Letters of love and gallantry, and several other subjects. Vol. II written by ladies ; with a dialogue between love and reason, shewing, the reasonableness and unreasonableness of love, the nun's letter to the monk, characters and pictures of several ladies and gentlemen, with other passionate letters that passed betwixt both sexes, in town and country.

A DIALOGUE BETWIXT LOVE and REASON.

Reason.

IT was very difficult for us, agreeable Enemy, to meet in any place but at Calista's: you always fly me so obsti∣nately, and I have endeavour'd so un∣successfully to accost you, that I could never have obtain'd my wish, if Fate had not conducted you to her; but 'twas impossible to shun me there, for I never abandon her, and now I'm resolv'd not to lose so favourable an occasion. Whilst I have you here, I will tell you a hun∣dred things that lye at my Heart; I will ask you, why you hate me so vio∣lently, and if there be no means for us to be reconcil'd.

Love.

I don't know, Madam, what cause you have to complain; I do not flie you; I am not your Enemy; and I never, that I can remember, was out of your company; much on the con∣trary, I always make you my Judge in all my Quarrels; I bring you to justi∣fie my Conduct; and in fine, I make use of you in every thing I undertake.

Reason.

How dare you maintain so great a falshood to me? you, who chace me from every place where you enter; who are never satisfi'd whilst I take up the least part of a Soul which you wou'd subject: you, who grow angry when I resist you, and who despise me so much, that you will not hear me speak, when I complain of the disor∣ders, and of the violence you do me.

Love.

Yes, Madam, I maintain what I have said: Is't not making you a Judge of my Quarrels, when I oblige a Lover who loves without being belov'd, to appeal

to you for the injustice which is do•…•… him? Is't not appealing to you to just•…•…¦fie his Conduct, when he says 'tis re•…•…¦sonable to love that which is lovely and is't not making use of you in〈…〉〈…〉 actions, when in stealing a Kiss,〈…〉〈…〉 some other Favour, he maintains th•…•… Reason counsels to pay ones self, wi•…•… the fortune of one who refuses to pay•…•…

Reason.

I grant indeed, that you sometim•…•… make use of my Name, but never of m•…•… Self. Since I am welcome in all plac•…•… which are not infected by you, or t•…•… other Passions. that I am almost a•…•…¦ways desir'd, and that you are as mu•…•…¦dreaded as I am wish'd for. You a•…•… glad to employ my Name when yo•…•… wou'd enter any where, that you ma•…•… the sooner gain admittance; but as soo•…•… as ever you are admitted, you easily di•…•…¦cover that I'm not with you, and th•…•… you hardly know me, or if you do〈…〉〈…〉 all the use you make of your knowledge is to fly from me, or to drive me from you. If at any time I resolve to com•…•…¦bate you, when you have attack'd on•…•… that I govern'd; your flatteries imme¦diately

prevail with the Senses to revolt •…•…gainst me: You intrench your self in •…•…heir Post, and then their support makes •…•…ou so bold, and yours makes them so •…•…trong, that all my Darts are broke or •…•…lunted, without wounding you in the •…•…east. 'Tis to no purpose I stir and •…•…ake a Noise; call Honour and Duty •…•…o my aid; all my resistance becomes •…•…ain, I sink in the end, and must resign •…•…he place to you.

Love.

You tell me, Madam, that I sometimes •…•…ake use of your name, but never of •…•…our self; and I answer to this, and to •…•…ll the other Reproaches which you make me, that on the contrary I often Combat the Name, but I never Com∣•…•…at you. 'Tis true, in many Hearts I find false Maxims, dangerous Opinions, and ridiculous abuses, which having as∣sum'd your Name, have also the inso∣lence to resist me, and to deny me en∣trance into those Hearts, which they have possess'd themselves of. Then knowing 'em to be Enemies that have taken your Name, tho' they do not belong to you, I do my utmost endeavours to destroy

'em. I neglect no advantage; and seeing that they seek Protectors in their Quarrels, that they always interress in their party evil Custom, stupid Shame, and false Glory: By their Example •• engage the Senses and the Pleasures to my aid, who have lov'd me long, and who are inseparable Friends. With thi•• support I undertake the Combat, and am almost always certain of Victory: •• rout my Enemies, who without wearing your Livery, have the Insolence to pre∣tend they belong to you, and to engage against me under false Ensigns: So that, Madam, I revenge your Quarrel, as we•• as my own.

Reason.

You are ingenious in defending your self; but yet your excuses are very weak▪ How can you know, that the Enemies you Combat with are not of my Reti∣nue, since you don't know my Livery, and that perhaps you don't know me, who am always at the head of those you call false Maxims, dangerous Opinions, and ridiculous abuses? but you are a Young rash one, that strike without knowing who; who neither considers

Honour, Duty, nor Justice; and who call, all those your Enemies, that oppose your Pleasures.

Love.

Since I fight against you without knowing you; you ought not to be dis∣pleased with me for it: but is it possible, Madam, it should be you that I always see at the head of so many false Maxims, which oppose themselves to my designs? Really I might easily be deceiv'd in it: after having heard that you were the finest and the most Judicious Person in the World, I should never have known you under the appearance of an old quarrelsome Woman, who is always out of humour; who Preaches eternally a∣gainst pleasure, and who is Natures Ene∣my as well as mine. I should know you, Madam, if you did put on a Face more gay; If you were of a less severe hu∣mour; If you did agree better with Na∣ture and with me; and if, in fine, you wou'd furnish us sometimes with Coun∣sels proper for our designs.

Reason.

I understand you, my little Minion; to stand upon good terms with you, I must be at odds with my self; or ra∣ther I must not be what I am, if I would make a Peace with you. But do not slatter your self, that I will be guilty of so mean a thing: 'Tis more just that Love should conform to Reason, than that Reason should condescend to Love; and I will have you know, that there's no comparison betwixt one that is Blind like you, and one so clear-sighted as I; betwixt a little rash Boy, and one that's Prudent: If I seek after you, 'tis be∣cause I am naturally good, an Enemy to disorders, and careful to set those right who are out of the way. But you are unworthy of my goodness; you are a little Hair-brain'd Boy, not sensi∣ble of the kindness one wou'd do you, nor of the good advice one gives you.

Love.

What! You condemn me for my Transports, and you fall into the fault you blame. You load me with reproaches, you are angry, you are transported your self, and Reason is within a little of seem∣ing

unreasonable. I perceive, Madam, that I must oblige you to retract to day, and to make you own, that my Extrava∣gancies are better than your Prudence. To which end, since you have now made me some Complaints in general, I desire you to come to particulars; and you shall see that I will satisfie you in every Article, and that Love has his Reasons, which are better than those of Reason her self.

Reason.

I begin to have bett••r hopes since I see you Inclin'd to satisfie me. 'Tis no little matter to have reduc'd Love to reason the case; tho' his Reasons, should prove very ill ones; 'tis however to have converted him in some measure: for hi∣therto he has been an Enemy to all that was call'd Reason. Let us take the ad∣vantage then of the humour you are in, Reasonable Love (for at this time you deserve that Name) let us see what par∣ticular reasons you will give for every particular complaint I have to make to you. I am going to begin with one, which I believe will be hard for you to answer. Tell me a little, when I have

taken possession of the Soul of a Young Person, when I have subjected her to the will of a Father, who has command∣ed her to love some one, and to look upon him as one that must be her Hus∣band; Why do you often make use of your Power to make her Love another, contrary to the Obedience which she owes her Parents? Why do you take pleasure in making her find a thousand defects in the Husband that's propos'd to her, and a thousand Perfections in the Lover which you offer her? Why do you chase me from her, when I put her in mind of her Duty? Cannot the Obedience due to Parents which seems reasonable to all Nature beside, pass with you for a Reason? If you were reasonable, as you wou'd be thought, would you not make her Love what a Father Enjoyns her to Love? Would not you side with Duty, and would not you give her the same Counsels that I do? But 'tis enough that I advise her any thing to oblige you to counsel the contrary. You wou'd think you dis∣honoured your self, if you had any Sen∣timents conformable to Reason.

Love.

Tho' what you complain of does not happen every day, yet I own that I do sometimes occasion it: but in that it happens that 'tis not I, but the Father that wants Reason. If he took care as he ought to consult me before he made such a command, he should not find me excite revolts against his will. If he were reasonable, he wou'd not antici∣pate my Right, or pretend to act my part in the Heart of his Daughter. I am jealous of my Prerogative and of my Power; and when any Body does Incroach upon them, 'tis but just I shou'd make use of them for my Revenge. I know that the Obedience due to Parents is reasonable; but it ceases to be so, when 'tis to the prejudice of my Authority. The Obedience due to me ought to be preferr'd, when a Father's Counsel and mine disagree. Reason must grant the Counsels of a God are to be follow'd before those of a Man. Besides mine being always agreeable to the taste of those I advise; their end is only to plant tranquility in a Soul that follows 'em; and the advices of a Father, which

oppose mine, cause always an intestine War in the heart of those that receive 'em. So that Reason preferring Peace to War, will have my Counsels follow'd, even when they are contrary to a Fa∣thers.

Reason.

There is some appearance of Reason in your excuse; but what can you answer for your malice in making one Person to be belov'd by many rivals. If you were reasonable, you wou'd not wound seve∣ral Hearts with the same Dart. You wou'd give but one Lover to each Mi∣striss; and but one Mistriss to each Lo∣ver. By this means you would hinder the fatal effects that jealousie produces every day; and you wou'd not be the cause of a thousand Quarrels, and a thousand Murders, which we see happen among Rivals. For you can't deny that you are the Author of those Disorders, since they would not happen, if you wou'd be content to make each Beauty be belov'd by one Lover only.

Love.

'Tis not so difficult as you imagine to prove that I am in the right in what you condemn so much. I know very well, that 'tis against common sense to endea∣vour to make that pass for reasonable, which is condemn'd by Reason. But, Madam, I must tell you now, what I should have told you at first, that it is because you are a being which has never been well known: You put on different Faces to different Persons; and yet eve∣ry one of these Faces will pass for Reason. You give divers counsels according to the Persons you advise: among those that contradict each another in all their actions, every one maintains that Rea∣son counsel'd him his. 'Tis thus, that many Lovers love one Mistriss, because all of 'em finding her Lovely, they say that Reason bids them all Love her; though it does not appear reasonable to those that don't Love her. 'Tis thus, that a Lover follows the dictates of his Reason, when he frees himself from a Rival that's an obstacle to him, in the pursuit of what he Loves. 'Tis thus, in fine, that those Actors of disorders, whom

you blame with so much violence, be∣lieve they have follow'd your Counsels, when they commit Murders: because you advise those, who love to do and undertake all things, to possess what they Love; tho' those that don't Love say, that Reason teaches that what the others do, is altogether unreasonable; and that, as I have told you, because you give dif∣ferent advices to the different Persons whom you counsel.

Reason.

If there is no solidity, at least there is Wit in the Reosons you have given: but what expedient will you find to justifie your self when you drive Reason from the mind of an Old Man; when you make him renounce Wisdom to love a Young Person when he might be her Grandfather. I pardon you easily e∣nough, when you are content to sub∣ject Young People to your Empire; for they hardly having known mine, I have no great regret to see them willing∣ly submit to yours. But may I not com∣plain when you come to rob me of my faithful Subjects; those who have so long rever'd me; those, in fine, who are

grown gray under my conduct; for 'tis what you do, when you slide into the Heart of an Old Man: when the Senti∣ments you give him are opposite to those which I inspire. Is it not doing me a cruel outrage, when you turn topsy-turvy a Mind which I had settled with so much care and pains? What chagrin do you think it gives me to see an Old Man perverted by your Counsels, leave me to follow you; become a Beaux in his Old days; shave his Beard, wear little Shoes; dress himself in the gayest co∣lours; become a Slave to the Fashion; read with Spectacles what you call Billet doux, and gallant Verses; play the Child by a Young Person; whisper her in the Ear; go to Balls, Plays, and publick Feasts; and do, in fine, all the Fooleries which I can hardly excuse even in Youth. What—

Love.

If I did not interrupt you, I believe you wou'd never cease complaining up∣on this Chapter; tho' if I had nothing to answer but that I made use of the right of reprisal, when I slide into the Heart of an Old Man, I think I shou'd

not want Reason; for tho' I don't com∣plain of it here, you sometimes rob me of my Slaves, as I sometimes rob you of yours. Very often, when I think my self Master of a Young Heart, you know how to take a time when it has some disdain, some coldness, or some distast, and then seizing on the occasion yo•• drive me from it with a great deal of sharpness and scorn: So that 'tis not without Reason, that I too sometimes observe the time when an Old Man has most disposition to leave you, and that with the Fire of some bright Eyes I melt his Ice, and warm the blood which was frozen in his Veins. I con∣fess 'tis making your own Subjects revolt from you: But don't you use me in the same manner when you excite Young People to Rebel against me. If this Rea∣son appear weak to you, I'm sure you can't answer what I am going to add: You complain that I sometimes make Old Men in Love with Young Women; and you pretend that nothing is so far remov'd from Reason; but I say that there is nothing more reasonable, since by the result of what you have said, a Man should be the wiser the Older he

is, he ought to love that which in rea∣son is the most Lovely; and who is more reasonably lovely than a young Person. Wou'd an old Man make use of his Rea∣son, if he shou'd love one of his own age, where there is neither Beauty nor Comliness, where there's no Fire that can heat him, nor no Charms that can please him? And is it not more reasonable him for to love a young person, which, one may say, makes one young again, and whose Humour and Gayety excites one to Joy and Pleasures? For the rest don't think it strange that he observes in his Actions and Dress all the Gallantries of Youth; since as old as he is, he be∣comes young, when he becomes amo∣rous. Tho' he minds Fashions, tho' he does all that you call fooleries, he does it with Reason; since, being a Lover, he must endeavour to please the young person he loves; and he knows that the way to please Youth, is to live like 'em: shew the same Desires, and the same Inclinations. Wou'd he b•• welcome to his young Mistriss, if he came Preach∣ing the Vanity and Inconstancy of the Age, railing at Balls and other Di∣versions, and finding something to say

against all the pleasures of Youth? Wou'd this be a fine way of making him∣self belov'd? and has not he Reason when he practices the contrary?

Reason.

There is always a great deal of sub∣tilty in your Answers; but what can you say to justifie the Crimes you commit, when you oblige one that's Marri'd, to love another besides her Husband? Why do you snatch her Heart from him, who is the lawful Master of it, to give it to a stranger, who ought to have no pre∣tence to it? Why do you separate two Persons whom the Laws have joyn'd, to unite Two others, who can't be uni∣ted without a Crime? Do you think your self more reasonable than the Laws▪

Love.

Yes Madam, I am more reasonable than those Laws, which do not so much as consult Reason, in those Marriages, which generally are the Works pure∣ly of Chance, of Ambition, which s••metimes mix Fire and Water in joyn∣ing

two persons, who have no disposi∣tion to love one another: have they any shadow of Reason? And has not a Woman more, who finds her self sub∣jected in that manner, to give her Heart to a Gallant that loves her, than to a Husband that hates her; to a Gallant well fashion'd both in Body and Mind, who thinks of nothing but how to please her, than to a Husband ill made and humorsome, who is Eternally grum∣bling in the House?

Reason.

But tell me, since you are reasonable sometimes, Why are not you always so? I'le allow that you are in the right, when you unite two persons; but are you so again when you separate 'em? If Thyrsis had reason to love Phillis, is he in the right too, when he ceases to love her? Is he in the right, when he leaves Phillis for Calista? What excuse can you find for his inconstancy; after having brought me to be pleas'd with his Love, How can you make me love his change? Is it reasonable to despise what he did esteem, and so throw down those Al∣tars upon which he has so often s••cri∣fic'd, to sacrifice upon new ones?

Love.

It is true, that sometimes Lovers are Inconstant, but they are not without reason in their Inconstancy. When an Object seems lovely to them, they have reason to love it; but when the same Object appears to them no longer so, they are in the right too, to give away their Love. Thyrsis had reason to love Phillis, because he hop'd to be belov'd by her; he had reason to employ for her all the cares, and all the assiduity that a fair Person deserves: but he had reason to leave her, when he saw that his Cares were in vain, and that his Hopes were without any Foundation. Besides, is it not reasonable to leave the less for the more; to abandon Phillis, who all charming as she is, is however infinitely inferior to Calista? 'Tis thus, that every Lover is reasonable in his In∣constancy; tho' he had no other reason for ceasing to love an Object, than be∣cause it ceases to appear lovely to him.

Reason.

Tho' I am not fully convinc'd of what you have said, I will not however

lose time in answering you, because I have something to ask you that touches me very nearly. How comes it, unjust Love, that you slide often between Per∣sons of an unequal condition; and so unequal, that sometimes, by your Inju∣stice, we have seen Queens in love with Slaves, and Princes in love with Ser∣vants? I willingly pardon you, when you unite persons that are equal. Nay more, I approve your Conduct, I authorize it with all my Power. But how wou'd you have me suffer to see, a Woman of Quality prefer to a Gentleman, accom∣plish'd both in Mind and Body, some gross Peasant, in whom there appears nothing that's lovely? How can I for∣bear to murmur, when Princes or Lords chuse, to the prejudice of many Ladies as considerable for their Beauty, as Birth; a Country Girl or Ser∣vant, who has nothing in her that's fine or agreeable, but in the imagination of that Prince or Lord, your Malice has abus'd? Must not we condemn your ir∣regularities in such occasions? May not we accuse you of overturning your own Principles, since Sympathy which ought to be the principle of all

your Actions, does not meet in such Loves? For in fine, what sympathy can you find between a Princess and a Slave▪ between a Prince and a Servant? Mean while these are the Loves we see many examples of; and that convinces all the World that you are altogether my ene∣my.

Love.

I never do what you accuse me of, I own that sometimes Princes have lov'd Slaves; but it does not follow from thence, that I have joyn'd two Persons so une∣qual. When I kindle such a Love, I raise the Slave equal to the Princess, or I humble the Princess to the Slave: and to me they seem always equal, tho' they do not appear so to those, that are igno∣rant of my Power and mysteries I ob∣serve that Sympathy always, which you say I renounce, for Simpathy is not as you seem to think it, a conformity of Birth, of Riches, and of Honours: it is rather a conformity of Birth under the same Planet; to be of one temper, and to have the same inclinations. And may not this Conformity be found sometimes between two persons, which the diffe∣rence

of Riches and Honours have ren∣der'd unequal. I cou'd explain it to you more clearly, and let you see that this Simpathy is sufficient to make all the World equal. But 'tis a Knowledge that's reserv'd only for me: and my Policy teaches me, that, for the good of my Em∣pire, it ought to be unknown to reason. that Simpathy that hinders equality, those secret Knots, those invisible Chains, that fetter Hearts, and tye Souls, are the foundations of all my Strength and Pow∣er: or rather, 'tis I that take pleasure to appear only in my Effects, and scarcely ever in my Cause. And 'tis that, which renders my Empire very different from yours; for you Command nothing with absolute Authority, since you are ob∣lig'd to give a Reason for every thing. But for me, I act as a Soveraign, and only give a reason when I please. And to tell you the truth, 'Tis a Maxim I have established over all my Empire, that they who Reason well, do not Love well; and that they Reason ill, who Love well.

Reason.

I see plainly by your last words, cru∣el Enemy, that my Conversation be∣gins to be tiresome; you are not us'd to Reason so long: you suffer too much vio∣lence in such a Discourse; and tho' I have many things still to ask you, I must make an end, since I grow trou∣blesome to you; I am also sensible that I lose my labour, and that it is impos∣sible for us ever to be reconciled. I hop'd that meeting at Calista's, we might have contracted an Union, that has never been known between us: and that in the presence of so charming a Person, I shou'd have made Love more reasonable.

Love.

Be comforted, Madam, there is some∣thing better happened than what you had undertaken. If Reason has not made Love reasonable, I will believe that in the Presence of Calista, Love has made Reason amorous.