Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. XX.

The Conclusion of this first Book,

I. That our Senses are only given us for our Bodys.

II. That we must doubt of their Testimony.

III. That it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as we ought to do.

WE have, in my Opinion, * 1.1 sufficiently discover'd the General Errors into which our Senses be∣tray us, both in respect of their proper Objects, as also of those things which are not perceiv'd but by the Understanding. I believe there is no Error we are subject to upon their occasion, whose Cause may not be discover'd in some of those things which have been already mention'd, if they be well examin'd.

We have also seen, that our Senses are very faith∣ful and exact to Instruct in the Relations, which all Bodies, that are about us, have to one another, but that they are incapable of informing us, what Bodies are in themselves; that, a right use of them, tends only to the Preservation of our Health and Life; that we cannot sufficiently despise them, when they arrogate Dominion over the Mind. This is the thief thing which I wish may be well remembred in all this first Book, viz. That we conceive well that our Senses are only given us for the preservation of our Body, that we six this Thought in our Mind; and that to be deliver'd from the Ignorance we are now involv'd in, we seek for other assistances besides those which our Senses afford ••s.

But if there are some Persons (as certainly there will be too many) who are not perswaded of there last Propositions from what I have here advanc'd, * 1.2 I would, at least, desire this of them, That they would only learn a little to distrust their Senses; and if they will not wholly reject their Testimony, as false and deceitful, that they will not refuse to doubt of it.

And indeed, it appears to me, that enough has been said, to create, at least, some scruple in the Mind of reasonable Persons; and consequently, to excite them to make use of their Liberty, otherwise than they have yet done: For if they begin to doubt, whether the Testimony of their Senses are true, they will more easily refrain their assent, and so keep themselves out of those Errors unto which they have hitherto been subject. Especially, if they well remember that Rule in the beginning of this Treatise, Never to give an entire assent but to things intirely evident, and to which they cannot refrain consenting, without knowing certain••, that they should make an ill use of their Liberty, if they did not consent.

Besides, * 1.3 let no one imagine that he has made but a small advancement, if he has only learn'd to doubt. To doubt with Judgment and Reason, is not so small a thing as People imagine, for here it may be said, that there's a great difference betwixt doubting and doubting, we doubt through Passion and Brutality, through Blindness and Malice; and lastly, through Fancy, and only because we would doubt. But we doubt also with Prudence and Caution, with Wis∣dom and Penetration of Mind. Academics and Atheists, doubt upon the first grounds, true Philoso∣phers on the second: The first doubt is a doubt of darkness, which does not conduct us into light, but always removes us from it. The second doubt is begot of Light, and assists us in some manner to pro∣duce it in its proper place.

Those who doubt only after the first manner, do not apprehend what it is to doubt with Judgment, they laugh at what Defeartes teaches us about doubt∣ing,

in the first of his Metaphysical Meditations, be∣cause it appears to them that he would only have them doubt out of fancy; that he would only have them say, in general, that our Nature is infirm, our Mind is full of blindness, that we must take great care to deface these prejudices, and other like things. It is not sufficient to say, the Mind is weak, we must be sensible of its weaknesses. It is not enough to say, it is subject to Error, we must discover in what our Errors consist. This is what I believe has been begun in this first Book, by explaining the Na∣ture and Errors of our Senses; I shall, in the second, prosecute the same design, by explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. That our Senses are only given us for the preserva∣tion of our Body.
• * 1.2

  II. We must distrust the Testimony of our Senses.
• * 1.3

  III. Th•••• it is not an in∣considerable thing to doubt as one ought to do.