VVar and peace reconciled, or, A discourse of constancy in inconstant times containing matter of direction and consolation against publick calamities / written originally in a foreign language and translated for the benefit of the gentrie of this nation.

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Title
VVar and peace reconciled, or, A discourse of constancy in inconstant times containing matter of direction and consolation against publick calamities / written originally in a foreign language and translated for the benefit of the gentrie of this nation.
Author
Lipsius, Justus, 1547-1606.
Publication
London :: Printed and sold by R. Royston ...,
1672.
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Subject terms
Constancy -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A48625.0001.001
Cite this Item
"VVar and peace reconciled, or, A discourse of constancy in inconstant times containing matter of direction and consolation against publick calamities / written originally in a foreign language and translated for the benefit of the gentrie of this nation." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A48625.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 18, 2024.

Pages

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JƲSTƲS LIPSIƲS To the READER, Touching the design and End of this TREATISE.

Reader,

I Am not ignorant of those new judgments and censures I am likely to undergo in this new way of writing: Partly, from such as will be surprized with the unexpected pro∣fession of wisdom from him, whom they believed had only been conversant in the more pleasing and delightful studies; and partly from such as will despise and undervalue all that can be said in these matters, after what the ancients have written. To both these; it is for my concern, and no less for thine, that I should briefly reply. The first sort of persons seem to me to miscarry in two most different respects: in their care, and their carelesness. In the former that they assume to themselves a liberty of enquiring into the acti∣ons and studies of others: in the latter, that their enquiries are yet so overly and superficial For (that I may give them an account of me) the Hills and Springs of the Muses did never so

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intirely possess me; as that I should not find fre∣quent opportunities to turn back my Eyes and Mind upon that severer deity: I mean Philo∣sophy. The studies of which (even from my Childhood) were so pleasing to me, that in this youthful kind of ardour I seemed to offend, and to stand in need of the bridle of restraint. My Tutors at Ubich know how all those kind of books, were as it were forced out of my hands together with those writings and commentaries which I had laboriously composed out of all the best ranks of interpreters. Nor certainly did I afterward degenerate; for I know that in all the course of my studies; if not in an exact and straight line, yet at least in the flexure, I have tended towards this mark of wisdom. Not after the rate of most here that deal in Philosophy: who doting upon some thorny subtilties, or snares of questi∣ons, do nothing else but weave and unweave them with a kind of subtile thread of disputati∣ons. They rest in words, and some little falla∣cies; and wear away their dayes in the Porch of Philosophy, but never visit its more retired apartments. Tey use it as a divertisement, not as a remedy, and turn the most serious instru∣ment of life, into a sportage with trifles: Who a∣mongst them seeks after the improvement of his manners, the moderation of his affections; or de∣signs a just end and measure for his fears or hopes.

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Yes, they suppose that wisdome is so little con∣cerned in these things, that they think they do nothing, or nothing to the purpose that look af∣ter them, And therefore if you consider of their life, and sentiments, amongst the vulgar them∣selves you shall find nothing more foul than the one, nor more foolish than the other. For as wine (though nothing is more wholsome) is yet to some no better than poyson: So is Phylosophy to them that abuse it. But my Mind was other∣wise; who alwayes steering my Ship, from these quick sands of subtilties, have directed all my endeavours to attain that one Haven of a peace∣able and quiet mind. Of which study of mine; I mean these books as the first and undeceivable instance. But say some others, these things have been more fully and better treated of by the an∣cients. As to some of them I confess it: As to all I deny it. Should I write any thing of man∣ners or the affections after Seneca and the divine Epictetus: I should have (my self being judge) as little discretion as modesty: But if such things as they have not so much as touched upon, nor any other of the ancients (for I dare confidently affirm it) then why do they despise it, or why do they carp at it? I have sought out consolations against publick evils: Who has done it before me? Whether they look upon the matter, or the method; they must confess they are indebted to

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me for both: And for the words themselves (let me say it) we have no such penury, as to oblige us to become suppliants to any Man. To con∣clude, let them understand I have written many other things for others; but this book chiefly for my self; the former for fame, but this for pro∣fit. That which one heretofore said bravely and acutely; the same I now truly proclaim. To me a few Readers are enough, one is enough, none is enough. All that I desire is, that who∣soever opens this book, may bring with him a disposition to profit, and also to pardon. That if possibly have any where slipt (especially when I endeavour to climb those steep places of provi∣dence, Justice and Fate) they would pardon me. For certainly, I have no where erredout of ma∣lice and obstinacy: But rather through humane ignorance and infirmity. To conclude, I de∣sire to be informed by them, and I promise that no Man shall be so ready to convince; as I to correct. The other frailties of my nature, I neither dissemble nor extenuate; but obstinacy and the study of contention, I do heartily pray I may never be guilty of, and I do detest it. God send thee good health, my Reader; which I wish may be in part to thee through this book.

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