The third part of the reports of severall excellent cases of law, argued and adjudged in the courts of law at Westminster in the time of the late Queen Elizabeth, from the first, to the five and thirtieth year of her reign collected by a learned professor of the law, William Leonard ... ; with alphabetical tables of the names of the cases, and of the matters contained in the book.

CCCXXXVII. Harris and Wing's Case. Mich. 32 Eliz. In the Kings Bench.

* 1.1IN the Case between Harris and Wing, The first point was, That the Lease made by Queen Mary was void. 1. Because a former Lease of Record was not recited in the Letters Patents of it: The reason wherefore such recital ought to be, is not, as hath been alledged by Cook, Quia circa solium Regis subsistunt justitia & veritas; and then when there is a former Lease in Esse, the King makes a Lease in possession, the same cannot stand together, so as there is not Justitia & Veritas; but the very reason thereof is so high, that he cannot take, &c. but by matter of Record; and if that he mistaken, it makes all void: and therefore, In Petitions of Right,* 1.2 and Monstrans de Droit; If the King be not enformed of all the Titles, all is void. And therefore in the Case between Sir Moyle Finch and Throgmorton, which now depends in the Ex∣chequer; which was this, The Queen made a Lease for years rendring Rent, with a Proviso, That if the Rent be behind, That the Estate shall cease: the Rent is behind, the King granted the same over to Sir Tho. H. It was first moved, If the same Lease should cease without Office. And it was holden by Popham, and many other grave and learned Men, upon a Conference, That the said Lease should cease without Office; for the Contract which is upon Record is determined and ceased, by which the Estate which was created by the said Contract shall also cease without Office. But yet the Lessee continued in possession notwithstanding that, and took the Profits; but thereof after office found, he ren∣dred recompence to the Queen: And it was holden there, upon the said Conference, That the Queen in her Grant to Sir T.H. of the said Estate which was now ceased, ought to recite that Lease; For the Tenant is in possession, and could not be punished for his occu∣pation before Office. So in the Case of the Vicarage of Yatton, 17 Eliz. Dyer 339. The presentment being devolved to the Queen by Lapse, the Ordinary collated A. and afterwards the

Queen presented B. who brought a Quare impedit; depending which, A. proved another Presentment of the Queen, without mention or recital of the first Presentment, and the same was hol∣den void; For, in that, the first Presentment is not recited, nor the pleasure of the Queen to revoke it; and therefore it was in disceit of the Queen. So the Case 18 Eliz. Dyer 352. An Abbot leased for 60 years; the Lessee made a Lease for 80 years, the Reversi∣on came to the King; the 60 years expired, the second Lesse sur∣rendred to the King ea intentione, that the King would re-grant the same to him for 20 years remaining. The King reciting the Indenture and Surrender, ex certa scientia granted for 20 years: It was holden by the Court, That the Grant was void, because the King was misenformed, &c. It hath been Objected, That here needs no recital; for that the Lease to be recited is ended, eo in∣stante that the new Lease beginneth. Sed distinguenda sunt tempora; aliud est facere, aliud perficere; the first Lease is ended, when the new is perfected, and the Great Seal put to it. The second rea∣son wherefore the Lease shall be void, is, because otherwise the Grant of the Queen shall enure to two Intents. 1. To make a Lease. 2. To accept a Surrender; and how can the Queen ac∣cept a Surrender of an Estate, of which she hath not notice? for She is not enformed of it by any Record, without which She can∣not take notice of any thing. See 7 E. 4. 30, 31. Baggotts Assise, The King granted an Office to an Alien, the same shall not enure to make him a Denizen, for then it shall enure to two intents, &c. The words of the Grant of Queen Mary, are, Omnia tenementa no∣stra; and, If by that a Reversion shall pass, was the Question: Certainly, In verbis ambiguis Intentio sumenda est; Then here in our Case, by this Patent, is other Land which should pass, and the Reversion is nostra; but in property, not possession: Where∣fore here (Nostra) shall be restrained to that which is in possession. Where there are general words in Grant of the King, they ought to be served; but if they can be served, they shall be taken in a common and general sense; but the words shall not be stretched. But if they cannot be served, then they shall not be void, but the King shall be rather prejudiced; and always the Grant of the King either may be served or taken to a common in∣tent, 2 H. 3. 4. Quaelibet Concessio Domini Regis capi debet stricte contra Dominum Regem, quando potest intelligi duabus viis: As if two be joyntly endebted to the King, and the King pardons to one of them Omnia debita, the same shall not extend to joynt-Debts, but to those Debts of which he is only Debtor, 40 E. 3. The King granted to a Subject the Fines and Amercements ho∣minum suorum; All which hold of him by Homage, may be said ho∣mines suos; and also his Villeins are, homines suos; but because the general words may be served, the said Grant shall be taken to extend to his Villeins only. So in our Case the general words may be served with Lands in possession, and shall not extend to

Lands in Reversion. At another day the Case was argued by Popham Attorny General, and he conceived, That by the Lease made 2 Mar. both the former Leases, as well that which was made by Henry the eighth, as that which was made in Reversion by the Bishop of Bath and Wells, are gone. Lessee form term of years to begin at a day to come, accepts a new Lease in possessi∣on, which is to continue until the future Interest shall commence, the future Interest is gone; and in Barkings Case, 2 Eliz. It was holden by Dyer and Brown, that where Lessee for two years accepts a new Lease to begin two years after, this new Interest of a term determines the present Interest. For as the Lessor cannot contract with a Stranger for the Interest of a Term, which is to have con∣tinuance during a former Term; by the same reason, when the first Termor will accept an Interest of a Term from his Lessor to begin at any time during his former Estate, this new Interest determines the first. So, if one hath an Interest of a Term to begin at a day to come, and he before the beginning of that Interest accepts a Lease for life, his first Interest is gone. The words of the Patent are, All her Interest, Lands and Tenements, in the Parish of St. Cut∣bert in Wells, and parcel of the possession of the late Priory of R. and if these general words will carry Lands in Reversion, where other Lands in possession pass, &c. was the Question. General words shall have a special understanding, if the special Constructi∣on may agree with the proper signification and sense of the general words, as the Case, 2 H. 3 4. before cited; and yet in the Case of a common person, all manner of Debts were released thereby, for that it shall be taken strongest against the party: Also he conceived, That the Lands in Reversion should pass as well as the Lands in possession. And he said, All former Leases of Record needed not to be recited. &c. but such Leases only which are made by the King; For Subjects may have Leases of Record, as by Fine, Deed en∣rolled, &c. but such Leases need not to be recited; For such Lea∣ses may determine without matter of Record, as Surrender, Re-entry, &c. and then to compel the King or the party to search for such Leases which might be so determined by any Act in pais, should be as absurd, as to compel him to search by what means, and for what matter in pais such Leases are determined. And he con∣ceived, That this Lease needed not to be recited (which was made by King Henry the 8th) For after the said Lease made, the King granted the Reversion to the Bishop of Bath and Wells, and his Successors, and during the time that the said Land was to the Bishop; It might be, that the Lease was determined by matter in suit in pais, by Surrender, Forfeiture, &c. and then, notwith∣standing that the King obtained the Reversion after, and will make a new Lease; if he should be driven to recite the former Lease, whereas perhaps it is determined by an Act in pais, it should be very inconvenient. Also here, if any recital should be in the Case, how might the party interested know such former Leases, but by

search? and how long ought the party search? for his search ought to have an end, Non excrescere in infinitum tempus. And in our Case, the most equal time for search is the beginning of the last Title of the King, and no further; that is, from the present time till the time of the Title of the King begins; and in this Case the Title of the King doth begin from his repurchase from the Bishop; and if the Law be such, then here nothing is to be recited; for no Lease is mean between the re-purchase and the new Lease: For no Lease made before the re-purchase, need to be recited. For ad∣mit, That King Henry the 3d had made a Lease of a Mannor for 500 years, and afterwards granted the Reversion to an Abbot, and afterwards the Mannor by suppression came again to the King; and he will Grant a new Lease of the same, such Lease shall be good without any recital of the Lease made by King Henry the 3d for such Lease might have been determined in the hands of the Abbot by Surrender, or other matter in fact. So King Edw. the 2d made a Gift in Tail, and afterwards granted the Rever∣sion to another, the Grantee disseised the Tenant in Tail: One who was Heir to the Grantee, was attainted of Treason, the Grantee died, by which the Land came again to the King, who made a new Patent of the same, without recital of the Gift in Tail, and the Patent holden good for the Cause aforesaid. And in some Cases there needs no recital of Leases. As if the King makes a Lease for years, rendring Rent to his Receivor, and for default of payment, that his Estate shall cease. Now if at the day the Lessee tendreth the Rent, and the Receivor will not accept of it; and afterwards it is found by Office, that the Rent was not paid, by which the Lease should be void (yet he may traverse the Office;) and afterwards the King Grants this Rent to a Stran∣ger, there he needs not to recite the Lease; for it appeareth by the Office, That the same is void, and yet in truth the Lease was in Esse, &c. and so a Lease of Record in Esse in some Case needs not to be recited. So if the King Lease for years to J.S. and he assigns his Interest over, and afterwards Surrenders the same to the King; Now if the King will make a new Grant of it, he need not recite that Lease; for the Surrender of it appeareth of Record, and the Assignment of it is but matter in fait, which cannot be known by any search. So on the other side, void Leases which are not in Esse, shall be cited until it appear, as in the Case of Throgmor∣ton cited before by Egerton; And in such Case where the Queen granted the same to Sir T.H. the Grant ought to be in possessi∣on, and not in Reversion, because then void, for the King had not a Reversion. Also this Lease ought not to be recited, for the se∣cond Patent is granted to the first Lessee; and so by acceptance of this new Lease, the first Lease is determined. And now we are to see, if the things in the former Grant are necessary to be recited, the Estate in the Land and the Tenant, not necessary; The Reser∣vation, Condition, Covenant, and the Date. The reason

wherefore the Estate ought to be recited, is to this purpose, that the King might know, and be enformed how far the Land is encum∣bred with other Estates, &c. but that reason is of no effect in our Case, when the second Patent is made to the first Lessee; for by the acceptance of the new Estate, the first Interest is gone, where∣fore of that there needs no recital. The second reason, wherefore such former Lease ought to be recited, is to the intent, That the new Patentee may not have colour or countenance by reason of his Patent to do wrong to the first Patentee who hath the present possession by disturbing of him by Entry, or Suit; for all the truth of the matter appears in his own Letters Patents, and the true Estate of the Tenant in possession: But that reason hath not any force in our Case; for the second Estate is made to him, who hath the former Estate. The reason wherefore the present Tenant ought to be mentioned in the second Letters Patents, is, so as the Queen may be ascertained what manner of person he is, who is the present possessor; for it may be, he is such to whom the Queen hath given such Estate upon special favour for his good Service, and in recompence thereof; and that she will not disgrace the party so much, as to give his Farm to another over his head, which might be much to the discomfort and prejudice of him in possession: which the Queen peradventure would not do, if she had full in∣telligence of it; but rather advantage him with it, and not let it to any other person. But in our Case here, there is not any such matter of mischief; But it is good to consider what Tenant ought to be specified in the Recital: Assuredly, the most sure way is, the Patentee himself to whom the Lease was originally made; al∣though he be dead, or hath assigned his Interest over. For it may be dangerous to rely upon the Tenant, who hath the possession; for it may be, that another hath the Interest, although he hath the posses∣sion, and then the recital is false; wherefore it is best to say by way of recital, Cum dimisimus, &c. And as to the Land, the same also ought to be recited by the same name in such form, and by the same words as it was granted before in the former Grant; and yet if the name was mis-recited in the former Grant, it ought not to be so in the second. As if the King Grant the Mannor of Little-Court by the name of the Mannor of Litt-cote, or the Mannor of Welling∣ton, by the name of the Mannor of Welton, the same is good by the Statute. But if a new Grant is to be made of the same, in which the first Grant is to be recited; now the former mis-recital shall not be put in ure, but the very name; but in this special manner, that is, where the King hath demised the Mannor of Little-cote, by the name of the Mannor of Litt-cote, &c. So where a Mannor is known by two names, and the Queen leaseth the same by one of the said Names, and afterwards Grants the same by the other name; The Recital ought to be, That whereas the Queen hath demised the Mannor of D. by the name of the Mannor of S. &c. And as to the recital of the Estate, the Habendum in the first Patent ought

to be recited, and all that which preceeds the Reddendum; for, in that, the Estate is fully contained. But here, in our Case, such recitals are not necessary; for it is impertinent to make recital of the same, which is determined eo instante, that the new Patent is made, and that by reason of a matter precedent, although that all be done eodem instanti; and as to an Instant, the same is not to be considered in Law, as it is in Logick, as a point of time, and no parcel of time. But in our Law, things which are to be done in an instant, have in consideration of law a priority of time in them: As Lessee for life makes a Lease for years, they both Surrender to him in the Reversion; the same Surrender which is made in an instant, shall in Law be understood to have degrees. The Surren∣der of Lessee for years to the Tenant for life, and then the Sur∣render of Tenant for life; So in our Case, the determination of the first Lease shall be first, 1 E. 3. 6. The Tenant took the Seignioresse to Wife, had Issue, the Wife died; the Husband shall not be Tenant by the Curtesie; for, although the Seigniory was in him at the time of the Marriage, yet by priority in Law it ceased, so as no seisin of the Seigniory was during the Coverture. So in our Case, eo instante that this new Patent is made, the first Estate is determined; yet in construction of Law, the Surrender shall be said precedent, and then the said Estate needs not to be re∣cited. For if there had been an express Surrender in fact, there had not been any doubt, that recital was not necessary; Ergo, nei∣ther in the Case of a Surrender in Law. As to that which hath been Objected, That the Grant of the Queen cannot enure to two Intents; scil. to make a Surrender, and also to make a new Lease, The same Rule is true, where both Intents enure, and work against the King; But whereas the one Intent serves and works for the benefit of the King, it is otherwise: As in our Case, This Sur∣render is for the benefit of the King; therefore it shall be taken, &c. as 6 H. 8. The King Grants Land to another, durante bene∣placito, and afterwards the same Patentee purchaseth a new Estate from the King; here needs not any recital of the former, for the second Estate is made to the first Patentee, and the first Estate is determined by the acceptance of the second, 3 Eliz. The Case of the Earl of Arrundel was this, The Lord John Gray be∣ing Lessee for years of a House called Hull-rake, of the Lease of the Queen, afterwards took a Grant from the Queen of the Custody of the same Messuage, with a Fee for it, and that was without reci∣tal of the former Lease, and the Grant holden good, and yet it did enure to two Intents; to a Surrender of the Lease, and a Grant of the Custody, but both the Intents were not against the Queen, for the Surrender was for Her benefit. As to the Lease made 13 Eliz. it is utterly void, for mis-reciting of the date of the for∣mer Lease made 2 Mar. for the very date of the said Lease was the 11th of May, and in the Recital it is the 21 of May. For although the date is not necessary to be recited, yet here, as this

Case is, the same ought to be truly recited. For the Surrender of the said Estate which passeth by it, is the Consideration of the new Grant; then, if the same be false, the Patent is void, for it was made by reason of that: for there is a more ample Lease re∣cited, than in truth it is by ten days. And so the Consideration, scil. the Surrender, not so beneficial as the Queen expected; also this new Patent doth contain in it self a Grant of such Lands as were demised formerly by Letters Patents, dated 21 of May, scil. Omnia praemissa, in forma praedict. dimissa, and nothing was demised in forma praedict. scil. by Patent bearing such date; Ergo, nothing passed by the later Patent. For the Pa∣tent of 13 Eliz. is in consideration of a Surrender of a Lease made and bearing date 21 of May, whereas no such Lease was, and then no Surrender, and then no Consideration. Also here the Conside∣ration is false; for the Lessee who is supposed to have surrendred his Lease, before the same Surrender assigned parcel of his Term to one Hagget, and afterwards purchased a new Lease in conside∣ration of the Surrender of the former, and of his full Interest in it, whereas he had not the whole Interest; and so this false consi∣deration destroys the whole Grant. For in all Cases, where the considerations are real, and savour of the Land, or extend to such a real thing; if it be false, it destroys the Patent: But where the consideration is personal; as in consideration of Mony paid, or for Service done, although it be false; yet the Patent may be good. So here, forasmuch as the consideration is real, in respect of this Surrender, and is false as appears before, the Patent is void: And as to this point, there is not any difference between Consideration and Suggestion; for if it be real and false, the Patent is void; contrary, where personal. But in some Cases where the Letters Patents are, Ex certa scientia, &c. such falsity in the reality shall not hurt. Which see 18 Eliz. Dyer 352. So the Case between Manxel and Turvil, where Lessee for years, his Lease being expired, supposing that he had twenty years of his Lease not entred; in consideration of such Interest, took a Patent de novo, the same was void. So Owens Case: Terril being Lessee for years of the Parsonage of P. in the County of Sommerset, of the Grant of the King for certain years; In consideration of his said Interest, obtained a Grant of the Queen of Lands in Wales, whereas in truth he had before assigned his Interest in the said Parsonage to another; and it was adjudged, That the said Grant of Lands in Wales was void, for the Consideration was void; and so the Consideration being real, was false. And in some Cases, a Consideration personal, if it be false, shall destroy the Patent, if it be future and executory; as if the King Grants Lands to J.S. ea intentione, that he shall pay to J.D. 10 l. Now if he do not pay it, the Patent is void, and the Estate given by it void also. It hath been Objected by Godfrey, That by this Sur∣render, the Patent was cancelled, and so the parcel of the Term

which was assigned to Hagget, was defeated and avoided, foras∣much as the Original Letters Patents out of which the Estate of Hagget was derived, are cancelled, and so there is a good Surren∣der, and then the Consideration is true; especially, forasmuch as Hagget being Assignee but of parcel of the Term, cannot have a Constat by the Statute of 4 E. 6. As to that I conceive, That the Assignee of part of the Interest may have a Constat by that Sta∣tute, notwithstanding the Surrender of the Letters Patents, and the cancelling of them; and for that matter the difference is, If the Roll remains a Constat may be, although that the Patent be cancelled. See Brook, Patents 89. 32 H. 8. If a Vacat be en∣tred upon the Roll, then no Constat can be afterwards; and therefore in Sydnies Case, the Assignee could not have a Constat, because there was a Vacat entred upon the Roll. But a Constat had before any Vacat entred upon the Roll; such a Constat is good, notwithstanding the Vacat afterwards: And it doth not appear, that any Vacat is entred upon the Roll; so for any thing that ap∣pears, Hagget may have a Constat, and then his Interest is saved to him, and then the Surrender is void, and the Consideration false; and although there be other Considerations in the Letters Patents, which are true and good, yet that shall not help the mat∣ter. For if any part of the Consideration be false, the Patent is void in all; and so it was holden in Manxell's Case, cited before, and so be prayed Iudgment for the Plaintiff. Egerton Sollicitor, to the contrary. Where the words ex certa scientia, are not put in Letters Patents; they shall be intended to be made at the sug∣gestion of the Patentee, and so the Grant shall be taken beneficially for the King, and strictly against the Patentee: But where such words are put in the Letters Patents, there the Grant shall be ta∣ken beneficially for the Subject; These words, Ex speciali gratia, imply the bounty of the King, certa scientia excludes all ignorance, and mero motu shew the voluntary and liberal benevolence of the King, without suit of the party; and where the words in such Letters Patents are general, they shall be construed liberally for the Subject, but with limits and bounds, that nothing pass in such case, but such things which are aptly signified by such special words; as to pass two things, where the meaning of the King was to pass but one. And if the Patent be conceived utro{que} modo tam ex cer∣ta scientia, &c. as upon the suggestion of the party; If the Sug∣gestion be in any part false, the whole Patent is void, for the Sug∣gestion extenuates the force of the other words, Juris forensis est, si quid falsis precibus obtentum acquirenti non proderit; and to that purpose he cited the Case, 18 Eliz. Dyer 352. before cited. And he conceived. That the Lease made by Queen Mary is utterly void. 1. Because the first Lease of Record is not recited. 2. If the same shall be good, the Queen should accept a Surrender, where she knew not of it; and so the Patent should enure to divers Intents. 3. This Lease is made by general words; that is, Of all the

Lands in the Parish of St. Cuthberts: For these general words may be well satisfied with the Lands which the King hath in possession; and therefore they shall not extend to the Lands which are now in Question, of which the Queen at the time of the Grant had but a Reversion; and first I conceive, That general words without any restraint or limitation, will pass nothing: As, if the King pardons all Demands, or Grants Omnia terras & te∣nementa sua; But, general words qualified with a restraint, where the Limitations are effectual; As, if the King Grants Omnia terras & tenementa sua in D. which he hath by the Attainder of J.S. or which were the possessions of such dissolved Monasteries, such Grants are good; And where the Case is, That Queen Mary hath the Lands in possession, of the annual value of 19 l. and other Land there in Reversion of the annual value of 6 l. and then she Grants Omnia terras & tenementa nostra, rendring 19 l. per annum. I conceive, That upon these words the Land in possession only passeth, because that the said general words may be aptly served and satisfied with the Lands in possession, if no other Lands pass. And I agree, That this word (Nostra) extends as well to the Lands in Reversion, as to Lands in possession; but most pro∣perly to Lands in possession: for Land in Reversion cannot dici simpliciter Nostra, but quodam modo tanquam terra revertens, and not to take the natural profits of it; for the Termor hath such pro∣perly, that he shall have an Action of Trespass, Quare clausum fregit: But the intent and meaning of the Queen is to be regar∣ded, and that is the surest way to have right intelligence of the Grants of the King; For here the Queen hath reserved but 19 l. Rent, which is the proper and ancient Rent of the Lands in posses∣sion; and if Lands in Reversion should also pass, the Rent of which was 6 l. per annum, then upon the whole Grant but 19 l. being reserved, the Queen should lose 6 l. per annum of her ancient Rent; which should be contrary to the intent and meaning of the Queen; and the intent of the Grantor, even in the Case of a Subject, shall direct the construction of Grants. As 9 H. 6. Br. Grants 5 by Babington. A Man grants Common in his whole Lands, he shall not have Common in his Orchards, Gar∣dens, or Meadows, for such was the meaning of the Grantor, a for∣tiori in the Case of the King. It hath been argued, That the for∣mer Lease ought not to be recited, because that after the first Lease made by King Henry the 8th, the Inheritance hath been in a Subject, that is, the Bishop of Bath and Wells; but the same is not so: For if the King makes a Lease for years, and after∣wards Grants the Reversion upon Condition, which after is bro∣ken, and so found by Office, by which the Reversion is reduced to the King; If now the King will make a new Lease, he ought to recite the former Estate, notwithstanding the mean grant of the Reversion, or else such second Lease is void. Another matter hath been Objected, wherefore the former Lease ought not to be recited;

and that is, because it is determined by surrender in Law, before that the new Lease takes effect; Sir, the same is not so, for the former Lease is in being, as the Case betwixt Fulmerston and Steward, 1 Mar. Plow. Com. 106. upon the Statute of Monaste∣ries, 31 H. 8. See the words of the Statute, whereof and where∣in any Estate or Interest for years at the time of the making of any such Lease had his being or continuance. And an Abbot made such a Lease to one, who had a term for years of a former Grant; although here be a Surrender, yet this Case is within the said Statute, and the said former Lease shall be said to have his being at the time of the making of the later Lease; and the Surrender shall not be said so to preceed the making of the Lease, but that the former Lease shall be said in Esse at the time of the making of the later Lease. And in our Case, it shall not be taken for any Surrender, for then the Queen shall lose 6 l. of her ancient Rent and Revenue; and always when the Title of the King and of the Subject concur, the Title of the King shall be prefer∣red; as 43 E. 3. The King Lord, Mesne, and Tenant; The Tenant pays his Rent at the day to the Mesne before Noon, and then the same day before Night the Mesne dieth, his Heir within age, the King shall be paid the Rent again; for here the Title of the King and the Subject concur together at one time, and in that the King shall be preferred; and so he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant. And afterwards at another day the Iustices declared their Opinions, and by Wray, Chief Iustice, We all agree, That the first Lease ought to be recited; and the reason which hath been urged against that point, hath reduced us to be of that Opinion, scil. That the second Lease was made to the first Pa∣tentee, and the King doth not make the recital; but the party ought to inform the King of all former Estates of the said Lands; and that he might well do, for he is well knowing of them; and although that the Reversion after the first Lease made hath been conveyed to a Subject, the same is not material here, forasmuch as the se∣cond Estate is made to him who had the first Estate, and might know whether the first Estate were determined or not; Also by the re-purchase, the King is in Statu quo prius. Gawdy Iustice, al∣though that the former Term be drowned by the taking of the se∣cond Lease; yet it was in being at the time of the taking of it, as it is holden by Bromley, in the Case of Fulmerston and Steward. It is determined by the second Lease, and yet it was in being at the time of the making of it. Fenner Iustice, to the same intent. Clench Iustice, If the Grant of the Queen shall enure to two in∣tents, then the Queen should lose 6 l. per annum of her ancient Revenue. It was agreed by all the Iustices, That the general words in as much as they are restrained to a certainty would pass the thing si caetera essent paria; contrary, if they had remained in the generalty; and afterwards Iudgment was given: Quod que∣rens nihil Capiat per Billam.

Notes

• * 1.1

  More Rep. 4. 5.
• * 1.2

  Ante 5, 6.