Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. XIII.

I. Of the Nature of Sensations.

II. That we know them better than we lelieve we do.

III. An Objection and Answer.

IV. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations.

V. That we deceive our selves in be∣lieving that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects.

VI. Objection and Answer.

THE third thing that is in each of our Sensations, * 1.1 or in what we feel, for Example, when we are near the Fire, is, a Modification of our Soul in relation to what passes in the Body to which it is united. This Modification is agreeable, when what passes in the Body is proper to assist the Circulation of the Blood, and the other Functions of Life, which is called by the Equivocal Term of Heat; and this Modification is painful, and perfectly different from the other, when what passes in the Body is capable of incommo∣ding and burning it, that is, when the Motions that are in the Body, are capable of breaking any of its Fibres, and this is generally called Pain or Burning, and so of other Sensations; but these are the common thoughts Men have upon this subject.

The first Error is, that we unreasonably imagine we have no knowledge of our Sensations. * 1.2 We see a great many Men every day who much concern them∣selves to know what Pleasure, Pain, and the other Sensations are; they grant that they are only in the Soul, and that they are but the Modifications of it. 'Tis true these sort of Men are very much to be ad∣mired at, for being willing to learn what they cannot but know already, for it is not possible that a Man shou'd be entirely ignorant what Pain is, when he feels it.

A Person, for Instance, that burns his Hand, distin∣guishes very well the Pain he feels from Light, Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, Pleasure, and from all other

Pain than what he feels; He very well distinguishes it from Admiration, from Desire, and Love; from a Square, a Circle, and Motion: in fine, he discerns it very different from all things which are not this Pain that he feels. Now, if he had no knowledge of Pain, I wou'd fain know how he can have any certainty, that what he feels is none of these things.

We have some knowledge therefore of what we immediately feel, when we see Colours, or when we have any other Sensation; and even 'tis most certain, that if we knew it not, we cou'd know no sensible Object; for 'tis evident we cou'd not distinguish Wa∣ter from Wine, if we did not know that the Sensa∣tions we have of one of them, is different from those we have of the other, and so of all things we know by our Senses.

It is true, that if I was pressed and required to ex∣plain what Pain, Pleasure, and Colour is, &c. I cou'd not do it as it ought to be done by Words; but it follows not from thence, that if I see Colour, or burn my self, I do not know, at least, after some manner, what I actually feel.

Now the reason why all Sensations cannot be well explained by Words, as all other things are, is, * 1.3 be∣cause it depends upon the Will of Man, to affix the Idea's of Things to such Names as they please; they may call Heaven Ouranos, Schamajim, &c. as the Greeks and Hebrews did; but even those Men cannot, at their pleasure, affix their Sensations to Words, or even to any other thing; they see not Colours, altho' they speak of them, if they open not their Eyes: They relish not Tastes, if no change happens in the order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain. In a word, Sensations depend not upon Mans Will, and it is only he who hath made them, that preserves them in the mutual Correspondence that is between the Mo∣difications of the Soul, and those of the Body; so that if any one shou'd desire me to represent to him Heat or Colour, I cannot find Words for that, but I must impress in the Organs of his Senses, the Mo∣tions

to which Nature unites these Sensations; I must take him to the Fire, and show him some Pictures.

This is the Reason, why 'tis impossible to give the Blind the least Knowledge of what we mean by Red, Green, Yellow, &c. For since we cannot make our selves be understood, when he that hears us, has not the same Idea's as we that speak; It is manifest, that Colours not being united to the sound of Words, or to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear, but to that of the Optic Nerve, they cannot be represented to the Blind, since their Optic Nerve cannot be shaken by coloured Objects.

We have then some Knowledge of our Sensations, let us now see from whence it is, that we seek yet to know them, and believe our selves ignorant thereof; this is, without doubt, the reason.

The Soul, * 1.4 since Original Sin, is become, as it were, Corporeal, by its inclination; its love, for Sensible Things, continually diminishes the Union, or Rela∣tion, that it hath to Intelligible Things: It is with great disgust, that it conceives Things which do not produce some Sensations in it, and it immediately cea∣ses to consider them: It does all that is in its power, to produce some Images in its Brain, which represent them; and it is so much accustomed to this kind of Conception from our Infancy, that it even thinks it cannot know, what it cannot imagine. Yet there are many things, which not being Corporeal, cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images, as our Soul, with all its Modifications: But when our Soul wou'd represent to it self its own Nature and Sensa∣tions, it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image thereof; It seeks it self in all Corporeal Beings, and takes it self sometimes for one, and sometimes for ano∣ther; one while for Air, and then again for Fire, or for the Harmony of the parts of its Body. Thus be∣ing willing to find it self amongst Bodies, and ima∣gining its own Modifications, which are its Sensa∣tions, to be the Modifications of Bodies, we must not wonder if it Errs, and is intirely Ignorant of it self.

What yet induces it further to be willing to imagine its Sensations, is, that it Judges them to be in the Objects, and that they are even Modifications there∣of; and consequently, that 'tis something Corporeal, and which can be Imagin'd. It Judges therefore, that the Nature of its Sensations consists only in the Motion that causes them, or in some other Modifica∣tion of a Body; but when it finds that which is diffe∣rent from what it feels, which is neither Corporeal, nor can be represented by Corporeal Images, this em∣barasses it, and makes it believe that it does not know its own Sensations.

As for those, who do not make these vain Efforts, * 1.5 to represent the Soul, and its Modifications, by Cor∣poreal Images, and yet are Solicitous to know the Nature of their Sensations, they must consider, that neither the Soul, or its Modifications, are to be known by the Idea's, taking the word Idea in its true sense, as I have determin'd, and explain'd it in the Third Book, but only by an inward Sensation: So that when they desire the Soul, and its Sensations, to be explain'd by some Idea's, they require what is im∣possible for all Mankind to give them, since Man can∣not Instruct us in giving us Idea's of Things, but only in making us reflect upon those we already have.

The second Error we are subject to, in respect to our Sensations, is our attributing them to Objects, as has already been explained in the 11th and 12th Chapters.

The third is, * 1.6 our Judging that every one has the same Sensations of the same Objects. For Example, we believe all Mankind that sees the Sky, takes it to be Blue, and the Fields to be Green, and all Visible Objects to be after the same manner as they appear to us; and so of all other Sensible Qualities of the rest of our Senses. Many persons will wonder, that I shou'd bring such things in question as they have thought Indisputable, yet I dare affirm, they have never had any reason to Judge of them after the man∣ner they have done; and altho' I cannot Mathema∣tically demonstrate to them that they are deceived,

yet I can demonstrate, 'tis by the greatest Chance in the World if they are not deceived. Nay, I have sufficient Reasons to be assur'd, that they certainly, are in an Error.

To know the Truth of what I advance, we must re∣member what I have already proved, viz. that there is a great difference between Sensations, and the causes of them; for from thence we may Judge, that its possi∣ble, absolutely speaking, that the same Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optic Nerve, do not cause the same Sensations in different persons, that is, to see the same Colours; and that such a Motion may hap∣pen, which shall cause in one the Sensation of Green, or Gray in another, or even a new Sensation, which no body before ever had.

It is certain that this may be, and that Reason does not demonstrate the contrary to us, yet 'tis generally agreed, that 'tis not probable it should be so; It is much more reasonable to believe, that God acts al∣ways after the same manner, in respect to the Union he hath created between our Souls and Bodies, and that he hath tyed the same Idea's, and the same Sen∣sations, to like Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain, altho' in different Persons.

Let us take it for granted then, as the same Mo∣tions of those Fibres, which end in the middle of the Brain, are accompanied with the same Sensations in all Men; so if it happens, that the same Objects produce not the same Motions in their Brain, by consequence they do not excite the same Sensations in their Soul. Now it appears indisputable to me, that all Mens Organs of their Senses, not being disposed after the same manner, they cannot receive the same impres∣sions from the same Objects.

For instance, The blows a Porter hits himself over the sides, to warm himself, wou'd be sufficient to lame a great many Men: The same blow wou'd produce many different Motions, and by consequence, as ma∣ny different Sensations, in a Man of a strong Consti∣tution, and in a Child, or a Woman, that is of a weak Constitution. So that there not being two Persons in

the World, who we can be certain have the Organs of their Senses in a perfect conformity, we cannot affirm that there is two Persons in the World who have ex∣actly the same Sensations of the same Objects.

This is the Original of that strange variety which we meet with in the Inclinations of Men. There are some who love Musick extreamly, and others who are insensible of it; and even amongst those that de∣light in it, some love one kind of Musick, and others another, according to the almost infinite diversity that is found in the Fibres of the Nerve of the Ear, in the Blood, and in the Spirits. For instance, how great a difference there is between the Musick of France, that of Italy, of Chinese, and other places; and by consequence, between the Tastes that different Peo∣ple have of different kinds of Musick. Nay, it even happens, that at different times, by the same Consorts, we receive different Impressions; for if the Imagina∣tion is heated by a great quantity of agitated Spirits, we are much more pleased with a bold and dissonant Musick, than with one that is more sweet, and more agreeable to mathematical Rules and Exactness. This Experience proves, and it is not very difficult to give a reason of it.

It is the same also of Odours, he that loves to smell of the Flower of an Orange, it may be cannot endure a Rose, and the contrary.

There is likewise as much diversity in Tastes, as in any other of the Sensations; Sauces must be very dif∣ferent equally to please different Persons, nay, to please the same Person at different times. One loves that which is sweet, another that which is sowre; one thinks Wine agreeable, another hates it; and the same Person who liked it when he was well, thinks it bitter and unpleasant when he's in a Fever; and so of the rest of the Senses: Yet all Men love Pleasure, they all delight in agreeable Sensations, and have all, in respect to that, the same Inclination; they receive not then the same Sensations of the same Objects, fince they love them not equally.

Thus, what makes one Man say he loves that which is sweet, is, because the Sensation he has there∣of is agreeable; and that which causes another to say he does not love what is sweet, is, that indeed he has not the same Sensation as he that loves it: And when he says he loves not that which is sweet, he does not mean he does not love to have the same Sensation with the other, but that he has it not: So that he speaks improperly, when he says he loves not that which is sweet, he ought to say he does not love Sugar, Hony, &c. that every one else thinks to be sweet and agree∣able, and that he has not the same Taste as others have, because the Fibres of his Tongue are otherwise disposed.

This is a very Sensible Example: Suppose that of twenty Persons, there was one amongst them who had his Hands very cold, and knew not the Words that are made use of to explain the Sensations of heat and cold; and that on the contrary, all the rest had their Hands extreamly hot. If in Winter, cold Water was carried to all of them to Wash in, those whose Hands were very hot, would immediately, upon washing one after another, say this Water is very cold, I don't love it; but when the other, whose Hands were extreamly cold, should come at last to wash his Hands, he wou'd say, on the contrary, I don't know why you don't love cold Water, for my part, I take a great deal of pleasure in feeling the cold, and wash∣ing my Hands in it.

From this Instance 'tis very clear, that when this last shou'd say I love cold, it shou'd signifie nothing else but that he loves heat, and feels it, whereas the others feel the contrary.

And so when a Man says, I love what is bitter, and cannot abide sweet things, it is only to be understood, that he has not the same Sensations as those who say they love sweet Things, and have an aversion for whatsoever is bitter.

It is then certain, that a Sensation which is agree∣able to one Person, is also to all those who feel the same; but that the same Objects cause not the same

Sensation in all the World, because of the different dispositions of the Organs of the Senses, which is of the highest consequence to be observ'd, both in re∣spect to Philosophy and Morality.

'Tis true, an Objection may here be rais'd, but 'twill be very easily solved, viz. It sometimes hap∣pens, that persons who extreamly love certain sorts of Food, come afterwards to have an aversion for them, either because in Eating they have found some Dirt in them, or have been Sick, because they have Eat to excess of them; or else for some other reasons. These same Persons say, they no longer love the same Sensations that they loved formerly, for they have them still when they Eat the same Food, and yet they are not agreeable to them.

To answer to this Objection, it must be observed, that when those Persons taste any Food that they have so much aversion to, they have two very diffe∣rent Sensations at the same time; they have that of the Food they Eat, according to the Objection, and they have also another Sensation of Dislike, which, for instance, proceeds from the strong Imagination they have of the Dirt in what they Eat: The reason of it is, that when two Motions are made in the Brain at the same time, the one is never excited after the other, except it be after a considerable time. Thus, because the agreeable Sensation never comes without this other disgustful one, and because we confound things that are produced at the same time, we imagine that this Sensation that was formerly agreeable to us, is now no longer so; Yet if it is al∣ways the same, it is necessary that it should always be agreeable. So that if we imagine it is not agree∣able, 'tis because it is join'd and confounded with another, that causes more distaste than the other does of agreeableness.

There is more difficulty to prove that Colours, and some other Sensations, which I have called weak and languishing, are not the same in all Men, be∣cause all those Sensations so little affect the Soul, that we cannot distinguish them so well as we can Tastes,

or other Sensations more strong and lively, the one being more agreeable than the other; and thus to discover the diversity of Sensations that are found in different Persons, by the variety of their pleasure or dislike: Reason, which always shows that the other Sensa∣tions are not the same in different Persons, tells us also, that there will be a variety in the Sensations they have of Colours. And indeed, there is no doubt but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight in different Persons, as well as in those of the Ear, or the Taste; for there is no reason to suppose a perfect resemblance in the disposition of the Optic Nerve in all Men, since there is an infinite variety in every thing in Nature, and chiefly in those that are Material, 'tis therefore very probable that all Men see not the same Colours in the same Objects.

Yet I believe it never, or very rarely happens, that Persons see White or Black to be of any other Colour than we do, altho' they do not see it equally White or Black: But for mixt Colours, as Red, Yellow, and Blue, and chiefly such as are compound∣ed of all three, I believe there are few Persons who have perfectly the same Sensation of them. For In∣stance, there are some Persons, who when they look upon cettain Bodies with one Eye, take them to be Yellow, and when they behold them with the other, see them to be Green or Blue; yet if we suppos'd these Persons Born blind of one Eye, or with both their Eyes so dispos'd, to see that Blue which we call Green, they wou'd believe they saw Objects of the same colour as we see them, because by Green or Blue, they wou'd always have understood what they see Yellow or Red.

We may further prove, that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour, because, according to the observation of some, the same Colours do not equally please all sorts of Persons, and if these Sensations were the same, they wou'd be equally agreeable to all Men; but because very weighty doubts may be raised against the Answer I have given to the precedent Objection, I do not believe it solid enough to insist upon it.

Indeed, it is very seldom that we are as much more pleased with one Colour than another, even as we are much more pleased with one Taste than another? The reason is, the Sensations of Colours are not given us to Judge, whether or no Bodies are proper for our Nourishment, that is distinguished by Pleasure and Pain, which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil; Objects, in respect to their Co∣lour, are neither good nor bad to Eat. If Objects appear agreeable, or disagreeable to us, in respect to their Colour, their sight wou'd be always follow∣ed with the course of those Spirits which excite, and accompany the Passions, since the Soul cannot be touched without moving it, and we shou'd often hate good Things, and love bad, so that we shou'd not long preserve our lives. In fine, the Sensations of Colours are only given us to distinguish Bodies from one another, and therefore it does as well, if we see Herbs Red, as if we see them Green, provided the Person that sees them Red or Green, sees them al∣ways after the same manner.

But we have said enough of these Sensations, let us now speak of Natural Judgments, and the free Judgments which accompany them; which is the fourth thing that we confound with the three others, that we have already mention'd.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. A Defini∣tion of Sen∣sations.
• * 1.2

  II. That we know our own Sensa∣tions, better than we be∣lieve we do.
• * 1.3

  III. Objecti∣on and An∣swer.
• * 1.4

  IV. Why it is we ima∣gine we do not know our own Sensations.
• * 1.5

  See the Ex∣planations of the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part, l. 3.
• * 1.6

  V. That we d••ceive our selves in be∣lieving that all Men have the same S••nsations of the same Objects.