so that it was much easier for him to preserve his Righteousness, without the Grace of Jesus Christ, than it is for us, fince without it we

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feel but little satisfaction in our Duty; * 1.2 yet he suffer'd himself unhappily to be Seduc'd, and lost his Righte∣ousness by his Disobedience; and the principal Change which happen'd to him, and which caus'd all the Disorder of his Senses and Passions, is, That God forsook him by way of Punishment, and would no longer be his Good, or, rather, would not any lon∣ger make him sensible of that Pleasure which assur'd him that he was his Good: So that Sensible Pleasures, which do but incline a Man to Corporeal Good, remaining only, and being no longer Counterballanc'd by these, which formerly carry'd him to his true Good, the strict Union which he had with God is strangely weaken'd, and that which he had with his Body is much strengthned; Sensible Pleasure reigns in his Corrupted Heart, by enslaving him to all Sen∣sible Objects, and the Corruption of his Heart hath darkned his Mind, by turning it aside from that Light which Enlightens it, and inclining it to Judge only of Things, as they can have any Relation with Bo∣dies.

But after all, we cannot say that there was any great Change in respect of the Senses, 'tis as if two Weights hang'd in Aequilibrio in a Ballance, and I should take something from one of them, the other would weigh down, without any Change in its self, in Relation to the first Weight, since it is still the same. Thus after the Fall of Adam, the Pleasures of the Senses have Sensualiz'd the Soul, for want of those Internal Delights, which before Counterballanc'd the Inclination we have for Sensible Goods, but without such a considerable Change in the Senses as is com∣monly imagin'd.

But to come to the second way of Explaining the Disorders of Sin, and which is certainly more Rea∣sonable than the preceeding: 'Tis very different from the former, because it depends upon a different Prin∣ciple, however they both agree in what respects the Senses.

Because we are Compos'd of Mind and Body, we have two sorts of Goods to enquire after, viz. Those

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of the Mind, and those of the Body. We have also two ways of knowing whether a thing is good or bad for us, by the Help of the Mind only, or by the Assistance of the Mind and Body together; We can know what is Good for us, by a clear and evident Knowledge, as also by a Confus'd Sensation. I know, by Reason, that Justice is Amiable; I also know, by Taste, that such Fruit is Good: The Beauty of Justice is not Tasted, the Goodness of Fruit is not known by Reason, the Goods of the Body deserve not the application of a Mind, which God has made only for himself; the Mind then must receive such kind of Goods, by a short and Incontestable Proof of Sensa∣tion, without examining any further: Stones are im∣proper for Nourishment, Experience proves it, and Taste alone will convince all Men of it.

Pleasure and Pain are therefore Natural and Indu∣bitable Characters of Good and Evil, I confess it, but 'tis for such things only, as in their own Nature are neither good nor bad, nor can be known for such, by a clear and distinct Knowledge; and 'tis only for such things, that, being below the Mind of Man, can nei∣ther Reward nor Punish it: In fine, 'tis for such things only, as are unworthy the Application of the Mind; and about which, God being unwilling our Mind should be imploy'd, inclines us to them only by a certain Instinct; I mean, by agreeable or disagree∣able Sensations.

But as for God, who is only the true Good of the Mind, and who only is above it, who only can Re∣ward it a thousand different ways, who is only wor∣thy its Application, and who is not afraid, that those that Love him, should not find him Amiable; He is not content to be lov'd with a Blind Love, or a Love of Instinct, but will be lov'd with a Rational Love, and a Love of Choice.

If the Mind saw only those things in Objects, that are truly there, with adding other things to them by the Imagination, which really are not, it would find much difficulty to Love, or make Use of them; so that it is, as it were, necessary for them to appear

Page 29

agreeable, by causing Sensations which they have not, but 'tis not so with God, it's sufficient to see him as he is, to incline us to him, and it is not necessary that he make use of this Instinct of Pleasure, as a kind of Artifice, to draw our Love to him, without his deser∣ving it.

Hence we must conclude, that Adam was not car∣ried to the Love of God, and his Duty, by * 1.3 pre∣possessed Pleasure, because the Knowledge which he had of God, as his Good, and the Joy that he conti∣nually felt, * 1.4 as a necessary consequent of seeing his Happiness, in being United to God, might suffice to keep him to his Duty, and make him act more De∣servingly, than if he had been, as it were, Determin'd by a prepossess'd Pleasure. After this manner he en∣joy'd full Liberty; and, perhaps, 'twas in this Con∣dition that the Holy Scripture would Represent him by these Words, God made Man in the beginning, and after having propos'd his Commandments to him, he left him to himself; that is, without determining him by the Sense of some Prepossess'd Pleasure, only keeping him close to a clear Light of his Happiness and Duty. But Experience hath shown the frailty of Adam, in so Regulated and Happy Estate, as that he was in before his Fall, to the Shame of Free Will, and the Glory of God alone.

But it cannot be said that Adam was inclin'd to seek after, and make use of Sensible Things, by an exact Knowledge of the Relation they might have with his Body, for if he had, he must have Examin'd the Con∣figurations of the parts of some Fruit, with all the parts of his own Body, and the Relation resulting from both, to be able to Judge, whether in the heat of his Blood, and a thousand other Dispositions of his Body, this Fruit would be proper for his Nourish∣ment; 'tis plain, that his Mind was intirely imploy'd upon things that were unworthy its application, and even unprositably enough, because he was not long preserv'd after this manner.

If we consider then, that the Mind of Adam was not Infinite, we may safely say, that he knew not all

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the Properties of Bodies that were about him, since 'tis manifest that they are Infinite; and if it be granted, which cannot reasonably be deny'd, that his Mind was not made to Examine the Motions and Configu∣rations of Matter, but for the Contemplation of God, no one can be displeas'd, if we assert, that it was biass'd and disorder'd in that time, wherein all things should have been perfectly well order'd, if he had been oblig'd to turn his Mind from the Consideration of the Perfection of his true Good, to Examine the Nature of some Fruit for his Nourishment.

Adam then had the same Sensations as we have, which suggested to him what was necessary for his Body, without being diverted from God; he was Sensible of Pleasures as we are, and even of Pains, or prepossess'd and indeliberate Aversions, but these Plea∣sures and Pains could not Enslave him, or render him Unhappy like us, because that being Absolute Master of all the Motions which were excited in his Body, he immediately put a stop to them, if he only wish'd they might cease, and certainly he always wish'd it, in respect of Pain. How happy had he been, and we also, if he had done the same in respect of Pleasure, and if he had not voluntary strayed from the presence of his God, by suffering his Mind to be taken up with the Beauty, and expected Sweetness of the For∣bidden Fruit, or, perhaps, with a Presumptuous Joy that was excited in his Soul, at the Consideration of his Natural Perfections.

But after he had Sin'd, those Pleasures which be∣fore only modestly Accosted him, and those Pains, which without disturbing his Felicity, only put him in mind that he might Fall, and become Miserable, were not any longer under his Command, his Senses and Passions Revolted against him, they became Irregular, and made him, like us, a Slave to all Sensible Things.

Thus the Senses and Passions, do not derive their Origination from Sin, but only the Power they have of Tyrannizing over Sinners; and this Power has not so much disorder'd the Senses, as the Mind and Will of Men, which ceasing to be so strictly united to God.

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do not any longer receive that Light and Vigour, by which they might preserve their Liberty and Hap∣piness.

From these two ways of Explaining the Disorders of Sin, we may easily gather, * 1.5 that there are two things necessary for our Recovery.

The first is, That we must lessen that Load we sink under, and which drags towards Sensible. Goods, by continually Retrenching our Pleasures, and Mortify∣ing our Sensuality with Repentance and Circumcision of Heart.

The second is, That we must beg the Assistance of God's Grace, and that prepossess'd Delight which * 1.6 Jesus Christ hath particularly Merited for us; without which, whatever we retrench from that first load, will still oppress us, and however small it is, it will Infallibly draw into Sin and Disorder.

These two things are absolutely Necessary for us, to begin and persevere in our Duty; Reason, as we have show'd, does perfectly agree with the Gospel in this, and from both we learn, that Humility, Self∣denial, and the Diminution of the Power of Sin, are necessary Preparations for our Recovery, by the Power of Grace, and Re-union with God.

But in our present State, tho' we are continually oblig'd to strive against our Senses, yet we must not thence conclude, that they are absolutely corrupted and deprav'd; for if we consider that they are given us for the Preservation of our Bodies, we shall find that they admirably well perform their Duty, and con∣duct us, after so just and faithful a manner, for the end we receiv'd them, that it seems very injurious so to accuse them of Corruption and Disorder; they so rea∣dily inform the Soul by Pain and Pleasure, by agree∣able and disagreeable Sensations, of what is necessary to be done or omitted, for the Preservation of Life, that we have little reason to say, this order and exact∣ness is the Consequence of Sin. * 1.7

Our Senses then are not so deprav'd as is imagin'd, but the inward Constitution of our Soul; 'tis our Li∣berty that is Corrupted; 'tis not our Senses, but our

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Will that deceives us, by its precipitate Judgments. For Example, when we see the Light, 'tis certain that we see it; when we feel Warmth, we are not de∣ceiv'd, if we believe we feel it, whether before or after Sin, but we are deceiv'd, when we judge that the Heat we feel is out of the Soul that feels it; as shall be Explained hereafter.

The Senses then do not deceive us, if we make a good use of our Liberty, and if we accustom not our selves, upon their account, to Judge of things with too much precipitation; but since it is very diffi∣cult to refrain from it, and we are, as it were, con∣strain'd thereto, because of the strict Union between our Soul and Body, I shall lay down a Method to conduct us in our use of them, so as to avoid Error.

We must exactly observe this Rule, * 1.8 Never to Judge by the Senses, of things as they are in themselves, but only of the Relation that they have between themselves; for, indeed, they are not given us to know the Truth of Things in themselves, but only for the Conservation of our Body.

But that we may be wholly deliver'd from that easiness and inclination we have of following our Sen∣ses, in a Search after Truth, we shall particularize, in the following Chapters, some of the chief, and ge∣neral Errors which we are liable to; whence the Truth, of what we have advanc'd, will be more Evi∣dent.

Notes

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