Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.

CHAP. XII.

I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses.

II. That either we perceive not these Motions, or else confound them with our Sensations.

III. Experience, which proves it.

IV. Three sorts of Sensations.

V. The Errors which accompany them.

THE second thing that may be observed in each of our Sensations, * 1.1 is the shaking of the Fibres of our Nerves, which is communicated unto the Brain; and we deceive our selves in this, that we con∣found this shaking with the Sensation of the Soul, and judge there is none when we perceive it not by the Senses.

We confound, for instance, the Motion that the Fire excites in the Fibres of our Hands with the Sen∣sation of Heat, and we say that the Heat is in our Hand. But because we feel not the shaking that vi∣sible Objects produce in the Optick Nerve, which is in the bottom of the Eye, we think that this Nerve is not shaken, and that it is not cover'd with the Colours that appear to us; on the contrary, we judge that 'tis only external Objects upon which these Co∣lours are dispersed, yet we may see by the following Experiment, that Colours are almost as strong and lively in the bottom of the Optick Nerve, as upon visible Objects.

Take the Eye of an Ox that is newly killed, * 1.2 and strip the Skins from it that are opposite to the Apple of of the Eye, in the place where the Optick Nerve is, and put in their room a little bit of Paper that is very thin; and place this Eye in the hole of a Window, so that the Apple be in the Air, and the back part of the Eye be in the Chamber, which must be shut close so that it may be very dark; and then all the Colours of the Objects which are without the Chamber, will

appear upon the bottom of the Eye, but represented upside down. And if these Colours shou'd happen not to be very lively, if the Objects which are painted at the bottom of the Eye are too near, the Eye must be lengthned by pressing the sides closer together, and on the contrary, it must be compess'd, if the Ob∣jects are too far off.

By this Experiment, 'tis plain, that we ought to judge, or be sensible of the Colours at the bottom of our Eyes, after the same manner as we judge the Heat to be in our Hand, if our Senses were given us to discover the truth, and if we were guided by Rea∣son in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senses.

But to be able to give a Reason for the variety of our Judgments upon sensible Qualities, 'tis necessary that we consider how strictly the Soul is united to the Body, and that it is so sensualized since Original Sin, that many things are attributed to it which belong to the Body, and that it is now hardly to be distinguished from it; so that it ascribes to it not only all its Sensa∣tions, which we are speaking of, but also the force of Imagining, and even sometimes the power of Rea∣soning. For there has been a great number of Philo∣sophers that have been ignorant and foolish enough to believe, that the Soul was only a more fine and sub∣tile part of the Body.

If we read Tertullian, we shall soon see too many proofs of what I say, since we shall find him of the same Opinion, with a great number of Authors whom he Cites. It is true in the Book of the Soul he endeavours to prove, that Faith, Scripture, and even particular Revelation oblige us to believe that the Soul is Corporeal. I will not refute these Opinions, be∣cause I have already supposed that we ought to have read fome of St. Augustin or Descartes Works, which wou'd have sufficiently shewn the extravagancy of these Thoughts; and also wou'd have confirm'd the Mind in the distinction betwixt Extention and Thought, be∣twixt the Soul and Body.

The Soul is then so blind that she is ignorant of her self, and does not see that her own Sensations belong to her. * 1.3 To explain this we must distinguish three sorts of Sensations in the Soul, some strong and lively, o∣thers weak and languishing, and some again in the medium between both.

The strong and lively Sensations are those which surprize the Mind, and awaken it with some force, because they are either very agreeable, or very trou∣blesome, such as are Pain or Pleasure, Heat or Cold, and generally all such as are not only accompanied with Impressions in the Brain, but also with some Mo∣tions of the Spirit, such as are proper for the exciting the Passions, as shall afterwards be explained.

The Weak and Languishing Sensations are those which very little affect the Soul, and which are nei∣ther very agreeable, nor very troublesome, as a Mo∣derate Light, all Colours, Ordinary Sounds, which are very weak, &c.

And the Medium between both I call those sort of Sensations which indifferently touch the Soul, as a great Light, a violent Sound, &c. Now it is to be observed, that a Weak and Languishing Sensation may become indifferent, and afterwards strong and lively. For Example, the Sensation that we have of Light is weak, when the Light of a Flambeau is weak and languishing, or very far from us, and afterwards this Sensation may become indifferent, if the Flambeau be brought near enough to us; and at last it may be∣come very strong and lively, if the Flambeau be brought so near our Eyes that they be dazled with it, or else, when we look upon the Sun. Thus the Sen∣sation of Light may be strong, weak, or moderate, according to its different degrees.

These are then the Judgments that our Soul makes of these three sorts of Sensations, * 1.4 wherein we may perceive, that it almost always blindly follows the sensible Impressions, or Natural Judgments of our Senses, and that it is pleased, if we may so say, in dispersing it self over all the Objects that it considers, and by divesting it self to cloath them.

The first of these Sensations is so lively and mo∣ving, that the Soul can scarce hinder it self from ac∣knowledging, that in some respect they belong to it, so that it does not only judge them to be in the Ob∣ject, but also believes them to be in the Members of the Body, which it considers as a part of it self. Thus it judges that Cold and Heat are not only in the Ice and Fire, but that they are also in its own Hands.

The Languishing Sensations so little affect the Soul, that it does not believe them to belong to it; nor that they are either within it self, or the Body, but only in the Objects: 'Tis for this reason that we take away Light and Colours from our Soul and Eyes, thereby to adorn External Objects with them, although Rea∣son teaches us, that they are not in the Idea we have of Matter. And Experience shews us we ought to judge them in our Eyes, as well as upon Objects, since we see them as well there as in the Objects, as I have proved by the Instance of an Oxe's Eye placed at the hole of a Window.

Now the Reason why all Men do not immediately see that Colours, Odours, Taste, and all other Sen∣sations are only Modifications of their Soul; is, be∣cause we have no clear Idea of our Soul. For when we know any thing by the Idea which represents it, we clearly know all the Modifications it can have. All Men agree, for Example, that Roundness is a Modification of Extension, by a clear Idea which re∣presents it. * 1.5 Thus not knowing our Soul by its Idea, as I shall explain hereafter, but only by the Internal Sentiment we have thereof, we know not by a simple Sight, but only by Reasoning, whether Whiteness, Light, Colours, and other Weak and Languishing Sensations, are not Modifications of our Soul; but for the lively Sensations, such as Pain and Pleasure, we easily judge they are within us because we are very sensible that they affect us; and have no need to know them by their Ideas, to perceive they belong us.

As for Indifferent Sensations the Soul is very much perplexed with them, for on the one hand it wou'd follow the Natural Judgments of the Senses and

therefore it removes from it, as much as possible, these sort of Sensations, to attribute them to the Objects; but on the other side, it cannot avoid feel∣ing within self that they belong to it, especially when these Sensations come near those that I call strong and lively; so that 'tis after this manner that it guides it self in the Judgment it makes of them; if a Sensa∣tion affects it very much, it concludes it to be in its own Body, as well as in the Object; and if it touches it but a little, the Soul believes it only in the Object. And if this Sensation is exactly in the Me∣dium between the Strong and Weak, then it knows not what to determine, if it Judges by the Senses.

For Instance, if one looks upon a Candle at a little distance, the Soul judges that the Light is only in the Object; but if the Candle is brought nearer, it judges it to be not only in the Candle, but also in the Eyes. But if we draw back about a foot from it, the Soul continues sometime without judging whether or no the Light is only in the Object; never thinking, as it ought to do, that this Light is or can be, only a Propriety, or Modification of Matter, and that it is only within it self; because it does not think it ne∣cessary to make use of its Reason to discover the Truth of what appears therein, but only of the Senses, which never discovers it, and are only given us for the preservation of our Bodies.

Now why the Soul makes no use of her Reason, that is, of her Understanding, when she considers an Object which may be perceived by the Senses, is, be∣cause she is not affected by things that she perceives by the pure Understanding; and that, on the contrary, she is most lively touch'd by Sensible things; for the Soul applies it self much to what affects it much, and neglects applying it self to things that do not touch it. Thus she almost always conforms her free Judgments, to the Natural Judgments of her Senses.

To be able to Judge rightly of Light and Colours, as well as all other Sensible Qualities, we must care∣fully distinguish the Sensation of Colour, from the Motion of the Optic Nerve, and by Reason, discover

that Motions and Impulsions, are Proprieties of Bodies, and that thus they may meet in Objects, and in the Organs of our Senses; but that Light and Colours which we see, are Modifications of the Soul, very dif∣ferent from others, and of which also we have as diffe∣rent Idea's.

It is certain, for instance, that a Country Man sees Colours very plainly, and distinguishes them from eve∣ry thing that has no Colour. It is also as certain, that he perceives no Motion either in Coloured Objects, or in the bottom of his Eyes; and that therefore he concludes, Colour is not Motion.

Likewise, a Country man is as sensible of Heat, and hath a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish it from all things which are not Heat, and yet he does not think that 'tis only because the Fibres of his Hands are mo∣ved; he thinks the Heat therefore, that he feels, is not Motion, since his Idea's of Heat and Motion are very different, and he can have the one without the other: For there is no reason to be given, that a Square is not round, but only because our Idea of a Square, is different from that we have of a Circle, and that we can think of the one, without thinking of the other.

There's only a little attention requisite, to be able to know, that 'tis not necessary, that the Cause, which makes us feel such or such a thing, contains it in it self. Thus it is not needful, that I have Light in my Hand, that I might see it, when I strike my Eyes; nor is it necessary, that there shou'd be Heat in the Fire, to make me feel it, when I hold my Hand to it; or, that any other Sensible Quality, that I perceive, shou'd be in the Object; it is suffi∣cient, that they cause some Motion in the Fibres of my Flesh, so that my Soul, which is united thereto, be Modified by some Sensation. There is no Rela∣tion, between Motions and Sensations, it is true, but there is none also between the Body and Mind; and since Nature, or the Will of our Creator, has joined these two Substances together, how opposite soever they are in their Nature, it must not seem surprizing

if their Modifications are Reciprocal; it is necessary that they shou'd be so, that they may together make an entire Being.

We must observe, that our Senses being given us for the Preservation of our Bodies, it is very proper that they shou'd incline us, to make such Judgments as we do of Sensible Qualities. It is much more ad∣vantageous to us, to feel Pain and Heat, as being in our Bodies, than if we Judg'd them only to be in the Objects that cause them, because, that Pain and Heat being capable of prejudicing our Members, it is fit we shou'd be advertiz'd when they are affected there∣with, so as to prevent their being hurt by them.

But it is not so with Colours, they cannot easily hurt the bottom of the Eye where they meet together, and it is of no use for us to know they are Painted there. These Colours are only necessary to discover Objects more distinctly, and that is the reason our Senses induce us to attribute them only to the Ob∣jects. So the Judgments, to which the impression of our Senses carry us, are more Just, if we consider them with relation to the Preservation of our Bodies; but nevertheless, they are various, and very far from the Truth, as has already been shown, in part, and will more evidently appear hereafter.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. Errors concerning the motions or shaking of the Fibres of our Senses. II. That we confound them with the Sensa••∣on of our Soul, and sometime again do not perceive them.
• * 1.2

  III. Expe∣rience, which proves it.
• * 1.3

  II. An Ex∣planation of the three kinds of the Sensations of the Soul.
• * 1.4

  V. Errors which ac∣company our Sensations.
• * 1.5

  See Chap. 7. 2d part of the 3d Book.