A treatise of the causes of incredulity wherein are examin'd the general motives and occasions which dispose unbelievers to reject the Christian religion : with two letters, containing a direct proof of the truth of Christianity / translated from the French of Monsieur Le Clerc.

CHAP. II. That Pride may be the Cause why Assent is not granted to the Proofs of the Truth of the Christian Religion.

PRide is inconsistent with a strong and lively perswasion that Christianity is true; not only because the Gospel condemns it, as it does all other Passions contrary to the Good of Mankind, but also because those affected with it find themselves dispos'd by a particular Effect of this Vice to reject unexamin'd the Proofs alledg'd for the Truth of the Go∣spel. This is what I design to shew, after I have first describ'd Pride and its contra∣ry Vertue Humility, lest what I am to say concerning it should not be so well un∣derstood.

Pride is no other thing but a Disposition of Mind that makes a Man imagine he pos∣sesses

more Knowledg, Endowments or Vertues than he truly does; and that by Consequence he should be more honour'd and esteem'd than he deserves. The Proud cannot without Vexation bear that the one or the other should be deny'd to them, especially if they are not refus'd to other Persons. They have not only a high Idea of themselves, but likewise despise others, who, they are easily perswaded, have not the same good Qualities, nor any thing worthy of that Esteem which they pre∣tend to be their own due. The too good Opinion any conceives of himself, is ever accompany'd with a Contempt of others, and both the one and the other are equal∣ly apparent outwardly. Those who suf∣fer themselves to be blinded with this Passion, believe not only that there are no good Qualities except in their own Per∣sons, and in such as admire them; but they also abhor all that to them appears ordinary, and think they should debase themselves, had they any Thoughts that were common to several others.

Such were, for example, the antient Stoicks, who imagin'd they had more Knowledg than all the World besides, and that they were above those Weaknesses remarkable in other Men. They look'd upon those with Scorn and Pity (if their Principles would permit 'em to have any) who were not perswaded of their Do∣ctrines.

They troubl'd themselves little with the Sentiments of others which they confider'd as idle Dreams, and never spoke of the most ordinary things but in strange Terms. Pain was not an Evil, Pleasure was not a Good, all Vertues were equal, there was no Difference between Vices; their Sage only had common Sense, all others were Fools. They utter'd a thou∣sand Paradoxes of this Nature, only to di∣stinguish themselves from the Vulgar, who have Ideas very opposite to these.

On the contrary Humility, which is the same Vertue the Heathens call'd Modesty, consists in having no other Sentiments of our selves but what are proportion'd to our good Qualities, and not to pretend to Honours that are not due to us. Nay, this Vertue goes yet further, and those whom we may call humble patiently suffer themselves to be debas'd much below their Merit. As those who have this Ver∣tue esteem not themselves more than they ought, so they are far from despising others, and willing to do them all the Ju∣stice they can reasonably wish. Nor are they vex'd to see People that are their In∣feriours in many respects exalted above them, and more consider'd than they de∣serve.

This Vertue may be remarkably seen in the Primitive Christians, who perfectly knowing the Errors of the Heathens, and

the Defects of their Philosophy, did not reject however all that it taught, to distinguish themselves from the Pagan Philosophers. On the contrary, they rea∣dily approv'd all that was good in it, and were transported to discover a Conformi∣ty between the Notions of those Sages ad∣mir'd by the Multitude, and the Doctrines of the Gospel. They even confess'd with great Sincerity, that the Heathen Authors did much surpass in Eloquence the first Writers of the Christian Religion. Cle∣mens Alexandrinus in his Stromates, and Eusebius in his Evangelick Preparation, can furnish a thousand Proofs of it; as well as many other Ecclesiastical Authors whom I need not cite.

Such therefore as reject Sentiments ge∣nerally receiv'd, or at least receiv'd by a great Number of Persons, should take care that the Love of Singularity, rather than a Demonstration that others are mi∣staken, has made them quit the beaten Road. 'Tis true indeed that the Multi∣tude of those who embrace a certain Opi∣nion, is not a good Proof of the Truth of it; but on the other hand it is no cogent Argument that a thing is false, because many People believe it.

It is certain notwithstanding, that to be distinguish'd from the Croud, a Man fre∣quently rejects what he believes true, for no other Reason, but because it is a vul∣gar

Notion. A vain Spirit cannot bear that he should be equall'd in any thing to an infinite number of Persons whose Know∣ledg he believes inferiour to his own, and whose mean Inclinations aim at nothing but what is common.

I'm perswaded that several are Unbe∣lievers, because at least the fundamental Doctrines of Christianity are extremely common. They think it noble to be indeceiv'd concerning vulgar Opinions, and to look upon others as People that feed themselves upon Chimera's. A Man thus conceited of himself, thinks he's ele∣vated far above the credulous Multitude, which is led rather by Custom, than gui∣ded by Reason.

There is nothing so pleasant, says an Epicurean Poet, as to live in the exalted Temple of Wis∣dom, where you may enjoy a perpetual Calm, and whence you may look down upon other Men wandring and scatter'd in their different ways of living.

—Nil dulcius est benè quam munita tenere Edita doctrinâ sapientum templa serena; Despicere unde queas alios, passim{que} videre Errare, at{que} viam palantes quaerere vitae.

But at bottom, one exposes himself, as I have said already, as much to Decepti∣on by contemning whatever the Vulgar esteems, for no other Reason than this;

as by blindly embracing all that the Mul∣titude authorizes. Neither its Aprroba∣tion nor its Hatred are the proper marks of Truth or Falshood. If there have been Chimera's generally receiv'd, there have been also as many ridiculous Noti∣ons countenanc'd by a small number of People who imagin'd themselves more knowing than others. Therefore when any finds himself inclin'd to forsake vul∣gar Sentiments, he ought to take heed that he be not impos'd upon by the agree∣able Thoughts of being exempted from those Errors wherein he sees others en∣gag'd. This may be as well the Delusion of a secret Pride, as the Effect of uncom∣mon Knowledg.

It is by so much the more dangerous to fall out of Vanity into any singular Thoughts, as that when once a Man is govern'd by this Principle, it is the har∣dest thing in the World to make him change his Mind. The same Passion that leads him into it, confirms him in it in∣sensibly, by reason of the Pleasure where∣with it fills those who will be blinded by it, representing them, as I said, to them∣selves as Persons highly elevated above the Vulgar. Beside all this, vain People imagining they are more clear-sighted than others, easily believe themselves ne∣ver mistaken, and that the rest of Men have not the necessary Sagacity for disco∣vering the Truth.

This is the reason that when any, where∣of they have not so good an Opinion as of themselves, proposes to them Sentiments contrary to their own, they will not so much as give him the Hearing. The first Thought that offers it self then to their Minds, or, if you please, the Sentiment that is awak'd in their Heart, is, that if this Man spoke the Truth, it would follow that a Person whom they despise, and not, as they think, without Reason, should have more Penetration and a sounder Judgment than themselves. But this is what they can never agree to; for so they must entirely change the pleasing Idea they hitherto entertain'd of them∣selves and others. They would be oblig'd to allow those whom they always believ'd much their Inferiours, a more considera∣ble Rank in their Esteem than themselves, and, in certain Regards, acknowledg their Superiority.

I shall illustrate this Truth by some Ex∣amples. Let's take a Jewish Doctor, and, if you will, of the Sacerdotal Race. Sup∣pose him to have studied the Laws of Mo∣ses with great Application, and the Tra∣ditions currant among the Jews in the Apostles time. Add likewise, that he succeeded well enough in this Study, ac∣cording to the Notion Men had of it then; that he thereby acquir'd a great Reputati∣on

amongst the most considerable of his Nation; and had been preferr'd to the greatest Honours they could confer upon him. A Man in these Circumstances might very easily conceive a good Opinion of his own Person and Understanding, and con∣sequently despise such as were destitute of those things which procur'd him all that Honour and Esteem.

Now let us suppose, that one of the common People, not of the Priestly Stock, neither skill'd in the Law, nor of any Esteem in the World, goes to see this eminent Priest, and tells him of things directly contrary to his Sentiments; main∣tains against him, for instance, That the best part of the Traditions he had learn'd were contrary to the true Sense of the Law, and that a Man may be acceptable to God without observing any of the Mo∣saick Ceremonies. Now what would the Priest, think you, answer to this? What Opinion would he have of a Person that should speak after this manner? 'Tis no difficult Business to guess, that he would treat this Man with Indignation and Con∣tempt; a little of his Pity is the most he could expect. It is plain notwithstanding, that the Priest would be more deserving of this Treatment, whatever good Opini∣on he had of himself.

To set the Effects of Pride in another Light, let us imagine an Epicurean Phi∣losopher,

a Man of Parts, and that by his Writings and Discourses had got him∣self a considerable Reputation amongst the Greeks, such as Lucian was for Ex∣ample, or any other that you please. This Man was accustom'd for a great while to laugh at the Heathen Religion, wherein, doubtless, he was not to blame; but he also join'd to it all other Religions, without examining them. He looks up∣on Religion in general as mere Supersti∣tion, or as a Trick of Politicians to im∣pose upon the Simple. He has a hundred times declaim'd among his Friends against the Infatuation and Prejudices of Mankind in this respect; nor did he miss the Return of Applause from those of the same Dis∣position. His Friend's and his own Rail∣leries against Religion have been a long time the best seasoning of their Conver∣sation and Debauches.

Let us also send this Philosopher to some vulgar Person, who undertakes to prove against him, that his Epicure∣anism is the most absurd thing in the World; and endeavours to inspire him with some Awe of a Divinity, whose Pro∣vidence governs the Universe. I desire not that this should be granted me as true or probable, but let us suppose it so a mi∣nute or two. Now, What will the Epi∣curean say? He'll presently put on a jeering Countenance, and laugh at all this

Man has said to him, without examining any part of it. And indeed, What Pro∣bability is there that a Person of Wit should condescend to learn of one who seems to have none, and who is infatuated to boot with the Opinions of the Mob?

These Examples belong properly to the Ages past; and to be sensible of their Force, we must, as it were, forget our own Time, and imagine our selves living before we had yet a Being. But such as have any Knowledg of Antiquity and the present Time, and have compar'd our Passions with those of our Predecessors, know that the Theatre of the World has only chang'd its Ornaments, and that the Heart of Man is the same now as hereto∣fore.

Men are proud, as they have always been; and it must be granted, that this Passion may work the same Effect now, as it could have upon a Jewish Priest or Epi∣curean Philosopher sixteen hundred Years ago. We see every day, that a Man pre∣judic'd in favour of an Opinion, defends it out of Vanity, against the clearest Evi∣dence of Reason. A Professor, for In∣stance, that in the University has long taught the old Philosophy or the old Phy∣sick, not only rejects the most ingenious and probable Conjectures of the Moderns, but even those Demonstrations which shew us the Errors of the Antients as plain as

the Sun. The Reason of this Conduct is no other, but that if he acknowledg'd what the Moderns say to be true, he must at the same time own that he taught no∣thing for many Years but pure Chimera's: nor can he find in his heart to humble himself so much to others, who have dis∣cover'd Truths whereof he's ignorant.

Those who doubt of the Christian Re∣ligion, or that reject it, ought to retire within themselves, and consider why they yield not to its Reasons. They will find perhaps, that the imaginary Pleasure of being above the common Level, and their Unwillingness to be in the same Rank with such as they despise, are the true Causes which retain them in their Doubts and Infidelity; or at least, that this Dis∣position contributes towards it very much.

As it cannot be deny'd that Pride is a Vice, and Modesty a Vertue, it must be granted, that such as act by a Principle of Pride do put themselves in danger, at least of being deceiv'd; and that therefore Pride should never be concern'd in the Search of Truth.

This every body will own; but I may be ask'd, How we shall know that a Man judges by a Principle of Vanity, and by what means we can defend our selves from the Delusions of Pride? for those who re∣ject the common Opinions, will not ac∣knowledg that they do it out of Vanity.

To this I answer, that besides a Man's own Consciousness, we may know by two things whether the Motive of Pride comes into our Judgments of things.

The first is, that when we judg after that manner, we never carefully examine the Matter in question. We content our selves with a very general and superficial Review; after which we peremptorily conclude, without ever beginning our Examen anew. 'Tis to no purpose for those who are con∣demn'd to beg a little patient Hearing, or to have their Reasons exactly consider'd once more; for they shall no longer be listen'd to. They are condemn'd with∣out Appeal, and can never recover them∣selves. So a Judgment once made with∣out Examination, serves for a Principle to others, who continue to condemn on what they never well thought of, and will not grant any Hearing to their Adversa∣ries.

If any doubts of what I say, let those who out of Pride have rashly decided a∣gainst the Truth they did not understand, endeavour exactly to repeat the Reasons of them they have condemn'd. Had they judg'd after a mature Examen, which re∣quires a long and strict Discussion of all that was alledg'd in Defence of what they condemn'd, they would so well understand it, as never to forget it. They could re∣peat, and shew the Weakness of each Rea∣son

brought against them: As we see a Judg, that has carefully read and exa∣min'd all the Parts and Papers of a Trial, report the Particulars without any Hesi∣tation; especially when it is a Matter of Consequence, and deserving Attention.

But I take it for granted, that those who reject the Truth of the Christian Re∣ligion, cannot distinctly report the Rea∣sons of such as defend it, nor tell what they except against in every one of them. This is what they should examine them∣selves about, and without which, they must confess they did pronounce a hasty Sentence: nor can they, without Injustice, refuse to examine once again a Matter of so great Importance.

All the Books that have been seen, and all the Discourses we could hear upon this Subject, contain only some loose Difficul∣ties, which seem by no means to be the Result of an exact and methodical Exami∣nation. These Difficulties cannot be more sufficient to inform those who would judg solidly of so great an Affair, than the Ob∣jections of one of the Parties are to inform equitable Judges.

We have therefore Reason to believe, that those who declare themselves against the Christian Religion, after resolving out of Vanity against the common Senti∣ments, continue to reject them by the same Principle. I confess they may have,

and that they actually have, other Mo∣tives; for it is very rare, that in a Judg∣ment which is made of a Subject so full as the Christian Religion with all its Conse∣quences, there should not enter Motives of divers sorts. But I maintain, that the particular one of Pride, I have been speak∣ing of, is found among the rest. I won't say here, that the other Motives, what∣ever they may be, are not better than this. I shall prove it in the Sequel of this Work: for 'tis enough now to shew that Vanity is concern'd in't.

Another thing whereby it may be known what great Influence Pride had upon a Judgment made of any Subject, is, that after having embrac'd an Opinion that cannot be demonstrated, 'tis presum'd that this Opinion unexamin'd must serve as an infallible Rule to judg of Truth and Falshood. Mathematicians have their Axioms, their Definitions, and their Sup∣positions, which they do not demonstrate, by reason of their own great Clearness and Plainness, which puts 'em beyond the Reach of all sorts of Doubts. They have Reason to suppose them therefore, with∣out proving them; but to suppose most obscure and uncertain, not to say false things, and to make use of those Supposi∣tions as Principles, is absurd. To expect this Method should be approved of, and to treat scornfully those who reject it, is

so sensible a Mark of their being govern'd by Vanity, that I do not know a greater Proof can be given of it.

The Jews, for Example, when the Gospel begun to appear in the World, thought they had a Right to suppose as indisputable the eternal Duration of the Mosaick Law, and the Necessity of obser∣ving it in order to become acceptable to God; that to demand a Proof of it was sufficient to gain their Hatred. The Greek Philosophers likewise of that time, look'd upon themselves as so knowing, and upon their Opinions as so well establish'd, that every thing was false, in their Judgment, which contradicted them the least in the World. Nevertheless it may be said, that the particular Principles of the Jews and Heathen Philosophers, compar'd to Christianity, were not even probable; as I could shew, if those I have to do with doubted of it. So the Jews, those blind Guides of the Blind, and the Greeks con∣ceited of a thousand Chimera's, concluded the Gospel to be false out of mere Vanity.

Those who, being educated among Christians, are got into the same Fancy, should take heed they do not commit the like Fault, unless they will be voluntari∣ly deceiv'd. Let them examine then whe∣ther, in the Judgment they form of Chri∣stianity, they suppose nothing but what is clear and incontestable. They reproach

Christians with making Suppositions with∣out Proofs; let them not be guilty there∣fore themselves of what they object to others.

For my own part, I'm perswaded that if they go back to the first Principles of their Reasonings, and then reduce them to certain Propositions, they will be con∣vinc'd of their having built upon the most obscure and incomprehensible Principles that ever were. To suppose, for exam∣ple, that there is but one Substance in the World, compounded of Extension and Thought, and which modifies it self, as we see the Ʋni∣verse is, without having any supreme Intelli∣gence distinct from the Ʋniverse it self con∣cern'd about it: To suppose, I say, so strange a Proposition without demon∣strating it, is certainly to imagine that the peremptory manner of saying such obscure things serves them for Evidence or Demonstration. When I say to demon∣strate, I understand, as Mathematicians do, what leaves no Doubt nor Difficulty be∣hind in the Minds of any who understand the Terms of the Demonstration. Other∣wise they must not talk of demonstrating, unless they would impose upon the Weak by this Word. Let the Writings of those be read over and over who maintain the Proposition I have mention'd, and ground themselves upon it, to deny the Truth of Christianity, and it will appear that there

is nothing in all Religion which equals the obscuring of this Principle. There are notwithstanding some People, who utter it as an incontestable Truth, and judg thereby of whatever the Christians say concerning God, the Creation of the World, and Providence. If these Peo∣ple would diligently examine themselves, I'm much deceiv'd if they did not disco∣ver that one of the greatest Reasons which brings them to think this a clear Principle, is, their valuing themselves upon defend∣ing an Opinion remote from vulgar Noti∣ons, and of admitting rather the most obscure things imaginable, than they should mix again with the Croud, from which they endeavour'd hereby to di∣stinguish themselves. As Credulity and Superstition add to their Objects, as it were, a false Light, which serves them instead of Evidence: So Pride makes a Geometrical Principle of a thing that's in it self unintelligible.

There are other Persons to whom this dogmatical and peremptory Air is so dis∣pleasing, that they equally condemn such as stick to the vulgar Opinions, and those who, forsaking what is commonly re∣ceiv'd, endeavour to establish new Prin∣ciples. They think that seeing there are Difficulties every where, and those some∣times insurmountable, the surest way is to affirm nothing, and to reject all without

establishing any thing. I will not under∣take to confute this Principle here; I shall only say, that altho this Way seems very different from that whereof we have been speaking, it is probable nevertheless that it proceeds from the like Disposition of Mind. It is not much less agreeable to humane Pride to consider it self secur'd from popular Errors by doubting of every thing, than by establishing Principles con∣trary to those that are commonly receiv'd. Some look upon other Men as the Sport of their Opinions, and the Prey, to speak so, of a thousand Chimeras; whilst, un∣der the Shelter of Doubt, they think themselves safe from the Danger of Er∣ror.

It might be said nevertheless by some Men, that not Pride, but the mere Im∣possibility of discovering the Truth, which is a very mortifying thing, is the Cause of their Doubts. I won't say that they ap∣pear not over-mortify'd who are in this Condition, nor will I set about to shew the Absurdity of Scepticism; I shall only remark, that no body stops at a mere Doubt in Religion. Those who say they have Doubts, are not content to look up∣on others as possibly deceiv'd, but as ef∣fectually so. They consider not them∣selves as Persons who might well be in an Error, but as having found the true Se∣cret of Infallibility; and this may be the

Effect of humane Pride, as much as the boldest Determinations. Let them have a great Care therefore; and since it is manifest, that to doubt as well as to affirm out of Vanity, is exposing of ones self to Error, let them get rid of this fallacious Passion; or, at least, suspend the Influ∣ence of it whilst they judg of Religion.

We require not this of them from the Principles of that Religion whereof they doubt, or which they reject, but from this Maxim of common Sense, viz. That a Passion, such as Pride is, cannot be of any Service in the Discovery of the Truth.