A discourse concerning the successe of former parliaments by Thomas May ...

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A DISCOURSE Concerning Former Parliaments.

SIR:

I Have, according to my small ability, and the shortness of time, fulfilled your com∣mand, in sending to you this briefe and plain Discourse con∣cerning the ancient opinions and esteeme of English PARLIA∣MENTS (for that was all which you desired) without any reflection upon the procee∣dings of this present Parliament: accept

as a plaine peece of common talk, which I would have delivered, had I beene pre∣sent with you: Such discourses need no dresse of Rhetorique.

THe constitution of our English Monarchy is by wise men esteemed one of the best in Europe, as well for the strength and honour of the Prince, as the securitie and freedome of the People; and the Basis, on which both are foun∣ded, is the conveniencie of that great Councell, the High Court of PARLIAMENT.

Without which neither can the Prince enjoy that honour and felicitie, which Philip de Commi∣nes, a forrainer, so much admires, where he deli∣vers what advantages the Kings of ENGLAND have by that Representative Body of their people, by whose assistance in any action they can neither want meanes, or lose reputation. Nor on the o∣ther side, can the people have any possibilitie of pleading their owne rights and liberties. For in the Intevim betweene Parliaments, the People are too scattered and confused a body, to appeare in vindication of their proper interests; and by too long absence of such Assemblies they would lose all. For (as Junius observes) Populus authoritatem suam tacitè non utendo amittit; sic plerumque acci∣dit ut quod omnes curare tenentur curet nemo, quod omnibus cōmissum est, nemo sibi commendatum putet: The People insensibly lose their power for want

of using it: for so it happens, that what all should look after, no man does; what is committed to all, no man thinks his owne charge.

And in that Interim it happens, that those Op∣timates Regni (as he speaks) who under the Prince are entrusted with Government, meaning Coun∣cellours, Judges, and other great Magistrates, ei∣ther through feare, flatterie, or private corrupti∣on, doe often betray the peoples rights to the Prince.

The state of government standing thus; If di∣stempered times happen to be (as our Chronicles have shewed some) where by diffention betweene Prince and People, the Kingdomes ruine hath beene endangered, it doth not so much prove that the English government is not the best, as that the best government may be abused. For in everie Monarchy, how limited soever, the Prince his person is invested with so much Majestie; that it would seeme a mockerie in State, if there were no considerable power entrusted into his hands; yea, so much as that, if he be bad or weak; be may endanger the ruine of the Kingdome; so necessary is it for all humane ordinances, how wise soever, to leave somewhat to Chance, and to have alwayes need of recourse to God, for his assisting or curing Providence.

And though the Kingdome of England, by ver∣tue of the government thereof, will be as hardly brought into a confusion, as any in Europe; yet ••••••••e is no warrant against the possibility of it.

For it was ever heretofore seene, that our Par∣liaments were rather a strength and advantage to an honourable wise Prince, than a remedy against a bad or weake one; or, if wee change the expres∣sion, they were rather an excellent diet to preserve a good raigne in strength, than Physick to cure a bad one; and therefore have been as much loved by sound and healthy Princes, as loathed by them that were out of temper; the later having thought them a depression of their dignitie: as the for∣mer have esteemed them an advantage to their strength. So that in such times only the true con∣venience of that great Councell hath been percei∣ved by England, and admired by forreine Au∣thors: in the other times it was, that those wittie complaints have been in fashion (as sir Robert Cotton speaks of a bad time) that Princes in Par∣liaments are lesse than they should be, and Sub∣jects greater. But on the contrary, that they have been an advantage to Kings, the constant Series of our historie will shew. 1. By those great at∣chievements which they have enabled our wise Kings to make, who were most constant in calling them, and consenting to them. 2. That no one Prince was ever yet happie without the use of them.

It may therefore seeme a Paradox, that any Prince should disaffect that which is so high an advantage to him, and a great wonder, that some Kings of England, not vicious in their dispositi∣ons, nor very shallow in their understandings,

have so much kicked against Parliaments. And that such have been (before we shew what reasons may be of it) see the characters of some Princes, whose successe and fortunes are knowne to all that read the histories, as they are delivered by Polidore Virgil, who in his six••eenth book speaks thus of Henry the third: Fuit ingenio miti, animo magis nobili quàn magno, cultor religionis, adversus inopes liberalis. Hee was of a gentle nature, a mind ra∣ther noble than great, a lover of religion, and li∣berall to the poore.

In his eighteenth Book thus of Edward the se∣cond; Fuit illi natura bona, ingenium mite, quem primò juvenili errore actum in leviora vitia inciden∣tem, tandem in graviora malorum consuetudines & consilia traxerunt. Non deerant illi animi vires, si repudiatis malis suasoribus illas justè exercuisset. He was of a good nature and mild disposition, who first by the errours and rashnesse of youth falling into small faults, was afterwards drawre into grea∣ter, by the societie and counsels of wicked men. There was not wanting in him a strength of mind, if avoyding evill counsell, hee could have made a just use of it.

And in his twentieth Book thus of Richard the second; Fuit in illo spiritus non vilis, quem con∣sociorum improbitas, & insulsitas extinxit. Hee was of a spirit not low or base, but such as was quite destroyed by the wickednesse and folly of unhappie Consociates.

A reason of this accident may be, that their

soules, though not vicious, have not been so large, nor their affections so publike, as their great cal∣ling hath required; but being too much manci∣pated to private fancies and unhappy Favourites, and long flattered in those affections under the specious name of firmnesse in friendship, (not being told that the adaequate object of a Prince his love should be the whole people, and that they who receive publike honour, should returne a ge∣nerall love and care) they have too much neglec∣ted the Kingdome, and grow at last afraid to look their faces in so true a glasse as a Parliament, and flying the remedy, encrease the disease, till it come to that unhappie height, that rather then acknow∣ledge any unjust action, they strive for an unjust power to give it countenance, and so by a long con∣sequence become hardly reconcilable to a Parlia∣mentarie way.

Such Princes (though it may seeme strange) have beene a greater affliction to this Kingdome; than those who have been most wicked, and more inenrable for these reasons. 1. They have not been so conscious to themselves of great crimes; and therefore are not so apt to be sensible of what they have beene accidentally made to doe against their people by evill counsell, whose poyson them∣selves did not perfectly understand. And there∣fore they are more prone to suspect the people, as unkind to them, than themselves as faultie, and so the more hardly drawne to repent their actions, or meet heartily with a Parliament. 2. The second

reason is from the People, who natural••••, looke with honour upon the Prince, and when ••••ey find none or few personall vices in him (no•• ••onside∣ring that the true vertues of Princes, h••••e a lar∣ger extent than those of private men) will more hardly be brought to think, though themselves feele, and suffer for it, that he is faultie; and ther∣fore sometimes (which would hardly be beleeved if experience had not shewed it) the People have been so tash as that to maintaine for the King an unjust Prerogative, which themselves understand not, they have to their owne ruine, and the Kings too (as it hath after proved) deserted that great Councell whom themselves have chosen, and by whom only they could be preserved in their just rights; untill too late, for the Kings happinesse and their owne, they have seene and repented their great folly.

Such a desertion was too sadly seene at the end of that Parliament of EDWARD the second, where the two Spencers were banished, and the tragicall effects that followed, when the King found so great a partie both of Clergie and Laitie, as enabled him to call home againe his banished Favourites, and proved fatall to so many Parliamentarie Lords, as the like execution of Nobilitie had ne∣ver before beene seene in ENGLAND: ever whose graves the People afterwards wept when it was too late, and proceeded further in their revenge, than became the dutie and allegiance of Subjects.

It is therefore a great mis-fortune to England,

and almost a certaine calamitie, when the distem∣pers of government have been let grow so long, as that for their cure they must need a long Parlia∣ment. For there are no wayes, how just, how mo∣derate soever they be, which that great Councell can take (if they go far enough to make the cure) but will provoke, either by the meanes, or the length of them, the Prince his impatience, or the Peoples inconstancie.

For the first; the Delinquents must needs be many and great, and those imployed, and per∣chance highly favoured by him, besides the re∣flexion which is made upon his judgment by their sufferings, and that will be one reason of his impatience.

Another is, that many Prerogatives which were not indeed inherent in the Crowne, but so thought by the Prince, and by him and his bad Councell long abused, to the prejucice of the People, with some seeming advantage to him (though well weighed they brought none) are then after a long sufferance called in question.

For the people are used to entrust kind Prin∣ces with many of their owne rights and priviled∣ges, and never call for them againe till they have beene extremely abused. But at such a time to make all cleare after so long a reckoning (and those long reckonings in State being commonly fatall; for Parliaments have seldome been dis∣continued, but by such Princes whose govern∣ments in the Interim have been very illegall) th••••

usually question so much, as that the Prince thinks himselfe hardly dealt withall, such a Prince as we spoke of, who not bad in himselfe, but long mis∣led by wicked counsell, was not enough sensible of the injuries he had done.

The second obstacle that such Parliaments may find is the Peoples inconstancie; and what age is not full of such examples which before we name, let us consider whether there be any rea∣son for it? This perchance may be one, that the People naturally are lovers of noveltie, affecting with greedinesse every change, and againe loathing it when it ceases to be a noveltie Long disconti∣nued and reforming Parliaments seemes to carrie the face of a change of government, and those things may then happen which doe in the shift of Princes, that some People may for a while flatter themselves with new and strange hopes, that prove frustrate; or else with quicker redresses of inconvenience, than the great concurrence of so many weightie businesses can possibly admit, how industrious soever that great Councell be, distra∣cted with so great a varietie; and the people after some time spent, grow wearie againe of what be∣fore they had so long wished to see. Besides, the people are more and more poysoned daily by the discourses of the friends, kindred, and retainers to so many great Delinquents, as must needs be at such a Parliament: who, though they be no con∣siderable party in respect of the whole Com∣mon-wealth, yet ply their particular interests

with more eagernesse than most doe the publike. They subtilly perswade the people, that whatso∣ever the Parliament does against those great De∣linquents is aimed against the Kings honour, and that he is wounded thorow their sides. And this opinion is somewhat furthered, when the People see how many prerogatives of the Prince (as wee said before) are after long enjoying called in que∣stion. So that by this meanes their inconstancie seemes to be grounded upon loyaltie to the King, and they (perchance with honest, but deceived hearts) grow wearie of the great Councell of the Land.

Another reason may be, that the Prince him∣selfe averse from such a Parliament, for the rea∣sons aforesaid, can find power enough to retard their proceedings, and keep off the cure of State so long, till the People tired with expectation of it, have by degrees forgot the sharpnesse of those diseases, which before required it.

By this meanes at last, accidentally a miracle hath been wrought after a long Parliament, which is, that the People have taken part with the great Delinquents against the Parliament; for no other reason, than because those Delinquents had done them more wrong than the Parliament could sud∣denly redresse. And so the multitude of those great Delinquents crimes hath turned to their owne advantage.

But in such reforming Parliaments, upon whom so much businesse lyes, not onely the inconstancie

of the People hath been seene in historie, but the unstedfastnesse of the Representative Body it self, and the distractions of that Assembly, whilst they forsake each other under so great a burden, have let that burden fall dishonourably to the ground. The most unhappie instance in this case, was that Paraliment of Richard the second begun at West∣minster, and adjourned to Shrewsbury in the nine∣teenth yeare of his raigne; a Parliament that dis∣charged their trust the worst of any that I read of; where there was as much need of constancie and magnanimitie as ever was, to redresse those great distempers which were then growne upon the State; and as much mischiefe ensued by their de∣fault, both upon Prince and People, which might have beene well prevented, and his happinesse wrought together with their owne (in the judge∣ment of best Writers) if they had timely and constantly joyned together in maintaining the true rights of Parliament, and resisting the ille∣gall desires of their seduced King. But being fa∣tally distracted, the major part of Lords and Bi∣shops wrought upon by the King, and the House of Commons too far prevailed with by Bushy the Speaker, and his Instruments, they utterly deser∣ted the Common-wealth, and looking only upon the Kings present desire, assented to such things as made the Prerogative a thing boundlesse; that he himselfe (as the Storie reports) was heard glo∣rying to say, That there was no free and absolute Monarch in Europe but himselfe. Upon which,

the same bad Councell which had before brought him out of love with Parliaments, brought him to as great an abuse of that power which hee had now gotten over a Parliament. And then follow∣ed the blank Charters, and other horrid extorti∣ons, besides the suffering of some Lords, whom the people most loved; and shortly after, by a sad consequence, his owne ruine. Nor doe wee read that any of those Lords, who under colour of Loyalty and love (as they called it) to his per∣son, had trodden downe the power and priviledge of a PARLIAMENT under his feet, had afterwards so much Loyalty to him, as to defend his Crowne and Person against the force of an Usurper, who without any resistance or contradiction unjustly ascended the Royall Throne: the sad occasion of that miserable and cruell civill war, which in the following ages so long afflicted this Kingdome of ENGLAND. This was the worst example of any Parliament; but in other times, though bad too, they have proved better Physick than any other earthly wayes or meanes could be; yet their greatest vertue and excellencie is seene, when they have been used as a diet by honourable and just Princes, such as this Nation hath been often blest with; and such who have thought it no disparage∣ment or depression of their dignitie, to be ruled by the sway of that great Councell, than a wise guider of a ship would think it to follow his Compasse, or any Mathematician to be directed by his necessary rules and instruments.

FINIS.