The excellency of monarchical government, especially of the English monarchy wherein is largely treated of the several benefits of kingly government, and the inconvenience of commonwealths : also of the several badges of sovereignty in general, and particularly according to the constitutions of our laws : likewise of the duty of subjects, and mischiefs of faction, sedition and rebellion : in all which the principles and practices of our late commonwealths-men are considered / by Nathaniel Johnston ...

OF THE EXCELLENCY OF Monarchical Government, Especially of the English Monarchy; WHEREIN, Is largely Treated of the several Benefits of KINGLY GOVERNMENT, and the Incon∣venience of COMMON-WEALTHS, &c.

CHAP. I. A Comparison of the Body Natural and Politic; with an account of the subject Matter treated of.

FROM the Contemplation of our selves, in the Faculties of our Souls, and the Subservience of our Bodies, no doubt wise Men have fram'd the Idaeas of Government; with is agree∣able to what the Great and Ancient Philosopher(a) 1.1 notes, That every living Creature consists of Body and Soul, whereof the one by Nature commands, and the other obeys: and in another place(b) 1.2 he distinguisheth the manner of the Soul's Rule; in that it rules the Body by a Masterly and Absolute, and the Mind rules the Affe∣ctions by a Kingly Command.

As the Natural Body consists of Head and Members, made stable and erect by the Bones, tyed together and curiously interwoven by the Nerves, Ligaments, Tendons, Muscles, and Membranes;* 1.3 per∣vaded by the nutritious juice, Lympha and Blood; irradiated by Natural, Vital, and Animal spirits; animated and enlivened in all its motions by the Energy of a Rational Soul: So in the Political, the Sovereign the Head, and the People the Members, are held together by the strong Sinews and Nerves of good Laws and Politi∣cal Constitutions; actuated and enlivened in all their motions by

the influence of the Prince and his Government (as the Soul, Ar∣chaeus and Coelestial fire) whereby every Member performs its Offices in this great Oeconomy, the whole System is kept in regular and orderly Motion, is firmly established, and enabled to exert all those beneficial Powers that are admired in a well composed Body Politic. The Body without the Head, being but a Trunk and inanimate Carcase; and the Head without the Body, as a curious piece of Clock-work without Motion.

It must be owned to be a noble Enterprise to make researches in∣to the constituent Parts, Harmony and Composure of Government, which is that benign Supreme Power which influenceth vast Socie∣ties of men, and combines all tempers, constitutions and interests in one noble Machine, for the benefit of the whole and every part; and makes every Dominion a little World; wherein Beauty, Order, and the Blessings of this Life are inspired into all the Members, how minute soever, with that calmness (when no disturbances are given it) that we scarce hear the motions of the(c) 1.4 Machine, or see the Springs that move it.

But as in the Body Natural the(*) 1.5 Philosopher observes, That by the turbulence of depraved Appetites, by heady Rashness, and seducing Passions in the vitious and ill-affected, the Body seems to command the Soul, and Reason is dethron'd: So in the Commonweal, when from mistakes and misguided Zeal, Discontent, Ambition, and o∣ther vitious Inclinations, People are infected, whereby the Malig∣nant Fever of Sedition, or the Pest of Rebellion rageth in a State; the Sovereign is, for a time, kept from the Exercise of his Royal Power,* 1.6 and sometimes dethron'd.

But to leave this pleasing Allegory, which I could pursue in com∣paring all the Members of the Body, and Faculties of the Soul with the constituent Parts and Offices of Government: I shall, in∣stead of that, draw a short Scheme of my design in this Work, which I had never undertaken, if it had not been that I was invi∣ted to it by a Great and Wise Minister of State,* 1.7 whose glorious Service to his Prince and Country will be celebrated in remotest Ages: and having liv'd to make some Observations on the Causes and Managery of the Rebellion against King Charles the Martyr, and the tendency to another Civil War of later date; and revolving with my self, that though many wise and judicious Persons both know, and have learnedly writ, of the secret Springs and Movements of them, infinitely beyond what I can pretend to: and that both our own Country-men have, in Parts, writ of all the branches of the English Government, and many Foreigners of Politics in general, or such as were fitted for the Governments under which they lived; yet having met with none that had so particularly writ of the Ex∣cellency of the English Monarchy, as to illustrate it so as it might be useful to the preventing Seditions and Rebellions, and to clear the Commodiousness and Necessity of submitting to it; and placing a great Portion of our happiness here in living under it, I con∣ceived it might be a profitable Essay to excite those, who have not leisure and opportunity to peruse great and numerous Volumes, to

extract, for their use, such things as had occurred in my poor Read∣ing, to induce them to prize it as they ought, and to furnish them with such Arguments, as my low Reasoning was able, whereby to answer the Objections of our late Republicans against it, and dis∣cover their Methods of Proceedings towards the overthrowing it, and to caution all the well-meaning Subjects against all the Arts of Factious and Seditious People and Principles.

And though I cannot promise my self the success I wish; yet I hope I may excite some more knowing, learned and judicious, to furnish our little World with a more Copious and Elaborate Piece, which may supply my defects, and more abundantly satisfy the ingenious and curious Reader, to whom I shall now draw the Curtain, and expose the Model of the designed Work.

First, Therefore,(d) 1.8 as a Foundation, I shall treat of the neces∣sity of Government in General; In which Chapter I shall discourse of its Original in Families, &c.(e) 1.9 Then that the People are not the original of Government. Then(f) 1.10 of the benefit of Government in instituting Laws; In(g) 1.11 securing Property and other particulars. From this I proceed to treat of the(h) 1.12 inconvenience of Democracy, and of the several(i) 1.13 Forms of Common Wealth Governments, before and in, Aristotle's time. After which(k) 1.14 of the inconveni∣ence of all kinds of Republick Governments Then of the preference(l) 1.15 of Monarchical Government before all others. In all which Chapters I touch upon the Principles and Practices of our late Re∣publicans, which having dispatched, I give the Character of a good(m) 1.16 King in general. Then that the care(n) 1.17 of Religion is incum∣bent upon Kings. Then of the(o) 1.18 Clemency, Prudence,(p) 1.19 Courage(q) 1.20 and Military Conduct of Kings; of the(r) 1.21 burden and care of Kings.(s) 1.22 The Excellency of Hereditary Monarchy. Then I proceed to the King's Authority and(t) 1.23 Sovereignty in general; and more(u) 1.24 particularly according to our Laws by the Enumeration of many particulars.(w) 1.25 Then, as a Corollary, that the Sovereign is not accountable to any upon Earth. That the King is not to be(x) 1.26 Re∣sisted or Rebelled against. In what cases he may(y) 1.27 dispence with the Execution of the Laws of his Country. Then I treat of the King's Authority(z) 1.28 in making Laws, and of the Laws of the Romans in Britain, and of the British and German Polity. Next of the Saxons(a) 1.29 great Councils, of whom they consisted, and how the Laws were established by the respective Kings. Then of the great(b) 1.30 Councils from the Conquest to the beginning of Hen. 3. Then of the great Councils(c) 1.31 and Parliaments during the Reign of Hen. 3. to the end of Edw. 3. After which of the Parliaments(d) 1.32 of England during the Reign of Edw. 2. to the 22. of King Charles the 2d. Then of Modern(e) 1.33 rightly constituted Parliaments, and of the Factious(f) 1.34 Members of Parliaments; wherein I discourse, at large of the Encroachments of some Parliaments, especially of some Houses of Commons. Then from the great Council I pass to the(g) 1.35 Right Honourable the Privy Council, their Qualifications, to be at the King's sole appointing. Of Ministers(h) 1.36 of State, &c. Then of the King's Sovereignty in appointing(i) 1.37 Magistrates,

(k) 1.38 Judges, Justices(l) 1.39 of Peace and their Sessions; Of the Kings Soveraignty in making(m) 1.40 War and Peace. Concerning(n) 1.41 rai∣sing Money upon the Subject, and obligation of Subjects to supply the Soveraign.

Having thus dispatched the particulars, that more immediately relate to the Soveraign, I come to the Subjects, and first discourse(o) 1.42 of the Nobility; Then of the(p) 1.43 Gentry, and the(q) 1.44 Com∣monalty. Then of the disposition(r) 1.45 of the Common People: Next of the Subjects obedience.(s) 1.46 Which last leads me naturally to dis∣course of the contrary, viz.(t) 1.47 Faction and Sedition, and the causers and causes of them under Ten several heads. Then of the signs(u) 1.48 of them: Then of the(w) 1.49 Prognosticks of Faction and Sedition; After which I pass to the Remedies(x) 1.50 of Faction and Sedition. Then of the Preservatives(y) 1.51 against Sedition and Faction; and Lastly, of Conspiracies(z) 1.52 and Rebellions.

In all which I have endeavoured to divert the Reader with vari∣ety of History,* 1.53 and Quotations out of such most approved Au∣thors as I judged most suitable to my Design, and would be most grateful to the Reader; whom I desire, according to my poor Talent, to please as well as instruct; and have chosen rather to give him the Authorities I use in their own Language, and thereby be just to the Authors, than to follow the way of many Writers in this Age, who though they take the Notions and Hints from such as have writ before them, yet by varying Expressions and new-wording things more Modishly, their Writings pass for Originals.

Because I design this Work principally for the Nobility and Gentry, as well as the Learned of all Ranks, I have judged it a duty incumbent upon me to give them the Greek and Latin Quo∣tations, whereby they may be excited to peruse such Authors as have been valued in all Ages; and lest some might complain of the interruption by them of the continued discourse, I have mostly placed them in the Margent, upon which they may cast their Eye, only when they please. And though the whole may look more like a piece of Mosaic Work, than a beautiful Picture to be viewed uno intuitu; yet I hope the Ingenious Reader will find, that as I have bestowed some pains in disposing and placing the Gems and Stones; so he will find, in the perusal, some lively Figures and Images, which will bear proportion to the great Leviathan of Go∣vernment, I design to represent; and though I cannot pretend to heighten and enrich all things with floridness of Language, yet he will find something to commend it, as a Country piece, where it received its first and last hand.

Mr. Hobs having adorned the Frontispiece of his Leviathan with the figure of a Giant's Head, on all parts of which are swarms of all Orders, Offices, and Imployments of mankind, that are com∣bin'd in Government, delineated as the Picts are supposed to have painted their Bodies, or Trajan's Column is engra∣ven.* 1.54

So I think it not improper to give a rude draught of the Com∣parison betwixt the Parts and Offices of Humane Bodies and of the

great Colossus of Government— Sic parvis componere magna—

The common People I may not unfitly with their Tillage and Labor, call the common Digestor, like the Stomach that affords nourishment to this great Behemoth; the(a) 1.55 Philosopher telling us that the Husbandman's toyl is for nourishment. The Mechani∣cal Traders are the Bowels and lacteal Vessels, which transmit the nourishment in the inferiour Belly. The Merchants are the Veua Porta. The lower Magistrates and Corporate Towns may be re∣sembled to the Glandules and the Viscera, that promote the secre∣tion and distribution of the nutritive Juices.

The Gentry and Yeomanry are the Muscles, Ligaments, and Membranes which make up the fleshy and robust Parts. The wealthy are the fat and plumpy Parts. The Learned part of Man∣kind may be judged the Organs of Sense; The Military the Hands and Feet; The solid and judicious the Bones that give stability and erectness.

The Bishops and Judges bear some parallel to the Heart and Li∣ver, by whose functions the Religion and Laws are brought to re∣finedness and a racy Spirit. The Preachers and Pleading Lawyers have some Analogy to the Lungs and Midriff, which if untainted contribute much to the spiritualizing of the blood.

The Nobility are the Vital Spirits, who, by a liberal Education, give a generous mien to the whole.

The Counsellors of State may well be compared to the Brain, from whose Spirits the progressive and regular Motions are directed.

The Laws Spiritual and Temporal,* 1.56 by some are compared to the Nerves and Sinews, that bind and fasten together all the Contex∣ture; or may be resembled to the Blood which permeates the whole mass and keeps every part from putrefaction.

The Sovereign is that Forma Informans, that divinae particula aurae, The Philosophers 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the forming Soul, the Portion of Divine Spirit and Ubiquitary power that presides and governs all.

CHAP. II. Of the necessity of Government in general, in Families first, and after in Societies.

HAving represented Government by the energy of the Soul in the combination with the Body in individuals: The next Idea of it illustrated in Families.* 1.57 Therefore the Philosopher saith,(a) 1.58 There is a necessity to conjoyn those, whereof one can∣not be without the other, as Male and Female for the cause of Pro∣creation. To which according to Hesiod(b) 1.59 he adds a servant: but supposing in the first beginning there were no men servants born, he

makes that an Ox, as being the usefullest for all the imployments this first joyned couple had use of in Tilling the ground, and I doubt not but under that name he includes either all the Creatures ser∣viceable to man, or all that Species, as Bull, Cow, Calf and Ox.

Therefore the same great Philosopher(a) 1.60 makes it his first conside∣ration of Government to discourse of the three constituent parts of a Family; The first Despotic of a Master over his Servants; the second Paternal, of a Father over his Children, and the third Nup∣tial, which is the Authority of the Husband over the Wife; and from hence we may judge that Polybius considered his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a∣bout which a late Author gives a large account.

Now the Master of the Family, according to(b) 1.61 Aristotle, in seve∣ral places of his Politics was as King; as expresly in one place he saith, Every house is governed by Kingly command, by him that is eminentest in Age.* 1.62 In which short sentence we may note, that this must relate to an Infancy in the World before Families were embodied, and seems to overthrow the opinion of its Eternity ascribed to the Philosopher, and however is a plain illustration of the Rise and Original of Kingly Government from that of the Paternal.

In this Family the same Philosopher(c) 1.63 distinguisheth the Hus∣band's rule. That over the Wife is civilly, that over the Children Kingly; both which words are used for a milder sort of Government, than that which was masterly over Servants. So that it is not to give Parents the Power of Saturn to devour their Children; nor was there need for a late Author(d) 1.64 to bewail the state of Children under such a Tyranny (as he accounts it) of Parents. For I shall hereafter I hope make it appear that Kingly Government is of all other the least Arbitrary (as exercised especially in England) and that Kings are justly stiled Patres Patriae, Fathers of their Countries, and that it is Kingly as well as Fatherly, to govern without asperity and bitterness, by benevolence and Paternal care, which never was known in Republican Patriots. However all I will infer at present from hence is, that Government is coeval with Families, and shall speak more of it in the Chapter of Monarchy.* 1.65

From these private Lares and Occonomies sprung up Societies. For man being of all the Creation only endowed with Speech, and that furnishing him with discourse upon things troublesome and pleasant, profitable and unprofitable, just and unjust; For(e) 1.66 that before all other Creatures, saith the Philosopher, it is the Property of man that he alone hath the sence of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust; from thence it must follow not only that man is a sociable Creature, or fitted for Political Government, but that Society is founded in Nature.

For the Tongue cannot be imploy'd reasonably but in Company; none but one crazed in his Sense, will hold Parly with himself, or talk to himself the thoughts of his heart;* 1.67 Nature that gave man a Tongue, gave him also Inclination to Society, where he might use it,* 1.68 as a late Author out of Aristotle words it.

The same is demonstrated by the Moral Virtues, which are pro∣per

and peculiar to mankind. How and to whom shall Justice be administ'red but amongst men? How shall Fortitude appear but up∣on such occasions as appear amongst men? Where shall Prudence have place unless in debating and resolving the affairs of men? Who can be liberal if he gives not to many? Who shall enjoy the sweets of Friendship, if he have not to whom he may be a Friend, with whom to share his happiness. Nature therefore that hath made Virtue proper to man, hath also made it proper to man to live in Company.

These praecognita being granted, it will be easy to evince,* 1.69 that no Society can be happy without Government; the body of the Peo∣ple being the Subject matter of it; of which the Philosopher(a) 1.70 reckons several kinds, as Fishers at Tarentum and Byzantium, Ma∣riners at Athens, Merchants at Aegina and Chios, Skippers at the Island Tenedos, and in all places are Husbandmen, Artificers, Soldi∣ers, and Nobles; so that Government is most necessary to com∣bine these into Societies for mutual safety and profit. Therefore the same(b) 1.71 Philosopher observes that to obey and command (which are the Characteristics of Government) are not only to be num∣bered among the profitable but the necessary; For as soon as we are born we fall under that discrimination.

The great(c) 1.72 Orator assures us that without Government,* 1.73 nei∣ther House, City or Nation, nor the Complex of Mankind or Na∣ture, nor the World it self could subsist.

So the divine Plato(d) 1.74 tells us that it is a Law established by Nature, that the Inferior should yield to the Superior in Eminence, and that Law would be inverted if we did not yield to them, and live according to the direction of our Governors.

So the Aborigines in(e) 1.75 Sallust are those only which are reputed a wild sort of men without Laws and Government; and Tacitus(f) 1.76 speaking of the Babarous Parthians, calls them loose and unsetled, rather without a Lord than in Liberty: and there may be good reason for it; since, as Justin(g) 1.77 notes, they sprung from the Peo∣ple banished from the Scythians, and so we may suppose them none of the most civilized among them.

Uncontrouled Liberty may seem sweet and be affected by a sett of People led by Appetite only,* 1.78 and upon the first notion: but when the Wise and Sober reflect upon the inconveniences of it (where lawless and unlimitted) there inevitably will appear a ne∣cessity of Government and Laws, to rescind the Luxuriousness of our depraved desires, without which we should all run into Spruns and Ramel-wood, and the Capreoli, Suckers, Wi••s,* 1.79 and Brambles would choak up the richest Soil; yea the rude dispositions of men without the force of Government, would not more be broken than those of untamed Beasts.

Mr. Hobs(h) 1.80 hath introduced, in the condition of Nature, an ima∣ginary State of War, whereby every man, in his pure Naturals,* 1.81 had right to every thing his brawny Arm, or daring Soul could gripe, covet, or affright his fellows from possessing; and ascribes to his Aborigines such a baseness and villany in their Nature, as degrades them to that Bestiality rarely found amongst Savages. Allowing

them scarce Reason, or such an one as was wholly subordinate to their Appetites; as if he had taken his observation from the Swine-Trough, where he had seen the master Boar pass from Trough to Trough, to drive the weaker from their feeding, till he had been satisfied.(a) 1.82 All which (saith a most Judicious Nobleman) he doth for no other end but that he might fit man for those Chains and Fet∣ters he hath provided for him; depriving him of the greatest glo∣ry and happiness that can be attributed to him of Gentleness and Benevolence, which is conspicuous in man's Nature; and on the contrary making him the only Creature, that out of the malignity of his own Nature, and the base fear he makes inseparable from it, should be obliged, for his own benefit, and the defence of his Rapine, to worry and destroy all of his own kind, till they all became yoak∣ed by Covenant of his own contriving, never yet entered into by any one man, or in Nature possible to be entred into; as in due place I shall make appear.

Supposing however by the Law of Nature, every man may de∣fend himself and annoy those whom he hath power over;(b) 1.83 yet how much more eligible is it to part with that Right, and yet to do nothing contrary to Nature, when Reason tells us we shall obtain a more excellent good, the benefit of Peace and Prosperity in Society; which together with Safety and Plenty are what Go∣vernment aims at. The People finding by reason, that the good they wanted was not attainable without a Common Protector, to administer Justice equally amongst them; and the sense of the miseries that would befal them sor want of this made their Routs become Societies: The Salus populi, in the Constitution of Govern∣ment being the prime end of it, as most agreeable with the joynt Interest of Rulers and People.

The multitude therefore that do not consider the Reason, that made all People commit themselves,* 1.84 their lives and fortunes to the trust of their Rulers, ought to be convinced that their giving up their Right of defending themselves and subjecting them to Govern∣ment, and restraining their own Arbitrary Wills, and yielding themselves to the Conduct of their lawful Superiors, will conduce most to the obtaining of that most excellent good, the benefit of Peace and Society, every one being in less danger of mischief from the rapacious and bloody minded, living in Society and under the Protection of the Government, than where every one might follow his own Inclinations. This also being the chiefest preservation from that Misery and Confusion which Sedition and Rebellion (general∣ly blanched with the abused names of Salus populi) have brought many Nations to.

so the Judicious Chancellor(c) 1.85 Fortescue saith, that no Nation by its own Consent was incorporated into a Kingdom, but that there∣by they might,* 1.86 with more safety than before, maintain themselves, and enjoy their goods from such misfortunes and losses as they stood in fear of.

Therefore the old(d) 1.87 Persians (saith Sextus Empiricus) for five days together, after the death of their King, permitted the People

to live Lawless, that after the Experience of the Slaughter, Ra∣pine, and other Outrages committed in that short interval, they might learn to hold the Government in more esteem.

Self-preservation and an ardent desire of happiness (saith a(w) 1.88 learned Author) are the two Poles upon which all our Natural and Rational desire and aversions move. These are the Tutelars and Inseparable Companions of Mankind through all the vicissitudes of Life. These are the potentest incentments to Society and Government, which not only allure but neces∣sitate the Congress, Combination, and Cement of Confede∣racies in Societies, for the mutual Preservation and Peaceable Possession of that Happiness all do covet.

This implanted Love to our selves made all Mortals exer∣cise their best faculties, to defend and ensure themselves against every thing they could foresee or fear would be capable of disturbing their felicity, the peaceable fruition of which was the upshot of all their desires and appetites; which was no ways so likely to be effected, as by Union in Government. For to be rich and not able to defend our wealth, is to expose our selves as a prey; and to be safe and poor, is to be securely miserable: both which are avoided by the benefit of Govern∣ment.

Furthermore,* 1.89 if we consider the nature of the common peo∣ple which make up the gross body, we shall find an absolute necessity of Government. For as the Orator(x) 1.90 observes, in the multitude is a great variety and change of opinions, they are as unconstant as the weather, nothing being so familiar with them as the change of their affections; being not led by choice and wisdom to judge of things, sed impetu & quadam te∣meritate, without Council, Reason, Discrimination(y) 1.91 or Diligence to search the Causes, and forecast the Event of things, by custom rather than judgment, following one ano∣thers sentiments, as to their short-sightedness seems most eligi∣ble: Their Wills and Appetites being no less various than their features and countenances: Their actions and designs turning to as divers ends, as the desires that guide them are divers; so that it were impossible they should continue long together in society and peace, or enjoy the benefits desi∣red, if there were not some strong tye, which, holding them united together, should draw them all along to the same end.

When there is no(z) 1.92 Government,* 1.93 that which is left is known by the name of Anarchy, which is described by Bodi∣nus, to be where there is no Majesty of Empire, nor power of command in Magistrates, or subordinate Officers; no form of a City, none found to command or obey: Of all Governments (continues he) Tyranny is the worst, but of all Tyrannies,* 1.94 that of Many is most pernicious, and the impotent power of the people is the worst; yet Anarchy is the most pestiferous of all. This indeed dissolves all into the first confused Chaos,

where is nothing of order but a jumble of jarring parts, every one justiling other out of its place.

Imagine a person placed upon such an Hill that he might see below him a confus'd multitude, various in their Interests and Appetites, let loose to the fiery bent of their wills. He would be amazed to hear the boisterous clamors, and see the strange turmoils and tempestuous tossings of that crowd, the desulto∣ry actions, and all the pageantry of Garboiles, before the last down-right counter-scufflle, which the sage wisdom of one man (if he might be heard) would be able to compose.

Even so it is in Anarchy, or whereever the Peoples unbridled will governs;(a) 1.95 this is a Mart wherein voices are bought and sold, poverty and ignorance driving the crowds to null that to day, which they have eagerly pursued the day before; scarce forbearing the same day to condemn and absolve, no∣thing being done amongst them but in tumultuary ferments, and an high boyling fret, or a dead torpidness and irresolu∣tion; the Ebbings and Flowings of the Ocean being more regu∣lar than theirs; whereas all Government (according to the(b) 1.96 Philosopher) subsists and is established in firmness and con∣stancy, by every mans knowing what is his right to enjoy, and his duty to do, or as(c) 1.97 St. Augustine calls it, a society of Men incorporated for common benefits, by the agreement of Laws.

It is a grave saying of(d) 1.98 Tacitus, That the common Peo∣ple neglect the affairs of the Common-weal, by their over-bulkiness, void of publick spirit and care; and in another place, That the incentives to their private profit produce a disregarding neglect of the publick.

(e) 1.99Bodinus compares a Common-wealth or Government to a Ship, and well observes, that without the Keel (which u∣nites the Stern, and Fore-castle, Ribs, &c.) it would be but informe lignum: So a Community without Government (which unites the members of all Ages, and all Families in one bo∣dy) can no ways deserve the name of society: Such a People headless, is not worthy to be called a Body Politick; for Go∣vernment no ways consists in the number of Persons, or the heads of Citizens, but in the combination of them, under one Soveraign Power.

The unwieldy bulk of numerous Armies, wanting Conduct and Discipline, rarely effect any glorious enterprise. In the Tumults of Naples, the Rascality were forced to set up an Head, though it were but the frothy boisterous Thomas Anello. So were Cade, Ket, Tyler, and others in our popular Rebel∣lions, set up as the Captains, Leaders, and Idols of the Clowns. From whence we may learn, that even such people as rose up (as they pretended) to suppress Magistrates, Monarchy or Ty∣ranny, level Estates, and set all at liberty, yet once imbodi∣ed, were forced to chuse Captains to lead them, to whose Or∣ders there was a necessity of submission.

If we thoughtfully consider,* 1.100 we shall find that Government is founded in nature, in which state there is no such thing as equality; for the Parent, by priority of natural cause, must be superior to the Children. Yea, if we should believe Peo∣ple to be Juvenes ab Aquilone creati, like Grashoppers or Locusts, or like Cadmus his men, sprung up at once out of the Earth, underived from any pre-existent Parent, all of them having equal Origin and Power; yet a short converse one with ano∣ther, would have necessitated them to embody in Societies.

We Christians believe God made Man after his own Image,* 1.101 and gave him dominion over all the Creatures of our sublunary world; and it is not reasonable to think, that he endowed him not with faculties necessary for the administration of that great Empire, not only over the Brutes, but over his own Spe∣cies.

For the Philosopher(f) 1.102 notes, that nature hath made some fit to command, and others to obey or serve; of which we have many and great Instances: So Julius Caesar and others (whose great actions are recorded in History) manifested more sublime Spirits, than any of those who were subdued by them;* 1.103 and when those great Heroes were dead, though their Officers and Soldiers survived (by whose prowess and valour they had effected those wonders) yet we read of a suddain degenera∣cy, as if the soul had expired, and left the carcass only of an Army.

The Orator observes, that no Nation was ever so Barba∣rous,* 1.104 as to be wholly void of Religious Worshippers, since e∣very where, some Deity or other hath been acknowledged. Even so we may affirm, that never any People were so rude, wild, and savage, but they found a necessity of Government, of which they had at least, in their first embodying, some un∣pollished Model, and some sort of Institutes appointed by, and coeval with their Governours, by which their political interests and private concerns were regulated, without the in∣finite disorder which would happen to all publick transactions, which should be the product of tumultuous votes, where eve∣ry meeting would be a jumble of great and small,* 1.105 soft and hard sculls, a pudling of business, and putting all things to chance, and blundering in a maze, till at last some Mens wis∣dom formed them into order.

How then is that condition of a People to be wailed, which Tacitus(g) 1.106 describes to be the Roman State of liberty, where∣in there was no Senate, no Magistrates, no Laws, no Ancient Usage, no Institutes of the Fathers.

From all which we may conclude, that the same nature that ordered societies, gives them prudence to know that to preserve the Society and the peace of it, it was necessary, that there should be one or some, who, laying aside private advantage and particular Interest, should imploy their minds, bend all their thoughts, and direct their actions for the publick

good, and by the sinews of power hold all so fast united, as they should guide them to the same end; and we must determine, that Government is absolutely necessary for the being and well-being of a People, though there be servitude in it, which made Seneca (comparing Augustus's times with the preceding irregular ones) say,* 1.107 The City could not have been safe with∣out the benefit of servitude.

CHAP. III. That the People are not the Original of Authority and Government.

BEfore I proceed to treat of the several forms of Govern∣ment; I judge it requisite to examine some positions made use of by Republicans; so long at least, as they argue against Monarchical Government, or till they obtain their ends in the subverting of it.

One of which is, that supreme power is originally and fun∣damentally in the People, for whose benefit all Government was established. Secondly, That there is a tacit reservation of power in them, to vary the form of Government, and change the Persons when the people finds it convenient for them. The Law of Nature, as they say, justifying any attempt to shake off those Bonds and Fetters imposed on them by their Superiors, or voluntarily yielded to by themselves, if they judge that thereby their common Freedom is impeached; for that, they say, the People never submitted to any Govern∣ment, but by way of Agreement and Contract, unless in cases of absolute Conquest.

Therefore one (whom the Commonwealth-men esteem their(a) 1.108 Martyr) asserted, That Kings have Usurped over the People a power inconsistent with their natural liberty, and that Kings owe their right to prescription, which the greatest Tyrant may maintain by force, and to that consent which they may procure by violence or flattery.

I am sensible, that I might more orderly have placed what I have to answer to these assertions, in the Chapter of Mo∣narchy; but intending to prove that to be the best of all the known Governments, and that Chapter and the other pre∣ceding it, being so large, I judge it not so fit to clog it with this, but make it as a preliminary. For though I oppose Mo∣narchy principally to this sentiment; yet it hath something in it also of use, to the right stating of the Original of Govern∣ment in general.

First therefore I shall endeavour to evince, That God Al∣mighty was the Original Donor of the Authoritative Power

of Government,* 1.109 and that not to any collective body of the People; Secondly, that there never was such a state of primi∣tive freedom, or natural liberty, as is challenged; Thirdly, That where ever the Peoples Election was admitted in consti∣tuting a Soveraign, they capitulated not for any reservery of power of resumption; and Lastly, that in the present State of our English Monarchy, no such Power ought to be challen∣ged.

First then (with a Reverend(b) 1.110 Author) it is to be con∣sidered, that if Adam had never fallen, and his posterity had remained in the same innocence, yet in order to civil life, they would have been capable of civil precept, and in reason one man, or more, should have had the superiority over all others, as Parents over Children; and the consideration of the divers orders of Angels, that never fell, evidenceth, that even in the state of Innocency, God designed Superiority, not Equality.

But since from the Fall it is apparent, that the irregular pas∣sions of Men, have caused a need both of Rules and Rulers, Laws and Law-makers: it was but reasonable that God should, and it is most certain that he did design and appoint Government; and so gave not man that freedom which is supposed to be the foundation of this Doctrine. Hence we may note what God says to Eve,* 1.111 That her desire shall be sub∣ject to her Husband, and he shall rule over her: so that here is the first Dominion. And the second we find in Scripture, is,* 1.112 where God tells Cain that his Brother Abel's desire shall be sub∣ject to him, and he shall rule over him; and this was as he was the first-born, though after he wickedly slew Abel.

We have reason to judge, (according to Scripture) that God gave Adam (as an universal Monarch) Dominion over all his Fellow Creatures, and of all Men that should be born into the World as long as he liv'd, and the like may be said of Noah: so that whatever property (as it is clear Cain and Abel had) and what share of Government over any part of the World, either of their Sons had, they held it all of them originally by gift and Assignment, Allotment and Authority, without awaiting the Election or consent of, or entring into any Articles or Capitulations with the People that were to be governed by them.

So that in the Infancy of the World all Men were born Sub∣jects, either to him that was naturally their Father, or to him that by Right of Primogeniture was representatively their Fa∣ther. That this continued for many succeeding Generations is most apparent in the Blessing that Jacob and Esau receiv'd from their Father Isaac. For Rebecca knowing that such a Blessing was of the same force, that now the last Will and Testament, or Deed of Gift of a Parent is, and of much more absolute force, con∣trived that way to obtain the Blessing of Primogeniture for her Son Jacob, that his Brother Esau might serve hm.

(c) 1.113After the multiplying of Mankind (though I cannot say with a Learned Author, there were so many absolute Prin∣ces within the compass of a Parish, that a Man had scarce room to walk in a Territory, when a Common-wealth was lodged in a Cottage) yet it appears from Gen. 10.32. That the Fami∣lies that sprung from Noah's Sons divided the Earth, and gave distinction to Nations, and the Cadets of the first Houses travelling to distant places, exercised Authority, and gave Laws to their Descendants; and being thus separated to settle new Plantations, every Planter becoming so by himself a Father, encreased to a Family, and that into divers Families, those in∣to a City, and thence into divers Cities, and at last into a large Dominion.

(d) 1.114So that a King in the first Ages of the World was no more than a common Father, either by natural right, as a Parent, or after by a legal Right, as the eldest Descendant of such a Fa∣ther; and when the pleasantness or profitable commodiousness of one Soil allured several to covet it, then arose Contests, and the Conqueror possess'd it, forcing the Conquered to seek other Habitations, or made them his Slaves, and so a Succession of some brave Princes enlarged their Dominions to Empires, establishing them by just Laws, and good Government.

So upon the overthrow and breaking up of Kingdoms, In∣stance may be given that some victorious Person obtain'd the Peoples Subjection to him; for that being depriv'd of their na∣tural common Father, and Sovereign, they necessarily entertain∣ed such supply of their loss, as their Fortunes could best afford them: and whatever those conquered People did, it was no o∣ther but the chusing of one to bear the known Office of the true natural common Father; even as those might do, who either like Swarms and Colonies, voluntarily separated from the main Stock, to more roomy and rich Plantations; or those who es∣caped from the Conquerors Sword into a remote unpeopled Land, setled themselves in Society, and under the Government of one. For as hereafter I shall make it appear, the world was grown to a great Age, e're any form of Government was known but what was Kingly. Whereas if the People had known of any such Right they had of Government inherent in, and con∣natural to themselves, we should in the Sacred or Prophane Hi∣stories have had Instances of it: whereas we find the very Sa∣vage Americans (who, if any People, live according to natural Instinct) to be govern'd by Kings, and not Republics.

Having thus far Illustrated the Government in the Golden Age of the World, wherein we find no Footsteps, or the least tract of any popular Suffrages, but an entailing of Sovereign Au∣thority; We may farther consider,* 1.115 that the Government of the several Kingdoms in this World have been, and are by the appointment of the Sovereign of the whole World, not only by Gods appointment of Moses, the several Judges, and Kings of Israel, and Judah; but by the frequent expressions in Scrip∣ture,

that by God Kings Reign, that Kings are the Ministers of God, that God will give deliverance to his King, to his a∣nointed, &c. By which Expressions we may rationally(e) 1.116 con∣clude that God hath reserved to himself the immediate Depen∣dance of the supream Power, to shut out the restless and extrava∣gant Multitudes from the frequent Revolutions they would make, and the desolations they would occasion, if they had any ground to think the supream Power depended on theirs, or that they were not bound to obey for Conscience sake their Governours.

Whence also are they stiled Gods, but to denote they were not made by Men? And as it is most clear that inferior Magi∣strates derive their Power from the King, and not from the People, as supream: so by that Analogy which runs in a de∣pendance, and chains through the whole Creation, Kings should derive their Power from God alone, who is their King, and, as the(f) 1.117 Apostle saith, are ordained of God, and so no humane Ordinance: for Supremacy is affixt to the King, but Governors are sent by him; and if the King were the Creature or Creation of the People, it would have been express'd that they were commissioned, or sent by them; whereas it is expresly said, They are of God.

That Kings or Sovereigns derive their Power from God alone,* 1.118 and consequently not from the People, is attested by the joint consent of all unbiass'd Learned Men, Fathers and Schoolmen in all Ages, who have unanimously given their Suffrages for the same, as grounded upon solid Reason.

(g) 1.119So Tertullian saith, Let Kings know that from God only they have their Empire, in whose Power they only are. So St.(h) 1.120 Augustine, Let us not attribute to any other the Power of giving Kingdoms, and Empires, but to the true God.

So in the Civil Law,(i) 1.121 we find Deo anctore, nostrum guber∣nante Imperium, quod nobis à Coelesti Majestate traditum: God be∣ing the Author, governing our Empire, which was delivered to us from the Heavenly Majesty.

(k) 1.122Justinian acknowlegeth his Obligation to take care of his People, because he received the charge of them from God.

And certainly the People are happier in such acknowledg∣ments, than if Kings think it only a charge conferred on them by the People, and that they were therefore only answerable to them.

The Reader that would be further satisfied, may consult Arni∣seus, Cap. de essentia majestatis. Marca Archbishop of Paris de Concordia Sacerdotum & Imperii, Lib. 2. Cap. 2. Num. 2. Graswincke∣lius de Jure Majestatis, Cap. 8. Num. 2. The Learned and Loy∣al Kings Advocate of Scotland, and the Authorities I have cited in the Chapter of Monarchy.

Besides what I have urged hitherto we may (with a(l) 1.123 Reverend Author) consider that the Sovereign hath an higher Power than the People can give, not as representing

them; but as representing God himself. For every supream Magistrate hath a Power that never was in the People to give; for never any Man was by God or Nature invested with Power of his own Life to take it away, or kill himself lawfully. For all Christians generally declare against this Self-murther, as a Crime equally against the sixth Commandment, as the killing of any other Man.

Now this Power of Life being so essential a part of the Su∣premacy, and no part of the natural Liberty, cannot be inhe∣rent naturally in a Community of Men, which have no more Power so united, than each single Person hath. So that though it cannot be said with some, Nemo est dominus Membrorum suo∣rum (for Man hath the power over his Members, to cause one to be cut off, for the preserving the whole; and the Jew un∣der Gods own Government, had power to make himself a Slave) yet this Jus Gladii, the Right and Power of the Sword (which is really the Sovereign Power) is by the(m) 1.124 Or∣dinance of God, not the Donation of the People. For it was not in the Power of the People to dispense with Gods Precept, Thou shalt not kill, nor to distinguish shedding of Blood with the Sword of Vengeance, from Murther; and consequently the Power is not deriv'd to Kings and Princes by private Men, who cannot transfer that Power they never had; according to that known Maxim, Nemo plus juris transferre ad alium potest, quam ipse habet: but it's bestowed on them by God Almighty, who is the sole Arbiter of Life and Death, who can only take it a∣way, because he gave it.

The supream Magistrate therefore, as God's Deputy, hath the Power communicated to him, as an Endowment necessary to that Power which is design'd to protect and govern others. So Agamemnon having received contumelious Language from his Officers in a Council of War, to let them understand his Sovereign Power, tells them(n) 1.125 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That he had Power of Death.

When Kings are Elective, though it be the act of the People, and not of God immediately that designs or nominates the Person to that Office; yet doth not this Nomination bestow this Power; but God who alone hath this Power, bestows it on him who is so Elected. Which we may illustrate by the Example of chusing inferiour Officers. For though a Corpo∣ration by the Grant of a Sovereign, hath Power to chuse a Mayor, or chief Officer; yet they give him not the Power of Exe∣cuting that Office so and so: For that is appointed and limited by the King's especial Grace and Favour. The nominating of the person being granted to them by the Sovereign, but the qualifications of his Office and Power, are by the sole Prescript of the King's Charter and Laws.

Having hitherto founded my Reasoning upon the History of Moses, and the Authority of Scripture, I might bring in a long Discourse out of prophane Historians, Greeks, and Romans, as

well as more modern Writers, who give an account of the Foundations of Kingdoms; but since a late(o) 1.126 Author hath made such a flourish out of Polybius, slily and maliciously en∣deavouring to represent Monarchy as a Tyrannical Govern∣ment, wh•• the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the three constitu∣ent parts, viz. Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy were not so evenly poiz'd, and attemper'd, ad pondus, as Lycurgus endea∣voured it in the Lacedaemonian State: I shall content my self with an Epitome (not a Paraphrase, as the forementioned Au∣thor hath made) of what Polybius(p) 1.127 hath left in his Excellent History; wherein he deducing matters from such an Original as those who knew not, or believed not the Creation could do, delivers us his sence of the mutations and managery of Go∣vernment to this purpose.

That when by reason of some great Inundation,* 1.128 great Plague or Death, all Institutions and Arts having been lost; In process of time, by the propagation of those that escap'd these Devastations, a multitude grew who herded according to their kind, and for the weakness of their Party (in respect of ravenous Creatures as well as their Savage Neighbors, we may suppose) they associated together, it necessarily followed that he who in the Strength of his Body, and confidence of Spirit excell'd the rest, obtain'd the Princedom and Empire, as we see in Bulls, Goats, Cocks, &c. and so the rest obey'd that Man who was properly the Monarch, and in Process of time,* 1.129 by fami∣liar Conversation, and living together under this one Head, like a select Flock or Herd, these Mortals began to think of Ho∣nest and Just, and their contraries, and by the noble or ignoble actions of some of the Society, the Sence of Honour and Dis∣grace was impress'd in their Minds, and consequently of Profi∣table and Incommodious.(q) 1.130 He that was their Governour excelling in Power, and in the opinion of all endowed with those qualifications, were judged good and profitable, and ad∣ministring to his Subjects, what was competent to every of them. They now fearing no violence, most willingly submit∣ted themselves to him, and he being venerable to them,* 1.131 with unanimous consent they impugn and revenge themselves on those who oppose or conspire against his Government; and so from a Monarch he becomes a King, when reason had obtain'd the Principality, which before Fierceness and Power possess'd.

So that in all this first settlement of Monarchy or a Kingdom (in the purest state of Nature we can conceive describ'd) we have no mention in this judicious Author, of Compact, with the People, or Election, but of submitting.

It is true upon the degeneracy of Kings, Factions arising, he speaks of Election, not of those of strong Bodies only, and daring Souls; for such he presumes made themselves Masters; but of such as by their Wills and Reason (experimentally discover'd in their Actions) were most agreeable to the Peoples liking.

But that this was done by the force of Faction, appears from what he subjoins,* 1.132 that those who were thus destined for the Kingdom, selected special places, and encompassed them with Rampiers, or Walls, fortifying them for the security of them∣selves, and to supply their Subjects with necessaries; from whence arose the great Cities which had large Sokes, by which means they possess'd the whole Country of the Kingdom.

I do own that he makes offence and hatred of the People, or envy against the succeeding Princes who were debauched and degenerated,* 1.133 to be the causes why in process of time some of the Noblest became the leaders of the People, to repress such Princes, and root out the Monarchy and Kingdom: But still it was because Factions encreased, and so Aristocracy was chang∣ed into Oligarchy; which set of Rulers oppressing the People, whose discontents being observ'd by some popular Persons, they animated them to join to subvert the Oligarchy. Hitherto we find nothing of the imaginary delegation of the Peoples Power to one or more, but prosperous events crown'd their Rebellions against their Superiors. What follows is observable, that the People having slain the Optimacy, fearing the Injustice of Su∣periors, they durst not set a King over themselves, nor trust the Government in the hands of a few, having so late Instances of their Tyranny and Sloth.* 1.134 So the single and sincere Hope which was only left in themselves, induced them to establish a Demo∣cracy, and so to themselves receive the Trust and Providence of the Common-weal, which the(r) 1.135 Paraphrast calls their last untainted hope, founded on themselves, that is, in their own Strength.

So that till the forms of Government by a King or Tyrant, Aristocracy or Oligarchy were wholly subverted, we hear not a Syllable of the Peoples challenging a power, and then it is no wonder (when they have slain the richest, and divided the spoil, and have entertained an opinion that they shall never be Ser∣vants more; but live in an equal Freedom and Wealth) if they be blown up with a popular Pride, and call themselves the su∣pream Power. But what is this to the natural Freedom plead∣ed for, when it is nothing but the headstrong unbridledness of the Multitude, that have cast their Riders, and got loose the Reins on their own Neck?

(s) 1.136Polybius goes on to tell us how Democracy was soon over∣turned after, though for a while those who had Experience of the Oppression of the Rich, were delighted with the Equality and Liberty of the present State,* 1.137 that seemed sweet to them above all Treasure: yet afterwards some growing Rich, little valued that Equality and Liberty, which custom had made them sleight and nauseate; and so began to contemn the Poor, and excelling the rest in Riches, began to covet Rule; yet knowing they could not by their own Interest or eminence of Vertue ob∣tain it, they began to be lavish of their Wealth, and variously bait the People, and so corrupt them into Tumults and Sediti∣on;

and the People being thereby raised to hopes of living up∣on the Goods of those of contrary Factions, by following some magnanimous and daring Captain (who yet for his Poverty could not Lawfully aspire to the Honours of the Common∣wealth) found no better or easier way to rise, but by heightning Factions, whereby Parties being imbodied, Murthered, Plun∣dered, and Destroyed one another; till at last, wearied, or one Man getting a greater interest in the People than the rest, and being fortunate to overtop the rest, they submit to such, and af∣ter all their miseries return again to Monarchy.

I cannot dismiss(t) 1.138 Polybius without noting from him how pre∣ferrable Monarchy is to any of the popular sorts of Government. For he observing that as Iron is wasted by rust, Wood by worms; so that although they might escape exterior defacings, yet they will decay by those inbred devourers. So he observes that all simple Governments are apt to some evil that is peculiar and consequential to their Nature, as he instanceth in a King∣dom changed into Monarchy absolute, by which he means that which we now call Tyranny; Aristocracy into Oligarchy,* 1.139 and Democracy into Bestial Chirocracy,* 1.140 when the Seditious of the people prevail more by Fisticuffs than reason: When he enume∣rates the causes of the Envy and Hatred of the People against the King that is turned Tyrant, he never mentions that the People challenged any Original Right, or that they conferred any trust upon him, or made any compact with him to govern so and so. But that some young Princes degenerating from their Just, Prudent, Wise and Valorous Ancestors, giving themselves up to Debauchery, and because of their plenty following their Pleasures, committed excess in ther Habits, eat more deliciously and luxuriously, indulged themselves in prohibited Lusts, by some necessities or wantonness galling the Necks of their Subjects, or committed some contumelious or outragious Act against some powerful Person, or committing the managery of affairs to some unfit or envied Person, lost the affections of some popular per∣sons, and by their immersing themselves in Pleasure, neglecting the Inspection into their affairs, or by their sloth and lasiness, neglecting the timely redress of Evils, or suppressing of some growing Faction, gave opportunity to some of the most popular and daring of their Subjects to conspire together to put an end to their Lives and Governments.

But in all this he mentioneth nothing of those miserable de∣vastations, which are brought upon whole Countries, that in popular Governments are torn in pieces by them; as too of∣ten I shall have occasion to mention. For certainly, one days misrule by the Rable, may do more mischief to a Country, than the whole age of a vitious Prince; and the pretences of making Government more easie for the People, and that the end of it is the Peoples safety, hath ushered in all Tragical Re∣volutions and Rebellions; and however Philosophers and o∣ther Writers of Greece and Rome declaim against Tyranny

and absolute Monarchy: yet they conceal not the perpetual intestine, as well as Foreign Wars, betwixt one Commonweal and another; or what Butcheries Countries have undergone, whereever the People got a participation of the executive parts of the Soveraignty.

It is not unfit to be observed what the great(u) 1.141 Philosopher notes, that a Kingdom is the refuge and defence of the good, against the injury of the People: for, saith he, a King is con∣stituted of the good, and those that excel in vertue and ver∣tuous actions; but a Tyrant is taken out of the People and Multitude, against the Noble and Illustrious; as he instanceth in Phidon at Argos, Phalaris in Ionia, Panaetius among the Le∣ontines, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, and Dionysius at Syracuse, by the cunning leading of the People. So that according to his opinion, and the experience of all ages, the People may be truly said to be the Original of Tyrants, and not of Kings. For whereever an unlawful Government was introduced, which properly might be called Tyranny, it was brought upon the People by their own choice; some ambitious cunning man having wound himself into their good opinion, was by their strongth and assistance able to suppress the Nobi∣lity, and establish himself their Executioner, after he had long been their Creature.

Those who please themselves with the notion of Compact and Agreement, mostly do it for some ill end, to make a plau∣sible Scheme, to decoy the People into an opinion, that Prin∣ces can claim no more Power as of right belonging to them, than the People shall intrust them withal; which they may from time to time (as they shall see cause in order to the pre∣tended publick weal and safety) either enlarge or restrain at their pleasure.

These must suppose (saith a most profound(w) 1.142 Scholar) a multitude all free without any sort of dependences on Pa∣rents, under no restraint, but every one at full liberty to do what he listeth, with an equality of Power in them, none having authority over other; which surely was never yet found in any People or Country, since the Creation of the World, if these men will own its Creation, or the Scripture-History of it; and if they could in Authentic History, point out some Pa∣rallel story they would do well to produce it: for though I have quoted Polybius his conjecture of a state nearest it, yet he makes no such inference from it that I can find. But the forementioned Reverend Bishop hath suggested so many quae∣ries to be answered, before any thing can be yielded to in this way of contract, that it will puzzle the ablest of the Patrons of this popular way of constituting Government, to solve a∣ny of them; whereby to satisfie any considerate man of the legality of such a way, or the consentaneousness of it to Prin∣ciples of nature, and the state of Liberty, these men are such pretenders to.

It would be resolved, whether Women and Children, Mad∣men and Fools, had the freedom of suffrage, as well as Men of Age, and Fortunes, and understandings? If any were ex∣cluded, who did it, and by what authority? If all were ad∣mitted, whether with equal right to every one, or with some inequality? Was the Wives interest towards making up the bargain equal with that of the Husband, and the Child with that of the Parents? and the Servant's (if there were, or could be any such thing as Master and Servant) equal with that of his Master's? If one had not an equal share and interest in the business, whence did the inequality arise? who made the difference among them? and what right had any man? and how came he to have that right to give more or less pow∣er to one than another?

If all were equal, who could summon the rest to convene, or appoint the day and place of meeting? Or when met, take upon him the Authority and Office of regulating their proceed∣ings, or presiding or moderating in their Assembly, of deter∣mining such doubts and differences as might arise, while mat∣ters were under debate, of calculating the voices, and draw∣ing up the Articles of Agreement in case they should agree?

Supposing all these doubts were cleared, and the Contract made as they would have it; it may be demanded, whether majority of Votes shall conclude all that are present, Dissen∣ters as well as others? Whether by vertue of an Act of those upon the place, an obligation shall lie upon such as are casu∣ally, necessarily, or willingly absent, when it was free for them to do so, no man having power to require their appea∣rance? And whether a contract made by such persons as were at liberty before, can debar those that shall succeed them in the next Generation, from the use of that liberty their Ance∣stors had and enjoyed? If so, by what Law and Right are the said respective persons so concluded, and whence should the obligation spring?

None of these look like the Dictates of the Laws of Nature, and other Laws besides that (according to the Hypothesis) could be none, when as yet there was no Government, and the Contract it self as a bare contract (without the help of some Law or other to give it force) cannot operate upon any but the Contractors; for it can have no cogency upon those that never gave consent thereto.

I know no other resolve can be given to most of these quae∣ries, but that, as it is fabled of Thebes, that the Stones that composed the Walls, came into their places by the Musick of Orpheus, without any Artificer's hand: So some cunning and fluent Orator, learned above the rudeness of such an age, who had signaliz'd himself by many feats of Arms, Arts and Skill, by which he had got an ascendent over the People, and yet so circumspect as to have avoided envy and emulation; such amongst them who was most hardy to encounter dangers,

had most bodily strength to overcome any single person, and such as had by degrees worn of the rudeness of his Compani∣ons, and taught them something of consideration, and the use of reason to understand justice and honest dealing, and to see the advantages that prudence and a wise head hath over-raw and uncultivated strength, not only in deciding controversies, and administring Justice, but even in providing against, and expelling danger: Such an one as this might have made him∣self the head of a Colony; but what is this to the Original power of the People?

Have we not much more reason to judge the rise of Go∣vernment (as I have hitherto inculcated) was from primoge∣niture, and by Gods appointment, than from any such Chaos, or existence of Prae-Adamites, or a race of People sprung up none knows when or where.

To gratifie the insatiable Republican as much as may be, let us suppose a Colony, or swarm of younger Brothers, men that lived poorly in their native Country, Women, Children and Servants, not tied by any preceding Allegiance to a Prince, or to have shaken off the yoke, or to be banished, or freely dismissed by those under whose Government they had been born, and to be absolved from all Allegiance, and de∣clared manumitted and restored to that absolute freedom, which they could claim as the birth-right of mankind, that priviledge of nature equally common to every one as the air and light, and to enjoy this freedom as an unlimited power, to use their abilities as will did prompt; and those to pass into an unpeopled Land, which no Prince or People laid a claim to: Would not every one conclude these were as free to live as they listed, as any people under the Sun; and to be any ways restrained of this, would be very grievous, and an Invasion of that right to freedom every one might challenge?

Yet can it be conceived, that these could continue long without the consideration, that it was not so delightful to do what every one liked, as it would be miserable to suffer as much as it pleased others to inflict; or that the powerful could take comfort in that hostile estate, wherein he was in conti∣nual fears of others mischievous designs against him, who had in this imagined state(x) 1.143 as much right in any thing as the pre∣sent Possessor.

The consideration of this surely would oblige every one to transfer his particular power into one or more hands, tying themselves by obligation, not to make use of that natural power of resisting the power set over them, but to aid him or them, when he or they summoned their strength, or required their assistance. In requital of which submission of private strength, the whole Government becomes their Guard, where∣by they are secured from the dangers of private injuries.

But can it be thought that any such Governour or Gover∣nours would take upon him or them, the burthen of spending

his whole time in watchfulness, anxiety and care, for the pre∣serving such a society in peace, and the free enjoyments of what they should acquire, without having a power to execute impartial Justice upon Offenders, in raising forces to suppress any Tumults or Insurrections, in rewarding and promoting the inferior Ministers; or would yield himself to be accountable to any party of that people who should fancy themselves ag∣grieved.

But on the other side, to make the Government useful, it must be established, that every one yield his life to Soveraign Justice, to be capitally punished, if he transgress such Laws as they had agreed upon to be so inflicted, or in lesser offences to yield to proportionable punishments.

Now if it were to be understood as a tacit Covenant, that when ever the Subjects found themselves aggrieved, they might re-assume their Power, and depose or change their So∣veraign; every Offender that could engage his Relations or Dependents to back him, would be remonstrating, and to avoid the punishment (especially if Capital) would adventure his life in Arms, and so defeat the great end and design of Government.

But further, supposing that this People oblige themselves and Posterities, by Oaths and other Authentic Bonds, to as∣sist the Government against all Disturbers, Domestick and Fo∣reign; and to be subject, and pay all due obedience to the Government and Laws: By what justice, or reason, or pre∣tence of natural Right, could they or their Posterity claim a power of re-assumption of that Original Power they had de∣vested themselves of?

It is manifest that a People may consent to subject them∣selves to a Soveraign without limitation, as appears by the fa∣mous(y) 1.144 Lex Regia among the Romans, wherein it is expres∣sed thus, Populus Imperatori, & in Imperatorem, omne Imperi∣um suum, & potestatem transtulit, That they transfer to and up∣on their Governour all the Power they singly, or in combi∣nation had. After which the right of Nature, which remains for them innocently to make use of, is that freedom, not which any Law gives, but which no Law takes away.

Therefore, if we consider Men once to have been in such an imaginary State of freedom, and after to have yielded up themselves to be subject, and thereto tyed themselves and their Posterities, in the strongest obligations that can be in∣vented; What power can such People now have of substract∣ing their obedience, since their Ancestors, many Centuries of Ages since, and in all successive Generations, have either transferred what Power they ever could claim, to their Go∣vernours, or by his Laws and their own consents have bound themselves in fidelity to the Soveraign, his Heirs and lawful Successors.

So that in what Ʋtopia soever this Doctrine of the Original

of Power being in the People, and their Power of re-assum∣ing it, may be asserted; it can have no place in our happy Islands. For the Government of England is a successive He∣reditary Monarchy, declared so by all our Laws: so that with us, allegations of natural Right have no sort of place, our Kings having their Power established by Birth-right, by Con∣sent, by Prescription and Law, which are all the ways where∣by any right can be legally established.

Therefore we must look upon all such as cast in such Baits for the People to nibble at, that they intend to make a prey of them; and having fastned the gilded Hook in their Jaws, may draw them out of their own Element to a free air in∣deed, but such as will stifle them. For when any Subjects (by the instigation of such pretended Patriots) are excited to put in their claim of Original Power, and shake the Govern∣ment; though their Rebellion be prosperous, it is not with∣out vast effusion of Blood that the Government can be chan∣ged. After which, how will it be possible that the Commu∣nity of the People can be put into that pristin state of free∣dom, those State-Mountebanks promise? but rather into an Anarchy, which is contrary to the end of all Society, and to quiet and peace, and is the Parent of all confusion, which is much worse than the hardest subjection.

This truth (by a most chargeable tryal) we experimented in the late War, when the Pretended Saviours of the Nati∣on, and great Promoters of Spiritual and Temporal Liber∣ty, having wheedled the People into a belief of their honest Intentions, and by their prosperous Arms overthrown the most temperate Monarchy, by the effusion of infinite Blood and Treasure; by pretended agreements of the People, they assumed the Government to themselves; enslaving both the Nobility, Gentry, and Commonalty, more than any Fo∣reign Conqueror would do, or ever their Ancestors had been in any Age; and the Golden Scepter, and that of King Ed∣ward with the Dove, was turned into a Rod of Iron and a Flaming Sword, Basilisks and Fiery Serpents.

CHAP. IV. The Benefit of Government from the Establishing and Instituting of Laws.

THe(a) 1.145 Philosopher describes Law to be the Promulgation of what by the common consent of the City is defined, which commands upon Terms how every thing is to be done. Which is to be understood after Government is established, where the Lawgivers are agreed upon, and the Subjects known that are to obey them.

In another place, the same(b) 1.146 Philosopher saith, Laws are to be declared concerning all things that may respect the com∣mon Benefit of all, or of the Optimacy, viz. the Nobility or Prime Gentry, or the Sovereign, or be agreeable to Vertue, or to any other Necessity of the People: and these he calls Com∣mon Laws.

The same(c) 1.147 Learned and Wise Composer of Politicks tells us, That the Law hath no force to compel Obedience, but as it receives it from Usage and Custom; and this springs not from any thing so much as from length of Time, and multitude of Years.

Of these kind of Laws few Nations make such use as we do in England, under the Title of Common Laws and Customs; and it is no small Credit to them, that so Judicious and Anci∣ent a Writer hath given such a Character of these kind of Laws, by which we have something more than a shadow of ours.

The same(d) 1.148 Philosopher likewise, with great Judgment, tells us, That to forego Laws received and long used, and over-easily to substitute new ones, is to make weak and infirm the Laws themselves. Yet he is not for tying Posterity to the Laws of their Progenitors too strictly; for that it is likely (saith he) the first Ancestors of them being such as he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Sons of the Earth, or such as escaped from some great Calamities and Destructions, were rude and illiterate, such as he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so that it would be(e) 1.149 absurd to persist in their De∣crees; therefore he saith, All seek not their(f) 1.150 Countrys Laws, but those onely that are good, as generally such are which have had the Approbation of Ages.

By what hath been noted from so Ancient and Judicious an Author, I may easily infer, That Laws resulted from Govern∣ment, and were the necessary Products of such Counsels as the first Leaders or Monarchs entertained to order their People by; and since he(g) 1.151 makes the Laws of such like validity and force in the Commonwealth, as the Rules and Orders of Parents in private Families, we may well conclude, That as those had their Origination from the Will of the Father of the Family, so the other from the Prince, who is his Peoples Common Parent.

Therefore, in Homer Kings are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Givers of Laws, or Judges of the People, as well as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Pastors or Feeders, Conductors, Defenders or Shepherds of the People. So in Sacred Writ, the first Hebrew Captains or Kings were called Judges. Therefore Pomponius Laetus saith, In the ancientest Times, before Laws were agreed upon, the King's Will was a Law: And(i) 1.152 Dionysius is express, That the intimation of their Mind by Signs, and their absolute Wills, were in stead of Laws.

(k) 1.153Tacitus giving an account of the Roman Laws, saith of Romulus, That he commanded at his own pleasure; and after him Numa bound the People with Religion and Divine Laws. Some were found under Tullus and Ancus; but the principal In∣stitutor of Laws was Servius Tullius, to which even Kings should obey; that is, they thought themselves obliged to observe and keep the Laws they had appointed. He then notes, That after Tarquin was expell'd, the People prepared many Laws for the defence of their Liberty, and to strengthen their Concord against the Factions of the Fathers.

A late Judicious(l) 1.154 Author saith, That God and Nature in∣vesting Primogeniture with the Right of Kings and Magistrates, they made Laws; and this not being observed, or wilfully dis∣owned by some Popular Patrons (who would possess the Peo∣ple, that the Laws made Kings and Governours) hath created the greatest Mischiefs, by giving an Inlet to the Changes of Go∣vernors and Government. For, granting this most enormous Doctrine, and dangerous Principle; Laws being alterable for the Convenience of Prince or People, by consequence the Right of the Sovereign (if it be onely from the Laws) must be preca∣rious also.

The Opinion is in it self most absurd and unreasonable; for there never could be Laws, till there was some Form of Govern∣ment to establish and enact such Laws, and give them their energy and vigour: For nothing can have the force or pow∣er of a Law, or oblige men to Obedience, unless it pro∣ceed from such Person or Persons as have a Right to command, and Authority to punish the Disobedience and Neglect of those who ought to be subject to it: So that it is almost impossible to find the least Footsteps of Law, that is by far so ancient as Go∣vernment.

If we consider the Infancy of the World, when Nations were divided by the Swarms that made new Colonies; we may easily conceive, that Differences and Quarrels would not onely fall out amongst them about Boundaries; but within the District of one Government, the Shares of distinct Families and Persons would be allotted, and these would require the Preservation of those Peculiars, from the Incroachment of Thieves, Robbers, or other mischievous Persons: From whence must spring a necessity of Laws, to prevent Domestick Quarrels and Injuries, and to ascer∣tain to every man his Right, and effect those good things which would make the Society happy.

Which Laws (as far as we have any Record of History) were first appointed by those who first led the Colonies, or such as they chuse out to assist in such a design of concern, who being supream over the People, had the only Power of making Laws, and exacting obedience to them: Consentaneous to which the Serjeants at a late Call gave this Motto, A Deo Rex, a Rege Lex.* 1.155

But however we conceive of the first Authors and Institutors of Laws, it no ways lessens the benefit all Societies enjoy by be∣ing govern'd by Laws, adapted to the Constitution of the Peo∣ple and Government. For as(m) 1.156 Aristotle observes, Of all li∣ving Creatures man is the best; so he is the worst, if not go∣verned by Laws and Judgment.

Both(n) 1.157 Plato and* 1.158 Aristotle agree, that Men Just and most Eminent in Vertue, being as Gods among Men, are under no Law, living as regularly(o) 1.159 on their own accord, as o∣thers constrained by the Laws; for these good Men are Laws themselves, exciting others to Vertue by their Examples. Yet since this is but the Portion of a few, there is a necessity of enforcing the Laws by Authority upon those that are not obe∣dient to them, nor a Law to themselves.

As to the use of Laws,* 1.160 the(p) 1.161 Orator tells us that by their Au∣thority we are taught to subdue our Lusts, to circumscribe, and bound our unlawful desires; to defend our own, and restrain our Eyes and Hands from that which belongs to others.

They were, saith the same Cicero,(q) 1.162 invented for the security of every one, a greater and more plentiful Inheritance com∣ing to us by them, than from those that left us our Estates.

These are fitted for the Diseases of the Common-wealth, ex malis moribus oriuntur bonae leges. They restrain Men from their depraved Appetites, the over-boilings of their Lusts, the de∣bauchery of their Lives, the Injustice of their Rapines, stop the Effusion of Innocent Blood, secure every Man's Interest, in∣struct and dispose all to do well, and secure them when they do so.

Hedges are set up (saith Mr. Hobs(r) 1.163) to stop Travellers, and keep them in the way that is allowed and prescrib'd, and for hindring them from chusing a way for themselves. So Laws are made to guide, govern, and punish Men, who presume to de∣cline the Rule, and chuse another to walk by, that is more a∣greeable to their own Appetite and Convenience. The poorest necessitated Man (saith a(s) 1.164 Judicious Author) amidst the Calamities of his wretched Life, would yet be more unhappy, were not Laws and Government his Sanctuary. Oppression, the heaviest of all miseries, would crush him to pieces, and break the Repose of his shortest Slumbers. The malice of the Clown, the dark Arts of the City would surround us; and what we most prize (tho' we want the comfort of it) no Man's Life could be safe a minute without them; nothing could be sure, nothing certain, no commerce, no conversation: These protect the Or∣phan, the Widow, and the Stranger.

Seneca elegantly calls the Laws, Virtutes Armatas, because they compel evil manners into good order: for without Laws Men are but a more cunning and pernicious sort of Brutes; and where they are instituted and prevail, humane Nature is most civilized, refin'd and polite.

It is said of the Liberal Arts, that Emolliunt mores, nec sinunt esse feros: They soften Mens minds and manners, they correct that churlishness of temper, and addulce and mellow the austere, sowre and crabbed Disposition, tame and make gentle the Savage Natures, file off the Asperities of them: all which is equally true of the force and efficacy of the Laws put in Exe∣cution.

What would this great World we live in, be less than a great Bedlam, were it not for these Political Combinations, civil ap∣pointments, and Laws which in all places and Countries not only curb and command that untamed Pride, Fury, and Malice, which too naturally resides in many; But the Laws likewise form and incorporate Men into civil Societies, making those persons capable of Living, conversing, and dwelling together, as Men endowed with rational and religious Faculties; who o∣therwise would appear no better than a company of wild and Savage Creatures.* 1.165

So great Veneration had the Ancients for the Laws, that they esteem'd the Lawgivers(t) 1.166 Holy, and such as had Correspon∣dence with the Deities they worshipped, and were, while they lived, for these great Blessings to their People, deified. So Mi∣nos among the Egyptians makes Mercury the Author of the Laws, and among the Cretians, Jupiter. Lycurgus among the Lacedae∣monians fathered them on Apollo, Numa Pompilius derived them from the whispers of the Goddess Aegeria: the Persians from Zoroaster, Xamolxis among the Goths, deduces them from Vesta; and that Moses received the Jewish Laws from God Almighty we all believe.

So that as every where we find the Heathens make the Gods descend for their Production, and celestial Wisdom to flow into them (saith the learned Mr. White in his Sacred Laws of the Land; in which little Treatise is comprehended a great deal of curious Learning) and who further adds, That as Livy allows to Antiquity (mixing things humane with divine) to deduce the Original of Cities from Gods or Goddesses, to make their beginnings more majestic; the same may be said of the Laws (saith my learned Author) if it be Lawful to Canonize any, to carry them up to Heaven, or fetch them down from thence, that Glory is alone due to the Laws, yea to the sacred Laws of our Land: And in another place he saith, It was not so much the Charms of the Sibyls Leaves, nor Numa's Shield, or the Palladium that made the Roman Common weal so much to raise its lofty Head, as the just and wholesome Sanction of the Laws obeyed and re∣verenced.

On the contrary, Bodin(u) 1.167 observes, that the overthrow of Carthage was without difficulty, and certainly prognosticated, since neither Vertue nor Law had place there.

Hence the Orator observes, That if the Laws be once aban∣doned, or but negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, there is nothing any man can be sure to receive from his An∣cestors, or leave to his Posterity. Which leads me to the se∣cond head of the Benefit by Government, which is Propriety.

CHAP. V. Propriety secured by Government.

WE find that Plato,(a) 1.168 Socrates and Lycurgus, pro∣posed a Community of all things in their Com∣monwealth, not only in Goods, Chattels and Lands, but also in Wives and Children.

As to Community of Goods, the Argument that Socrates used was, That if every one might call every thing his own, and not his own, it would be a means whereby a City would be perfectly one.

On the contrary, Aristotle argues, That this would create endless disputes. For he that took pains would never agree that he who took no pains should have an equal share; and in a little time, one would be coveting a larger dividend than another, and this would destroy the great vertue of Tempe∣rance, and would allow it no place: for that consists in ab∣staining from what is anothers. Neither would there be room for Liberality, i•• none had of his own to give. Besides, by possessing in common, Sloth, Idleness and Negligence would be encouraged;(b) 1.169 because whatever thing is common to many, hath less care imployed about it, or it is not with that sedulousness provided for, because what is every bodies work is no bodies work: according to our English Proverb, The mean Pot never boils well. So he concludes, That possessing in common gives more occasions to differences, than where every one knows his own. Therefore it is more conducible to the well-being of a People to unite in one order of Discipline, than in unity of Stock and Community of Goods.

There was some difference in the modus of this communi∣ty. For we read that Pericles and Cimo pulled down the En∣closures of their Gardens and Fields, that the meaner sort might have free liberty to take the Fruits. This kind of Com∣munity was received at Tarentum, and the Agrarian Law at Rome allowed something of it.

But I believe this kind of Community was little practised, but rather every one enjoyed his separate share, and some

Commons, as we have in England, were best un-enclosed, ac∣cording to that of(c) 1.170 Boiocolus in Tacitus, That as the Hea∣vens were given to the Gods, so the Earth was given to Men; and those places that were empty or unpossessed in several, were for the publick, or common to all.

The Anabaptists in Germany, were very earnest to have ob∣tained such a Community, where they were powerful enough to eject the right Owners out of their Estates, pleading the Apostles usage: And in our late Confusions (among the many revivals of obsolete opinions and Heresies) we had some that were very fond of a notion, That the perfectest State of a Com∣monwealth was not only where there should be no distincti∣on of Dignities and Degrees, but Estates should be levelled; and some that foresaw the People would not easily consent to this (as an Essay) begun to dig and cultivate Commons, en∣ticing the Poor to joyn with them, of which, as I remem∣ber, one Everard was the chief.

As to Communities of Wives,(d) 1.171 Plato would have it so, that because,* 1.172 when every one might call every Mans Wife and Child his own, there would be an amicable concord in the enjoying and providing for them. But the Philosopher argues against this, much what as he did against the Community of Goods; especially, by reason that the Children would be neglected by the Fathers; none being certain whether such or such a Son were his or no; and so all Paternal affection would be abolished, and all Cognations wholly obliterated, and there would be no way to distinguish ones own Issue, but by the si∣militude, as among the Garamants of the superior Africk, and the Pharsalian Mare(e) 1.173 which was called Just, because the had always her Foals like the Horse that got them. Besides that, Parricide might be committed, and injury done by Chil∣dren to Parents (which no civil Government ought to allow) and yet the Father not be truly known.

But to leave this,* 1.174 because I do not read that any Common∣wealth did ever, or not long enjoy the benefit of any such institution; we may note, that as in other things, so in this, the custom of Men is much changed. All being now so jea∣lous of any breach made upon their Property, that Princes are looked upon as Tyrannical and Arbitrary, that shall, for the necessary support of the Government, lay any imposi∣tion upon the People, without their consents; which made, in King Charles the First's time, that outcry against Ship-mo∣ney; though the Legality of it was owned by twelve Judges, and very ancient Records were produced, and much learning and reading shown in the arguments for it. But this point is now adjusted to the satisfaction of the whole.

The English Subject enjoys many choice peculiar Privileges and advantages,* 1.175 far transcending those of the Subjects of most Princes: So that any rougher touch upon that tender part, must needs gall, and the lightest Yoak be uneasie to the

neck unaccustomed to it. By his Birth-right he hath some∣thing he can call his own; he hath not only the protection of his Person, but the inheritance of his Freehold, his Liberty and Property secured to him by Law; he cannot be violently assaulted in the one, or forceably invaded in the other, but the publick Justice of the Kingdom will be satisfied for it, and call the Aggressors to a strict account.

We have such a grand Charter of all just and reasonable Priviledges and Immunities, continued and confirmed to us, by the Piety, Munificence and Royal bounty of our Princes, that we may dispute peaceable and happy living with all o∣ther Subjects of the World.

The Government we live under, being setled and suppor∣ted by known and excellent Laws, such as for their policy and prudence, justice and equity in their composition, challenge all the constitutions of Europe (in which part of the World are (if any where) to be found the greatest perfections of Human Nature) to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the like. They do so justly and clearly support the Grandeur of Majesty, the Dignity of the Crown, with the Peace, Liberty and Property of the Subject,* 1.176 that all Nations round about envy us for that felicity they can never hope to enjoy.

To disturb this blessed condition of the English Subject, there are two Extremes: The one of a People fond of a No∣tion, of the Primitive fundamental of Government in the People, that they will needs have Property in order of Na∣ture before Government; without considering that nothing is gained to their advantage by the concession of it. For it must also be(f) 1.177 proved, that it was before it in order of time; for as one of the principal ends of Government is the preservation of mens acquisitions, of Cattle and Fields, by their industry; so we must suppose some Government first, because the right which any man hath to the acquired stock and lands, must be ascertain'd to him by some Law, which supposeth Government. So that the dispute (saith the Re∣verend Bishop) is de Lana Caprina, and when men have crow∣ded themselves into the Circle, they reap nothing but a Brain∣sick giddiness; and it is like the dispute in Macrobius, Whether the Hen or Egg were first.

All that believe the Creation, must own, that Adam's Go∣vernment was before any Mans property, and the like may be said of Noah; so that there is no need to have recourse to Articles, or capitulations with the People (which those make such a noise with) unless they can first evince the World to be Eternal, and Men to have sprung in some rank Soil, as Tube∣ra terrae, Mushroms after a fruitful shower.

Another Extreme is what Mr. Hobbs every where in his Le∣viathan,* 1.178 endeavours to establish, (viz) That the Sovereign should be so absolute and so arbitrary, that he should upon Exigents of State, or at his own pleasure, have the disposal

of every Subjects fortune, which how necessary it may be for vast Empires (such as the Ottomans) I dispute not. But the Soveraigns of Christendom, especially of England, take no such measures to the advantages of themselves, or their Sub∣jects slavery.

The most judicious Earl of Clarendon, in his eleborate Trea∣tise against(g) 1.179 Mr. Hobbs, hath with great judgment refuted this opinion, from whose Armory I shall borrow some of the Artillery, though I dare not presume to use them with the same dexterity, and address his Lordship doth.

This Propriety (saith he) introduceth the beauty of build∣ing, and the cultivating of the Earth, by art as well as indu∣stry, that they and their Children might dwell in the Houses they were at the charge to build, and reap the Harvest of those lands they had been at the charge to sow: whatsoever is of civility and good manners, all that is of art and beauty, of rule and solid wealth in the world, is the product of this; the Child of beloved property; and they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at would strangle this Issue, desire to demolish all buildings, eradicate all planta∣tions to make the Earth barren, and live again in Tents, and nourish their Cattle by successive marches into the Fields where the Grass grows. Nothing but joy in propriety redeemed us from this barbarity, and nothing but security in the same can preserve us from returning to it again.

If there be no Propriety (continueth the great Lord) there is nothing worth defending from foreign Enemies, or from one another, and consequently it is no matter what becomes of the Commonwealth. For the Government can never be so vigorously assisted by a People who have nothing to lose, as by those who defending it, defend their own Goods and E∣states; which if they do not believe their own, they will not much care into whose hands they fall.

To this wise Lord I may add what a great(h) 1.180 Statesman and Scholar hath long since observed. That though by the Civil Law all are the Kings; yet even those things (whereof the Universal possession belongs to the King) have their peculiar Owners: So that we may give the King, House, Free∣hold or Money, yet are not said to give him his own. For to the King the Power over all appertains, but to every single Person his Property, according to that of Bulgaris to Zeno, Omnia Rex possidet Imperio, singuli dominio.

If it were thus under the absolute Power of the Roman Em∣perors in Seneca's time, how much more secure may we judge Propriety in ours, when so guarded by the Royal Sword and Scepter; that in several cases Actions may be brought in de∣fence of a Mans right, even against the Crown, and the Judges have pronounced Sentence against some claims of the King, and ought to do so.

Whatever pains Mr. Hobs takes to render those precious words of Property unvaluable and insignificant, we see that

a better Philosopher than He, and who understood the Rules of Government (having lived under just such a Soveraign as Mr. Hobs would set up) gives his judgment otherwise, where he expresly tells us, that he is(i) 1.181 much deceived that thinks that King is in safety, from whom the Subject is not safe in what he enjoys; the security of the one being from the stipulation of the security of the other.

That in former ages also the condition of the English Sub∣ject hath been happier, in enjoying greater security, as to their Persons and Estates, than the Subjects of Foreign Countries: and that the English Laws and Government have been very tender of them, appears by what another(k) 1.182 Lord Chan∣cellor writes, who lived in a turbulent age, and was forced into exile with the Prince, eldest Son to King Henry the Sixth. He in many places, treats of the miseries of the Pea∣sants in France, and of the generality of the French Subjects, too tedious here to relate, and in his free way of Dialogue with the Prince, he divides Kingly Government into that which is Regal and Absolute, and that which is Political. In which last are condescensions of Princes to bound their Prero∣gative, and this he commends to his Prince, saying,(l) 1.183 No Prince can be reputed powerfuller or freer than that Prince, who is not only able to master and subdue others, but also his own oppressive and extorting disposition, which he saith, a King that governs Politically, can do, and ever doth.

Therefore we may look upon all such, as now, or in the late times, have made such terrible outcries, for fear of their Properties being invaded (since we find two such great Men in distant ages so freely and elaborately writing against Ar∣bitrariness) as men that rather design Sedition and Rebellion, by raising in the Peoples minds, groundless jealousies and fears, than that there can be any umbrages of such fears in the con∣stitution of the Government, especially under such a just Prince as we have, who will make the Laws the Rule, by which he will square his Royal Administration, and hath given such assu∣rance of it in his never to be sufficiently valued Declaration, at his Majestie's first sitting in his Council, to the infinite joy of his Subjects of all conditions.

Therefore since we have our Properties so well secured and provided for, by the gracious Grants of our Sovereigns in Mag∣na Charta, the Petition of Right, and other Acts; let us thank∣fully acknowledg this great Blessing, and with so much more duty and industry, endeavour to defend, in our several capa∣cities, the Royal Prerogatives of our Kings; which as much appertain to them, and in a more transcendent way, than our Properties are ascertained unto us.

For it must be owned, that the primary end of all Govern∣ment, is for the better ordering the People, whereby they may live in accord among themselves, and follow their seve∣ral imployments under the protection of the Soveraign.

Therefore whoever endeavour to disjoynt and discompose the frame of Government (by the wisdom of our Ancestors and long experience, found so agreeable to the English Genius) are to be reputed, either ignorant of their own happiness, or designers of as horrid mischiefs: Whether they be such, as ac∣cording to Mr. Hobs's Principles, may lessen the affection and tenderness of Princes to their Subjects, or lessen the duty and obedience of Subjects to their Prince, and make them less love the constitution of Government they live under; or they be such as would cramp the Sovereign Power, and wrap it in soft Ermines and Robes of State, without a Sword or Scepter.

Having thus far treated of Government in general, and of the usefulness of it to mankind: I think it necessary to give an account of the several Governments which have been hither∣to used in the World; and that I may give a more distinct ac∣count of them, I have chosen to represent them as I find they have been practised in the ancientest times: and finding so ma∣ny in the last age and this so zealous for a Commonwealth-Government, and some yet bewitched with the notions of it, I think it incumbent on me, to be more copious in the repre∣senting of the inconveniences of all other Governments be∣sides Monarchy, tht as far as my reading may afford me helps, I may disabuse his Majestie's Subjects, and represent to them the excellency and beauty of the English Monarchy, which is the whole scope and intendment of this discourse; and I must beg pardon, if either in the words of my Authors (whom I shall endeavour faithfully to quote) or in my own, I use any smar∣ter or sharper expressions than they are willing to hear. For I think it much more advantageous to the persons concerned, that they feel the acrimony of my Ink, and the small punctures of my Pen, than that following such mischievous Principles of our late Republicans, they should have their bloods tainted, or suffer the edge of those severe Laws, which are steeled a∣gainst Rebels, and think it safer for them to be blackned by my Ink, than that their blood should stain the Scaffolds.

CHAP. VI. Of Democracy, and the Inconveniences of it.

ALL Ages have allowed of Aristotle's division of Govern∣ment: where he saith(a) 1.184 that the Republic and the public Administration are the same, and this public administra∣tion is the Lord or Sovereign of the City, and that Sove∣reign is either one, a few, or the multitude, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. In Democracy the People is the Prince, and in Oligarchy the few.

To this division(c)) 1.185 Tacitus assents, where he saith, Cunctas Na∣tiones, & Ʋrbes, Populus, aut Primores, aut singuli regunt. That either the People, the principal Citizens, or single Persons go∣vern all Nations and Cities.

Every one of these are again subdivided. The Government of one is either a(d) 1.186 King, who rules for the good of his whole Subjects, or a Tyrant, who pretending the Protection of the People against the too severe Rule of a King, or the States, ex∣erciseth Arbitrary Rule over all. The few constitute an(e) 1.187 Ari∣stocracy, wherein a select, and small number of the principal Citizens Rule for the public good; or Oligarchy where the Rich only rule for their particular Profit. As to the Rule of the People, or wherein all the People have by amicable consent an equal right in the Government, and accord to manage it for the common good of the whole, it is call'd Democracy: If not for the common benefit of Rich and Poor, it is call'd Oclo∣cracy, or the mis-rule of the Rable. All(f) 1.188 which he includes in that division, that whatever forms of Administration regard the common benefit, they are regular, and such as are consentane∣ous to Justice; but whoever having the Administration, consult their own Profit only, they are depraved and distorted from the right Forms of Government.

The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a mixture of all these, or any two of them, is often mentioned by the Philosopher; but of this I have no pre∣sent occasion to discourse.

I shall begin with democracy; which is the Clay and Iron Feet of Nebuchadnezzar's Image. It is but one remove from Anarchy, wherein all the People have, or pretend to have equal right to Authority, where all govern and all obey. For the Peo∣ple (saith the Philosopher) is a Monarch or simple Government by aggregation of many, being many Lords, not as single Per∣sons, but as Members of the All; which he thus expresseth,(g) 1.189 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Of this sort of Government the(h) 1.190 Philosopher makes five Kinds. The first when Rich and Poor are equally capable of Government.* 1.191 The second when a small real Estate is required

to capacitate them. A third where all Citizens, not by some Qualifications debarred, are admitted; but so that the(i) 1.192 Laws govern, or are the Standard. A fourth where only the Inhabitants of the City, not those that live dispersed in the Villages depending on the City, had share in Government, the Law also being the Rule. The fifth when the Multitude rule by majority of Voices, and not the Law; so that their tempo∣rary Votes were Law.

We have resemblance of these kinds of Governments in our Corporations,* 1.193 where in the Elections of Magistrates, in some places all Freemen, in others those only who have Burgage Land, in others a Common-Council solely, have Vote, and the whole Body, or such and such parts have Power to make By-laws.

If we had no other Argument against Democracy but this, that it is of that narrow capacity that it cannot be adapted to order Regions of large extent, it would be sufficient to discre∣dit it; for we find in those incorporated little Democracies, there are more Factions and divisions than in the whole large adjoining tracts of Land about them, though the Villages con∣tain a much numerouser People.

It is rarely found but that in all Votes relating to the public, Combinations are made by Kindreds, Companies, or Factions. The inferior sort having equal Vote, often out-number the Rich∣er and Wiser, and so businesses are aukwardly or tumultuarily determin'd, and the meaner People must either neglect their domestic affairs, to attend frequent Conventions, or leave the managery to a stirring factious Party, which is(k) 1.194 contrary to the fundamental equality and freedom they labour for. As these Corporations were first created by the Sovereigns Grace and Favour, for the encrease of Trade, and enriching the pla∣ces, and administration of Justice: so while they keep themselves within the bounds of their Duties, are Loyal to their Prince, and Faithful to the Government, and presume not by their Prag∣maticalness to dispose of the Fate of the Empire, or by their factious Elections to make disturbances; It is very necessary they should enjoy all their municipal Priviledges. But so ma∣ny Corporations having of late acted contrary, it is no wonder that the late King, upon solid reason of State, issued out his Quo Warranto's against them; and in all the new Charters reserv'd a Power in the Crown of displacing the Evil Magistrates at pleasure.

But to leave this to another place, I shall note out of the Phi∣losopher such Arguments as he useth against Democracy.* 1.195 As first that the common People being the greater number, and the Soveraignty being supposed to be in the whole complex Bo∣dy, whatever they approve must be establish'd as a Right and Law,(l) 1.196 and suppose they vote a Dividend of the richer Citi∣zens Estates among themselves; though this by the force of their Government be just, yet in its own nature it is great Injustice

to destroy the rich Man's Propriety, as well as it were for the Rich to do the same to the Poor.

2dly.* 1.197 Liberty being the principle of all Democratical Go∣vernment, it consists in two things, either to live(m) 1.198 licenti∣ously, which in Athens and other places was very fatal, and as Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Cicero complain that under the spe∣cious pretence of Liberty, even Anarchy prevail'd. Or Second∣ly in the free and uncontroulable Power of chusing their Ma∣gistrates, and this accasioned the contest of parties for Victory; hence Crowds, Tumults, Routs, Riots, Frays and Quarrells, and after all, Heart-burnings.

(n) 1.199Plutarch gives us an account of the manner of some E∣lections for Senators, that certain Persons being closed in a Room where they might hear the peoples Voices, but not see the People, One Competitor after another was proposed, and him who was judged to have most Voices, they carried Crown∣ed to the Temples of the Gods, Women and Children follow∣ing him with Shouts. This(o) 1.200 Aristotle calls a Childish action in so grave an affair, it being not fit for any to seek Magistra∣cy in such a way, that by the judgment of the Multitude only, is thought fit to Rule; but(p) 1.201 he that is worthy, be he willing or unwilling, should have the place. Therefore we observe where the King hath the sole Power of nominating Judges, Sheriffs, Justices of Peace, &c. though they are of as great ad∣vantage to the Peace and order of the Government, as Mayors, Sheriffs, or Common-Council Men of Corporations, there are neither Hubbubs or Quarrels at their Elections, and they are generally better qualified than such as court the peoples Fa∣vour. Therefore(q) 1.202 Laertius exclaims justly that the Com∣mon-weal must perish, in which the Nobility consult, but the People and unskillful common Rabble give Judgment.

3dly.* 1.203 In this Government there is a continual spawning of Faction. So it is(r) 1.204 observ'd that at Athens the Democratical Government mostly obtain'd, yet in the Attick State there were no less than three Factions, according to the tripartite division of the People: viz. the Diacrii, that inhabited the mountai∣nous Parts, who were for pure Democracy; the Pediaci, who inhabited the lower Grounds, and they were for a mixture of Oligarchy; and the Parulii, or Inhabitants on the Sea-Coasts, and those were a mixture of both; which Aristotle calls the Politick. Hence Pisistratus appearing an Enemy to the Pedia∣ci, made himself gracious with the People, and so easily got the Government. So he instanceth in the changes of those of Mi∣lesia, by the Prytania, which was like a Consulship or Dictator∣ship at ••••me. So he gives an account of Dionysius feigning himself to be wounded by the Nobility, who hated him for his love to the People, raised a great Envy and Rage of the Peo∣ple against them, and so established himself. So Theagenes by slaying the Cattle of the Nobility, animated the People of Maegara to follow him, till by suppressing the Nobility and

Richer, he got himself to be Master of all. The like we may read in(s) 1.205 Diodorus Siculus, that Agathocles did at Syracuse. All which Changes were the Issues of Factions betwixt the Nobility and Common-people, which is as inseparable from this sort of Government, as the Prickle is from the Thistle, or the Husk from the Corn.

Fourthly, The Philosopher notes, That in this Government the Demagogues were most used. These indeed were the Bell∣wethers of Faction, the Conductors of the Peoples Wills and Affe∣ctions, by the power of their Popularness. The(t) 1.206 Philosopher tells us, there was no use of them, where the Law commanded; but where Matters were judged by the Decrees of the People onely, they were of use, being the Authors that all things might be reduced to the Power of the People, whom they wrought upon by their Suasives, to place or displace Magistrates, or to enlarge or circumscribe their Power. Therefore he scarce al∣lows the(u) 1.207 Name of Government to this kind of Republic, because where the Laws have not Authority, there is no Com∣monwealth; for that these Demagogues making the Mobile Lord over the Laws, and constantly raising Factions against the Rich, Civitate ex una duas faciant, of one City or Society made two: So that in that Contest mostly an Oligarchy prevailed; and by the petulancy of the Demagogues (who led the People by Herds, pretending, as it was their Office,(w) 1.208 that none should injure the People) they exasperated the Nobility to subvert the Government, or having got a powerful Ascendant, usurped it themselves; as the Philosopher instanceth in the Islands of Chios and Rhodes, in the Cities of Heraclea, of Pontus, in the Colonies of the Athenians at Megaris; the Nobles being abused and banished, righted themselves by Arms, and obtained the Go∣vernment; and Thrasymachus did the like at Cuma.

These Demagogues among the Grecians, the Ephori among the Lacedemonians, and the Tribunes of the People among the Romans, are often compared, as Officers of the same kind, chosen to sup∣port the Peoples Interests. The Philosopher gives us an ac∣count how the Demagogues comported themselves at the places before-named; of which number, he saith, were Pericles, Cilon, Hyperbolus, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Demosthenes.

Concerning the Ephori,* 1.209 (x) 1.210 Aristotle saith, That among the Lacedemonians they had the greatest Power, and being chosen by the People, it often hapned that very poor men obtained the Office, who by reason of their poverty were mercenary, as he instanceth in the Andrici, where they being corrupted with Money, lost the City. He further adds, That though these were chosen by the ignorant Populace, and often were men very un∣fit for their Office; yet they had Judgment in Capital matters, and did not judge in Cases of Death or Ignominy by written Laws, but arbitrarily; so that the very Kings of Sparta were forced to observe, caress, and reverence them.

As to the Tribunes of Rome,* 1.211 they caused many grievous Trou∣bles about the Agrarian Laws. Sp. Cassius being the first (ac∣cording to Valerius) that raised those Disputes, and was slain by his Father; though Livy and Dionysius say it was Licinius Stolo, and after many years Q. Flaminius put the same in execution, the Senate being against it. So Gracchus, Tiberius, Titius, &c. did upon the same account raise great Commotions.

This was for the taking the ancient Possessions from the Rich, and distributing them among the Poor, Therefore(y) 1.212 Cicero saith, It was a pleasant thing to the People, for that they were thereby supported without Labour; but the good Citizens resisted it, because it would extinguish Industry, and exhaust the Treasury, and inure the People to Sloth.

From all which, we may conclude, That Democracy in its Constitution is onely fitted for small Principalities; and in it neither Industry, or worthy Persons, can have Encouragement: How obnoxious it is to Factions, or must have a mixture of other Governments to support it, in being headed by some few popular Persons; or must have a shadow of Monarchy, in the ruling Demagogues, Ephori, or Tribunes; otherwise it cannot subsist.

This leads me to the Fifth Argument of the Philosopher against Democracy,* 1.213 That it was never found to be of any long continuance: For,(z) 1.214 he saith, That all Tyrannical Constituti∣ons are Popular: And it is well known, That, of all Govern∣ments what is Tyrannical, is the most short-lived. Liberty being the End and Scope pretended, according to the Funda∣mental Constitution of Democracy,(a) 1.215 to Obey and Rule by Turns; the sweetness of Command induceth them that have once obtained it, to continue it; and the Slavery of obeying such Fellows and Companions, continually provokes others to cast off the Yoke: So that from hence Jars and Feuds shatter the Government in pieces. Besides, the unwieldy Body of the People seldom continue long in one mind, nor can transact things without delegation of Power to some few; by all which their instability is discovered, and the shortness of their conti∣nuance shews the feeble and impotent Principles they are founded upon. For where ever it hath had any duration, it hath not been from its intrinsick adapture, but from the mixture of other Forms in their kinds more durable; Democracy be∣ing in it self such a Rolling-ground, that nothing stable can be built upon it.

It is not to be denied,* 1.216 that Aristotle in some Cases allows of Democracy; but it is where the(b) 1.217 Multitudes live by Husban∣dry, Pasture, or Feeding of Cattel. For these being continu∣ally employed, have not much publick Business, nor leisure to attend the Assemblies; it being more pleasant and profitable for them to mind their private Affairs, than to bear Office where little Profit is to be had. But he likewise observes, That those that lived upon Tillage and Pasture (being the ancientest sort

of People, before Luxury brought in Handicrafts and Artizans) easilier yielded to the Government of a Single Person, or Ty∣ranny, or Oligarchy, so long as they could enjoy their Country Farms in peace. Whereas those in Cities, consisting of Trades∣men, Artificers, the mercenary Multitude, and such as lead an idle Life, having Leisure and Curiosity to carry them to the Assemblies, were more subject to Democracy, or Aristocracy, or any Novelty or Change.

There are three things which render Democracy most taking with the Vulgar.* 1.218 First, Pretended impartial Administration of Justice. Secondly, The specious, but empty Name of Li∣berty. Thirdly, The so much applauded Equality, by which they seem to reduce their Civil Constitutions to the primary Laws of Nature, which gave to all men Common Right.

Concerning the first, (saith a Judicious(c) 1.219 Author, whose Discourse on this Head I shall epitomize) Their Hopes that Ju∣stice should be more equally administred, are grounded upon this, That though some Rivers may be corrupted, yet the Ocean cannot. A man may satisfie the Interests of some few, and cor∣rupt them into favour and respect of Persons; but it is hard to do the same with a Multitude: for to buy Justice of so many, would be no thriving Trade.

But this, though plausible, is but a very fallacious Argument: For it is found by experience, that some few more crafty Citi∣zens, who have gained Credit with the People, order Business in their close Committees, and so undiscernably lead the Mul∣titude to whatever they call the Publick Good (of which they, having prevailed upon their Affections, are esteemed the most competent Judges) by which any one of the Juncto (for they must gratifie each other mutually) is enabled to cross the Course of Law in a Friend's behalf, and to put a sharper Edge upon the Sword of Justice when it strikes an Enemy.

These kind of men, by frothy Eloquence in set Speeches, cun∣ningly fitted to the Capacity of the Common People, having got the Art of changing the Peoples Opinion of Just and Un∣just, (for Reasons are not weighed, where such Numbers hold the Ballance) their Art is to apply their Harangues to that which rules the weaker men, the Affections; and these are ea∣sily convinced, and made the Measures of their Judgments, the want of weight in the(d) 1.220 Premisses being supplied by an ex∣traordinary love to the Conclusion.

The Judgments of Right and Wrong (being not like Mathe∣matical Knowledge) are as various as their Interests different, because they concern Meum and Tuum, wherein Profit is the(e) 1.221 Parent of Equitable and Just; and these Ruling men, when they have a mind to do a man a prejudice, can easily transfer his Business to the Common Peoples Verdict, where they shall be sure to have their Fleece torn off by the Brambles or Briars, or suffer as cruel Death (if they be judged Capital Offenders) as those may be conceived to undergo that are

rolled to death in a spiked Barrel. So we find the Grecian Emperor Isacius Angelus, and the two De Witts were torn in pie∣ces, when exposed to be worried by the Rabble.

Secondly, as to Liberty;* 1.222 it is strange Men should so generally fall in love with a bare sound, and court a name of freedom, which duly examined, signifies nothing. They cannot mean by it a looseness from all Laws; they dare not own such perni∣cious Licence; the true debate is not, Whether they shall ad∣mit the Bonds of Laws (for they readily embrace them, being forged and fitted by themselves) but who shall impose them? The question is not, Whether(f) 1.223 they should serve, but, Whe∣ther they should serve one or more? and with them it is com∣monly called Liberty, to serve many Masters.

Now if we rightly consider, the restraint of our Freedom is that which is most valuable amongst the benefits of Govern∣ment. For this it is preserves Peace among men, by it their hands are tied up from doing injury. Every one, it is true, could wish to retain full and absolute liberty, but not upon condition all others should enjoy the same. For that love to it, and delight in it, is overbalanced by the fears, and the sad consideration arising from the thoughts of others freedom, to make us suffer as much as they may be tempted to inflict.

Besides, where can true Liberty be, where the unconstant Mobile have the dispensing of it; who have no clear Idea of it, are always catching at the shadow, and the ungrasped Cloud, for Juno. Their Votes are easily corrupted, when a(g) 1.224 Marius pours out Bushels of Corn in the Forum, to buy them: They are impelled as we see in crowds, first one way, then another, ebbing and flowing in their actions, like the unconstant Ocean; and this they call their Liberty, which ra∣ther is their servile Bondage, being all this while in the shorter or longer Chain of their corrupt affections or weak judg∣ments. For how can we think the common body competent Judges to manage affairs, who besides inconstancy and disor∣der, do every thing in such a manner as it is very hard to se∣parate Tumults and Multitudes; and amongst Judges, so qua∣lified as they are, it is not enough to give prudent Council, but it must likewise be fortunate; otherwise the judicious gi∣ver of it, may probably find a great abridgment of his Liberty, if not worse.

Thirdly, Concerning Equality,* 1.225 while they urge it comes nearer to the Law of Nature; by the same reason they must dissolve Government, since it would take away all Magi∣strates, Superiors and Inferiors. Besides, it is against Nature it self, that there should be such Equality; as to instance, if in Rewards it had been intended, Nature would have made all men equally deserving: and Reason teacheth us, that since we may excel others by Education and Industry; greater Encou∣ragements should be allotted in consideration of the charges of good breeding, and of the extraordinary studies whereby

Men enable themselves to serve the Publick. Besides, this Equality, though pretended to conserve, doth in truth de∣stroy Unity; for none are so quarrelsome, none so subject to envy as equals: Every one being Judge in his own case, will yield nothing to common Justice.

To close this Chapter, We may judge of the thriving of popular States, by what we observe of Commons, which are always poor and bare of good and wholesome Grass, compa∣ratively with Enclosures. If these Wafts be taken into one Mans hand, he causeth the fertile crop of Thistles to be Mow∣ed, stubbs up the Shrubs and Brambles, ploughs up the Brakes, trencheth and cultivates the Whole, and encreaseth the profit four fold; whereas, when it lies in common, every one serves his present turn of it, overstocks it, and nothing is bred upon it, but poor Jades and Beasts of Burthen.

Yea, the greater part of Men in a popular State, being bred up to gain, make Profit the rule of their Actions, enter∣tain but little sence of Honour, and thereby the State is soon corrupted by their low affections: so that though some may be rich, yet the State can never be glorious.

In the standing Pools of popular Government, from the putrilage and mud, spawn swarms of Tadpols. The rankness of such soyl brings store of Tares and Goss, Docks and Net∣tles: Here the Henbane, Night-shade and Aconite grow too luxuriantly; so that the medicinal and fragrant Plants rarely find room or cultivation.

CHAP. VII. Of the several Forms of Government in Greece, before and in A∣ristotle's time, and of the Roman Commonwealth.

THE Philosopher observes,(a) 1.226 that in remote Ages, when there were fewer Persons of the sublimest eminence for Valour, Wisdom, Vertue and publick spiritedness to protect by their Courage and Conduct, to institute Laws by their Wisdom, to be a living Law by their just dealing and ex∣ample, to study the emolument and benefit of the common People, by their good will to them;(b) 1.227 Kingly Government was solely used. But after that many grew up to be equal in vertue, they endured Kings no longer, but setled Common∣wealths, and used an Aristocratical Government, where the eminentest in Vertue only governed: but when these degene∣rated, and begun to make profit of their publick places, Oli∣garchy began, where respect was not so much had to Vertue, as to Riches and Honours; and these growing Tyrannical, the People revolted from them, and so Democracy was intro∣duced.

Of Aristocracy the Philosopher makes four kinds: The first and best consisting of men absolutely(c) 1.228 good and ver∣tuous, not in supposition only.* 1.229 The second, where respect was not only had to Vertue, but also to Riches. The Third, where, besides Vertue, also Respect was had to the Peoples Liberty, as in Lacedaemonia, where the Ephori were introduced. The fourth, where Respect was had to Vertue, Riches, and the Peoples liberty, as at Carthage.

The same Philosopher(d) 1.230 makes four kinds of Oligarchy. The first, wherein those of the largest proportion of Estate, according to a certain limit, were capable of Authority, and all under that degree were excluded; so that whoever had acquired such a proportion of Estate, was capable of Rule, without any other qualification. The second was, when the Census was less, whereby the Government was in more hands, and those had power to chuse others in the room of such as deceased. As it is usual in our Common-councils. In the third kind great Riches were required, so that there were few∣er Governours, and they had greater Authority, and their Children succeeded them. The last kind was, wherein the greatest Estates only were capacitated: But the Governours were not tied to the observance of Laws, but ruled accord∣ing to their own wills, as they agreed among themselves.

That form of Government which the(e) 1.231 Philosopher calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.232 seems rather an Idea of Government, than that ever (as it is described) it was put in practice. For he instanceth in no State but that of Sparta, that had any resemblance of it, and the Thurians which degenerated into Democracy. How∣ever I shall give such an account as I find of it in him, or in such Commentators as I have by me, especially in Giphanius: First, He makes it a(f) 1.233 commixture of Democracy and O∣ligarchy; wherein the Poor and Rich had an equal capacity to the Office and Administration of Government, and calls it pro∣perly a Republic, because those Governments which incline to Democracy, were so called, because they seemed most fit∣ted for the Peoples good; but those which inclined more to Oligarchy, were used to be stiled Aristocracies,(g) 1.234 because those that are rich are commonly Persons of good education, and ennobled, which things he saith appertain to Vertue. So that there being three necessary ingredients or terms in a Commonwealth, Vertue, Riches and Liberty, this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 directly includes the two last; and the first also is included, because amongst(h) 1.235 most, the Rich are reputed amongst the best deserving. So he makes this kind of Government to be different from Democracy and Oligarchy, because mixed of both; so that in one particular he shows the combinations of these two in Polity, by setting a mulct upon the Rich that ab∣sented themselves from the administration of the Government, and reward upon the Poor that should attend it, which in Oli∣garchy had no place.

Another sort of Commixture(i) 1.236 he makes, that whereas in Oligarchy, there is only respect had to great wealth, and in Democracy, no respect at all had to it; This Polity is mixed of a middle sort of Riches, and such men he judgeth the best tempered, as not covetous and greedy as the Poor, nor be∣ing wealthy enough to do mischief, but contenting themselves with their Mediocrity.

A third kind of their mixture he makes, that whereas in Oligarchy, the Magistrates are chosen by Riches and Suffrage, and in Democracy without these; the Composition is, That the Election be by Suffrage only, without respect had to Wealth.

As to the Roman Commonwealth; The Soveraignty, after the expulsion of Kings, consisted in the Senate, the Consuls and Tribunes of the People, all of them seeming checks upon others; but at some times one part, especially the Patricii or the Plebs, assumed or exercised more power, one than the o∣ther, according to the prevalency of either party.

As to the Senate of Rome, Romulus elected an Hundred out of the Patricii,* 1.237 to be his Council, to assist him in determining matters concerning the Commonweal. Tarquinus Priscus ad∣ded an Hundred more,(k) 1.238 and Brutus, according to most Authors, another Hundred; and though at first, only the Pa∣tricii were chosen, yet after, the Commoners also were cho∣sen, called Senatores minorum Gentium.

These had the consulting part under their care, were the great Judicature, to which last Appeals were made, and by their ratifying of things, added the force of the Senatus consultum, by which they decreed honours and punishments.

Concerning the Consuls, after the expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus, the Government of the City, which was before in(l) 1.239 one (the King) was now divided betwixt two, who at first were called Praetores quod praeirent Populo, and not long af∣ter Consules from consulting for the People. These at first, had the executive parts of most things relating to the Government, under their care; but after, by the consent of the Senate, they chose two Censors, who took an account, not only of the number and riches of the People, but had power to enquire into every mans life.

They also for administring Justice,(m) 1.240 created two Officers, the Praetor Ʋrbanus for City-affairs, and Peregrinus for Fo∣reign affairs, like our Mayors. These Consuls had the Govern∣ment of the Military Force, and other Jurisdictions too long to be here inserted. They were at first but two for a year, after four or more by removable resignation or death. The People got one of the Consuls to be chosen of the Plebei∣ans.

Concerning the Tribunes of the People,* 1.241 we may note that the Commonalty, finding(n) 1.242 themselves oppressed by the Wealthier sort, departed unto the Aventine Mount, threatning

the Nobility they would depart the City, and never again ad∣venture themselves in War for the defence thereof, unless they had some release and easment, and had certain Magistrates cho∣sen, who should be Sacrosancti: that is, such as might not be hurt nor violently used, not so much as in words: and those Magi∣strates should be the Protectors of the Commonalty, who be∣ing at first chosen from the military Tribunes, and they having the name of Tribunes from the distinction of the Romans into Tribes; that they might be distinguished from the military Tri∣bunes, were called the Tribunes of the People. At(o) 1.243 first they were only two, but after encreased to the number of ten. They had power to hinder any Proceedings in the Senate, which they thought might prove prejudicial to the Commons. At(p) 1.244 first they had not Authority to enact any new Decrees, as after∣wards by abusing their Authority, and by Connivance they u∣surped; for in old time they sate(q) 1.245 without the door of the Senate, whither whatsoever was determin'd within the Senate, was sent to them to be perused, and if they approved it, they subscribed a Roman T for Tribunus.

When any new Laws were to be proposed, the(r) 1.246 Praetors, Consuls, Dictators, Interrex, Decemviri, military Tribunes, Triumviri, and Tribunes of the People only had liberty to pro∣pose them, and they were exposed to view of the People for three Market days, and after the Magistrates assembled the People to hear the Law, which by the Proponent was pleaded for by an Oration, and seconded by others, and if not liked, it was op∣posed in the same manner. The People being assembled accor∣ding to the triple distinction of them into Tribes, and the divi∣sion of each Tribe into ten Curiae, or Parishes, and the Centu∣ries or Hundreds, the Assemblies were called Comitia, Tributa Cen∣turiata, or Curiata. Now into a Pitcher were put the names of these several divisions, and that Tribe or Centuries Name which was first drawn, was called Tribus, vel Centuria Praerogativa; be∣cause they were first asked their Voices, and commonly the vote of that was followed by the rest, especially in choice of Consuls: the Curia upon which the first Lot did fall, was called Principium.(s) 1.247 Now while the People were busy in their Lottery, if any Tribune of the Commons should intercidere, or forbid the Proceeding, he might be heard, and the whole As∣sembly was for that time dismissed; or if the Consuls com∣manded supplications to be offered up in behalf of the Empe∣ror, or if it fell on some forbidding of Feasts, or if any were seized with the Falling-sickness, or the Soothsayers found any unlucky Signs: upon any of these the Assembly was dissolved; otherwise the Law that was approved by the People, was record∣ed, being graven(t) 1.248 in Brass, and put in the Treasure house. That which was determined in the(v) 1.249 Parish-Assemblies was called Lex Curiata, that in the Centuries, Lex Centuriata, that which was in the Assembly of the Tribes was not called a Law, but Plebiscitum.

CHAP. VIII. The Inconveniences of all kinds of Republic Governments.

I Shall now consider all these forms of Commonwealths in gross, and hope to satisfy the ingenuous and unbiass'd Reader, That if a People were in a capacity to chuse their own Government, they should have no reason to chuse a Common∣wealth, rather than Kingly Government: much less that they should endeavour to innovate or introduce it, where already so Geometrically composed as it is in England, both for the glory and benefit of the King and People.

It is Judiciously noted by a late(a) 1.250 Learned Writer, That the happiness of all Societies principally consists in the secu∣ring domestic Peace, or protection from foreign Enemies, se∣curing to every Member of the Society their particular right and property, free from encroachment and oppression; or in the equal distribution of Justice to all, according to their proportion of Reward or Punishment. Through all which heads I shall endea∣vour to shew that in Commonwealths these Particulars cannot or have not so effectually been secured, as in a rightly constitu∣ted Monarchy.

First as to the securing domestick Peace,* 1.251 the very constituti∣ons of Commonwealths, requiring many Magistrates of equal Authority, subject to the Political Diseases of State; Viz. Co∣vetousness, Ambition, Oppression and Faction, and all the Concomitants of these, make them more subject to Intestine Discords than Monarchy can be.

First,* 1.252 It must be considered that in all Commonwealth Go∣vernments, there is a necessity of change of Persons, either annually chosen, or to be for some few Years duration; and all such must at the same time intend the interests of their private affairs separate from the public: and there being most tempting Probabilities of a private and particular advantage to be made of all publick Trust, where there is Power; it is a perpetual Spur to ambitious and selfish Spirits, to court such Employments which are like to be serviceable to their Honour or private Fortunes; and the(b) 1.253 best Men being restrained by their modesty and pau∣city, those that have designs by direct or indirect ways, wind themselves into those places, and by the rotation knowing they shall not long enjoy them, they will improve the time in enriching themselves, and connive at others that do so, lest they themselves should be called to an account: every ones rapaci∣ousness being likelier to be so much the eagerer, because he knows it may not come again to his turn to have the Quarry to prey upon. Therefore the common interest (if it be regarded) must be only as it is subservient to these By-ends.

Thus in our late Republic, the great Business (even of the zealousest Pretenders to the Public) was to enrich themselves and their Confederates, as was apparent by the considerable E∣states they had, even after they had been forced to disgorge those fat Portions of Crown, Bishops, Dean, and Chapter, and Cathedral Lands.

By this observation we may conclude that the constituent parts of this Government, being ever like to be such, the mi∣serable People must be continually spunged, to feed so many greedy Worms, and when the Prey grows scarce, these Blood-Hounds will be sure to fight who shall get the best Share.

Besides, there must be continual Heart-Burnings and Part-ma∣king,* 1.254 when those that are endowed with(c) 1.255 great Souls, or are equal in Fortitude, or Vertue, have not the eminent∣est command (at least as they judg) according to their Worth and Merits. By which means some will be carrying things by Arbitrary Power over their Equals, as the Philosopher instan∣ceth in Pausanius in Lacedaemon, Hanno at Carthage, Lysander, and Eniadas, and the Partheniae, who judging themselves equal with those that had rule, and being by them slighted and brand∣ed with the title of Bastards, conspired to have slain the Senate and Optimacy.

To instance in all the Factions in Commonwealths, were to write a voluminous History. I shall touch upon some, and show that the causes either given or taken will always be the same in these kinds of Government; the very Constitution of them, by the purity and equality of Dignity and Power, naturally producing Jealousies, Animosities and Aemulations: whereas the(d) 1.256 Philosopher well notes, that many may disagree a∣mong themselves, but one cannot. The difference of Judg∣ment as to Conduct and Managery among multitudes of Equals embarrassing Debates, the Result must be according to the pre∣vailing of some Faction: Every one Judging most advantage∣ously of his own council and advice; and those whose Councils are rejected, will look upon it as a Diminution of that esteem for Wisdom and Policy, which they think they deserve, and these Discontents will occasion making of Parties, entring into Con∣federacies, and Combinations of Faction, and frequently end in popular Insurrections, Tumults, and Disorders, to which Republics, by their make are thus propense.

Since therefore they are the seminaries of Faction, we can expect no wholesome Fruit from such corrupt Seed; for all factions endeavour to suppress their Opposites, and those heats, underminings and jarrs, are not confined to their Senate-house, but are dispersed, according to the places of their Residence, Estates; Marriages or Alliances, through the whole Domi∣nions, every one strengthening his Interest what he can; and the nature of Mankind being to side with one or other, if the Parties be Proud, Ambitious, Covetous, or Imperious, they will be most absolute and arbitrary in such places where

they can prevail; and if Persons admitted to Copartnership of Rule, be not of their own Nature guilty of such Vices, the de∣sires of every one to be reputed the wisest, and to gain the leading of a Party, or obtain the supream Authority, are apt to taint such, who being exalted, not born to Greatness, would have all to judg that such Promotions are the pure-pute effects of their Merits, and whoever sets that high value upon himself, can∣not escape the danger of unsupportable Pride, as well as Vani∣ty, which will hurry them on to over-bear all Opposition.

I shall now proceed to some few Instances of the Ruins brought upon many by Faction.* 1.257 At Athens, after the death of Codrus, the race of their Hereditary Kings ceased, and there succeeded Kings for term of Life, like as the Elective Kings of Poland. After twelve such Kings ending in Alcmenon, they constituted Decennial Kings, or Archontes, whereof Erixias was the last; and then they passed to annual Magistrates, like Lord Mayors, or Burgo-Masters: and all these changes were by the prevalence of one Faction after another. Solon was one of these yearly Magistrates, and he compiled their Laws, such as the Romans in after-times sent to peruse, and reduced into twelve Tables. These were framed unto the Practice and main∣tenance of popular Government, which in Solon's own Life∣time were violated, and almost extinguished: for Pisistratus the Son of Hippocrates, finding the Citizens distracted betwixt two Factions, whereof Megacles and Lycurgus (two Citizens of noble Families) were become the heads, took occasion by their contention and Insolence, to raise a third Faction more power∣full, because more plausible; for that he seemed a Protector of the Citizens in general: and having once got love and credit, he wounded himself, and feigned that by Malice of his Enemies, he had like to have been slain for his love to the good Citizens, and so procured a Guard, and made himself Lord: but he was soon driven out by Megacles and Lycurgus, and then the Aemulation began afresh betwixt the former Factions; and Megacles finding himself too weak, called in Pisistratus, but he was once more expelled, and was restored a third time, and governed Athens seventeen Years, and his Son Hippias succeeded him, who was at last forced to fly to Darius.

I shall under this Head only touch upon one example more in Athens.* 1.258 After the Lacedaemonians had subverted the Walls of Athens, thirty Men were appointed by the People to compile a Body of their Laws, and these had supream Authority, and were made Judges; and in cases wherein the Laws were defe∣ctive, had power to give Sentence according to their own plea∣sures. At first they exercised their Authority upon lewd and wicked Persons, such as were odious to the People. But after∣wards all sorts of People (under the notion of Perturbers of the Peace) were Fined, Imprisoned, or put to Death, accor∣ding as they among themselves judged fit.

To strengthen their own Tyranny, they associated three Thousand Citizens to them, the rest they disarmed, exercising the greatest Tyranny imaginable upon them, and agreed a∣mongst themselves that every one should name one, whose Goods should be seized on, and the owner put to Death; upon which Theramenes, one of the Thirty discovering his detestati∣on at those proceedings (though there had been a Law that none of the three Thousand should suffer Death at the appoint∣ment of the Thirty, but have a legal Tryal) yet Critias, one of these thirty Tyrants, ordered Theramenes's name to be blotted out of the Number. Theramenes urged the ill consequence to the rest of the Thirty, if without any just reason the names of any might be expunged by the overruling of one or more of the number; but every one thought fit rather to pre∣serve his own Life by Silence, than presently to draw upon him∣self the danger which as yet he thought concerned him little, and perhaps would never come near him: so the Tyrants interpreting Silence, Consent; he was forthwith condemned, and compel∣led to drink Poyson.

These Proceedings caused many Citizens to fly, who under the conduct of Thrasybulus made head against them, and at last the Lacedemonians removed the thirty Tyrants to Sparta; and the Citizens rose against the Captains of the tyrannical Faction, and slew them as they were coming to a Parley, and so put an end to that worst of Miseries they had undergone, since those thirty were constituted. In which sad History we may ob∣serve, that these Tyrants were elected by the People, and at last after their outragious cruelties, were by the People destroyed: and no doubt they at first appeared such to the People as they might confide in for Administration of Impartial Justice; into which belief they had cunningly bewitched them; and they were by the same Hands that raised them, demolished. For as Sir(e) 1.259 W. Raleigh well observes in popular States, when any mischief happens, the People take revenge on the Commanders; and where any Judgment is left to them (as in popular States, they will be always pushing on for a Share) there will be very dismal and indirect Proceedings: and when their Judgment proves sound, it is by chance rather than otherwise.

In Carthage,* 1.260 Factious and disorderly popular Government was as fatal as in any other place. Hanno and Bomilcar were two famous Captains, but the heads of two several Factions, and such Enemies to one another, that when they were chosen Generals against Agathocles, Bomilcar suffered Hanno to be cut in pieces rather than he would assist him. So Hanno and Amil∣car being joined against the Mercenaries, Amilcar could per∣form nothing by reason of the envy of Hanno, till for the pub∣lick Service sake they were made Friends.

The Barchine Family (of which Hannibal was the third in Succession that was General of the Carthaginians) had the greatest Interest both in the Senate, and among the People for

some time; none being able either to tax his, or his Families Vertue, or to perform the like service for the Commonweal. Yet we find, that when Hannibal and his Brother Mago, had so far overrun Italy, that nothing but the supply of Men and Money, to compleat the Conquest, was wanting; yet the Fa∣ction of Hanno wrought upon the people (not by detracting from the Valour and Conduct of Hannibal and the Family, but by the general reprehension of the War) that when Mago was sent over for Recruits, he had wrought so on the covetous∣ness of those that were loth to lay out their Money before ex∣treme necessity required it, and had more feeling of their own present commodity, than sence of the publick need; that he got little encouragement: and when the matter being propo∣sed to the People, they yielded to a supply, yet Hanno and his Party gave so many impediments to the Execution, sugge∣sting the danger, that if Hannibal and his Brother conquered, he would make himself King, that by that means, he cunning∣ly undermined that brave man, and brought at last ruin upon the whole Commonwealth. When Scipio (without the com∣pliance of the Senate, but with the concurrence of the Peo∣ple) translated the War to Africk, so that the Carthaginians were forced to recal Hannibal, who not able to master Scipio, the whole Commonwealth was subjected to the Romans, of whose Factions and civil Discords, I shall now give a short ac∣count.

When the Truce betwixt the Romans and Veientes was con∣cluded for Forty years, there arose a Sedition about the Lex(f) 1.261 Agraria, which was appeased by the raising a War against the Sabines, Aequi and Volsci: Such new Wars being the on∣ly extinguishers of the Domestick Fires, which constantly, in peaceable times, were kindled betwixt the Optimacy, or the Patricii and the Plebs.

At the instigation of some desperate Bankrupts (who thought themselves wrongfully oppressed by the Senate and Consuls) the People made a dangerous uproar in the Holy Mount, 'till Menenius Agrippa, by the discreet allusion of the inconveni∣ence of the discord betwixt the Head and the Belly, brought them to some reconciliation, on condition they might have some new Magistrates erected, to whom they might appeal in matters of variance betwixt them and the Consuls; which were therefore called the Tribunes of the People.

After this the ten(g) 1.262 Men, called the Decemvirate, with Ap∣pius Claudius, ruled all, and wrested the power from the Se∣nate and Consuls; but he and they were forced to resign to the Senate again, after some few years Tyranny.

Before the Siege of the Veii, they changed the Government of Consuls to Military Tribunes, who usurped the power for al∣most Seventy years; so as by civil(h) 1.263 differences there was great interruption, that one while Consuls ruled, another while there was an Anarchy, then the Tribunes were restored,

and after many years the consular Authority was established, but so as one of the Consuls should be a Plebeian.

Concerning the Seditions by Tiberius Gracchus and Caius his Brother, and Apuleius Saturninus suppressed by Marius, of Li∣vius Drusus by Philippus, and that betwixt Marius and Cinna against Sylla, and the(i) 1.264 calamities the People underwent in those Tragical Factions, betwixt Pompey and Caesar, I must re∣fer the curious Reader to Florus and the Roman Historians. Therefore(k) 1.265 Tacitus makes a most true remark, That since in the command of many, it is unavoidable, but that all things will be disturbed by Factions; therefore for peace sake, it is behoveful that the Power be devolved on one: as like∣wise in(l) 1.266 another place, That there is no other remedy, where disagreements are in ones Country, but that one should govern.

Therefore before the Government was changed at Rome un∣to that of Emperors, They had no other remedy in great Exi∣gents,* 1.267 than to chuse a Dictator, whether it were in imminent danger from Enemies abroad, or Factions at home. So Appius Claudius at a pinch cries, Agedum, Dictatorem, a quo nulla pro∣vocatio, creemus, Let us choose a Dictator from whom is no Ap∣peal. For his power was such, as(m) 1.268 Livy tells us, That he had the Power of Death, and against whose Authority, nei∣ther the Tribunes of the People, nor the People themselves durst lift up their eyes or gape to oppose. By the chusing of this Officer, with such absolute Power, we may infer how ne∣cessary it was in a Commonwealth (to avoid the diversity of opinions, the factions of Parties, and the evil consequences that would result from them) to fix the Power in one, who might be a temporary Monarch: by which it is sufficiently evi∣dent what deference is to be paid to Monarchy; it being no small addition to the power of Julius Caesar, that he was in vested in the perpetual Dictatorship, That being an authori∣ty known, and as far as I can judge, gave him a fuller and va∣ster extent of Power, than the Title of Imperator, which im∣plied no more than General of an Army.

That all Republics are subject to Factions, appears farther in the Philosopher in several particulars, as in the use though not the name of Demagogues, as well in them,(n) 1.269 who were the Peoples Flatterers, as in Democracy, and that their Magistrates were chosen by tumultuous Elections, as he particularly instan∣ceth at Elis, where the Senatorship being for life, by reason of the longer duration of the Honor and Profit, the contests were so much the more violent.

But above all the inconveniences of these Commonwealths (which was bottomed upon the securing of one Faction against another) he(o) 1.270 reckons the keeping up of a standing Army in War and Peace, which, he saith, was by reason of the distrust among themselves, whereby they were obliged to com∣mit themselves to the custody of Soldiers, and the Comman∣der

being by that means impowered to be a Judge or Arbiter betwixt them, made himself Lord of both, as he instanceth in the time of the Government of the Family of the Alvidi at Larissa, and at Samos and Abydus, and in Timophanes at Corinth. For this reason, the Romans fearing Camillus, banished him: So Julius Caesar, for ten years, having the command in Gaul, was able to master the Senate with more ease.

If we had never heard of any such thing in the World be∣fore, yet we had the too late calamitous experience of it, in our late Republican Government; which was no longer able to subsist, but while it had an Army (maintained at the charge of the enslaved People) to secure them: yet they falling into Factions themselves, their Army did so likewise, and the Houses and Army at last came to have several Interests, and to have competi∣tions for Sovereignty (which any wise man might have fore∣seen) and at last, the Army being divided, the happy Restau∣ration of the King was thereby much facilitated.

Having thus cleared,* 1.271 I hope, the point, That a Commonwealth Government is less conducible than Monarchy, to prevent inte∣stine Discords; I shall now proceed to discourse how difficult it is in this Form also, to defend their Subjects from Foreign Invasions, especially without the constituting of Dictators or Generals, with unsociable Power, which is in effect, a temporary Monarchy.

In all Wars nothing is more requisite than Unity of Coun∣cils, and Secrecy in the conduct of Affairs, which is most diffi∣cult to be obtained, where many are at the Helm. Besides, among so many different judgments (as there must be in such a Body, before they can arrive at a Resolution) favourable opportunities for Action, are by protractions irrecoverably lost; and the fear they have of impowering their General too much (lest he should establish himself in the Sovereignty) makes them limit and restrain him, so as he cannot take advantages, when offered: and thereby Commanders are cautelous and wary not to offend so many Masters; whereby time is lost in procuring new Instructions, and sometimes for the reasons a∣foresaid more Generals than one are appointed, that one may be a check to the other: So(p) 1.272 Herodotus observes, That the dif∣ference of Generals, when in equal command, hath lost victo∣ries, as at Isthmus, by the dissention betwixt Themistocles and Euribias the Persians had almost mastered all: So Thucydides notes, that so long as Pericles, by his own judgment and will, governed the Affairs of Athens, so long all things were pros∣perous; but after by the Factions of evil-disposed persons, he was opposed, he sped as ill.

Besides, in the numerous Masters in a Commonwealth, the saving of every ones own Stake, will be the principle of their(q) 1.273 care and sedulity; So that if a Foreign Power give them a defeat, they will be easily induced to follow (as they of late used to call it) Providence in all Revolutions; and if they can obtain any assurance of enjoying their private Laws,

or obtaining an higher pitch of greatness, under another power, they will not easily resist the temptation of betraying the Li∣berty of their Country; and so quitting the leaking Vessel of the Commonwealth, will either fairly tack about in their pri∣vate Shalop, and stand in with the next Shore of safety, or by striking Sail, come under the Lee of the Conqueror, or strike into the assistance of him, in hope to have a share of the Plunder.

Besides, in the Multitude of Councellors (if there happen any notable miscarriages of State) there is safety to them∣selves.* 1.274 It being difficult to fix it upon any one single person, every one shrowding himself in the complex Act of the whole: So that though they singly put in for the glory of prosperous Atchievements; yet in unfortunate or unlucky Councils and Actions, they skreen themselves under the majority of Votes; which because they always may do, it must necessarily make some more Supine, and less Vigilant over the Publick. It is in these muddy Pools of Commonwealths, the devouring Ot∣ters may safelier lodg; here the gliding slippery Eel finds Co∣vert, the Horseleeches abound, the Water-rats lodg in their Banks, and the Uliginous parts swarm with Frogs and Toads, every one preying upon other. Here the Cockatrice breeds, and the fiery Basilisks, as well as Lizards and Newts. Africk is not more fruitful of Monsters than they of Harpyes. This is the common Sewer that receives all the sludg and filth of Peo∣ple; the hopes and expectation of Liberty alluring all.

As to the Peoples living freer from oppression in a Republic,* 1.275 than under Monarchy, it is evidently found the contrary; as I shall make it appear in the Chapter of Monarchy: And there is strong reason for it, since in this form, these Lords the States, will be continually striving to enlarge, not only their Power but their Riches; and the more they increase in either, the more must the common and middle ranked Men be oppres∣sed and exhausted.

It hath been from the insolence, oppressing and engrossing of Estates by the Governing Party, that the Th••rians changed their(p) 1.276 Aristocracy to Democracy, that the Messeniac War was occasioned, that the Revolutions were at Lygdamus in the Isle of Nexos, Maffilia, Istria, Heraclea and Enidus. So the Philosopher says, That the unjust Judgments, or unusual Seve∣rities, exercised by the revengeful temper of the Factions, caused great Convulsions in the State, as he particularly instan∣ceth in Eurition at Heraclea, and Archias at Thebes; who both being justly condemned for Adultery, yet, because in an un∣usual way of Contumely, they were tyed to Stakes in the Mar∣ket place, they out of revenge, excited their Friends to assist them, and overthrew the Oligarchy.

Besides, when Men are thus established in Power, few can have Redress for their private injuries and wrongs, being that every complaint would but look like contempt of Authority; because the Party oppressing, being one of the Associates in

Power,* 1.277 and joynt Rulers, he would influence the residue to vindicate him. Hence we saw in the late long Parliaments Members (yea their Officers and common Soldiers) that they were such Tyrants in their Residence and Quarters, that none durst question their outrages, lest they should be brought be∣fore Committees, for Malignancy or Delinquency. It being a characteristic note of a disaffected Person, not to resign up ones self to an absolute slavery to their imperious Commands.

The World never knew greater oppression, than those that stiled themselves Keepers (indeed Jaylors) of the Liberties of England, were guilty of. It would trouble (saith a judicious(s) 1.278 Author) a publick Accountant to cast up those vast Summs, and incredible Treasures, which in less than twice seven years they raised, and spent, to support the worst of all luxurious Rebellion, and to act upon the publick charge and Theater of the Nation (not Masques and Plays, as they had charged one great part of the Expences of the Court on) but the most real and inhumane Tragedies, and those infinite in number, one of which was such as the Sun never saw, or any History could parallel.

It would be endless to recount the Annual Revenue of the Crown, Bishops, Chapter and Cathedral Lands, besides the Money they received for the purchace of them; the constant, heavy and unheard of Assesments, free Quarter, Plunder, Se∣questration, Compositions, Decimations, Excise and Customs, voluntary Contributions of Plate, Jewels, &c. Summs borrow∣ed on the Publick Faith (which some found to their cost, was but fides Punica) and almost innumerable ways and arts they had to squeeze and drain the Treasure of the Nation in∣to their bottomless Gulph: so that the same Writer is confi∣dent, That not any three Kings of England, since William the Conqueror, to this present, were so expensive to England, as that one Tyrannical and Prodigal Parliament.

The Nation was then, and ever will be: under any Usurp∣ing Republic, in worse than Egyptian Bondage. In every County a Committee was placed to seize the Estates and Rents of all the Loyal Subjects, with such a Tyrannical Ar∣bitrariness, as never was known under any Kings Reign; and as if that were not enough, there were added to them Basha Major Generals, and the sucking Vermine in every Town and Hamlet, were either fire-side Troopers, or some well affected Person whose Information would be believed before the best in the Parish. Every one that would not worship those Pagods, were proceeded against by some of those, or their Arbitrary High Courts of Justice, or were convened before the House of Commons, where every one of those Parliament Demarchs were as absolute as the Laws of their own will could make them.

No Person could either question their Actions or Authority, but he paid his Life or Fortune, or one of them, for his pre∣sumption: so that we saw the whole Kingdom brought into a

slavery, far greater than theirs that wear Canvase Cloth and Wooden Shooes, and not only look like Ghosts, but really are so, as they made all which they either suspected, feared, or hated: All which was never to have been altered (as long as their standing Force should be true to them) to the incredi∣ble charge, oppression and impoverishment of the Subjects, Friend and Foe; though they had the Policy to lay the hea∣viest Burthen and Load upon the Backs of their Enemies, if possible to break them; keeping the Loyal Nobility and Gen∣try so poor, that many of them have not been able, or ever will be, to forget the kindness of that Government, which was the ruin of them and their Families.

I shall now pass to the last head of Rewards and Punishments,* 1.279 and executing of Justice; none of which can be according to merit, where prevalent Faction shall sway the Balance, and open and shut the Eyes of Justice by the cunning Instruments of Partiality. It being impossible to separate Faction and In∣terest from this kind of Authority, so that none shall obtain a∣ny thing, but according as they shall be judged favourable or ad∣vantageous to the Interest of the ruling Faction. So that the Vertuous shall have the least share; since Vertue is not over na∣tural to Mankind, it is like to thrive but poorly in a soil where it is not tenderly cherished, and frequently refreshed with the encouraging Dews of Reward and Benefit. But those shall have the greatest share that can best wheedle, or seem by a well∣managed Flattery, to join with the topmost governing Party.

I shall therefore give some examples of the Ingratitude of Commonwealths to the well-deserving great and brave Men,* 1.280 who have served their Country, and been ill rewarded by the governing Part, or been exposed to be baited or worried by the People, instigated by Factions; or suffered base Ignominy, Banishment, or Death.

I shall begin with Athens, the eye of Greece, and the Seat of the Muses.

When Xerxes invaded Greece,* 1.281 the Athenians and Peloponnesi∣ans were the most considerable States; yet the Athenians were forced to leave their City and get into their Navy, which might carry the whole People and their Power to some remote Coun∣try, where they might enjoy more secure Habitations.

The Spartans were unwilling to hazzard a Sea-Battle near Salamis, but would have weighed Anchor, and gone to Isthmus. Themistocles did all he could to perswade the staying and join∣ing of the Fleets there, to wait the Enemy, who would have less Sea room; whereas if they fought elsewhere, by his num∣bers, he would have overborn the Confederates: and when he could not prevail, but that they would weigh Anchor the next day, he sent a private message to the Persian Captains, that the Grecian Fleet intended to fly, and in the interim advised the Grecian Fleet to be in a readiness against all Events: By which Stratagem he toiled the Persian Fleet to make the Attacque with

that disadvantage he desired; and the Grecians obtain'd a most memorable Victory. Several other great Services he did, not only in saving of Athens, but the rest of Greece from Xerxes. But when the Athenians were returned to their City, and re∣built it after the Battle of Mycale, the People were so proud of their Exploits, that they not only endeavoured to get the Command of many Towns and Islands of the Greeks, but within their own Walls would admit no Government but meerly Democratical; which being argued against by Themistocles, they laid upon him the Punishment of the Ostracism, banishing him for ten Years; before which time was expired, a new accusation was framed against him by the Lacedemonians, that he intended to betray(t) 1.282 Greece to Xerxes.

So that he was forced to fly to Artaxerxes, who afterwards would have imployed him against Greece; but he decided the great Conflict betwixt thankfulness to his well-deserving Pa∣tron, and natural Affection to his own ill-deserving People, by finishing his Life with a draught of Poyson.

This Ostracism was a Sentence of Banishment writ upon an Oyster-shell; and the like in Sicily, writ on a Leaf, was called Petalismus. This was so often abused by exterminating Per∣sons, not so much for Crimes, as by factious Envy made use of to remove out of the way Persons that were like to oppose the prevailing Factions, that the(u) 1.283 Philosopher confesseth it had been better for the Law-givers at the first so to have attempered the Commonwealth, that they might have had no need of such a Medicine.

Miltiades had done the Athenians great Service at the Battle of Marathon against Darius,* 1.284 yet after by this ingrateful People, he was cast into Prison, and fined fifty Talents. Where his weak and wounded Body (having broken his Thigh at the assault a∣gainst Paros) being not able to endure the one, nor his Estate the other, after a few days he ended his Life; and this was oc∣casioned by the Envy of Xantippus, Father of Pericles. This Envy of the better sort against each other by their private Fa∣ctions assisted by unthankful and witless People, brought the A∣thenians not many years after from a victorious and famous Commonweal, to a base Subjection and Slavery.

I might instance in Aristides, Cimon, and many others; but shall pass to Phocyon,* 1.285 who had been Forty five times (without ever suing for the place) chosen Governour of Athens. He had been in good esteem with King Philip, and by King Alex∣ander was presented with two Hundred Talents in Silver, and the choice of one of four Cities of Asia; but refused those and other Gifts, howsoever importunately thrust upon him, resting well contented with his honest Poverty. During his Govern∣ment, having given his Promise for Nicanors's safe coming to the Piraeus, to treat with the Athenians, and his safe return, about their joining with Cassander or Polypserchon, and finding that the Athenians practised with Dercillus to take Nicanor Prisoner, he

was nothing pleased with such a trick of politick Dishonesty, and so did quietly permit him to depart: at which the Athenians were so incensed, that he was forced to save himself by Flight with some others, whom Polypserchon sent to Athens, where neither he nor the rest were suffered to speak for themselves, but were condemned to dye by the unjust Judgment of wicked Men, by drinking Poyson: which, saith Sir Walter Raleigh,* 1.286 by the just Judgment of God, so infected the City of Athens, as from that day forward, it never brought forth any worthy Man re∣sembling the Vertue of their Ancestors.

It is not to be expressed what Honours the Athenians gave to Antigonus and Demetrius his Son,* 1.287 when they assisted them in their necessities, and declining Fortune; but when after his Fathers defeat, and death at the Battle of Ipsus, Demetrius fled to Athens for succour, they sent their Embassadors to meet him, with a Decree of the People, that no King should be admitted into their City, Which example I the rather mention, that the difference may be observ'd betwixt the generousness of Princes, and such Commonweals: for when soon after Deme∣trius reduced Athens to his Obedience, they being almost Fa∣mished and yielding to his Mercy, he did not take away the Lives of these unthankful Men, but gave them Food, and placed such for Magistrates as were acceptable to the People; yet a second time when Demetrius was overcome by Pyrrhus, and Lysimachus, the Athenians were as ungrateful as ever.* 1.288

Sophocles and Phthiodorus the Athenian Generals were con∣demned to Exile by the People, pretending they had taken Mo∣ney for making Peace in Sicily; whereas indeed there was not a∣ny means of making War. And Alcibiades with Nicias chuse ra∣ther to banish themselves, than undergo the Judgment of the incensed multitude, and adventure their Estates, Honours and Lives upon the Tongues of shameful Accusers. And though (saith the same excellent(w) 1.289 Historian) it is the part of an Ho∣nest and Valiant Man, to do what reason willeth, and not what Opinion expecteth, and to measure Honour and Dishonour by the assurance of his Conscience, rather than by the malicious Report and Censure of such; yet they are to be excused, as having before their Eyes the Injustice of the People, knowing that a wicked Sentence is infinitely worse than a wicked Fact, as being held a Precedent and Pattern, whereby Oppression be∣ginning upon one, is extended as warrantable upon all.

The Insolence of the Athenians having after this expedition wearied some of the principal Men of Athens;* 1.290 four Hundred of them got so far the Power into their Hands, that what they had agreed upon in private, was only propounded to the Peo∣ple for their consent: but this lasted not long. For their Fleet and Army (which was then at Samos) revoked Alcibiades from Banishment, who had lived in Sparta (the other famous Com∣monweal) where in Council and good Performances, he so far excelled all the Lacedaemonians, that all their good success was a∣scrib'd

to his Wit and Valour: yet there he began to be envi∣ed, and so withdrew to Persia. Being now called home, some of those four Hundred would have resign'd their Government, yet the most of the Faction laboured to obtain Peace of the La∣cedaemonians, desiring chiefly to maintain their own Autho∣rity.

This Alcibiades won many Victories for the Athenians, and was made high Admiral; yet he was forced afterwards to banish himself, only because his Lieutenant, contrary to the express Command of Alcibiades, fighting with the Enemies in his ab∣sence, had lost a great part of the Fleet.

I shall add one Story more, and so pass to the Romans.

The Athenians having appointed ten Captains over their Fleet,* 1.291 wherewith they beat Callicratidas the Lacedaemonian Ad∣miral; yet six of these Captains were put to Death upon in formation that they had not rescued some Citizens, who were lost by the breaking of their Vessels by a Storm, which hap∣pened when those Captains were obliged to follow the Enemy, and two of them had like to have been shipwracked themselves: and besides, they offered in their own defence, that they left a sufficient number of Ships to have succoured those that were wracked. But one that escaped in a Meal-tub, having told the People, that those that were drowned, had charged him to desire the People to revenge their Deaths upon the Captains; this was a sufficient incentive to the People, precipitately to put them them to death. The absent Captains escaped, and when the Fury of the People was over, the Sentence against the rest was revoked too late.

All these ingrateful usages of such great Commanders is ascribed to the violence of the People. But we may suppose, if it had not been for the Arts of such Magistrates as were Enemies to those Worthies, and envied them the Glory of their great Atchievements, the People had been better Instructed. How∣er it shews the tendency of such a complex Body of Magistrates and People: and though Athens had as much of the Popular Government called Democratical, as any else in Greece; yet the source of all was from the Texture of the Republic Go∣vernment in general.

I shall now pass to the Romans,* 1.292 and onely single two or three of the many Examples of their Ingratitude to their deserving Chiestains, to illustrate, That Rewards were not bestowed as they ought to have been, even to such as were the greatest Preservers of their Country, and such as raised the Glory of the Roman Name to the highest pitch of Glory.

T. Martius,* 1.293 called Coriolanus, had conquered the Volsci and Aequi; yet, under pretext that he had advised to sell Corn in time of Dearth at an higher Rate than was convenient, he was banished: Yet he took not that Revenge he might have done, in joyning with the Volsci.

Furius Camillus subdued the Falisci,* 1.294 but was banished the City, upon a Suggestion of some Inequality of dividing the Spoil, and retired to ARdaea; from whence (when the Gauls under Brennus had got all Rome but the Capitol) he, forgetting the Ingratitude of his Country, drew an Army together, with which he fell upon the dispersed Gauls, and so saved his Country.

The two Scipio's strangely enlarged the Roman Empire,* 1.295 by conquering every place where they were employed. Publius Sci∣pio, the elder Brother, overthrew Hannibal, and subjected the whole State of Carthage; by which he deservedly had the Style of Africanus, as his Brother had that of Asiaticus, by conquer∣ing the Kingdom of Macedon, and giving Laws to all Greece, and other Territories in Asia.

Concerning the elder, the Senate was unwilling he should carry the War into Africk: But the People were earnest for it.* 1.296 Upon which the Learned(x) 1.297 Historian and Statesman observes, That it is often found in Councils of State, that the busie and obstinate Heads of a few do carry all the rest, and many times Men make a surrender of their own Judgments to the Wisdom that hath gotten it self a Name, by giving happy Directions in Troubles by-past; therefore he that reposeth himself upon the Advice of many, shall often find himself deceived: The Coun∣sel of the Many being wholly directed by the Empire of a Few, that oversway the rest. For here Q. Fabius was accounted the Oracle of his time; for his wary Nature suited well with the Business that fell out in the chief of his Imployment; therefore others adhered to him, that was grown old in following one Course, from which they would not shift as the change of Times required. But the People (who though they could not well advise and deliberate, yet could well apprehend) embraced the needful Motion of Scipio, and furnished him with all Supplies and Furtherance they could.

From hence I may note the Inconvenience of this Govern∣ment, wherein sometimes the Senators shall be led by one, or some few, one way, and then by others, and sometimes the People shall over-rule the Votes of the Senate: For though this may be fortunate at some times, yet at others it may be as fatal.

The great Success of Scipio was celebrated with that excess of Joy, and deservedly, as Rome perhaps never shew'd the like; and his Brother L. Scipio's Triumph was not much less than it. Yet these two so famous Brothers afterwards were called, one after another, by two Tribunes of the People, to Judgment, in probability by the instigation of some of the Faction of the Senate against them.

The African could not endure that such unworthy Men should question him of purloining from the common Treasure, or of being hired by Antiochus to make an ill Bargain for his Country: When therefore the Day of Answer came, he ap∣peared

before the Tribunes, not humbled as one accused, but followed by a great Train of his Friends and Clients, with which he passed through the midst of the Assembly; and ha∣ving Audience, told the People, That upon the same day of the Year he fought a great Battel against Hannibal, and finished the Punic War by a signal Victory: In memory of which, he thought it no fit Season to brabble at the Law, but intended to visit the Capitol, and there give Thanks to Jupiter, and the rest of the Gods, by whose Grace, both on that day, and at other times, he had well and happily discharged the most weighty Business of the Commonweal; and that if from the seventeenth Year of his Life, until he now grew old, the Honourable Pla∣ces by them conferred on him, had prevented the Capacity of his Age, and yet his Deserts had exceeded the Greatness of those Honourable Places, that then they would pray, That the Princes and Great ones of the City might still be like to him. So all followed him, except the Tribunes, and their Slaves, and one of the Cryers, by whom ridiculously they cited him to Judgment, until for very shame (as not knowing what else to do) they granted him, unrequested, a longer Day.

But after, when he perceived that the Tribunes would not let fall the Suit, he willingly withdrew from that unthankful Rome, that could suffer him to undergo such Indignities, and so spent the rest of his time at Linternum.* 1.298

The same Tribunes proceeded more sharply with his Brother Lucius Scipio the Asiatick (whose wise Conduct and Valour had subjected Greece and Macedonia to the Roman Yoke, and extend∣ed their Empire over those rich Countries). They propounded a Decree unto the People touching Money received of Antiochus, not brought into the Common Treasury; that the Senate should give Charge unto one of the Praetors to inquire and Ju∣dicially determine thereof: And Matters were so carried against him, that he was condemned in a Sum of Money far greater than his Ability; and for non-payment, his Body should have been laid up in Prison; but he was freed from the Rigour of this by Gracchus the Tribune: and his Estate being confiscated, when there neither appeared any Sign of his being beholden to Antiochus, nor there was found so much as he was condemned to pay; then fell his Accusers, and all whose Hands had been against him, into the Indignation of the People.

It is observed, That Cato the elder (who had been his Trea∣surer) was a Promoter of this. A Man, saith Sir Walter Raleigh, of great, but not perfect Vertue; Temperate, Valiant, and of singular Industry; Frugal of the Publick, and of his own; who though not to be corrupted with Bribes, yet was unmerciful and unconscionable in increasing his own Wealth, by such means as the Laws did permit. Ambition was his Vice, which being joyned with Envy, troubled both himself, and the whole City: And some write, That Fabius Maximus, out of some private displeasure, countenanced these Proceedings.

From these and other Examples it may well be noted,* 1.299 how this famous Commonweal was pestered with Faction; the want of sufficient Imployment were Sparks that help'd the kindling of the Fire of them, which now began to appear, and first caught hold of those great Worthies, to whose Valour and Conduct Rome was so indebted. But these factious Contenti∣ons did not long while contain themselves within heat of Words and cunning Practice: for when the Art of Leading the Multitude into such quarrelsom Business, grew to perfection, they that found themselves overmatched by their Adversaries, at this kind of Weapon, began to make opposition, first with Clubs and Stones, afterward with Swords, and, finally, proceeded from Frays and Murthers in the Streets, to Battels in the Fields.

During the whole time of their Commonwealth, there were Heart-burnings betwixt the Plebs, or ordinary Rank of Peo∣ple, and the Patres Conscripti Patricii, or Senatorian Order: Those never owning themselves to be the Delegates of the Peo∣ple, but an Order of themselves, that endeavoured to keep the Government in themselves, taking State and Authority upon them, using a sort of Arbitrary Government, endeavouring to win a great Power over the People, decreeing, That the Con∣suls provide that the Commonweal receive no detriment. On the other hand, the People were restless, by Representatives to get a share in the Government, and the Senate as stoutly oppo∣sed such Encroachments and Innovations, (these kind of Emu∣lations being the inseparable Diseases of all Commonwealths;) so that in one of the Mutinies the whole Commonalty forsook the City, and(y) 1.300 embodied upon Mount Aventine, till they were gratified, as I have before hinted, in the Tribuni Plebis, who were chosen by them to look after their Concerns in all Debates, and who exercised a very imperious Power sometimes. Yet this did not suffice; but afterwards they more violently contended to have the Choice of one of the Consuls: and the Fury of the People was so great, that the Senators durst not come to the House; and this Feud was so durable, that it cau∣sed a five-years Anarchy, and at last the Senate was forced to yield to the Peoples Importunities.

After the death of C. Gracchus, and Saturnius, a Popular Man, who by the Senate was put out of the way; it was not long e're Marius, a famous Captain of theirs, was so condem∣ned, who, by force of Arms, returned to the City, and mur∣thered all the principal Senators; which giving unto Sylla (who prospered therein) opportunity to make himself abso∣lute Lord of Rome, taught Caesar (a Man of higher Spirit) to affect and obtain the like Sovereign Power, who by the like decree of the Senate, was provoked.

If all that I have hitherto mentioned, be not sufficient to put a People out of love with this way of Government, they may hug their Chains and Fetters as long as they please, for me.

I know these People magnifie the wise contrivances of the State of Venice,* 1.301 the United Provinces, and Switzerland. But they may consider, That the first is an Optimacy mixed with a restrained and elective Monarchy; and they all are more be∣holden to the Situation of their Countries, and the interest their Neighbours have (lest they should fall into the hands of others) than for any excellency of their Constitution, why they should have any likelyhood of duration.

The Prince of Orange's Stat-holder-ship, being Hereditary in the Family, contributes something to the suppressing of any potent Faction; yet none knows, but in process of time, Facti∣ons may arise amongst them, and then the World will see them molder, as other such Commonwealths (sometimes as flourish∣ing as they;) and then they will either be made a prey to their Neighbours, or submit to a Monarch of their own. However it is experimentally known, That in no other State, the Subjects pay so much for their protection; and that from their first Re∣volt, they have been very few years without being engaged in chargeable Wars.

CHAP. IX. Of Monarchical Government, and the Preference of it before other Forms.

IN the commendation of Monarchy, all Authors are so copious, that it is more difficult to order and compose with Beauty, the Jewels of the Crown, than to amass and heap them. That it hath been the most Antient and Primi∣tive Government of the World, we have the Universal suf∣frage and Testimony of all the preserved Records of remotest Ages; Royal Authority and Kings being coaeval with what ever Monuments we find of the Origin of Nations.

The Writings of Moses (much ancienter than any other Historian,* 1.302 and of more Authority) evidently prove the So∣vereignty of Adam and Noah: Whence St. Chrysostom well ob∣serves, That at the Creation, God made one Man, not many; to intimate to us, That he did design Monarchy, not Aristo∣cracy or Democracy. For it cannot be doubted, but that the Posterity of Adam, during his life, were his Subjects, both by the Law of God and Nature: The Charter of God Almighty giving to Adam, Dominion over all the inferior Creation; and to Noah, over every living Creature. Hence the(a) 1.303 Poet speaking of the Origin of things, owns his Dominion over the Creatures.

Sanctius his Animal, mentisque capacius altae, Deerat adhuc, & quod dominari in caetera posset. Natus homo est—

Indeed it were absurd and irrational to believe, that God who had made the Lion King of the four footed Beasts, the Ea∣gle Sovereign of the feathered Fowl, and the Whale over the Fishes; should leave the most glorious part of the Creation, un∣der the confusion of Anarchy or Parity.

Therefore(b) 1.304 Seneca elegantly,* 1.305 and according to his man∣ner, rightly observes, that Nature it self points out Kings, as we may know in several living Creatures, especially in Bees: and(c) 1.306 Virgil, before him, hath given us a curious descri∣ption of the Obedience Bees pay to their King:

Praeterea Regem non sic Aegyptus, & ingens Lydia, nec Populi Parthorum, aut Medus Hydaspes, Observant, Rege incolumi, mens omnibus una est; Amisso, rupere fidem — Illum admirantur, & omnes Circumstant fremitu denso, stipantque frequentes; Et saepe attollunt humeris, & corpora bello Objectant—

So there may be observed a Dux ipse Gregis, amongst all brute Creatures.

It is from Paternal Power, That many Authors deduce the naturalness of Monarchy, which was first exercised in Families, Hords and Septs, as I have(d) 1.307 elsewhere cleared: therefore the Philosopher(e) 1.308 sets it down as a Fundamental Truth, That that which begets commands, by reason of his tender Love and older Age, which is a kind of Kingly Go∣vernment. The sence of which is, That the Paternal Govern∣ment hath a resemblance to Monarchical Rule; and that it was according to the order of Nature, that the Elder should Rule, as he confirms by the Oracle and Authority of(f) 1.309 Ho∣mer, who making Jupiter Sovereign, calls him Father of Men and Gods; and the great Badge of Sovereignty, to have Pow∣er of Life and Death, is owned by the(g) 1.310 Orator, in his time, to remain, when he saith, The Father had the Power of Life and Death over his Children. So that what Brutus, the first Consul, did in beheading his two Sons, in not taken by most to be done qua Consul, but as Parent; for that the Con∣suls never had any Regal Power without leave of the Peo∣ple.

If we consider the Scope of(h) 1.311 Moses's Expostulation with God Almighty; Why layest thou the burthen of all this People upon me? Have I conceived all this People? Have I begotten them?] must from hence infer, That if He had been their com∣mon Parent, he ought to have had the Charge and Govern∣ment

of them; so natural seems the Connection betwixt Fa∣therly Authority and Filial Obedience: and that this was an Original Truth, the Philosopher cites(i) 1.312 Homer, who saith, That every Father, to his Children and his Wives, gives Laws.

This kind of Power seems to be confirmed in Scripture, con∣cerning Cain, Abraham sacrificing Isaac, Thamar and Jephtha. But in after times, when Fathers abused that Authority, it was judged expedient to deprive them of it, and place it in the hands of the more publick Father, the King.

Having thus cleared the point,* 1.313 That Monarchy is according to the Institution of Nature. I come now to speak of the An∣tiquity of it.(k) 1.314 Sanconiathan, of greater Antiquity than any Greek Historian, gives a large account of the Phoenician Monarchy; the like Manetho gives of the Aegyptian, and the true Berosus of the Babylonian. So* 1.315 Aristotle speaks of the long Duration of the Molossiac Kingdom, which began in Pyrrhus Son of Achilles, and, according to(l) 1.316 Reinerus, lasted nine Hundred and Fifty years; and the Lacedaemonian, according to Plutarch, Eusebius and others, continued near upon as long.

The Philosopher(m) 1.317 advanceth the Origin of Kingly Go∣vernment, as high as the Heathen Religion or Philosophy could carry him, when he saith, That the very Heathen Dei∣ties were under this Form and Regimen: So what Herodotus saith of the Egyptians, may as truly be said of all other Nati∣ons, That they could not live without Kings. So Isocrates saith, Before Democracy and Oligarchy, the barbarous Na∣tions and Cities of Greece obeyed Kings. Therefore the Phi∣losopher(n) 1.318 saith, At first Kings governed Cities, and now Nations. So Salust(o) 1.319 saith, The name of Empire was first known in the World; and Justin(p) 1.320 most expresly, In the be∣ginning of all things and Nations, the Power and Government was solely and absolutely in Kings. So(q) 1.321 Cicero saith, That it is certain that all Ancient Nations did obey Kings. If we consult Homer, Plato, Lucretius, Diodorus Siculus, lib. 2. Jo∣sephus lib. 4. c. 1. or any Historian, Greek or Latin, we shall find no Tract of Time, nor Society of Men, without Kingly Government.

The first Popular State we read of,* 1.322 is that of Athens, after the Reign of Erixias Anno Mundi 3275. and after that several other Cities of Greece, as Sparta, Corinth, &c. followed their examples, expelling their Kings, and in their Rooms erected little Commonwealths, but great Tyrannies, being in a conti∣nual broil, either among themselves, about their Magistrates, or with their Neighbours for Preheminence, till the time of Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Monarchy, when the Country returned to their pristin Government, and might so have continued, if the Roman Arms and Ambition had not overthrown it.

As to Rome it self, it was two Hundred and Fifty Years un∣der Kings; and Kingly Government was found under Lavinius,

when the Trojans came from that little Kingdom of Pergamus. Therefore(r) 1.323 Tacitus tells us, That the City of Rome, from the beginning, had Kings to govern it. Their Commonwealth began upon the Regifugium: So that (saith a Judicious(s) 1.324 Au∣thor) for three Thousand Years Monarchy possessed an Uni∣versal and Uninterrupted Empire over all the Affairs of the Universe; so that the Sun, the glorious Monarch of the day, does not, in all his Travels round the earthly Globe, behold any spot of Ground inhabited by any thing but Brutes, where Monarchy, either is not at present, or hath not been the An∣tient Original and fundamental way of Government.

From the consideration of this Naturalness of Monarchy,* 1.325 and the Venerable Antiquity of it, we may conclude the reason why the best and Ancientest Writers have adorned it with such Eulogiums, deducing its Original from the Divine Being. So Hesiod(t) 1.326 saith, Kings are from Jove; and(v) 1.327 Callimachus adds, that none are so Divine as they: So in Homer(w) 1.328 as well as in Hesiod, they are stiled, nourished of God, and born of God; not as deriving their Pedigrees, but Kingly Honours from Jove, as Eustachius notes; and from Homer's making the Scepter of Agamemnon to be the Gift of Jove (though a late(x) 1.329 Author contemptuously compares it to a Constables Staff) He(y) 1.330 saith, The King hath both his Scepter and Jurisdicti∣on from God: Of which the curious Reader may see more Authorities in the learned Tract of Archbishop Ʋsher's Power of Princes.

(z) 1.331Plato, according to Synesius de Regno, makes the Regal Office to be a Divine Good among Men; and a King to be as it were, a God among Men: And(a) 1.332 Diotogenes the Pytha∣gorean saith, that God hath given him Dominion.

Others have stiled them Gods, which a late(b) 1.333 Author saith, may be allowed for want of a better in Hobs's State of Ignorance and Atheism, and would have him have the Epithete of Optimus as well as Maximus. Thus some take a Liberty to ridicule all things most Sacred and Venerable: But I shall have occasion to enquire into such Mens Principles afterwards, and at present shall only say, That no Mans Hyperbole, or Expres∣sion, is further to be understood, than as it makes the Kingly Original from God, and makes Kings his Viceroys upon Earth. Therefore I shall not balk such Authorities.

(c) 1.334Plato affirms Monarchy to be the most uncompounded, the Mother of all Governments, and that a King is to be a God amongst Men; and a King is a living Image of God, saith the(d) 1.335 Poet. So the Grecian Orator saith, God from Heaven 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, did send the Regal Power unto the Earth.

(e) 1.336Diotogenes yet raiseth the Character higher, according to the Sovereignties of his Age; That the King, having a Power uncontrollable, and being himself a Living Law, is the Figure or Adumbration of God among Men: And in(f) 1.337 another place, Of all things which are most honourable, the Best, indeed,

is God; but on Earth, and amongst Men, the King.(g) 1.338 So Agapetus observes, That although the King in the Nature of his Body be of the same Mold with every other Man; yet in respect of the Eminence of his Dignity, he is like unto God over all, whose Image he beareth, and by him holdeth that Power which he hath over all Men.

Hence it was, that the Roman Emperors (not to make Re∣searches further) in their(h) 1.339 Coins used some Emblems and Im∣pressions proper to their Gods, or their Religion; inferring, That they derived their Character from them. So in the Coins of Julius Caesar we find the Image of Venus, from whom he de∣duced his Extraction. So we find the Goddess Victory, the Image of Mars, and the Caduceus often, and Ensigns of the High Priest; and not onely in his, but in many other Emperors Coins, the Thunderbolt, to denote, they had the same Power upon Earth, that their Jupiter had in Heaven: according to that of the Poet,

Jupiter in coelis, Caesar regit omnia terris.

After that Julius Caesar was in Divos relatus, we find a Star over his Head, or himself sitting in the Habit of a God, holding in his Hand a Cornucopia ascribed to the Genii and Hero's, and in his Left-hand holding the Goddess Victory.

So in one of Augustus's Coins, we find Victory sitting upon a Celestial Globe, holding a Scarf in a Circular Figure in its Hand, denoting Eternity.

In Otho's Coin Jupiter is placed in a Chair, with a Spear in his Hand, with the Circumscription, Jovis Custos, Jupiter Custos. For it appears out of the Verses of Ennius, and out of Hyginus and Apuleius, that in the Nominative Case Jovis was used for Jupiter. So in a Coin of Titus the Sella Jovis and Thunderbolt are to be found. And Trajan holds a Thunderbolt and Spear, and is Crowned by the Goddess Victory; and in another, Jupiter with his Thunderbolt in his Hand is shrowding Trajan under his Pal∣lium, according to which,(i) 1.340 Pliny saith of him, Te dedit qui erga omne hominum genus vice tua fungeris. So in the same Trajan and Hadrian's Coins, the Head of the Sun is figured with a ra∣diated Crown, as representing them; of which Custom the Tabulae Heliacae may be consulted: and although Chrysologus re∣prehends it as a proud affectation in the Persian Kings, that with radiated Heads they place themselves in the figure of the Sun, or are effeminate into that of the Moon, or assume the form of Stars; yet we may suppose such Impresses were to testify to the People from whence they derived their Origi∣nation, or whose Tutelarship they were under.

For after Christianity obtained, Constantine wore in his great Ensign called the Labarum, the Figure of the Cross, and the Letters which appeared to him in the Air, with the Circum∣scription, sub hoc signo vinces. So(k) 1.341 Theophylact and Manuel

Comnenius, in their Medals, have Christ figured putting a Gar∣land upon their Heads.

Hence a grave(l) 1.342 Author saith, The Prince's Publick Power in Earth is a kind of Image of the Divine Majesty; in the same sense with that of(m) 1.343 St. Ambrose, Princes for the correcting of Vice, and prohibiting of Evil, are erected of God, having his Image, that the People may be under One.

We Christians have the Authority of Holy Scripture, That by God Kings reign, and that they are his Anointed. So Daniel saith to Nebuchadnezzar, The God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom; and to Cyrus, God gave to Nebuchadnezzar thy father a kingdom.

So(n) 1.344 Irenaeus affirms, That by whose Command they are born Men, by his Command likewise they are ordained Kings. Agreeable to which, is that of(o) 1.345 Tertullian, Thence is the Em∣perour, whence he became Man before he was Emperour; thence he hath his Authority, from whence he hath his Breath.

A late(p) 1.346 Author scornfully confronts the Sentiments of so many Learned and Judicious Persons, with that of Aratus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, That all men are the Off-spring of the Deity. Which if we allow in his sense, then Pierce Plowman is of as good Divine Authority as any Crowned Heads. Whereas St. Paul's Application makes it to be meant quite another way, viz. of the Creation of Man by God Almighty. But I shall pass to other Remarks.

The Philosopher makes Four kinds of Kingly Government.* 1.347 First, That of Sparta, where there were two Kings of two Royal Families, the one a Check upon another: And this was, he saith,(q) 1.348 a Generalship onely of an Army; for they had not the Power of Life and Death, but in Expeditions of War; as he instanceth in Agamemnon, whom Homer makes patiently to en∣dure the Reproaches of the Great Men in the Assemblies. For, he affirms, That in Times of Peace the Power of Life and Death was in the Senate and the Ephori. So in the Roman Common∣weal, the Generals having the Style of Praetores and Imperatores, when the Republic was changed by Julius Caesar, he retained the Military Name of Imperator, which the Grecians rendred King: And thence it is that Ammianus saith, That Valentinian was the first that changed the Roman Empire from a Principality to a Kingdom. But to return from this Digression: This La∣conic Commonwealth had Hereditary Kings, with a Power in War and Divine things, limited by Law: Of which the Curi∣ous may read Plutarc. de Lycurgo, and Xenophon de Republica La∣cedaemoniae, and(r) 1.349 Giphanii Comment. in Arist. Polit.

The second kind of Kingly Government, he calls that which was amongst the Barbarous (for such the Grecians styled all Na∣tions that were none of their Country); and this, he saith, had a Power equal to the Tyrannical, yet was legitimate,* 1.350 and ac∣cording to the Use of the Country; for that the Barbarous Na∣tions were more prone to Servitude than the Grecians; and the

Asiaticks endured with less trouble than the Europeans, that Command which he calls Absolute, as of Masters over Servants. This he calls in reality,* 1.351 Tyrannical Government; but Kingly also, in that it is firm, legitimate, and according to the Use of the Country. For that, he(s) 1.352 saith, Citizens or Subjects defend Kings, but Guards of Strangers are employed by Tyrants: Kings commanding lawfully, over the willing; and Tyrants, over the unwilling, and without Rules of Law.

The third kind he calls that which among the Grecians was styled the Aesmynetian: And this, he(t) 1.353 saith, was an Elective Tyranny, either perpetual for Life, or for a time. And this, because it was a Command over the Willing (such Persons be∣ing elected) he styles a Kingly Government, and instanceth in the Mitylenians, who chose Pittacus to be their King, against Alcaeus and Antimenides, who were banished. Such(u) 1.354 Diony∣sius makes the Roman Dictators: Such the Cumaeni, by an hone∣ster Name styled their Tyrants; and such were the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Athens. Such a Kingdom Timolio held at Syracuse, which he, as well as Pittacus, spontaneously resigned, and did not convert into a Tyranny, as Dionysius did; or as Sylla and Julius Caesar did at Rome, and Aratus at Sicyon, according to the(w) 1.355 Orator.

The last kind he calls(x) 1.356 Heroic, because it was used in the Heroick Ages, and had three Characteristicks of true King∣ly Government; That it was a Power exercised over the Wil∣ling, Fatherly, and Legitimate. For, he saith, the first Kings, either for the Benefits they conferred on the Multitude, by In∣vention of Arts, Conduct in War, or leading them out in Co∣lonies, or supplying them with Lands, governing those who lonies, or supplying them with Lands, governing those who freely yielded to obey, were in that esteem, and had that Power and Authority which was requisite.

These had command in War, and in things sacred, where there were no Priests, and did determine Causes; and all these things, some Kings administred without Oath; others were sworn to the observation of them, by the lifting up the Scep∣ter: and(y) 1.357 concludes that in ancient times Kings had Rule and were Lords over all affairs of the City, and those at home and abroad. From whence and from what the Philosopher de∣livered in the beginning of this work and elsewhere,(z) 1.358 Gipha∣nius with Thucydides concludes, That these Hereditary Kings had such a Power as was restrained by certain Laws, and they did not Reign as they listed, and at their Pleasure; but by cer∣tain Prescripts of Laws, such, we may presume, as they or∣dained.

This was that Monarchy which was known in the first Ages of the World. All People in all Ages, and all places ha∣ving by constant Experience found it most conducive to their Happiness, and well-being. For had there been any other form, under which Mankind could have rationally promised them∣selves more, or more certain Happiness than under this; all hu∣mane care would long e're this have hit on it, and there would have been an universal Regifugium.

But supposing we should quit these Topicks of Monarchy,* 1.359 being according to the Law of Nature, and that it is venerably for its Antiquity; there are other Commodities wherein it excells other Forms.

As first that it is freest from the Canker of Faction, which corrodes and consumes all other Governments. Hence the most judicious(a) 1.360 Historian tells us what Asinius Gallus replied to Tiberius, That the Body of the Empire is one, and so is to be governed by one Soul; and in(b) 1.361 another place tells us how difficult it is to find Concord among Equals in Power, especi∣ally where not only, (as at Sparta) there were two races of Kings governing at once, but as many of them as there were Senators, or Magistrates, which by Bands and Confederacies, are rest∣lessly making Parties against each other, whereby the Admini∣stration rowls from one Faction to another: whereas Kingly Government is uniform and equal in it self; and when by Facti∣ons, Commonweals have been brought almost to utter ruin, a(c) 1.362 single Persons Conduct hath restored all. As(d) 1.363 Florus writes of Augustus Caesar, that he ordered the shaken and distracted Bo∣dy of the Empire, which without doubt could never have been united in one Form again, unless by the Direction of one Pre∣sident, as a Soul and Spirit: Even so we experienced in his late Majestie's admirable, yea miraculous Retauration, which effected as great Blessings to these Islands, as that of Augustus to the Roman Empire.

Besides, it is a strong Argument for the Preference of Mo∣narchical Government to all sorts of Republics, that in all po∣pular States, we find all great affairs managed by some one leading Man, who by the dexterity of his Address, Power of his Eloquence, or the Strength of his Arguments, induceth so many as are necessary to join with him to effect them, unless when by contrary renitency they are dissolved into Faction.

So when the Senate of Rome was in a most critical Debate, An delenda esset Carthago? Cato shewing them the Grapes which a few Years before grew there, illustrated from thence the dan∣gerous vicinity of so potent and opulent a State, as had con∣tended with them for the universal Empire, and wanted only the skill of an uti Victoria, to have effected it. By which he cooled the warm Debates of the Senate, and brought them to an affirmative Determination. So Cicero often prevailed, so De∣mosthenes, and so the Daemagogues in popular States, who are(e) 1.364 pro tempore Monarchs; the very head of every Faction in a Republic being a King in Disguise, or a Tyrant in the dress of a Private Man.

The single Government being freed from the prime Cause of all intestine decay, viz. Faction: It necessarily follows that it must be of longer Duration,* 1.365 as being built upon stronger and firmer Foundations than any other Model. Ambitions, Ae∣mulations, Hostile Parities, popular Insolencies, Senatorian Ty∣ranny, tumultuous Elections, and infinite causes of Discords

are the inseparable Associates, and close Conomitants of all other Forms. But in Monarchy, hereditary Succession is as a Golden Chain, that holds fast together and close every part of the Royal Contexture in it self, and leaves no Chasms, Chinks, or Ruptures, whereby any dissolving cause can be ad∣mitted entrance to subvert or disjoint the Frame.

I have before spoke of this Head, and shall only add, that as Kingly Government was the first; so when Commonwealths were introduced with much strugling, they kept Life a while in Greece and Rome; but have been reduced to Monarchy a∣gain about one Thousand seven Hundred Years since.

Tacitus after his short way tells us,* 1.366 that Rome had Kings first; that L. Brutus appointed Liberty and Consulship; Dictatorship was sometimes assumed; the Decemvirate lasted not alive two Years; nor did the Consular right of the Tribunes of the Peo∣ple long continue; nor was the command of Cinna or Sylla du∣rable; and the power of Pompey and Crassus devolved upon Cae∣sar, as the Arms of Anthony did upon Augustus, who received all (being weakned, wearied, tired out, or spent with civil Discords) under the Empire of a Prince. From whose very Name the title of semper Augustus, and Caesar is continued to this day, which duration in no Commonwealth can be found. Therefore every one that desires to live under an uniform, un∣changeable, and durable Government, must prize and value Monarchy most.

It is furthermore the peculiar Excellency of Monarchy, that it hath no separate or distinct Interests, or Designs, from the Good of the Publick; the End of all just Empire being the Safety and Profit of the Subjects, saith a(f) 1.367 Judicious Histo∣rian. For a King, neither in time of Peace or War, can ever have any Good or Evil befal him, wherein his Subjects have not their share. It is onely in Monarchy where Paternal and Con∣jugal Love are in the highest degree and relation, betwixt the Prince and his People; the(g) 1.368 Blessings of Happiness, or the Miseries of Infelicity, are stowed in the same Bottom. So that a Monarch consulting the Safety, Honour, Welfare, Peace, and Prosperity of his People, doth at the same time consult his own Interest in every one of them; and this must of necessity oblige him to act strenuously and constantly in all his Endea∣vours for the attainment of those Ends. This will induce him to exert all his Royal Vertues, of Justice, Fortitude, &c. will cause him to be watchful to suppress the Turbulent and Facti∣ous, who would discompose the happy Harmony at home, and be vigilant against the Attempts of Foreign Powers. For the State can neither sink by Intestine Discords, or fall by Foreign force, but he must be ruined with it, and so out of the natu∣ral Tenderness, care and concern for the Safety, Peace, and Happiness of himself and People, he must be truly a Father of his Country; whereas the Members or Representatives of a Republic, are at best but Guardians (and greedy ones, as we

of late experienced) who generally commit great Wastes.* 1.369

The common objection, perpetually in the Mouths of De∣mocratick Factious People, is that Monarchy is apt to degene∣rate into Tyranny, according to that of the(h) 1.370 Philosopher; who, having recounted the external and intrinsick causes of the decay of other forms of Governments, saith, that the dissolu∣tion of Kingdoms happens rarely from external Causes, and so they are more durable; but it may happen from two intrin∣sick ones, viz. the Dissention of those of the Royal Family, or Princes, or when Kings govern something Tyrannically.

But this is only true where Monarchy is Absolute, Arbitrary, and Unbounded; which in the English Monarchy is much other∣wise. For though the Kings of England (where they have not pre∣cluded themselves by their gracious Condescentions and Grants to their People) are not limited by any other Power than their own Royal Pleasure: Yet their Concessions have been so many, and formed into Laws (as Measures and Standards of Govern∣ment) that they are Mounds and Boundaries, which the Mo∣narchy hath no less Prudently than Indulgently been pleased to give it self, thereby to ease the Subject of any just occasion of Fears or Jealousies (which receive their Birth from the formi∣dable redundancy of their absolute Power) and by this means the Government is secured from the falling intoan Arbitrary and Tyrannical way of Rulers, and the Minds of the Subjects freed from the dreadful apprehension of Slavery. And as by this In∣comparable method of goodness, and generosity in our Prin∣ces, the Subjects of all conditions are the more powerfully ob∣liged to all dutiful Allegiance to their temperate Government; so the Government it self is thereby rendred more capable of effectually answering all the Ends and Intentions of Society.

When it is debated whether Monarchy or Tyranny be the most convenient Government; the true Sence of it is this,* 1.371 Whether the People shall live more happily when the supream Power is in one, and the Person by the Laws of the Country is known, whereby no Room is left for Division and Faction, concerning that single Sovereign? Or, When one Man, being more active and crafty than his Fellows, who ought to have an equal share in the Authority, raises a Faction upon some plausi∣ble pretences, and under the colour of serving his Confederated Party, perswades them to be commanded by him, and so ex∣ercises the supream Power in an Illegal way: which as is com∣passed by engaging the People in misery, under colour of making them more happy; so it must be kept up by as bad Arts, and an Army must be maintained to make good by force what Law cannot justify.

In this manner as the question is to be stated betwixt a Law∣ful King and Tyrant. So if it be enquired whether Monarchy or Aristocracy be better; it is not whether a bad King be better than a good Commonwealth consisting of the Optimacy: but the Comparison ought to be betwixt a good King, and a good Aristocracy, or betwixt them when both bad.

First,* 1.372 Therefore it is to be considered, That a People may easilier have a good King, than a good Nobility (taking Good) in a Political Sence, as providing for the Peoples Happiness;) because the King's Interest is the same with that of the Peoples, which is a strong State-security: whereas the Commonwealth of Greece, affords us many Examples of Persons selling their Country, and putting their great Councils upon ill attempts, and labouring with their utmost cunning, to frustrate good Designs; because their Dependance upon a Foreign State or Kingdom, was worth much more unto them, than they could hope to gain by honest Service to their Country.

Supposing both the King and Optimacy be willing to pro∣mote the Peoples Happiness; yet he is more able to compass that End, by reason he hath a more United Power, and the Execution of all Designs depends upon a single resolve; and therefore may be managed with a certain closeness and all con∣venient swiftness, so that good Councils shall be first discover∣ed in their effects: Whereas a great Body move slowly, and most times the opportunity of Doing is gone by, while they are but half way in their deliberation.

Besides,* 1.373 as there are many Advantages peculiar to Monarchy (as in these three Chapters I hope I have evinced) so there is not one Inconvenience, to which a People, living under Ari∣stocracy, are not subject in a much higher Degree than they are under Monarchy. For supposing a King cruel, yet one Man's Cruelty cannot reach so many as that of Multiplied oppres∣sors, when every one takes their peculiar Province to fleece, or exercise their Lordliness over, according as their Estates or Interests are divided.

The Covetousness likewise of Senators is more devouring, because we may feed one Fire with less Expence of Fewel than five Hundred.

A Princes profuse Largesses to his Favourites, is infinitely o∣ver-balanced, by so many providing for their poor Kindred, and making Friends, and purchasing Dependants. This very thing must likewise be practised by Senators, for underproping their several reputations, hiring Advocates to plead for them in their absence; purchasing of Votes in their private concerns, and obtaining of Offices, Places and Estates for themselves and their Relations: So that these must require more considerable Supplies from the People (who must be squeezed every time a∣ny single Grandee wants) than are necessary to nourish the Li∣berality of a Prince, who hath a large Patrimony, standing Revenue, and places of Honour and Profit to gratify his Ser∣vants withal. The wisest States having made ample allowan∣ces to their Princes, to enable them to bestow Favours accord∣ing to Merits or liking.

Some think that of Ecclesiastes (Wo to thee, O Land, when thy King is a Child!) a strong Argument against Monarchy,* 1.374 be∣cause this Calamity is not incident to a Senate, because they

are not subject to Nonage: But the place rightly understood (saith a learned(i) 1.375 Writer, whom I have epitomized in the Parallel) is a very full Confirmation of the happy Condition we have reason to expect under Monarchy, and of the Calami∣ties and Woes which probably attend an Aristocracy. For the cause of those Miseries foretold is plainly thus: A King during his Infancy, being not able personally to Rule, the Govern∣ment is managed by the Nobles; and thence come Factions, and all the Mischiefs that accompany them.

To close therefore this Chapter, we may consider, that Kings have no Rivals whom they fear, and must keep under, as Go∣vernours of Commonwealths have; which is no small Blessing to a People.

Kings, as Proprietors, take all the care possible (saith a ve∣ry(k) 1.376 Learned Author) to improve their Dominions; where∣as Republicans are as Tenants, mind nothing so much as their private Profit: and the very Pretenders to Liberty and Pro∣perty, in this and the last Age, have been the great Cheats of the Nation. They, when raised to govern, grew insolent; whereas Princes are still the same, and their Passions rise not, because their Fortunes do not.

The Prevailing Factions in Commonweals, spare none that oppose them, having no consideration of them, but as Enemies: whereas Kings pity even Rebels, as considering them still as their Subjects; and though I cannot say with my(l) 1.377 Author, of one Year, yet I may say of the whole time of the Usurpa∣tion, That more were murthered and ruined in that Reform∣ing Age, than suffered by the Great Mogul, and King of France, in that space of time; and more Severity was exercised by those Reformers, than by all the Race of our Kings these Six hundred years. And whatever Evil Ministers Kings are said to have, yet what that Judicious Author notes of Scotland, we may say the like of England, That after they had taken from the Blessed King his Prerogative of chusing Judges and Coun∣cellors; the Parliament did the next year put in (I will not say with him, the greatest Blockheads and Idiots in the Nation but) men of much meaner Parts, and more corrupt and unfit, either for knowledge, or the upright dispensing of the Laws, Justice and Equity, than any Age had known.

I have discoursed of this Head before, and so shall say no more, but that as well as in Antient times, the unequal Distri∣bution of Justice hath been noted; so the Severity of the State of Venice against their Nobles, and the executing Men without Citing or Hearing, upon meer Jealousies, induced a wise Spa∣niard (who hath collected the Arbitrary Courses practised and allowed in that State) to say, That there is less of Liberty there, than under the worst of Monarchies. And for the State of Holland, it hath been more than once observed, how in∣grateful they have been to all their Neighbours, who have as∣sisted them in their greatest need (and with what a Jealousie

they treat the Prince of Orange, whose Ancestors setled them in the Possession of what they have) as well as to the Crown of England, is obvious to common Observation. By them their Allies have been unworthily deserted; In the matter of Trade no Pact or Faith hath been kept. In their Country, Mint and Cummin, Coleworts and Herbs are excised; nothing worn, nothing fed upon or necessary for Humane Life, but pays something to their Exchequer: You pay a Tribute for the Ground you walk on, for the Rivulets you pass on; only they have not yet found out a Tax upon their Foggy Air.

CHAP. X. The Character of a good King in general.

BEfore I come to treat of the Sovereignty, I think it con∣venient to discourse of the usefullest Qualifications of Monarchs, and the benefits that will redound to themselves and their Subjects thereby.

The(a) 1.378 Philosopher, in several places, compares a King to a Parent and Shepherd, but a Tyrant to a Lord over Slaves, and a Wolf.* 1.379 The One in his Government having a special Re∣gard to the Peoples Benefit: the Other governing without or against Law, pro nutu & arbitrio; reducing all things under their absolute will and Power, in such a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as is unhappy to their People, and in the Conclusion to themselves.* 1.380

More particularly the same(b) 1.381 Philosopher describes a good King to be one, that no ways governs Tyrannically, but as the Master of a Family with a Royal mind, not challenging or appropriating all to himself, but procuring good for, and de∣fending, his People and Subjects, in the course of his Life, using Moderation in all things: Affable to his Nobles, and in Com∣pany desirous to show himself of easie Access, sweetning his Government to his People, by his gracious Declarations. By these, saith he,(c) 1.382 his Empire will not only be more Beautiful, more Esteemed, and more Fortunate, but more Durable; be∣ing not dreaded or envied of his Subjects, but command∣ing over the good, and not over broken and depressed Spi∣rits.

Such Princes use a moderate just Government according to the Laws, (more Majorum) contented with Power sufficient to support the Government; no ways injurious to their People, but willing that some things should not be in their Power, that they may the more securely perpetuate, what they enjoy. For(d) 1.383 they that are Lords over fewer things, necessarily subsist the longer.

So it is recorded of(e) 1.384 Alex. Severus, that when his Wife Menemia, Daughter of the Consul Sulpitius, and Niece of Ca∣tulus, told him, That he had made his Power gentler and more despicable, by not taking State enough upon him, and Gover∣ning more gently. He gravely answered, That it was more secure and durable. The very same, Aristotle relates of Theo∣pompus.

Therefore, saith a grave(f) 1.385 Author, That State of a Commonweal is to be desired, and is most firm, in which private Persons live Holily and unoppressed, or Inoffensive, and Justice and Clemency are in full Vigor by the Princes care.

Therefore(g) 1.386 Musonius in Stobaeus saith, a Prince should so deport himself in his Government, That he should rather be re∣vered and honoured, than feared by his Subjects.

The excellent(h) 1.387 Greek Historian tells us, That the Pra∣ctice of Tyrants is to Lord it over the Unwilling, by Terror and vitious Exorbitance, being always engaged in mutual ha∣treds betwixt him and his Vassals: But on the contrary, Kings doing good to all, with Liberality and Clemency, govern those that freely are subject to them, living in a mutual Benevolence and Charity with his People.

It is by such a Deportment of a Prince to his Subjects, that a Prince receives much inward Contentment. For as the Pain∣ter delights when he hath finished a curious Piece, and every Artist when he hath shewed great Mastership in his work; so a Prince, when he hath, by his prudent, wise and merciful Go∣vernment, made his Reign Prosperous and Happy to his Sub∣jects,* 1.388 cannot but receive the greatest satisfaction to himself, and will thereby acquire a most glorious and durable name.

It was a Kingly saying of(i) 1.389 Theodahad in Cassiodorus, That whereas Kings can do all things, they think, and believe those things only to be lawful for them to do, which are Praise-worthy.

As the Pilot (saith the Orator) designs a prosperous Voy∣age,* 1.390 the Physician Health to his Patient; so the Supreme Ma∣gistrate should have care of his Subjects, the(k) 1.391 Lives of them, and their Fortunes, for that End being committed to them.

Hence Tacitus commends that Prince, who lives with his People as a Parent with his Children; when neither to his own Breast, Closet, or(l) 1.392 Family, any Access is made by Ambition, or in which any thing is Mercenary. So we find in the same Judi∣cious Historian, the advice of Galba to Piso, when he had adopted him, was, That the surest and shortest Rule to sort good from evil, was to weigh with himself(m) 1.393 what under ano∣ther Prince he would have allowed or blamed. Therefore Nerva gloried most, That he had done nothing in his Government, whereby he might not safely live, although he should lay down his Empire, and live again a private Life. So Trajan said, He would approve himself such an Emperor over his Subjects, as He, being a private Man, would have wished the Emperor to

have been. Therefore(n) 1.394 Pliny so highly commends the Peoples Vows for him, quod bene Rempublicam & ex utili∣tate civium, rexerit. Thence the same(o) 1.395 Panegyrist com∣mends him, That he did not only consider himself to be mor∣tal Man, but that he was appointed to govern Men, not Brutes.

It was to the fore-mentioned Nerva that Fronto said,(p) 1.396 It was a great Evil to have such a Prince under whom none can have Liberty; but it is worse when every one hath Liberty to do as he list, the one discovering a very Tyrannical Disposition, and the other a great remissness and negligence in Government. There∣fore(q) 1.397 Tacitus adviseth that a Prince's Easiness, and too much Lenity weaken not his Authority, or his too great Seve∣rity lessen the Love of his Subjects.

Lipsius(r) 1.398 gives us this noble Character of a good Prince, That being raised to the highest Eminence, desires not to be ac∣counted more great than good, and mingles two the most dif∣ferent things, Power and Moderation; whom his Subjects in his Progress look upon as a beneficial and comfortable Divi∣nity, so that the People attemper'd with Fear and Love, with interchangeable Sentiments, doubt whether they shall salute him as their Lord or Parent.

All Princes must necessarily be most dear to their People (saith the(s) 1.399 Chancellor to the Parliament, Anno 1571.) dearer than their own Lives, when they by their Actions demonstrate that they make the whole Scope and design of their Government the Prosperity of their People. Among the chiefest of which Benefits, that of Peace is to be most valued, as being the end and mark that all good Governours direct their Actions to. In another place he makes it a sure sign of good Princes, when they wish themselves all the good qualifications and fittedness for Government, and all the Vertues of the greatest Princes for their Subjects good; this being a full Demonstration how precious and valuable the safety and quietness of their Subjects are to them.

The learned Lord Chancellor Bacon marshals the degrees of Sovereign Honours under five Heads,* 1.400 every one of which are as so many Characteristicks of great and good Kings. First the(t) 1.401 Layers of the foundations of Empires, as Romulus, Cyrus, Caesar, &••.(u) 1.402 Secondly the Founders of their Laws, or Law∣makers; who by constituting good Laws, are as second Found∣ers, perpetual Princes, because they govern by their Ordi∣nances after they are translated from this World. Such were Solon, Lycurgus, Justinian, and others.(w) 1.403 Thirdly, such as have freed their People, and delivered their Country from Servitude, or have put an end to, and composed long civil Wars, as Augustus, Vespasian, our King Henry the Seventh, and the Fourth of France, and most eminently our late Royal Sovereign.(x) 1.404 Fourthly such as by honourable ways enlarge their Territo∣ries, or make a noble Defence against Invaders. Lastly, such

who reign justly, and make the Age good wherein they live, therefore stiled Fathers of their Country; such both was and is our late and present Gracious Soveraigns.

So that such a Prince as others describe according to their Wish, or as an Exemplar, the English Nation,* 1.405 and all his Ma∣jestie's Subjects, above all other Kingdoms in the World, have been and are Blessed with, under the Reigns of two such un∣parallell'd Royal Brothers. We may justly give our late Sove∣vereign of immortal memory, that Character which we find in Arnisaeas as the Idea of a good Prince, That leaving entirely to his Subjects their Properties, governed according to God's, Nature's and his own Laws founded upon Equity and Ju∣stice; or that of(y) 1.406 Hadrian's, that so managed his Government, That all might know that he studied the Peoples, not his own private Profit.

Surely we may hope for great happiness under our present Sovereign;* 1.407 who hath not only been a Copartner in his Royal Brother's sufferings, but a Co-adjutor in the management of his great Empire; and hath so signalized himself in the haz∣zard of his Life and glorious Atchievements for his Country, and is endowed with all the Heroic Accomplishments that ennoble Princes in the Records of Fame: so that we have the greatest Moral assurances (if we disturb not his Reign by Se∣dition and Rebellion) that he will out-go most of his Ancestors in the prosperous Government of his People, as well for their Glory, as their Peace and Tranquillity.* 1.408

CHAP. XI. The Care of Religion a duty incumbent upon Kings.

IT is not enough to give a Character of a good King in ge∣neral; but we must descend to Particulars, and first of his Care of Religion, according to that of(a) 1.409 Aristotle, That in all Government the first and principal Concern of a Prince, is to take care of things Divine. For according to the(b) 1.410 Stoick, It becomes him that is the Best, to be worshipped by the Best; and that the great Sovereign of the Universe be worshipped by his Earthly Vicegerents.

For of old it hath been noted, That many advantages both accru'd to the Sovereign and People, when the Prince was truly Religious.

Therefore the(c) 1.411 Philosopher tells us, That it is the duty of the supream Governour principally to take care of those things which appertain to the Deity: for thereby the People are more obedient to their Princes, as not fearing injustice from them.

For that it is to be supposed, that he that is Pious and Just, will not do an Unjust and Impious Action; and by it he is more secure in the assurance of Protection from the Deity, whereby he may hope for its Defence and Patrociny, from the Sediti∣ons and Treacheries of his Subjects, having the Deity to fight for him.

Consentaneous to which, is what(d) 1.412 Livy observes, That all things happen to them prosperously that follow the Gods, and as unprosperously to them that despise them.

Upon the same Ground it is that the Orator saith, The Ro∣mans had not conquered the Spaniards by their Numbers, or the French by their Strength, the Carthaginians by their Strata∣gems, or Grecians by their Arts, nor the Italians and Latines, and their Nation and Land, by their Native and Inbred Wis∣dom; but by Piety and Religion, and(e) 1.413 by that Wisdom alone, that they understood all things to be governed by the Deity, they had overcome People and Nations.

Agreeable to this Affirmation, is what we find recorded of Numa, That his care of Religion was the chief cause of the succeeding Felicity of Rome. For as the(f) 1.414 Florentine Se∣cretary observes, That Romulus exercising his People wholly in Military Affairs, his Successor Numa, finding he had to deal with a Fierce,* 1.415 Rude, Cruel and Ungovernable people, thought the way to attemper and soften their minds, was to devise some Religious Institutions; which being once given credit to, might make them more pliable to Government. Therefore(g) 1.416 Li∣vy saith, That of all things, he thought the fear of the Gods to be the most efficacious means for the ordering the unskilful Multitude, rude in that Age. And(h) 1.417 Tacitus tells us, That with Religions and Divine Laws he yoaked them in obedi∣ence: and so intent he was in the Observance of the Service to the Gods he had introduced, that Plutarch tells us, That he being one time Sacrificing, was told that the Enemies were ad∣vancing against him, but he would not desist, but returned(i) 1.418 Answer, That he was performing a Divine Work, and he would not leave till he had finished it.

It is by(k) 1.419 Livy noted of this Numa, That he was forced to use some little Arts to possess the People with some Awe and Re∣verence to the Religious Worship he appointed. For he saith, that finding, that without some shew of a Miracle, these new Religious Institutions would be difficultly embraced by such a sort of Rude People, He pretended he received them from the Inspiration of the Nymph Aegeria. In the like manner it is reported, that Sertorius (to establish his manner of Religi∣ous Worship, and to obtain the firmer Obedience to his Com∣mand) pretended he conversed with an Hart inspired. It is notoriously known,* 1.420 how the greatest of Impostors Mahomet palliated his Natural Infirmity of the Falling-sickness, with the subtil Fiction that he was transported at such times to Heaven, and received the Instructions for his Alcoran there: and having

taught a Pidgeon to pick Corn out of his Ear, he made use of that to delude the wild Arabs, telling them, It was the Holy Ghost, which at such Seasons revealed to him certain hidden Mysteries.

From hence we may learn how great Deference hath been paid to Princes, who have pretended Obedience to the Su∣preme Being, or had Conversation with Celestial Ministers, Spirits or Angels; and how useful, true and untainted Religion in a Prince must be, when the Umbrage of it is owned to make so pleasant and beneficial a shade.

Before I leave this Head, I cannot but observe what Respect some Heathens paid to the Religious Worship of the Gods,* 1.421 and what Punishments have been recorded to be inflicted on those who have profaned their Rites.

When the Gaules besieged the Capital,(l) 1.422 Caius Fabius Dru∣so would not omit the Customary Sacrifices, but carrying with him in his Hands, the consecrated Vessels (contemning the Danger) passed to the Quirinal Hill, and the Barbarians per∣mitted him to solemnize his Worship, and to return safely to the Capitol.

So(m) 1.423 Pausanias, at the famous Battle of Platea, though the Enemy pressed sore, would not fight till he had a lucky Omen by his Sacrificing.

(n) 1.424Josephus tells us, That Pompey the Great, when he had taken Jerusalem, and entred the Sanctum Sanctorum, although he found a Table of Gold, a Sacred Candlestick, and many other Vessels, and two Thousand Talents of Silver; yet he touched nothing thereof, but caused the Temple to be pur∣ged, and the Sacrifices to be offered according to Law.

The Christians being about to build a Chappel at Rome, wherein to perform Service to Almighty God, were hin∣dred by some claiming the Ground. The matter was brought before Alex. Severus the Emperor, who determined, That the things which concern the Gods, should be preferred before things that concern Men; and so allowed the building the Chappel, saying, That though their God was unknown to them at Rome, yet he ought to have Honour done him, if but for that Respect alone, that he bore the Name of a God.

All which, and many more Instances which may be given, ought to teach Christian Princes to perform a greater Venera∣tion to the true God, than the Heathens did to their false and imaginary Idols.* 1.425 As to the Examples of Signal Disasters that have happened to Princes and others, who have sacrilegiously robbed the Shrines of the very Heathen Gods, or used those feigned Deities contumeliously, discovering thereby an Athei∣stical Temper; there are many Instances recorded in such Wri∣ters, as in other things are generally credited.

It is reported of(o) 1.426 Agathocles, that exacting fifty Talents of Silver of the Liparenses (which they could not pay with∣out taking something consecrated to Aeolus and Vulcan) in his

return, the ten Ships which carried the Money, were dashed in Pieces by Storm: by which it was said Aeolus had his revenge, and Vulcan's followed after, for that Agathocles was burnt a∣live.

(p) 1.427Cambyses King of Persia, having conquered Egypt, smote the Ox that was consecrated to Apis, in the Hip, that he died; but mounting his Horse to go against the Counterfeit Smerdis, the same Sword he had slain the Ox with, fell out of the Scabberd, by the prancing of the Horse, and he falling upon the point of it, was wounded in the same place of the Hip, whereof he died shortly after.

I might instance in Nero's contempt of the Roman Gods, and his sprinkling the Face of the Syrian Goddess with Wine: and what an Exit he had we know: as also, how(q) 1.428 Helio∣gabalus extinguished the Vestal Fire, would needs marry one of the Vestal Virgins, and violated indifferently all the Rites and Ceremonies of Religion in Rome; his End was violent, being slain by his own Soldiers. But I shall only remember what is reported of Philomelus, Onomarchus and Phaillon; who having spoiled the Temple of Delphos, one of them was burnt alive, another drowned, a third thrown headlong from an high Place; being the three sorts of Death, the Grecian Laws appointed them to undergo that were Sacrilegious. But I will refer the Inquisitive Reader to Lipsius his Monita, Fulgosius, Dinoth's memorabilia, and others; and only mark, That it seems not safe out of an Atheistical Humor, to contemn even salse Deities; for that is seldom done without some Suspicion that the Persons who do so, scarce reverence any Divinity. The sence of which ought to make us resent the publick stabbing, rending and burning of the Prints, Pictures or Images of our Saviour, and Saints; which some too scornfully have done.

From these Remarks, I shall now come to consider some of Machiavel's Positions about Religion: First he(r) 1.429 owns, That it is necessary that a Prince appear careful of Religion, and appear himself Religious and Devout.

But he thinks,* 1.430 for a Prince to be truly conscientious, is not conducible, but rather disadvantageous to their Designs if great, or the Art of Government. This Principle must be owned to have been practised to the highest Improvement by Cromwel, whose Master-piece lay in pretending extraordinary Sanctity, whereby he won more to his Party, than by any o∣ther of his Arts, and out-did Machiavel's Original Caesar Bor∣gia.

In Answer to which,* 1.431 I shall oppose first the Philosopher, who, in the place before cited by me in the beginning of the Chap∣ter, in commendation of the Prince's taking Care of Religion,(s) 1.432 saith, It is not foolishly and impertinently to be pretended: whereby we may infer, it is to be sincere and Cordial. So Pom∣ponius(t) 1.433 Laetus tells us, That Philippus Arabs covered his Wickedness and Cruelties, by feigning himself a Christian, and

relaxing their Persecutions, and he reigned but five Years, and He and his Sons were massacred by his Soldiers at Verona. In∣deed it cannot be expected otherwise, but that the Judgment of God, and the Indignation of Men, should fall upon such Dissimulation and Hypocrisie: For however Princes or private Persons may lacker over their specious Religiousness, yet in some times or places it will appear so thin, that it will be dis∣covered, and at best it will bear no resemblance with pure Gold Foyl.

It must not be denied, That Princes have a larger Latitude than others, to conceal their Sentiments of Religion, or to set the fairest Gloss upon it, as being to guide their Actions in this matter, as well as in secular Affairs, suitable to the Interests of State. But every one will likewise acknowledge, that a Prince,* 1.434 who useth in this as well as other matters, a generous plain dealing, is valued more by this Standard Coin without Alloy, than those are, who make, as the States of Holland do their Third in Silver, mixed with four parts of adulterate Metal, pass for currant Sterling Coyn. Among just Men, such a Prince that deals candidly with God and the World, will find infinite more credit than any Tinsel heart will do.

But I must pass to another of the Florentine's Paradoxes;(u) 1.435 he saith, The Pagan World was kept principally in Obedience by the belief they had in the Responses of Oracles, as that of Jupiter Ammon at Delos, or Apollo's at Delphos, &c. or by the Prognosticks of the Augurs; and that, when once Men began to sleight these, they neither believed God nor the Devil, but became as ungovernable as unchained Slaves: and in another(w) 1.436 place adds, That the cause why the Force and Power of Christians is less than that of the Grecians and Romans, was in the difference of their Religion: For that the Christian Reli∣gion makes the Honour of the World contemptible, and of little Estimation, whereas the Gentiles esteemed Honour to be the Soveraign good, which to obtain, they had an exceeding great Fierceness and Hardiness in all their Deeds and Enterpri∣zes; and that the Heathen Religion promiseth no Happiness, but to such as having fought for their Prince, Country and Com∣monweal, were loaded with Glory and worldly Honour: whereas the Christian Religion promiseth blessings to such as are humble and contemplative, and to those which despise most the Goods and Honours of this World: and further adds, That the Christian Religion hath conducted and brought the World into that Weakness and Feebleness we see it in, delivering it as a Prey to the wicked and barbarous People; because all Christians, to take the way to Paradise, dispose and arm them∣selves, rather to receive Blows, than to give or take Venge∣ance. So that to him it seems, That the thing which makes Christians so effeminate and cowardly, proceeds only from this, That they esteem more of an Idle and Contemplative, than an Active Life.

In answer to all which I do own,* 1.437 That the Oracles and Au∣gurs had some Influence upon the People; but we must like∣wise yield, That they were often Instruments and Tools fitted by Princes to carry on some designs, to give Courage to their Soldiers, and disheartning to their Enemies; and that God in the Machine was oftentimes a Prince's Spring that lay there.

As to the Rites and Ceremonies, whatever Power they had to influence Mens Minds to Obedience and Duty to Gover∣nours, and to stimulate and excite them to great and glorious Actions; the same Motives and Inducements we may find in the Christian Religion, and better bottomed.

That there is something else besides bare Forms, Modes, and Schemes of Religion, that ought to be countenanced and che∣rished by Princes, and which is very conducive (not to make any Comparisons) to the support of Government, I will now endeavour to prove.

First therefore let us consider what is related of Numa.* 1.438 It is said he appointed divers Ordinances concerning Priests, and several Ceremonies, whereof several Rolls were found in his(x) 1.439 Sepulcher Anno V. C. 574. in the Consulship of Lucius Manilius in a Stone Coffin, one part Latin and the other Greek. These Books being seven in all, by order from the Consuls and Se∣nate, were perused by Quintus Petilius, who made such a Re∣port of them, that according to Livy, they were decreed to be burnt, as of no great account; and besides, judged pernicious and damageable to the Commonwealth, by bringing that Re∣ligion into Use, which was like to bring great(y) 1.440 alterations in the present Rites.

Valerius Maximus gives something a different account; for he saith the Greek Books only(z) 1.441 of the Discipline of Wis∣dom were burnt, for that they were judged in some respects to dissolve Religion. For, saith my Author, the Ancients would preserve nothing in this City by which the Minds of Men might be withdrawn or led aside from the Worship of the Gods.

From this Story I shall first mark, obiter, that it seems for want of the engraving these Institutions of Numa concerning Religion, in Brass, as the Roman Laws were, though the suc∣cessive Priests had the ordering them ever since; yet there was that alteration made in that long interval of time in the Rites and Ceremonies, from what he had instituted, that to have reduced them to their practice was like to un-hinge all their pre∣sent Ecclesiastical Polity; and so the Senate, Consuls and Priests thought it more adviseable to burn and annihilate them, than to disorder the present Establishment.

Secondly, We may note, that the Senate and Consuls took care that nothing should be exposed to the People (how sacred a Relique soever) that might enervate or debilitate Religion.

Now we may further note out of a judicious(a) 1.442 Historian, That Numa built a Temple to Faith, where he established ma∣ny

Ceremonies to induce People to reverence Faith,* 1.443 and to fear Perjury; and ordained likewise upon Controversies hap∣pening among Parties, they should be bound to go to the same Temple, and there with certain great Ceremonies swear the points of their Contests. He also further declared that those who usurp'd upon the Limits of others Possessions, were not only to be punished here, but were doomed to Torments in Hell; to the end that every Man might be afraid to seize on the Goods of another Mans.

These therefore I look upon as the Fundamentals of civil Religion, in the rendring so venerable the Faith by Oaths, whereby not only Allegiance to the Prince, but Society was established upon that firm Basis of mutual Confidence: and by the securing Propriety, the whole Compages of Government was preserved.

We ought likewise to consider that there are moral Vertues which conciliate such a Reverence to the Practisers of them,* 1.444 that they are great helps to preserve and make flourishing every Kingdom and Commonweal, and which constitute a considera∣ble Religious Portion of civil Government; and when Princes and People exercise them, both live happilier, than when without them, great Sanctity and Devotion are only pretended.

The Vertues I put in the Balance against Bigotry in Religion,* 1.445 are Justice, Temperance, Charity, Fortitude, Magnanimity, which are branched out into many flourishing Boughs, that bear the Golden Fruit upon them; such as these, Not to do to another that which we would not have done to our selves; To live contentedly in our Station; To be obedient to our Magi∣strates and Superiours; To live in Charity with all Men; To be Compassionate to the Poor and Needy; To give no evil Exam∣ple in any sort of Debauchery; To consider that we come into this World to live according to the rules of Life, the Sovereign Being of all hath pleased to reveal; That we do nothing here which may forfeit our more durable Inheritance in the other World.

These were the Buttresses of Government in the Heathen World, when the whole train of Moral Vertues without Hypo∣crisie and Dissimulation were practised: and can Machiavel or any of his Disciples find that the same things are not pressed as a duty upon all in the Christian Religion; there seeming to me this only advantageous difference, That the Foundation and Basis upon which these Moral Vertues rest in the Christian Reli∣gion, is more firm, more regular, and more curiously hewen and polished, and more consentaneous to the Dictates of right Reason, in that they are implanted and promulged as standing Laws by one God Omnipotent; than in the multiform, jarring Polytheism of the Heathens, who for every different Spe∣cies of things, or qualifications of Beings, introduced a presi∣ding Spirit.

In answer to the second Plea of the Secretary,* 1.446 That our Reli∣gion hath dis-spirited Christians; I think every one will be fur∣nished (out of the Armory of his own Experience, or the perusing of antient and modern Histories) with Shield and Buckler a∣gainst such false Thrusts, and will own that there have been as considerable and glorious Atchievements performed by Chri∣stians, as by Heathens: as may be instanced in Constantine the Great, Theodosius, Valentinian, Justin, Charlemain, Scanderbeg, and infinite more modern Christian Princes, who neither yield for Manhood, Valour, or Conduct, to Turks or Pagans: and how Patient and Meek soever Christianity teacheth Men to be; yet it no ways hinders Subjects from using offensive or defensive Arms, when commissioned by Lawful Authroity; nor discou∣rageth adventuring of Life for the defence of Kings, or their Countries; nor is it an Extinguisher of Endeavours to serve God the Soveraign, or his People, in the Honourablest Imployments.

It must be confessed,* 1.447 that since Religion hath been reduced from Precepts and Axioms to Systems, and that the practical part of Justice, Moral Vertues and Honesty, were no longer in E∣steem, than as they were found subservient to the promoting Speculations; there hath been a way found out to render these fundamental and substantial Qualifications of less value in ve∣ry good Men, unless withal they added some quaint Notions that might sublime their Heathenish Moralities (as they call them) into Elixirs and quintessences of Religion: as in our late Times, If one could not give a certain Diagnostick when Grace was wrought in him, he was not fit for reforming Employment; Men being more distinguished by Tests and Oaths, than by good Manners.

By which we forgo the Substance of Moral Piety for a fleet∣ing Shadow; and many are so bigotted in their several Senti∣ments, that it is a more arduous task of late, than formerly, for Princes to comport themselves in this particular, so as to keep in one Uniformity, Subjects of so different Perswasions, whereby they may command that obedience Subjects ought to pay to their Sovereigns.

To find Expedients, or offer any directions to Princes in this Case, were to involve ones self in an endless Labyrinth, and discover an unpardonable Presumption; the Difficulties being very great, if not insuperable, how to frame Laws that should combine such varieties and diversities of Opinions in one Yoak, Order or Rule, without such an universal and absolute Mo∣narch, as scarce in Idaea, much less in Practice can ever be.

I shall therefore concern my self no way in tugging at the end of that Saw of Controversies, which (how pleasant soever it may be to such as have an over-weening Opinion of their Knowledge in such Subtilties) is very harsh and ungrateful to my Temper.

This one Hypothesis or Postulatum, however, I hope few will deny, That since Monarchy is the Established Government in

his Majestie's Dominions, and however maliciously and potently assaulted in our Memories; yet never can be altered here.* 1.448 Princes by small searches into the aptitude of the several Schemes of religious Worship and Government, may soon find which is most agreeable to the Constitution of the Monarchy, and will be most subservient to it. In which particular, the Church of England, as established by Law, in its Do∣ctrine and Discipline, and all the true Members of it, and the Subjects of all Conditions, who act according to the Princi∣ples of it; have obtain'd a Royal and Gracious Character, founded upon the constant Experience the Kings of England have had, That upon all the most critical trials, the Members of it have stood firm to the Crown, even when worn by Prin∣ces of different Religion.

Therefore till other Forms, practised in the late times, can give as undeniable Proofs of their unconditionate Loyalties; I think it but reasonable they should allow His Majesty liberty to consult his own, and the interest of his Government, rather than their inconsistent Models.

One of the Principles of the Church of England (conform∣able to that of the Christian Religion.) is, That it teacheth O∣bedience to the Soveraign, not for Fear only, but for Consci∣ence sake; and all considerate (as well as Pious Men) where they are convinced, That it is better to obey God than Man (if any thing should be commanded that would put them upon that Dilemma) will chuse to suffer (if they cannot fly) rather than rebel.

Therefore since it pleased his Majesty at his first Step to the Royal Throne (which was like that of the rising Sun dispen∣sing innumerable Blessings to his People) to express his Royal Favour to the Church of England,* 1.449 with such an Encomi∣um of its Members, in that most refreshing Declaration at his first Council (which from so just a Prince carries the Force and Energy of an Act of Parliament as well as of State in it) it ought to bow the Hearts of all Men that design not to be Rebels, as one Man to him.

Since which, by the repeated solemnity of it to his two Hou∣ses of Parliament, all suspicion of his Majestie's ever acting to the contrary, so long as the Subjects keep their dutiful Station, is totally removed. His Majesty also hath laid a solid Founda∣tion for true Piety in the discountenancing and discrediting all forts of Vice and Debauchery: by which none can doubt, but himself as well as his Subjects, will in short time reap happy Benefit according to that so the excellent(b) 1.450 Historian, Exam∣ples have a more durable force than Laws.

I shall conclude this particular with the famous Story of the Zealots in(c) 1.451 Judaea: Those being told by Vespasian (which Messages Josephus himself carried to them) that he would change nothing of their Religion, but maintain them therein,* 1.452 and in all their Liberties and Franchises; yet under colour, that

they were bound to sacrifice their Lives in the defence of the Temple, would never hearken to Peace upon any condition what ever: but living upon Forraging, Rapines, Free-booty, and com∣mitting most cruel Butcheries; Vespasian found himself obliged to arm against them, and use them with all Extremity. In fine, Those who pretended so much the Preservation of their Religion, committed a Thousand sort of Impieties and Cruel∣ties, and themselves set the Temple of Jerusalem on Fire, and at last brought utter Ruin to their Country.

I shall make no further Application, but that from hence we may learn, First, That it was agreeable to Principles of Go∣vernment, that Vespasian (though a Prince of a different Re∣ligion to the Jews) should not alter their Civil or Religious Government: And, Secondly, That the utter Extermination of a People and their Religion there, was the Consequence of the Zelots Rebellion, as to the apparent procuring cause; for I en∣quire not here into the Original cause of that Nations Destru∣ction, viz. The crucifying of our Lord and Saviour.

I come now to consider wherein a Sovereign's care of Reli∣gion consists,* 1.453 which would carry me into a dangerous Ocean, if I should survey all the Rocks, Creeks and Quick-sands to be avoided in this matter. At the best I shall find an high rolling Sea, as that in the Bay of Biscay, if I escape the difficult and dangerous passage betwixt Scylla and Charybdis.

First therefore, I shall consider the Obligation the Pagan Ro∣mans thought they had, not to make any Innovation in mat∣ters of their Religion, with some Reflections upon it. Second∣ly, Consider the Condition of People under Diversity of Re∣ligions: Thirdly,* 1.454 Speak something of the Diversities of Reli∣gion sprung up in the time of the late War: And Lastly, Some∣thing concerning Toleration. But I must praemonish the Rea∣der, that I intend not to treat of these, either as Divine or Statesman, but only as a Lay-man that loves Order and Peace, in transitu, as a Parergon.

First then as to the Heathens, we find that remarkable Ad∣vice of(*) 1.455 Mecaenas to Augustus, That he ought to worship the Deity in all Methods, and at all times himself, according to his Countries Laws, and cause others to do so: and further adds, That he should restrain those that would innovate in Di∣vine things, not for the cause only of the Gods; but because those that bring in new Deities, do drive men to make other dangerous Changes: and from thence, Conspiracies, Sedition, Conventicles, Cabals, &c. which are things no ways condu∣cible to the benefit of Government.

In which we may consider Mecaenas to advise like a Statesman, considering, that Augustus had but newly extricated himself from a great and dangerous War, for no less than the Empire: Therefore it behoved him to make no Alterations in Matters that might endanger the Settlement of his present Estate. Therefore we find, That Augustus laid aside the name of Tri∣umvir,

contented with the Consulship, and for defence of the People with the Tribunitian Authority; which were old Offi∣ces the People were acquainted with: and that he attracted the Soldiers good Will to him by Gifts, the Peoples by Provi∣sion of Food; and all with the sweetness of Peace: arising by(d) 1.456 degrees, to draw to himself the Imployment and Autho∣rity of the Senate, the Magistrates and the Laws, none oppo∣sing him.

How far this is to be imitated by Princes, in the Circum∣stances of Augustus, I leave to others to determine.

As to the general Sentiment, that the Heathen Roman Reli∣gion was not to be changed: I shall content my self with two Authorities of the great Orator, who in one place(e) 1.457 saith, That it is the part of a wise Man to defend the Institutions of their Ancestors, in retaining sacred Ceremonies; and that in all Nations, it is reputed wicked to violate and banish our Coun∣tries Rites.

In another place(f) 1.458 he pronounceth it absolutely, That all are moved with Religion, and judge their Country Gods which they have received from their Ancestors, to be worshipped and retained.

I am sensible, that if this were yielded to, Christianity would not have been propagated in the World. For if it had not been lawful to alter the so long established Idol Worship and Polytheism, the Doctrine of Christianity had been shut out. But on the other side, when I consider how Christianity was propagated by the working of Miracles, and by the Force and Energy of Conviction upon the Minds of such as would admit the Explanation and Dilucidation of the Doctrine, and the Christians patient sufferings under the Heathen Persecuti∣ons, and peaceable awaiting till God Almighty disposed the Emperor Constantine's Heart to embrace the saving Doctrine of our Lord Jesus Christ; I cannot but conceive it fit (as a Primitive, so an imitable Example) to follow the Method of perswading and convincing Reason and Judgment, before Changes in Religion are to be attempted; especially since the Conversion is not to be from Paganism, but concerns Modes of explaining Doctrines, Jurisdiction of some Orders and Churches, and such Rites and Usages, as possibly enough Men may be saved without arriving at the knowledge of the Essentialness of them.

The Religions of Mankind are extreamly various,* 1.459 diversi∣fyed according to the Genius of the People, their Education and Interests. For as Dominions are circumscribed, and bear one against another, for the preserving of their respective Limits and Bounds, so that a kind of Hereditary Hostility is continued betwixt them: So we find together with that Na∣tive civil Enmity, there is also some disagreeing in such Points of Religion, as is sufficient to keep up the Feud betwixt the Learned Part, as well as the Common People; and the Earth is not more diversifyed by the large Tracts of Sands in Arabia,

Chains of Hills at Caucasus, the Alps, &c. or with the Ribs of vast Rocks, or the Fertile Plains, Pools, Morasses and Seas, than it is variegated with Religions; so that what is sacred in one Country, is even piacular in another.

—cum solos credit habendos Esse Deos quos ipsa colit—

What Application is to be made of God Almightie's Me∣thods of Providence in this I leave to Divines, whose Pro∣vince it is: Only we may observe, since the Roman Church is obeyed in a large Portion of the World, and Ethnicism and Turcism possess as great Territories, and the different Modes in all these (some insisting on old Usage, others on Reforma∣tions and Refinings) are so considerable, it is not to be hoped, there can be any Uniformity or Harmony of Religions in the Universe.

Therefore it seems to be the great concern of Princes in their several Dominions, to use their utmost Endeavours, that the great Fundamentals of Religion (which consist in solid Piety, Justice, Temperance, &c.) should be strictly observed, and the particular Forms, which, by the Wisdom of forego∣ing Ages, have been adapted to the Genius of their People, should be protected and defended, and no Innovations made in them upon private Mens Fancies of Reformation, without a publick Sanction.

As to the third Particular concerning the Diversities of No∣tions in Religion,* 1.460 which have been spawned in our late Wars, during the Rebellion, when every one pretended, that the Li∣berty of propagating their several new found Opinions, was what they had fought for, and purchased with the expence of their Blood and Treasure, we may consider these things fol∣lowing.

First, That when Religion is only seated in the Brain, it strangely infatuates, and renders the possessed difficult to be cured: for it either produceth downright Hypocrisie (which hath Millions of Subservient Wheedles to accompany it) or the Imagination is heightened, That (as a learned(g) 1.461 Wri∣ter observes) they think Salvation is only ordained for those of their fine Sculls; the very mossy Notions of which they think sufficient cure for the falling Evil: Judging Mankind, till within a Century or so, to have been dull indigested Masses of unthinking Animals; whereas in Truth and Reality, they are the tubera Terrae, Insipid or Poysonous Fungs, which sprung up by the Showres of Blood.

Under this Ecstasie of new Beams of Light, they are ravi∣shed with the Opinion of their own Saintship, and they in∣dulge themselves in all the sweet Appetites of Spiritual Pride, affected Sanctity, and singularity of Perswasion; for without some odd Notion (more subtile than others have or a Reve∣lation,

as if dropped from St. Paul's third Heaven, they have no Hearts-ease; and having the Maggot turn'd into a Butter∣flie, O how it flutters and mutes its Eggs upon every fresh Colewort!

This kind of Brain-sick Religion, is no sooner born,* 1.462 but presently like Cadmus's issue, it falls to war under the Banner of Reformation, which is that Fort Spiritual, that Palladium, they must defend; and thereby promise to themselves Laurels and Palms, which shall cover and protect them from all the bruta Fulmina, as they repute them, of the National Church; thinking themselves above the Jurisdiction of any Ecclesiastical Court, their Dominion being founded in Grace.

The pretence of maintaining Religion, or the sham-affrights such People divulge they have of it, being altering, or taken from them, may, with the least danger to the Designers of a∣ny Revolution, be used as a blind to carry on any Intriegue; and the pretence of refining Religion, hath powerful Philtres and Fascinations, to bewitch the Unwary, and tickle the Hy∣pocrite.

While such like Religious People, as I have been describing, in the late miserable times (when there was neither Lawful, Civil, or Ecclesiastical Authority) obtained Power, these Glow∣worms were as plentiful as Locusts, filling every place with new, but not uniform Light; nothing was more common in their Mouths, than that the Dispensation or Gospel of the Ho∣ly Ghost was to be expected, that of God Almighty being pas∣sed away, at the coming of our Saviour, and His Sacred Esta∣blishments being to cease at the approach of this.

What wild fancies, What Heresies revived, were then in Vogue, I had rather were forgot than shown upon the Stage: and only shall observe, that since Religion is like the Heart in the Body, full of Vital Spirits, it encreaseth the care of a Sovereign, That neither the Divine Fire be sufflaminated or extinguished by Irreligion or Atheism; nor by Enthusiasm so sublimed, as it cause a Calenture.

As to the last Particular, it is so nice a point (now especial∣ly) that I had once designed not to have touched upon it;* 1.463 but that I may not wholly frustrate Expectation in saying no∣thing, I shall Content my self with summing up some few Au∣thorities from Lipsius, and others upon this Subject.

(h) 1.464Lipsius saith, it is his firm Opinion, That one Religion should be preferred in one Kingdom, and bemoans the Conditi∣on of Europe, wherein Religion hath kindled such disagreeing Flambeaus, and endeavours to pour Water on that Sacred Fire.

(i) 1.465He makes two kinds of those that sin in Religion; First, Those who have ill Sentiments of God, and the received Holy Rites, and do endeavour to force others by Riots and Tu∣mults, to be of the same perswasion. Secondly, Those who have as depraved opinions, but keep them to themselves, keep∣ing

this Fire on their own Hearths, only to dress their own Viands with.

Concerning the first of these, he concludes, they ought to be punished; lest, as St. Cyprian saith, The Prince be punished for them; for with St. Austin(k) 1.466 he affirms, That it is better that one Scabbed Sheep be removed, than the whole Flock be infected. Agreeable to which is that which(l) 1.467 Seneca affirms, That in divers places, the punishment may be divers, of Religi∣ons violated, but every where some Punishment is enjoyned.

(m) 1.468Justinian gives the Reason, why some Punishment in such cases should be inflicted; because the concern of Religion being of a great extent, the Injuries committed against Divine Religion in some sort affects all.

There being so many Hot-spurs and Bigots in Religion, that are always busily and pragmatically perplexing themselves and others with subtile Enquiries of things under the Earth, and a∣bove the Heavens (as(n) 1.469 Plato phraseth it) that is, of things beyond the Ken of judicious Mortals; either poring in St. Faith's under Paul's, or fluttering on the Fanes of some Spires or Cu∣palo|'s, to the Disturbance of those that would be at their pub∣lick Devotion in the Quire. Such Turbones (as Lipsius calls them) should be suppressed, if it can be without a greater Disturbance. So(o) 1.470 that the Application of the Remedy be rightly timed, that by unseasonable Remedies the Distemper be not fired, as the Judicious(p) 1.471 Historian saith, Intempestivis remediis delicta accendere.

As to those who have Souls tainted with Errors, yet endea∣vour to infect none, but keep the Contagion within Doors, and propagate not their Errors: Lipsius applies that of(q) 1.472 La∣ctantius, Who can impose a necessity upon me, either of be∣lieving or disbelieving? And that of(r) 1.473 St. Austin, That such be wrought upon rather by Instruction than Injunction, by ad∣monishing than menacing. As when Strings are out of Tune, they are leisurely to be screwed up to Concord, not hastily, lest they break; since they desire(s) 1.474 no greater Liberty than to be silent. For as Curtius saith, lib. 7. Nemo Rex perinde ani∣mis imperare potest ac linguis: None can so well command the Mind as the Tongue. So in matters of Faith, he commends(t) 1.475 St. Austin's Rule, so to suppress Errors, that there may re∣main such as may repent they have sinned. Therefore he is not for using severity to such, whereby some may be made Hypo∣crites, and few Converts, according to that of Themistius, Purpurae tuae Cultores aliquos efficies, non Dei.

It is for such as these the Act of Uniformity provides, when it allows five besides the Family; and those that cannot be con∣tent with that Indulgence, may thank themselves, if they oc∣casion severer Laws against them.

CHAP. XII. Of the Clemency of a Prince, and how far Beneficial.

THIS is the soft Ermin that lines the Royal Robes of Princes, this is the orient Pearl which studs their Dia∣dems. None ever wore a finer or gentler Furr within his Impe∣rial Vest; nor ever had more conspicuous, valuable, or more genuine Jewels of this sort in his Crowns, than our late most Gracious and Merciful Soveraign of Blessed Memory. Who, as a Learned Person most truly observed long(a) 1.476 since, had goodness of Nature, Humanity, and Charity (or by what di∣vine Attribute you will call it) as the master Ingredient in his Composition: of whom most truly was verified, what out of Herodian, Pareus notes in his Aphorisms of Pertinax succeeding Commodus, (as that most Gracious King did to the Senate of Ty∣rants, and the wickedest Usurper Cromwel)(b) 1.477 That nothing more pleasant and profitable could happen to Subjects, than the Death of Tyrants, and the Empire of a Clement or Merci∣ful Prince succeeding. So that whatever I can write in com∣mendation mendation of this Royal Qualification, and much more, is but a Dawb, and no Varnish to his Statua, who in all our Annals will be stiled the Clement, Merciful, and Restorer. But I de∣sign not here his Apotheosis, yet could do no less than strow some Lillies on his Grave upon this occasion.* 1.478

Therefore to pass to the subject matter. The(c) 1.479 Philosopher observes, That the moderation of Theopompus much setled the Spartan Government; and adds, that what lessens a Kingdom in Power, augments it in Length and Duration. By which he can mean nothing else, but that mild, and not austere or violent se∣vere Government, is what gives a long continuance to Princi∣palities. However we may be sure a Prince's Mercifulness is one of those Vertues which are echoed through the longest and loudest Speaking-Trumpet.

(d) 1.480Sallust saith, That those who have tempered their Empire with Benignity and Clemency, have had all things Prosperous unto them, their very Enemies being more just to them that use it, than some Subjects are to others who less practise it. There∣fore the Orator(e) 1.481 saith, That Men (much more Princes) in nothing, make nearer approaches to the Deity, than in giving that to Men which he calls Salus; Health, Prosperity, and Be∣nefit to a People: to produce all which a Prince's Clemency must concurr.

The Divine(f) 1.482 Seneca gives an excellent Rule for Princes to observe that they deport themselves so to their People, as they would wish the Gods would do to them.

Such a Prince, the other(g) 1.483 Seneca the Poet elegantly describes,

which (if any other) our late King deserves to have writ on his Tomb:

Pulchrum eminere est inter illustres Viros: Consulere Patriae, parcere afflictis, fera Caede abstinere, tempus at{que} Irae dare, Orbi quietem, saeculo pacem suo: Haec summa Virtus, petitur hac Coelum Via.

Another famous(h) 1.484 Poet tells us, That divine Power en∣largeth temperate Government; and a grave(i) 1.485 Historian tells us, That moderately exercised Power conserves all that it hath acquired; for Mildness in all Affairs, and(k) 1.486 Obedience, is better payed to gentler Commands, than to the more rigid and austere.

A Prince, saith* 1.487 Tacitus, should endeavour to obtain Love among his Subjects, and fear among his Enemies. For as the‖ 1.488 Poet saith,

Non sic excubiae, non circumstantia tela, Quam tutatur Amor.—

That Love is a better defence than Halberts, Battle-Axes, and common Guards.* 1.489 Yet we have known a Prince (who for this Vertue of Clemency, deserved as much Love as any) designed to be assassinated, when wicked Conspirators hoped his small Guards would be too weak to defend his Roy∣al Person against their Force.

Therefore however commendable Clemency be in a Prince, yet it should not be his constant wear; some Scarlet, with the fine Linnen, makes not only a more splendid, but an use∣fuller show. Though the(l) 1.490 Poet say true,

Hoc Reges habent magnificum, Et ingens, nullus quod capiet Dies, Prodesse Miseris, supplices fido lare Protegere.—

Yet the Rule of the Prince of(m) 1.491 Historians, is to be observ'd, That a Sovereign know all the Stratagems of his Enemies, but not to prosecute all; to pardon small faults, and accommodate Severi∣ty to great Crimes. For as another Judicious(n) 1.492 Author saith, Healthful Severity should sometimes overcome the unprofitable and ineffectual kind of Clemency; for it often happens,(o) 1.493 That the unruly Patient makes the crueller Physician.

So(p) 1.494 Cotys the Thracian King, answered some that taxed him with Severity in a necessary Case, that it was to make his Subjects Healthful; for sometimes there is no other way to save the sound Parts, but to separate the gangrene by a total Ab∣scission, though a gentler Hand is desired by ignorant Spectators.

(q) 1.495In some Cases it is true, generous Souls as tender-mouthed Horses, are governed by a gentler Bitt; and out of(r) 1.496 Pity to such as wander, ignorantly missing, rather than willfully passing out of the way, it is better with a gentle Hand to lead them into right Paths, than to expel them.

All this Method our late King followed too long, till the

cunning Designings of the Achitophels, the Pride and Lust of pamper'd Men, the contempt of his forgiving Temper, and the wilful Deviations from their Allegiance, of others, had almost put it out of his Power to let the Dutiful and Just see that he had a Care for himself and them.

I cannot here omit what King(s) 1.497 James the First, his Royal Grandfather, saith of such a People; That he was the Phrygian that too late, and at too great a price, was wise: For whereas by all gentle means he endeavoured to allure them to Obedi∣ence, the contrary hapned to him; so that all the return was, he lost his Endeavours upon an ungrateful People, and unloos∣ned the Government by his Lenity. This Age hath found this Remarque too true; and though I should be loth to excite his Royal Grandson to any sort of Severity, yet I suppose it is a general Belief, That His present Majesty will not suffer Him∣self to be imposed upon by a Party that have so grosly abused the Lenity of His Royal Grandfather, Father, and Brother.* 1.498

Nor can it be judged Severity in a Prince (who hath seen so great and durable Clemency contemned, and disposing men ra∣ther to the most cruel and wicked Rebellions) to oblige these by the terror of his Laws to be kind to themselves, as well as the Publick, by creating no Disturbances, or publickly affront∣ing his Authority, as they did too lately in His Royal Brother's time. If there be any such, who for sinister Ends are at this time of day pressing him with what was urged to(t) 1.499 Cleome∣nes, That it becomes good Magistrates to be mild to all: It is to be presumed they may receive the like Answer, That it must not be to that degree, as to bring Himself into contempt. Much less ought a Prince to use it to those who have at any time heretofore joyned in those Tumultuous Petitions in His Royal Brothers Time, or in countenancing the Bill of Seclusion against His Royal Person.

For although His Majesty may follow the Example of(u) 1.500 Al∣phonsus, who said, That private Offences to his Person he could forgive; yet he ought to be severe against those Offences which concerned the Commonweal:(x) 1.501 Or as Lewis the Twelfth of France, who being advised (after he came to the Crown) to take some Revenge against that Great General Lewis de Tre∣moulie, that had fought against him, replied, He would not pu∣nish the Affronts done to the Duke of Orleance.* 1.502 And so His present Majesty may forgive the Injuries done to Him as Duke of York; yet it is not reasonable to think, but that he will stre∣nuously assert and defend the Rights and Prerogatives of the Crown. So that it will be His Majesty's Interest to trust none of those that would (contrary to the Laws of God and Man) so wickedly have precluded him from his Right to the Crown: And it will be adviseable for all them to repent them of that unjust Act, and transmit it as a Caution to their Posterity, never to attempt the like: Which will be more honourable and ad∣vantageous for them to do, than the striving to set up a spu∣rious Title.

CHAP. XIII. Of Prudence requisite in a Prince.

IT is Prudence directs all the great Affairs of a Monarch to that Scope and Terminus,* 1.503 to which all must aim, who design an happy Reign over good Subjects. By it they know when to relax, and when to straiten the Reins; where to place their Fa∣vours, and whom to employ in every Administration; and by it they are guarded from all the Vicious and Malevolent: For none dare disturb the Prudent, who have no unarmed Parts, being all Head, all Eyes, all Hands: Inaccessible by the Flatte∣rers, inaccessible by the Vain-glorious, the Ambitious, and De∣bauched. Such a Prince is served by the Just, the Wise, the Prudent, and Skilful. Nullum Numen abest, si sit Prudentia. Such a Prince is never short-sighted; he foresees every thing in its Original Cause, fits every thing to its End.* 1.504

The(a) 1.505 Philosopher tells us, That it is the proper and pecu∣liar Vertue of a King: For, more things, saith the Sententious(b) 1.506 Historian, are done in great Empires, by Conduct and Coun∣sels, than by Weapons and Hands: Hence Flaccus in his Argo∣nauticks

— non solis viribus aequum Credere, semper acri potior prudentia dextra.

Hence it is that the great(c) 1.507 Orator saith, It is the Property of Prudence to attract and allure Mens Minds, and render them useful. For, Vertues of different Classes by it are united; there being nothing that destroyeth Authority, so much as the unequal and untimely Interchange of Power, pressed too far, and relaxed too much; and Hatred, Timorousness, and Teme∣rity, Profuseness, and Parsimony: all which are balanced, ti∣med, and seasonably applied by Prudence.

What the Eye is to the Body, in discovering the various Fi∣gures, Dimensions, and Distances of Bodies, whereby we may direct our Course to or from them; that Light of the Soul (but much more pure) is Prudence, which sees not before only, and one Hemisphere singly, but every where round; whereby the Soul forms (saith a subtile(d) 1.508 Philosopher) a most beautiful Model and Exemplar of all its Actions.

It is this Vertue (saith another sage(e) 1.509 Author) which de∣signs and disposeth infinite Things, and so is the Parent and Conductor of all other Vertues, by whose Prescript and Rea∣son all things are ordered.

To Exercise this useful Vertue, requires a Man not only of Ingenuity,* 1.510 Wisdom, Memory, disquisitive and speculative; but

also conversant in great and various Affairs, in Histories Ancient and Modern, whereby he may be able to collate Matters, and adjust them to their proper Scope and Designs.

By this all Men (as well as Princes) take mature Counsel, consider things good and evil, commodious and incommodious, examine all Instruments, as to their fitness and unfitness, compare Circumstances, revise Examples, consider of timing of Business, Places and Persons, natural tendencies, and where Authority is to be used, and where Suasives; how to countermine, how to penetrate into hidden Counsels of others, and to unmask their Disguises; to ruminate upon things by-past, to order the pre∣sent, and provide for the future.

It is Prudence teacheth how to be skilful in knowing the Causes, Symptoms, speediest and most effectual Cures of the Diseases of a State. For, as Prudence is the very healthful con∣stitution of a Soul, exerting no sickly or distempered Actions;* 1.511 so a prudent Prince endeavoureth with all his Skill and Might to keep the State in a most perfect temper of Health, vigour, beauty, and firmness: So that under an old experienced Prince, there are no Symptoms of old and decrepit Age in his King∣dom.

Archytas the Pythagorean saith, As a General leads his Army,(f) 1.512 the Admiral orders his Fleet, the Pilot his Ship, or God governs the World, and the Soul the Body; so presentness of Prudence orders the Happiness of Life.

It were endless to remember all the Benefits that accrue to a Prince and his People by this only Vertue, Prudence. Be the Body of the Commonwealth in a Calenture by Factions and Seditions, a prudent Prince knows how to extinguish the Fire, by substracting the Feeders, or breaking the Force of it, by subdividing the complication of Causes, or diverting of it some other way. Doth it bleed by a Civil War? He can bind up the Wound. Does it suffer by want of Nourishment? He can supply it with suitable Food, that will neither pamper it to an unwieldy Sloth, or luxurious Licentiousness: He can by Bleed∣ing or Drenching clear it of all its superfluous Humours: He can asswage its Pains by removing Grievances or Oppressions: He can invigorate every languid part, by cordial Privileges and wholesom Laws; can set strait its dislocated or distorted Joynts, when any of the great Officers or Magistrates faulter, limp, or halt in their Duties. Medaea never knew so many Bal∣samick Herbs to renew the old Age of Jason, as a prudent Prince doth Rules and Methods to cure all the Distempers of his Kingdom, preserve it in a perfect Health, or restore it when declining.

The Consideration of all which, made(g) 1.513 Lipsius say, How many Vertues are necessary as Anchors to fasten the Ship of the Commonwealth? how various Prudence, as a Rudder to go∣vern it?

CHAP. XIV. Of a Prince's Courage and Conduct in Military Affairs.

IT is not onely necessary that a Prince should know and ex∣ercise all those Royal Vertues that make him adorable on the Throne, and in his Cabinet-Council, when he is clothed with the Robes of Majesty:* 1.514 But he must likewise, for the preservation of his People from Foreign Invasions, enlarging of his Empire, and keeping his Subjects in a profound Peace at home, free from intestine Seditions and Rebellions, put on his Armour, and act the Part of a Generalissimo.

This requires, according to the(a) 1.515 Philosopher, many Ver∣tues to establish it. Therefore in another place(b) 1.516 he saith, In some Countries the Laws were framed towards the attaining of particular Ends to the Governours and People: and in some the End of the Laws were, that they might rule over their Neighbours; as he instanceth in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan Government, where the greatest part of their Laws were ac∣commodated to Warfare; and concludes, That in all Nations which can hope to be Superiour to others, such Laws are in ho∣nour; as he instanceth in the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celtae. So in Carthage, to encourage Military Service, so many Rings were given to the Soldiery, as they had served in several Expeditions. In Macedonia it had been a Law, that he that had killed no Enemy, was girt with an Halter: And among the Scy∣thians, That such an one should not drink of a Cup which at a certain Solemn Feast was to pass round. Among the Spaniards there were as many Obelisks, or pointed Pillars, set about their Graves, as they had killed Enemies. All which, and infinite more Places in(c) 1.517 him, and other Authors produceable, suffici∣ently clear the necessity of a Prince's both having and encou∣raging Military Force: and all are as so many Arguments, That it is very necessary, and conducible to the Prince's Glory and Safety, as well as his Peoples, that he be not only valiant and couragious in his own Person, but that he understand the Office of a great General. There are none more famous in the World, than such Princes as have themselves led and headed their own Armies; as is most eminently proved in Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. So in our King Richard the First, and Edward the First.

Hence it is that(d) 1.518 Caesar was wont to say, There are two things which obtain, keep, and encrease the Princedom, viz. Soldiers and Money. For, as the great(e) 1.519 Historian observes, By Sloth no great Empires are held together, but it must be done by Force of Men and Arms: It being(f) 1.520 the part of a Private Family to retain its own; but to carry Arms abroad, is a Kingly Praise.

Such a Prince who hath (when a Subject) hazzarded his Life for his King and Country, shown his great skill in order∣ing and providing for his Army, in disciplining it,* 1.521 hath been fortunate and successful, hath a Genius to military Employ∣ment, a brisk and vigorous Soul, not only (when he comes to be Sovereign himself) puts a fresh Spirit into his People by raising their Hopes and Confidence that he will encrease the Glory of his Nation; but it makes him secure at home from Seditions and Rebellions. For he is very fool-hardy, or despe∣rately Revengeful, that will challenge a single Man who is ex∣perimented to have Valour and Skill at his Weapon: much more is he who knowing his Prince such an one, and who hath the Power of his Kingdom to assist and defend him, will offer to molest his peaceable Reign, unless he find some advan∣tagious opportunity strangely favourable to his Design, or take some Season before such a Prince be well setled in his Throne (as despairing ever after to effect any thing) and be in that des∣perate Condition, that if he then cannot push forward his De∣signs, he must for ever live inglorious and miserable. Such was the Case of the rash, ingrateful, and aspiring Duke of Mon∣mouth, who to the eternal discredit of the name of Protestant, so unpolitickly as well as maliciously raised the late Rebellion against his Lawful Soveraign, pretending a Legitimacy, which his Father (that the best of all Men living knew the falshood of) disowned, and more than once made publick Declaration of it. How he prospered in this attempt, the World knows; and if He and his Advisers had not been besotted, they might have easily foreseen.

Besides this great and happy advantage to a valorous and Military Prince,* 1.522 in the securing his own Country in Peace within themselves, the Benefit is likewise great in the preventing of any affronts, injuries, or Indignities to him or his People, from any of his Neighbours; for none dare(g) 1.523 provoke or do Injury to a King, his Kingdom, or People, saith Lampridius, that knows the Prince prepared, forward, and ready to vindicate his People.

This military Genius in a Prince being supperadded to his other Royal Vertues and Qualifications, furbisheth all their Arms, sets a fresh Gloss and Lustre upon them; and such a Prince be∣ing generally successful in his Attempts, (for that commonly gives the first notice of his Courage and Conduct) will have every one readily flock to his Standard, to(h) 1.524 expose them∣selves betwixt him and the points of Traitors Swords, will have them throw themselves and their Fortunes whereever the safety of their King requires it. So Cicero notes, that Fabi∣us Maximus, Marcellus, Scipio, Marius and other great Gene∣rals, had the Emperors Office and Armies committed to them not only for their Vertues, but also by reason of their for∣tunateness, to whom(i) 1.525 the Winds and Tempests have been fa∣vourable. It greatly(k) 1.526 conducing to the management of

War, what opinion the Enemies and Allies have of such Ge∣nerals, as the same Orator notes: and the like may be said of Warlike Kings.

What immortal Glory is it to England, that it hath had King Richard the First,* 1.527 who carried his victorious Ensigns to the Ho∣ly Land! What a Memorial of his Name, and of the Prowess of his People hath King Edward the First left to all Posterity, by the advancing his conquering Armes into the very High-Lands of Scotland!* 1.528 What renown did King Edward the Third, and the Black Prince his Son win in France, when they not only won so great Victories, but brought the King Prisoner, and (what no Nation else can boast of) had at the same time the King of Scotland also Prisoner! It may be easily conceived that these two valiant Princes, and the Sons of that great King, spirited the whole English Nation; and in that Age the Renown of it equal∣led, what now the French ascribe to their great King.

The Annals swell with the Atchievements of Henry the Fifth, who in so few Years,* 1.529 upon the matter, subdued all France. So that his Infant Son was Crowned King at Paris.

It is not to be expected that many Ages can produce such Ex∣amples; but every Reader of History may observe, That in e∣very Age some one or two Crowned Heads carry the Trophies from all the rest, fill their Countries with Triumphal Arches, and raise pyramids of Glory to their own, and their Countries high Renown.

A strange Factiousness in the Reigns of our three last Kings, and the dreadful Rebellion,* 1.530 have deprived them of the oppor∣tunity of showing the English Prowess on the publick Theater, as it had been before. Yet when they were employed, they showed they still retained the old English Valour; and now that God hath sent us a King who hath aided both the French and Spanish Armies,* 1.531 more signally Triumphed at Sea over the Dutch, than any Admiral did before or since: Who hath a Soul and Genius inclined to Warlike and Heroic Actions, and hath with himself resolved, and publickly to his two Houses declared, by the As∣sistance and Blessing of God, He will adventure his Person as far as any Man in his Dominions for the Good of his People, and their safety; and endeavour to raise the renown and repute of England as high as any of his Royal Predecessors. I can∣not see (if God prolong his Reign) why we should not hope to reap all the advantages either England or any other Nation have enjoyed under their most Victorious Princes: and though by so early a Rebellion he hath been necessitated to enter the Field so soon, to suppress his ungrateful Subjects; it was but the giving him occasion to whet that Sword, and scour his Armour, which had long been unexposed to the Sun; and by this Speci∣men of his Courage, Conduct, and good Fortune, and his Subjects Valour, show to the World, that he is able to secure his People from any Foreign Hostile Attacques: And if any of

his Neighbours be found to have furnished these Rebels with Arms and Money; no doubt his Loyal Subjects will be very pressing to be imployed to repay their kindness:* 1.532 and they will find, that(l) 1.533 according to the Kings Warlike Spirit, so will his Armies be; it being true of himself, what(m) 1.534 Cice∣ro saith of another, That there hath been no kind of War in which Fortune hath not exercised him; so that his Armies may be secure both in his Discipline and Example. The Qualifica∣tions of an Emperor (as(n) 1.535 Cicero describes them) all con∣curring in his Royal Person, (viz.) Labour in Business, Forti∣tude in Danger, Industry in Action, and Swiftness in Executi∣on, joyned with great Temperance, Faith and Humanity; to which I may adjoyn that of Claudian,

— Ductorque placebit, Qui non praecipiti rapiet simul omnia casu; Sed qui maturo vel laeta, vel aspera rerum Consilio momenta regens, nec tristibus impar, Nec pro successu tumidus: spaciumque norandi, Vincendique modum, mutatis noscet habenis.

CHAP. XV. Of the Burthen and Care of Kings in Governing.

THere are as many other Vertues requisite in a good King, as there are in a good Man; but I have only treated of those that are the Orientest of the Crown Jewels.

I shall now consider two great advantages, that accrue to People by Kingly Government: The first is the Burthen and Care that Kings undergo in the Government of their People; and the second, the benefit to the People in the Hereditariness of Monarchy: and then pass to the King's Sovereignty, and the principal Branches of it.

(a) 1.536Ammianus tells us, That Empire is nothing else but the Care of the safety of others, which, according to the extent of their Dominions, the well or ill Temperedness of their Subjects, are greater or less, as will be obvious to all that will consider the continual Consultations and Directions,* 1.537 necessary to be sedulously undergone and issued forth, the Dispatches, In∣telligences and regular ordering such an immense Body: Which made the great(b) 1.538 Moralist and Courtier experimentally to assert, That the Sovereigns Watchfulness makes our Sleep se∣cure, his Labour procures our Holy-days, his Industry our De∣light, his continual Employment our Vacation; and that he may enjoy sometimes a Relaxation, but never a Freedom from Cares. Which indeed can be no otherwise, when we consider

what he else-where(c) 1.539 saith, That the Care of this one Sove∣reign watcheth for the Health of the whole, and every parti∣cular. So that the immense(d) 1.540 Multitude (whether we take it for Men or Business) is encompassed with the Soul of one, by his Spirit is governed, and by his Reason is bowed or in∣clined.

I find it reported of Pericles, That so often as he was made Commander in Chief, he used at the putting on the Military Cloak, to excite himself to the consideration of the Weight of his Employment, by observing that he was to command o∣ver Freemen,(e) 1.541 Graecians and Athenians; upon which Re∣flection he was induced to approve himself more Diligent, Careful and Industrious,* 1.542 having the Burthen of all their con∣cerns upon him.

So a great and learned(f) 1.543 Author tells us, He ought not to sleep who sits at the Helm, to pilot the Ship, since no Sea hath so great Tempests, as every Kingdom hath. Therefore a Prince is assiduously and constantly to watch, lest he err; be∣cause he cannot do so, but it is with Mischief to many.

So the(g) 1.544 Tragedian, not unelegantly according to his wont, describes the Cares of Kings thus,—One Care adds Fatigues to another, and new Tempests unquiet their minds; so that the successive rolling Waves of the Sea, rage not so on the Libyan Shelves or Quicksands, nor doth sleep, the Subduer of Cares, unload their Breasts.

(h) 1.545Alexander Severus having Information, That Ovinius Ca∣millus (a Senator of an Antient Family, but withal delicate∣ly effeminate) intended a Rebellion, affecting the Govern∣ment; sent for him to the Palace, and gave him thanks, that he, when other good Men refused, did spontaneously offer himself to take care of the Republick; carried him to the Se∣nate, and called him his Companion in the Empire; took him home, and made him wear the Imperial Robes; took him to walk with him a five Miles march, allowing him, when tired, an Horse; and when he was wearied of riding (being one not used to bodily Labour) he ordered him a Chariot, and by other ways, letting him understand, that the weight of Go∣vernment was not to be sustained by such Shoulders as his, so wearied and discouraged him, that he desired to be freed from the toylsomeness of it: and when he understood the Empe∣rors drift, and expected his severity, he only recommended him to those Soldiers that were forward to elect him, and sent him to his Village.

If therefore such little Tryals discouraged Camillus, what must we think it will do any Prince that hath untractable Sub∣jects, who force him to make Essays of various Methods to re∣claim them, and of a constant standing upon his Guard to se∣cure himself and the Government? Such are they who make many Princes Reigns Calamitous, that might have been calm and peaceable.

Kingdoms, saith my Lord St. Albans, represent our Bodies,* 1.546 have their times of Health and Sickness, Seasons of Prosperity and Adversity, flourish with Wealth, and languish in Poverty and Want, suffer Distempers, Alterations and Changes. If therefore the Care and Concern of the Physician be great, that hath the Health of many Patients under his Cure: How much more must this great Aesculapius's be, who hath the superintending of in∣finite Numbers of Subjects of all Degrees, to preserve them in their perfect State of Felicity and Happiness, to watch over the growth of depraved Humors, and hinder their Ferments from boyling into the Fevers and Calentures of Rebellion, to re∣move all the Obstructions that may hinder the equal distribu∣tion of Nourishment in Trade, Commerce, and the free Ener∣gy and Force of the Laws; so to order the infinite Varieties of Tempers and Dispositions, that the very lucta and jarring of them, may produce an Harmony in the whole. Besides these, there is a Necessity to cherish the Vertuous and the Brave, to discountenance the Vitious and Debauched, and keep them from infecting others; and finally so to manage all things, as not only the present Age, but remote Posterity, may find the happy Effects of his Reign. This is to undergo the nobilem Servitutem, as Antigonus told his Son, Kingship was.* 1.547

Therefore Philo observes, That as the Pilot must change his Sails and Rudder; and as the Physician useth not one kind of Remedy for all Diseases, but observing the Encrease or Re∣misness of Symptoms, the plenty or want of Humors, and ac∣cording to the changes of Causes, tries various Experiments: So a Supreme Governour ought to be multiform, or endow∣ed with variety of Qualifications; to act one way in times of Peace, and another in War: being opposed by few, to act reso∣lutely and couragiously; if by many, to add to these Authori∣tative Suasives; in publick Dangers to act himself, and to commit those Ministeries to others which require Labour more than Conduct: In his Councils to be a Judge, in his Exche∣quer an Accountant, in his Armies a General, in his Navies Admiral; in his whole Dominions the prime Gentleman, Pa∣triot, and Peer, in Vertue as well as Place.

Besides all these foregoing Considerations, though a Prince by his own Justice, Prudence and other Regal Vertues, and the well disposedness of his People may keep his own Domi∣mions in Peace: and though there were no Whirlwinds, Earth∣quakes or Trepidations of Faction and Sedition in his own Kingdom; yet a King's Care is no less in making diligent Ob∣servations upon the Designs and Actions of all his Neighbour-Princes and States; to shelter his own Subjects from Tempests and Hurricanes from abroad, to divert Storms,* 1.548 to mingle In∣terests, or divide, as shall be most for the advantage of his Sub∣jects; to assist his Allies, to countermine the Clandestine Designs of his Enemies abroad.

These require an Atlas to support this immense Structure of Government:* 1.549 These require many Hands of the roughest, delicatest and strongest; many Feet of the swiftest and steadi∣est; many strong Shoulders and brawny Arms; many severe commanding or charming Eyes; many wise, subtle and toyl∣ing Brains; infinite Varieties of Tempers and Dispositions, which must be directed, ordered and imployed by that presi∣ding Soul, that every where, in every part, and in all seasons, must give Life and Energy to all its Members, Faculties and Im∣ployments.

Furthermore,* 1.550 the Actions of Princes after their deaths, will be judged(i) 1.551 without Flattery and Varnish. As after Death and Corruption of parts, the Vertues of Kings perfume their Graves, ennoble, and by Examples, refine Posterity, and leave a taste of immortality behind, out-living their Mar∣ble. So if they rule ill, they cannot think by their(k) 1.552 pre∣sent Power, to extinguish the memory of the next Age, saith the judicious Historian. Therefore Lipsius saith,‖ 1.553 After their Deaths, there is no place then, or time, wherein the Ghosts of detested Princes will be free from Execration.

Since therefore Kings are like heavenly bodies, cause good or evil times, have much Veneration, but no rest; since their Examples are constantly imitated; so that, as* 1.554 Lipsius saith, If a Prince lead to Vertue, we follow; if to Vice, we easily bend to it; if he live happily, we flourish; if unfortu∣nately, we fall into the praecipice with him: Or that of Pliny be true, That Subjects are mostly plyant, and easily handed in∣to whatsoever way the Prince leads; it necessarily follows, That this Consideration must bring a great Addition to their Cares. For such elevated Souls must needs undergo great An∣xiety, how to comport themselves so, as being conspicuous in Vertue and Conduct, they may be secure of good Report. For as(l) 1.555 Seneca saith, Fame wafts abroad all the Deeds and Works of Princes, that they cannot more lay hid than the Sun. Hence Possibly we may conclude the Reason of that Inscription on Constantine's and others Coyn, Soli invicto Comiti: For as the Sun, not only by his Light and enlivening Heat, brings that unspeakable benefit to the whole Earth and living Creatures, as a King is to do to his Subjects; so by its Diurnal Motion, we discover it never to be at rest.

Therefore it must be a great Care in a Prince (that is placed in his Kingdom, as the Sun in our Vortex, whereby his Actions can never be long hid) that he act nothing that(m) 1.556 may de∣tract from his Fame, and the Dignity of his Place. All the Actions of Sovereigns, being not only Examples but Precepts; there being no such Incentments to Vertue or Vice, as their Practices.

Besides,* 1.557 what I have hitherto delivered on this Head, there lies still an heavier Burthen upon a Prince, That for his Sub∣jects sake, he be not only vertuous himself, but by all his Indu∣stry,

endeavour to take care that they be so likewise. I know this is much facilitated by his own Example: For as(n) 1.558 Pliny saith, The Life of the Prince is a standing Law of manners, to it we direct our course, are all Heliotropes turning to it. For Subjects need not so much command as Example: yet we find, that when some in the Senate moved(o) 1.559 Tiberius, that he would restrain the Roman Luxury; he writes to them, That he knows not whether he should perswade them to pass by the strong and overgrown Vices, rather than to discover how unable they were to suppress them; and so tells them that he would not have the matter of envy to fall upon him, but refers it to the proper Officers: There being(p) 1.560 something greater and more sub∣lime, required of a Prince, (viz. the guarding of Italy, the Sea and Provinces.

By this we may see how arduous a task it is to root out vici∣ous Customs and Habits, which by a short Intermission of Exe∣cuting the Laws severely, will soon be so overgrown,* 1.561 that it will be much Labour to dig up their Roots, and requires a long and frequent weeding, 'till all the Young Plants, the Evil Plen∣tiful Seed hath produced, be cleansed out of the Ground.

This Tiberius, that declined this task, was at that time in such esteem, that some Provinces (as particularly the further Spain) would have built Temples to him; and he denying that, yet could tell the Senate, That it was(q) 1.562 enough to him that he possessed the Supreme place, and desired them to witness, and Posterity to remember, That they believed he was worthy of his Ancestors, was provident of their Affairs, constant in Danger, not fearful to give Offence to any, for the profit of the Commonwealth. These things, to him, should be Temples and the beautifulest Statues. In this we find a short Descripti∣on of the Burthen of a Prince, and a shorter but comprehen∣sive one in(r) 1.563 Sallust, That the greatest Empires have the greatest Cares.

(s) 1.564Tacitus tells us of Vespasian. That he was Author of a stricter manner of living than formerly, using the Ancient Fru∣gal Dyet, and plainer Cloths; which had that effect, that the study to imitate the Prince, was more efficacious, than the Fear and Punishment of the Laws.

If then, to be conspicuous in all sorts of Vertue, and the Actions(t) 1.565 that flow from them, and the whole, higher and lower class of them, in the most Comprehensive Qualifications, be no small Labour, and require no small sedulous Care to ef∣fect in ones self; how much more must it be, to make so ma∣ny Millions more Vertuous by Example, Precept, strict Vigi∣lance and Punishments? Every one that attentively reflects on this, must needs own it an Herculean Labour, and such as ex∣ceeds almost the Apprehension of the Subjects.

Since then, we are happy in such a King as hath laid this as a Corner Stone upon which his Throne is built,* 1.566 by his own Ex∣ample, to discountenance all Vice; and since so great and

weighty a Burthen of the well-ordering and governing so great a People lies with great pressure upon him, (for our ease and tranquillity) let us not be so impolitick, unworthy, or ingrateful by Seditions, Factions, or Rebellions to cause him to undergo more disquiets. For the result will be, Our own Miseries and Calamities will sit close behind us, when we set our Faces against such a Prince, worthy of the most Imperial of Diadems.

CHAP. XVI. Of the King's Authority and Soveraignty.

AN awful Reverence,* 1.567 Qualm, and Trembling, must neces∣sarily surprise every one that considerately raiseth his Thoughts to contemplate so sublime a Subject as the Soveraign∣ty of Princes; least what he delivers should appear too dis-spi∣rited, and below the dignity of the Theam; or he should be guilty of such Indiscretion, as to think he could enrich the Crown and Scepter with Lacker of his own Composure.

(a) 1.568Pliny the younger tells us, that the great Naturalist, his Uncle, was so desirous to discover the true causes of the burning of Vesuvius, what materials they were that af∣forded Fuel to so lasting a Fire, and by what imprisoned Spi∣rits, so violent eruptions of Flame and Cinders, were at times belched out of the Caverns of that Mountain (though less stu∣pendious than Aetna, Hecla, or other Vulcano's) that his curio∣sity led him to climb so near the Eruptions of those Flames, that Posterity lost the Benefit of his Observations, by his un∣timely Death in the approaches he made.

We daily see the Pyralis not only singe her Wings, but often lose her Life by her rash approaches to the Flame. It behoves me therefore, with all the Circumspection I can, to endeavour to keep my self from such a Fate, as Temerity, too prying or daring an Attempt, may bring upon me on the one hand; or that I fall not into as unpitied a Destiny of being contemned and despised for too gross and palpable Flattery, in equalling the Throne of Kings with that of the Deity.* 1.569

A bold stroke of this kind of Sycophantry we find in(b) 1.570 Va∣lerius Maximus his Epistle Dedicatory to Tiberius; wherein he tells him that he invokes him as Patron of his Work, to whom, by the consent of Men and Gods, the Government of Sea and Land was given; by whose Heavenly Providence, the Ver∣tues he was to treat of were most benignly cherished, and the Vices severely Chastized: and in the same stile (though other∣wise reputed a grave Author) he goes on, ascribing a Divinity to his Person; telling him, that if from Jove the antient Orators

begun their Speeches, and the Poets invoked some Deity, He more(c) 1.571 justly courted his Favour; other Divinities being founded upon Mens Opinions, but that of Tiberius's, by the Te∣stimony of the present Age, was equal to the Deities of Juli∣us or Augustus. Yet this Tiberius was not only a wicked Prince, but one that rejected such Deifyings, as we find in Tacitus, that the farther Spain having sent Embassadors to the Senate, that ac∣cording to the Example of Asia, they might erect a Temple to Tiberius and his Mother; upon which occasion, (saith my(d) 1.572 Author) being resolved to slight the Honour, and to stifle the Rumour, that he inclined to Ambition, he tells the Senate, That he had not appeared averse to the desires of those of Asia, be∣cause Augustus had not prohibited a Temple to be built to him and Rome, at Pergamus; and he was resolved to observe all his deeds and resolutions as a Law, and had yielded to the E∣recting that Temple, the rather, because to the Worship of him∣self, the Veneration(e) 1.573 of the Senate was joined. But as it was pardonable once to have received that honour. so to be made sacred with the Image of the Deity through all the(f) 1.574 Provinces, was to be Ambitious and Proud, and the Honour of Augustus would be lessened, if it were made common by promiscuous Adulations. Therefore he tells the Senate that he knew himself to be a mortal Man, and to exercise the offices of Men, and it was enough to him, if he filled the prime place, was worthy of his Ancestors, &c. (as I have touched before.)(g) 1.575 These in their Minds, should to him be Temples, and the most beautiful Images, which should be durable; for those which are built of Stone, if the judgment of Posterity be turned to Hatred, are despised as their Sepulchers.

Yet however this subtile Emperor managed this affair,* 1.576 it must be acknowledged, that some Princes have been so Vain-glorious, as to deem themselves above the condition of Mortals; as we have Instances in Amulius(h) 1.577 King of the Latines, and after him in(i) 1.578 Heliogabalus, who endeavoured to appear such by imitating Lightning. So it is recorded of(k) 1.579 Alex∣ander, that he desired to be reputed the Son of Jupiter Ammon; and when he was wounded at the assault of Mazaga, he said, though he was said to be Jupiter's Son, yet he felt the smart, though his Flatterers told him it was not Blood was spilt, but a more generous Ichor of the Gods that run in his Veins. So(l) 1.580 Psaphon the Libyan, taught the Birds to stile him a great God. So(m) 1.581 Lysander had Altars built to him, and Sacrifi∣ces appointed in Honour of him, and had his Brass Statue ere∣cted at Delphos. Julius(n) 1.582 Caesar likewise suffered such Ho∣nours to be decreed to him, as were the Badges and peculiar Ensigns of a Divinity, as Temples and Altars, a Priest and Couch. Of Augustus and Tiberius I have touched before. Ca∣ligula proceeded something higher, for he took off the Heads of the Statues of Jupiter Olympius, and other of their repu∣ted Deities, and placed the figure of his own Head upon them,

and had his Temples, Priests and Sacrifices, and was desirous to be worshipped as a Deity. The like Examples might be pro∣duced of Domitian, Dioclesian and others.

It is to be owned, That the longer space of time is measu∣red, since these kind of adorations were affected by these Hea∣then Emperors,* 1.583 the less of esteem and value they obtain; yet it is worth observing likewise, what the most judicious(o) 1.584 Historian notes, upon the fore-cited occasion, That some ascribed the refu∣sing of these Divine Honours to Tiberius's modesty; others, to the distrust he might have of the Senates relishing it well; others in∣terpreted it a Token of a low degenerate Spirit: for, as he observes, The best of all Mortals have coveted the highest Ho∣nors; so Hercules and Bacchus, among the Greeks, and among the Romans, Quirinus were added to the Number of the Gods! Therefore he commends Augustus, that hoped for such Ho∣nours, and to such Princes all things else are added. For that which he calls a prosperous Memory, he saith is principally to be obtained; and concludes, That Fame being contemned, so likewise are Vertues.

Although therefore the Vanity of such Emperors, as requi∣red this Superfetation of Honour,* 1.585 be justly censured; yet when we abstractedly consider the Soveraignty of Princes, from their Personal lessening of their esteem, by unkingly Vi∣ces; we must needs pay the greatest deference to it, as that which is a lively Shadow of that Divinity, by which Kings Reign.

So(p) 1.586 Curtius tells us, That the Sovereignty is the Defence of that Salus Populi; which is the very Ground-Work-stone of Government: And Seneca truly observes, That once(q) 1.587 re∣move Majesty, that is, Soveraignty) and the whole Contexture of Government flies into Splinters, or is disjoynted. For with∣out a Soveraignty (beyond which is no Appeal) be lodged somewhere, no People can be governed: That(r) 1.588 being that Soul, that Life which enlivens, directs and orders all the Sub∣jects in their several Capacities; more sensibly than the Philo∣sophers Aether, or Anima Mundi, doth the Macrocosm or Sub∣lunary World. Therefore Seneca saith of the Soveraign, That he is the Bond which holds fast the State together; he is that vital Breath which so many Thousands draw in, which other∣wise, as a liveless and unwieldy Load, would prove a Booty, if that Soul of the Empire were taken away.

Of this Sovereignty of Princes it is, that(s) 1.589 Ecphantas the Pythagorean saith, It is the Priviledge first of God, and then of the King, under him, not to be ruled by any: and it may be ra∣tionally conceived, that it was from this sence of absolute Sove∣reignty, flowing from the Divine Being that disposeth of the great and weighty Affair of Government; That Sovereigns are both ••n Scripture, and by Heathen and Christian Writers, called Gods: The import of which Name being a Denomination of a Being, Sovereign over other subjected Beings. In the Chapter of

Monarchy I have recited some of the expressions in Scripture; and for Heathen Writers, one can scarce read any Historian, where their Emperors are not called Dii or Divi;(t) 1.590 and in Justi∣nian, Divus Imperator is generally used for Emperor.

So the Majestic Pavillions, or Cloath of Estate, under which the Emperors usually sate, were called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, little Heavens, for such Gods to sit under: and tho' some(u) 1.591 affected these too much, or had them given them by their Flatterers (as in Mar∣tial of Domitian,

—Edictum Domini Deique nostri;

and the Persian Monarchs, more than any, affected such Ti∣tles, as(w) 1.592 Rex Regum Sapor, particeps Syderum, Frater Solis & Lunae; Sapor King of Kings, partaker of the Stars, or one en∣dowed with the Heavenly Nature of the Stars, Brother of the Sun and Moon;) yet if we take these Expressions in the sence of the Emperor Cantacuzen, it may be allowed: For he saith,(x) 1.593 That absolutely the Name of Lord, and so of God, is only due to God Almighty, and that man hath it, with some Addi∣tion of Person or Place. And we may consider, that as the Su∣premacy of Princes and their Governments is delegate from the highest (their Judgment being also called his) so in a ge∣neral Name they are titled Gods, even by God himself,(y) 1.594 be∣cause here on Earth, they should, for their Power, be his Imi∣tators; and we find the Apostle Rom. 13. calls Supreme Gover∣nours, Potestates supereminentes.

In the Codes we frequently read (long after Christianity was received) nostra Divinitas, nostra Perennitas, nostra Aeternitas, Divinae Vocis Oraculum: Yet we find the Chri∣stian Fathers refusing to give the Title of God to the Heathen Emperors. So(z) 1.595 Socrates saith, He doubts he shall be reprehended of some, because he did not stile the Emperors most Divine, and Lords, and by other Titles, which the use of times had allowed: And(a) 1.596 Tertullian saith, That he cannot call the Emperor God, either because he can∣not lie, or dare not mock him; or because he will not be so stiled, who is a Man: For he denies him (saith he) to be Emperor, who calls him a God; for unless he be a Man, he is no Emperor.

This stile of God, the Samaritans gave to Antiochus(b) 1.597 Epi∣phanes, stiling him in their Epistles, God, who had, to his ut∣most, defiled the Temple of the true God: So the Jews in their(c) 1.598 Acclamations, stiled Herod Agrippa, no longer Man but a Deity; and(d) 1.599 Mezentius, commanding his Subjects to offer unto him all such Sacrifices as they had Destinated to the Gods, professing withal, that no Deity was above himself; justly de∣served the Title of contemptor Divûm.

The obsequious Impiety in the Elder times (saith(*) 1.600 Mr. Selden) of attributing the Name of God to the Emperors,

was the Cause, it seems, that, as well in the Christian as Hea∣thenish Times and States,* 1.601 the Subjects of the Empire continu∣ed that ill Custom of swearing by their Princes: So in Antoni∣nus's and Commodus's time, it was usual to swear per Genium Principis, & per Principis Venerationem, as it is in a Rescript of(e) 1.602 Alexander Severus; under whom the learned(f) 1.603 Tertul∣lian upbraids the Romans, that they readilier forswore them∣selves by all the Gods, than by the one Genius of Caesar. Horace speaking of Augustus, saith,

Jurandas{que} tuum per Nomen ponimus Aras:

and(g) 1.604 Vegetius gives the Reason for it, because to the Em∣peror, when he takes the Name of Augustus upon him, faith∣ful Devotion is to be exhibited, and watchful Service, as to a present and corporal God. For he that is a private, or a mili∣tary Person, serves God, when he faithfully loves him who go∣verneth by Gods Authority: from whence and many other Au∣thorities the great Selden saith it appears, how, both among Chri∣stians, Mahometans and Heathens, a certain Sanctitas Regum (as in Suetonius, Julius Caesar calls it) was specially regarded; and he instanceth in many Nations who had a Deities Name in the Kings; as from Baal and Astaroth, Beleastartus, Abdastartus, Ithobaal; so from Nebo a Babylonian Idol, Nebuchodonezar, Na∣bopollassar; so from Belin or Abellio, a British Deity, Cassebelin, Cynobelin. All which seem not only to be the Affectation of the Princes, but to be intended to denote the Divine Chara∣cter that Princes bore.* 1.605

Hence we may Note,* 1.606 That the Name of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Czar is used by all the German and Muscovite Empero••s: because the Roman Empire was founded by Julius Caesar; and this Custom was of older Date: For in Holy Story, all the Aegyptian Kings, 'till Solomon's time, are called Pharaoh; which was not a pro∣per Name or Sirname of a Family, but only a Title which eve∣ry one had belonging to him, as he was King; which, as Mane∣tho saith, begun in Pharaoh Narecho, and Josephus saith in Me∣nis, much ancienter than Abraham; but Suidas is positive, That it was derived from the first King, or him that first had that called Ptolomies: So the Parthian Princes, from Arsaces (their first great Monarch) were called Arsaces; according to whose Memory, saith(h) 1.607 Justin, the Parthians attributed that Honour, that all their Kings, from thence forward, were called Arsaces.

So the Title of Augustus was given to Octavius, next Successor to Julius, by the Senate, as if he had been something more than Hu∣man, saith(i) 1.608 Dio: And as(k) 1.609 Suetonius saith, not only by a new, but a more ample Sirname, because, that all Reli∣gious places, in which any thing Augurly was consecrated, were called Augnsta; for which he cites Ennius,

Augusto Augurio, post{que} inclyta condita Roma est.

This came from Augeo, which (besides the common sense of it) is a proper word enough to sacrifice, as augere Hostias; and in Sextus Pompeius Augustus is interpreted Sanctus; the Greeks in∣terpret it by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Venerable or most honourable; and it seems to be translated from the holy Use of the Word, whence it was derived: and as(l) 1.610 Dio saith, a Designation of the splendor or greatness of their Dignity, the Emperors after were stiled Caesares Augusti; neither of the words denoting any Power in them; but are now, and ever since the first Family ended, honorary. According to this kind of continuance of Names in Succession, are those Patronymics of Achemenidae in the Persian Kings, Alevadae in the Thessalian, Cecropidae in the A∣thenian; from Achemenes, Alevas, Cecrops: So the Alban Kings in Italy, had every of them the addition of Sylvius, most of the Bithynian Kings were called Nicomedes.

In the latter times, the Constantinopolitan Emperors much affected to give their Children and themselves, the great Name of Constantine. So were the Danish Kings anciently titled Shieldungs from their King Shield: The French had their Mero∣vings, and the old Kentish Kingdom here its Oiscings from Me∣rove and Oisca. Concerning this successive assuming such hono∣rary Names from the first Families, the curious Reader may observe many more in the most disquisitive Mr. Selden.

The use I make of it is to show, That Sovereign Princes,* 1.611 as some of them affected to derive their Power and Authority from the Deity; so others from such as had been more Signal and Eminent in their several Reigns, that they might with the Title, seem to derive a Fame, Glory and Authority from them, and in those Attributes, be judged their rightful Successors.* 1.612

Before I treat of some Attributes that are given to Sovereign Princes, I shall take notice of some things I have either omit∣ted, or less fully explained in the Chapter of Monarchy; espe∣cially considering it will give some light to the Authority and Sovereignty, many learned Men have ascribed to Princes in general.

(m) 1.613Cedrenus makes Adam the first King and Governour, when he saith he governed or commanded all mankind as long as he lived, and Seth succeeded him in the Empire: and if we may believe the Letter of Alexander the Great to Aristotle, men∣tioned by(n) 1.614 Joseph Ben Gorion a Jew, and Rabbi Abraham, Zacuthius and others, Kenan the Son of Enoch, Grandchild of Seth, was Emperor over all the World. In Berosus we find the Kings of Chaldaea, that were before the Flood; were Alorus, Alasparns, Amchon, Amenon, Metalarus, Daorus, Adorachus, Amphis, Ottartes and Xisuther; which according to Cedrenus and others, was Noah: From him the Greek Authors derive the supreme Monarchy of the Earth to Sem.

The first mention in Holy Writ of a Kingdom, is that of Nimrod's;* 1.615 of whom Moses saith, The beginning of his King∣dom was in Babel, Erech, Acad, and Calna, in the Land of Sinaar: and he is by most Writers judged the Founder of the Assyrian Monarchy, which he had begun about the Forty fifth Year of Abraham. Cedrenus saith, The Assyrians made Nimrod a God, and placed him among the Stars of Heaven, and called him Orion. In his Age (saith the Judicious(o) 1.616 Selden) there was so general a Propagation of this Title of King over the Earth, that there is scarce a Nation whereof there is Memory in those Ages, without a King, or Prince, or Monarch assigned to it. So, besides the Division of the Earth among Noah's Po∣sterity, (said in Scripture to be according to their Language, and according to the Families in their Nations) we find in Profane Histories,* 1.617 that the Kingdom of the Sicyonians began in Aegialeus, that of Tanaus in Scythia, and of Vexoris in Aegypt; and others are cast in, in the Age of Nimrod. In the Holy Text also are frequent Occurrences of Kings to be referred to that Age; as that of Abraham's Wars with Kedorlaomer King of Elam, and the Kings of divers other Nations are mentioned; whence it is,(p) 1.618 Cedrenus saith, that about Serug's days (who was born about 170 Years after the Flood) Men arrogating to themselves Power over each other, made themselves Emperours and Kings, and did first use Arms, and made War on each other.

Afterwards, the Course of the Holy Story shews us the same, not only naming expresly the particular Kings (which had been made either by Sword or by Choice), but saith, The Israelites desired Samuel to give them a King, to judge them, according as all other Nations had.

Although, saith Mr. Selden, divers of the chiefest States of the old Grecians (and I think (saith he) only of the Grecians in the elder Ages) were in their most flourishing Times Democra∣cies, or Optimacies; yet the more ancient States there, were in every place Monarchies, as is expresly noted by(q) 1.619 Pausanias, That every where in Greece, in the ancient Times, their States were Monarchical, and not Popular.

Having premised this, I come now to the Epithets given to such Sovereign Princes, as Kings, Emperours, Lords, and the At∣tributes of Majesty, &c. in the Abstract, or in the second or third Person, and other high and lofty Titles given to them, either justly,* 1.620 or by Flattery.

Concerning Kings,* 1.621 the Account that I have given of them in the Chapter of Monarchy, may suffice. I shall only add, That in the Assyrian Empire, Nebuchodonosor is styled King of Kings;* 1.622 and after the translation of this Empire to the Persians, Artaxerxes Mnemon, in his Commission to Ezra for the Restitu∣tion of Jerusalem, and the Temple, thus salutes him; Artaxerxes King of Kings, to Ezra the Priest: And on the Great Cyrus his Tomb this Epitaph was written in Persian Characters, (if you be∣lieve the Authors that have it),

(r) 1.623〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Here I Cyrus lie, who was King of Kings.

And the bare Name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the King, without addition, is especially used for the Persian; whence the Nation is styled also, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The most Kingly Nation.(s) 1.624 Sesoosis, the same with Sesostris in Herodotus, King of Egypt, attributed to himself the Title of King of Kings, in his erected Columns of Victory: And(t) 1.625 Plutarch reports, That Tigranes King of Armenia was angry, and would not vouchsafe to answer Lu∣cullus, because in his Letter he had styled him King only, and not King of Kings.

The Acknowledgment of Regal Supremacy, paid by way of Homage, from Princes or People, under the Subjection of such Kings, was the Acceptance, upon their Demand, of Earth and Water: A special Example of which, is in(u) 1.626 Darius's Letters to Indathyrsus King of the Scythians; where he first in∣vites him to the Field: but if he would not, then, bringing to the Sovereign as Gifts, Water and Earth, come to a Parley; as the Words run. So in the Assyrian Empire, the King commands(w) 1.627 Olophernes, That he should bid all the Western Nations pre∣pare him Earth and Water. By the yielding up of these two Elements, they acknowledged a giving up to those Sovereigns their Jurisdiction over them.

When William the Conqueror landed at(x) 1.628 Hastings in Sussex, as he came out of his Ship, he fell down; and one of his Knights told him, Sir, you have possession of England, and shall be King: and observing that he had took up Sand and Earth in his Hand, he added, And you have taken Livery and Seisin of the Country. So when Land is sold in England, the way of recei∣ving Possession is by delivering a Clod of the Earth, and a Twig of Wood, if any be growing on it.

To denote also the Sovereignty of such Princes, kissing of the Feet, or embracing their Knees, or Adoration was used.* 1.629(y) 1.630 Herodotus saith, When the old Persians meet, you may know whether they be equal or not: for in Salutation they kiss one another; but if one be something inferiour, they kiss only the Cheeks; and if one be far more ignoble, he falls down, adoring the other. The manner of which Adoration is yet observed in the Eastern Empires, as may be seen in the Prints of them in Mr. Ogilby's Asia, especially in Japan. Thence we have Adorari more Persarum, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is expressed by Euri∣pides thus, personating Phrygius to Orestes,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉— Falling down, I adore thee, O King, after the Persian manner.

In Alexander's turning the Grecian Liberty into this Servitude, Q. Curtius expresseth it by Venerari, procumbere, & humi corpus prosternere; and thereof Justin saith, the(z) 1.631 Macedonians re∣tained the manner of saluting their Kings, exploding the Ado∣ration. Lampridius, speaking of Alexander Severus, saith, That he forbad himself to be adored; but Heliogabalus began to be adored after the Persian manner.

As to the Kissing, the Learned(a) 1.632 Selden saith, It was usual in Adoration among the Romans, either to kiss the Images of their Gods, or adoring them, to stand somewhat off before them,(b) 1.633 solemnly moving the Right-hand to the Lips, and then casting it, as if they had cast Kisses, and turning the Body on the same Hand, (which was the right Form of Adoration): and it grew by Custom, first, that the Emperours (being next to Deities, and by some accounted as Deities) had the like done to them, in acknowledgment of their Greatness. After some of the Roman Emperours would be called Jupiter, be supposed carnally to lie with Venus and the Moon, and (upon their infi∣nite such-like frantick Conceits) pretended themselves to be Divine, they were not satisfied with Those usual Customs, but thought themselves much wronged, and their Majesty impair∣ed, if they who saluted them(c) 1.634 presumed to kiss above the Knee. We find Examples of Kissing the Hands and Feet in Caligula: Therefore(d) 1.635 Seneca (speaking of his offering his Feet to kiss) says, He was a man born to that, so as to change the Customs of a Free City into Persian Servitude. Maximinus Junior allowed the kissing the Knees, Feet, and Hands; and Diocletian (according to Pomponius Laetus) published an(e) 1.636 Edict, That all without distinction, being prostrate, should kiss the Feet; therefore he adorned his Shoes with Gold, Gems, and Pearl. Yet this was not allowed by all: For Tiberius (as Sue∣tonius tells us) oscula quotidiana prohibuit edicto; and the elder(f) 1.637 Maximin (although a Tyrannical and most wicked Prince, yet) would suffer none to kiss his Feet, saying, The Gods for∣bid that any Freeman kiss my Feet: And Alexander Severus was only saluted by his Name, God save thee, Alexander; as Lampridius tells us, who adds, That if any bowed the Head, or spoke any thing like a Flatterer, if his Quality permitted, he was spurned away; or, if his Dignity allowed not such an Injury to be done him, he was laughed at aloud. And(g) 1.638 Mar∣tial, in Trajan's time, rejects those base Flatteries that had been used to Domitian, thus.

Ad Parthos procul ite Pileatos, Inopes, humilesque, supplicesque, Pictorum sola basiate Regum.

Princes use now only the kissing of the Hand (besides a pro∣found Obeisance to them) in stead of these forementioned Adorations; and the kissing of the Hand is offered frequently

as a Testimony of serviceable Love to other Great Persons, ac∣cording to that of(h) 1.639 Pliny, As the Back of the Right-hand with a kind of Religiousness is desired, so with an assurance of Faith it is stretched out.

This Name of King was among the Romans (after they set∣led themselves under the Government of a Commonwealth) reputed so contrary to their Liberty, (as implying in its Office too great an Absoluteness of Power) that in solemn memory of its being cast out by Brutus, they yearly celebrated on the Seventh of the Kalends of March (our Twenty third of Fe∣bruary) their Feast Regifugium: And lest the giddy Multitude might desire again to have a King, they prohibited that no Concourse for Merchandise should ever happen upon the Nones of any Month, (King Servius Tullius his Birth-day, they knew, was in the Nones, but not of what Month; therefore they pro∣vided it) fearing (saith(i) 1.640 Macrobius) lest the Multitude, ga∣thered together at such Fairs, should innovate any thing by the desire of a King: And(k) 1.641 Cicero, though he acknowledged that Caesar was revera Rex, fully a King in Power, yet (upon hate that continued of that Title) tells us, That hereafter nei∣ther Gods nor Men would permit any to be King of Rome. Therefore to palliate (as Mr.(l) 1.642 Selden saith) some part of his Ambitions, Caesar himself, being saluted King by the Multitude, withal perceiving that it was very distasteful to the State, (by the Tribunes pulling of the white Fillet from his Laurel) an∣swered, Caesarem se, non Regem esse; refusing it utterly, and consecrating the Diadem, which Anthony would have often put upon his Head, to Jupiter. Yet the whole People were sensible that his Authority differed only in Name from that of King, as appeared by his Sentiment of it, who subscribed Julius his Sta∣tue with,

Brutus quia Reges ejecit, Consul primo factus est; Hic, quia Consules ejecit, Rex postremo factus est.

Thus much may suffice to shew,* 1.643 That the Romans judged a King to have such Absoluteness, as in their Free-State was not to be endured; when as in the Change to Emperours they un∣derwent more (by some of their Arbitrary Rulings) than they did under Kings: And though the Terms were milder, yet the Yoke of them was heavier. But such is the Nature of the Mul∣titude, that if their Governours keep but the old Name of the Magistracy, they readilier yield Obedience to them; such power hath Custom. This Observation made Cromwel con∣tent himself with the Name of Protector, under which, by his Arts and Army, he exercised more Arbitrariness than ever had been by any King of England.

I come now to the Title of Emperour. This at the first on∣ly denoted a General, or Leader of an Army.* 1.644 So Julius Caesar (having made himself Master of the Roman Free-State) thought

it safer to retain than innovate his Title of Supremacy. Therefore having the perpetual Office of(m) 1.645 Dictator and Consulship, with the place of General or Imperator (as the word had Re∣lation to his Military Force) he took that also (being as wil∣lingly given as the rest) for a perpetual Title; this Title of Imperator being assumed both by Brutus and Cassius; as appears in their Coins, though they pretended to be the greatest assert∣ers of the Roman Liberty, and the like occurrs in the Coins of Antonius, Lepidus, and the thirty Tyrants, and others.

This Title of Imperator is said to have been a(n) 1.646 Praenomen, by Suetonius, but it was often used after it, which when it was, it denoted either only, or chiefly, some great performance by Arms, in setling, or encreasing the Empire; but when a Sir∣name, in those elder times, it signified only the Emperor's Su∣premacy in the State; so in the Coin of Augustus, where the Inscription is, IMP. CAES. AƲG. IMP. IX. TR. P.V. The Fore-name Imperator, signifies his Supremacy; and the latter signifies he had been General, and as such, it may be, de∣served a Triumph nine times. The TR. P. V. For Tribuni∣tiae potestatis quintum, shews how often he had been Tribune of the People, which was every Year renewed; therefore in that the number of the Years of their Empire was expressed, as(o) 1.647 Dio observes. So that what Tacitus relates of Tiberius, was most true, that eadem Magistratuum vocabula, he retained the old Names of the Magistrates; so that the first Emperors Authority and Soveraignty consisted in the Power of the Consuls, Dictator, Tribunes of the People, and the Title of Prince.* 1.648

The Title of Princeps, Principatus and Principium, were pro∣per Names also for these Emperors, and their greatness; there∣fore(p) 1.649 Tacitus saith, that Augustus took the Empire under the name of Prince, all being wearied with civil Discords; though Suetonius saith of Caligula, that Title was wanting, but that he should suddenly take the Diadem, and change the show of a Principality to the form of a Kingdom. Now it is to be observed as the Title of Emperor was taken from the Military Employment of a General; so this of Prince signi∣fied the Superiority of them in the Senate. For the Title of Princeps Senatus was known familiarly in Rome, and so might upon that Ground be used without Envy.

Concerning the Grecians using 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for Emperor, the dif∣ference betwixt the Eastern and Western Empire, about both their Titles, and the more modern use of both, I must referr the Inquisitive Reader to the often, but never too much to be com∣mended(q) 1.650 Mr. Selden; and shall only note out of him, that divers Civilians, especially of Italy and Germany, which pro∣fess the old Laws of Rome, tell us, That the Emperor is at this day of Right, Lord of the whole World, or Earth, as their Text also(r) 1.651 affirms: besides divers other flattering Passages in good Authors, of the ancient Empire; as that of Corippus to the Emperor Justin,

—Deus omnia Regna Sub pedibus debit esse suis.

And Julius Firmicus(s) 1.652 hath this courtly Expression, That the Compass of the whole Globe of the Earth is subject to the Power of the Emperor, and he is constituted in the num∣ber of those Deities whom the Principal Divinity hath appoint∣ed to do and conserve all things; grounded upon that Coin of(t) 1.653 Constantius, which hath on the reverse VICTOR OMNIƲM GENTIƲM. But Mr. Selden hath sufficiently confuted this, by shewing that the Roman Empire had its Limits (or as Tacitus calls it its Claustra) in Augustus, Trajan's, and Hadrian's time, and that in the heighth of the Roman Empire there were Liberi Populi, Regesque. So that after the perusal of the several Instances he produceth, none can be unsatisfied, but that many other Princes enjoy their Supremacy as fully as the German Emperors, in ac∣knowledging no Superior but God, as particularly I shall shew, in what relates to England, in the next Chapter.

For the fuller Expression of Majesty, saith(u) 1.654 Mr. Selden, other Attributes have been given to Supream Princes, which be Names as essential as those of Emperor and King; yet they are not so convertible with them, nor so particularly designing them: These are chiefly Domini & Dii, Lords and Gods. Of the one I have discoursed before, of the other I shall now speak something.

This Title of Dominus, or Lord,* 1.655 (importing properly a Ma∣ster or Lord over Slaves) was by the wisest of the Roman Em∣perors rejected; though it be now grown(w) 1.656 so familiar, that we use it to Tradesmen: such a change being wrought by time in the Usage, Emphasis or Signification of many other words.

(x) 1.657Suetonius tells us, that Augustus at a Play, hearing him∣self called Lord, though with the Epithetes of Just and Good, and finding the Spectators rejoicingly approve of it as applica∣ble to him; with his Hand and Countenance repressed the un∣becoming Flatteries, and the next day by a severe Edict, pro∣hibited it to be given him; neither would he suffer his Children or Nephews to use it in their Complements, or other Language, to each other. Neither would Tiberius endure this Title so much as in common Salutation: whereupon the great(y) 1.658 Historian and States-man observes, Ʋnde Augusta & lubrica o∣ratio, sub Principe, qui libertatem metuebat & adulationem oderat. To which purpose(z) 1.659 Statius speaks of Domitian.

Tollunt Innumeras ad astra Voces Saturnalia Principis sonantes, Et dulci DOMINƲM favore clamant, Hoc solum vetuit licere Caesar.

Yet either the Poet flattered or dissembled, or this was in the Infancy of the Empire; for we find in(a) 1.660 Suetonius, that by his express Command, the Titles of his Letters and other matters, were Dominus & Deus noster sic sieri jubet; and Caligu∣la before him, endured it publickly, and Festus(b) 1.661 Lieutenant of Jewry in that of St. Paul's appeal, calls Claudius absolutely Lord, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. Lord Emperor; and the Emperor in his Petition to(c) 1.662 him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. Lord Emperor; and the Emperor in his Answer calls himself Lord of the World.(d) 1.663 Victor saith that Dioclesian, the first of all the Emperors after Caligula and Domiti∣an, suffered himself openly to be called Lord, to be adored and stiled as a God; which may be understood of publick Salutati∣ons only. For in Claudius and Antonine I have instanced to the contrary. Also in a Gold Coin of the great and Religious Con∣stantine, stampt with his effigies sitting, and his Court of Guard about him; the(e) 1.664 Inscription is, FELICITAS PERPE∣TƲA AƲGEAT REM DO MIN. NO ST.

The reason why some Emperors refused this Name (as Pliny in his Panegyrick makes(f) 1.665 Trajan to do, when he saith, Thou ob∣tainest the place of the Prince, that there may be no place for Lord,) was either because it seemed a Relative to Servus, a Bond∣slave; or in respect that it supposed (if ill interpreted) the Subject, and his Substance to be in the Property of the Emperor: For(g) 1.666 Ʋlpian tells us, that in the Laws of the Empire, in the Ap∣pellation of Lord, was signified he that had the Propriety, al∣though another was Usufructuary. How considerable a Name of Dominion this was, appears in Lucan (who being one of the Pompeian Party, that stood much upon the ancient Liberty of Rome,) saith that that Age first found those Appellations, by which they lyed to the Lords.

(h) 1.667Namque omnes Voces, per quas jam tempore tanto Mentimur Dominis, haec primum reperit Aetas.

That which I observe from hence is, That by this Title of Dominus, the Soveraignty of Princes, and greater absolute∣ness was understood, than the first Emperors were willing to seem to allow, that they might avoid Envy in the Infancy of their Power:* 1.668 and now so great a Power or Dignity is not so much understood by the Word, either Latin or Greek, in the Person it is applied to, as when our Kings had the Title of Lords on∣ly of Ireland, and yet had Kingly Supremacy; and now our Nobility are called Lords, and Domine in the Latin is dwindled to signify any Gentleman.

There are other Forms of Speech that either have been or are peculiar to Kings,* 1.669 as the use of the Plural Number, as, We command, We ordain, Our Royal Favour, Our Royal Care, Pleasure, &c. This seems derived from the Jews (saith(i) 1.670 Mr. Selden) who say that in their Language, by reason of the Plu∣rality of Vertues or Power (being the true Roots of Dignities)

which are supposed in a Superior, they use the Plural Number to or of one Man. So with their Elohim Gods, joined to a Word of the Singular Number, is by their Grammarians, made an Enallage of Number, chiefly to express Excellency in the Persons to whom it is referred. But this hath since been used by single Persons, as particularly by Margaret Countess of Richmond, Mother to Henry the Seventh, thus, Nos Margareta Comitissa Richmondiae, Mater excellentissimi Principis Domini Henrici, &c. Inspeximus, &c.

Therefore I leave this as communicable to great and emi∣nent Subjects, and shall pass to the abstract of Majestas.* 1.671 As Your Majesty, His Majesty, Imperial Majesty. The word it self denoting all kind of special Dignity, as if we should say in English, Greatness, as well in private Persons, as supream Princes and Deities. Ovid(k) 1.672 elegantly describes Majesty to be born of Honour and Reverence, and he saith Majesty con∣tinued among the Gods, until the Rebellion of the Giants a∣gainst Jupiter, when she so daunted them, that afterwards she was honoured for it with a place next to Jupiter, whose King∣dom she defends by the greatness only of her Presence, and un∣armed; and that she came down also among Men, since which, both Supream and Subordinate Princes, and some also of all Kinds have had their special Dignity from her Presence with them; whence Majestas Pueri, Matronae, Virginis, &c. and, as Valerius Maximus(l) 1.673 calls it, a private kind of Magistracy, a Majesty of eminent Men, without the Honour of Tribunal∣ship, or any other Office.

But it is not of this kind of Majesty I now treat; but as it is applicable to the Sovereign. So in Cicero, Majestas Populi Romani denotes the Supream Dignity of the State of Rome, as(m) 1.674 Polybius calls it the Empire and Power of the People of Rome. Afterwards this Majesty of the People, or of the whole Empire and State was cast upon the Emperors as a Cha∣racteristick of Soveraignty, and then it was Majestas Impera∣torum. Whence it grew into frequent use to write(n) 1.675 NƲ∣MINI MAJESTATIQƲE EJƲS DEVOTISS: or DIC ATISSIMƲS, as in that Inscription in Tarragona in St. Barbara's Church, of Septimius Acindynus to the Empe∣ror Trajan.

From the use of Majesty thus applied, came the name of Crimen Majestatis, to denote that offence which was commit∣ted against the Dignity of the State of Rome, or against the Emperor. So(o) 1.676 Ʋlpian saith, It is that which is committed against the People of Rome, or their Security.(p) 1.677 And Cice∣ro calls it a Diminution of Majesty, to draw a Tribune of the People out of the Temple. And Justinian saith, That the(q) 1.678 Julian Law of Majesty, extends its Force against them who at∣tempt any thing against the Emperor, or the Commonwealth. And for this offence the word Majestas is used singly by(r) 1.679 Pli∣ny to Trajan, That he had wholly taken away the fear of too

frequent questiou upon that crime, being contented with the greatness of his Power or Office, which none more wanted than those that challenged Majesty to themselves; as if he had said, that his mild Empire and Greatness was better to himself and his People, than theirs who had a more absolute Sove∣reignty.

This Expression of the Emperors by the abstract Majestas (wherewith Numen also was commonly joyned in Inscriptions) became, it seems, the Example by which the ensuing times brought in the frequency of those other Abstracti, which de∣signed the Emperors, as well in the first as the second and third Person; as Perennitas, Aeternitas, Tranquillitas, Serenitas, &c. which are most obvious in the Rescripts of the old Emperors, that remain in the two Codes of Theodosius and Justinian: And in the Greek Empire, this Attribute of Majesty was denoted by the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.680 which the Emperor had, with the Addition of Sacred, and sometimes with(s) 1.681 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, serenissima jestas.

There are great Numbers of other Epithetes, that have been given to Soveraign Princes;* 1.682 as among the Romans, Pius, Foe∣lix, Clemens, Tranquillus, Sanctissimus, Pater Patriae. In the later times, both in the Empire and Kingdoms, Clementissimus, Excellentissimus, Invictissimus, Illustrissimus, Serenissimus, Glo∣riosissimus, Potentissimus, Sacratissimus, Celsissimus, Religiosissi∣mus; and some have had peculiar Attributes: The Emperor is stiled Semper Augustus; the King of England, Fidei Defensor; the King of France, Christianissimus; of Spain, Catholicus.

Most of these Attributes were given to denote the Eminence of their place, or the peculiar Vertues such Princes excelled in; and under the Greek Empire, the Epithetes agreeable to their Language, and the Attributes of the Eastern Monarchs, are to this Day more luxuriant: So we find Emanuel Comnenus, in his Letter to Frederic Barbarossa, writes thus;(t) 1.683 Manuel in Christo Deo fidelis, Imperator Porphyrogennetus, Divinitus Co∣ronatus, Regnator potens, excelsus, & semper Augustus & Modera∣tor Romanorum magnificus: Nobilissimo & Gloriosissimo Regi Al∣manorum & Imperatori ac dilecto Fratri Imperii nostri salutem. So(u) 1.684 Isaacus Angelus useth this insolent Title (as Mr. Selden calls it) to the same Barbarossa, Isachius a Deo constitutus, Impe∣rator Sacratissimus, Excellentissimus, Potentissimus, Sublimis, Mo∣derator Romanorum, Angelus totius Orbis; Haeres Coronae magnae Constantini, Dilecto Fratri Imperii sui Maximo Principi Alemaniae, &c. So the Sirnamed(w) 1.685 Emanuel stiled himself, Governed by God, Heir of the Crown of Constantine the Great, and obser∣ving of his Laws.

The Grand Seignior (besides the Enumeration of all his vast Dominions) particularly stiles himself, By the infinite Grace of the just, great, and most puissant Creator, and by the abun∣dance of the Miracles of the chief of his Prophets, Emperor of Victorious Emperors, Distributer of the Crowns of the grea∣test

Princes of the Earth, &c. Lord of Europe, Asia and Africa, conquered by his victorious Sword and powerful Lance, &c. and so after the recital of the several Kingdoms, he saith of many other Countries, Villages and Seigneuries, Conquered by his Imperial Power and Justice, &c. By the Grace of God, the resort of the great Princes of the World, and the refuge of Honourable Emperors: This was from Achmet Son of Ma∣homet, to Hen. IV. of France.

A late Author,(z) 1.686 who takes all the Advantages to depress Monarchy, out of a pretence of declaring against the too great absoluteness of Princes; tells us, That as the Majesty and real greatness of the Emperors declined; and as the Empire began to sink, the Froth and Flattery came above: so that though Augustus and Tiberius forbad any to call them by so proud a Title as Dominus;* 1.687 yet it was lawful to call Domitian Lord and God, and his Successors were not satisfied, till complemented in the Abstract, with Your Everlastingness, Your Eternity, Di∣vinity, &c. and when the wooden Eagle was split in two, that Chip of the Eastern Empire brake out into Blossoms to a Mira∣cle; that with the Porphyrogenneti and Despots, were blown a∣bout the Sebasto Cratori, Pan-hypersebasti, protonobilissimi, &c. and that after these Titles among the Romans (so pompous and glorious) had been worn a while at Court, they de∣scended to the City and Country: and further tells us, That in France, the word Sovereign is commonly used for any Supe∣rior; as Sovereign of Accounts, Treasure, Forest, Sovereign Judge, Sovereign Bailiff, &c.

To him we may add, what an older(a) 1.688 Author objects; That it is an Usurpation of the Attribute only proper to God, to give the Title of Majesty to Emperors or Kings; and ano∣ther(b) 1.689 saith, It is a piece of Idolatry to assume the Titles of nostra Divinitas, nostrum numen, Coeleste Oraculum, adorandum Rescriptum, &c. Which were used by Theodosius and Valentini∣an, and other Christian Emperors, in the first and third Person, as I have before largely hinted.

To the first of these I shall answer, That the reason of Au∣gustus and Tiberius declining the Title of Dominus, was be∣cause in that Age it was understood as a Lord over Slaves;* 1.690 which in the first setling of the Empire, would have caused Heart burnings and Rebellions against them, in that State, ac∣customed to Freedom. But as the usage of the word came af∣terwards to be liquified, and of a benign and softer significa∣tion; so there was no reason to reject it, especially since the Author himself (if no Quaker) would not think it unfit in Latin, to be used to him as a Gentleman: and as to the invi∣dious Expression of the wooden Eagle, he might have known, that the Ancient Vexilla of the Emperors, which had the Ea∣gle upon them, as he may see the Figure of them in Antonius, and many other Coyns, were not always of Wood; and if so gilt with Silver or Gold, but of Metal: But it may be he calls

it wooden, out of a sleight to the Authority, or the better to pursue his Allegory of a Chip blossoming. However it dis∣covers the mean and low opinion he hath of such Supreme Powers. As to the Hyperbolical Epithetes of the Grecian Empe∣rors; something must be yielded to the luxurious exuberance of the Grecian Language, and the usage of the Eastern Coun∣tries; and that Sovereign is sunk so low in France, as to be the Epithete of a Baylive, it may be ascribed to the Acceptation of the word, in signifying any Supreme Officer in his kind, as we call Lord High Treasurer, Lord High Steward, to distin∣guish them from inferior Treasurers and Stewards.

As to the two following Authors, it may be considered what the judicious Mr.* 1.691 Selden observes, That the Title of Majesty may as well be afforded to them, as of Wisdom, Power, Clemency, or any other Quality; because those are, as all else, which is great or good, principally in God: Therefore(c) 1.692 Contzen, in the last Age, Professor of Divinity at Mentz, saith, That Christian Princes may be called Divi, or Gods, be∣cause they are Gods Vicars, and do judge by Gods Voice: Yet he thinks that Divus Imperator, nostra Divinitas, nostra Aeterni∣tas, and such like, are not altogether so fit for Christian Princes, for fear both of their arrogating more than they should, when they are so magnified; as also lest too much offence be taken by such as may miss in the Reason of the Application of those Titles to them.

We may further note, from the learned Selden, That when the Lacedaemonians admired a Man, they used proverbially to say, he is a Divine Man; and the Philosopher(d) 1.693 saith, That Men became to be reputed or called Gods, from the excellence of their Heroic Vertues; and these Vertues and themselves al∣so, were (as he says) called Divine, by way of some simili∣tude, or by reason of Participation with the Deity, being all goodness and excellency, as the contrary quality, that is, In∣humanity or Barbarousness is named 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Feritas, because it is most like to what is Bestial. So that as he who affirms, that a Barbarous or Inhuman Fellow, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Bestial, makes but an high Expression of his ill nature, not at all sup∣posing him to be a Beast; so on the other side, Divinus or Divinitas, or the like expresseth only an Admiration of Excel∣lency, which hath its highest and first Example in the Deity, and is by some Similitude or Participation in the Person to whom it is attributed. Therefore(e) 1.694 Aquinas saith. That anciently, Governours of Commonweals were called Divine, because they were the Ministers of Divine Providence: They being here upon Earth in their Dominions under God Supreme Governours, undisputably in Civils, as Philip le Beau of France to Pope Boniface the Eighth, in his scornful Letter, saith, in∣stead of sciat sanctitas tua, sciat tua maxima fatuitas nos in temporalibus alicui non subesse: That in Temporals he was not subject to any.

Instead of these lofty Titles, the modern Sovereigns have contented themselves with the Addition of Dei Gratia,* 1.695 which applied to Lay Princes, doth always signifie a Supremacy in their own Dominions.

This Stile begun about Charles the(f) 1.696 Great's time, as in several of his Patents appears; neither did it continue in use by his Successors, till about four Hundred years since: F•••• O∣tho the Third titled himself sometimes nothing but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••o∣ctolorum; and Mr. Selden hath not observed it to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the Greek Emperors, but that instead of it, they used,(g) 1.697 Crown∣ed of God; the more ordinary and later Expression of them being trusting(h) 1.698 in Christ, that is God, or in God Emperor of the Romans.

With us in England, Ine King of the West Saxons, that li∣ved many years before Charles the Great, useth it, IC INE MIDGODES GIFT WEST SEAXNA CYNING: I Ine by the Grace of God, King of the West Saxons, in his preamble to his Laws: But until about our Henry the Third, it was not of so constant use, as that the Stile of the King ne∣cessarily required it.

This Stile of Dei Gratia is frequently given in old time,* 1.699 and yet in use, to Spiritual Lords, nothing being more common in the Instruments of Bishops and Abbats, in the Chartularies of Monasteries; and it is given from Kings to them in the Summons of Parliament, and Writs to Assemble or Prorogue Convoca∣tions in this form, Jacobus, &c. Reverendissimo in Christo ••••∣tri, praedilecto{que} & fideli Consiliario nostro, Georgio eade•••• 〈…〉〈…〉 Archiepiscopo Cantuariensi, &c. But at this day, though it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••∣ven to them, they use it not in the first Person, but De••(i) 1.700 ••••∣mentia, or Providentia Divina; and in older times, when they writ to the Pope, Emperor or King, they were not to write Dei Gratia of themselves, but only such or such, licet indignus, vel immerens, Bononiae Episcopus, &c.

By all these Titles we cannot but observe, that the dignity of Kings and Sovereigns, was looked upon in all Ages, as de∣riving Authority from God Almighty, and his Vicegerents here upon Earth; having the Attributes of God, that as he was Supreme over all things in Heaven and Earth, so they within their Districts upon Earth.

I shall end this Chapter with this Observation, That the Attribute of Dei Gratia applied to Sovereigns and Bishops, might probably have Authority from the Constitution of Justi∣nian,(k) 1.701 which runs thus. The greatest Gifts which Gods goodness from above, hath conferred on Men, are the Priest∣hood and Empire, both of which proceed from one and the same Principle, and are for the ordering and disposing of the Affairs of Mankind.

Concerning the peculiar Title of our Kings of England, De∣fender of the Faith, the learned Spelman having given us th•• Copy of the Bull, and discoursed so fully of it, I shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the curious Reader to him for satisfaction.

CHAP. XVII. Of the Soveraignty of the Kings of England, according to our Histories and Laws.

THE Titles and Attributes which other Soveraign Princes have either assumed,* 1.702 or have been given to them, our Kings of England have used, as might be made appear by in∣numerable Examples: But I shall treat but of a few, and shew wherein the Soveraignty is discovered, and what ancient Pre∣rogatives they have by their acts of Grace quitted; and lastly, how the long Parliament of 1641. would have cramped the King's Authority.

First as to the Title of King or Emperor promiscuously. So our Edgar frequently in his Charters, calls himself Albionis & Anglorum Basileus;* 1.703 and I have noted before that the Grecians esteemed the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be of full as eminent Signification as Emperor. So in a Charter(a) 1.704 to Oswald, Bishop of Worcester, he is called Anglorum Basileus, omniumque Regum, Insularum, Oce∣anique Britanniam circumjacentis, cunctarumque Nationum quae in∣fra eam includuntur, Imperator & Dominus. In which we may note that one of our Kings of England writ himself not only Basileus, according to the Grecian usage, which signified King and Emperor; but also Emperor and Lord, three of the fullest Attributes, either the Grecian, or Roman Emperors ever used; as also Lord of the British Sea, as Canutus his Successor chal∣lenged. So in a Charter to(b) 1.705 Peterburg, Ego Edgar sub ip∣so sidereo Rege praesidens Regno Magnae Britanniae.

I have seen another(c) 1.706 of his Charters prefaced thus, Gra∣tia Domini nostri Jesu Christi omnium seculorum omnia suo Intuitu distribuentis Regna terrarum, & moderantis habenas rerum. Ego Edgar sub ipso eodem Rege praesidens Regno Britanniae, &c.

So King(d) 1.707 Edward in the same Book stiles himself, Ego Edwar∣dus Rex Anglorum Monarchiam Regiminis tenens, hoc decretum Pa∣tris mei per deprecationem Abbatis Aidulfi, perhenniter affirmavi. In which we may note, that Edgar owns himself subject to Jesus Christ, God. And King Edward saith, he holds the single Command of Government. So King Edward in a(e) 1.708 Charter to Ramsey, stiles himself Totius Albionis, Dei moderante Dominatione, Basileus, King of all Albion: and King Edwin in a Charter to Crow∣land, calls himself King of England, and Governour and Ru∣ler of all the Land of Britain. So Ethelred in his Charter to Canterbury, stiles himself Of all the English born, and the Orea∣des lying in Circuit about it, Monarch, and Emperor of the English. So that by Orcades must be understood all the Isles a∣bout Britain.

So William Rufus dates his Charter to the Monastery of Shafts∣bury, secundo Anno Imperii mei. By all which it appears that the

Kings of England have justly assumed the Supream Imperial Command in their own Dominions: and though the Title of Emperor hath been disused,* 1.709 yet we shall find the substance of it sufficiently challenged in that of(f) 1.710 William Rufus to Arch-Bishop Anselm, when he told him, That he had all the Liberties in his Kingdom, which the Emperor challenged in the Empire. And in a Constitution(g) 1.711 of King Edward the Second, it is declared, That the Kingdom of England is most free from all Im∣perial Subjection; which excluded all public Notaries, who were made by the Emperor or Popes, and by this Constitution were utterly rejected.* 1.712

This further appears in the(h) 1.713 Statute of Praemunire made 23 Ed. 3. which runs thus, That it being shown by the grie∣vous and clamorous Complaints of the great Men and Commons, how that divers of the People be, and been drawn out of the Realm to answer of things whereof the Cognizance pertaineth to the King's Court; and also that the Judgments given in the same Court be impeached in another Court in prejudice and dis-inherison of our Lord the King, and of his Crown, &c. Therefore it was enacted, That none of the King's Liege-Peo∣ple, of what condition soever, shall draw any out of the Realm in Plea, whereof the Cognizance appertaineth to the King's Court, or of things whereof Judgments be given in the King's Court, &c.

This Statute as well as that of Provisors 25 Ed. 3. was made to hinder the Subjects Appeals to Rome, or to any other Court in such things whereby the King's Soveraignty might be dimi∣nished, and this Statute relates to one made by King Edward the First. Also in the Statute of Provisors, 25 Ed. 3. refe∣rence is made to the(i) 1.714 Statute made at Carlisle, by King Ed∣ward the First.

The Statute of(k) 1.715 Praemunire for purchasing Bulls from Rome, gives an account of the preceding Statutes, and further saith, Whereas our Lord the King, and all his Liege-People ought of right, and of long time were wont to sue in the King's Court, to receive their Presentments to Churches, Prebends, and other Benefices of Holy Church, which they had right to present to, the Conisance of Plea, of which Presentment be∣longeth unto the King's Court, of the old right of his Crown used and approved, &c. then particularly enumerates the En∣croachments of the Bishop of Rome, by Processes, Excommu∣nications of Bishops, for executing Judgments given in the King's Courts, and the translating of Prelates out of the Realm, or from one spiritual Living to another, against the King's Laws and Regality, &c. The Statute expresly declares, That the Crown of England hath ever been so free, that it is in no Earth∣ly Subjection, but immediately subject to God in all things, touching the Regality of the Crown, and to no other.

Under King Henry the Eighth,(l) 1.716 the whole Parliament say, that by sundry old and authentick Histories and Chronicles it

is manifesty declared and expressed, that this Realm of Eng∣land is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the World, governed by one Supream Head, and King, having the Dig∣nity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same; unto whom a Body Politick, compact of all sorts and degrees of People, divided in Terms by names of Spirituality, and Temporalty have bounden and owen to bear, next to God, a na∣tural and humble Obedience.

The next(m) 1.717 Year in another Statute, it is stiled the Impe∣rial Crown and Royal Authority, recognizing no Superior, but only Your Grace: and in the Chapter following, the Kings of England are stiled Kings and Emperors of this Realm: and in(n) 1.718 another of the same King, it is called, The most Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of this Realm. So in the same(o) 1.719 Year (before the Title of Lord of Ireland was altered in∣to King) the Stile is Kings and Emperors of the Realm of Eng∣land, and of the Land of Ireland; and in several other Sta∣tutes it is called the Imperial Crown.

I have inserted these to clear that by our Laws the Kings of England are under no Subjectjon to any foreign Prince or Po∣tentate whatsoever. And Mr.(p) 1.720 Selden saith, that the Su∣premacy is not only used by the English Sovereigns, but hath been challenged by the Kings of Spain, Denmark, Poland, the Czars of Muscovy and other free Princes; over all within their own Dominions, exclusive of all foreign Powers: and upon the like ground of Supremacy was that Law made by King James the Third of Scotland, in these words, —Our Sovereign Lord has full Jurisdiction, and free Empire within this Realm, &c.

A Confirmation of this Supremacy of our Kings appears in what is reported of our King Edward the Third, That when Lewis(q) 1.721 of Bavier the Emperor, had an Interview with him, the Emperor stomached that the King of England submitted not himself to kiss his Feet. But the King answered, That he was(r) 1.722 an anointed King, and had Life and Member in his Power, therefore he ought not to submit himself to him as o∣ther Kings.

Whence it was that Alsonso the ninth King of Castile defining what Kings were, (after he had dispatched the Particulars that belonged to the Emperor) says, That they are every one in their Kingdoms, the Vicars or Vicegerents of God, placed o∣ver the People to govern them,(s) 1.723 no otherwise than as the Emperor is in his Empire. Whoever desires further Satisfacti∣on in this Point, may have recourse to the voluminous Col∣lections of Mr. Pryn, and other Authors that have treated of the Kings Supremacy.

Most of what I have hitherto discoursed, relates to the King's Supremacy, ab extra, that he hath no foreign Superior, that ought to impose any thing upon him or his Subjects, con∣trary to his Pleasure and his Laws in his Dominions.

I shall now give a short Abridgement of what I find our lear∣ned Lawyers have writ concerning the King's Authority and Sovereignty, in his Kingdom of England, and how,* 1.724 in former Ages, Kings have quitted some of their Royal Prerogatives. In our Laws the King is stiled in Ecclesiastical matters, the Su∣preme Ordinary;(t) 1.725 in Civil matters, caput Reipublicae, Pater Patriae, totius Regni Pater-Familias, Chief Justice, &c. being furnished with plenary Power, to render Justice and Right to every Member and part of the whole Body,(u) 1.726 without the help of Foreign Jurisdiction. Some Attributes of God in a similitudinary way (say(w) 1.727 the great Lawyers) are aseribed to him for the Excellency of his Person, and the greatness of his Office, as Sovereignty and Power, Omnipresence, Majesty, Immortality, &c. In his Political(x) 1.728 Capacity, not subject to the Infirmities of others, as Nonage, Death, Attainder, &c. So no Laches, Negligences, Defects, or Stops of Blood, can be imputed to, or fastned upon him, as is well known in the case of King Henry the Seventh,(y) 1.729 wherein it was unanimously resolved by the Judges, That his Natural Capacity doth so far participate with the Politic (which is superadded to the Body natural of the King) that these become consolidate, consub∣stantiate and indivisible in one and the same Royal Person, and the Body Politic (which is the more worthy, and of a subli∣mer Nature) is in no ways obnoxious to the Humane Imbecil∣lity of Death, Infamy, Crime, or the like, but doth draw from the Natural Body, all Imperfections and Incapacities whatsoever.

So that there is, by the Law, said to be in the King,(z) 1.730 a threefold greatness of Perfection; First of being freed from Infamy and all kind of Imperfections common to Man: Second∣ly, of Power, in having the command of all his People: Thirdly, of Majesty, being the Fountain of Honour, Justice, and Mercy.

The King is Gods immediate Viceroy(a) 1.731 within his Domini∣ons Vicarius Dei: As his Protection and Government reacheth to all his People as Subjects; so the Allegiance and Obedience of them all, is due to him as their Sovereign, whether Ecclesia∣stical or Civil, and so he is Persona mixta; his Prerogatives are called Jura Regalia, Insignia Coronae, Ancient Prerogatives and Royal Flowers of the Crown, so inseparably annexed to the Crown, that none but the King may have them, nor can they be communicated to, or taken by any Subject.

(b) 1.732All Lands are said to be held of him immediately or mediately, he can hold of no Man, or any be equal to him, as to be joynt Tenant of Land with him, and his Jurisdiction is over all places within his Dominions, both on the dry Land and on the Sea. The Judges are to observe it as a certain Rule, That whatever may be for the benefit of the King, and his pro∣fit, shall be taken most largely for him; and what against him, and for his disprofit, be taken strictly: neither is it only the du∣ty

of Judges, but of all other his Subjects in their Stations, to help the King to his Right.

The Perogatives are many and great, yet such as are his by the Ancient Law of the Land, and what the Kings of England have, time out of mind, used, and are such as are of absolute(c) 1.733 necessity, for the security of the Government, and the Public weals: As to call and dissolve Parliaments, give his Royal Assent to Laws, command the Militia, coyn Moneys, grant Honors, make and dispose of the great Seal, dispense with penal Laws, pardon Felonies and Treasons, make and appoint great Officers, Justices of Eyre and Assize, of the Peace, Gaol-delivery, and Sheriffs, to grant Charters to Corporations and other Persons, or Fraternities: He hath the sole Power of appointing, ratifying and consummating all Treaties with Fo∣reign Princes, making War and Peace, granting Safe-Conduct and Protection; and all these and many other, are firmly as∣certained(d) 1.734 by Laws, and have ever been, and still are, in the King alone, and at his own Discretion.

Although there is no need in describing the Sovereignty of our Kings, to carry it up to that absoluteness of Monarchy, where all things are appointed and reversed by the Sovereigns fiat: yet(e) 1.735 we must on the other side consider, That the Mo∣narchy, which is subject to the impetuous Caprices of the Mul∣titude, when giddy, or to the incorrigible Factiousness of the Nobility, when interested, is, in effect, no Government at all; it must be owned, That in all Governments a Sovereignty must reside some where, and a Monarch can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no Participants. For then it would cease to be a Monarchy, and in things that relate immediately to Government, the King hath as much right to regulate them (as to instance, to restrain the Licence of the Press or secure Peace) as we have to regulate and dispose of our Property; Government being the Kings Property: for with the Monarchy, the King must enjoy all things that are ne∣cessary for the Administration of it, according to that just Max∣im(f) 1.736 of the Law, When any thing is granted, all things seem to be granted, without which the thing granted cannot be explained: Which warrants the Kings Advocate of Scotland, to lay that down as a general(g) 1.737 Rule, That their Kings can do every thing that relates to Government, and is necessary for the Administration thereof, though there be no special Law or Act of Parliament for it, if the same be not contrary to the Law of God, Nature or Nations.

The Power and Authority of the Kings of England, have been much more unbounded than they are at present.(h) 1.738 Bra∣cton speaking of his time, saith, That neither the Justices or private Persons might dispute the Kings Charter; but if there were a doubt of it, the Resolution must come from the Kings own Interpretation. If Justice be demanded of the King (saith(i) 1.739 he) seeing no Writ lies against him, one must petition that he would correct and amend what he hath done.

By the Condescensions of gracious Princes, such Restricti∣ons have been made of their Sovereign Absoluteness,* 1.740 that they have obliged themselves to govern their Kingdoms (transmit∣ted to them with such Limitations, by their numerous Ance∣stors) by Rules of Law, Equity, Justice, and right Judg∣ment, in Imitation of their Supreme Head and Omnipotent Monarch.

That therefore it may demonstratively appear how happily the Government of England is constituted for the Benefit of the Subjects (who under so benign a Monarchy, enjoy more Advantages in the Security of their Persons and Proprieties, than under the most free Commonwealth that ever we read of) I shall lightly touch upon some of those Particulars, which the Kings of England (by reason of several Acts of Parlia∣ment, they have given their Royal Assents to) have preclu∣ded themselves from the single Disposal of, as in Absolute Mo∣narchies are used; yet I hope to make it clear in several Bran∣ches of this Discourse, That there is no such thing as Co-ordi∣nacy of any other Power, or such a mixture as vitiates the Monarchy by a debasing Alloy; much less that the Govern∣ment can be Arbitrary or Tyrannical; which hath sheathed the Sword of Justice within the Velvet Scabbard of the Laws, and lined the Scarlet Robes of Majesty with the softest Er∣mine of Indulgence to well deserving Subjects, who by their Obedience and Considerateness, make their Princes and their own Happiness most perfect. For it is equally unhappy to Prin∣ces and Subjects, where(k) 1.741 Maximilian's Jest is true, That whereas other Princes were Kings of Men, he was King of Kings, because his Subjects would do but only what they list.

But to come to the Particulars of Royal Abatements and In∣dulgences. The Kings of England may not rule their People by their Will, or by Proclamation, as the Roman Emperors by their(l) 1.742 Edicts; or make new Laws, or change any of the old standing Laws, without the mutual Consent of the two Houses of Parliament: He may not oppress the People, or in any Arbitrary way, take from them their Liberties or Estates, under any pretence whatsoever, without due course of Law. Nor can he impose upon their(m) 1.743 Persons, what Charges or Burthens he pleaseth, but according to, and by the Laws of the Kingdom. He cannot do any thing against the Law of the Nation, or against common Right; cannot change Ancient Customs: for a Legal(n) 1.744 Custom is more available than a Royal Concession; yet on the other side, that Custom which advanceth against the Prerogative of the King, is void.

He cannot impose Arbitrary(o) 1.745 payments, erect new Offi∣ces of Charge to the Subject; may not deny or delay Justice, may not compel his People to make Gifts, Loan, Benevolence, or Tax, without consent of the two Houses.

The King(p) 1.746 may not imprison without just Cause, nor keep any Mans Cause from Tryal; may not send any man out

of the Realm without his own Consent; may not, in time of Peace, Billet or Quarter Soldiers or Mariners upon his People, against their Wills; may not grant Commission to try Men by Martial Law in time of Peace, nor to determine any matters of difference betwixt Subjects, other ways than by ordinary(q) 1.747 course of Law and ordinary Courts; may not, by Patent or Licence, make a grant of a Monopoly, or the benefit of a Penal Law, or give a Power to dispense with Penal Laws in some Cases.

(r) 1.748He may not have, or take, that he hath right to, which is in the Possession of another, but by due course of Laws; and may not make new, or alter old Courts of Justice, unless to be kept after the Course of the Law, and not in Course of Equity; Nor(s) 1.749 alter the Courts of Westminster, that have been time out of mind, nor erect new Courts of Chancery, Kings-Bench, Common-pleas, or Exchequer.

(t) 1.750He may not by his last Will and Testament, under the great Seal, or otherwise, dispose of the Government, or of the Crown it self; nor give and grant away the Crown-Lands or Jewels, which he hath in his Politic Capacity, nor give away any of the incommunicable Prerogatives.

By these Abatements of Power and gracious Condescenti∣ons of the Kings of England, for the Benefit and Security of the Subject;* 1.751 we are not to conclude, that there either is, or can be any Co-ordination or Coaequality of any State, Order or Degree of the Subjects with the Sovereign, nor any Com∣petition of the Subjects Power (in his Concurrence) with the Vertual and Primary Influence of the Sovereign; but a plain Subordination and subjected Ministration of the one, under the Sovereignty of the other. For although there is a Co-ope∣ration of the Members with the Head, for the performing some Acts of State, and they may seem Orders or States coaequally Authorized in the Power of Acting with the Sovereign, in Pe∣titioning for, advising, or consulting about, or consenting up∣on the Kings Summons to Laws. And although in judging and determining matters of Private Interest, the King hath not an Arbitrary Judgment, but is restrained to the Judgment, to be administred by the proper sworn Judges in his Courts, whom he appoints to judge according to his Laws; and in the making of Laws, his Power and Judgment is restrained to the Con∣currence of the Nobles, and Commons in Parliament: yet in all other things (wherein he is not expresly restricted by any Law of his own or Progenitors granting) he retaineth the ab∣solute Power, as in the particulars before mentioned, and in the Chapters of Parliaments I shall further discourse.

In the Rebellion under King Charles the First, the(u) 1.752 Pen∣combatants for the Party (knowing they had the whole Cur∣rent of the Laws against them) made a great noise and bustle with Sophisms, and plausible specious Pretences, to captivate the Populace; and nothing was more frequent than the Misap∣plication

of that of the Philosopher, That the King was Singu∣lis major, but Ʋniversis minor: Inferring from thence, That the Collective Body of the People, and their Representatives, were Greater in Authority than the King.

In answer to which, it may be observed, That the Aphorism, how true soever in any other sense, is most false, in any sense, of Sovereignty. For, if it be meant, That the King is a bet∣ter Man only than any of us single, this doth not tell us he is better than Two; and this is no more than possibly he might be before he was King: For we must needs look upon Princes, as Persons of Worth, Honour, and Eminency, when taken from the People; which the superaddition of Royalty did not de∣stroy. Besides, any Lord of the Land may challenge such a Supremacy over all the Knights, and any Knight over all the Esquires. Furthermore, if Princes be Sovereigns to single Per∣sons of Subjects only, and not to the universality of them, then every single Subject by himself is a Body Politick, whereof the King, as King, is Head; and so the Publick Community is out of the King's Protection, he being no King as to them in a complex Body. Such impudent Falsities, and many more de∣structive Consequences, flow from such absurd Principles: And if the Maxim were true, the People have placed a King not over, but under themselves.

But they enforce the Argument still further, That the Foun∣tain and efficient Cause of Power is the People; and from hence, they say, the Inference is just, That he is less than the Universe. But the(w) 1.753 Consequence is rather the contrary: For, suppose the People were the efficient Cause of Power, it can be no otherwise than by translating, or deriving their di∣vided Power, and uniting it in him. Since then they cannot retain what they have parted with, nor have what they gave away, it follows, That he who hath all their Power, and his own particular besides, must needs be greater, and more pow∣erful than they; it being a very great Truth, That he is the only Fountain of Power and Justice.

Another of their Maxims was, That quicquid efficit tale, illud est magis tale: And they assume, But the King was made by the People, therefore less than the People. In answer to which, it is apparent, the Argument is Sophistical, as being built on a Maxim in it self amphibolous, which is not simply true, but as it is restricted: For it is true before the Effect produced, not after. So a Spark firing a City, was once more Fire than the Houses; but not so after the whole Town is become a Flame. It is true also in those Agents in whom the Quality by which they operate is inherent; not true in those who by ways of Donation divest themselves of Power or Wealth. For a thing cannot retain its Fulness, after it hath emptied it self. If the Objector have an Estate, which he would willingly improve, let him bestow it on another, and he shall make him rich, and, by his own Argument, himself richer: It is to be supposed, ra∣ther

than such an one will part with his Estate, he will find an Answer to his Objection.

As to the minor Proposition, I have before cleared, I hope, That the People are not the Original Cause of Government, But the Observer saith, They are the Final Cause; and the End is far more valuable in Nature and Policy, than that which is the Means: therefore the Commons, whose Good is the final End of all Government, are more Honourable than the Sove∣reign. But the Rule holds in such Means only as are valuable by that relation they bear to their Ends, and have no proper Goodness of their own. A King is not so to his People. If we look back to his first Extraction, when he was first taken from the People to be set over them, we must needs behold him as a Man of some Worth, Honour, and Eminence; which the super∣addition of Royalty did not destroy, but encrease; and to be a means of his Peoples Preservation, is very consistent with the Heighth of Honour. Besides, they that would captivate the unthinking Multitude by such Fallacies, must consider, that the Question is not, Who is Preferable, but, Who is Superiour. One good Christian is preferable to a thousand that are not so; yet his Interest in the Commonwealth may not be preferable. A Shepherd is ordained for his Flock; yet a Flock of Brutes is not preferable to any Reasonable Creature. Further, the King's Interest and the Peoples are inseparable in the Constru∣ction of the Law, which presumes, what the King doth, he does for the People. Whether therefore the King's Power be deri∣ved from God, or the People, it is preferable. If from God, because his Ordinance: If from the People, because the People have elected him, and consented it(x) 1.754 should be, and have trusted him with the Publick Interest, which is still preferable.

If this way of arguing were sound, Angels being Ministring Spirits for the good of Men, it would follow, That Men should be more Honourable than Angels; and the poor Client should be a better Man than his Learned Counsellor; and the simple Patient, than his Doctor.

As to Bracton's Authority, Rex habet superiorem Deum, legem item Curiam suam, I must refer the scrupulous Reader to the Book called The Case of our Affairs, p. 14.

CHAP. XVIII. That the Sovereign is unaccountable to any but God.

BEfore I come to treat of the several Branches of the Sove∣reignty of Kings in the Executive parts of them, I shall from the general Idea of their Sovereignty deduce three Co∣rollaries, in this and the two following Chapters, which seem to me to flow naturally from the Being of a Sovereign, viz. That such are accountable to none but the Great Sovereign of the Universe: And secondly, may dispense in some Cases with the Laws: And lastly, must not be resisted or rebelled against.* 1.755

If there were no other Motive to induce me to treat of this Head, the barbarous Murther of the Blessed Martyr King Charles the First, would have the same power as the sense that Croesus's dumb Son had to see his Father's Life in imminent dan∣ger, which made such a violent emotion of the Spirits, as un∣loosned the stiff Ligaments by which his Tongue was contract∣ed, or forced an Irruption of Powerful Spirits to invigorate the paralytick Muscles of it, so that he cried out, Spare my Fa∣ther. So certainly the Consideration of such an High Court of Justice, that arraigned and sentenced their Sovereign, should raise an Indignation in any one that hath sense of Allegiance, Duty, or Religion, to defend that as a Fundamental Truth, That Sovereigns are subject to no Tribunal but that of their Heavenly Sovereign.

In the handling this, I shall pick out some of the Assertions of Learned and Judicious Authors, Heathens and Christians, and annex and intersperse such Reasons as may evince it; and then show, That this doth not leave Princes to a Tyranni∣cal Liberty; and lastly, give some short Remarks upon the unparallell'd Sentence of the Regicides of King Charles the First of Immortal Memory.

(a) 1.756Rabba bar Nachman, in his great Gloss upon Deuteronomy, saith positively, No Creature may judge the King, but the Holy and Blessed God alone: For the Original Hebrew of which, and the place of Moses from whence he deduceth this Asserti∣on, I must refer the Reader to the Authors cited, having cho∣sen this not only for the fulness of the Expression, but for the Antiquity, though not of the Comment, yet of the Text, be∣fore any other.

All those Places also in Holy Scripture which style Princes and Judges of the Earth(b) 1.757 Gods, and the Sons of God, and Psal. 82.6. I have said ye are Gods, and all sons of the most High; which in the Chaldee Paraphrase is thus rendred, Behold, ye are reputed as Angels, and all of you as it were Angels of the most High;(c) 1.758 are sufficient Proofs of this Truth: As are likewise those Places that tell us, It is the Will of God that we(d) 1.759 submit our selves

to these Higher Powers, for his sake. Therefore(e) 1.760 St. Chrysostom calls Regality such a Government as is not subject to the con∣trol of any. Sophocles calls it(f) 1.761 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Free and Inde∣pendent Regiment; and(g) 1.762 Marcus Aurelius in Dio, an Abso∣lute Kingdom, not subject to the Control of any. To all which, agrees that of Horace, Lib. 3. Carm. Od. 1.

Regum timendorum, in proprios Greges, Reges in ipsos Imperium est Jovis.

By which he fully expresseth, That as Kings have Power over their Subjects, so God hath the Power over Kings.

All the vast Collections that may be made, of Emperours asserting, or Subjects owning, that their Authorities are from God, that God gave them their Kingdoms, they were Crown∣ed of God, &c. of which there is a copious Collection in Archbishop(h) 1.763 Ʋsher; are so many Arguments to prove this Assertion, That as they derive their Authority from God, so they should only be accountable to him.

But I shall now proceed to more positive Authorities. Mar∣cus(i) 1.764 Aurelius saith, Of a Free Monarch none may judge but God alone; and(k) 1.765 Dion Cassius tells us, That Kings are loosened from the Laws, that is, they are freed from all coactive Obe∣dience to them, and are held by none of the written Ordinan∣ces. So(l) 1.766 Pliny tells us, That the happiest thing in a Prince∣dom is, that the Prince may be constrained to nothing. There∣fore the most Judicious(m) 1.767 Primate saith, In regard of them∣selves, Kings are said to be exempted from Subjection to the Laws, because they are not tied (otherwise than for Conveni∣ence, and good Example sake) to the observation of such as are more positive and temporary Laws; and because they are not liable to the Civil Punishment set down for the breach of any Law, as having no Superiour upon Earth, that may exer∣cise such Power over them. For, as in another(n) 1.768 place he saith, If the People may call him to an account for the Breach of the Law, the State is plainly Democratical; if the Peers, it is Aristocratical; and if either, or both, it cannot be accounted Monarchical.

To which we may add that of the Judicious Lord(o) 1.769 Chan∣cellor, That though a Prince's violating his Faith is against the Law of Nature, yet the Obligation doth not set any Judge over the Sovereign, nor doth any Civil Law pretend there is any Power to punish him. It is enough that in Justice he ought to do it, and that there is a Sovereign in Heaven above him, though not on Earth.

So(p) 1.770 Cyril of Alexandria saith, Who dare violate the De∣crees of the Kings o the Earth, unless he himself be one that is invested with Regal Dignity, (and I may add, his Superiour:) For in such the Charge of transgressing the Law hath no place at all.

So(q) 1.771 Cassiodorus saith, If any of the People transgress, he sinneth against God and the King; but when the King offend∣eth, he standeth guilty to God alone, because he hath no Man to be Judge of his Doings. So Nicephorus, Catena, Lyra, Didy∣mus, Arnobius Junior, and all the Commentators on the fifth Verse of the 51. Psalm, on those Words, Against thee only have I offended, concur in the same Assertion, That Kings are subor∣dinate to none but God. Nor do any oppose it, but such as would place a Mufti or Sanhedrim above Kings.

Consentaneous to which, was the Sentence of the(r) 1.772 Coun∣cil of Toledo, That it is unlawful to call his Power in question, to whom the Government of all is known to be delegated by Judgment from above.

(s) 1.773Tertullian speaking of the Prerogative of Kings, saith, They are in his Power alone, from whom they are second, and after whom the first; and in another place(t) 1.774 We worship the Emperor, as a Man next to God, and who hath obtained of God what∣ever he is, and is only less than God.

So* 1.775 Optatus saith, Over the Emperor is none but he that made the Emperor. Therefore St. Chrysostom(u) 1.776 saith, The King is top and Head of all Men on Earth, having none upon Earth higher than himself So(w) 1.777 Otto Frisingensis well notes, That Kings alone (as being placed above Laws) are reserved to Gods Judgment, and are not restrained by any secular Laws.

There is good Reason for all this. For if the Sovereign were obliged, ex officio, to give an account of his Administra∣tion to his Subjects, or had any Superior upon Earth to exact a reason of his Actions (if he governed not according to the Laws) and for Transgressions to inflict a Punishment upon him, he should cease from being a Sovereign. As in the Chapter of Non-resistance I shall further prove.

It is a Constitution grounded upon Necessity, to place Impu∣nity somewhere, for the avoiding Confusion: for a Circle in Government would be of most pernicious Consequence; and infinitely absurd it must be (saith a late(x) 1.778 Author) that a∣ny should challenge a right to rule the Rulers, and be Superi∣or to the Supream.(y) 1.779 This Dernier resort, or last appeal must rest somewhere. It is a right consisting in unpunishableness for Faults, which fences the Person or Persons in whom is Supream Domination, and secures them as strongly (as Laws can do) from all Violence; and if it were otherwise a most large In-let would be made to overthrow all Authority: for every malicious Male∣content would be pretending some Arbitrariness, or oppressi∣on in the Government; for which, if they had any colour of Authority, they would be calling him to an account.* 1.780

I foresee how solid, Judicious and Religious Authors soever have brought to vouch this Assertion; yet Republican Libertines will be raising up their Crests against me, and more moderate Persons will be pulling me by the Ear, and admonishing me,

lest hereby I should make the Sovereign lawless, and give him liberty to do what he listeth. Therefore no ways deserting the Principle of unaccountableness (the Mischief of the contrary of which I think is sufficiently discovered in the Chapter of Common∣wealth-Government) I shall endeavour out of good Authors, and the examples of great Princes, to lay down some Rules, which Princes may think prudential for them to imitate.

First therefore I shall observe what the great(z) 1.781 Philoso∣pher notes, That a King that governs by Law, makes no new Species of Government, from that King that makes the Law his Standard. So that governing by Laws, and according to them, in his Opinion, is very agreeable to Kingly Government, and he every where commends it as most acceptable to the Peo∣ple, and most safe for the Prince.

There is an excellent(a) 1.782 Soliloquy that Philo brings in his King to make, and which may become the potentest Monarch to imitate, That he writ the Laws himself into a Book, that he might transcribe them into his Soul, and imprint into his Mind those divine Characters, never to be washed out again: whereas other Kings therefore bear Staves for their Scepter, the abridgment of the Law should be his Scepter, his rejoycing and Glory uncontroulable, the Ensign of that unreproveable Go∣vernment, which is fashioned according to the Pattern of Gods own Kingdom.

Although according to Harmenopulus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the King is not to be subject to the Laws; because offending against them, he is not punished: and as St.(b) 1.783 Ambrose speaking of David, saith, He being a King, was tyed to no Laws, because Kings are freed from the Bonds or Punishments of Faults, being called to Punishment by no Laws, being protected by the Power of their Empire; yet(c) 1.784 as a grave Father saith, God's Word, and right Reason must give a Law to the Law-giver. Therefore that weighty and elegant Expression of(d) 1.785 Tertullian deserves consideration by all Prin∣ces, which is this, While we temper the Majesty of Caesar under God, we commend him the more to God, unto whom alone we do subject him; therefore great, because he is less than Heaven.

To the voluntary submission of a Prince to his own, or the Laws of his Progenitors, may be referred the memorable say∣ing of Valentinian(e) 1.786 the Younger, It is in truth a greater thing than Empire to submit the Princedom it self to the Laws: and that other equally imitable by Princes, Though the Laws of the Empire have freed the Emperor from the Solemni∣ties of the Laws, yet nothing is so proper for Empire, as to live by the Laws, or according to them. So inthat com∣mendation which Plutarch gives(f) 1.787 Alexander the Great, That he conceived he ought to be thought superior unto all Men, yet subject to Justice.

Such a Prince we find Pliny fully describe in his(g) 1.788 Panegy∣rick of Trajan, That he thinks himself to be one of us, and so much the more excellent and eminent he is, that he so think∣eth, and no less remembreth that he is a Man, than that he is a Ruler of Men. For he who hath nothing left to(h) 1.789 increase his heighth, hath but this one way to grow by, if he submit himself (that is, to the governing by Laws, it may be presu∣med he means) being secure of greatness: and in another place he calls him equal to all; in this only greater than the rest, That he was better: and more nearly to our present purpose, Thou hast made(i) 1.790 thy self subject to the Laws, O Caesar, which were not written to restrain the Prince by.

So we find both Severus(k) 1.791 and Antonius often set down in their Rescripts, Although we be loosed from the Laws, yet we live by the Laws.

These Laws are the Laws of God, of Nature, or those of the Kingdom; concerning the first and last I shall not now dis∣course: concerning that of Nature the(l) 1.792 Orator saith, It is not writ, but born with us, which we have not learnt, recei∣ved, or read, but from Nature it self have powerfully attract∣ed, drunk in, and extracted; to which we are not taught, but made obedient, not instructed, but imbued.

Concerning the original of which Law, he saith,(m) 1.793 That God our common Master and Ruler of all, is the Inventer, Judg and Law-giver, which he who will not obey, must fly from himself, (i. e. abandon the Dictates of his own Reason and Conscience) and despise the Nature of Man; and in himself (i. e. in his Conscience) undergo the greatest Pains, although he should escape all those other which commonly are accounted Punish∣ments. It is concerning this Law he saith, That from it neither the Senate no•• the People can exempt us, nor is it lawful to abrogate it in the whole, nor derogate from it,(n) 1.794 Neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per Sena∣tum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus.

The fore-mentioned Archbishop(o) 1.795 from hence concludes, That to this moral Law of God, whether by Nature, thus written in the Hearts of Men, or more fully delivered by Gods own written word, or by just consequence deduced from the grounds of either of them, the greatest Monarch upon Earth owes as much obedience, as the lowest and meanest of all his Subjects. And however the Prince is obliged to the directive force of the Law, and so ought to be governed by it as his Di∣rector; and though it be most true that(p) 1.796 Kings are restrain∣ed only by the fear of God and Hell, yet we may conclude that these, together with the consideration of their Interests, will be sufficient Incitements to them to govern according to such Laws.

Yet still it is to be owned, That when a King doth not act ac∣cording to such Laws, he is not thereby capable of any Pu∣nishment for the transgressing of them: and the reason (saith

the learned(q) 1.797 Primate) is obvious, because the inflicting of a punishment is an Act of a Superior to an Inferior; and to make one upon Earth Superior to the Supreme Governour, would imploy an absolute contradiction: though a Father or Master were never so faulty, none would be so absurd as to think, that their Servants or Children might chastise them.

When I reflect on that dismal Day, when the wicked High Court of Justice arraigned and sentenced the most Innocent, Just and Religious King, that possibly hath worn a Crown since our Saviours time; I always stand amazed, and read, or meditate on that Tragical Act with a concern next to that of our Saviour's suffering: All that black and bloody Scene was acted by Men, of and upon the Principles successful Rebels made use of,* 1.798 That Kings are admitted and trusted with a limi∣ted Power to govern by, and according to the Laws of the Land, and not otherwise; and by their Trust, Oath and Of∣fice, are obliged to use the Power committed to them, for the Good and Benefit of the People, and for the Preservation of their Rights and Liberties; which they charged that Blessed King to have designedly violated.

To which I shall give only some (k) short Heads of his Ma∣jesties Answer,(r) 1.799 which if they had been weighed, were enough to confound all their arguing. He demanded by what lawful Authority he was seated there; he had a trust committed to him by God, by old and lawful Descent, that he would not betray,* 1.800 to answer to a new unlawful Authority; That England was an Hereditary Kingdom: He tells them how great a sin it is to withstand lawful Authority, and submit to a Tyrannical or Unlawful: That Kings can be no Delinquents: That Obedi∣ence unto Kings is strictly commanded in the old and new Testament,* 1.801 particularizing that one place, Where the word of a King is, there is Power; and who may say unto him, What dost thou?* 1.802 That no Impeachment can lye against him, all run∣ning in his Name: That the King can do no wrong; the House of Commons never being a Court of Judicature, can erect none. He owns an Obligation to God, to defend and main∣tain the Liberties of his People, against all such Illegal and Ar∣bitrary Proceedings.* 1.803 But 'twas to no purpose to show such Crown-Jewels before such Wolves and Bears, that were gaping for his Blood, and would not admit his only request to them to be heard, for the Welfare of the Kingdom and Liberty of the Subject (before they precipitated Sentence against him) before the Lords and Commons, and pressed it, That it may be it was something he had to say, they had not heard before Hand. But nothing his sacred Majesty could say, would move those, who, under a vile and notorious Lye, in the Name of the People, the Supreme Authority, as they called it, passed that barbarous Sentence against that sacred Head, to the a∣mazement of the whole World, sufficient to raise the utmost Indignation of all good Men, against such barbarous Principles and Proceedings.

CHAP. XIX. That the Sovereign may dispense with the Execution of the Laws of his Country in several Cases.

HAving discoursed of the Kings being unaccountable to any but God Almighty, when he governs not accord∣ing to the Laws of God, Nature, or his Dominions;* 1.804 upon that Foundation, That there cannot be two Supremes here upon Earth, in one Kingdom: I come now to discover what Power Kings in general, and our Kings in particular, have to dispense with the Execution of the Laws upon some cases; for it is far from my thoughts, ever to suggest any such dangerous asserti∣on, That Princes in general may dispense with the Execution of the Laws.

Plutarch(a) 1.805 setteth this down as a chief point of that na∣tural skill which Philopoemen had in Government, That he did not only rule according to the Laws, but over-ruled the Laws themselves, when he found it conducing to the Weal pub∣lick.

For as the(b) 1.806 Emperor saith (whilst the Laws stand in force) it is fit that sometimes the Kings Clemency should be mingled with the severity of them; especially when by that means the Subject may be freed from much Detriment and Damage.

Princes, according to the(c) 1.807 Judgment of great Lawyers, have Power to judge according to their own Conscience, and not according to the Letter of the Law: and no doubt it was such written Laws as these that(d) 1.808 Justinian the Emperor meant, when upon the enacting of a Constitution of this kind, he added thereunto this Limitation, From all these things which have been said by us, let the Emperors State be excep∣ted, whereunto God hath subjected the very Laws themselves, sending him as a living Law unto Men; who therefore in ano∣ther place, assumeth to himself the Title of a Father of the Law. Whereupon the(e) 1.809 Glossator maketh this Observation, Note, That the Emperor is the Father of the Law, whereupon the Laws also are subject to him.

So the great(f) 1.810 Schoolman saith, The Prince is above the Law so far, that if it be expedient, he may change the Law, and dispense with Time and Place; as when a Man is condem∣ned to banishment, the Prince, if he see cause, may revoke him from thence; and therein, saith(g) 1.811 Accursius, his own Will is accounted a great and just cause,

Magna & justa Causa est ejus Voluntas.

The Reason of these Assertions is couched in what Aeneas(h) 1.812 Sylvius observes, That there is a certain other thing to

which the Emperor is more obnoxious than to the Law, and that is Equity, which is not always found written: Now if the Law doth command one thing, and Equity perswade another. It is fit the Emperor should temper the Rigor of the Law with the Bridle of Equity; as he, who alone may, and ought to look unto that Interpretation, which lyeth interposed betwixt Law and Equity; since no Law can sufficiently answer the Va∣rieties and unthought on plottings of Mans Nature, and in Tract of Time, Laws at first, just, or in terrorem, become un∣profitable and harsh: and this moderating of Laws (which is called, saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Equity) is so annexed to the Prince, that by no decree of Man it can be pulled from it.

This Absoluteness I have hitherto mentioned out of such great Authors,* 1.813 is not practised by the English Sovereign; for he challengeth no such Power to make or abrogate Laws, without the Concurrence of the two Houes: But he hath a sufficient Prerogative by dispensing, conniving or putting some Laws more in Execution than at other times, so to manage the Execution of the, as the Government, and consequently the Peoples safety be not prejudiced. So though there be a Law for Triennial Parliaments; yet when a Prince finds a Potent Faction that may influence the Electors, so as the meeting of such a Parliament at such a time, may be hazardous to the pub∣lick, there being no Penalty can be inflicted on a King for the Omission, and the Danger being visible, that such a Factious Par∣liament was only wanting, to bring to perfection the Design of Traiterous and Seditious Persons: It is very agreeable to Rea∣son, that a Prince, in such a juncture, should prefer the publick Peace of his Kingdom, and the security of his Crown (by the omitting such Summons) than to hazard all by convening them. There are other Cases may intervene, wherein the Reason of State, the Salus publica, may require the dispensing with, or suspension of the Execution of some Laws: As in time of o∣pen Rebellion, the King's arming of such as he may most sure∣ly confide in, though they take not such Oaths, or be so qualifi∣ed, as the Laws require, and as in several other Particulars, might be instanced in.

I shall only add two Authorities of our own Country, who were well versed in the matter; the one a great Divine, and the other as great a Lawyer and Statesman: First, the learned(i) 1.814 Primate saith, Such positive Laws being (as other works of Men are) imperfect, and not free from any Discommodities, if the strict Observation thereof should be pursued in every par∣ticular: It is fit the Supreme Governour should not himself on∣ly be exempted from Subjection thereunto, but also be so far Lord over them, that where he seeth cause he may abate, or totally remit the penalty incurred by the breach of them; dis∣pense with others for not observing of them at all, yea gene∣rally suspend the Execution of them, when by experience he shall find the Inconveniences to be greater than the profit that

was expected should redound thereby, to the Common∣wealth.

The Second Authority shall be that of the Earl of Clarendon,(k) 1.815 who affirms, That by our Laws, the King hath, in many Cases, the Power of dispensing with the Execution of the Law, espe∣cially in granting pardon for the transgressing of them, except in those Cases where the Offence is greater to others than the King, as in murder of an Husband or Father: therefore upon an Appeal by them, the Offendor may suffer after the Kings pardon; which shows how tender our Laws are of protecting the Lives of Subjects.

This Prerogative of Kings(l) 1.816 Bodin avouches among the Rights of Sovereignty, to pardon the Persons, the forfeiture of their Goods; and to restore the attainted Honours of those condemned by righteous or unrightcous Judgment; according to that of St.(m) 1.817 Hilary in St. Augustine, Imperatori soli licet revocare sententiam, & reum mortis absolvere, & ei ignoscere: That it belongeth only to the Emperor, to revoke the Sen∣tence or Judgment; and to absolve and pardon the guilty. For as Themistius saith, One thing becoms a Judge, and ano∣ther thing a King; the one is to observe the Law, the other hath power to correct the Laws themselves, and to qualifie the severity and harshness of them, as being himself a living Law, and not confined to the unchangeable and unalterable Letter. For that end, saith he, it seemeth, God did send from Heaven the Regal Power into the Earth, that Men might have a refuge from that dead and immoveable Law, to the living one, as he instanceth in Capital Offenders. For we have seen (saith he) Men returned to life from the Gates of Death, whom the Law indeed sent thither, but the Lord of the Law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, brought back from thence again.

As to the Power of Equity, claimed by the great Civilians, the Administration of that is vested in the Chancellor or Lord-Keeper of the Kings appointment, who is the Keeper of the Kings Conscience, or Dispenser of that reserved Power in the King.

CHAP. XX. That the Sovereign is not to be resisted or rebelled against, upon pretence of ill Government, Irreligion, or any such matter.

OUR Republicans of 1641. set themselves, with all their skill and cunning,* 1.818 as well as force, to overthrow the Doctrine of Non-resistance; and to establish that of its being lawful, not only to rise in Arms, for the defence of their Li∣berty, Property and Religion (the gilded pretences of all Re∣bellions) but to prosecute that blessed King and all his Loyal Subjects, in the highest Degree of Cruelty and Revenge, that they could devise, or their success embolden them to commit. Therefore it is a most necessary Duty of all that wish well to themselves, as well as the Government, to oppose such dange∣rous Positions and Practices.

The Authorities I have cited in the two Chapters of Sove∣reignty, are but the gleanings of what may be found in lear∣ned Men on this Subject; and since I shall have occasion here∣after (when I treat of the Subjects duty) to handle this mat∣ter more particularly, I shall be the shorter in this, and refer the curious Reader to the elaborate Treatise of Mr. Dudley Digs, Of the unlawfulness of Subjects taking up Arms against their Sovereign; and to the Glory of his Age, for Learning, Loyalty and Sanctity, the Lord Primate Ʋsher's Power of the Prince, and His Second Part of Obedience; to the judicious and learned Sir George Mackenzie his Jus Regium, and(a) 1.819 others that treat of this Subject, ex instituto: desiring all those, who have imbibed, or would avoid any of these dangerous Princi∣ples, that they will seriously consult those Authors, out of whom I shall only hint some few of their Reasons and Argu∣ments, that may be as Antidotes against the most destructive poison of resisting Sovereign Princes, or allowing any Order of Subjects the Liberty upon any Pretence of Misgovernment, to call their Sovereigns to an account.

In the first Place it ought to be considered, that by consti∣tuting any check upon Sovereign Princes, all Decisions and Controversies must be writ in Blood; and it would lay a fruit∣ful(b) 1.820 Seed-Plot of civil Wars, by indulging the most perni∣cious Freedom of righting our selves: for though the People, or some ambitious Male-contents, may not be so happy as they could wish; yet to make use of Force, as a Remedy, will cer∣tainly encrease the Miseries.

If this Principle be granted, it will make Sovereigns always jealous,* 1.821 and consequently studious to secure themselves a∣gainst such opposition by strong Hand, which will be very gal∣ling to the Subject.

Besides, upon all differences betwixt the King and People,* 1.822 no Judge can be found to determine the Matter; and to allow this Power to the People, is to allow a Difference that can have no end, before one half of the Nation have ruined ano∣ther, as by sad Experience we found in our late Civil Wars.

Further it ought to be considered, That this not only over∣throws Monarchy, but all Government; for who will obey,* 1.823 when they can resist? Under all Governments we should have one Rebellion(c) 1.824 rising out of the Ashes of another; for only those who prevailed should be satisfied, and all the rest would certainly conclude, that they might more justly oppose those Usurpers, than the first did their lawful Prince: and thus, Government (which is designed for the Security, Peace and Tranquillity of the State) should be perpetually embroyled, and by the cruel Hostilities of emulous Factions, mastering one another; the common People, and those who would de∣sire to live peaceably, should be the continual Prey of Rave∣nous Harpyes and Vultures.

If we allow Subjects to take Arms against their Prince;* 1.825 we ought to allow Children the like Liberty against their Parents, Servants against their Masters, Soldiers against their Officers, and the common Rabble against their Magistrates: For the King in his Sovereignty, eminently comprehends all these Re∣lations.

Besides, what reasonable Man can think (much more ought to assert) that it is fit to allow this Principle; when all Ages,* 1.826 and daily Experience teach us, That the numerous Party of Mankind is difficultly, by the most rational and strictest Laws, contained in their duty: What might we therefore expect, if every Man should be invested with Power to be his own Judge, and be loosed from all Laws, and encouraged to the Duty (as it must be upon this Doctrine) of transgressing, dis∣obeying, and breaking all Laws that establish a Government uneasie to him.

It cannot but be observed, and by daily Experience is found, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in all Popular Congresses, in all Elections, or public Votes of the Body of the People, how violent they are, when op∣posed by some few: How Insolent when they find their Strength, that nos numeri sumus: And how Cruel when enra∣ged, as in the History of Cardinal Bentivolio (to go no high∣er) in that of Naples, under Masianello, and that of Amster∣dam against the De Witts, and many more might be instanced in. And it will certainly be allowed, that the Multitude (be∣ing cajoled by Pretenders to be their Patriots, and the publick∣spirited maintainers of their Liberties, Properties and Religion (the usual Shams and Wheedles, ambitious and contriving Men make of to seduce them) find these very Men more un∣just, oppressive, exorbitant and Arbitrary than the worst of Princes.

Therefore since the multitude is no better qualified to judge, nor juster when led by such Chieftains: Surely all prudent Men, and Lovers of their own and their Countries Happiness, must conclude it much safer, and conducibler to the Publick Weal, to obey those whom God hath set over them; and the Laws, their Duties and Oaths oblige them to bear Faith and Allegiance to; than to subject themselves to their fellow-Subjects, who can have no other Title but rebellious Success to warrant them to harass, butcher, and ruin them. Whereas at the worst in Kings, we have but an ill Master; but allowing Subjects to usurp, we may fight our selves into slavery under hundreds of Ty∣rants, and those too fighting one against another, so that we shall not know even which of those Devils to obey.

Would we consult the Histories of preceding times, or our own Experiences, we should find the Pretenders to reform(d) 1.827 Government, have proved the greatest Cheats to those they have seduced. They in reality neither promoting Liberty or Religion, but under that Vizard-mask, shrouded other black designs; and when they succeeded in their Attempts, they be∣came infinitely more oppressive to the People, than the lawful Powers ever had or could be, they pretended to protect them from the Rigor of. And when(e) 1.828 others rose against them on the same pretence, they did in the severest manner declare that Rebellion in others, which they contended to be lawful in themselves. Whoever will not be convinced of this (if he by woful Experience knew it not) may read it in the Histories of our late Miseries; and if he have any Spirit of Ingenuity or Christianity, will totally abandon such Principles, as brought so wasting a Calamity on our Country.

In the Constitution of our English Government, we have but one Sovereign,* 1.829 to whom we owe Fealty, Homage, Allegiance, and Obedience by Oaths and Laws. Even all the Acts of Par∣liament that acknowledg this a Monarchy, are so many solid Arguments and Testimonies of the Kings Supremacy; and to set up any co-ordinate Power whatsoever, would be to create Regnum in Regno in Temporals, as the Phanatick Principle, That Dominium fundatur in Gratia, or in Orthodoxa Religione, doth in Spirituals: Than which no Sentiment was ever invent∣ed more dangerous to overturn States, and bring all to Confu∣sion.

If indeed we were to form the Government, under which we were to live,* 1.830 we might agree upon setting up Ephori, Tri∣bunes of the People, Daemagogues, Calvin's Three Estates, or a co-ordinate Power in the two Houses, as so many checks upon the Supreme Governour. But we are born under a Monarchy fix'd by Law and Consent, time out of Mind; so that we may as well yield to the Levellers reducing us to the pure pute State of Nature, as the forming such an Idaea of a Common∣wealth, wherein a Sovereign is to be resisted, if any factious Party think themselves aggrieved.

It is to be well considered, that though William the Conque∣ror had little or no Title of Right, yet his Conquest, with the Subjects submission, then, and in after Ages to his Successors, and the Obligation of Oaths, and subsequent Acts of Parlia∣ment, supplied all Defects; and all the Limitations of that ab∣solute Power which accrued by Conquest, being the free Con∣cession of himself and his Successors (which appears in their Grants by way of Charter, as I shall hereafter have occasion to enlarge upon) it is most evident that the King's Power is abso∣lute, where no Law(f) 1.831 can be produced to the contrary, and no special Case can be determined by the Subject to the Kings disadvantage: and though the Kings succeeding the Conquest (to sweeten Subjection,) quaedam jura pactis minuerunt, and these Acts of Grace were confirmed by Promise and Oath;* 1.832 yet we find no Footsteps of any security given, that should endan∣ger the Person or Regal Authority, by giving to their Subjects any legal Power to unking them if they should not perform Covenant. Nor could it be rational to expect such; for they knew full well if they should not break such Promises, yet a Pretence that they did so (as we have known it was alledged concerning the Coronation Oath) might upon the first oppor∣tunity create a Civil War.

Therefore their Subjects had as little reason to accept, as the Kings had to offer so pernicious a Security, as would bring both Parties into such a sad Condition. For if Rebellion were to be allowed in any Case, that Case would be always pretended: and though the Prince were Just, Wise, and Religious; yet ambitious Men (to compass their own Ends) would impute to him Oppression, Weakness, or Irreligion, as the World knows by too sad Experience was verified in King Charles the Martyr; who taking his measures of others Sincerity, by the rule of his own Heart, suffered pretences of publick Good to grow up to insolent Tumults, and at last to Rebellion; and notwith∣standing his Exemplary Practice in his publick Devotions, was traduced to have but handsomly dissembled, and favoured a∣nother Religion in his Heart; and at last brought before a crew of Regicides, impeached of breach of Trust, Tyranny, and I know not how many horrid Crimes against his Subjects; who yet died the Peoples Martyr, and the Royal Asserter of their Liberties and Priviledges, which all his Subjects found to ex∣pire with him; the greatest Arbitrariness and cruellest Tyranny, being, during their Power, exercised by the new Common∣wealth Men, that ever was read of in any History.

Those who read Books, among those of the Sect of Liber∣tines in Politicks, and so much magnify the great name of Li∣berty of the Subject and co-ordinate Powers,* 1.833 converse most in Greek and Latin Authors, who lived under Commonwealths, and so were profuse in the commendation of their Country Government, against Usurpers; or else these admired Authors were(g) 1.834 Stoicks, who out of a selfish Pride, equalled them∣selves

not only to their Kings, but to their own Gods; even as our Quakers who pretend a Light within them a more sure guide to them than the Law.

Now the same reason they had to commend their form of Government,* 1.835 (and so much more as Monarchy is preferrable to Aristocracy) we in England have reason to commend our Con∣stitution, where our Kings are truly the Fathers of their Coun∣try; and if they would ballance the convenience or inconveni∣ence of either Government, they would soon discover it. For whereas they say that the Doctrine of Non-resistance is the readiest Motive to establish Tyranny: It is much more certain and experimentally known that the Leaders of the Rabble al∣ways prove such, and that the Distractions of a civil War (which ordinarily are occasioned by the pretence of reform∣ing something amiss in the Governours, and Competitions be∣twixt Persons for Soveraignty) destroy more than the Lusts of any one Tyrant can do; which made Lucan, a Re∣publican, and of the Pompeian Party, conclude, after a sad re∣view of the continual Civil Wars betwixt Sylla and Marius, Caesar and Pompey, without touching upon what followed under the Triumvirs,

Foelices Arabes, Medique, Eoaque tellus, Qui sub perpetuis tenuerunt Regna Tyrannis.

And if he preferred even the Tyranny or absoluteness of those Kings, before the State of Civil Wars; how much more have we reason to submit, and that chearfully, to the most easy Yoak of the Sovereignty of our Princes. We need not be solicitous, that their unaccountableness to their Subjects shall prompt them to Tyran∣ny, because we have good Security (as strong as humane Wisdom ever invented) that we shall live happily under that Constituti∣on which our Fore-fathers enjoyed the Benefit of in an high Degree,* 1.836 never distrusting the sound temper of the Policy.

For first our Kings swear at their Coronations to preserve the Laws, Liberties, Properties and Religion. Secondly, If they should command illegal things, the Executors of them are re∣sponsible to Parliamentary Inquisitions. Lastly, the Interest of the King is the same with that of the Subject, as to their Prosperi∣ty and Misery; so that a King will always consult the good of his Subjects: which made(h) 1.837 Lipsius tell the Sovereigns, That they govern over Men but for their good, and are not only Lords and Judges of Matters, but Tutors and Administrators; That the Government of the Commonweal, by God and Men, is placed in their Bosoms or Laps, but so as to be cherished and protected there.

To conclude this discourse, We have heard of, or seen, the sad Calamities the Republican Rebellion brought upon all his Ma∣jesties Dominions, when the mild Government of King Charles the First was altered to the most Bloody and Tyrannical one of

his rebellious Subjects that any Age could parallel; and we have had Experience of the merciful Government of his Royal Son and Successor, and have lived to see all the Establishments of Usurpers brought to Confusion.

We have seen a formidable Rebellion burst forth in our Mag∣nanimous King James the Second's Reign (which had been form∣ing seven Years before) utterly overthrown in two Months; and we cannot peruse Histories, but we must meet with infinite Ex∣amples of the sad devastations such Rebellions bring to their Country, and the unsuccessfulness of them. Therefore I would earnestly advise all Malecontents, never to make their Coun∣try's Ruine, and the slain Carcasses of their Countrymen, the Steps by which they must ascend the Scaffolds, or the Rounds of the Ladders they must mount the Gallows, which, without a Prince's Clemency, are the sure Rewards of all Rebels, and their certain Fate.

CHAP. XXI. Of the King's Authority in making Laws.

HAving treated of the King's Sovereignty, I come now to treat of that Top-branch of it, the Power and Authority of the King in giving Laws to his Subjects. I must be shorter on this Head, because the following Chapters, concerning the Great Councils, and those particularly concerning Parliaments, will more fully illustrate and confirm this Particular.

In all Government, the Legislative Power must be fixed some∣where; and it is the concurrent Opinion of all(a) 1.838 Civilians, That all Laws do flow from the Prince, as from a Fountain.

The Word Lex and Jus, by Cicero, and the Romans, were most-what used promiscuously; though Lex, or Law, did fre∣quently signifie what was writ, and enjoyned to be observed. Therefore the Plebiscita of the Romans at first were not called Laws, because they obliged only part of the Citizens, till the Hortensian Law gave them the same force as those which were accorded in Comitiis Centuriatis.

The Plebiscita were among the Romans,* 1.839 after the expulsion of their Kings, binding Laws; and they were made thus: The Magistrates who had the greater Auspices in the Commonwealth (such were the Consuls, Dictators, or Pretors) proposed the Laws to the Assemblies of the People, and asked them by the Name of Quirites, Whether they willed or commanded them? And they writ in the Table either A. for Antiquo, or Ʋ. R. for Ʋti Rogas, As thou askest.

The Tribunes and Plebeian Aediles were the proper Magi∣strates of the Plebs; but the Aediles were never known to de∣mand

the Peoples Suffrage to the Laws. The Plebiscita at first were made in the Assemblies of the(b) 1.840 Tribes, and the Laws in the Hundredary or Curiate Assemblies. But, to be short, L. Valerius and M. Horatius being Consuls, it being a doubt whe∣ther the Fathers were obliged by the Plebiscita, they passed a Law in the Centuriata(c) 1.841 Comitia, That whatever the Plebs should enjoyn in the Convention of the Tribes, should be bind∣ing to the People; which was confirmed by(d) 1.842 Q. Hortensius the Dictator, at the third Secession of the People to the Janicu∣lum; therefore(e) 1.843 Pomponius saith, That the manner of con∣stituting a Law and Plebiscitum differed, but the Power was the same.

That which the Senate commanded and constituted, was called a Senatus consultum. Vinnius proves, That while the Ro∣man Republic stood, the Laws were made by the People alone, and not by the Senate: For they had permitted to them, as the Publick Council, to take cognisance and Decrees of things that related to the constituting the Republic; but so, that all Matters of great moment were not established, unless the(f) 1.844 People confirmed them. So that by no Decree of the Se∣nate, either any new Law was introduced, or any old one abrogated. So that neither in Julius Caesar, or Augustus's time, we find mention of their Decrees: And(g) 1.845 Bodin affirms, That from the time of the expulsion of the Kings, to the Empire of Tiberius Caesar, the Senate had no power to make Laws, but certain Annual Decrees, which yet did neither bind the People or Plebs.

During the Civil Wars, there was scarce any Authority but in the Emperors, till Augustus in some measure restored the Power of the Comitia, as Suetonius tells us, who saith, That Julius Caesar(h) 1.846 did not wholly abrogate the Power of the Comitia, but divided the Power betwixt himself and them; and Augustus brought back the ancient Jus of the Comitia: And Tacitus tells us of these times, Ad eam diem, etsi potissima arbi∣trio Principis, quaedam tamen studiis Tribuum fiebant; That to that day, although most things were done by the Will of the Prince, yet some things were done by the Study of the Tribes.

Yet it is observed, That from what time the Laws and the(i) 1.847 Plebiscita were weakned, or less regarded, the Senate be∣gan to make Laws; but it was by the Connivence and Indul∣gence of the Princes, as appears by the Orations the Princes had in the Senates. Therefore(k) 1.848 Tacitus makes his Prince sole Arbiter of Affairs by Kingly Right and Name; and gives the Reason for it; Because the nature of Commands consists not otherwise, than that the last resort be to One: Ea est imperandi ratio, ut non aliter constet quam si uni reddatur. So the Judicious(l) 1.849 Livy saith, Kings are Lords of Things and Times, attracting all things by their Counsel, not following them. So Mecaenas's Advice was to(m) 1.850 Augustus, insensibly and gradually to draw to himself the Appointment of Laws and Magistrates. How∣ever,

by Pliny it is recorded, to the Honour of Trajan, That he would make no Laws without the Senate: as Alexander did no∣thing in Military Affairs, without his Council of Officers; or in other Matters of moment, without his Council of Prudent Men.

Thus the Senate had a shadow of Authority, and were some∣thing like the Parliaments of France, to ratifie the King's Edicts: And it was some advantage to a Senate, that the Prince concur∣red with(n) 1.851 them, & è contra. So we read, That Theoderick the Goth passed that obliging Complement upon them,(o) 1.852 Our Assent (Fathers of the Senate) accompanies your Judgment.

So Bodin observes, That whenever the Senate had any Au∣thority, it was when it was particula quaedam Majestatis, and had it not vi Senatus, sed quia simul sustinet partem Majestatis: So he would ascribe to the Senate Jus decernendi, & Sententi∣am pronunciandi; but to want the absolute Legislative Power. For if the Senate had obtained that, the Government must have been Aristocratical.

How the Equites, by a Law of Caius Gracchus, Tribune of the People, were brought in to be Judges, whereby they had the Lives and Fortunes of the Senators and Nobles in their Power, is fully discoursed of in the Judicious History of(p) 1.853 Dr. Howel, to whom I refer the Reader.

There were also Praetorian Laws, and the Responsa sapientum; but these seem to be Judgments passed in Courts, rather than Laws, and are like our Precedents and Reports: So I pass them, as also the Laws of the Twelve Tables, only noting,* 1.854 That in the great Strife betwixt the Tribunes of the People and the Senate, about the 298 of the City, Sp. Posthumius, and others, were sent to Greece, to fetch a Transcript of their Laws; and they were proposed to the view of all Men in Ten Tables, and a Senatus consultum passed for ratifying them; and the Questi∣on being put to the People, in the Centuriata Comitia, they were confirmed most religiously, in the presence of the Ponti∣fices, Augurs, and Priests, and were engraven in Brass: By which Account we have the true Method of the Roman making of Laws.

The Power of the Senate, and all Magistrates Authorities,* 1.855 being weakned in the Wars of Marius and Sylla, and still more in those betwixt Pompey and Caesar, the prevailing Party still made the Senators and Tribunes, Consuls, &c. of their Faction. The like was done in Augustus's time, after the Defeat of An∣thony: so that both Julius and Augustus got the Tribunitian Pow∣er and Consularships, and Julius got himself made Dictator for ten Years, and had Tribunitian Power for Life: By which means they got all the Powers of the Commonweal, in effect, into their Hands; all which was confirmed by the Lex Regia, of which I shall say something.

The Emperors, Julius and Augustus,* 1.856 having as Conquerors (rather than by any other Right) got possession of the Sove∣reign Power, after a quieter Settlement, obtained the Lex

Regia to be established; of which(q) 1.857 Justinian saith, That what pleaseth the Prince, hath the vigour of a Law: Forasmuch as by the Lex Regia, which was made concerning his Power, the People to him, and upon him, granted and conferred all its Command and Authority. Therefore whatever the Emperor by his Epistle appoints, or knowing decrees, or commands by Edict, that is a Law. In the Pandects he mentioneth it almost in the same Words; and in(r) 1.858 another place, That by an an∣cient Law, called Lex Regia, all the Right, and all the Power of the Roman People was translated into the Emperor's Au∣thority.

Some Civilians, that have lived in Commonwealths and mix∣ed Governments, would gladly evade the force of this, by ma∣king the Hortensian Law to give the People and Senate equal Power and Authority, and by the Lex Regia the Prince came to be joyned to them as a third Party; so that the Powers of neither of the other were by this Law extinguished. But(s) 1.859 Vinnius saith, The Words ei, & in eum, signifie the People to have endeavoured to show their Will to transfer all their Power, Authority, or Command, fully and compleatly on the Emperour. Otherwise, How can it be said they grant omne Imperium & Potestatem, if they retained any of their old Power? Though upon a prudential account, (that the first Emperors might not endanger their own Interest by too univer∣sal a Change) they did leave some Shadow of Authority to the Senate and People, which Tacitus elegantly calls, Vestigia morientis Libertatis, some Footsteps of dying Liberty.

(t) 1.860Dr. Howel observes, That Justinian declareth, That his Sentence standeth for Law, and bindeth all under his Com∣mand; which the very composing of the Body of Law, as from him it is transmitted to us,* 1.861 sufficiently demonstrates: Wherein he by his sole Authority repealeth what he pleaseth, and enacteth a-new what seemeth good to him, without inter∣position of any other Authority; which he could not have done (nor his Predecessors) as to the Plebiscita, and Senatus Consulta, if he had wanted that Power which the People and Senate had, and were devested of.

Juvenal speaking of the People of Rome, how they were fallen from their Power and Authority, and were, under the Emperors, contented to have the Allowances of Corn, and the Pleasure of Shows in the Cirques, expresseth it thus:

— Qui dabat olim Imperium, Fasces, Legiones, omnia, nunc se Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat, Panem & Circenses.

In stead of all other Authors,(u) 1.862 Dio Cassius may serve to clear this Point, whose Discourse on this Subject I shall epito∣mize. He speaking of Augustus, saith, All the Power of Peo∣ple

and Senate was transferred upon him, and that all things were managed merely as the Prince pleased; though all other Magistrates, except the Censors, were preserved: and they had not this Power by Force, but by Law;* 1.863 taking upon them all things which were of greatest Force (and that by universal consent) as well as the Names; as of Consuls, Imperator (not only as General, but to signifie their plenary and absolute Power) in the Room of King and Dictator: They had the Power of raising Men and Money, making War and Peace, commanding all things effectually, both at home and abroad; putting to death Equites and Senators, and doing all other things, which a Consul and other Magistrates, who had abso∣lute Power, might do: They were Censors, admitted Persons into Equestrian and Senatorian Ranks, and removed them at their Pleasure; were inaugurate in all Priesthoods, and had all Religious and Sacred things in their Hands.

As to the Tribunitian Power, it enabled them to interpose against any thing that might be done contrary to their Plea∣sure, and thereby they were Sacrosanct, or Inviolable; so that if any injured them in the least, by Word or Deed, they might put him to death, as piacularly criminal.

They have another Priviledge (saith the same Author) which never was universally granted to any Roman; for the Emperors are loosed from the Laws, by which thing alone, Li∣berty is given them to do those things which he hath related, and all other things.(w) 1.864 He concludes thus, The Common∣wealth was changed into a better Form and Order; for it was utterly impossible ••••should subsist under the Power of the Peo∣ple.

From the Consideration of this State of the Empire, and of absolute Sovereign Princes,(x) 1.865 Bodin saith, it is the first and principal part of Majesty, to command Laws, and impose them on all and singular the Subjects: and he saith, That in the Emperors time, the name of the Senate was inscribed only to testify such Laws were made, and to render them more accep∣table to the People, by the opinion they would then have, that they were made with Council and Prudence.

So(y) 1.866 Anisaeus ranks it among the first of the Jura Majesta∣tis to make Laws: for that the Government, saith he, is for the most part by Laws; therefore they should be in the hand of the Sovereign; for that they have no Power, but as they are inforced by his Authority, who possesseth the Plenitude of Empire.

I shall only note a few things of the absoluteness of the Ro∣man Emperors, in point of Law-making or abrogating, and so pass to the considerations of our English Monarchy; refer∣ring the larger and more explicit treating of it, to the Chap∣ters of Parliaments.

In the Capitol, now Lateran Palace, is extant a Table of(z) 1.867 Brass, where is to be seen a fragment of the Lex Regia,

renewed as to Vespasian, confirming many things of Sovereign and sole Authority, as descending upon him from his Prede∣cessors; and enacting, That what he had done, decreed, or commanded before his Ratification, should be held and taken for as good Law, as if the People it self had done, decreed, or commanded it: So that tho' he might make use of the Senate or Peoples Ratification; yet his Right was as strong before.

So(a) 1.868 Constantine challengeth to himself alone, Authority to judge betwixt Law and Equity; and so in point of Repeal of Laws,(b) 1.869 Theodosius and Valentinian say, That the Laws were to be abrogated by no other but themselves.

It is not to be doubted, but that great and vast Empires re∣quire for their better Government, a more absolute Power in the Sovereign, to make Laws suitable to Emergencies, for the Preservation of the whole. So the Ottoman Empire, and those of China, Persia, and the Mogul, could not well be con∣served entire without it: Yet in these there are established Laws, agreeable to the Laws of Nature and of Nations; whereby the Rights of meum and tuum to Strangers, are ad∣justed; and the Subjects, though they have no Property like the Europaeans, yet are kept in Order, and under Protection of the Laws; and their Absoluteness consists principally in the ordering the Execution of any Subject, without Juridical Pro∣cess; in placing and displacing Governours, or depriving Ci∣ties, Provinces and Kingdoms of Priviledges.

I have enlarged upon this Head, to show how happy we are in England;* 1.870 that though the Force and Vigor of all our Laws, flow from our Sovereigns Paternal Care, ••••ace and Bounty; yet in the Point of making and abrogating Laws, not only Consultation is had with so venerable a Body, as the two Hou∣ses of Parliament are, but nothing is done by the Sovereign, without their own Preparation of Bills, for his Royal Assent: A wise and wealthy part of which are chosen by our selves, and by the Kings Permission, impowered in that particular to act for us, in deliberating upon, and fashioning such Bills as they peti∣tion the Sovereign to grant.

So that what the Judicious(c) 1.871 Dr. Brady (after many o∣ther learned Men) asserts, is most true, That by time and the Concessions of our Kings, the Subjects of this Government have and may enjoy all Freedom and Happiness, that sober rational Men can desire; and such as is no where to be found, but in this Island, and the Dominions to it belonging; nor can any Man that loves his Prince or Country, wish for other than the present Constitution.

By the whole series of great Councils, in the Saxon times, until 49 Hen. 3. and the Parliaments succeeding, I shall make it clear, That the Royal Assent is that which forms the Prepa∣ratory Bills, presented by both Houses, into Laws; and that in ancienter times the Laws were made by the Kings sole Grant, by way of Charter.

I shall here only lay down some Preliminaries, to shew in general what the ancient Usage was, referring Particulars to the following Chapters.

First it appears, That there were no certain(d) 1.872 Persons de∣signed by Law, whose Concurrence was required to constitute a great Council; but the Kings used the Advice only of those whom they pleased to call unto themselves; who were always such as they thought most able to counsel and direct them in the matters that were to be consulted of, and whose assent was most likely to add most Credit and Estimation to the Laws that were to be divulged. So we find in(e) 1.873 Bede, that Sege∣bert or Sigbercht, who was King of the East Saxons, in the time of Oswi King of Northumberland (who perswaded him to be∣come a Christian) held a Council with his Wites, i.e. Nobles and Wisemen, and his Friends; and by their Advice, Aid and Con∣sent, received the Christian Faith.

We find, that Offa King of the Mercians, made Laws with∣out the Assent of his Great Council; for he being at Rome,(f) 1.874 go∣lng into the School of the English which was there; out of his Royal Munificence, He gave to the support of the People of his Kingdom, that should come thither, a Penny to be paid yearly for ever, out of every Family, by all, whose Goods in the Fields exceeded the value of Thirty Pence; and this he made a perpetual Constitution throughout all his Dominions, excepting the Lands conferred upon the Monastery of St. Al∣bans. This Imposition and Law continued a long while in force; though we find it not confirmed by any great Council in his own time, or his Successors; only in the Laws of King Edgar and King Edward, it is enjoyned to be payed as the Kings Alms; which implies it was the Kings Gift solely, not by consent of a great Council.

So his Son(g) 1.875 Ecgfrid grants Thyreseld to St. Albans, with the Consent and Testimony of his Magnates; which imports it to be granted by Consent of a Great Council, and the Op∣timates witnessing are Cynedrid the Queen, three Bishops, one Abbot and Brorda, Wiega, Cuthbert, Eobing, Esne, Cydda, Win∣bert, Heardbert and Brorda Dukes; besides Ethelbeard Archbi∣shop, Forthred Abbat, and Sighore Son of Siger.

But I shall hereafter more copiously give an Account of the constituent Parts of the great Councils.* 1.876

The Legislative Power (saith a learned(h) 1.877 Author) belongs to the King alone by the Common Law; for though the two Houses have Authority granted them by the King to assent or dissent; yet the Power that makes it a Law, the Authority that animates it, and makes it differ from a dead Letter, is in the King, who is the Life and Soul of the Law; by whose Au∣thority alone the Laws command, forbid, vindicate and punish Transgressors.

This was resolved by divers Earls and Barons, and by all the Justices in the Reign of King Edward the Third; for one

(i) 1.878 Haedlow and his Wife, having a Controversie with the King, and desiring to have it decided in Parliament: It was resolved, That the King makes Laws by the Assent of the Lords and Commons; and not the Lords and Commons; and that he could have no Peer in his own Land, and could not be judged by them.

This is further manifested, that the Laws are primarily and properly made by the King; and the two Houses have a Co∣operation, but no Co-ordination of Power: for the breach of any Statute, whether it be by Treason, Murther, Felony, Per∣jury, or by any other way, is an offence against the(k) 1.879 Kings Authority alone; and Pleas made against such Offences, are called, The Pleas of the Crown; because they are done against the Crown and Dignity of the King. So that it is not the Dig∣nity and Authority of the Lords and Commons, which is vio∣lated, but the Dignity and Authority of the King.

This appears also in the Power the(l) 1.880 King hath in dispen∣sing with such Laws, as forbid a thing which is not malum in se, and in pardoning the Transgression of others; as Treason, Fe∣lony, &c. which in Reason he ought no more to do, than to dispense with the Laws of Germany, Spain or France; or par∣don the Transgressors thereof, if they were not made by his Authority.

Furthermore it is a certain Maxim of the Law,(m) 1.881 None can interpret the Laws, but the same Power that makes them: But the King may do this, as appears by the Statute of Gloce∣ster 6••••. where, immediately after the Statute, are these words; After by the King and his Justices, certain Expositi∣ons were made upon some of the Articles above mentioned: So the Judges are appointed by the King, and they have from him a Power to interpret the Law judicialiter; otherwise they could not proceed to Judgment; and being called by the King, with him, and under him, they have a Power to interpret the Law Authoritativé.

But the two Houses (besides, that they can do nothing sin∣gly or joyntly, without the Kings Concurrence) in(n) 1.882 their make and composition, are unfit to interpret Law: For such Power as interprets Law, must be always existent, or in being, to act according to emergent Occasions; which the two Hou∣ses are not: And if they were a permanent Body, yet they ha∣ving a Negative upon each other, the Interpretation of the Law must be retarded, and all Controversies depending there∣upon undecided: And this Disagreement might perhaps en∣dure for ever; and so, a final Determination in such Suits would be impossible. Now these are Inconveniences which ought not to be admitted in any Commonwealth; for it de∣rogates both from the Honour and Wisdom of a Nation, to be so moulded and framed, that Justice cannot have a free Pas∣sage in all Contingencies.

Not only the Legislative Power it self, but the very(o) 1.883 Ex∣ercise of the Power also (so far as it is essential to Govern∣ment) is in the King alone; for he can by Edicts and Procla∣mations provide for all necessary occasions, and special Emer∣gencies, not provided for by fixed Laws, which is one of the most excellent and eminent Acts of the Legislative Power, and a sufficient Remedy against all Mischiefs, in case the two Houses should refuse to concurr with him in those things which concern the Benefit of the Kingdoms.

For as(p) 1.884 Bracton saith, those things which belong to Jurisdicti∣on and Peace, and those which are annexed to Justice and Peace, appertain to none but the Crown, neither can they be separa∣ted from it, because they make the Crown. If the King should unwarily by Act of Parliament consent to any thing prejudicial and derogatory to His Royal Prerogative, such Acts are void by the Common Law, and the Judges are bound to declare them so; as that of 23. H. 6. about Sheriffs, not to con∣tinue longer than one Year, was by the Judges declared void, and all Kings since, might with a Clause of non obstante, a∣gainst the manifest words of the Statute, have granted that of∣fice for Life, in Tail, or in Fee.

But I need not enlarge upon this, for all the Acts for the King's Supremacy, all the Laws and Statutes that over were made, put this beyond Dispute, that the affirmative Voice is ab∣solutely in the King; that no Laws can be binding, or be Laws at all, without his special Consent: and this being one of the great Rights of Sovereignty, cannot be separated from the Person of the King, although he(q) 1.885 would himself: For it is essential to Majesty and Soveraignty, and cannot be abdicated while he remaineth King, nor separated without the diminuti∣on or destruction of Majesty. How both King and People are obliged to defend the Rights of the Crown, will appear in the Laws ascribed to King Edward the Confessor, in the 17.35. and 56.

As to the Particular, How absolutely necessary the Royal As∣sent is to all Laws, in the Act of Recognition to King James the First, it is fully expressed thus: Which if Your Majesty shall be pleased (as an Argument of your Gracious acceptation) to a∣dorn with Your Majestie's Royal Assent, without which it can neither be Compleat, and Perfect, nor remain to all Posterity ac∣cording to our Desire, as a Memorial of your Princely and ten∣der Affection towards us, &c.

Against what I have laid down, those who were for co-ordi∣nate Powers in the two Houses, object many things;* 1.886 some I have answered in the Chapter of the King's Sovereignty, and I shall meet with others in the Chapters of Parliaments: And shall here only take notice of some omitted, or not fully answered there.

Against the assertion, That the Liberties granted by King Henry the Third, were by way of Charter; they produce the Pre∣amble(r) 1.887 to the Confirmation of King Edward the First, of

Magna Charta,* 1.888 and Charta de Foresta, wherein he saith that the Charter of Liberties, and the Charter of the Forest, made by the Community of all the Realm, in the time of King Hen∣ry our Father, shall be kept, &c.

To which, with the Judicious Doctor.(s) 1.889 Brady, may be answered that these were the Petitions and Requests of the Community of the Kingdom, and may be said to be made, that is, digested by them into the form of a Charter. So the Ba∣rons offered King John's Magna Charta to him ready drawn in a Schedule, and forced him to grant it, and cause his Seal to be put to it; and the whole strength and validity of the Charter lay in his Grant, and the Confirmation of it under his Seal. This was the only Security they desired, and demanded no other, and the Tenour of all the Charters were accordingly, We grant, We confirm, We give for us and our Heirs, to them and their Heirs, &c. Which Grants and Concessious were always in these times accepted, and acknowledged to be sufficient, with∣out the least doubting or scruple, There was no other Power or Authority that gave them being but the King's; so that it seemed the great Councils or Parliaments of those times, own∣ed the Kings Charters under Seal, and the Grants made by them to the People, to be of good force and effect, and that their Petitions, to which he gave his assent, and caused to be put un∣der his Seal, were by them accepted, and from time to time ac∣knowledged as firm and valid Laws.

The same learned(t) 1.890 Doctor Brady observes that Sir Edward Coke hath a formal way of speaking, The Law doth this, and, The Law doth that, This is Law, That is by Common Law of England, abstracting it from any dependance upon, or Creation by the Government; as if it had been here before there was any, and had grown up with the first Trees, Herbs, and Grass that grew upon English Ground, and had not been of our antient Kings and their Successors planting, by assistance and advice of their great Councils in all Ages, as it was found expedient ei∣ther by them, or upon Petition and Request of their People; which is acknowledged by all the Bishops, Earls, Barons, and People present at the(u) 1.891 Coronation of King Edward the Second, in these words: Sir, Will you grant and keep, and by your Oath confirm to the People of England, the Laws and Customs grant∣ed to them by the antient Kings of England, your Predecessors, true and devout to God, and namely the Laws and Customs and Liberties granted to the Clergy and People, by the glori∣ous King Edward your Predecessor?

Another Objection some make against the Absoluteness of the King's Power,* 1.892 when it is said in antient Statutes, The King or∣dains, The King wills, that it hath been resolved by many of the Judges,(w) 1.893 that if these Statutes be entred in the Parliament Rolls, and allowed as acts of Parliament, it shall be intended they were by Authority of Parliament.

With the Judicious Dr. Brady I shall not enquire how such Entry and such Allowance (without any Words in the Statutes to that purpose) can make them to be by Authority of Parlia∣ment. But we may he sure, those Words, The King ordains, The King wills, being pronounced in Parliament, and recorded in the Rolls thereof, do clearly prove the King's Authority and Power in making Laws, to be far greater than many Men would allow him, or have him to enjoy.

(x) 1.894Bracton, and the Author of(y) 1.895 ••leta, applying the Pas∣sage of the Civil Law, Quod Principi placet, Legis habet vigorem, to the King of England, say, That Clause ought not to be un∣derstood of every thing that is rashly presumed to be his Will, but of that which is justly determined upon good Advice and Deliberation, by the Counsel of his Magistrates,(z) 1.896 the King giving it Authority, and confirming it for a Law; and from hence(a) 1.897 infer, That when he himself is the Author of the Law, Injustice ought not to spring from the same Fountain from whence the Law doth spring.

It is no diminution of the Sovereignty of a Prince, in the matter of making Laws, or repealing them, to have the Assent of the Nobles, and such a select Body of Great and Wise Men as the House of Commons are. But when (as in the Parliament 1641.) the Two Houses claim a Co-ordinate Power, and would make their Advices be swallowed as Commands, it is this that all Loyal Persons should oppose.

We generally understand, that the Persian Monarchy was as Absolute as any; yet in it we have a manifest Discovery of the Concurrence of the Nobles in preparing a Decree;* 1.898 yet they wanted the King's establishing the Decree, by his signing it, whereby it might not be changed: and Grotius thinks they signed it also.(b) 1.899 The Words are, The Presidents and Princes assembled together to the King, and told him, That all the Presi∣dents of the Kingdom, the Governours and the Princes, the Coun∣sellors and the Captains, have consulted together to establish a Royal Statute, and to make a firm Decree, &c. Now, O King, establish the Decree, and sign the Writing, that it be not changed, according to the Law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not. Here the Presidents, &c. assembled, consult about the Decree, they propose it as they had framed it; yet they own, it was of no force without the King's establishing and signing it: Which is exactly parallel with the Constitution of the Legislative in Eng∣land, if we joyn the Commoners to the Presidents, Princes, &c.* 1.900

But the Writers for the Long Parliament, were so desirous to make the Two Houses to have a Radical Mixture of the Legisla∣tive Power equal with the King's, that they sought all the speci∣ous and plausible Arguments they could, to enforce it, having lit∣tle regard to what was Law it self, or ancient Usage. Therefore one of them, in his(c) 1.901 Answer to Dr. Fern, saith, A Legislative Power is not to be satisfied by a bare powerless Consent;* 1.902 and therefore deman•• Whether that Consent be causal and autho∣ritative,

or meerly consiliary and unauthoritative? That the Two Houses have an Enacting Authority, he would prove from that Clause set in the beginning of Acts, Be it En∣acted by the King's most Excellent Majesty,* 1.903 and the Authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: For, he saith, this implies distinct Authorities; for the Addition of the Authority of the Lords and Commons were superfluous, if Laws be enacted by the King's Authority alone.

To which it may replied, according to(d) 1.904 Mr. Sheringham, That though it be granted, that they have an Enacting Autho∣rity in this particular of Law-making, (which how step by step it hath been brought to the state it is now in, will be cleared in the following Chapters) yet the Question is, first, Whether that be only a Power of assenting, that such or such a Law shall be established; or a Power that commandeth and giveth life and vigour to the Laws? Secondly, Whether the Power be radi∣cally in themselves, or derived from the King?

As to the first, It is agreed by the Judges,(e) 1.905 That the Words Assenteth and Enacteth are equivalent in this Case: For their Power of preparing Materials for a Law, by framing Bills, suf∣ficiently denotes their Assent, because they are Bills of their own framing; and the Wisdom they show in these, and the Care of the Government and People, will always make that August Body of great use to the Government, and valuable by their Fellow-subjects.

But secondly,* 1.906 It must be considered from whom they have this Authority. They have the Use and Exercise of the Legisla∣tive Power, so far as is necessary for that Act, although it be not radically in them: for although the King's Authority cannot be separated from him privativè, so as to deprive him of it; yet cumulativè it may be inherent in his own Person, and yet be in others too; as the Light of the Sun is inherent in its own Body, and yet diffused through the whole World: And so we call it Moon-shine, and Star-light, when all their Lights are from the Sun. And this Delegate Authority may be called theirs, be∣cause for the time of their Sitting they are by the Sovereign and Constitution of Government so capacitated to act: But since they are called by the King's Writ, and dissolved at his Pleasure, they cannot be said to have the Power radically in themselves.

If this radical Power in the Two Houses were true, How could the(f) 1.907 Statutes declare the King to have entire, whole, and plenary Power, and to be so Supreme, that all Authority is derived from him, and all Obedience and Allegiance due to him, and him alone? An utmost Chiefty and Primity of Share (as they used to speak in 1641.) will not make out the Force of the Statutes.

Because the Kings of England desiring to rule their People by Lenity, have out of Princely Clemency condescended so far, as not to impose upon them (as hereafter it will appear

they anciently did) any new Law, or alter and repeal the old, without their own Consents, by their Representatives: The Black Parliament of 1641. would have the People believe,* 1.908 that their Authority was equal with the Kings: But when Suc∣cess had. hardned them, they were not content with a share, they at first challenged, but laid claim to all; wholly exclu∣ding the King, and denying him his Negative Voice; usurping and taking upon them the whole Power of making Laws: So that this Serpent of Co-ordinate Power is not to be suffered to wrigle in its Head, lest the whole Body glide easily after.

But I leave the further discourse of this to its proper Place,* 1.909 and shall now proceed to give some Light to the Government the Britans had among them, by the Comparison is found be∣twixt them, the Gauls and Germans: Being desirous, as much as I can, to show the Ancientest usages, and under the several Conquests of England; how the Government hath received Growth and Alteration (sometimes the People being under the Slavery of absolute Conquerors, and other times factious No∣bles bearding their Kings) how the even Thred of Regular Go∣vernment hath been carried on or interrupted; how from an absolute Power of giving Law, and ruling in a Military way, by the Feudal Law, and many other particulars, the Government is brought to that Temperament, whereby the Subjects may, if they will be dutiful, live happilier than any other do.

To illustrate all these, it will be necessary to represent the State of the Britans under the Romans, and to discourse of the Germans, from whence our Saxon Ancestors came; and of both of their Manners and Laws, and from thence to proceed to illustrate the Legislative Power: In all which, if I carry my Reader out of his Country, to view the State of our An∣cient Neighbours; I hope he will think it no ill spent time, to make that pleasing as well as profitable towr: And though I represent him his Ancestors rude and barbarous in Comparison of the Roman civilizedness; yet he will find they had some Religion, some Arts, great and generous Souls, as well as strong Bodies; and their greatest mis-hap seems to be, that those in Britan, Gaul or Germany, were not under one Monarchy,* 1.910 but divided into Multitudes of little Kingdoms: which made Tacitus observe, That there was nothing more profitable to the Romans, against the most puissant and valiant Nations, than that they advised not in common.

CHAP. XXII. Of the Government of the Britans, and the Romans imposing their Laws upon them.* 1.911

CHancellor(a) 1.912 Fortescue affirms, That in all the times of the Britans, Saxons, Danes and Normans, and of their Kings, this Realm was ruled with the self same Customs, that it is now governed withal; which, he saith, if they had not been right good, some of those Kings, moved either with Ju∣stice, with Reason or Affection, would have changed them, or else altogether have abolished them, and especially the Ro∣mans, who did judge all the rest of the World by their own Laws.

So Sir Edward Coke(b) 1.913 saith, the common Law of England was here before the Entry of the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans; and it was never altered by any of them; and so he(c) 1.914 makes Magna Charta Declaratory of the principal Grounds of the fundamental Laws of England, and for the residue, that it is additional to supply some Defects of the Common Law, and was no new Declaration.

So Sir John Davis, in his Preface to the(d) 1.915 Irish Reports, magnifies the Common Law as Jus non scriptum, better than all the written Laws in the World; excelling Parliament Laws, which are written; coming nearest to the Law of Nature, which is the Root and Touchstone of all good Laws.

When I read these Assertions, I think it had been incumbent upon these learned Men to have deduced (as far as they could by History) some Testimonies of Ancient Writers, to have confirmed their Positions: But in none of them do we find the least offer of a Proof for what they say.

I think it would be a very commendable Work, and very pleasant to all ingenious Persons;* 1.916 if some of the Long Robe would digest into Heads, that which is owned as the Common Law. For though Sir John Davis calls it unwritten, and which had its beginning beyond the Memory of any Man living; and that a Custom tryed and approved, time out of mind, doth be∣come a Law to bind the People; yet nothing can hinder, but whatever is preserved in the Memory of Men living, and own∣ed as custom, may be committed to writing: Now I would not only desire it might be so written and published, but that some judicious Lawyer (who was likewise well versed in Hi∣story and Antiquities) would search out for some parallel writ∣ten Laws among the Graecians and Romans, as also compare all the Saxon Laws we have, the Laws of the Lombards, Boiarian, Ripuarian, and other Laws, and then I doubt not but they would acquire a greater Veneration in the World; and it would be known whether the Opinions of the learned Chancellor and

Lord Chief Justice, were to be relied upon as to the Antiquity of them before the Roman time.

The Glory of his Profession, and of our Nation (as to that learning he was versed in, which was not small) I mean(e) 1.917 Mr. Selden, hath given the best Solution to this point of the Antiquity of our Customs and Common Law, that I have yet met with; which I shall abstract in as summary a way as I can.

First he saith, The Opinion of the Antiquity of our Com∣mon Law, before the Civil, is founded upon the Story of Brute (of which the Chancellor speaks in his Thirteenth Chapter) and that Story supposing him to be here more than three Hun∣dred Years before Rome was built, makes the Chancellor con∣clude our Common Law so Ancient; but supposing there were some Truth in that Fiction, how can the Chancellor be cer∣tain, that the same kind of Law and Policy hath ever since continued; unless an Oral Tradition may here find as great respect, as it hath with some in spiritual matters.* 1.918

Therefore with Mr. Selden we may judge all Laws in gene∣ral, originally to be equally Ancient, as being grounded upon Nature, every Nation taking the grounds of their Laws from it; and Nature being the same in all, the beginning of all Laws must be the same: Even from the first Peopling of the Land, when Men (by Nature, being civil and sociable Creatures) grew to plant common Society and, I may add, when they being under the Government of a Prince, received Laws by his Appointment, extracted out of the Laws of Nature, the Necessity of Government, and the Conveniences of the Peo∣ple, we may date National Laws. Now though the Law of Nature be truly said to be immutable, yet it's as true, that it's li∣mitable, and the limited Law of Nature is that now used in every State; for the divers Opinions of Interpreters, proceed∣ing from the weakness of Mans Reason, and the several con∣veniences of divers States, have made those different Limita∣tions, which the Law of Nature hath suffered: It falls out, that in several Nations they are so disguised by the various Modifyings and Repairs, that as to their first being, they are like(f) 1.919 Jason's Ship, that had nothing of the old Materials remaining.

Therefore the learned Selden adds, That little follows in point of Honour or Excellency, specially to be attributed to the Laws of a Nation in general, by any Argument drawn from the difference of Antiquity, which in substance is alike in all: for as soon as Italy was peopled, this beginning of Laws was there; and so when there was first a State in that Land which the Common Law now governs, there were natural Laws limited for the Convenience of civil Society here.

Notwithstanding the Opinion of the(g) 1.920 Chancellor, that neither the Roman Civil Laws, nor the Laws of the Venetians, which above all other, he saith, are reported to be of most An∣tiquity,

nor the Laws of any Paynim Nation of the World, are of so old and antient Years as the Customs or Common-Law of England, and that they have weathered out the changes and overthrow of People by the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans: Yet I cannot believe but every of those Nations, when they obtained the Power of Government, introduced their own Laws, and abolished what they found not agreeable to their own Politie.

As to the British Laws,* 1.921 before the Romans Arrival, we can find very little of them, but what is related of the Druids. Peter Ramus in his Book de moribus Veterum Gallorum, hath Collected out of the antientest Authors, a parallel betwixt the Customs of the Gauls, the Germans, and Britans, there be∣ing found in Caesar and Strabo's description of their manner of Li∣ving, strength of Body, Temperance, Marriages, Habitations, and many other Particulars, a great affinity, of which I shall touch some Particulars hereafter. At present I shall speak of the original of the Gauls, and of the Druids Discipline, and Govern∣ment of the Gauls, and Britans.

The fabulous Berosus, published by John Annius of Viterbium, a City in Tuscany, saith, that Dis or Pluto was the Founder of the Celtick Colonies. Celto Gallatia comprehended what was within the River Rhine, the Alpes, the Mediterranean Sea, the Pyrenean Hills, Gascoign and the Brittish Ocean, and Ptolo∣my(h) 1.922 comprized all Europe under the name of Celtica. This Berosus calls this Dis Samothes, and makes him Son of Japhet. Caesar countenanceth that of Dis, from whence he saith they reckon by Nights.

The best Authority we have for the Samnothei is that of Laer∣tius,(i) 1.923 who saith, that amongst the Celtae and Gauls the Sem∣nothei (as saith Aristotle in his Book of Magick, and Sotion in his Twenty third Book of Succession) were. But there is no mention of their being skilled in Laws, Divine and Humane, as the fabulous Berosus saith. Here Stephen in his notes upon Laertius thinks them to be called Semnothei, for having the worshipful Gods, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in their Mouths, or that they themselves were accounted amongst Men as a kind of worship∣ful Gods.(k) 1.924 So in Pausanias we meet with the Chappels of the Goddesses, whom the Athenians stiled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is Wor∣shipful.

Ramus(l) 1.925 out of Berosus, saith, Philosophy proceeded in the beginning from the Semnothei of the Gaules, and that Ma∣gus succeded him, then Sarson their third King, who, saith Stephanus Forcatulus, reduced the Laws of his Grandfa∣ther and Father into one Volume, and with severe Threats gave order for the keeping of them: and Ramus saith, he was the first that appointed the Study of Learning. Their fourth King he makes Druis or Druidus, from whence the Druids (of whom I shall hereafter discourse) and their fifth Bardus, whose Glory is celebrated by the Bards, their Poets and Orators.

(m) 1.926Marcellinus, out of Timagenes, makes the Aborigines of Gaul to be the Celtae, and some part of them to be Peopled by the Dorienses, who followed the elder Hercules, and posses∣sed the Ocean Shore. So Marseilles a City of France, was a Greek Colony of the Phocians. The Drasidae were another part of the Indigenae or home-bred People, and others, saith he,* 1.927 have flowed hither from the remote Isles, and from the tract of Land beyond the Rhine, and some few after the Destructi∣on of Troy, flying from the Grecians, being every where dis∣persed, seated themselves in the empty Countries. Where we may note by the by, that then the Opinion of the Trojans set∣ling in several Countries, was believed. But Marcellinus saith,* 1.928 the Inhabitants do affirm (which he had also seen cut in their Monuments) that Hercules the Son of Amphitrio, having over∣come Geryon the cruel Tyrant of Spain, and Turiscus of the Gauls, begot upon their noble Women several Sons, and cal∣led them by the names of the Countries they commanded. Al∣so that some came from Phocaea in Asia, flying the cruelty of Harpalus the President of Cyrus.

I am larger upon this Matter, because the Britains had the Doctrine and Discipline of the Druids in Perfection, as hereafter I shall shew, and we find in Caesar a great part of Britany, once under the Government of Divitiacus, King of the Soissons, a People of France, and often the customs of the Gauls, Britains, and Germans are compared, or their Manners are near a-kin, as appears by Caesar, Tacitus, Strabo, and others.

Concerning the Laws of Samothes, we find nothing in anci∣ent Authors; for that of Basingstoke,(n) 1.929 Count Pal••••••n is but a very modern Authority, that Samothes defined the Spaces or In∣tervals of all time, not by the number of Days, but of Nights, and he observed Birth-days, and the Commencements of Months and Years in that order, that the Day should come after the Night. Only I cannot but observe that both Caesar saith the same thing of the Gauls, and Tacitus, of the Germans, and the Britains do yet observe it: So we call the seventh Night for the seventh Day in our usual Speech, such or such a day Senight; which is agreeable to Nature and Scripture, where we find the Evening and the Morning were the first Day: and so Aristotle reckons Privation as the first of the three Prin∣ciples.

I pass by the rest of the Story of Phranicus, who about nine hundred years after Samothes (if we will believe Jeofrey of Monmouth) being to reside in Pannonia, intrusts the Druids with the Government of Britain, and how Brutus the Grand-Child of Aeneas, got the Kingdom; and about six Hundred Years after, Dunwallo Molmatius being King, made Laws, accor∣ding to our Jeofery and Ralph Monk of Chester, that their Ploughs, Temples, and Roads, that led to Cities, should have Priviledge to be places of Refuge, and many other things which Gildas mentions, and Polydore Virgil hath gathered, and how he was

buried in Troynovant, near the Temple of Concord, which(o) 1.930 Norden will have to be the Temple of London. All these wanting the Confirmation of sound Authority, as also doth the whole Series of Brittish Kings, and the Title of the Trojan Laws that Brutus brought in; for there is but one specially men∣tioned, that the Eldest Son should inherit the whole Right and Estate of their deceased Father. This indeed might be taken from Herodotus(p) 1.931 that writes it of Hector, Son and Heir of Priamus, and this (if we believe the Brittish Story) was some∣times broken, as when the three Brothers, Locrinus, Camber, and Albanactus divided the Land betwixt them, as also the Shares that Fenix, and Porrix, Brennus and Belinus had.

It is no wonder that we have no better account of those A∣ges, since we find in(q) 1.932 Caesar, That the Druids committed not their Learning to Writing, but taught a certain number of Verses, and some spent twenty Years in the Discipline: and(r) 1.933 Tacitus notes of the German Priests, that though they were ignorant of the secret of Letters, yet in ancient Verses, they celebrated their Gods and Kings, and that alone was with them their Memorials and Annals.

It is true, Caesar(s) 1.934 saith, that though the Gauls did not think meet to commit their Doctrine to Writing, yet generally in all other things, whether publick affairs, or private accompts, they made use of Greek Letters: and he saith, That there were Tablets found in the Camp of the Switzers, made up of Greek Letters. Yet it doth not appear that the Greek Language was used by the People: for one and the same Character of Letters may serve to express different Languages; so the Tar∣gum or Chaldee Paraphrase, and the new Testament in Syriack are done in Hebrew Letters, yet the Language very different.

That the Greek Language was not known among them, ap∣pears by what(t) 1.935 Caesar saith, That being to write to Quintus Cicero, who was then besieged in Flanders; by great Rewards prevailed with an Horseman of Gaul, belonging to the Nervi∣ans, to carry a Letter to him, which he writ in Greek, lest it being intercepted, the Enemy should discover the design.

Peter Ramus(u) 1.936 is so desirous to promote the Glory of his Country, that he offers considerable Authority to prove, that the Grecians learnt their Letters from the Gauls, affirming that the Learning of Semnothei, Saronidae, Druids and Gauls flourish∣ed in Gaul many Ages before Cadmus came into Greece; and the great(w) 1.937 Selden seems to allow it, when he saith, That Learn∣ed Men do think the Greeks took the Gallick ones for their Co∣py, after the Phoenician Letters, which were not altogether un∣like the Hebrew, were grown out of use.

He further adds, That the rude Gothic Characters, which(x) 1.938 Bonaventure Vulcanius of Burges published, do very much resemble the Greek ones, as also the present Russian Characters. As to the Latin Letters, they were first brought over into Ita∣ly from Arcadia, with Nicostrata the Mother of Evander, who was banished his Country.

As to the Druids we should have been at a great loss, both concerning their Doctrines, and of the Manners and Customs of the Gauls, Britains and Germans, if we had lost the Histo∣ries of Julius Caesar, Pliny, Strabo, and some more after them, since the Memorials and Epinicia of the Bards, are so totally lost, that we have nothing remains of the, but fuimus Troes, and that of(y) 1.939 Lucan.

Laudibus in longum, Vates, demittitis Aevum, Plurima securi fudistis Carmina Bardi.

The Welsh Bards glory, that they still retain the Memorials of their great Men, and especially their Kings; but we may easily conceive, that the great Mixture of Poetical fancy (as even in Homer and Virgil is found) must render the whole very Ro∣mantic.

Caesar saith, That in Gaul there are only two sorts of Men, who are in any Honour or Account, viz. The Druids and the Equites, of whom I shall treat, and first of the Druids; and having after occasion to mention several particulars, upon emergent occasions, I shall in a summary way here collect what dispersedly is recorded by him, not only concerning the Druids Doctrine, Religious and Civil, but of the Government or Po∣lity, and lastly of the manner of Living, Customs and Usages of the Gauls, Germans and Britains: towards the better under∣standing of which I think fit to note these things.

First, as to their Name, we may not rely upon the Autho∣rity of Berosus from their King Druis: As to the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an Oak, which was sacred to them, I shall speak hereafter, only at present noting that Pliny saith, They performed none of their Devotions without Oaken Leaves. Goropius(z) 1.940 Beca∣nus would have it from the Dutch True-wise, or from Trutin a word, which with the Ancient Germans signified God, and sometimes Lord; as* 1.941 Merula notes out of the Gospel of Othfred. Now as to their learning I shall say something; Caesar saith, They were Professors of all learning; and(a) 1.942 Ramus divides it into their sacred learning; their Philosophy, Astrono∣my, Cosmography, Music, &c. who may be consulted by the curious Readers. As to their Religious Doctrine and Concerns, what follows is observable.

First, They taught the Immortality of the Soul, as(b) 1.943 Cae∣sar tells us, by which they excited greatly all Persons to Vertue, and to neglect the fear of Death. Since the learned Selden will not undertake to judge, whether the Druids had their Metempsychosis or Transmigration of Souls from Pythagoras, or he from the, as(c) 1.944 Lipsius also queries, I shall not enter in∣to dispute: for some make(d) 1.945 Pythagoras only in Tarquin's time; and those that speak of his greatest Antiquity, place him with Numa; whereas most make the Druids of the An∣cientest standing among the Philosophers of the Gentiles.

Secondly,(e) 1.946 Caesar further adds, That the Druids dispute ma∣ny things of the Stars, and of their Motion, and of the great∣ness of the World and the Earth, of the Nature of things, of the Power of the Immortal Gods, and several things of Ver∣tue: And so Mela saith, Druides motus Coeli & Siderum pro∣fitentur, They discoursed of the Motions of Heaven and Stars.

Thirdly, They excommunicated those that stood not to their Sentence, that is, they(f) 1.947 forbid them to come to sacrifice, which among them was the most grievous punishment, and those who are thus excommunicated, are accounted wicked and ungodly Wretches; every Body goes out of their way, and shuns their Company and Conversation, for fear of get∣ting harm by Contagion; neither have they the benefit of the Law when they desire it, nor is any respect shown to them.

Fourthly,(g) 1.948 Caesar saith further, That they have one over them, who hath the chiefest Authority amongst them; and when he dies, if there be any one that is eminent above the rest, he succeeds in place; but if there be several of equal merit, one is chosen by Majority of Votes.

Fifthly, They were wont to be excused from personal Atten∣dance in War, nor did they pay Taxes with the rest. Such Pri∣viledges we find the(h) 1.949 ••evites among the Hebrews enjoyed.

Sixthly, As to Civil matters, they were in such Honour as they determined almost all public and private Controversies; and, as(i) 1.950 Caesar saith, if any great Wickedness be done, any Murther be committed; if there be any Controversie about Inheritance or Boundaries; they do judge and appoint Re∣wards and Punishments. I sometimes think Facinus may be in∣terpreted any great or noble Enterprize done, because Caesar saith, They appoint Rewards, whereas to none of the other particulars Rewards are due. But this obiter.

Seventhly, These, saith the same Caesar, at a certain time of the Year, in the Confines of Carnutum (Chartres according to Ortelius) which is esteemed the middle of France, sit in a con∣secrated place, and thither, from every part, those who have any Controversies, meet, and they obey their Judgment and Decrees. From whence Ramus thinks, That the Druids were dispersed through France, as the Priests are now; and the Principal of them carried the Controversies of their Citizens to this general Council, where the High Priests of the Druids presided;* 1.951 and that this was like the Convention of the Am∣phictyons (f) of Delphos, when Greece was at Freedom; and he thinks this Power of the Druids was Kingly, not only over e∣very private Person, but over the whole People.

I have enlarged thus far of the French Druids; which some may say, appertains not to the Britans; but if we will believe(g) 1.952 Caesar, we shall find that the Discipline of the Druids came from Britain to the Gauls: for speaking of them he saith, That the French Discipline, i. e. the Arts, &c. taught by the Druids,

was found in Britain, and from thence is believed to be trans∣mitted into Gallia; and now, saith he, those that will more diligently know it, for the most part go thither, i. e. to Britain, to learn it. I know Ramus faintly opposeth this, because Cae∣sar speaks elsewhere of the Gauls making a part of Britain; and that of the Britans, the Gauls are the most civil: all which may be true, and yet the Doctrine have its Original here; and Ramus concludes from this, That the Discipline or Learning of the Britans and Gauls were both one.

I shall refer the curious to what Pliny saith of the Misleto,* 1.953 with how great Ceremony it was cut by the Druid Magicians, as he calls them, there being present two white Bulls; the Priest climbing the Tree in a white Garment, and cutting the Misleto from the Oak with a Golden Pruning-knife, and recei∣ving it in a white Cassock, and then the Bulls were sacrificed. Britain being so famous for the best Oaks, and the word Druid coming from the Greek word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an Oak, we may safely rely upon Caesar's Testimony for the bringing the Learning of the Druids from Britain to France.

That which I infer from this Discourse is, that there were Laws in Britain, and that the Druids were the Lawyers and Judges; but how the Laws were made, or what they were a∣mong the Britains, is not in my reading to inform the curious; how and for what cause the Druids were extirpated, I shall speak hereafter.

The other Member of the honourable part of the Gauls,* 1.954 were the Equites, under which are to be comprehended the Princes and Soldiers.(w) 1.955 Caesar tells us, That not only in eve∣ry City and every Territory (for so I interpret Pagus) but al∣so almost in every Family there were Factions; and they are the Princes of the Factions, who in their Judgment are esteem∣ed to have chief Authority; to whose Arbitriment and Judg∣ment, the Supremacy of all Matters and Councils are remit∣ted. This, he saith, was invented, that the common People might not want some to defend them, for every one would hinder his own People from being oppressed or circumvented; and if in that they failed them, they lost their Authority over them; and this Caesar saith was the manner throughout all Gallia.

From hence (x) concludes the Government was a Timocratia, or the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Aristotle,(n) 1.956 which he and Plato so commend, and which was used in Greece and Italy while free, where there was a mixture of Kingly Government in Annual Magistrates, or of longer Duration; and of Aristocracy in the Senate, and Democracy in the Authority of the People, in chu∣sing or abdicating their Authority; all which he concludes from the last Clause, That if the Princes of the Factions did not protect those under them, they lost their Authority.

I rather judge these Princes of Factions,* 1.957 to be the Heads of such as we call Clans, in the Highlands and Ireland; for I see

no shadow of that Polity, Ramus speaks of in this Description, and I believe the Government both of Gaul, Germany and Britain, was rather in several Circles and Destricts, than that a∣ny one Monarch was over all; only in time of War one or more were chosen, by common consent, to be their Captain Gene∣ral; or where the Romans could prevail, they established a Commonwealth Government.

As to the first and second we have the Authority of(k) 1.958 Cae∣sar speaking of the Germans (with whom the Gauls are all a∣long compared by Ramus) h•• saith, In time of Peace, the Princes of the Country and of the Pagi give Law among their own People, and take order to end their Controversies, and then there is no common Magistrate; but when there is a War either made by, or upon the City, Magistrates are chosen, who have the command of the War, and have Power of Life and Death. Such a like choice we find, by a Common Council of several Kings and Princes in(l) 1.959 Britain, was made of Cas∣sivillan, to manage the War against Julius Caesar.

That the Gauls, by a Common Council at Bibracte, chose Vercingetorix singly for their General against Caesar, is well known; and when he was besieged in Alexia, by another Coun∣cil of the Princes, the Heduans and Avernois, with their Cli∣ent Towns or Cities, which were many, were to raise 35000. Men, and so others proportionable, and their Forces were com∣mitted to four Generals: Now it is said by Caesar, that when Vercingetorix had the sole command, that he placed his Camp on an Hill, and at certain distances he disposed the forces of e∣very City several, and every day called to him the Princes of those Cities, either to communicate something to them, or or∣der them to do something.

The like manner of Clans and Families (of which he who was most able for Military Service, at that time commanded) we have a plain proof in(a) 1.960 Tacitus, who saith of the Ger∣mans, That the principal incitement of valour was, that not chance or fortuitous meeting and embodying made a Wedge or Troop, but Families and Kindred: So he saith, That Ario∣vistus at equal Intervals, placed the Marcomanni, Triboci, Van∣giones, Nemetes, Sedusii and Suevae.

That both the Gauls, Germans and Britains had several Kings,* 1.961 Roylets or absolute Princes, who had some one or more City or Country under his peculiar command, is very clear in Julius Caesar: so Galba the King of the Suessiones, was chosen Commander in Chief against Caesar by the Belgians. The opi∣nion I have also, that such Princes were the Heads of Clans ap∣pears in that of Orgetorix; who when the City of the Helveti∣ans (which had under it fourteen Towns, oppida, and forty Ham∣lets, Vicos, and four Pagi, Burroughs or Places of Judicature, where were Senates) all met in Consultation about burning their Country, and possessing the Empire of Gaul: This Orge∣torix being elected; but they having notice of his Conspiracy

against them, seize on him, and condemn him to be burnt: but upon the Day, Orgetorix summoned all his Family, or Kindred, or those of his House or Clan, as by Familia must be under∣stood. which consisted of a Thousand Men, and all his Clients and Bonds-men or Debtors, obaeratos, whereof he had a great number, and they rescued him.

Such as this Orgetorix was, I doubt not Cavarinus was, who and his Ancestors, Caesar saith, were Kings of Agendicum and Villannodunum: So Targetius of the Carnuti, Vertiscus Prince of Rhemes, Divitiacus King of the Suessiones, Comius King of the Atrebates or Artoys, and the two Kings of the Eburones, Ambiorix and Cativulcus, Cingetorix of the Triveri: I shall add but one Testimony for all, of(b) 1.962 Caesar's, That Kingdoms were acquired in Gallia by those who were the most Powerful, and those that have most Wealth to hire Men.

As to the affairs of Britain, recorded by Julius Caesar,(c) 1.963 we find Cassibilan, chosen to manage the War. In Kent, no great County, we find Kings, viz. Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Sergonax, and it cannot be doubted but there were many other petty Kings in the rest of the Country; for we find that Mandubraces, Son of Imanventius King of the Trinobantes, i.e. Middlesex and Essex, slain by Cassibilan, was restored by Julius Caesar; and after we find in Octavius Caesar's time, Cunobelin King of the same, whose Son Adminius fled to Caius Caligula, where he came to Belgia for Protection; so we read of Caractacus who maintained War for nine Years with the Romans, and whose magnanimous Speech to Claudius is Extant in Tacitus; so of Cartismandua, a Queen of Brigantes that betrayed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 actacus. I might give an account of Prasulagus, King of the Icenians; the famous Boodicia his Queen, and of the famous Caledonian Galga∣cus: but it is enough to my purpose, that among the Britans we find Kings so stiled by Julius Caesar, and other Writers, especial∣ly by Tacitus, and Dion,(d) 1.964 speaking of Aulus Plantius (sent General by order of Claudius Caesar with an Army into Britain) saith, That the Inhabitants at that time were subject to divers Kings of their own.

I shall now summ up the rest of the Laws, Customs, or Usages we find amongst the Gauls or Britans; and first what concerns the publick, out of Caesar.

The Magistrates(e) 1.965 conceal those things they think fit, and what they judge may be of use to the Publick, they discover to the Populace.

(f) 1.966No Body hath leave to speak of the Commonwealths, or of publick affairs, but in Council.

They(g) 1.967 came Armed into the Council, as Livy saith; and Tacitus speaks the like of the Germans.

(h) 1.968It was established, that if any received any Rumours from the Neighbourhood, or any report concerning the Republick, that he relate it to the Magistrate, and none else.

They had something which our Hue(i) 1.969 and Cry resembles: when any great or famous thing happens, they give notice of

it by loud Cry through the Fields and Countries, and this o∣thers receive and transmit it to the next, so that in a Day, as he observes, Intelligence is given above an hundred Miles.

One thing more is remembred by Plutarch de virtutibus Muli∣erum, that it was grown a Custom amongst them, that they treated of War and Peace with their Women in Company; and if any question arose betwixt them and their Allies, they left it to them to determine. On this Head the famous Selden spends a whole Chapter to reckon up the famous Princesses and Women; and(k) 1.970 Tacitus saith of the Germans, In Rule they made no diffe∣rence in Sex: which shews it was Hereditary.

In now come to the more private Usages in their Families and Servants.

(l) 1.971Caesar saith, They do not permit their Children to come to them in open Sight, but when they are grown up to that Age, that they may be able to undergo Military Duty, and serve in War: And of the Britans he(m) 1.972 saith particularly, They have ten or twelve Wives in common amongst them, and especially Brothers, and Fathers with their Children; but what Children were born of such Mothers, were fathered on them by whom they were first lain with when they were Maids.

This strange Confusion had some thing of the Primaeval Pra∣ctice of Polygamy, and some think helped to the multiplying of People; where it must be rare for any Woman to be un∣fruitful, that had so many Gallants.

The Men (of Gaul(n) 1.973 Caesar now speaks) what Mony they receive with their Wives upon account of Portion, they lay downv; much out of their own Estate, upon an Appraise∣ment made, to make a Joint-stock with the Portion. There is an account jointly kept of the Product and the Profits reserved, and the longer Liver enjoys all.

The Men have Power(o) 1.974 of Life and Death over their Wives as well as over their Children, saith the same Caesar. Where∣upon Bodin(p) 1.975 chargeth Justinian with a falshood, for affirm∣ing that other People had not the same Fatherly Power as the Romans had.

When a Master of a Family, who is of higher Birth and Quality, dies, his Kindred meet together, That if the man∣ner of his Death were suspicious, they may by Torture, as Ser∣vants were used, examine they Wife concerning the Business, and if she be found Guilty, they(q) 1.976 torment her miserably, and burn her alive.

To this Sir(r) 1.977 Edward Coke referrs the Antiquity of that Law, which we at this day use of devoting to the Flames those wicked Baggages who stain their Hands with the nefarious Mur∣ther of their Husbands.

Those Servants(s) 1.978 and Dependants, who were known to have been beloved by their Masters in his Life-time, were when the Funeral Rites were prepared, burnt with him for Company. This was used by many Nations.

Many when they are(t) 1.979 opprest with Debt or great Taxes, or with the injurious Oppression of great Men, put themselves out to Service to the Nobles: over such they have the same Right or Authority, as Masters have over their Servants or Slaves.

Thus I have extracted the principal Laws, Usages, Customs and Powers of Government, Civil and Religions, used by the Gauls and Britans, as they are recorded by Julius Caesar and o∣thers: in which we find the Druids were their Gownmen, and were the Guardians, and Interpreters of their Laws; the same Caesar telling us positively, That the Discipline of these Druids was first found in Britain.

I come now to the last Particular,* 1.980 that where the Romans conquered, they established a form of Commonwealth in such places as they thought most convenient for their Obedience to them, and in other places they allowed Tributary Kings; which will appear by what follows.

(d) 1.981The Averni of the Gauls were a great People. Bituitus was their King, and fought two bloody Battles with the Romans, the one against Domitius, and the other against Fabius; he be∣ing taken Prisoner, and his Son Congentiatus, were deprived of the Kingdom by the Senate, and the City set free: Afterwards Ciltilus Father of(e) 1.982 Vercingetorix, although he had by Bat∣tle got the principality of all Gaul; yet aspiring to be King, was slain by the City, who had obtained this freedom from the Roman Senate: So that it was a free City till Caesar's time, and is reckoned so in Pliny's time; yet though there were some made so free by the Romans, and others following the Example of the Romans, had cast off their Princes and Kings; yet I can∣not with Ramus, conclude so universally of the Gauls, That every where the Government consisted of an elected or annual Prince and Senate, and People that had free suffrages.

Having thus far given some short hints of the Government of the Britans, by comparing them with the manner of the Go∣vernment of the Gauls and Germans, as supposing it might be made out from good Authority, that there was a great Agree∣ment in their Forms of Government: I come now more di∣rectly to prove, that where the Romans conquered, they esta∣blished their own Laws; and that the unwritten Laws and Customs must be of little force, during the Peoples Subjection to the Romans; and so by some Hundred of years disuse, were like to be so far forgotten, as it cannot be said (as Chancellor Fortescue doth) that during the Britans, Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans, the Realm hath been ruled with the self same Customs.

First therefore we may consider, That the Druids (who if they had not the Law-making Power, yet were the sole Judg∣es, and decided all Controversies) being so wholly abolished; and we finding no account of the Laws they judged by, we may well conclude, That the Brittish Laws (whatever they

were) lost their Esteem and Use.* 1.983 Especially when we consider that the Roman Conquest broke and destroyed all the Prince∣ly Families, especially the lineage of their Kings. So that now none had any setled Authority, but as he could court the Peo∣ple, if he intended to make a party against his Neighbour, or oppose the Romans: which might be the true reason why Xi∣philin(f) 1.984 saith, That with the Britans the People had a great share in the Government, which might very well be after the Subversion of their Monarchies, and the Commixture of the Roman Colonies with them.

(g) 1.985Ramus complains, That the Roman Conquest made the Gauls lose their own Native Language, while, not only the Roman Laws, but their Legions setling there, compelled the Gauls to speak their Language; besides, he saith, There were public Stipends allowed by the Roman Emperors, to have the Language taught. Therefore we in Britain may well presume the same befel us.

But the banishing and utter exterminating the Druids, is to me a strong Argument, that the British Laws were also expunged; which I shall now give a short Account of.(h) 1.986 Diodorus tells us, of the Druids sacrificing Captives to the Gods; and Caesar tells us, They used Human Sacrifices, without which they thought the immortal Gods could not be appeased. Diodorus saith, The Saronidae when they consulted about great matters, they killed a Man with the Sword; and from the manner of his falling, the flowing of his Blood, and other things, they prog∣nosticated future Events; and(i) 1.987 Caesar tells us, That he who comes last to the Council armed, in the view of the Multitude, was put to death by Torments. Strabo saith, That in their Temples, they sometimes shot a Man to death with Arrows, as he hung upon a Cross; and out of Artemidorus, That in Bri∣tain Sacrifices were made to Ceres and Proserpina, after the man∣ner of the Samothracians. Caesar and Strabo both speak of their making great Figures, or Colossuses of Twigs and Wands, or Wood covered over with Hay, which they filled with living Men and Beasts of several sorts, and so burnt them together. Although Ramus, in extenuation of these, brings some paral∣lel Sacrifices done by the Romans, and ascribes them rather to the influence the Gentile Devils had over People, in making those atrocia & horrenda Sacrificia, than that it was peculiar to the Druids; yet I think there is no Apology to be made for them: That of Lucan being true of them,

Et vos Barbaricos ritus, morem{que} sinistrum Sacrorum, Druidae, positis repetistis ab armis, Solis nosse Deos, & Coeli numina vobis, Aut solis nescire datum—

(k) 1.988Pliny tells us, That in the Princedom of Tiberius, the Druids of Gaul were taken away, which Lipsius well notes,

That it referred only to Rome, in such sence as Suetonius speaks of forbidding it in the Cities: But in Claudins's time, the Re∣ligion of the Druids was wholly abolished among the Gauls, by reason of its cursed cruelty; which in Augustus's time, was only forbid to be practised in Cities: Druidarum(l) 1.989 Religio∣nem apud Gallos, dirae immanitatis, & tantum Civibus sub Augu∣sto interdictam, penitus abolevit. It may well be imagined, that the taking of it away in Gaul, extended also to Britain, as far as the Romans were Masters of it; which was both the Mother and Nursery of it.

This exterminating the Religion made(m) 1.990 Mela (who li∣ved under Claudius) say, That it made the Schools of the Druids, not to be public, but secretly kept in Caves and obscure Groves; it being now spoiled of its Honour, and as Lucan a∣grees with Pomponius,

— Nemora alta, remotis Incolitis Lucos—

No doubt this prohibiting of these Holy Rites of the Druids, made the Nations governed by them in point of Law (as the Gauls and Britans were) not so respectful of them as before they were, and so they became more prone to receive the Laws of Rome, which had prohibited the Reverence before gi∣ven to them, and having conquered them, would enjoyn them the observance of their Laws.

That the Romans imposed their Laws in such parts of Britain as they had conquered, is manifest by sundry good Inferences from antient and approved Authors;* 1.991 which(n) 1.992 Lipsius hath gathered, who positively affirm, That whereever the Romans conquered, were it Town or Nation, they used to carry some part of the People to Rome, and leave other parts behind; but so as they mixed the Romans with them, to have the Cu∣stody and Government of them; and those so sent they called Coloni, and the places(o) 1.993 Colonies. The Triumviri divided to them their shares of Land, and ordered the Laws and Govern∣ment of the Town, which was head of the Colony, and the Jurisdiction of it; so(p) 1.994 that all might resemble the Mother City Rome, even in Market places, and all places of public Congress, Capitol, Temples, Courts, &c. the Duumviri be∣ing in most places instead of Consuls, and the Aediles and De∣curions for the Senate.

(q) 1.995Tacitus tells us, That at Camalodunum (now Maldon in Essex) there was a Colony sent to be a Defence against Re∣bels, and to cultivate the conquered (admitted now into Con∣federacy with Rome) in the Offices of the Laws, So that here we find the Socii to be instructed in the Roman Laws, which evidently demonstrates, That the British Laws were not allow∣ed to be used: That Courts of Judicature were also here, Ta∣citus confirms, when he tells us, that under(r) 1.996 Suetonius Pau∣linus,

strange noises were heard in the Courts of Judicature there;* 1.997 so an old Inscription remembers one Aurelius Bassus Cen∣sitor civium Romanorum Coloniae Victricensis, quae est in Britannia Camalodunum. This Censitor or Censor (for they are promiscu∣ously used by Ʋlpian) was one, who did not only tax all to the public Contributions, but was a Judge in the Courts, cor∣rected all misdemeanors of manners, had Power over Senators, and in many other things acted Juridically.

We find two alterations made in the Officers, sent abroad into the Provinces and Colonies of the Romans, the one in Augustus his time, and the other by Constantine the Great. Be∣fore Augustus his Reign, the greater Provinces were ruled by Proconsuls, the lesser by Praetors and Questors, the Provincial Prae∣tors were Judges, gave Sentence according to Law, and we may be sure that was the Roman Law.

In Augustus time those principal Magistrates, sent into the Provinces, bordering on the Enemy, or Frontiers of the Em∣pire, were called Legati, the Magistrates or Officers in Italy were Praetorian and Consular, those abroad, Propraetorian and Proconsular. Whoever desires to see more of this or what was appointed under Constantine, may have recourse to Panci∣rollus de Magistratibus Municipalibus, Alciatus de Magistratibus, and the Notitia Provinciarum; where all the Officers are de∣seribed, with the several Provinces, and the Cities contained in them, and the Ensigns or Symbols of the Officers. Then Britain was divided into five parts; viz. Britannia prima, and secunda, Flavia Caesariensis, Maxima Caesariensis, & Valentia, be∣ing all under the Vicar, or Deputy of Britain, under the Vice∣roy or Praetorian Prefect of Gaul; we find in the Roman Coins, exhibited by Camden, a Colony at York, Divana, or Chester, and others. So that it cannot be thought that Britain was not as subject to the Roman Laws, as other Conquered Countries. Whence(s) 1.998 Malmsbury saith, That Julius Caesar compelled the Bri∣tans to swear Obedience to the Latin Laws. And Gildas* 1.999 saith, it was reckoned not Britannia, but Romania.

And more particularly, that Britain was subject to the Ro∣man Law, these Observations following will prove.

‖ 1.1000Tacitus tells us that in his time the Britans began to learn the Arts, and to exceed the Gauls in Wit and Learning; and though they did at first reject the Roman Speech, yet at length they did covet their Eloquence: from thence they had in Esteem the Roman Habit, and their Gown was frequently worn, and by little and little they descended to the fashionable∣ness of their Vices, in their Portico's, Baths, and Beauty or sumptuousness of their Banquets; which among the ignorant was called Humanity or good Breeding, whereas it was a part of their Servitude.

If we add to this the Consideration of what I have noted out of Ramus, of the change of the Gallick Language and Laws, we may conclude that the ancient(t) 1.1001 Poet spoke Truth; who saith,

Cernitis ignotos Latia sub Lege Britannos.

All these things are to be understood of the natural Britans, who no doubt were not backward in affecting the Roman Laws as well as the other things mentioned by Tacitus. For which the Language and Rhetoric were most useful; otherwise what need was there of having Lawyers from Gaul, which the Poet calls(u) 1.1002 Nutricula Causidicorum, and who tells us that

(x) 1.1003Gallia Causidicos docuit facunda Britannos, De conducendo loquitur jam Rhetore Thule.

So we find, That Severus left his Son(y) 1.1004 Geta (when he made his Northern Expedition) to be as Lord President of the North; and Papinian the famous Civilian sate in the Tribunal at York, and from thence, Severus and Antonius set forth the Imperial Edict,(z) 1.1005 de rerum Venditione.

Hitherto we find no probability of any Laws amongst the Conquered Britans, but such as the Romans imposed or allow∣ed of. After the Britans embraced Christianity, we have some imperfect accounts of King Lucius sending to Pope Eleutherius to send him the Roman Laws, and of Caesar. But Sir Henry Spelman(a) 1.1006 and others, do justly reject this as spurious, because he could not want those, nor avoid the obedience to them in his own Coun∣try; for, as he saith, from the time of the Emperor Claudius, who subdued most of Britain, the Roman Laws were published in Britain, and the Brigantes (the Inhabitants of Yorkshire, and the Countries beyond Humber) according to Seneca(b) 1.1007 were subject to them, who speaking of Claudius Caesar, writes thus,

Ille Britannos ultra noti littora Ponti, Et Coeruleos* 1.1008 scuta Brigantas dare Romuleis Colla catenis jussit, & ipsum nova Romanae Jura securis tremere Oceanum.

So in another place,

Cuique Britanni terga dedêre, Ducibus nostris ante ignoti, Jurisque sui.

There being nothing to be found of secular Laws of the Britans, either before their expulsion by the Saxons into Wales,* 1.1009 or after, (excepting some Ecclesiastical Constitutions in Synods) till the Laws of Hoel Dha, i. e. the Good: I must refer the in∣quisitive Reader to Sir Henry Spelman's first Volume of Coun∣cils, where he will find the first at Verulam, or St. Albans, An∣no Christi 446. that by St. German against the Pelagian Heresy, Anno 449. that in Wales near the Mountain Erir, that under

Dubritius, and three at Landass, before the year 560. and others at Landass after ann. 887.

Now as to the Laws of Hoel Dha, the Preface to his Laws saith, That he seeing his Welsh insolently to abuse the Laws, he called out of every Kemut or Hundred of his Kingdom, six(c) 1.1010 Lay-men, excelling in Authority and Wisdom, and all the Ecclesiastics dignifyed with Pastoral Staves; as Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats and Priors, to a place called Guin sup. Taff yn Deved, which House he would have built with white Wands, for an House to lodge in when he came to hunt in the parts of Demetie; wherefore it was called Ty Gvyn; there they stayed all Lent, praying and fasting, &c. of those the King chose Twelve Lay-men, most learned, and one Clergy-man called Blangorid, to instruct him in the Laws, that they might come nearest to Truth and Justice, and ordered them to be writ in three parts:(d) 1.1011 One for his daily Court; another to be the Law of the Country; and a third to be of use for both: The Laws printed are all Ecclesiastical; only in(e) 1.1012 one of them it is said, that it is found in the Roman Laws, That where the number of Witnesses are not determined, there two are sufficient. As to the other Laws, I have not had the good Fortune to meet with any Transcript of them, only in(f) 1.1013 Sir Henry Spelman's Glos∣sary, I find that the Manuscript saith, That he abolished the old Laws, received by long Custom, and gave to his Britans new ones; which, from the Makers Name, are called the Laws of Hoel Dha.

Who over reads these Laws, saith a judicious(g) 1.1014 Author, will have little reason to think our Common Law ran from any such Fountain; and it seems the old Laws and Customs of this People were far worse and more rude yet, as the Proem in∣forms us.

I know some will be displeased that I take no notice of the Mulmutian, or of the Mercian Laws, concerning which the Ab∣bat(h) 1.1015 of Jorval and the Monk(i) 1.1016 of Chester give this ac∣count, That Dunwallo Mulmucius, a British King (who lived 430 years before our Saviour) made those Laws which conti∣nued in esteem till Edward the Confessors days, by the Name of the Leges Molmucinae, in which he appointed Cities, the Tem∣ples of the Gods, and the Ways leading to them, and the Ploughs of the Country Men to be Sanctuaries; and after Mer∣cia (a Queen of the Britans) Wife of Gwithelin (whom Le∣land calls Mercia proba) in the Minority of her Son, saith the Monk of Chester, who ruled in the Country of the Mercians, published a Law full of Discretion and Justice, called the Lex Mercia; which two Laws Gildas the Historian translated out of the British Language into Latin; and these in the Saxons time, were called Merchena Laga, or the Law of the Mercians; which Alured the Saxon (saith the Monk of Chester) from the Latin turned into the Saxon Language, and added the West Saxon Law, and Canutus added the Danelga or Danish Law;

all which three being joyned together by Edward the Confes∣sor, made those we call the Common Law or King Edward's Laws.

To which I shall only give Sir Henry Spelman's answer in his Glossary, That it is true that King Alfred did write the Mercian Laws into his own West Saxon Laws; but (as appears by the Pre∣face to his Laws) that he collected what ever he found in the Laws of King Ina his Countryman, Offa King of the Mercians, or Ethelbert, who was first baptized; and those that were just, he collected, others being rejected. It is not probable that Offa a Saxon King, the cruellest Enemy to the Britains, having driven them out of all the Confines of his Kingdom into Wales, should carry back their Laws as his Spoils; especially the Laws being so wicked, that in the next Age they should be expunged, and juster Laws be chosen, as we see in the Preface to those of Hoel Dha.

I shall offer but one Argument more, and so conclude with Sir Henry Spelman's opinion: When Ethelbert King of Kent made his Laws Anno 613. as in the next Chapter I shall relate; Bede saith, he framed them after the Roman Example, after Ro∣mana Bisena; by which we may understand, either according to the Laws then used by the Civil or Ecclesiastic State of the Romans.

As to Sir Henry Spelman(k) 1.1017 he saith, when the Goths, Sax∣ons, Longobards, Danes, Normans and other Inhabitants about the Baltic Sea, and Northern parts of Germany, had made great Conquests in Europe, they imposed their Laws every where upon the conquered, and their Country Ri••••: hence the Agreement betwixt the Laws of the Germans, French, Ita∣lians, Spaniards and Sicilians; and who ever boast of the Anti∣quity of their Municipal Laws, can deduce them no higher. For(l) 1.1018 saith he, What conquering People will bow the neck under the Laws of the conquered, especially when they have ejected a great part of them out of the Country? So that if the Britains had any Laws of their own, after the Roman Con∣quest, they must be preserved in the remotest parts of Scot∣land, and after in Wales: but England had other Laws, as I shall make appear hereafter.

CHAP. XXIII. Of the German Government, and Laws of several Countries; after breaking of the Roman Empire, and an Introduction to under∣stand the Saxon Law-makers.

HAving treated of the State of the Britans under the Romans, I now in order should immediately treat of the Saxons great Councils, and discover by what Authority Laws were made in their time, who made up the great Coun∣cil, and whose advice was implied in the framing of their Laws: But before I enter upon Particulars, it may be needful to say something of the German Polity, a Member of which most famous Country (though we find not them mentioned during the time of the twelve Caesars) no doubt the Saxons were.

Caesar tells us,* 1.1019 The Germans had no Druids* 1.1020 which attend∣ed Divine Matters, nor did they study Sacrifices, and that they accounted among the Gods those they see, and from whom they are manifestly helped in their works, as the Sun, Vulcan and the Moon; the rest they have not received as much as by report: But Tacitus mentions their God Tuisto, born of the Earth, and his Son Mannus, and that they worshipped Mer∣cury most, to whom they sacrificed Men; but to Hercules and Mars other Animals,* 1.1021 and that some worshipped Isis.

When I read in Caesar, Tacitus, Diodorus, Strabo and others, of the Barbarousness of the Germans, Gauls and Britans, their homely Diet, poor Cottages and Clothing, their Habitations dispersed according as there was convenience of Water or Wood, and that uncultivated Disposition they describe; I am ready to think, before the Roman Attacques upon them, they had lived something like the Savage Indians, and had little of Arts or Industry among them: but when I consider on the o∣ther side, their great Armies, their Weapons, the Chariots of the Britans and Gauls, called Esseda, the(a) 1.1022 Lances of the Gauls, with Heads of Iron a Cubit long, and two Palms broad, their large Shields and Brass Helmets; the German Spears cal∣led Fram••••••, and the Ornaments of their Shields and Helmets, with Figures of Birds or four-footed Beasts in Brass, their or∣derly raising of such and such numbers of Men, in such and such Circuits and Jurisdiction of Cities, and their training up their Youth in Arms, and the Influence the Druids had in Gaul and Britain, and the Priests in Germany (in all which Par∣ticulars I could give a large account, but that Ramus hath sa∣ved me the labour:) I say, when I consider this, I look upon them as People of brave and Heroic minds, and such as were capable of great Improvements, and who were People of Cou∣rage and Prowess. But I shall leave these things, and only

speak of their Polity or Government Ecclesiastic, Military,* 1.1023 and Civil.

As to their Priests,(b) 1.1024 Tacitus tells us, That in the great Confluxes of the People, they had some kinds of President∣ship, and coercive Power in causing Silence. None were per∣mitted to Correct, Bind, or Punish any with Stripes, but the Priests, not allowing them to be inflicted for Punishment, and at the Command of the Captain, but as it were(c) 1.1025 God com∣manding, whom they believe to be present with their Armies. Therefore he saith, they carry some Effigies or Symbols of their Gods, taken from their Graves, into their Battles. He(d) 1.1026 saith, the Germans do not confine their Gods to Walls, nor make them after the similitude of Humane Shape, the greatness of Coelestial Powers not allowing it: they consecrate Groves and Woods, and call by the names of Gods that Secret, which by Reverence alone they see. Lucos ac nemora Consecrant, Deo∣rumque nominibus appellant Secretum illud quod sola Reverentia vident.

As to civil affairs,* 1.1027 In their Councils (which(e) 1.1028 Tacitus be∣fore saith, they ordinarily held about the New or Full Moon) their Princes are chosen, who administer Justice by Villages, and Dorps, and Council and Authority was in every Hundred. Such were our ancient Wapentakes, called Hundreds where(f) 1.1029 the Hundredary, and others judged: and in this account we have a description of our Fortnight and Monthly Courts in Wapentakes, and of the Courts of Mannors; but of this Sir William Dugdale is to be consulted in his Learned Treatise cal∣led Origines Juridiciales.

I come therefore to their Princely and Military Government: For in so Warlike a Nation, it is described by(g) 1.1030 Tacitus, as fittest for that Service. He saith they take their Kings by their noble Extraction, and their Captains or Leaders by their Vertue or Prowess, nor is the Power of their Kings free and absolute; and their Captains by Example rather than Command, are obeyed. If they be ready handed, of a good∣ly Presence, and signalize their Prowess in the Head of their Armies, this gives them Command.

Further he(h) 1.1031 saith, The King or Prince is heard (that is, valued, esteemed and obeyed) according to his Age, his Nobi∣lity, his Warlike Atchievements or Eloquence, rather by the Authority of perswading, than by the Power of Command∣ing. If the matter proposed displease, it is rejected with a fretting noise; if it please, they clash together their Spears: the honourablest kind of assent being to commend with their Weapons. All this seems to be fitted for Military Affairs; and Tacitus having had occasion to treat of the Germans as they were engaged in Wars against the Romans, must be thought to make his principal Remarks from the Intelligence he had from the Romans that were employed against them: Therefore little can be expected of their Government in Times of Peace;

which, no doubt, they rarely enjoyed after the Roman Ambiti∣on of subduing all their Neighbours, and bringing them under their Subjection, was so much endeavoured.

That the Germans were a Warlike Nation appears in all the accounts given of them;(i) 1.1032 therefore Caesar tells us, That the whole life time of the Germans was spent in Hunting and in Military Imployments. So Tacitus relates, That in their Councils, either one of the Princes,(k) 1.1033 or the Father, or Kinsman adorn the Youth with a Shield and Spear: This being among them, as the Gown among the Romans, the first Honour of their Youth. So he saith, They divided the Inhabitants of the Pagi into Hundreds, of which one was the chief, and these were the Footmen in their Armies.* 1.1034 Their Princes had always a great number of Compa∣nions in Arms, whom he calls Comites and Comitatus;(l) 1.1035 among whom was great Emulation, who should obtain the prime place about the Prince; and so among the Princes, who should have most, and the valiantest Companions: where this number of Clients, Retainers or Companions is not only glorious to them in their own Country, but among their neighbour-Cities where they fight. It is shameful for the Prince, saith he, to be over∣come by force, and as shameful for these Companions not to equal the valour of their Prince; and it is an infamous dispa∣ragement to them, all their lives, to escape alive out of the Fight, if their Prince be slain: for to defend him, and to a∣scribe their own valiant Actions to his Glory, is their principal Oath, the Prince fighting for Victory, and they for the Prince. If the City from whence they sprung, hath grown sluggish with long Peace and Idleness, the most of the Noble Youth, of their own accord, seek those Nations where Wars are: Idleness being ingrateful to them; and the Princes cannot maintain these nu∣merous Companions, but by Force and War: for these Comites require of the Prince's Liberality,(m) 1.1036 the Warlike Horse, and the bloody and conquering Framea or Spear. For plentiful Food, and Entertainments are to them in stead of Wages. Thus far Tacitus.

Methinks in this description of the Comites and Comitatus, there appears something like the Feudal dependence of the Mi∣lites upon the Prince; they are bound by Oath to defend him, they have Horse, and Lance, or Spear, have liberal entertain∣ment both in constant Food and Banquets for Wages; and that they had also Lands set out for the service, the following words seem to imply, viz. That one cannot so(n) 1.1037 easily perswade them to plough land, or expect the Fruits of the Year, as to provoke the Enemy, and to deserve wounds; for it is sluggish to them and dull to acquire that by Sweat, that they may ob∣tain by Blood. Whether this imply'd a Feudal Tenure or not, I will not determine; but it shews a rudiment of it: And in Scot∣land not only in the Highlands but the Lowlands, that which they call the Great-back, i.e. to be attended whereever they tra∣vel, when they please to command it, with a great train of

their Vassals and Tenants, especially in military expeditions; is yet in use; and till the Law of H. 7. against Retainers, this was as much used by the ancient English Nobility.* 1.1038

(o) 1.1039Tacitus further saith, concerning their Princes, That it was a custom for their Cities, of their own accord, and Man by Man, to bestow upon their Princes, Cattle and Corn, which is received as an Honorary Gift, and serves them for their House-keeping; and the Princes most rejoyce in the Gifts of the neighbouring Nations, which are not sent by single per∣sons, but as Publick Presents: viz. Chosen Horses, great Armes, Horse-trappings, and Collars or Chains, and of late, Money. Here we may note, that where Tacitus mentions Civi∣tates he means some distinct Government or Country under one Government. For he is positive that the Germans had not such places as were called Ʋrbes, Cities; nor did they endure con∣joyned Seats of Habitation, but did inhabit severally, as a Foun∣tain, a Field, or Wood pleased them, their Cities being only fen∣ced Woods or Morasses.* 1.1040 I might note many other things in which the Saxons agreed with the description(p) 1.1041 Tacitus gives of the Germans, and some usages we retain still; but I shall only add two particulars more, and so conclude. He saith, that they neither went about publick or private Affairs unarmed, not only where business required, but to their Feasts they went armed; and to drink at them a Day and Night was no disgrace: and often at these were quarrels, which seldom passed without reproaches, but often with death and wounds. At these Feasts they consult, saith he, of reconciling Enemies,* 1.1042 of joyning Affi∣nities, and chusing Princes, and for the most part, of Peace and War, as if at no other time, either the Mind is more open to receive simple thoughts, or is more warmed to great ones; yet, however, upon these occasions, they unbosom themselves, the next day they treat again of these matters, deliberating when they know not how to dissemble, and firmly resolve on a thing when they cannot err.

As to their publick Consultations, Tacitus observes further, That of lesser matters (such as I suppose concerned not the Pub∣lick State of Affairs in War or Peace, but the particular order∣ing the matters of their private Jurisdictions) the Princes con∣sult: about greater business all, yet so as those things, of which the lowest sort of the People are Judges, are first treated of by the Princes. By which I understand, Tacitus means by greater matters, the Consultations about the defending themselves against their Enemies, especially against the Romans, where the unanimous suffrage of the greatest multitude was requisite.

By all which, it is apparent that there were several Principa∣lities in Germany, and that the Souldiery made up a great part of the People: and where we read of suffrages, it is to be un∣derstood of theirs; and whatever freedom of Votes, &c. we read of, was principally in debating Military Affairs: and that Germany doth yet retain free Princes, and free Cities, though

under one Emperour,* 1.1043 as ancient Germany did, is well known.

Another of their laudable Customs is thus remembred by Taci∣tus, Insignis Nobilitas, aut magna Patrum merita, Principis dignatio∣nem etiam adolescentulis assignant, which I render, Great Nobility, or, the great merits of their Fathers, gives the dignity of Princes, even to their Youth. In this we may note the propagation of Gentry, through true Virtue deserving Honour, to whose Memory is dedicated that Worship which is often bestowed on unworthy Posterity.* 1.1044 This, saith Seneca, we owe to Virtues, that we do not only worship them present, but worship them taken out of our sight.

Another of the German Laws or Usages was, as Tacitus men∣tions, That the Wife doth not bring the Husband a Portion, but the Husband gives the Wife a Dowry.

Yet we find the Husbands severity in case of abusing his Bed, thus: The Husband, if the Wife prove an Adultress, cuts off her Hair, strips her naked, and turns her out of doors in pre∣sence of her Kindred, and drives her through the Streets, lash∣ing or beating her as she goes along. This, as Juvenal saith, was

— Ipsis Marti Venerique timendum.

So Antinous in Homer threatens Irus with the chopping off his Nose, Ears, and Privities; and Ʋlysses inflicts that very punishment upon his Goat-herd Melanthius for his Pimping. So in Canutus his Law, the Wife who took other Passengers aboard her, than her Husband, is doomed, she should have her Nose and Ears cut off.* 1.1045 The curious may see more in Selden.

Tacitus observes another Law,* 1.1046 that every ones Children were their Heirs and Successors, and there was no Will to be: If there be no Children, then the next of kin shall inherit; Brethren, or Unkles by the Fathers or Mothers. This seems to point out Gavil-kind, otherwise there had been need of a Te∣stament to dispose of something for younger Children. So Sel∣den observes, that till our Grandfathers time it was not lawful to dispose of Land-Estates by Will, unless it were in some Bur∣roughs that had such priviledges, but this hindred not but they might dispose by Deeds.

Another Law he mentions,* 1.1047 which shews the use of those are called Deadly Feuds in the North, was that to undertake the enmities rather than the friendships, whether of ones Father or Kinsman, is more necessary.

Yet he saith, those do not hold on, never to be appeased; for even Murther is expiated by a certain number of Cattle, and the whole Family of the murdered Person receives satis∣faction. So we find in our English Saxon Laws, Murthers were formerly bought off with Head-money, which was called W••••gild, though one had killed a Noble-man, yea, a King himself, which, as I remember, was valued at 60000 Thrimsas or Groats, and so a Prince 30000, and others Proportionable.

Another Law we find thus, The Lord imposeth upon his Tenant a certain quantity of Corn, or Cattle, or Clothes.* 1.1048 Here we certainly find the usage of Country Farmholders.* 1.1049 So yet in Scotland, a Gentleman of Quality, or Lords Estate is not com∣puted by Annual Rent, but by so many Bolls of Victual. So we find in Gervase of Tilbury, that the Kings had payments made them out of their Lands, not in Summs of Gold or Silver, but only in Victuals or Provisions, out of which the King's House was supplied with necessaries for daily use, which the King's Officers accounting with the Sheriffs, reduced into many payments, viz. a Measure of Wheat to make Bread for 100 Men 1 s. the body of a Pasture-fed Beef, 1 s. a Ram or Sheep 4 d. for Food for 20 Horses 4 d.

Thus far I have thought fit to pick out of Tacitus the man∣ners of the Germans, and compare some of them with the Eng∣lish, Saxon, or Norman Customs, to discover their Conformity.

But since, in this account from Tacitus, we find no satisfacto∣ry testimony as to the power of making Laws, but that in ge∣neral they used to meet in Consultation about the New or Full of the Moon, where 2(r) 1.1050 or 3 Days were usally spent, and the Turba, or Common Body of those that met, (which elsewhere he saith, was by hundreds) being Armed, the Priests com∣manded silence, and had the power of keeping Matters in or∣der, and the Princes Authority was there, as I have noted be∣sore: I say, considering these things, I must seek otherwhere for clearer discovery; before which I will only note,* 1.1051 that at such Councils as(s) 1.1052 Tacitus describes, Judgments were given upon offences: for he saith here, Accusations might be presen∣ted, and Capital Matters tried, the distinction of punishment* 1.1053 being according to the Crime: Traytors and such as fled to the Enemy were hung upon Trees, but the slothful, unfit for War, and such as are infamous for sluggishness (as Lipsius will have it Torpore not Corpore infames) were drowned in Morasses, an Hurdle being laid upon them, and the reason he gives of the divers punishments, is, that the first which he calls Scelera, are to be shown while punished; but the other, which he calls Flagitia, wicked and heinous crimes, (but particularizeth not what they were) should be hid and punished by Drowning; then follows, Levioribus delictis pro modo poenarum, equorum, pecorumque numero convicti mulct antur, pars mulctae Regi vel Civita∣ti, pars ipsi qui vindicatur, vel propinquis ejus exolvitur; and that for smaller faults, the punishment was a Mulct of Horses or Cattle, whereof a great part was pay'd to the King, or City, and part to him that was acquitted, or his kindred. By which we may note a Sovereignty in the Kings, or Free Cities, or People to whom these Mulcts were pay'd.

But I leave these obscurer times, and proceed to greater light. Therefore, for the better clearing of the Authority of the Saxon Kings in giving Laws to their Subjects, and the dis∣covering who were the constituent parts of the great Coun∣cils;

I shall first note something of the several Laws made in Germany, France,* 1.1054 and the Northern Countries, and so pro∣ceed to some general observations of our Saxon Laws; and last∣ly, to illustrate or expound by a short Glossary, the Saxon Ti∣tles of Great Men found mentioned in the Councils.

First (as the Ancientest I meet with) I will begin with the Gothic Laws:* 1.1055 These Goths overrun Europe, and did not only cause great Wars and Destructions, but made great alterations in the Laws and Kingdoms. The Goths, according to the cu∣stom of other Northern People, used not written Laws, but their Country Customs; till(t) 1.1056 Euridicus, Euric or Theodoric (for by those Names he is called) Anno Dom. 466. made them be digested into writing: These Levigild (Aera 608) amend∣ed, and they had their fullest Vigor from the Kings Chindas∣wind and Recaswind; and these are used in Spain, and that part of France called Gallia Narbonensis, anciently Braccata, containing Savoy, Dauphin, Province and Languedoc.

The next Laws for Antiquity are the Burgundian. Gunde∣bald or Gundebaud,* 1.1057 who was made tributary to Clouis King of France, Anno Dom. 501. having setled Burgundy under his Juris∣diction, did appoint (saith(u) 1.1058 Gregory Turonensis) milder Laws for the Burgundians, lest he might oppress the Romans: and Lindenbrogius notes, That his Laws agree with the Responses of Papinian; though(w) 1.1059 Agobard, in his Book to Lewis the Emperor, complains of the unjustness of one branch of them, in admitting Duel, when Proof might otherwise be had: However here it appears they were made by his Authority.

The next are the Laws of the Alemans, Baiuvarians and Francks, * all which took their beginning from Theoderic the First,(x) 1.1060 Son of Clouis the First, who founded the French King∣dom, Anno 511. having triumphed over the Almains, and be∣ing converted to Christianity, he took the Name of Lewis; when he was in Catalonia he called to him wise Men, skilled in the Ancient Laws of his Kingdom; and he himself indicting, he commanded the Laws of those Nations, according to eve∣ry ones Customs, to be written; adding, rescinding and chang∣ing them according as Christian Religion required, and those which, for the ancient Pagan Rites, he could not alter himself, Childebert the Second begun, and Clotharius the Second perfected, and Dagobert the great made them better, and to every Nati∣on concerned in them,* 1.1061 he gave them in writing.

As to that part which is called the Lex Alamannorum, they were amended by Clotharius the Second, Son of Chilperic, and his Princes, viz. Thirty three Bishops, Thirty four Dukes, Se∣venty two Earls, and the rest of the People, as appears by the Title; so that this, by an Act of the King and great Council, and the former by the Kings themselves, are recorded to be ap∣pointed or made.* 1.1062

As to the Law of the Francs (not the Salic Law, which is of later date) we find no more mention of them after they

were digested by Theodoric the first, till the time of Charles the Great; who and his Son, published Laws by the Name of Ca∣pitularies, which Ann. 840. were writ by Ansegisus Abbas Lo∣biensis, and Benedictus Levita; so that here is no mention but of the Kings and Emperors sole establishing these Laws.* 1.1063

The Longobards, now Lombards, in Italy were a Colony of the Saxons, who were removed into Pannonia or Hungary; and by Narses General to Justinian; about the year 550, were cal∣led into Italy to assist the Emperor against Totila King of the Goths; whom Narses totally routed in Italy: and these Longo∣bards(y) 1.1064 seated themselves there, and established a Kingdom, and Rotharis their King reduced the Laws which they held on∣ly by Use and Memory (being mostly such as the Saxons had used) into writing, and caused the Book of them to••be called an Edict; which was about 70 years after their setling in Italy; the succeeding Princes Grimoald, Luitprandus, Rachis and Ai∣stulphus, and after Charles the Great, Latharius and Pipin added and amended them. Sir Henry Spelman(z) 1.1065 saith, that betwixt our Laws and those of the Longobards, there is a great Agree∣ment in the Laws, Rites, Words, and other Particulars; but saith, our Ancestors brought out of Germany their Customs not written, but, according to the custom of the Lacedaemoni∣ans, and the Ancient Nations of the North, retained them in their memories only.

In the Laws of Henry the First,* 1.1066 we find the Ripuarian Laws (which were made for those of Luxenburg, Gelderland and Cleves) not only approved, but some of them are word for word in his Laws, as Sir Henry Spelman notes.

As to the Salic Law, the Francs, a People of Germany,* 1.1067 pas∣sing the Rhine, subdued a great part of Gaul; and in the third year of Pharamond, four of the Nobles of the Nation re∣viewed all the Originals of Causes, according to the Salic Law: There are two Prologues to these Laws; the first names the four Noblemen that digested them; the second saith names the Anno Dom. 798. The Lord Charles, the Noble(a) 1.1068 King of the Francs, ordained the writing of that Book of the Salic Law.

In the Laws of King Henry the First, Sir Henry Spelman notes, That many things are taken out of the Salic Laws, as he instanceth in the 87 and 89 Chapters, where the Words are used, and Punishments are appointed secundum Legem Salicam, according to the Salic Law.

I shall now set down something in general of our Country Law:(b) 1.1069 Sir Henry Spelman observes, That the Laws of the English in Britain, seem to take their Original from the Ger∣man Manners or Customs, but he knows not who first introdu∣ced them. It is known, that there came into England upon the Invitation of Vortigern, the Jutes or Goths,* 1.1070 the Angli or En∣glish, and the Saxons; tho all here obtained the Names of Sax∣ons. The Jutes setled in Kent, and the Isle of Wight: The Sax∣ons in Essex, Middlesex and Sussex, and so on the Sea Coast to

Cornwall, and were called the West Saxons: The Angli posses∣sed the East and North parts, which were called Mercia.

Those of Kent had their Laws,* 1.1071 but after being swal∣lowed up in the West-Saxon Kingdom, they were subject to their Laws; The Angli used the Mercian Laws, till the Danes over-running the Provinces of East-England, and of the North Humbers, brought in their Customs, not differing very much from the Laws they had before; from hence sprung the three∣fold Division of Laws, viz. the(c) 1.1072 West-Saxon Laws, the Mer∣cian Laws, and the Danish Laws.

The first Laws we have an account of, were made by Ethel∣bert King of Kent Anno 561. and the next by Ina King of the West-Saxons, who began to Reign Anno 712. and the next by Offa King of the Mercians, of which Laws I have spoke before: The Danish Laws were such as were not only used in Denmark, but in Normandy,* 1.1073 as well as Norway: which was the reason why William the Conquerour understanding that the Danish Law was used in that part where the Danes had settled themselves, he preferred them before other Laws; because his Country of Nor∣mandy was sprung from the Danes, and Norwegians: and it was with much difficulty that he was perswaded against impo∣sing them upon the whole Kingdom; saying, the Danes and Norwegians were as sworn Brothers with the Normans. These Danes entred about the year 790. and were at last overcome by King Alfred, and by agreement betwixt him and Guthrun King of the Danes (who governed the Kingdom of the East Angles and Northumbrians,) Guthruns People enjoyed the Danish Laws, which differed from the other in nothing so much as the pro∣portion of the Mulcts: King Edward the Elder, Aethelstan, Ed∣mund, and Edgar made Laws; but from the time of Edgar to Edward the Confessour, the Danes having the principal Com∣mand, the Danish Laws mostly prevailed. But Edward the Con∣fessour, of these three Laws, composed one, which, saith the Monk of(d) 1.1074 Chester, are called the Common Laws, and to his Days were called the Laws of King Edward.

By all I have hitherto noted concerning the Laws either made in Germany, France, Lombardy, Burgundy, Bavaria, or other Countries (after they came to have any established Go∣vernment of their own) or in England during the Heptarchy; It is apparent, whoever was Soveraign, imposed the Laws, which as to the Saxons in the next Chapter I shall make particularly appear.* 1.1075

That the Roman Laws begun to be disused as soon as their Empire declined and was broken, is as manifest; for these se∣veral Nations by the appointment of their Soveraigns had their unwritten Customs and Laws revised, and according to the suitableness of them to the Government of their People, had them writ into Books, and enjoyned them to be observed by their Subjects.

To make it evident that the Imperial Roman Law was much

disused after Justinian's time, (upon the account of other So∣veraignties being established, which acknowledged not that dependence upon the Empire as formerly) I shall offer some∣thing from Mr.(e) 1.1076 Selden (who, if any other, is to be credited in this kind of reading) after I have said something of Justi∣nian.

The Emperour Justinian(f) 1.1077 in the year of our Lord 565, by the help of Tribonian, Master, and Exquaestor of the Sacred Palace, and Exconsul, and of Theophilus and Dorotheus Illustri∣ous Men, of whose Skill and Knowledge in the Laws and their Fidelity in observing his Commands, the Emperour had mani∣fold experience of: Although he had commanded them by his Authority and Perswasions to compose those Institutions, that the Subjects might not learn the Law from(g) 1.1078 Ancient Fables, but from the Imperial Splendor, as he calls it, desire them: and after fifty Books of Digests or Pandects, and four Books of Insti∣tutions were made, in which were expounded whatever before∣time was used, and what by disuse was obscured, by the Im∣perial Remedy was Illuminated; and he had accomodated to them his fullest Authority, and had appointed them to be read and taught at Rome, Berytus, and Constantinople, and no where else: Yet the body of the Civil Law was so neglected, that till Lothar the Second, about the year 1125. took Amalsi, and there found an old Copy of the Pandects or Digests; it was in a manner wholly disused. Under that Lothar the Civil Law began to be profest at Bologna, and one Irner or Werner made the first Glosses upon it, about the beginning of Frederick Barbarossas's time, in Anno 1150. and Bologna was by Lothar constituted to be Legum & Juris Schola una & sola.(h) 1.1079

This Book Lothar gave to the Pisans (by reason whereof, saith Mr. Selden, it is called Litera Pisana) and from thence it is now removed to Florence, where in the Dukes Palace it is ne∣ver brought forth but with Torch-light, and other Reve∣rence.

By this account we may note, That even before Justinian's time, some Laws had been rather by old Traditions, which he calls old Fables, than by certain Authority received; others were by long disuse forgot: and after they were thus established by Imperial Authority, yet the succeeding Barbarity of the Ages, and the new Kingdoms erected, caused other Laws to obtain Force, the first of which we find very rude. All the first Laws, we read of in any Nation, seem either so, compa∣ratively to the refinedness of the Laws in these Ages; or else the Digesters and Authorizers of them complain how obscure, rude, or indigested those were, out of which they extracted theirs.* 1.1080

The Saxons made so great and universal a Subversion in the State, that scarce any City, Dwelling, River, Hill or Moun∣tain retained its former Roman or British name; so that we have less reason to expect any satisfactory account either of Bri∣tish History, Polity, or Laws, when we only know where they

had Camps, Stations, or Cities, Palaces or Fortifications, or Temples, by the Coyns, Brick, tessellated Pavements, Glass, Earthen, or Jett Fragments of Cups, and other Houshold-stuff; or Urns and Sacrificing Dishes, which by chance have been found in the Rubbish of many Towns that have been certainly fired, and totally demolished; which sufficiently dis••••ver the noble Structures and rich Furniture the Romens and Britans had before the Saxon Invasions: Besides which, we may consider, not only, the continual Wars and Depredations the Saxons made one upon another; but that the Daves, like a fatal Hur∣ricane or Whirlwind, tore up Root and Branch, every where overturning, ransacking, burning, and destroying all that they could not peaceably possess.

Having thus far treated of the State of the Britans, and some∣thing of the Laws in general;* 1.1081 as a Praeliminary to the better understanding, who are meant by the Persons, who we find do constitute the great Councils, I shall out of Sir Henry Spel∣man, Somner, and Doctor Brady, give a very short Glossary, referring the curious Reader to the Books themselves.

The most common Words in the Saxon Laws that are used, be∣sides the Bishops,* 1.1082 to express the Persons by, (whose Council and Advice the Kings used in the making Laws) are the Witan, Wites: From Wita, which Womner renders Optimas, Princeps, & Sapiens, a Nobleman, Prince, or Wiseman, from witan to know and understand. So in the Laws of King Ina we read Gethungenes Witan, a famous, noble, or renowned Wite; from Gethungen. So in the version of Bede by King Alfred, Witum is rendred Counsellors; so by Sapientes (when we meet with it in any Authors that render Witan by it,) we are to under∣stand not only Judges, but sometimes Dukes, Earls, Prapositi Provosts, Thegns, the King's Officers or Ministers: So in the Charter(i) 1.1083 of King Edgar to the Church of Ely, Anno 970. Alferre, Egelwinc, and Brithnoth are called Dukes, and Hringulph, Thurferth, and Alfric, are called Ministri: The first of which in another Charter, is called Alderman, and the other by the name of Sapientes.

Upon perusal and collating several Transcripts of Deeds and Councils, I am of opinion, that where Wites or Sapientes are used for Princes, Noblemen, and great Personages, those are to be understood that were called to the Kings Council, had command over Countries, as Lord Lieutenants, or were Members of the great Councils: So that they were of the most wise and knowing of the great Princes, Dukes, Earls and Barons; and where it doth not seem to import such great Men of Birth, then it signifies Judges. Which as to the first, seems to be clear, by what is said in the Auctuary(k) 1.1084 to the 35 Law of Edward the Confessor, where it is said, There were other Powers and Dignities appointed, through the Provinces, and all the Countries, and several Shires, which are called by the English, Heretoches (in King Ina's Laws, Here Thegne i. e. Noble

Ministers or Officers) and when he reckons up those who were to be understood by this name Heretoges, he calls them Barons, No∣bles, and famous Wisemen called Generals, or great Officers in the Army; and as to the latter Signification, Doctor Brady hath sufficiently cleared it in Adelnoth's Plea against the Monks of Malmsbury, where it is said, that in the Presence of the King, subtili disceptatione a Sapientibus suis, i. e. Regis, audita, where by Sapientes must be understood the King's Judges.* 1.1085

Alderman or Ealderman, was both a general Name(l) 1.1086 gi∣ven to Princes, Dukes, Governours of Provinces, Presidents, Senators, and even to Vice-Roys, as also to particular Officers: hence Aldermannus totius Angliae, like my Lord Chief-Justice; Aldermannus Regis, Comitatus, Civitatis, Burgi, Castelli, Hun∣dredi, &c. of whose Offices it is not easy particularly to define. This being so copiously discoursed of by Sir Henry Spelman, I shall refer the Reader to him.

The word Thane or Thegen was used by the Saxons in their Books variously, sometimes it signified a stout Man,* 1.1087 Soldier or Knight; other times Thanus(m) 1.1088 Regius signified the Kings great Officer, a Nobleman or Peer of the Realm; other times a Thane or Nobleman of lower degree; sometimes we meet with secular or Lay Thanes, other times Spiritual Thanes or Priests. Some Thanes were as the King's Bailiffs, Praefects, Reeves, of which Doctor Brady gives account in his Argum. Antinorm. Page 283.

In several of the Councils we find no particular orders deno∣minated, but only a division of the whole into the Clergy,* 1.1089 and Laity. So in the Council that Sir H. Spelman(n) 1.1090 tells us, Ethelbert King of Kent, held 685. with Bertha his Queen, and Eadbald his Son, and the Reverend Bishop Austine,* 1.1091 and the rest of the Optimates Terrae at Christmass, having called a Common-Council of the Clergy and People: by which it is apparent that both the Clergy (o) and Laity there understood, are comprehend∣ed under the name Optimates Terrae, the Nobility of Land. So in King Ina's Laws (as I shall hereafter particularize,) the com∣mand is given to Godes Theowas, Gods Servant, and eales folces, all People.

So King Edmund held a great Council at Easter in London, of Gods(p) 1.1092 Order, and the Secular Order, or Worlds Order, which Brompton(q) 1.1093 renders Laici, in another part of King Edward's Laws. So the Majores Regnorum of King Edgar are commanded to come, and then it is said, There came to Winche∣ster the Clergy and People: those were the Majores Regno∣rum.

The like was frequently used after the Conquest; so at the Co∣ronation of Henry the First, Matthew Paris speaks of the ga∣thering of the Clergy and all the People, and then saith,* 1.1094 The Clergy answering him, and all the Magnates; and in another place, Clero & Populo favente, the Clergy and People favouring. Further we find in a great Council, held by the King Anno

1102. 2 H. 2.(r) 1.1095 all the chief Men of his Kingdom, of the Ecclesiastic and secular Order. So that Plebs, Populus, Vul∣gus & Incola, where by way of Antithesis or contra-Oppositi∣on they are used, do signify the Clergy and Laity, or Lay-Princes, not the common People.

After the Conquest, we meet with the Word Regnum some∣times, and other times Regnum & Sacerdotium. As to the first, the Sence is to be understood best in the Quadripartite History(s) 1.1096 of the Life of Thomas Becket, where it is said, the King called to Clarendon, Regnum universum, all the Kingdom; and then saith, To whom came the dignified Clergy and the Nobles: which Matt. Paris puts out of all doubt by the enumeration that he makes of all that appertained to the Kingdom, to be the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Abbats, and Priors Installed, and the Earls and Ba∣rons.

So the meaning is best understood of the words in the last Chapter of Magna Charta, that the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Ab∣bats, Priors, Earls, Barons, Knights, and free Tenents, and all of the Kingdom gave a fifteenth part of their Moveables: and in other places, after the Barons, it is said, Omnes alii de Regno nostro qui de nobis tenent in Capite, concerning which the most Learned Doctor Brady hath given plentiful Proofs.

* 1.1097 By the words Magnates & Proceres (frequently found in the Councils after the Conquest) are to be understood the Arch-Bi∣shops, Bishops, Abbats, and Priors for the Clergy; and the Earls and Barons for the Laity only; unless afterwards that Dukes were included. However they were used always to contra-distin∣guish that order from the Inferior Tenents in Capite.

The Fideles & Liberi homines,* 1.1098 are to be understood to signi∣fy those which were the King's Tenents in Capite. So we find it in a Precept of H. 3. Rex omnibus(t) 1.1099 Comitibus, Baronibus, Militibus & aliis Fidelibus suis: And when we meet in any Charter or History with Fideles or Liberi homines, the meaning will be best known from the subject Matter where they are used, and the words with which they are joyned in Construction, as Doctor Brady observes.

We meet with Liberi homines frequently in the Laws of the Conqueror, as Liberi homines totius Monarchiae Regni nostri —ut nihil ab iis capiatur nisi servitium suum Liberum, and in ano∣ther, Ʋt omnes Liberi homines totius Regni sint fratres conjurati ad Monarchiam nostram defendendam; that all the Freemen of the Kingdom be sworn Brethren, to defend our Monarchy: and these were to be ready with Horse and Arms to do the King Service according to what they ought by their Fees. And this was called free Service in respect of other base Services; for they were the Tenents in Capite, who were the freest of any other Subjects, though that Tenure was at last most cryed out a∣gainst.

By the Communitas Regni,* 1.1100 Ʋniversitas Regni or totae Terrae, or Regni totius Communitas,* 1.1101 anciently were only understood the

Barons, and Tenents in Capite, or Military Men, though now it is taken for the ordinary People and Freeholders, or at best for Knights and Gentlemen under the degree of Barons: So besides other pregnant proofs brought by Doctor Brady, that one Record of the 30 of E. 1. is sufficient to clear it; where the King saith, That the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and the o∣ther Magnates for(u) 1.1102 themselves, and the whole Community of the same Kingdom, gave Forty Shillings of every Knights Fee; so that it is clear, that the tota Communitas Regni were such as pay'd Scutage, that is, Forty Shillings for a Knights Fee, and no others. Of these the Tenents in Capite granted and pay∣ed it first for themselves and Tenents, and then their Tenents in Military Service, by Vertue of the Kings Precept, payed it to them, for so many Fees as they held of them.

As to the probi & legales Milites, probi & legales Homines;* 1.1103 the words did not signifie an honest, though inconsiderable Countryman; but the probi Homines were famous, stout no∣ted Men of Renown, of great Report and Integrity. They were the best, chief, most knowing, and of the greatest Inte∣grity of those Orders and Degrees of Men, the word was ap∣plied to. In a Precept 7 H 3. Scire facient 12 tam(w) 1.1104 Milites, quam alios liberos & legales Homines; So that these were Te∣nents in Military Service, otherwise what needed the words to run, Twelve as well Knights as other Free and Legal Men.

Therefore in the Writs for Elections of Knights for Coun∣ties, the Persons to be chosen, are two de discretioribus & le∣galioribus Militibus, that is, the most discreet, just, knowing and resolute Men in the Country, who (as the Law, by con∣stant usage, then required) served on Inquests and Juries: And the Writ for Citizens and Burgesses, was de discretioribus, legalioribus & probioribus. Whoever desires further Satisfaction, may find it in Doctor Brady's Introduction to the English History, and his Glossary.

I now come to give an account seriatim, from all the Great Councils before the Conqueror and after, to the 49 of H. 3. who were the Members of them; and what Concurrence in Law-making, those Members had with the Sovereign; and af∣ter the Representatives of the People were brought in, what al∣teration it produced.

CHAP. XXIV. Of the Saxon Great Councils, of whom they consisted, and how, du∣ring their Government, the Laws were established by the respe∣ctive Kings.

AeThelbert King of Kent (who died 24 Feb.(a) 1.1105 Twenty one years after Augustine the English Apostle was sent to preach the Gospel to the English) is said by venerable(b) 1.1106 Bede, among other good things which he did for this Nation or Peo∣ple throughout, of his counsel or purpose, to have framed, setled or established, Right Judgment or Decrees with the Council of his Wise Men, after the Roman Example, and writ them in the English Tongue, which were holden of his Nation since; which in the Original of Bede is thus expressed: Qui in∣ter caetera bona quae genti suae consulendo conferebat, etiam decreta il∣la Judiciorum, juxta exempla Romanorum cum consilio sapientum constituit; quae conscripta Anglorum sermone habentur & observan∣tur in eâ, and by K. Alfred, are turned into the Saxon Lan∣guage, as in the Margent: In which we may observe, That it was the King that gefremede framed or established gesette, with the Council of his wise Men; which word Council, discovers where the Sovereignty lodged; and the words, By the Exam∣ple of the Romans, do not so much imply that they were ac∣cording to the Caesarean Law, but that they might be accord∣ing, or consentaneous to the Ecclesiastical Laws of Rome, or at least may comprehend both.

The(d) 1.1107 Textus Roffensis mentions Laws made by Hlothere, Eadric and Withred, all Kings of Kent, which were recorded by Ernulph the Bishop of that place, about Anno 760. but I have not seen the Manuscript, and so can give no account how the Legislative is declared.

The next Laws we find, are those of Ina King of the West Saxons,* 1.1108 who according to the Saxon Chronology lived Anno 681. and according to Lambard, begun his Reign Anno 712. and ended 727. In the Preface to his Laws we find it expres∣sed, as in the Margent, which I render thus in English,(e) 1.1109 I Ine, by or with Gods gift, King of the West Saxons, with the persuasion suasu (as Lambard renders the word Laere, but more properly as Somner renders it) with the Advice, Counsel, In∣struction or Exhortation (as our modern word Lore imports) of Cenred my Father, and Heddes my Bishop, and Ercenwold my Bishop; and with all my Aldermen (i. e. Princes, Dukes, Earls, Viceroys, Military Officers, Senators or Ministers of State, as the word then signified) those old Wites (i. e. principal or chief Noble Men, Chieftains, Governours or Wisemen) of my Kingdom, do command, and likewise with mycelre somnug Godes Theowena, The great Assembly, Congregation or Syna∣gogue

of Gods Servants, i.e. the Clergy,(f) 1.1110 meditating or stu∣dying the Health of our Souls, and upon the Estate or esta∣blishing of our Kingdom.

That ryht AE,(g) 1.1111 and ryhte cynedomas thurh ure Folc Gefaeste∣node & getrymmed waeron, That right Laws and right or just Judgment, or Dooms of the King (or Office and Dignity of Magistrates, and Somner) be fastned or established, and trim∣med, perfected or accomplished: That no Alderman, or un∣der our Jurisdiction (or as probably the Compound word may be rendred, any Prince under us; Theoden signifying a Lord, Prince or Ruler; or as in the Saxon Chronology a King) after them, shall turn from, break, corrupt or change,* 1.1112 these ure do∣mas, these our Decrees, Sentences or Ordinances.

Then in the First Chapter it follows, We beodaeth, that ealles Folces AE & domas thus synd gehealden, We bid or command, that all our People, shall after hold fast, or observe these Laws and Dooms.

From this Preface the candid Reader may observe, First,* 1.1113 That Kings are the gift of God, and that Godes Gyffe signifies the same with Dei Gratia, they are not the Creature of the People. Secondly, That Princes, for the better Government of their People, in the setling of Laws in Church and State, consult, deliberate and advise with their Bishops, Noblemen, and eminently Wise men of their Kingdoms, whom for their Wisdom, they honour with public Imployments in their Domi∣nions. Thirdly, That after such Consultation, Deliberation and Advice, the Sovereign establisheth•• and instituteth the Laws. And Lastly, That such Laws are not to be broken or infringed by the Judges or supremest Officers under the King, much less by the Subjects.

The next(h) 1.1114 Council I find is that of Colchyth in the King∣dom of Mercia, Anno 793. wherein are said to be Nine Kings present, viz. Offa, and Egferd his Son, and seven more num∣bred by Sir Henry Spelman, Fifteen Bishops and Twenty Dukes; and so in another at(i) 1.1115 Verulam, it is said to be under Offa, who called together his Bishops and Optimates; but these are only about Religious matters.

So(k) 1.1116 Kenulph King of Mercia, writing to Pope Leo the III. begins, Kenulphus Gratia Dei Rex Merciorum cum Episcopis, Ducibus & omni sub nostra ditione dignitatis gradu.

So at the Synod at(l) 1.1117 Colichyth, 6 Kal. Aug. Ann. Dom. 8••6. Wulfred the Archbishop being Praesident, it is expressed that Caenulf the King of the Mercians was present, cum suis Principi∣bus, Ducibus & Optimatibus.

So we find a Synodal Council at Clovesho,(m) 1.1118 praesidente Beorn••l∣pho Rege Merciorum, and Wulfrid the Archbishop, the other Bi∣shops, Abbats, and the Nobility of all Dignities, treating con∣cerning the profit of Ecclesiastical and Secular Persons, and the stability of the Kingdom.

That which I shall note from these is this, That in these Sy∣nodal Councils, sometimes it is said the King praesided, other times the Archbishop; but mostly all the Persons that consti∣tute such Councils are, the King, the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and the Optimates.

The next Council I find is called(n) 1.1119 Concilium Pananglicum held at London, 26 May Anno 833. wherein Withlasius King of the Mercians, gives several immunities to the Abby of Croyland, and more than once he saith, volo & praecipio, and this he saith he doth in the(o) 1.1120 presence of his Lords, Egbert King of the West Saxons, and Aethelwulph his Son; and before the Bishops and the greater Noblemen of all England in the City of(p) 1.1121 Lon∣don, where they were all gathered to take Counsel against the Danish Pirates, daily infesting the Coast of England. There∣fore Sir Henry Spelman judgeth this Council properly to be cal∣led for secular Affairs, and to be such as we now call our Par∣liaments: The Witnesses to it are the said Withlase the Archbi∣shop of Canterbury, Celnoth, and Eadbald Archbishop of York; and after nine more Bishops and three Abbats, Egbert and his Son Adelwulph sign; and after them Wulhard, Athelm and He∣renbrith Dukes, Swithin the Kings Presbyter, and Bosa his Se∣cretary.

But I shall leave these and come to more direct secular great Councils,* 1.1122 as that of King Alfred; who in the first part of his Laws recites the Commandments and Laws by Gods appoint∣ment delivered by Moses to the Children of Israel, to be ob∣served; and some of the New Testament, and from that of our Saviour, quod vobis fieri non velitis, id aliis non faciatis, con∣cludes that J••Plgment of Right ought to be given to every one, and that on(q) 1.1123 this one Sentence, That Man must bethink him much, that judgeth Right to every one: and he adds, That after the propagating of the Gospel in England, as well as in other places, were gathered (for making of Laws, both for Church and State, it is to be supposed he means) Holy(r) 1.1124 Bi∣shops and other famous wise Men or Wites.

Then in the Conclusion of the Laws about Religion, and Prefatory to the secular Laws, he saith, I Alfred King have ga∣thered(s) 1.1125 these (Sanctions) together, and caused them to be written, many of them being observed by his Ancestors: Those that he liked(t) 1.1126 not, with the Council of his Wites, he reje∣cted; and those he liked, he bid or commanded to be holden; and concludes, Ic tha Aelfred West-Seaxna Cyning, eallum minum Witun thaes geeowde, & hi tha cwaethon that him that licode eallum to healdenne; which thus I render: I Aelfred King of the West-Saxons, showed these to all my Wites, i.e. Nobility or wise Men; and they said they liked them to be holden.

In this we may observe, That the King speaks in the single Person,* 1.1127 that he collected, chose and rejected, and (as in the same place he adds) since it would be rashness to appoint all his own Laws, it being uncertain what credit those might find

with Posterity, which he liked: Therefore whatever in the Laws of Ines his Maeges i.e. Kinsman, or of Offa King of the Mercians; or of Aethelbyrhtes, who was the(u) 1.1128 first King of the English that was baptised: Those that he(w) 1.1129 thought righteous, he those here gathered, and the other he rejected, passed by, or pretermitted, forlaete. It may be also noted, That he calls the Noblemen, whose Advice and Assent he used, his Wites, minum Witum.

The next material Illustration of the Constituent Parts of the Legislative Power, is found in the(x) 1.1130 League betwixt Al∣frid and Guthrun, King of the Danes; which, though not pro∣perly a great Council, yet at least much resembled it; since it saith, This is the League of Peace which Aelfred and Guthrun Kings, and all the English Wites, and also those which inhabi∣ted East England, have declared or(y) 1.1131 established, and with Oath fastned or confirmed; For hi sylfe & for heora gingran, for themselves and for their Off-spring; ge for geborene, ge for ungeborene, born and unborn, that care (saith he) for Gods Mer∣cy or ours. The Godes miltse recce, oth-the ure.

In this it is to be noted,* 1.1132 That Alfred having so beat the Danes, that they gave him Hostages, either to go out of the Kingdom,(z) 1.1133 or turn Christian: This Guthrun (otherwise Gurmund) with Thirty of his Nobles, and almost all of his People were baptized; and Alfred received him at the Font as his Son, and called him Ethelstan: Also the Subjects of Guthrun are called the East-English Nation, and the Nobility are called the Wites of the English King, Angel cynnes witan: And Lastly, that the Oath or firm Contract was Obligatory to the present Age, and to Posterity; if they expected the Mercy or Com∣passion of God or the King; by which we may judge what value they had then for an Oath; so that this might be in the nature of a great Council of the King and the Wites, convened for the surer Stability of this Peace, to take the Oath.

In the Laws of King Edward the Elder,* 1.1134 after the Charge gi∣ven to the Judges; the first Law begins, Ic wille, I will, and so in others; in the fourth it is thus expressed, That Eadweard the King, with his Wites(a) 1.1135 that were at Exeter, strictly en∣quiring, by what means it might be better provided for Peace and Tranquillity, which he perceived was less studiously pre∣served than it ought to be, or it should, which he had before commanded, That no Man(b) 1.1136 deny, stop or hinder others Rights. In the Second and Third Chapter it is eac we cwaedon, also we declare, pronounce or sentence; and in the Seventh, Eac ic wille, and I will.

In which Laws we have none mentioned with the King but his Wites; and his commanding, willing, or pronouncing in the Imperative Mood, is observeable.

The next Laws I find are those of King Athelstan,* 1.1137 which be∣gin thus, Ic Aethelstane cyning mid getheahte Wulshelmes mines Hihbisceopes & othra mina bisceopa bebeode eallum minum Gereafum

thurh ealle mine rice; I Athelstan King, with the advice of Wulfelm, my High-Bishop, and other my Bishops, command or bid all my Rieves, i. e. Praefects, of what degrees soever, to pay Tithes, &c. And this he commands(c) 1.1138 his Bishops, his Aldermen, and Praepositi (who were the Judges in the County-Courts) to do the same.

Although in this Preface there be no mention that he used any advice but of the Bishops, yet the Conclusion of Twenty six Chapters of Laws, is in these words, Ealle this waer gesetted on tham miclan Synoth aet Greatanleage; on tham waer se Aercebisce∣op Wulfhelme, mid eallum thaem Aethelum mannum & Wiotan de Ethelstan Cyning gegadrian. Which I render thus into English, All these were setled, or done, in the great Synod or Council at Greatanlea, in which was the Archbishop Wulfhelm, with all the Noblemen,* 1.1139 (Ethelum mannum, must properly signify those of the highest Quality, such as were Princes of the Blood, and Dukes, because it is distinct from VViotan, or the Wites, by which usually Earls, and those of lower Nobility, and great Officers were understood) which Athelstan the King ga∣thered.

In these Laws We cwaedon is used, which I suppose is some∣thing more than Somner understands by his Cuide, a Saying, Speech, or Sentence; and properly is, we will. But the abso∣luteness of the King appears most in the Twenty sixth Chapter, wherein it is expressed(d) 1.1140, That if any of his Graeves do not perform these Commands, or be more remiss in the Exe∣cution of those he hath enjoined, he shall be punished for his excess of Contumacy, and the Bishop shall punish the Contu∣macy of the Graeve or Praepositus; and his Sequel, the Punishment for the first fault shall be five Pounds, and the other fault his were, that is, the value of his Head, and the third the loss of all his Goods, and the King's Friendship, ura ealra Freondscipes. King Edmund was the next of our Kings,* 1.1141 whose Laws are trans∣mitted to us, and they begin thus, Eadmund cyning gesommnade mycelne synoth to Lundenbyrig, on tha Halgan Easterlicon tid; Ed∣mund the King assembled a great Synod or Council to London, on the Holy Eastertide, and the persons summoned are stiled, aegther ge Godcundra hada, ge worulcundra, both Gods-kind, and World-kind, i. e. Clergy and Laicks.

After Six Chapters of Laws, the King signifies to all, old and young, That he had(e) 1.1142 considered with his Wites, Con∣sultation being had with Ecclesiasticks and Laicks: and in the Laws it is often said, Thonne cwaedon; these we pronounce, or appoint; and sometimes the single person is used, and in other places, us betweonan heoldan, it is holden betwixt us.

Here we find the Great Council summoned by the King, and the constituent parts of it to be the Clergy and Laity, and that the Laity were only the Princes, Dukes, Earls, great Officers, Military Commanders, the Kings Ministers, Graeves, Praepositi, Thanes, sometimes denoted by the general names of Wites tran∣slated

Sapientes, Magnates, Optimates, &c. as is every where be∣yond all possible doubt cleared by the most Judicious Dr. Bra∣dy, in his Answer to Mr. Petyt, to whose great collection for the proof of this point, before I proceed further, I shall only, in transitu, instance in a few.

The Title of the Council of Berghamsted(f) 1.1143 5 of Withred King of Kent, is, This Synd Wightraedes domas Cantuara Cyninges;* 1.1144 These are the Judgments of Withred King of Kent: and the per∣sons mentioned particularly, are the King that convened them, and Birthwald, Bretone, Heahbisceop, High or Archbishop of Bri∣tain, Gibmund Bishop of Rochester, and the rest of the Ecclesi∣astick(g) 1.1145 Order of that Nation, mid thy Hersuman Folcy with the Military Persons, such as in after times were called, Here-Thegni in King Ina's Laws, and Heretoches in the Auctuary(h) 1.1146 to the 35 Laws of King Edward the Confessor, which are there interpreted Barones, Nobiles, Insignes, Sapientes, Ductores Excer∣citus.

So in the Council at Clovesho, 3. Cal. Nov. Anno Dom. 824. un∣der(i) 1.1147 Beornwulph King of the Mercians, besides the Archbishop VVulfred, and several Bishops and Abbats, are enumerated only Beornoth, Eadberht, Sigered, Egberht, Eadwulf Alheard, Mucel, Ʋhtred and Ludica, under the stile of Duces, Bynna Frater Re∣gis, Aldred Thelonius.

So in the Great Council at London,(k) 1.1148 26, May Anno 833. the Title is, Presidentibus Egberto Rege West-Saxoniae, Withlasio Rege Merciorum, utroque Archiepiscopo, caeterisque Angliae Episcopis, & Magnatibus; and besides the Bishops and Abbats that sub∣scribe, we find these, Adelwulphus filius Regis West-Saxoniae, Wulhardus Dux, Athelmus Dux, Herenbrithus Dux.

So in the Council at Kingsburie, Anno 851.* 1.1149 under Bertulph King of the Mercians, it is said to be, praesentibus Ceolnotho Dorobernen∣si Archiepiscopo, caeterisque Regni Merciae Episcopis, & Magnatibus, and the Subscribers are besides the Bishops and Abbats, Er∣nulphus Dux, Osrithus Dux, Serlo Comes, Elbertus Comes, Huda Comes, Oflat Pincerna Regis.

I have upon this occasion instanced in these few of the Anci∣entest, to clear who the Persons were, according to their Or∣ders, Ranks, and Degrees, that constituted these Great Coun∣cils, and shall now proceed to other Saxon Councils succeed∣ing.

Eldred King of all England gave the Monastery(l) 1.1150 of Croy∣land to Abbat Turketul, and his Monks, by his Charter dated in Festo Nativitatis B. M. Virginis Anno Dom. 948. cum universi Magnates Regni per Regium edictum summoniti, when all the great Men of the Kingdom were summoned by the Kings com∣mand, and then more particularly he divides them into the two Orders of Ecclesiasticks and Laicks thus: Tam Archiepescopi & Episcopi & Abbates, quam caeteri totius Regni Proceres & Optimates Londoniis convenissent, ad tractandum de negotiis publicis totius Regni.

Some may object, That Ingulphus giving this account, may rather express the Members, and the occasion of it to treat of the Publick Affairs of the whole Kingdom, according to the usage of the Age he lived in, than of the Age the Great Coun∣cil was held in; which is well to be observed in many cases: But in the Laws of King Edgar I shall shew it was then used in such manner, to give account of the great Councils, as both his Laws, and those I have hitherto mentioned of the oldest Date, manifest.

The Preface to King Edgar's Laws is thus: This is seo geraednysse the Eadgar Cyng mid his Witena getheahte geraed;* 1.1151 This is the Con∣stitution, Act, or Decree which King Edgar with his Wise∣men, or Great-men hath made ready, trimmed or enacted. Then follow the three great Ends for which such Councils are called, viz. God to lofe, to the Love, Glory, or Praise of God in appointing Religious Laws, & him Sylfum to Cynescipe, rendred by Lambard, ad Regiae Majestatis ornamentum, or ac∣cording to the significancy of the Words, himself to make Kingly, or his own Kingship or Soveraignty to manifest; and thirdly, eallum his leodscip to thearf; all his People or Nation to profit, or according to Lambard, ad totius Reipublicae utili∣tatem.

The same King Edgar,(m) 1.1152 in his Charter to Glastonbury, concludes it thus, Hanc privilegii paginam Rex Edgarus XII. Reg∣ni sui Sacro Scripto apud Londoniam communi Concilio Optimatum suorum confirmavit. So that it appears, this was in the pre∣sence of a great Council, and the Witnesses named are Elfgina Regis mater, Edward Clito filius, Kinedius Rex Albaniae, Mareu∣sius Archiparata, Admiral.

Then follow both the Archbishops, and several Bishops, and Abbats, after whom the secular Optimates; viz. Elpher, Oslac, Ethelwine, by the Title of Duces, Oswold, Eufward, Ethelsic, Ellshie, by the Title of Ministri, which were Officers under the King, as Thegns, praepositi.

In the account given of a Council held at(n) 1.1153 Winchester in this Kings Reign, those present at it are reckoned thus, Prae∣sentibus Edgaro Rege cum Conjuge, Dunstano Archiepiscopo, Elfero Principe Merciorum, Ethelwino Duce Orientalium Anglorum; and the same persons called Duces in the foregoing Charter, Elf∣woldo suo Germano, Brithnotho Comiti, cum Nobilitate totius Regni. So that none but the Nobility were present.

The Witnesses to a Charter of the same King to the Monaste∣ry of Hyde, in Winchester, are the King, Archbishop Dunstan, Eadmund Clito, legitimus praefati Regis filius, Edward eodem Rege Clito procreatus, Aelftheyth Regina, Eadgita Regis avia; the present Queen hath the precedence of the Queen Dowager: Then follow several Bishops and Abbats, after whom the Lay-Peers, viz. Odgar, Athelstan, Athelwin, Dukes, Aethelweard, Aelf∣weard, and Walston, Ministri.

It is to be noted, That most do make the Laws of King Ed∣ward the Confesson, to be principally a revival of King Edgar's Laws, mixing such as Canutus had adjoyned to them.

The Preamble to the Laws of King Ethelred runs thus;* 1.1154 This is tha geraednyss the Ethelred Cyning & his Witan geraeddon, eallum Folc to fritherbote; These are the Constitutions King Ethelred and his Wites have enacted, all his People to mulct for the breach of Peace. These were enacted at Woodstock in Mercia after the English Laws.

Tho general Council of(o) 1.1155 Aenham, called Pananglicum, is said to be Hortatu Aelfeagi Dorobernensis & Wulstani Eboracensis Archipraesulum ab Aethelredo Rege edictum, accersitisque Episcopis & universis Anglorum Optimatibus in dic Pentecostes celebratum; and the Saxon Title of it is, Be witena geraednessa, rendred Sapi∣entum decreta; In the conclusion of the Latin Copy of them, this is added, Haec itaque legalia statuta, vel decreta in nostro Sy∣nodali Conventu a Rege(p) 1.1156 magnopere edict a cuncti tunc temporis Optimates se observaturos fideliter spondebant.

Sir Henry Spelman gives several reasons why this may be cal∣led a General Council, because it contains Secular Laws as well as Divine; and here we have expresly said, it was at Pentecost, one of the set times for such Councils; and it was by the King's Summons, and the Clergy and Optimates consented.

In the Charter of the Priviledges, granted by King(q) 1.1157 Ethelred to the Church of Canterbury, after the Subscription of the King, the Archbishops, Bishops, and Abbats, these are subscribed, Aelfric, Elfhelm, Leoffwin, Leoffig Ealderman, which in the Latin version are stiled Duces. Aethelmer mines Alaffordes discthen, tran∣slated Domini mei dapifer, verbatim, Dish Thegne or Thane. Byrh∣tric Cynges Thegen, Minister Regis, Leofric Hraegel Thein, rei vestiariae Minister, Master of the Wardrobe,* 1.1158 Syward Cynges Thegen aet Raede, Minister Regis & a Conciliis, Secretary or Counsellor, the rest only mentioned Gewitnys, and in the Latin Charter of the same (which we may imagine was the Original) these Thegnes are called Ministri, and so are these following, Ordulf, Eadric, Ethelric, Leofric, Sigeraed, VVulstan Senex, & Juvenis, Lysing, Leof••tan.

The Preface to the Laws of Canutus is conceived in the same Words, as that of King Edgar's,* 1.1159 only he is stiled Cnut Cyning ealles Englandes Cyninge & Dena Cyning, & Northrigena Cyning; King of all England, King of Denmark, and Norway, they were Established at VVinchester on thaem Halgan Mid-winter Tide, i. e. at Christmass.

The Preface to his Laws in Sir Henry(r) 1.1160 Spelman is conceiv∣ed in these words. This is thonne seo worldcunde geraedness, the Ic will midminan VVitenan roede, the man heald ofer eall Engla∣land; These are the Worldly Constitutions, that I will with my Wites Advice, that Men hold all over England. In most of the Chapters it is said, we laeroth, we teach, we beodath, we bid or command, we forbeodath, we forbid; and in the Conclu∣sion,

it is in the single Person of the King; nu bidde Ic georne & on Godes naman beode manna gehwylcne; Now I command all, and bid every Man in God's Name.

The Preface to the Latin version of them saith, Haec(s) 1.1161 sunt Instituta Cnudi Regis Anglorum, Dacorum, Norwegarum, veneran∣do sapientum Concilio ejus, ad laudem & gloriam Dei & suam Re∣galitatem, & commune commodum habita in sancto natali Domini apud Wintoniam.

So we find that Anno 1024. When(t) 1.1162 Canutus drove the Clerks living dishonestly from the Church of St. Edmund, and placed Monks there; it is said he did it cum consilio Archiepisco∣porum, Episcoporum & Optimatum. So in another Council it is thus, Ego Cnut Rex totius Albionis, cum Concilio Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Abbatum, Comitum, omniumque fidelium elegi sanci∣endum. By the word fidelium here, is meant the Thegne or lesser Nobility, as Doctor Brady fully proves in his Glossary, and elsewhere, Anno 1032. He grants Priviledges to Glastenbu∣ry,(u) 1.1163 which he doth consensu Optimatum meorum, with the consent of his Nobles; yet he useth the words concedo & prohi∣beo in the single Person, to denote from whose single Authority all concessions flowed.

Of this Canutus,(w) 1.1164 Malmsbury saith, that he commanded to be observed for ever all the Laws of ancient Kings, especi∣ally those made by King Ethelred his Predecessor, under(x) 1.1165 the penalty of the Kings Fine, to the observing of which, he saith in his time it was sworn under the name of King Ed∣wards Laws, not that he had appointed them, but had observed them.

It is of latter time(y) 1.1166 recorded, that Canutus in the fifth Year of his Reign, calling together all the Prelates of his King∣dom, Proceresque ac Magnates, Wulstan & Adelwode, the Archbi∣shops, and other Bishops, seven Dukes, and seven Earls, and divers Abbats of Monasteries, cum quamplurimis gregariis Mili∣tibus ac cum populi multitudine copiosa, who were personally present, Votis Regiis unanimiter consentientibus praeceptum & de∣cretum fuit.

Sir Henry Spelman saith, That this Manuscript must be writ towards the latter end of Henry the Third's Reign, if not after, because it useth the word Parliament, and discourseth of the Constitution of Parliament, as in that Age, not as the great Councils in Canutus time were; which I note that it may be obser∣ved upon how slender Antiquities Sir Edward(z) 1.1167 Coke relied.

From what Malmsbury observes of these Laws of Canutus, we may conclude, that whereever the Laws of King Edward the Confessor are mentioned in after Ages, these Laws of Ca∣nutus must be understood; and that it is a fruitless Enquiry to search for any other than those which Hoveden and Ingulphus give us, as confirmed by VVilliam the Conqueror: therefore I shall referr the Inquisitive Reader to the Authors, and Sir(a) 1.1168 Hen∣ry Spelman, and Mr. Selden.

I shall therefore only note who were the constituent Parts of the great Councils in his time. That convention at Christmas the Twenty fifth of his Reign, as Sir Henry Spelman(b) 1.1169 hath published it, was, Praesentibus Edwardo Rege & Conf••ssore, Edgi∣tha Regina, Stigando Archiep. Cant. Eldredo Archiep. Ebor. caeterisque Angliae Aepiscopis, Abbatibus, Capellanis, Regis Comitibus, Ministris (seu Thanis Regis) & Militibus qui in Chartarum sequentium sub∣scriptionibus nominantur. Then follows the second Charter to(c) 1.1170 St. Peters of Westminster, where after the Bishops and Ab∣bats we find the Subscriptions of Raynbaldus the Chancellor, and Harold, Edwin, Leofdwyn and Guden are titled Dukes. Ergar, Kendus, Wygodus, Robertus, Ednothus are called Ministri, then I suppose according to the Title, the Knights, Agelnodus, Wal∣fricus, Sywardus, Godricus.

To the third Charter,(d) 1.1171 when he dedicated St. Peter's Church, Anno 1066. there are these more added to the Lay-Nobility, (besides Osbern, Peter, and Robert the King's Chap∣lain, who are placed next after the Chancellor,* 1.1172 before the Dukes) Gud Comes, Marhe••••s Comes, Radulphus Minister, Agel∣nodus Minister, and besides that, Wulfric, Syward and Godrich in the aforesaid Charter, are called here, Knights, there are ad∣ded Colo and Wulsward, Knights; and the Conclusion of all is, Omnes consentientes subscripsimus. So that here may be no∣ted the use of the Subscriptions of the Noblemen to the King's Charters, which then were only by the mark of a Cross, and in after times by their Seals, to those we call Acts of Parlia∣ment, as hereafter will be shown.

Having thus treated of the General Councils, and such like Conventions, under the Saxon and Danish Kings, I shall pass to the Norman Kings, and so descending to the present Age, show the constituent Parts of the great Councils and Parliaments, and by what variety of Expressions in the gradual Progress of the respective Kings Reigns, the Soveraigns enacting of Laws was exhibited: only before I enter, I cannot but take notice that Mr. Selden (by what compliance I know not,* 1.1173 with the mode of his time) calls those which we make constituent Parts of the great Councils of the Saxon times, Custodes, and saith, he scarce meets with any of these Guardians of the Laws, different from these Lawmakers. Yet he brings no Representatives of the Commons; for he makes them the King, the Lord High-Con∣stable, the Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Alderman of Eng∣land, the Aldermen of Provinces, and the Graves. I cannot but wonder that he should not at least give some hint what dif∣ference there was betwixt the King and his Graeve, in the point of Law-making. Surely he knew the Constitution of the great Councils as well as any, but being a Sitting Member in that long Parliament, was in that Particular tainted, per contagionem uvaque livorem deducet ab uva.

CHAP. XXV. Of the great Councils of the Norman Kings, 'till the end of the Reign of King John.

WHAT Changes William the Conqueror made in the Go∣vernment, how he brought in the Feudal Laws of Nor∣mandy, and many other Alterations, Doctor Brady hath proved at large in his Argumentum Anti-Normanicum, and the Preface to his Complete History; so that I shall touch very little upon that Subject.

The Conqueror (saith the learned Sir(a) 1.1174 Roger Twysden) having obtained the Kingdom by dint of Sword, and knowing that no Empire is firmly established by Arms without Justice, applied his mind to three things: First, That he might have a sufficient Military Force: Secondly, That he might gratifie his French and Norman Adventurers; yet so as the English might not by over much severity, be instigated to rebel: And Thirdly, That the Husbandmen might live as Servants, and to perform the Drudgery, but not to be wholly extirpated.

As to the First, He disposed the Militia so as(b) 1.1175 Ordericus Vitalis tells us it was reported, That he could expend 1600 l. and 30 s. three Half-pence, Sterling Money, every day, besides the Presents, Fines for remitting of Punishments upon Trans∣gressions of the Laws, and many other ways whereby his Trea∣sury was encreased; and he made the Kingdom be surveyed, and all his Tributes or Revenues,* 1.1176 as in the time of King Ed∣ward, he made be truly described: His Lands he so distribu∣ted to his Soldiers,* 1.1177 and disposed them so, that in the Kingdom of England he had 60000 Horsemen, which he could with great readiness call together; therefore in the 58 Law as∣cribed to him, and which is in the Red Book of the Exchequer, it is thus expressed; We(c) 1.1178 appoint and firmly command, that all the Liberi Homines (such as held in Military Service, to whom he had distributed all the Lands of the English, except what he kept in his own Possession; as in all Authors that treat of such matters is most evident) of his whole Kingdom, should be sworn Brothers to defend and manfully preserve his Monarchy and the Kingdom, according to their Power, a∣gainst all Enemies, and keeping entire the Peace and Dignity of his Crown, and for the executing of right Judgment and Ju∣stice constantly, in all ways according to their Power, with∣out Deceit or Delay. I have inserted this at large, because it seems the Primary Law, upon which his Government was esta∣blished; and it seemeth to me to be the Substance of the Oath of Fealty, that all the Subjects which held. in Capite, were to take; or that the same Oath was to the same ends and purpose. This Law is said to be made in the City of London.

But without doubt it was much according to the(d) 1.1179 usage of Normandy, established by Rollo; and what had been practi∣sed by the Francks, when they conquered the Gauls in the de∣clining of the Roman Empire, who distributed their Lands a∣mong their Soldiers, to whom was reserved the Dignity of Gentlemen, and the Management of Arms; and the use of them taken from the Ancient Gauls, who were called Roturiers; and they were only permitted to manage the matters of Hus∣bandry and Merchandice.

So the Conqueror gave to some of his Followers(e) 1.1180 whole Counties, to some two or three or more Counties, with a great Portion of Land; to others, Hundreds, Mannors or Towns; who parcelled them out to their Dependants and Friends, 'till at last (though the Saxons most frequently held their own E∣states of those new Lords, and by new Titles from them) some Soldiers and ordinary Men had some proportionable Shares for their Services, though upon hard Conditions; possessing them for the most part, as Feudatories,* 1.1181 and according to the Rules of the Feudal Law, which, as it was the Law for the most part in Normandy, as to Possession and Tenure; so was it in En∣gland, until by the Indulgence of Usurpers, as well as of law∣ful Sovereigns, to the great Men, and of them to their Te∣nents and Followers, their Tenures became more easie, and were changed into Inheritances, both Free and Bond. So by Compact or Agreement, betwixt kind and favourable, as well as indigent Lords and serviceable Tenents, as also by the Intro∣duction of the use of the Canon or Imperial Law; the Rigor of the Feudal Law was abated, and received several Alterati∣ons and Amendments, by flux of Time, and especially by Acts of great Councils or Parliaments, and the Necessities or Indul∣gence of Princes: So that instead of more rigid Tenures, the soft ones of Fee-simple, in all its kinds, by Deed, or Feofment, or inheritable and qualified Copyholds, were introduced.

As to the second Particular concerning William the Conque∣ror's setling Laws for the equal Government,* 1.1182 both of the Nor∣mans and English; I shall first give an account out of(f) 1.1183 Hove∣den, what these were and how they were procured: He saith, That the Danish Laws being understood by the Conqueror to be used in Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridg-shire (others(g) 1.1184 add the Deirans and the Isles) concerning Forfeitures, he preferred them before the other Laws of the Kingdom, and commanded they should be observed; and gives the reason for it, that his and the Ancestors of most of the Barons of Normandy, were come from Norway, therefore the Laws of the Danes ought to be preferred before those of the Britains, viz. of the English and Picts: Which, saith my(h) 1.1185 Author, being heard by the great Men of the Country (who had, as hereafter I shall show, been appointed to revize the Laws) they all were very sorrowful, and unanimously intreated him, that he would per∣mit them to have the Laws proper to themselves, and their ancient Customs, under which their Fathers lived, and they

were born and bred under; for that it would be very hard for them to receive unknown Laws, and to judge of those things they understood not.* 1.1186 But finding the King unwilling to be drawn to consent, they follow on their suit, praying for the Soul of King Edward, who bequeathed him his Crown and Kingdom, whose Laws they were, that they might not have the Laws of strange Nations imposed on them; but he would grant them the Continuance of their Countries Laws: To which intreaty of his Barons (after Counsel taken) my Author saith,* 1.1187 he acquiesced; and from that day the Laws of King Edward were of great Authority and Esteem throughout England, and were confir∣med and observed before other Laws of the Country.

Our Author further notes, That these were not the pro∣per Laws of King Edward, but of Edgar his Grandfather, which had been little observed for 68 years, as in one place, and 48 years in another; he saith, by reason of the Danish In∣vasions, &c. and being revived, repaired and confirmed by King Edward, were called his Laws.

The Account the Chronicle(i) 1.1188 of Lichfield gives, is this, That King William, in the fourth year of his Reign at London, by the Counsel of his Barons, made to be summoned through all the Counties of England, all the Noble Wisemen, and such as were skilled in their Law, that he might hear their Laws and Customs; and then gives an account how he appro∣ved of the Danish Laws used in Norfolk, &c.* 1.1189 But afterwards, at the Intreaty of the Community of the English, he yielded to grant them King Edward's Laws. Before I proceed any fur∣ther, I cannot but note, that what Hoveden calls Compatriotae here, is called Communitas Anglorum; and in both of them af∣terwards it is called Concilio Baronum; by which we may know who these Compatriotae and this Communitas were, viz. the Ba∣rons or great Men. Our Author proceeds, That by the King's Precept, out of every County of England, Twelve Wisemen were chosen, who were enjoyned an Oath before the King, that according to their utmost they should discover the esta∣blishments of their Laws and Customs(k) 1.1190 going in a strait Path, neither declining to the right or left Hand, omitting, adding, or prevaricating nothing; and Aldred Archbishop of York, who crowned King William, and Hugh Bishop of London, by the King's command, writ the Laws which the said sworn Persons did produce: But it is to be noted, that this Chroni∣cle of Lichfield is of a later Date than other Writers; and the Laws in it differ from those in Ingulphus.

The next Testimony is that of(l) 1.1191 Ingulphus, who tells us, That he brought from London to his Monastery, i.e. Croyland, the Laws of the most just King Edward, which his Lord, the famous King VVilliam, willed to be Authentic and Perpetual, and had proclaimed under the severest Penalties, to be inviolably kept through the whole Kingdom of England, and commended them to his Justiciaries, in the same Language they were set forth in, &c. of which I shall say something below.

The Author of Jus Anglorum ab Antiquo, and the Argumen∣tum Anti-Normanicum, and Mr. Petyt, in his Rights of the Com∣mons asserted, have writ largely, to prove, That the Con∣queror made little Innovation in our Laws; and on the con∣trary, the profoundly learned(m) 1.1192 Doctor Brady hath from undeniable Records proved, that he brought in the Feudal Law of Tenures, and much of the Norman Laws; and that in his time, and for an Hundred years after, the Justiciaries or Chief Justices, the Chancellors, Lawyers, Ministerial Officers, and under-Judges, Earls, Sheriffs, Bailiffs, Hundredaries, &c. were all Normans: likewise the Military Men and Lords of Mannors mostly were such; and in his Preface to the Norman History, and his Answers to the forementioned Authors, eve∣ry where clears it, and proves, That though the Conqueror,* 1.1193 in the first beginning of his Reign, promised fair Matters, yet he observed no more of those Laws, than served for his own inte∣rest: Yet he also saith, That where any Relaxation of the Ri∣gor of the Feudal Laws was, the benefit principally accrued to the Norman English, who indeed were as active as could be ex∣pected, to obtain ease to themselves, and claim the Advan∣tage of all the favourable Laws had been used in the Saxon times; but they themselves were great Oppressors of those un∣der them.

These Matters therefore being so copiously discoursed of by the learned Doctor, I shall pass that whole matter by, and come to the third Particular, Sir Roger Twysden notes in the Conquerors Policy, and so directly speak to the Constitutions of his Great Councils, and his Sovereignty in making or con∣firming Laws.

As to the third Particular; First it is clear that the Conque∣ror divided the Land among his great Men, the Officers and Soldiers: for proof of which we need no more, but the Testi∣mony of Gervase of(n) 1.1194 Tilbury, who saith, That after the Conquest of the Kingdom, and just subversion of the Rebels, when the King himself and his great Men had viewed and sur∣veyed their new Acquists, there was a strict enquiry made, who there were, that fighting against the King, had saved themselves by flight: From these and the Heirs of such as were slain in Fight, all hopes of possessing either Lands or Rents, were cut off: But such as were called and urged to fight a∣gainst King William, and did not, if in Process of time they could obtain the favour of their Lords and Masters, by an hum∣ble Obedience, and Obsequiousness, they might possess some∣thing in their own Persons, without hopes of Succession, their Children only enjoying it afterwards at the will of their Lords, to whom when they became odious, they were every where forced from their Possessions.

Because some are prejudiced against the judicious Doctor Brady, for asserting the Conquerours changes that he made, I hope they will give ear to what the learned Selden affirms

thus,* 1.1195 That some while since the coming in of the Normans, there was not in England, except the King himself, any one who held Land in right of Freehold (as they term it) since, in truth, one may call all others, to a Man, only Lords in trust of what they had; as those, who by swearing Fealty, and doing Homage, did perpetually own and acknowledge a Superior Lord of whom they held, and by whom they were invested in their Estates. So he. Now this Fealty and Homage is now held no kind of Slavery, but then it was, as I have elsewhere noted. Let us hear what the same Mr. Selden a little below saith, That the Conqueror did not totally change the Constitution of the Laws,* 1.1196 although we may truly say, according to what Law∣yers dispute, That the English Empire and Government was overthrown by him. Thus far that learned Man.

Let us now return to the Exchequer-book, where we find, That when a common miserable Complaint of the Natives came to the King, that they thus exposed and spoiled of all things, should be compelled to pass into other Countries: At length, after Consultation upon these things, it was decreed, That what they could by their deserts and lawful Bargain, ob∣tain from their Lords,* 1.1197 they should hold by unviolable Right; but should not claim any thing from the time the Nation was conquered, under the Title of Succession or Descent. There∣fore, he saith, they were obliged, by studied Compliance and Obedience, to purchase their Lords Favour.

It is true, that in the 55th. Law of(o) 1.1198 William the Conqueror, it is said, That he wills and firmly commands and grants, that all Freemen, liberi Homines, of the whole Monarchy of his Kingdom, may have and hold their Lands and Possessions well, and in(p) 1.1199 Peace, free from all unjust Exactions and Tallage, that is, extraordinary Impositions and Taxes; so as nothing be ex∣acted or taken, unless their free services, which of Right they ought and are bound to perform to us; and as it was appoint∣ed to them, and given and granted to them by us, as a perpe∣tual Right of Inheritance, by the Common Council of the whole Kingdom.

In which we may observe,* 1.1200 that this was no Magna Charta made to English Men; these liberi Homines were such as held in Military Service, as appears by the 58th. Law following; and those then were Normans, and the Relaxations to them were, that these Fees were made Hereditary, which was not frequent among Feudataries in those days; and the Complaints that were made after, and the amendments that Hen. 1. promised, were mostly about the hard Taxes and Exactions.

Therefore I may conclude, That the ordinary English, tho' many of them might live upon the Lands they and their An∣cestors had enjoyed, yet their Tenure was changed, and they were but Vassals to other Lords; 'till by little and little, by the ways I have mentioned under the first Heads, they acqui∣red a Soccage Tenure, and Fee-simple Estate. Therefore the

foresaid(q) 1.1201 Gervase of Tilbury concludes this Observation, thus, Sic igitur quisquis de gente subacta, fundos vel aliquid hujus∣modi possidet, non quod ratione successionis debere sibi videatur, a∣deptus est, sed quod solummodo meritis suis exigentibus vel aliqua pactione interveniente, obtinuit, viz. So every one of the con∣quered Nation possest their Lands or any thing else; not that he should seem to get it by way of Succession, but by his de∣serts, or by some Compact or Covenant made with his Lord: as it must be understood.

The most industrious Doctor Brady, having on purpose writ so much of this Argument in his Answer to the Argumentum An∣ti-Normanicum, and, out of so many Historians, confirmed it in the Answer to the Appendix;* 1.1202 I must refer the Reader that desires satisfaction, to his Book, being loth to crowd those matters which are not directly to my purpose: Only I cannot but note, that the reason why we so often find the same Lands that have been granted by a Father, for him and his Heirs, re∣quired, and had a Confirmation by the Son; was because the Tenure was so fickle, for want of Homage or Omission of Ser∣vice, whereby they might be forfeited.

I now proceed to the great Councils that I have found in the Reign of William the Conquerour; and shall begin with that wherein the Laws I have spoken before of, out of Hoveden, were made, which are agreed by all to be in the Fourth year of his Reign.

In general, we find Gervase of Tilbury telling us,* 1.1203 That when the famous Subduer of England, King William, had subjected to his Empire the utmost parts of the Island, and by terrible examples had brought to perfect obedience the Minds of Re∣bels; that they might not have liberty to fall into the same er∣rors for the future, he(r) 1.1204 resolved to govern the People sub∣jected to him by written Right and Law: therefore the Eng∣lish Law being propounded according to their threefold di∣stinction, that is, the Mercian Law, Dane Law, and West-Saxon Law, he rejected some, and approved others, and added such Transmarine Norman Laws, as seemed most efficacious to defend the Peace of the Kingdom.

In this account we may observe, That the King solely is said to reject and approve, and to add such of the Norman Laws as he thought fit for securing the Peace of the Kingdom; and the Ingenious Dr. Brady thinks the 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64. are those Norman Laws intimated.

Concerning the Oath which Frederick Abbat of St. Albans, administred to the King on the Holy Gospel, and the Reliques of the Church of St. Albans, whereby he swore, That for the good of Peace, he would observe the good and approved an∣cient Laws of the Kingdom, which the pious Kings of England, and especially King Edward had inviolably observed; I must refer the Reader to(s) 1.1205 Matthew Paris, to understand the oc∣casion of it; and Dr.(t) 1.1206 Brady's Exposition or Commentary upon it, and how little he observed it.

What the Laws were that King William the First confirmed, Authors agree not about, as may be seen by comparing(u) 1.1207 Ho∣veden,(w) 1.1208 Knighton Collect. 2354. N. 61. Lambard of Wheelocks Edition, and Spelman in the First Tome of his Coun∣cils, Fol. 624. Selden(x) 1.1209 in his Notes upon Eadmerus, writes very suspiciously of all the Laws that are attributed to King Ed∣ward, except the Crowland Copy; judging neither Hoveden, Knighton, or the Author of the Lichfield Chronicle well versed in Law matters, and who writ long after Ingulphus, of whom he gives this Character, Qui in hac re testium non tam facile Prin∣ceps merito dicendus est, quam solus forsan cui ut par fit credamus.

The Title of the Laws properly ascribed to William the Con∣querour,* 1.1210 are in the Latin thus,

(y) 1.1211Hae sunt leges & consuetudines quas Will. Rex concessit universo Populo Angliae, post subactam terram. Eaedem sunt quas Edwardus Rex, cognatus ejus, observavit ante eum. In English thus, These are the Laws and Customs(z) 1.1212 which William the King granted to all his People of England after the subduing of the Land. They are the same which Edward the King his Kinsman before him observed.

In this Preface we have only to note, that the Laws are ex∣presly said to be the Kings Grant, and the Supplemental Laws (after the 50th. which were found in the Croyland Copy) be∣ing writ in the Red Book of(z) 1.1213 the Exchequer, are by way of Charter or Grant, thus, Will. Rex Anglorum, &c. omnibus hominibus suis Francis & Anglis salutem, and all along the Au∣thoritative parts expressed by statuimus, volumus, interdicimus, prohibemus, praecipimus, decretum est.* 1.1214

The expressions Authors use concerning his Laws, whereby the absolute Soveraignty of the Conquerour in the point of Law∣giving is manifested, are to be found in all those who have writ of his Life; I shall content my self with a few. Ordericus(a) 1.1215 Vitalis saith, eamque, i. e. England, Gulielmus Rex suis Legi∣bus commode subegit; that he subdued, or rather subjected Eng∣land profitably to his Laws.

Eadmer(b) 1.1216 saith, That King William designing to establish in England those Usages, and Laws, which his Ancestors, and he observed in Normandy, &c. all Divine and Humane Things he ordered at his pleasure.

The Chronology of Rouen saith, Leges quas in hunc diem Angli observant, idiomate Normanico promulgavit, The Laws which at this day the English observe, he published in the Nor∣man Language.

Mr. Camden saith,(c) 1.1217 That William the Conquerour, as a token of his Victory, laid aside the greatest part of the English Laws, and brought in the customs of Normandy, and commanded Plead∣ings to be in French.

Jo. Brompton Abbat of Jorval gives us an account of the pro∣per Laws of William the Conquerour,* 1.1218 which he recites under four Heads, and they are only concerning Pleas de examine Forensi;

and Mr. Selden gives this Character of him, that he was Dili∣gentissimus rerum nostrarum, maxime autem Legum vetustiorum In∣dagator. These are by way of Mandate, thus, W. Dei gratia Rex Anglorum, omnibus ad quos scriptum hoc perveniat, salutem, Mando, & Praecipio per totam Anglicam Nationem custodiri.

As to the constituent Parts of the Great Councils in the Con∣querour's time, in many of them we have many Bishops names,* 1.1219 and no others, not so much as the Principes, Primates, or Mag∣nates in general.

Anno 1071. 5 W. 1. the Plaint of(d) 1.1220 Wulstan Bishop of VVorcester is said to be ended in Concilio celebrato in loco qui vo∣catur Pedreda coram Rege & Doroberniae Archiepiscopo, & Primati∣bus totius Regni; before the King, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Nobility or Prime Persons of the whole Kingdom.

The Election of(e) 1.1221 Lanfranc Archbishop of Canterbury, a∣bout this time, or the year before, is said to be thus, the Seni∣ors of the said Church electing him, cum Episcopis ac Principi∣bus, Clero & Populo Angliae, in Curia Regis in Assumptione Sanctae Mariae. Here the Episcopi & Principes, Bishops and Princes, the Cleri & Populus, the Clergy and People or Laity were the same persons, and only expressive of one another.

In the Charter(f) 1.1222 of William the Conqueror, Anno 1077. 11 Regni, after the Names of several Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, and other Seniors, Robert de Oyley, Hamo dapifer signed it, ma∣ny illustrious Persons and Princes of divers Orders, saith the Author, being omitted: Then is added, His etiam illo tempo∣re a Regia potestate è diversis Provinciis & Ʋrbibus, to this Uni∣versal Synod at Westminster were called.

In this the(g) 1.1223 Principes diversi Ordinis, were the great dignified Clergy, and the Temporal Nobility, which is explained by Flo∣rence of Worcester, speaking of such a like Convention. 3 H. 1. Rex fuit apud Westmonasterium & eo omnes Principes Regni Eccle∣siastici & secularis Ordinis: and(h) 1.1224 Eadmer, of this very great Council, 3 H. 1. says, Primates Regni utriusque Ordinis huic con∣ventui affuerunt; that is, The Princes or great Men of the Cler∣gy and Laity, which were no other but the Archbishops, Bi∣shops, Abbats and Priors of the one Order, and the Dukes, Earls, Barons, and greater Tenents in Capite of the other; and for the expression, è diversis Provinciis & Ʋrbibus,(i) 1.1225 Doctor Brady hath sufficiently explained it in his Answer to the Argu∣mentum Anti-Normanicum.

In a Charter of this King, for changing the(k) 1.1226 Canons of Duresm into Monks, it is said, Haec Charta confirmata est apud Westmonasterium in Concilio meo, Anno Regni 18. praesentibus om∣nibus Episcopis & Baronibus meis.

In the Charter of the same(l) 1.1227 King about separating of Ec∣clesiastic Pleas from Civil, it is thus expressed, William by the Grace of God, King of England, to R. Bainard, G. de Magna∣villa, and P. de Valoines, and all his Fideles of Essex, Hereford-shire and Middlesex: Know they and all other his Fideles which

remain in England; that he hath(m) 1.1228 thought fit, with his Common Council, and the Council of Archbishops, Bishops and Abbats, and of all the Princes of his Kingdom to amend the Episcopal Laws, which were neither well nor according to the command of the Holy Canons before his time, obser∣ved in his Kingdom. Therefore he saith, he commands, and by his Royal Authority enjoyns, that no Bishop or Arch-dea∣con hold their Pleas any longer in the Hundred.

From all which we may observe,* 1.1229 First, That the Conqueror introduced the Feudal Laws of the Normans, and according to them disposed of the Lands of the conquered Saxons, to be held of his Norman Followers, and that he brought in several others of the Laws and Customs of his Country.

Secondly, That he difficultly granted to his People the Laws of King Edward, and those he amended at his pleasure; and all that he either confirmed or established, he did by his Royal Prero∣gative, using the single Person in the Sanction of them; and the Imperative in the commanding or forbiding: and those Laws which properly may be called his own, were by way of Char∣ter or Mandate; and in the Councils purely Ecclesiastical, the King summoned them, as is apparent in(n) 1.1230 Hoveden, where he saith, eodem Anno, i. e. 10703 Regni Concilium magnum in Octavis Paschae Wintoniae celebratum est, jubente & praesente Rege W. &c. of which more below.* 1.1231

Thirdly, There are no Members of these great Councils men∣tioned, but the Archbishops, Bishops and Abbats, for the Clergy, and the Optimates and Principes for the Laity.

Fourthly, That though the sole Power of enacting Laws was in himself, yet he used the Advice of his Common Council of his Kingdom; as is expressed in the 55th. Law, thus, Prout sta∣tutum est eis & illis a nobis datum & concessum jure haereditario in perpetuum, per Commune Concilium totius Regni nostri praedicti; which Commune Concilium consisted of the Bishops, Abbats, Earls, Barons and principal Tenents in Capite, as is every where clear, no Commons having Vote, or otherwise represented.

Lastly,(o) 1.1232 Eadmer tells us, That when the Archbishop of Can∣terbury presided in a general Council of the Bishops, the King permitted him not to appoint or forbid any thing, but such things as were agreeable to his will, and by himself were first ordained. Also he saith in all his Dominions, he would allow no Bishop of Rome to be accounted Apostolic, but whom he commanded to be received; nor any to receive his Bulls or Breves, unless they were first shown to him.

I have in the beginning of this Chapter spoken something of the Mutations that William the Conqueror made in the Consti∣tution of the Government of England; concerning which I shall only note, That the Conqueror took all the care (that a great Commander and Conqueror of a great Nation could do) for securing his Conqests(p) 1.1233 by building Fortresses and Castles within the City of London, and placing Norman Gar∣risons

and French Governours or Castellanes in the Castles in the Country, and giving them great Estates, and carrying the chief of the English Nobility with him as Hostages into Nor∣mandy, and imposed his Laws, as Pictavensis relates;(q) 1.1234 and though he, who was Chaplain to the Conqueror, speak of the Conqueror's smooth behaviour to the English, ordering things as he saith, prudently, justly and mildly; some to the Profit and Dignity of the City; some to the advantage of the whole Nation; and other some to the benefit of the Churches of the Land: and whatever Laws he dictated, he established with ex∣cellent reason; and adds, That no French-man(r) 1.1235 had any thing given him, which was unjustly taken from any Englishman, (which last, Ordericus Vitalis omits, though in other things he follows Pictavensis exactly) yet Pictavensis writing but to the Fourth of his Reign, Anno 1070. as is noted by Ordericus, we must look upon them as incompetent Witnesses of the severity the Conqueror after used, when he had secured his Conquest. So that what is urged by some, of the Conqueror's lenity, and his little change of Laws and Government, is to be understood of those times while he was unsafe in his Conquests, and doth not so interfere, as they would make the World believe,* 1.1236 with the assertion of those, who from credible Authors speak of his treating the English as a Conquered People. For Pictavensis(s) 1.1237 saith, that he possessed the Country by the rights of War. Ordericus(t) 1.1238 Vitalis saith, That having circumvented the two great Earls of Mercia, and slain Edwin, and imprisoned Morcas, then he began to shew himself, and gave the best Counties of England to his Assistants; and of the lowest of the Norman Cli∣ents, or very mean People, he made very rich Colonels and Captains, as he particularizes there; and in another(u) 1.1239 place, That having overthrown by Force and Arms the English Saxons, they obtained their Lands and all their Riches.

Malmsbury(w) 1.1240 saith, That there was no Englishman Duke, or Bishop, or Abbat, but Strangers do gnaw the Riches, and very Bowels of England. So(x) 1.1241 Hen. of Huntingdon saith, there was scarce any Prince of the Progenie of the English, but all are reduced to Servitude and Sorrow; so that it is a disgrace to be called an Englishman: and Gervase of Canterbury saith, That he used both Ecclesiastick and Secular Rights or Laws as he plea∣sed, tam Ecclesiastica Jura quam secularia sibi usurpavit.

As to King William's displacing of the Saxons, I find in the Transcript of Doomsday-Book that I have for Yorkshire, that very many enjoyed the same Lands they did in Edward the Con∣fessors time; but I remember no where that I do not find them hold of some Norman Lords, which is agreeable to what Dr. Brady writes; but I refer the Discourse of those to my Anti∣quities of Yorkshire, if God give me life and ability to publish them.

As to the Conqueror's changing the holding of Lands here, to the(y) 1.1242 Feudal Tenure used in Normandy (begun by the Ger∣mans,

Longobards, Francks and others, and of which something seems to be hinted in the English Saxon Laws) all Authors do conclude, that the Conqueror brought the exacter use, at least, of them into England, and divided the whole Land into se∣veral Knights-fees, whereof there are reckoned 700 Tenants in Capite, besides Bishops, Abbats, Priors and great Church∣men; and the Laws of King Edward that the Conqueror per∣mitted to be used, were either most of them Penal Laws, from which he got profit, or such as are properly his own, and were efficacious for the preservation of the Peace, and establishment of Government, as the 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 64. whereof the 55, 58, and 59. are Feudal.

How William the Conqueror brought in his other Norman Laws, Dr. Brady in his Preface to the Norman Story, hath at large discoursed; so that in Justice I must refer the Curious Reader to his elaborate work, and to Mr. Selden in his Second Book of his Janus Anglorum.

Of the Great Councils in William the Second's time.

IN the Reign of William Rufus we find few Great Councils. So that Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury complains(a) 1.1243 to him (when he was preparing to pass into Normandy) that since he was King, there had been no General Council of the Bishops, nor of several years before, so that Christianity was much de∣cayed.

The first great Council I have met with, is that of Win∣chester.(b) 1.1244 This Council is only thus expressed, Rex adunato Wintoniae conventu Nobilium, without specifying either Eccle∣siasticks or Laicks. In this Council the King declared Anselm Archbishop, and he did Homage to him.

(c) 1.1245This Anselm sought leave of the King that he might go to Rome, to receive the Pall from Pope Ʋrban, whom the King did not own for Pope, but Clement. This and some other Matters occasioned sharp words and unkindness from the King to Anselm; the King absolutely denying him liberty to go, telling him, that he owned not Ʋrban pro Apostolico, and that it had neither been his, nor his Fathers custom, that any should own(d) 1.1246 any Pope in the Kingdom of England, without his Li∣cence or Election; and whoever would take from him this Power of his Dignity, did the same as if he endeavoured to despoil him of his Crown. But Anselm persisted, that he had declared (before he would consent to be Bishop, while he was Abbat of Becc) that he received Ʋrban for Pope, neither that he would in any manner depart from his Obedience and Subjection. At which the King was very angry, protesting, that Anselm could not against the Kings good pleasure keep his Faith which he owed to him, and his Obedience to the Aposto∣lick See. So Anselm (saving his Reason or Argument which he declared concerning his Subjection and Obedience to the Ro∣man

Church) desired Respite for the examining the Matter in Question, till it might be defined by common consent (the Bi∣shops, Abbats, and all the Princes of the Kingdom meeting to∣gether) whether (saving his Reverence and Obedience to the Apostolick See) he could keep his Faith to his Earthly Prince;* 1.1247 and if it be proved that both of them could not be done, he had rather depart the Kings Land, till the Pope was owned, than for an Hour deny Obedience to St. Peter and his Vicar.

Then it follows,* 1.1248 Dantur ergo Induciae, atque ex Regia Sanctione ferme totius Regni Nobilitas 5. Id. Martii pro ventilatione istius causae in unum apud Rochingheham exit.

The Convention was on Sunday in the Church of the Castle, The King, and those(e) 1.1249 that were of the Kings part, secretly and studiously contriving their Councils against Anselm; then follows a plain description, who they were that constituted this Great Council, Anselmus autem Episcopis, Abbatibus & Principibus ad se a Regio, secreto vocatis, Anselm calling the Bishops, Abbats and Princes to himself from the Kings Secret Council, or from the Consultation they had with the King. By these I conceive we may understand the constituent Parts of this Great Council.

Then follows, eos & assistentem Monachorum, Clericorum, Lai∣corum numerosam multitudinem hac voce alloquitur; Anselm makes his Speech to those, that is, to the Bishops, Abbats and Prin∣ces, and likewise to the numerous multitude of Monks, Clerks and Laicks there present, standing or sitting there as Auditors, not Assessors, as the sequel will show.

(f) 1.1250He tells them how he was forc'd to leave his Country, by reason of the Kings desire, that Council being taken, it pleased the King and them to chuse him, and that then he de∣clared for Pope Ʋrbane, and then tells them the straits he was in, as before related, and so desired their Counsel, and prays them all, especially, his Brethren and Co-Bishops to give him advice.

The(g) 1.1251 Bishops tell him, They would advise him to sub∣mit to the King in all things as they were ready to do; but if he commanded, they would acquaint the King with his Dis∣course, and return his Answer; and the King(h) 1.1252 ordered, that all things should be deferred till the next day, because that was Sunday, and Anselm should return to his Lodging, he being a∣bout to petition that the Court might remain; unless the words are to be read, curiam mane repetiturus, he to return to the Court in the Morning; because the following words are, Factum est ita, & mane juxta condictum reversi sumus, It was so done, and in the Morning according to agreement we returned.

Then it follows, Anselmus in medio Procerum & conglobatae mul∣titudinis sedens, ita orsus est, Si juxta quod a vobis Domini Fratres hesterno die consilium de praesenti causa petivi, vel nunc dare velletis, ac∣ciperem; Anselm sitting in the midst of the Nobles, and the encom∣passing multitude, begun thus, If you my Lords and Brothers will give me counsel about the present Cause, as I Yesterday desired or

petitioned, I will receive it. In which we may observe, that he applies himself principally to the Clergy, unless we read the words disjunctively, Domini, Fratres, as we shall presently find he doth.

They give him the same Answer they did the day before, That he should submit to the Pleasure of the King: but if he, according to God, expected Counsel from them, which might in any thing gainsay the Kings Will, it would be labour in vain; for they would not assist him in it.

Then Anselm lifting up his Eyes aloft, with a lively Counte∣nance, and a reverend Voice, speaks to them thus; Cum nos qui Christianae Plebis Pastores, & vos qui Populorum Principes vocami∣ni: When we that are the Pastors of the Christian People, and you that are called the Princes of the People will give me Counsel, not otherwise than according to the Will of one Man, your Prince; I will run to the chief Pastor and Prince of all, to the Angel of the Great Council, &c.

In which we may observe, to my purpose,* 1.1253 that he divides this Curia, or Great Council, into two parts, the Pastors of the Peo∣ple, or the Bishops and Abbats, and the Princes of the People: so as here are no Commons, as in the acceptance of the word in this and later Ages they are understood. For the Multitudo here mentioned, are to be taken to be Spectators, who flocked to hear the Cause, as in other Courts; and even at this day, up∣on the hearing of Appeals at the Bar of the House of Lords, it is usual for many to croud in as far as the Bar.

That these Great Councils met where the King kept his Court at Christmas, Easter and Whitsontide, by custom, often is mentioned in our Histories, and needs no further Proof than what Doctor Brady hath produced; therefore upon this occasion of Archbishop Anselm, I shall only relate what Eadmerus saith,* 1.1254 That he attended the King at Pentecost, some∣times at Dinner-time, when he made his great Feasts, and o∣ther times during the Holidays, to try if the King's Mind was altered, but found no change.(i) 1.1255 Therefore the Festival-days being passed, the causes of divers affairs according to custom, began to be transacted, saith my Author, among which that that of Anselm's was one.

But to draw to a Conclusion of this King's Reign, my Author clears who were the Members of the Great Councils, and that they were convened at the King's Pleasure, in the relating that in the following(k) 1.1256 Month of August, when the King being to transact things concerning the State of the Kingdom, by his Summons had convened the Bishops, Abbats, and all the Noblemen of his Kingdom. The affairs for which they were assembled being dispatched, and every one prepared to return home; Anselm moves again his Petition, and in Octo∣ber, when the Convention was dissolved, he applied himself again to the King at Winchester.

Here we may observe that it was the King,* 1.1257 who being to transact things about the State of the Kingdom, by the Authority of his Precept or Summons, called together the Members of the Great Council, who are expresly mentioned to be the Bi∣shops, Abbats, and all the Noblemen of the Kingdom. Since therefore we find no other kinds of Great Councils in any Au∣thors that write of this King, we may conclude, the Commons were no ways represented in any of them.

Most Authors mention this King with no good Character. One old Writer saith,* 1.1258 That all Justice of Laws was in his time hushed in silence, and Causes being put in a Vacation without hearing, Money alone bore sway among the great ones.

Polydore Virgil will have the right or duty of First-fruits, called Annats, which our Kings claimed for vacant Abbies, and Bishopricks, to have had their Original from King William Rufus. However that be, it is certainly true, that at his Death the Bishopricks of Canterbury, Winchester, and Salisbury, and twelve Monasteries besides, being without Prelates and Abbats, payed in their Revenues to the Exchequer.

We may judge likewise of his burthensome Exactions,* 1.1259 by what we find in his Brother King Henry the First's Charter: Wherein he saith, because the Kingdom was oppressed with un∣just Exactions, he makes the Holy Church free; and all evil Customs, wherewith the Kingdom of England was unjust∣ly oppressed, he doth henceforth take away, and they are all in a manner, mitigations of the Severity of the feudal Tenor, as any one may see in Matthew Paris, Mr. Selden, and Dr. Brady, and is plain by the very first concerning the Laity, That if any one of my Barons, Counts, or others that hold of me, shall dye, his Heirs shall not redeem his Lands, as he was wont to do in the time of my Father, &c. And in another,* 1.1260 That ac∣cording to the relaxation he had made to his Homagers, they should regulate themselves towards the Sons, Daughters, and Wives of their Homagers.

Of the Great Councils in King Henry the First's time.

COncerning the Great Councils in King Henry the First's time, as also till Edward the First's time, I must refer the inquisitive Reader to Dr. Brady's answer to Mr. Petyt in the respective Kings Reigns, and to his Appendix, in which he hath amassed out of Ead∣merus, Simeon Dunelmensis, Florentius Wigornensis; Hoveden, Ger∣vasius Dorobernensis, Matt. Paris, Malmsbury, and other Authentick Writers, the Emphatical Expressions, by which the constituent Parts of the Great Councils are fully proved to be only the Bi∣shops, Abbats, and Priors for the Clergy: or the great No∣bility, or prime Tenents in Capite, such as the King pleased to summon under the names of Magnates, Comites, Proceres, Prin∣cipes, Optimates, Barones, or Sapientiores Regni, expresly used for Barones.

Where the Populus is used by way of Antithesis, as contra∣distinct from the Clerus, and where Regni Communitas, or Inge∣nuitas is used; the same Doctor Brady by pregnant Proof, puts it beyond dispute, that none of the Commons, as now we un∣derstand them, could be meant as Representatives.

So that though I had collected a considerable number of such Proofs, e're I saw the Learned Doctor's Book, I shall now wave them all, and only add in every King's Reign some few that he hath omitted, or wherein something remarkable, relating to the King's Soveraignty, or the manner of constituting Laws, is found by him noted, or as I have met with them in my Reading.

In the third of Henry the First, in the Feast of St.(a) 1.1261 Mi∣chael (saith the Monk of Worcester) the King was at London, and with him all the Princes of his Kingdom of the Ecclesiastick and Secular Order: and of the same Council Malmsbury saith, The King bidding(b) 1.1262 or willing with the common Consent of the Bishops, and Abbats, and Princes of the whole Kingdom, the Council was united: and this being mostly about Ecclesiastick af∣fairs, it is added that in this Council the Optimates Regni, at the Petition of Anselm were present; and gives the reason, For that whatever might be decreed by Authority of the Coun∣cil, might be maintained firmly by the mutual care of both orders. Whereby we may note the Obligation upon Subjects of both Orders, to observe the Laws once enacted by the King and Council. Anno 1107. 7 H. 1. Matth. Paris saith,(c) 1.1263 there was a con∣vention of the Bishops and Abbats, as likewise of the Magna∣tes, i. e. Noblemen, at London in the King's Palace, Archbishop Anselm being President. To which the King assented, and speaking of what was established, he saith, Rex statuit. To him Hoveden agrees; only what the one calls Magnates, the other calls Proceres.

The Manuscript of Croyland(d) 1.1264 saith, The same Year the King giving manifold thanks to God for the Victory he had given him over his Brother Robert, and other Adversaries, appoint∣ed a famous Council at London, as well of the Bishops and Abbats of the whole Clergy of England, as of the Earls, Barons, Optimatum & Procerum totius Regni. In this Council the King(e) 1.1265 remitted, freely granted, and fully promised, the Investiture by Ring and Staff, and freely left the Election of the Prelates to their re∣spective Churches. By which we may not only note who made up this Great Council, but that the enacting part was solely the King's Grant.

The Charter(f) 1.1266 of Henry the First was made before the Eighteenth of his Reign, in which he saith, because his King∣dom was oppressed with unjust Exactions; in(g) 1.1267 respect of God, and the Love which he hath to his Subjects, he makes the Holy Church free, and so proceeds in the rest of his Laws, by way of single Grant, and Prohibition.

Anno 1127. 28 H. 1.(h) 1.1268 W. Archbishop of Canterbury gathered a General Council of all the Bishops, Abbats, and Religious

Persons, and at the close of the Acts it is said, That the King being at London, having heard the Acts of the Council, gave his consent to them, and by his Kingly Authority and Power, granted and confirmed the Statutes of the Council. By which we may see that even the Constitutions of Ecclesiastical Coun∣cils required the Sovereign's Confirmation.

Of the Great Councils in King Stephen's time.

THat he was an Usurper, is notoriously known. His first great Council is only said by Malmsbury to be gathered at London,(a) 1.1269 consisting of Bishops, Nobles, and Abbats, in which many Ecclesiastical and Secular Matters were ordained. Matthew Paris saith, That he having gathered at London the Magnates Regni, he promised the bettering of the Laws according to the will(b) 1.1270 and pleasure of all. The reason of which compliance of this King was, for that he was set up and Crowned by a Faction, there being reckoned by Authors none of Eminence present at his Coronation, but the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Winchester, and Roger of Salisbury his Brother, no Abbats, and but few of the Nobility, they having all sworn(c) 1.1271 Fealty to Maud the Empress in Henry the first's life time, though he in the following Charter saith, That he was elected King, Assensu Cleri & Populi. But to proceed,

King Stephen primo Regni at Oxford, Anno 1136. grants the Liberties to his Subjects by way of Charter,(d) 1.1272 that the Church be free, and he confirms due Reverence to it, and so proceeds to recite many particular Priviledges to it: and as to his Lay-Subjects, he doth utterly root out all exactions, mis∣deeds, and injustices evilly brought in by Sheriffs or any others; That he will observe himself, and appoints and constitutes to be observed the good Laws, and antient and just Customs in Hundreds Pleas, or other matters. This was by Charter, and my Author saith, he disdains to set to the names of the Witnes∣ses which were many, because he so lightly or foolishly changed all.

But Richard Prior of Hexham closes the Charter thus,(e) 1.1273 Haec omnia concedo & confirmo salva Regia & justa Dignitate mea. By which Conclusion it is apparent, the King reserved to him∣self a Latitude to use his Prerogative, and some are of o∣pinion, Kings cannot by any Concessions divest themselves of that; but I want Mittans to handle such noli me tangere's of the Crown.

What I have further to add concerning this Charter is, That the Prior of Hexham makes it granted after the Popes Confir∣mation(f) 1.1274 of him (in which, if ever that See consulted its pri∣vate Interest, it was then; and in my poor Opinion nothing hath more discovered the Personal failures of Popes, than such countenancing of Usurpers) my Author I say makes it to be passed at his Parliament at Oxford, where he saith, he celebra∣ted

a general Council, & Episcopos & Proceres sui Regni regali edicto in unum convenire praecepit.

The Witnesses this Author sets down, makes it(g) 1.1275 appear there were none besides the Clergy and Barons present; for after fourteen Bishops named, the rest of the Witnesses are, Roger the Chancellor, Henry Nephew of the King, Robert Earl of Gloucester, William Earl Warren, Ralph Earl of Chester, Ro∣ger Earl of Warwick, Rob. de Vere, Miles de Gloucester, Rob. de Olli Briano Filio Comitis Constab. Robert de Martel, Hugh Bigot, Humfrid de Bohun, Simon de Bellocampo, Dapif. Rob. de Ferrers, William Petrus, Simon de Silban••et, William de Albania, Hugh de Sancto Claro, Ilbert de Lecsio. All which were very great Ba∣rons, the last of them being Heir to 150 Knights Fees; at least his Grandfather had so many: So that we cannot judge the Commons by any Representation were present.

The other great Councils of this King are to be found in the Authors(h) 1.1276 cited in the Margent; That at Northampton had Turstin Archbishop of York president, and the rest enumerated are Episcopi, Abbates, Comites, Barones, Nobiles quique per Angliam▪ That of the sixteenth(i) 1.1277 mentions only the Archbishop of Can∣terbury, Eustachius the King's Son, & Angliae Proceres; in the(k) 1.1278 Agreement 17 Regni, the Conventus was Episcoporum, Co∣mitum, & aliorum Optimatum; and the last I find Anno 1154. ultimo Regni (e) is cum Episcopis & Optimatibus;(l) 1.1279 never any Commons represented being to be met with.

Of the Great Council in King Henry the Second's Reign.

THE first considerable Act of State that I find Henry the Second did, was Anno 1154. 1 Reg. That he gathered his General Council to London in Lent,(a) 1.1280 he renewed Peace and the Laws and Customs of antient times appointed through England, and by his writing and Seal confirmed to Bishops and Abbats, Charters of Priviledges; whose Charter runs thus, Hen. &c. Baronibus & fidelibus suis Francis, & Anglis salutem. Sciatis me ad Honorem Dei & Sanctae Ecclesiae, & pro communi e∣mendatione Regni mei concessisse & reddidisse, & praesenti Charta mea confirmasse, &c. and so confirms the Charter of King Henry the First his Grand-father.

As to the Council of Clarendon, about(b) 1.1281 Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, after he had once promised, and his after refusing to set to his Seal in Confirmation of the Ancient Laws; I must refer the Reader to what Doctor Brady hath collected, and shall only touch upon that of(c) 1.1282 Clarendon Anno 1164. 10 Hen. 2. where those present by the King's Man∣date, were the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons and Noblemen of the Kingdom; and there was a Re∣cognition of parts of the Customs and Liberties of King Henry the King's Grandfather, and of other Kings, which were com∣prised in sixteen Chapters.* 1.1283 These Matthew Paris calls wic∣ked Customs and Liberties; because they subjected the Clergy∣men

more to the Crown, than he and others would have had them; yet he saith, the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Cler∣gy, with the Earls, Barons and Nobility, swore to them all,* 1.1284 and promised firmly in the word of Truth, to hold and ob∣serve them to the King and his Heirs, in good Faith, and with∣out Evil, and then adds, decrevit etiam Rex: by which it ap∣pears, that the Members of the Great Council did not only as∣sent, but did bind themselves by Oath and solemn Promise, obli∣gatory to themselves and their Posterity, to keep and observe them; and upon the whole it is the King that decrees, appoints and constitutes.

In all the great Councils of this King, it is manifest that the Members were only such as in former Kings Reigns; only in that of the 22 H. 2.(d) 1.1285 it is said, Rex congregatis in urbe Lon∣doniarum, Archipraesulibus, & Episcopis, & Comitibus, & Sapi∣entioribus Regni sui; where Sapientiores are instead of Barones, and for the Kings Summons it is always said, Rex convocat, con∣gregavit, praecepit convenire or mandavit, as is most expresly said in that great Council, Anno 1177. 23 H. 2.(e) 1.1286 That the King sent Messengers through the whole Isle of England, and com∣manded the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls and Barons of all Eng∣land, that they should be with him at London, the next Sunday after the beginning of Lent.

Of the Great Councils in King Richard the First's time.

THere are few great Councils met withal in his short Reign, he being so great a part of it out of the Kingdom: The first I find is in(a) 1.1287 Matthew Paris Anno 1189. 1 Reg. That in the day following the Exaltation of the Holy Cross at Pipewel, Archie∣piscoporum, Episcoporum, & aliorum Magnatum suorum fretus Con∣cilio, He supplied the Vacances of several Bishops Sees.

The Second I find is(b) 1.1288 when he and the King of France agreed to go to the Holy Land, where it is said, that his Earls and Barons, who took the Crusado in the General Council at London, swore, &c. of which it is that(c) 1.1289 Matthew Paris saith, That the King of England, convocatis Episcopis & Regni Proceribus, received the Oath from the Messengers of the King of France.

In the Fifth of King Richard(d) 1.1290 we have a full Example of the holding a Great Council by Commission; for during the Imprisonment of King Richard, Adam de Sancto Edmundo Clerk, was sent from Earl John the Kings Brother, to his Friends in England, to defend his Castles against the King, and dined with Hubert Archbishop of Canterbury, boasting much of the French Kings assisting Earl John: After Dinner the Mayor of London seized on him in his Lodgings, and upon all his Breves and Mandates, who delivered them to the Archbishop.

This occasioned the Archbishop (being the Kings Com∣missioner) to convene a great Council the next day;* 1.1291 but

surely Summons had issued out before, or else it is a great In∣stance, that the great Councils might be called of such of the Clergy and Nobility as were nearest at Hand; for my Author expresly saith,(e) 1.1292 That the Archbishop the next day, called before him the Bishops, Earls and Barons of the Kingdom, and showed to them the Letters of Earl John, and the Tenor of them; and adds, that instantly by the Common Council of the Kingdom, it was defined that Earl John should be dissei∣sed. This Adam, saith Hoveden, came into England not long before King Richard's release from his Imprisonment.

The next great.(f) 1.1293 Council I find, was upon the Thirtieth of March, summoned to meet the King at Nottingham, and at this were present Alienor the Kings Mother, Hubert Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffery Archbishop of York, and seven Bishops more, Earl David brother to the King of Scots, Hamelin Earl Warren, Ralph Earl of Chester, William Earl Ferrers, William Earl of Salisbury, and Roger Bigot, and names no more; but saith the same day, the King disseized(g) 1.1294 Gerard de Canvil, and others. It appears, that this Council sat but four days, on the second day the King required Judgment against Earl John his Brother; on the third day the King(h) 1.1295 appointed to be given him 2 s. of every Carucate of Land through England, and that every one should perform the third part of Military Service, according to their respective Knights Fees, to pass over Sea with him into Normandy, and then exacted of the Cesterti∣an Monks, all their Wool of that year, for which they com∣pounded; and the fourth and last day, Complaints were heard against the Archbishop of York, and further Prosecution of Ge∣rard de Canvil.

Hoveden gives an account of the King's Progress, till the 11th. of the same Month, to which time the great Council was adjourned to meet at Northampton; where the King of Scots made his demands of the Counties of Northumberland, Cum∣berland, Westmorland and Lancashire;* 1.1296 and my Author saith, That the King having taken advice with the Bishops, Earls and Barons (no orders of Men more are mentioned) he gave an∣swer to the King of Scots: but it seems he had no mind to part with those Frontier Counties, but by Charter, in the presence of his Mother Alienor, the Archbishop and other Bishops and many others, as well Clerks as Laics of either Kingdom, he granted the King and his Heirs certain Allowances, Safe-Con∣duct, &c. when he should come to the King's Court upon Sum∣mons.

The most remarkable things in these Councils to be consi∣dered,* 1.1297 are the quick dispatch of Business in them, the small Numbers they consisted of; and that there appears no Footstep of any Commoners by Representation; and by the Words, Rex praecepit, constituit, &c. it shows, that the King had solely the Authoritative Power of passing the Consultations into binding Laws, even where Mony was to be levied of the Subject, and

disseisure was to be made, which was then practised, but by an hap∣py ease to the Subject, is since by King Edward the First abro∣gated; for which as we ought all to be thankful, so to make use of this great Liberty, that we may not abuse it to the da∣mage of the Crown, that bestowed the Largess, and not so much boast our selves that we are freemen, as to remember gratefully whence our Freedom came.

Of the Great Councils in King John's time.

THE first great Council that I have met with in King John's time is that held at Oxford,(a) 1.1298 Anno Dom. 1204. 6 Reg∣ni, the Morrow after the Circumcision, where, as Matthew Pa∣ris saith, convenerunt ad colloquium Rex & Magnates, and there were granted to the King two Marks and an half out of every Knights Fee. Yet though all the Members are included under the name of Magnates, yet my Author(b) 1.1299 saith, that neither the Bishops, Abbats, or Ecclesiastic Persons passed away with∣out a promise (of supply, I suppose.)

So that I conceive the Clergy undertook for their Or∣der to contribute something apart, as it hath been since in use for the Convocation, to give a distinct Tax imposed by themselves on the Clergy: some evident Footsteps of which u∣sage we find in that Council of(c) 1.1300 Clarendon, wherein Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury was required by the King that he and the Bishops should set to their Seals in Confirmation of the antient Laws the King enjoined to be observed; which when the Bishops were willing to do, the Archbishop swore he would never do.

The Members of the Great Council, and the absoluteness of King John in imposing Taxes is fully discovered in what Mat∣thew(d) 1.1301 Paris writes, that Anno 1207. 9 Regni, the King kept his Christmass at Winchester, the Magnates Regni being pre∣sent; and on the Purification of the Virgin Mary, he took through England the Thirteenth of Moveables,* 1.1302 and other things, both of the Laics and Ecclesiastics, all murmuring,(e) 1.1303 but none daring to contradict him.

Anno 1213. 15 Joh. the King intending an expedition into Nor∣mandy, left Geofrey Fitz-Peter, and the Bishop of Winchester Commissioners in his absence, who at St. Albans held a Council with the Archbishop, the Bishops, and the Magnates Regni, where on the part of the King it was firmly(f) 1.1304 enjoyned, that the Laws of King Henry his Grandfather should be kept by all in his Kingdom, and all evil Laws should be totally dis∣annulled, and all Sheriffs, Foresters, and other Ministers of the King, under the severest Penalties of Life and Limb, should not violently extort any thing from any Person, or presume to offer Injury to any.

In which we may observe the Conventions of great Coun∣cils in the Kings absence, and that the Laws have force only by

the King's Authority, as appears by the expressions, ex parte Re∣gis firmiter est praeceptum.

In the same Year the Eighth of the Calends of Septem∣ber, Stephen,* 1.1305 Archbishop of Canterbury, with the Bishops, Ab∣bats, Priors, Deans and Barons of the Kingdom, met at Lon∣don, at St. Pauls, in a Conspiracy against King John; and as(g) 1.1306 Matthew Paris saith, the Fame was, that the Archbishop cal∣ling to himself a Club of the Nobles, told them secretly, that they had heard how he had absolved the King, and compelled him to swear that he should destroy evil Laws, and should re∣cal the good Laws, viz, those of King Edward, and make them to be observed in his Kingdom; and that now there was found a Charter of King Henry the First, by which if they would, they might recal to the Pristine State, their long-lost Liberties, which Charter he produced, and it was that made to Hugh de Bocland his Justiciary, and so they made a Confede∣racy among themselves, and broke up their Assembly.

We may note,* 1.1307 that this Convention at London was a Con∣spiracy, yet it had the Face of a great Council, as to the con∣stituent Parts of it, and no Representatives of the People, and they grounded their Confederacy upon the regaining their lost Liberties, and had recourse to King Edward's Laws, and their Confirmation by King Henry the First. So that even such Re∣bels owned Kings the Fountains, Authors, and Establishers of their Liberties, as well knowing they were born Subjects, and whatever was remitted of the absolute Power of Princes, was by their own Grants; though they might be induced to those Concessions from several causes, but whenever threats, force, or other necessities for supplies, or such like, extorted these, they were very ill kept. Anno 1215. 17 Joh. the Barons pressing the King to confirm the Charter of Priviledges, the Archbishop with his Associates read over each Chapter. But the King understanding the Tenor of them, with indignation and scorn said,(h) 1.1308 Why with these unjust exactions do not the Barons require the Kingdom? and swore he would ne∣ver grant such Liberties, whereby he should be made a Ser∣vant.

However he was afterwards at Runing-mede, compelled to sign the Charter, there being with him but eight or nine Bi∣shops, four Earls, and some twelve Barons, as Matthew Paris numbers them; but he saith, as to those present on the behalf of the Barons, the Company was innumerable, as being tota Angliae Nobilitas in unum collecta.

Therefore the King grants them the Liberties by way of Char∣ter(i) 1.1309 per consilium venerabilium Patrum nostrorum, &c. and so recounts those that were present with him, not mentioning any of those that were against him as I remember.

This was the Charter which Henry the third(k) 1.1310 confirmed, and is called Magna Charta, the principal matter in it, which re∣lates to my purpose, was, that he made some alteration in the

manner of Summoning Members to the Great Council, viz.* 1.1311 That the Archbishop, Bishops, Abbats, Earls, and greater Ba∣rons of the Kingdom, should be summoned by special Writs, and that he would cause to be summoned by the Sheriffs and his Bailiffs, those which held in Capite of him, to a certain day by general Summons. So that it is apparent, that the Great Councils heretofore had only consisted of such Earls and great Barons and Tenents in Capite, as the King by special Writ plea∣sed to Summon; and this new way brought in a greater num∣ber of the Tenents in Capite: but still here were no Represen∣tatives of the Commons.

In the Charta de Foresta, the King saith, Dei intuitu, &c. ad emen∣dationem Regni nostri, spontanea & bona voluntate nostra dedimus, concessimus pro nobis & haeredibus nostris, has libertates subscriptas.

The King was sore vexed,* 1.1312 that these Liberties had been ex∣torted from him, and sent to Pope(m) 1.1313 Innocent, who also absolved him from the Obligation, upon the ground that he had given(n) 1.1314 the Kingdom to St. Peter, and the Church of Rome, and so could make no such Charter without his leave, and after he Excommunicated the Rebellious Barons.

In this Charter, as in all the rest of the Charters of Liberties, we(o) 1.1315 may observe, that the Petitions of the People were drawn into the form of a Charter, and passed under the Kings Seal, as his meer voluntary free Grants, and Concessions, without any Votes, Suffrages, or Authority of the People. So Matt. Paris saith of this Charter, that when King John saw the Barons too powerful for him(p) 1.1316 gratanter eis concederet Leges & Liberta∣tes quas petebant; he willingly granted the Laws and Liberties which they asked, or petitioned for.

So in the Charter it self,(q) 1.1317 Concessimus etiam, & omnibus liberis hominibus nostri Regni Angliae pro nobis & haeredibus nostris in perpetuum omnes libertates subscriptas habendas, & tenendas eis, & haeredibus suis de nobis, & haeredibus nostris: that is, And we have also granted to all our Free-men of the Kingdom of England, for us and our Heirs for ever,* 1.1318 all the un∣der-written Liberties, to have and to hold to them and their Heirs of us and our Heirs, &c.

CHAP. XXVI. Of the Great Councils and Parliaments during the Reign of King Henry the Third, to the end of the Reign of King Edward the Third.

THE first great Council I find in this Kings Reign was on the Eighth of the Octaves of(a) 1.1319 Epiphany, Anno 1223. 7 H. 3. The King having kept his Christmas at Oxford, came to London, to have a Colloquium with his Barons, and the Arch∣bishop and other Magnates pressed the King to confirm the Li∣berties and Free customs, for which Wars had been moved a∣gainst his Father, and which he had confirmed by Oath, up∣on the recess of Lewis of France; to which also he said, the(b) 1.1320 whole Nobility had sworn that they would observe them, and deliver them to all others to observe. To which William Briwere, one of the Kings Council, answering for the King, said, The Liberties they desired being violently extorted from the King, they ought not of right to be observed.

From whence we may observe,* 1.1321 that whatever claims were made for Liberties, still they were grounded on the Monarch•• Concessions, and such as were by any violence wrested from the Kings, were not reputed binding to the Crown.

In the Octaves of the Holy Trinity, the Eighth of Henry the Third, there met at a Colloquium at Northampton, the King with(c) 1.1322 the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, and Barons, and many other, to treat of the Affairs of the Kingdom. By these, alii multi, the Tenents in Capite are to be understood, which more nume∣rously appeared since King John's Charter. This Great Coun∣cil was intended for the relief of Poicton; but Falcacius de Brent having seiz'd on Bedford Castle, and taken Henry de Bery∣broke, one of the Kings Itinerant Justices; obliged the King to prosecute him. At this(d) 1.1323 Council, the Prelates and Laics gave the King for his great Labours and Expences 2 s. upon every Plough,* 1.1324 and the King granted to the Magnates 2 m. out of eve∣ry Knights Fee. This was to be levied by the Magnates, such as held of the King in Capite, of their Tenents, to reimburse them what they had expended in aiding the King. And so the Council broke up.

But the King 9 Regni, Anno 1225.(e) 1.1325 keeping his Court at Christmas at Westminster, praesentibus Clero, & Populo, cum Magna∣tibus Regionis. After the Solemnity was passed, Hubert de Burgo the Kings Justiciary, on the part of the King, proposed to the Archbishops,* 1.1326 Bishops, Earls, Barons, and all the Ʋniverse (that is the Tenent in Capite) the damages and injuries which were brought upon the King beyond Sea; by which, not only the King, but many of the Earls and Barons were disinherited: therefore the King required Counsel and Aid of them of a Fif∣teenth.

Upon this the Archbishop, and the whole number of Bishops,* 1.1327 Earls, Barons, Abbats and Priors, having had deliberation, answered the King, That they would willingly yield to the Kings desire, if he would grant them the long desired Liberties. The King, saith my Author, being led by Covetousness, or as he means, being desirous of a supply, yielded to what the Mag∣nates desired; so he granted that which is called Magna Charta, so deservedly priz'd by all Englishmen ever since, and the(f) 1.1328 Charta de Foresta, and presently Charters were got drawn, and the King sealed them, and they were sent into all Counties two; one of the Liberties, and the other of the Forests.

Matth. Paris saith expresly, That they(g) 1.1329 were the same that King John had granted, and so refers the Reader to per∣use them in what he had writ on his Reign. It is to me very strange, that since so many Original Grants of the Kings of England, and other ancienter Deeds, being every where to be found among the ancient Evidences of many Noble and Gentlemens Families; yet no where that I can learn, any of these Original Charters are to be found, except one at Lambeth, as Mr. Pryn hath observed; That upon Re∣cord being only an Exemplification in King Edward the First's time

Anno 1232. on the Nones of March, the King called a Great Council to(h) 1.1330 Westminster, where there met Magnates Angliae tam Laici quam Praelati; The King required an Aid for the pay∣ment of his Debts, contracted by his Expeditions beyond Sea. To which Ralph Earl of Chester on behalf of the Nobility, an∣swered, That the Earls, Barons, and Knights that held of the King in Capite, being with the King personally in that Expediti∣on, and having fruitlesly spent their Money, were poor; so that of(i) 1.1331 right they ow'd not Aid to the King. And so my Author saith, the Laics having asked leave, all departed, and the Pre∣lates answered, That many Bishops and Abbats being absent, they desired respite till some other meeting, which was appoin∣ted fifteen days after Easter.

By this we may observe, who they were that had the power of giving consent, or granting aid; for if there had been any other Members of the Lay Order, besides Earls, Barons, and Knights, that held in Capite, the Earls of Chester's Argument had been of no validity.

In the Statute of Merton,(k) 1.1332 20 H. 3. it is thus expressed, Before William Archbishop of Canterbury, and other his Bishops and Suffragans, and before the greater part of the Earls and Barons of England there being assembled, for the Coronation of the said King, and Helioner the Queen, about which they were called; thus it was provided and granted, as well of the foresaid Archbishop, Bishops, Earls and Barons, as of the King himself and others.

I shall only cull out some few of the Great Councils in this Kings Reign, wherein most fully are expressed the true Mem∣bers

of them, or such wherein something remarkable was trans∣acted.

Anno 1237. 21 H. 3. The King keeping his Christmas at Win∣chester, sent his(l) 1.1333 Royal Writs through all England, comman∣ding all that appertained to the Kingdom of England, that is, all who were to be Members of the great Council, which my Author explains particularly thus, viz. Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors installed, Earls and Barons, that without failure they should meet at London on the Octaves of the Epiphany, to treat of the Affairs of the Kingdom, concerning the whole Kingdom; then he adds, That on the day of St. Hilary, there met at London an(m) 1.1334 infinite Multitude of the Nobles, viz. The whole University of the Kingdom, which were the Per∣sons of those Orders before particularized.

Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. By the Kings(n) 1.1335 Edict was called to the most general Parliament (saith Matthew Paris) all the No∣bility of the whole Kingdom of England, viz. of the Prelates as well Abbats and Priors as Bishops, also Earls and Barons; and a few Pages after, concerning the same Parliament, he saith, All the Magnates of the Kingdom met, and the King himself first spake to the Bishops apart, then to the Earls and Barons, and last to the Abbats and Priors.

In this,* 1.1336 that which frequently in Matthew Paris is called Col∣loquium, now he gives the Title of Parliament to, from the French word parler, to confer or speak together; and we find what is meant also by totalis Nobilitas.

Anno 1253. 37 H. 3. By the(o) 1.1337 Kings Edict the Nobility of England being summoned, met at London to treat together with the King, of the arduous Affairs of the Kingdom; and there were present with most of the Earls and Barons, the Archbishop Boniface, and almost all the Bishops of England. In this great Council were the Tenents in Capite, according to King John's Charter. The King in this Parliament or Colloqui∣um, requires Money for an Expedition into the Holy Land; but for fifteen days there were great Contests about it, till the King de novo confirmed King John's Charters, and a solemn Excom∣munication was agreed upon, to be pronounced against the Infringers of it; and my Author saith, Rex, Magnates, & Com∣munitas Populi protestantur, in the Presence of the Venerable Fathers, &c. That they never consented, or do consent that any thing be added or altered in the Charters, but plainly con∣tradict it; so 3 May(p) 1.1338 in Westminster-Hall, the Exempli∣fication passed the Seal of the King and other great Men.

But it is principally to be considered what is expressed in the Patent,* 1.1339 That the King in the Declaration of the said Sentence, did, by his own Mouth specially save and except to himself and his Kingdom, all the Liberties, ancient Customs of his Kingdom, and Usages, Dignities and Rights of his Crown.

By which it is apparent how cautious the King was in these liberal Concessions, not to prejudice his Prerogative. They

are neither few in Number, nor of mean repute for judgment and learning in our Laws, who assert,* 1.1340 that as Acts of Parlia∣ment made contrary to Magna Charta, are void; so likewise are all such as diminish the Prerogative in any part of it, which is necessary for the support of the Government: So upon the passing the Petition(q) 1.1341 of Right, King Charles the First, the King said, The King willeth that Right be done according to the Laws and Customs of the Land, and that the Statutes be put in due Execution, that the Subjects may have no cause to complain of any Wrong or Oppression, contrary to their Just, Rights and Liberties, to the Preservation whereof he holdeth himself obliged, as well as of his Prerogative: But this would not please, and so he pronoun∣ced, Le droit soit fait comme il est desire, and adds, that, he is sure, is full, but no more than he granted in his first An∣swer; his meaning in that being to confirm all their Liberties, knowing according to their Protestations, they neither meant nor can hurt his Prerogative. The Peoples Liberty strengthens the Kings Prerogative, and the Kings Prerogative is to defend the Peoples Liberties.

The rest of the Parliaments of this Kings Reign, are said to be called(r) 1.1342 per scripta Regalia, submonitione Regia, or that, scripsit Rex praecipiens, or missis literis convocavit, Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. or Edicto Regio convocat, &c. which denotes the Au∣thority convening them; and for the Members, they are ei∣ther stiled Magnates, omnis Regni Nobilitas, or Clerus & Populus cum Magnatibus, Magnates tam Laici, quam Praelati, Episcopi, & alii Ecclesiarum Praelati, cum Proceribus Regni, or else they are parti∣cularly numbred to be Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, for the Clergy, and the Comites & Barones for the Laity. In one I find Archiepiscopus cum Suffraganeis suis for the rest of the Bishops, and(s) 1.1343 another runs thus, Anno 1247. 31 H. 3. fecit Dominus Rex Magnates suos nec-non & Angliae Archidiaconos per scripta sua Regia Londinum convocari. Yet though Matt. Paris only mention the Magnates & Archidiaconi; yet he saith, when the prefixed day was come, the Bishops all willingly absented themselves, and he gives the Reason, ne viderentur prop••iis factis eminus adversari, sciebant enim corda omnium, usque ad animae a∣maritudinem, non immerito sauciari.

Then when he(u) 1.1344 gives an Account of the business of this great Council, he saith that the Archdeacons of England, as also not the least part of the whole Clergy of the Kingdom, with the Magnates complained of the Popes exaction; and so Letters were writ to the Pope and Cardinals.

It may be noted also, That in those Days the Kings summo∣ned other dignified Clergy besides Bishops, Abbats and Priors.

I shall insist no longer upon these Matters,* 1.1345 but pass to the great Mutation which was made in the Constitution of our English Parliaments: It seems to be clear, that before King John's time, the Members of the Great Councils were summoned by special Writ, and they were only the Archbishops, Bishops, Ab∣bats

and Priors for the Clergy, and the Earls and Barons, and such of the Tenents in Capite as were of greatest quality, as the King pleased: But in King John's Charter, all the Tenents in Capite were convened by a General Summons, which did much encrease the number of the Members of these great Councils; and by so much as they were more numerous, it is likely the Popular Barons hoped to make their Party the stronger against the King; for we find it introduced when the Barons were propense to rebel.

So the Second great Alteration on the Constitution of Par∣liament was introduced,* 1.1346 when Simon Montfort Earl of Lei∣cester, and the Rebellious Barons had the King and the Prince Prisoners. Simon Montford, to strengthen his Interest, first, in the Kings Name, summons the Earls and Barons which were in Arms against the King; also at other times summoned more Abbats and Priors than had been used, for that the Clergy at that time had a great Opinion of him, and he was their Mini∣on, as is apparent in Matthew Paris, and fully in the judicious(w) 1.1347 Doctor Brady, to whom I must specially refer the curious Reader in this particular.

The 14th.* 1.1348 of Dec. 48 H. 3. the first Writ issued out thus, Item mandatum est singulis Vicecomitibus per Angliam, quod venire faciant, duos Milites de legalioribus & discretioribus Militibus sin∣gulorum Comitatuum, It is commanded to all the Sheriffs of Eng∣land, that they make, or cause to come, two Knights of the more Legal and Discreet Knights of every County, to be at London on the Octaves of St. Hilary next.

So in the like manner(x) 1.1349 Writs were directed to Cities and Burroughs, to send two of the more Discreet, Legal and Ho∣nest Citizens and Burgesses. This is without Date; that to the Barons of the Cinque Ports is Jan. 20. It doth not appear by the Writ to the Sheriffs, whether they or the Counties were to elect and send those Knights, or who were Electors.

It is the Opinion of most learned(y) 1.1350 Men, that Simon Mont∣fort apprehended (from the Concourse of the Nobility, and their great Retinues, and the Example of his and the Barons Practices at Oxford) some danger to himself and his Affairs, and so altered the ancient Usage.

Upon the 5th. of August 49 H. 3. Simon Montfort was slain at Evesham, and all his Party routed; and the 8th. of September following, the King convened his Parliament at Winchester, which according to the old form,* 1.1351 consisted only of the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons and Great Men: nor did he con∣tinue Montfort's Method after, as appears by that Parliament he called 50 Regni.

By the Statute of Marleburgh 52 H. 3. it is evident,* 1.1352 That e∣ven all the great Barons were not summoned, but only the more Discreet, and such as the King thought fit to call; and the like is observed of the lesser Barons or Tenents in Capite: For if it had been by General Summons, that Restriction of

the more Discreet had been useless; so that it appears, that what(z) 1.1353 Mr. Camden's ancient Author observes, is true, That after the horrid Confusions and Troubles of the Barons Wars, those Earls and Barons, whom the King thought worthy to summon by his Writ to meet, came to his Parliaments, and no other.

The Preamble to this Statute of(a) 1.1354 Marlebridge runs thus in Tottel, Providente ipso Domino Rege, ad Regni sui Angliae me∣liorationem & exhibitionem Justitiae (prout Regalis Officii poscit Ʋtilitas) pleniorem, convocatis discretioribus ejusdem Regni tam majoribus quam minoribus, provisum est & statutum, ac concordatum & ordinatum.

According to Pulton the(b) 1.1355 Preamble is thus, That where∣as the Realm of England, of late, had been disquieted, with manifold Troubles and Dissentions, for Reformation whereof Statutes and Laws be right necessary,* 1.1356 whereby the Peace and Tranquillity of the People must be observed; wherein the King intending to devise convenient Remedy, hath made these Acts, Ordinances and Statutes underwritten, which he willeth to be observed for ever firmly and inviolably of all his Subjects, as well high as low.

Thus we see in the whole Reign of H. 3. (excepting in that Parliament of Montfort's Faction) the Bishops and dignified Clergy, Earls, Barons and Tenents in Capite, were only sum∣moned as Members of the great Councils; and there were no Representatives of the Commons; and the Kings Authority in summoning, dissolving and making Laws is most manifest.

Of Parliaments in King Edward the First's Reign.

I Shall now glean out of Tottel and Pulton's Editions of the Statutes, the most material Preambles, which give light to the constituent Parts of Parliaments, to the Legislative Power in the King, with the Concurrence of the two Houses, and how that in the Series of the Kings Reign hath been expressed, and such other matters relating to the Parliament, as may shew the gradual Progress of their Constitution, to the usage of this present Age; leaving the Reader to make his own remarques from the matters of Fact, and the expressions used by my Au∣thors, and explaining some.

The Preface to the Statute of(a) 1.1357 Westminster begins thus, These are the Establishments of King Edward, Son to King Hen∣ry, made at Westminster, at his first General Parliament after his Coronation, &c. by his Council, and by the Assent of the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, and the whole Commonalty of the Land thither summoned.

This Parliament was prorogued before it met, and the Writ of Prorogation mentions only, Quia generale Parliamentum no∣strum, quod cum Praelatis & Magnatibus Regni nostri proposuimus habere, &c. Therefore having prorogued it, mandamus, &c.

Intersitis ad tractandum & ordinandum una cum Praelatis & Mag∣natibus Regni nostri,(b) 1.1358 &c. So that all the Members are included in the two general Terms of Praelati & Magnates, which great Men very frequently comprehended as well the Barones Majores, as Minores, the Earls, Barons and greater Tenents in Capite, and the less, which then were called the Community of the King∣dom.

The rest of the Preamble of the Statutes made at(c) 1.1359 West∣minster runs thus, Because our Lord the King hath great Zeal, and desire to redress the State of the Realm, &c. the King hath ordained and established these Acts under written.

The Preface to the Statute de Bigamis, 4 Oct. 4 Ed. 1. is thus(d) 1.1360 expressed, In the Presence of certain Reverend Fathers, Bishops of England, and others of the Kings Council, the con∣stitutions under written were recited, and after heard and pub∣lished before the King and his Council; for as much as all the King's Council, as well Justices as others did agree, that they should be put in writing, for a perpetual memory, and that they should be stedfastly observed.

In the First Chapter it is said, Concordatum est per Justiciarios & alios sapientes de Concilio Regni Domini Regis, It was agreed by the Justices and other wise or sage Men, of the Council of the Kingdom of the Lord the King.

Perhaps (saith the judicious Doctor Brady) the best under∣standing of the preamble and first Chapter, may be, that the Laws and Constitutions were prepared by the King and his(e) 1.1361 Council, with the Assistance of the Justices and Lawyers that were of it, or called to assist in it, and declared after∣wards in Parliament:(f) 1.1362 for it is said in the close of the Sta∣tute, The aforesaid Constitutions were published at Westmin∣ster in the Parliament, after the Feast of St. Michael, the 4th. of the Kings Reign, and thence forward to take place.

The Preamble to the Statute of Gloucester, Anno 1278. 6 E. 1. is thus,(g) 1.1363 The King, for the amendment of the Realm, and for the more full Exhibition of Justice, according as the benefit of his Office requires, having called the most discreet of his Realm, as well the greater as the smaller; It is establi∣shed and unanimously ordained, as Pulton adds, after by the King and his Justices certain Expositions were made.

The Statute of Mortmain is thus prefaced, Nos pro(h) 1.1364 Ʋti∣litate Regni volentes providere, Remedium de Concilio Praelatorum, Comitum, Baronum & aliorum fidelium Regni nostri de Concilio nostro existentium, providimus, statuimus & ordinavimus, which(i) 1.1365 Pulton renders by the Advice of our Prelates, Earls, Ba∣rons and Subjects of our Kingdom, being of our Council, the King hath provided, made and ordained; whereas by Fideles is to be understood the Tenents in Capite.

The Statute of Acton Burnel, or Statute Merchant 11 E. 1. according to Tottel, was made by the(k) 1.1366 King himself and his whole Council: That this was done in Parliament, appears

by the Statute of Merchants, made in the 13th. of the same King, wherein it is said, Our Lord the King, by himself and by his Council, at his(l) 1.1367 Parliament, which he held at Acton Burnel, 11 Regni, made and ordained these Establishments; or as(m) 1.1368 Pulton hath it, The King caused the Statute made by the King and his Council at Acton Burnel to be rehearsed, and hath ordained and established.

Since the 49 of H. 3. to the 18 of Ed. 1. we find(n) 1.1369 no Writs for summoning of Knights, Citizens and Burgesses; but the 14 of June 18 Ed. 1. The King issued out the following Summons, Rex, &c.* 1.1370 cum per Comites, Barones & quosdam alios de Proceribus Regni nostri nuper fuissemus super quibusdam speciali∣ter requisiti, tam cum ipsis quam cum aliis de communitatibus Regni illius colloquium habere, volumus & tractatum, &c. Tibi praecipi∣mus quod duos vel tres de discretioribus, & ad laborandum poten∣tioribus Militibus de Comitatu praedicto, sine dilatione eligi, & eos ad nos, &c. venire facias, &c. cum plena potestate pro se & com∣munitate Comitatus praedicti, ad consulendum, & consentiendum pro se & communitate illa, hiis quae Comites, Barones & Proceres praedicti, tum duxerint concordanda, vel concorditer ordinaverint in praemis∣sis. The English of which is, Whereas we have been especial∣ly petitioned and requested by the Earls, Barons and others of the great Men of our Kingdom, concerning certain matters, upon which we will have Conference and treat, as well with themselves as with others of the Counties of that Kingdom: We command thee, that without delay thou makest to be cho∣sen, two or three of the most discreet and ablest Knights, for dispatch of business of the Counties aforesaid, and cause them to come to us, &c. with full Power for themselves, and the whole Community of the County aforesaid, to consult and consent for themselves and that Community, to such things which the Earls, Barons and great Men aforesaid, shall think fit to agree upon.

From this we may observe, That by Vertue of this Writ,* 1.1371 no Citizens or Burgesses could be chosen or sent to Parliament; But only Knights for Counties: Secondly, The Scutage was granted in this Parliament, as Doctor Brady hath noted, four∣teen days before the Writ for Election of Knights issued out; and it is(o) 1.1372 apparent, That the Statute of Westminster the Third was made the Eighth of July, which was a week before they were to appear, and consequently was made without them; for the Preamble runs, Dominus Rex in Parliamento suo apud Westmonasterium post Pascham Anno Regni sui 18. viz. in quindena S. Johannis Baptistae (i.e. 8 July) ad instantium Magna∣tum Regni sui concessit, providit & statuit.

From this Writ and the Variation of the following Writs, and other Records, the judicious Doctor Brady(p) 1.1373 notes, That it was from the Kings Authority, and at this time, that the House of Commons came to be fixed and established, in the present constant form it now is and hath been for many Kings

Reigns, and it doth appear that King Edward the First was not altogether confined to any certain number of Knights, Citi∣zens, or Burgesses, nor were several strict forms and usages now practised, ever then thought of, or some legal Niceties or Pun∣ctilioes now in use, then judged of absolute Necessity.

The Statute of Quo(q) 1.1374 Warranto in the Eighteenth Year of Edward the First, saith that the King of his special Grace, and for the affection he beareth to his Prelates, Earls and Barons, and others of his Realm hath granted, &c.

The Statute de(r) 1.1375 Malefactoribus in Parcis in the Twenty first Year of Edward the First, saith, Our Lord the King at his Par∣liament, &c. at the instance of the Nobles of the Realm hath granted, &c.

Anno 1294. the King issues out his(s) 1.1376 Writs to cause two Knights out of every County to be chosen, &c. Dated the Eighteenth of October, and the next day issues out Writs for other two to be chosen to meet at the same time and place.

Out of Mr. Ryley's(t) 1.1377 Placita Parliamentorum it is clear, that the Parliament which met on the Octaves of St.* 1.1378 Hilary or the Twentieth of January, in the Twenty eighth Year of Ed∣ward the First, sate but eight days, the Writ for the Commons Expences, bearing date, January the Thirtieth of the same Year; and the Letter to the Pope, signed by the Temporal Lords for themselves, and the whole Community of the Kingdom of Eng∣land; is dated February the twelfth next following, after the Commons had been dismissed fourteen days: so that the Ba∣rons still continued to stile themselves the Community of Eng∣land,* 1.1379 and both Spiritual and Temporal Barons, and others of the King's Council did stay and dispatch much Business after all others were dismissed, as further appears in a(u) 1.1380 Proclamation 21 March, 33 Ed. 1. Wherein the King gives the Archbishops, Bi∣shops, and other Prelates, Earls and Barons, Knights of Counties, Citizens and Burgesses, and other Persons of the Commons, which by our Lord the King's Command came to this Parliament, ma∣ny Thanks for their coming, and willeth that at present they return into their Counties, so as they readily, and without delay do come again at the time when they shall be remanded; except the Bishops,(w) 1.1381 Earls and Barons, Justices and others, which are of the King's Council, who may not depart with∣out special leave of the King.

I shall not here enter into the enquiry how far the extent of the Power of the King's Council was in those days; but it is very apparent that the King with advice of his Council, pro∣posed Laws, and that others proposed by the Houses, were considered by the King and Council, as no doubt they are now considered before the King gives his Assent to Bills.

So in the Statute of the Definition of(x) 1.1382 Conspirators in the three and Thirtieth Year of King Edward the First, it is said, This Ordinance was accorded by the King, and his Council in his Parliament.

Also in the Ordinance of(y) 1.1383 Enquests, the Eighteenth of Sept. in the thirty third Year of Ed. the First, It is said it is agreed and ordained by the King and all his Council, that is, his Parliament.

As to the special Prerogative of the King in giving the ulti∣mate Character and fiat to the Laws, every Act expresseth it; so the Statute of(z) 1.1384 Champerty, the Statutes are called by the King, Our Statutes, and, Our Lord the King hath commanded; and in the Statute de Conjunctim feoffat. it is said, It is no new thing that among divers Establishments of Laws, which we have ordained in our time; so in the Ordinatio Forestae, 34 Ed. 1.* 1.1385(a) 1.1386 We have ordained for our selves, and our Heirs. So in the Statute De asportatu Religiosorum, 35 Ed. 1. it is said by the Council of his Earls, Barons, great Men, and other Nobles of his Kingdom, at his Parliament, Our Lord the King hath Or∣dained and Enacted.

I shall only note first, That in the Twenty eighth of this King those the(b) 1.1387 King had appointed being ready to give an account of the Perambulation of the Forests, the King put a present stop to their report, and his determination; be∣cause the Prelates, Earls, Barons,* 1.1388 and the rest of the Magnates of the Kingdom, in whose Presence his own, and others Rea∣sons should be propounded, and heard, and by whose Coun∣cils he intended to work (especially seeing they were bound by Oath as well as himself, to observe and maintain the Rights of the Kingdom and Crown) were not then present, and those were not summoned who should propound their Reasons, so far as the matters concerned them, and the King was not wil∣ling without their advice to put an end to the matters, there∣fore he orders the Sheriffs to cause the two Knights that came to the last Parliament, by his Precept, now to come, and the like for the Cities and Burroughs, and if any were dead, or infirm, so that he could not come, then to cause another to be chosen.

By which it appears that it was only from the King's Indul∣gence, and that he might more deliberately resolve, for the best advantage of his Subjects, and for their satisfaction, that he would have the advice of a fuller Assembly.

We may also further note from hence, that it was in the King's Power to summon the same Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses without a new Choice, except the Persons were dead or infirm.

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Second's time.

IN this King's Reign, these following Particulars are most observable: In the Statute for(a) 1.1389 Knights, 1 Regni, it is said Our Lord the King hath granted.

In the Summons, 5 Ed. 2. the Precept to the Sheriff,* 1.1390 is to cause to come to the Parliament, to be held at Westminster, those Knights, Citizens and Burgesses in his Bailiwick, which he caused to come lately to the present Parliament at London,

and which for certain causes went from the said Parliament,(b) 1.1391 or others fit for the Imployment, if they cannot be at leisure. Dated Octob. 11.

In the sixth of Ed. 2. we have an example of the King's(c) 1.1392 proroguing the House of Commons in these Words, Dominus Rex praecepit quod Milites, Cives & Burgenses qui ad Parliamentum Regis ibidem summonitum, convenerunt pro Comitatibus, Civitatibus, & Burgis Angliae, ad propria remearent, ita quod reverterentur ibi∣dem in crastino S. Mich. prox. futuro sub poena qua decet. So that as they were commanded to return home, so they were ap∣pointed a time to return under the Intimation of a Punish∣ment.

The Preamble to the(d) 1.1393 Articuli Cleri runs thus, That by the Kings Progrenitors and himself, at the Instance of the Prelates, certain Articles were made, and in the Parliament at Lincoln, 9 Regni, he caused them to be rehearsed before his Council, and made certain answers to be corrected; and to the residue of the Articles, answers were made by him and his Council, and so by way of Charter they are published at York, 24 Nov. 10 Regni.

The Statute of(e) 1.1394 Gavelet at London saith, It is provided by our Lord the King, and his Justices.

In the Statute de Terris(f) 1.1395 Templariorum, it is said, Great con∣ference was had before the King himself, in the presence of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, Nobles, and great Men of the Realm, and others present; whereupon the Greater part of the King's Council,* 1.1396 as well the Justices as other Lay-men, being as∣sembled, the Justices affirmed precisely, &c. After the recital of Particulars, the words are, It is ordained and agreed in the same Parliament.

Anno 1326. the last of Ed. 2. There is a Prorogation of the(g) 1.1397 Parliament, before meeting, which runs thus, That though the King had intended Colloquium & Tractatum, Conference and Treaty in the Quindene of St. Andrew, by Isabel the Queen, and Edward his eldest Son, Custos of the Kingdom (the King then being beyond Sea,) and the Prelats, Proceres, & Magnates Regni, and so had commanded two Knights of the Communi∣ty of the County, two Burgesses of every Burrough;(h) 1.1398 yet for certain causes necessary and profitable, he hath prorogued the said Parliament and Treaty unto the day after Epipha∣ny, &c.

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Third's time.

THE Preface to the Statutes at(a) 1.1399 Westminster, 1 Ed. 3. is thus: To the Honour of God, &c. King Ed. 3, at his Parliament held at Westminster, &c.* 1.1400 at the request of the Com∣monalty of his Realm, by the Petition made before him and his Council in the Parliament, by assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and other great Men assembled at the said Parlia∣ment,

hath granted for him and his Heirs for ever, these Ar∣ticles.

The title of the Statute made at(b) 1.1401 Westminster, 27 Nov. 4 Ed. 3. is thus. At the request of the Commons these things be Established, and Enacted by our Lord the King, his Prelates,* 1.1402 Earls, and Barons, and other of the same Parliament.

So that at Westminster(c) 1.1403 5 Ed. 3. Our Lord the King by the Assent of the Prelates, &c. and other Great Men, and at the request of his People, hath granted and established.

The Preamble to the Statutes at York(d) 1.1404 9 E. 3. runs thus, It was shewed to our Lord the King, by the Knights of the Shires, Citizens of the Cities, and Burgesses of Burroughs which come for the Commons of the said Shires, Cities and Burroughs, Our Lord the King, &c. by the Assent of his Pre∣lates, &c. and other Nobles of this Realm summoned at this Parliament, and by the Advice of his Council, being there; Upon the said things disclosed to him, Ordains, &c.

So the Statute at(e) 1.1405 Westminster 10 E. 3. is, Our Lord the King by the Assent of the Prelates, &c. and at the Request of the Knights of Shires, and his Commons by their Petition, hath Ordained, Established, &c.

The Preamble to the Statute for the Clergy, 16 Apr. 14 E. 3. runs thus, At the Petition of John Archbishop of Canterbury, and other Prelates, upon deliberation had with the Peers of our Realm, and other of our Council, and of the Realm sum∣moned to our said Parliament.

Thus far we find the King Establishing and Ordaining upon the Petition of the Commons, as also of the Prelates, with the As∣sent of the Prelates and Nobility and his Council. Before I pro∣ceed to those Statutes which mention the assent or advice of the whole Parliament, I think fit to insert at large, the Repeal of an imperfect Statute made 15 E. 3.

There having been(f) 1.1406 a Statute made, That Ministers of the Church should not answer before the Kings Justices for things done touching the Jurisdiction of the Church: For what reasons, and in what manner this was repealed,* 1.1407 will best ap∣pear by the Kings Precept to the Sheriff of Lincoln, which runs thus:

Whereas at our Parliament, summoned at Westminster, in the Quindene of Easter last past, certain Articles, expresly con∣trary to the Laws and Customs of our Realm of England, and to our Prerogatives, and Rights Royal, were pretended to be granted by us in the manner of a Statute. And considering, how by the Bond of our Oath we be tied to the observance and defence of such Laws, Customs, Rights, and Preroga∣tives; and providently willing to revoke such things to their own State which be so improvidently done. Upon Confe∣rence and Treatise thereupon, with the Earls, Barons and other Wise Men of our said Realm; and because we never con∣sented to the making of the said Statute, but as it then behoved

us, we dissimuled in the Premisses, by Protestations of Re∣vocation of the said Statute, if indeed it should proceed, to eschew the danger, which by denying the same we feared to come, for as much as the said Parliament otherwise had been, without dispatching any thing, in discord dissolved, and so our earnest business had likely been ruinated, which God prohibit, and the said pretended Statute we promised then to have sealed.

It seemed to the said Earls, Barons, and other Wise Men, that sithence the Statute did not of our Free Will proceed, the same be void, and ought not to have the name or strength of a Statute, and therefore by their counsel and assent we have decreed the said Statute to be void, and the same as much as it proceeded of Dread we have agreed to be adnulled.

Nevertheless, that the Articles contained in the said pre∣tended Statute, which by other of our Statutes, or of our Progenitors Kings of England, have been approved, shall ac∣cording to the form of the said Statute, in every point, as con∣venient is, be observed, and the same we do only for the Con∣servation and Redintegration of the Rights of our Crown, as we be bound, and not that we should in any wise grieve or oppress our Subjects, whom we desire to rule in lenity and gentleness. So the King commands all these things to be open∣ly Proclaimed, 1 Oct. 15. Regni.

From this Statute we may 1st.* 1.1408 observe, That without the Kings free and express consent, there can be no Law pass'd. 2ly. The Bishops are not mentioned in this, it being contrary to some Liberties Churchmen claimed by the Canons. 3ly. The Kings assent was not compleat, but only a temporary one, like a Sal∣vo Jure, lest his earnest business for which he called them should miscarry for want of a seeming compliance; therefore he is said to promise the Sealing of it (which was in that Age the Characteristick of Confirmation) but never did it, but rather made some kind of Protestation in the presence of some, that what he did was unwillingly. 4ly. That seeing it did not pro∣ceed of his Free Will, therefore by the advice and consent of the Earls, Barons, and other Wise Men, it is declared void: Lastly, The principal reason why he gave not his free consent to it, was because it was against his Coronation Oath, where∣by he was tied to the observance, and defence of the Laws, Customs,* 1.1409 Rights, and Prerogatives: So that upon the whole, they that would advise their Princes to consent to whatever Bills the Houses should tender (as in the Chapter of Factious Members of Parliament I shall have occasion to discourse) may learn from hence, That the King found himself obliged to con∣sent to no Bills contrary to the Law, Customs, Rights and Pre∣rogatives: such were those the unhappy Parliament of 41 in the point of the Militia, and their other dethroning Bills; and of late, another Parliament in the Bill of Seclusion, endeavoured to impose upon their Soveraigns, contrary to the fundamental Laws and Prerogatives of the Crown.

To proceed, The Preface of the Statute at(g) 1.1410 Westminster, 7th. May 20 E. 3. runs thus, Because that by divers complaints made to us, we have perceived, that the Law of the Land (which we by our Oath are bound to maintain) is the less well kept, &c. we greatly moved of Conscience in this matter, &c. by the assent of the great Men, and other Wise Men of our Council, We have ordained, &c.

The Preamble to the Statute of Labourers(h) 1.1411 repealed 23 E. 3. was thus, Upon deliberation, and treaty with the Prelates, and the Nobles, and learned Men assisting us, of their mutual assent ordained; and that Statute for Labourers which remains in force, 25 E. 3. saith, Whereas it was ordain∣ed by our Lord the King, and by assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and others of his Council, &c.

It is apparent by several Records,* 1.1412 That the Kings of England have not been tied to the certain number of Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, though for a long while, two only have been chosen of each; but heretofore, sometimes but one, other times two or three, as that 18 E. 1. and 4 Knights 22 E. 1.

Besides which liberty there is a(i) 1.1413 memorable Record in this Kings Reign, wherein the King appointed the qualifications of such as were to be chosen Members of the House of Com∣mons.

The Writ is directed to all the Sheriffs of England, Quod de Comitatu tuo duos Milites, &c. de discretioribus & probioribus Mi∣litibus, Civibus, & Burgensibus, & ad laborandum potentioribus, qui non sint Placitatores, querelarum manutentores, aut ex hujus∣modi quaestu viventes, &c. sed homines valentes, & bonae sidei, & publicum commodum diligentes, eligi.* 1.1414

Pleading Lawyers, Maintainers of Plaints, and such as lived of such like gain were forbid to be chosen upon some particu∣lar Reason of State then inducing it, of which I shall write something in the Chapter of Parliaments.

The other Preambles most(k) 1.1415 remarkable in this Kings Reign, are mostly, By the assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and other great men, and all the Commons, or of all the Com∣monalty of the Kings Realm. The King hath Granted, Or∣dained, Established, &c.

The Statute for the Clergy(l) 1.1416 25 Regni, saith, Our Lord the King seeing and examining by good deliberation, the Pe∣titions and Articles delivered to him in his Parliament, &c. by Simon Archbishop of Canterbury, and other Bishops of his Province, upon certain Grievances, &c.* 1.1417 by the assent of his Parliament, for him and his Heirs, willeth and granteth the Points underwritten.

The Statute of Provisors, 25 E. 3. is(m) 1.1418 singular in its Preamble, That whereas, in the Parliament 15 E. 1. at Carlisle, the Petition heard, put before the said King and his Council in his said Parlia∣ment, by the Commonalty of the said Realm, containing, &c. whereupon the said Commons have prayed our Lord the King,

that sith the right of the Crown of England, and the Law of the said Realm, is such, That upon the Mischiefs and Damages which happen to his Realm, he ought, and is bound by his Oath, with the accord of his People in his Parliament, thereof to make Remedy and Law, and remove the Mischiefs and Da∣mages, which thereof ensue, so pray the King thereupon to or∣dain Remedy.

The Statute of Provisors(n) 1.1419 27 E. 3. runs, Our Lord the King, by the Assent, and Prayers of the Great Men, and Com∣mons of this Realm, &c. hath ordained.

The Statute of(o) 1.1420 Staple 27 E. 3. hath a singular Preface whereas good deliberation had with the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons and Great Men of the Counties, that is to say, of every County one,* 1.1421 for all the Counties; and so of Cities and Bur∣roughs, &c. by the Council and common consent of the said Prelates, &c. Knights and Commons, the King hath ordained, &c. In the 28. Princes are named after Prelates.

The Preamble of the Statute at(p) 1.1422 Westminster 36 E. 3. runs thus, The King at the request of the Commons, by their Petition delivered to him in the said Parliament, by the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and other Great Men in the Parliament assembled, have granted for him and his Heirs for ever, the Articles underwritten.

In the Second Chapter, of which it is said, The King of his own Will, without motion of the Great Men, or Commons, hath granted in ease of his People.

The Statutes made(q) 1.1423 42 E. 3. have only, At the Parlia∣ment of our Lord the King, it is assented and accorded. So in(r) 1.1424 43 E. 3. The Prelates, Great Men, and Commons seeing the Mischiefs, pray the King in this present Parliament there∣upon to ordain Remedy.

The Preamble to the Statutes(s) 1.1425 50 E. 3. runs thus, The Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and others assembled at the Parliament, &c. Our Lord the King desiring much, that the Peace of his Land be well kept, and his faithful Subjects in quietness and tranquillity maintained, hath therefore made and ordained certain Ordinances, and also granted certain Graces and Pardons to his Commons of England.

In all which, it is evident, the Two Houses had no more but an Advising, or Petitioning and Assenting Power. It is every where expressed that the King solely Ordaineth, Establisheth, Granteth. However he owns an obligation by his Coronation Oath to make good Laws for his Subjects.

CHAP. XXVII. Of the Parliaments of England, during the Reigns of King Rich∣ard the Second, to the First Year of King James the Second.

THE Preface to the Statutes at(a) 1.1426 Westminster, 10 R. 2. is thus, Richard by the Grace of God, &c. to the She∣riff of Nottingham, Greeting; Know you, That to the Honour of God, &c. by the whole Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls and Barons of this our Realm,* 1.1427 at the instance and spe∣cial Request of the Commons of our Realm, assembled at our Parliament, We have ordained and established certain Statutes in amendment and relief of this our said Realm.

That at(b) 1.1428 Gloucester, 2 R. 2. is thus, Our Lord the King at his Parliament, &c. amongst other things there assented and accorded, hath made certain Statutes and Ordinances.

The Preface to the Statutes at(c) 1.1429 Westminster, the same year, runs thus, Our Lord the King, &c. of the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons and other great Men, and of the Commons of this Realm summoned, &c. hath ordain∣ed.

In the first Chapter of the Statutes at(d) 1.1430 Northampton, 4 R. 2. it is thus, The Commons of our Parliament have pray∣ed us, by their Petition delivered to us, at our present Parlia∣ment, &c. We considering the said Supplication, will and grant by the Assent of the Prelates and Lords aforesaid.

In the Fourth Chapter of the Statutes at(e) 1.1431 Westminster•• 5 R. 2. The Members accustomed to be summoned to Parlia∣ment, are particularly by their Degree distinguished, viz. Arch∣bishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Dukes, Earls, Barons, Ban∣nerets, Knights of the Shires, Citizens and Burgesses, which last are frequently comprehended by the words Others or Com∣monalty.

The Preamble to the Statutes 8 R. 2. at(f) 1.1432 Westminster, is to the Honour of God, and at the Request of the Commonalty, of the Assent of the Prelates, Great Men and Commons afore∣said,* 1.1433 Our Lord the King hath caused to be made.

The Statutes 9 R. 2. at(g) 1.1434 Westminster, are thus prefaced, Our Lord the King of the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Mar∣quesses, Earls, Barons and Commons, hath ordained and esta∣blished.

The(h) 1.1435 Preface to the Statute 10 R. 2. is very full in the Ex∣pressions of the kindness of the King to his Subjects in this Form, Know ye for the Reverence of God, and to nourish Peace, Unity and good Accord, in all Parties within the Realm, and especially for the common Profit and Ease of our People, and good Government of the same (which we chiefly desire) of the Assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament,* 1.1436

we have caused to be made a Statute. So in the 11th. Regni(i) 1.1437 the King heartily desiring, That the Peace of the Land, be well holden and kept, and his faithful Subjects nourished and governed in Quietness and Tranquillity; and in that at West∣minster(k) 1.1438 13 Regni, For the Honour of God and Holy Church, and for the common profit of his Liege People.

In the First Chapter of the Statute at(l) 1.1439 Westminster, 13 R. 2. it is thus expressed, That our Lord the King, at his Parlia∣ment holden at Westminster, &c.* 1.1440 hearing the grievous Com∣plaints of his said Commons, &c. the more because Charters of Pardons have been easily granted in such Cases; the Com∣mons requested, that such Charters might not be granted. To whom the King answered,* 1.1441 That he will save his Liberty and Regality as his Progenitors have done heretofore: But to nou∣rish the more Quietness and Peace within this Realm, by the Assent of the Great Men and Nobles he hath granted, &c.

In the(m) 1.1442 Statute 20 R. 2. By the Assent of the Prelates, Lords and Commons, The Title of the Statutes at(n) 1.1443 West∣minster 21 R. 2. is thus, It is to be understood, that our Lord the King, &c. of the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Ba∣rons and Commons of his Realm there assembled, hath made certain Statutes and Ordinances.* 1.1444 Amongst the rest is a Repeal of the Statutes made 10 R. 2. For that they were made by Threats given to the King, and by constraint.

So it may be noted, That Henry the Fourth repealed all the Statutes made in the last Parliament, 21 R. 2.

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Fourth's time.

THE Preamble to the Statute at(a) 1.1445 Westminster 1 H. 4, runs thus, Henry by the Grace of God, &c. to the Laud and Honour of God, and Reverence of Holy Church, for to nourish Unity, Peace and Concord, of all Parties with∣in the Realm of England, and for redress and recovery of the same Realm of England, which now of late hath been dange∣rously put to great Ruin, Mischief and Desolation, of the As∣sent of the Prelates,* 1.1446 Dukes, Earls, Barons; and at the Instance and special Request of the Commons of the same Realm as∣sembled, &c. hath made, ordained and established, certain Ordinances and Statutes. Throughout all this Kings Reign, most of the Prefaces are much the same, By the Assent, or Advice and Assent of the Prelates, &c. At the Request or special In∣stance and Request of the Commons.

Only in the Preface to some,* 1.1447 it is, By the Assent and Advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal: this Distinction being mostly brought into use in his time, as may be seen in the 4th. 6th. and 9th. of his Reign.

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Fifth's time.

THE Preamble to the Statutes at(a) 1.1448 Westminster 1 H. 5. runs thus, Our Lord the King at his Parliament, &c. by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special Instance and Request of the Commons of this Realm, hath ordained, established, &c. and so much like all the rest, except the Statutes 4 H. 5.(b) 1.1449 which hath, Our Lord the King, with the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and at the special Instance and Request of the Com∣mons.

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Sixth's time.

THE Preamble to the First Statute of(a) 1.1450 Westminster, 1 H. 6. is thus, At the Parliament held at Westminster, &c. Our Sovereign Lord the King,* 1.1451 by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special In∣stance and Request of the Commons of the Realm, &c. hath caused to be ordained and established, &c. The 2d. 3d. 4th. and 6th. of H. 6. are the same.

As the first Statutes, call him Our Sovereign Lord, which was not used formerly; so in that of the 8th. of H. 6. he is stiled Our most Noble Christian Lord Henry, &c.

11 Regni(b) 1.1452 part of a new Phrase was used, By Authority of Parliament, which after some while is now familiarly used; that Preface runs thus, By the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special Request of the Commons in his said Parliament assembled,* 1.1453 by Authority of the same Parliament, Our Sovereign Lord the King hath ordained and established divers Statutes, Declarations and Ordinances.

The Preface to the Statutes at(c) 1.1454 Reading, 31 Regni hath these words, Our Lord the King, by Assent of the Lords Spi∣ritual and Temporal, and the Commons, being in the said Par∣liament, and by Authority of the same Parliament, hath made, ordained and established divers Acts and Statutes. Here the Commons Assent is joyned with the Lords, whereas in most others of his Reign it is, At the special request of the Commons.

So it is in that at Westminster, which is like the first; only it saith, Our Sovereign Lord, &c. the Thirty ninth of his Noble and Gracious Reign.

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Fourth's Reign.

THE Preamble to the Statutes of(a) 1.1455 Westminster, 1 Regni, is Edward by the Grace of God, &c. to the Honour of God and Holy Church, to nourish Peace, Unity and Con∣cord within his Realm (which he much desireth) by the Ad∣vice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of the

same Realm, and at the special Request of the Commons of his said Realm assembled, by Authority of the same Parlia∣ment, hath ordained.

The rest of the Prefaces vary very little, except that in the 3 E. 4. it is, By the Advice and Assent of his Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, &c.

Of the Parliament in King Richard the Third's time.

THE Preamble to the Statutes at(a) 1.1456 Westminster, 1 R. 3. runs thus, Richard by the Grace of God, &c. to the Honour of God and of Holy Church, and for the Common∣wealth of his Realm of England,* 1.1457 &c. By the Advice and As∣sent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the Request of the Commons of the said Realm, summoned to the said Parliament, by the Authority of the same Parliament, hath ordained and established, for the Quietness of his People, cer∣tain Statutes.

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Seventh's time.

THE Prefaces to all the Acts in his(a) 1.1458 Reign, are much alike, thus, The King our Sovereign Lord Henry, &c. To the Honour of God, &c. By the Assent of the Lords Spiri∣tual and Temporal, and the Commons in the said Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the said Parliament, hath done to be made certain Statutes and Ordinances.

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Eighth's time.

MOST of the Prefaces to the 20th. of his Reign are the same as in King H. the 7th. mutatis mutandis.

The Title of the 21 H. 8.(a) 1.1459 only is, Statuta ad Rempub∣licam spectantia edita in 1 Sessione Parliamenti, &c. Anno Regni invictissimi Principis Henrici, &c.

In the 5th. Chapter of the Acts of the(b) 1.1460 24th. of his Reign,* 1.1461 it is thus, Be it enacted by the King our Sovereign Lord, with the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of this present Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the same: So most of the rest are, excepting that in the second Chapter of the 26. of(c) 1.1462 his Reign, it is said, Therefore be it enacted by Authority of this present Par∣liament.

So in the first Chapter of the(d) 1.1463 28 Regni, it is said, For the Remedy whereof,* 1.1464 may it please the King our Sovereign Lord, by the Assent, &c. it may be enacted.

The Title of the Acts 31 H. 8.(e) 1.1465 runs thus, Henry the 8th. &c. Defender of the Faith, and in Earth supreme Head immediately under Christ, of the Church of England, to the Honour of Almighty God, Conservation of the true Doctrine

of Christian Religion, and for the Concord, Quiet, and Wealth of this his Realm, and Subjects of the same, held his most high Court of Parliament, &c. wherein were established these Acts following: and in the first Chapter it is said,* 1.1466 Be it enacted by the King, our dread Sovereign Lord, and by the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and by the Commons of this present Parliament assembled.

The Thirty second of H. 8. hath these Expressions, which day the said Parliament continued by divers Prorogations, was by His Graces Authority finished and dissolved, amongst many other the Acts following, By his Highness, with the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons assembled in the said Parliament, have been Established, Ordained, and Enacted.

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Sixth's Reign.

IN the first Chapter of the first(a) 1.1467 Statutes made 1. Reg∣ni, it is said, The Kings most Excellent Majesty,* 1.1468 mind∣ing the Governance and Order of his most loving Subjects to be in most perfect Unity and Concord in all things, &c. as his most Princely Serenity and Majesty, hath already declared by evident Proofs. Be it enacted by the Kings Highness, with the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons of this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.

In the second and third Year of Ed. 6. they are called(b) 1.1469 Acts in the Session, &c. humbly prayen, That it may be Ordained, and Enacted by His Majesty, with the assent of the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.

The rest are much, what like these foregoing.

Of the Parliaments in Queen Mary's Reign.

IN the Title of her first(a) 1.1470 Acts, she is stiled,* 1.1471 Defender of the Faith, and Supreme Head of the Church &c. Be it there∣fore ordained and enacted by the Queen our Sovereign Lady, with the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.

After the Marriage of(b) 1.1472 Queen Mary, with King Philip of Spain, the title is only, Acts made in the Reign of our Sove∣reign Lord and Lady, Philip and Mary, Defenders of the Faith, leaving out Supreme Head, &c.

In the fourth and(c) 1.1473 fifth of Philip and Mary, in the Bo∣dy of the Acts, it is thus, Be it Enacted, Ordained, and Esta∣blished by the King and Queens Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament as∣sembled, and by the Authority of the same.

Of the Parliaments in Queen Elizabeth's time.

WE may observe something new in the Acts of this Queen; we have noted once in Henry the Eighth's time, the two Houses pray that it may be enacted, and so in Edward the Sixth: but in the first(a) 1.1474 Chapter of the Acts of this Queen, it is more full thus,* 1.1475 Most humbly beseech your most excel∣lent Majesty, your faithful and obedient Subjects, the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of this your pre∣sent Parliament assembled; and in another(b) 1.1476 Paragraph, That it may please your Highness that it may be further enacted; and in another place, If some redress (by Authority of this your High Court of Parliament,* 1.1477 with the assent of your High∣ness) be not had and provided.

5 Eliz. Cap. 1. it is thus expressed, Be it therefore Enacted, Ordained, and Established by the Queen our Sovereign Lady, and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the same. And in the Eighth, Be it now Declared and Enated by the Authority of this present Parliament.

Most of all the rest of the Acts of her Reign are expressed after some of these forms.

The 43 of her Reign, in the First Chapter it is thus, In most humble wise beseechen your most excellent Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of your Highness's Parliament assembled.

Of the Parliaments in King James the First's Reign.

THE Title of his first(a) 1.1478 Acts is at the Parliament begun, &c. To the pleasure of Almighty God, the Weal pub∣lick of this Realm, were Enacted, &c.

In the First Chapter, We therefore, your most Humble and Loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled,* 1.1479 in most hum∣ble and lowly manner, do beseech your most excellent Majesty, that it may be published and declared in this High Court of Parliament, and Enacted by Authority of the same.

In the Second Chapter it is said, Be it further(b) 1.1480 Enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty, by, and with the Assent and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Com∣mons in this present Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the same.

In the Seventh of King James, is only expressed, Be it En∣acted by the Authority of this present Parliament, &c. The rest agrees with some of these.

Of the Parliaments in King Charles the First's Reign.

THE Preface of his First(a) 1.1481 Parliament, is, At the Parlia∣ment, &c. To the high pleasure of Almighty God, and to the weal publick of this Realm were enacted, &c.

In the First Chapter(b) 1.1482 it is said, Be it Enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Tempo∣ral, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.

In the beginning of the Petition(c) 1.1483 of Right it is thus worded, Humbly shew unto our Soveraign Lord the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, &c. and the close of it is, All which they most humbly pray your most excellent Majesty, as their Rights and Liberties according to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm, &c and that your Majesty would be graciously pleased.

In the Seventeenth of the said King,(d) 1.1484 Chap. 6. it is thus expressed, Therefore the Kings most excellent Majesty, out of his Princely care, &c. by the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assem∣bled, and by the Authority of the same, Ordaineth, Enacteth, and Establisheth.

Of the Parliaments in King Charles the Seconds Reign.

THE Preface to the Acts of the two Houses(a) 1.1485 begun 25 Apr. 1660. not summoned by the Kings Writ, is much the same with that of King Charles the First, and King James, mutatis mutandis. In the Third Chapter it is said, Be it Enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. In the Fourth Chap∣ter,(b) 1.1486 The Commons do by and with the Advice and Con∣sent of the Lords in this present Parliament, and by Authori∣ty of the same, give and grant unto you our Supreme Liege Lord and Soveraign one Subsidy, &c.* 1.1487

In the First Chapter 13 Car. 2. the(c) 1.1488 enacting part is thus worded, Do most humbly beseech your most Excellent Majesty,* 1.1489 that it may be Enacted, and be it Enacted by the Kings most Ex∣cellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament Assembled, and by Authority of the same. The rest of the Acts in King Charles the Second's Reign, are continued in the same form.

The Titles of the Acts of Parliament, 1 Jac. 2. our most Gracious Soveraign, are, At the Parliament begun at Westmin∣ster the 19th. Day of May, Anno Dom. 1685. in the First Year of the Reign of our most Gracious Soveraign Lord James, &c.

The Enacting part of the granting an Imposition, &c. thus, Most Gracious Soveraign, We your Majesties most Dutiful and

Loyal Subjects, the Commons Assembled in Parliament, to∣wards a Supply, &c. and with an humble and thankful ac∣knowledgment of your Majesties favourable and tender regard to us your Commons, have chearfully and unanimously given and granted unto your Majesty, an Aid and Assistance—and we do humbly beseech your Majesty, that it may be Enacted, and be it Enacted by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.

All the other Acts which are not Grants of Aid, Assistance, or Supply, are conceived in the latter words.

By this full enumeration of the most considerable Expressi∣ons, either of Records or Historians, relating to the Great Councils or Parliaments from William the Conqueror's time to this present Age, (which in a continued series of time I have deduced, it appears, that till King John's time, only the Pre∣lates, Earls, and Barons, and such of the great Tenents in Capite as were not Barons, were summoned, and at the Kings plea∣sure by special Writ; and after King John's Charter, the les∣ser Tenents in Capite by General Summons. Also, that the Charters of Kings wherein they granted Liberties to their Sub∣jects were received as Laws, and gave as ample Satisfaction as now The King willeth, doth to pass a Bill tendred for his Roy∣al Assent by both Houses; and there was good reason, because it passed under his Broad Seal.

Likewise, when the Constitution of Parliament was altered, 49 H. 3. whereby in place of the Tenents in Capite, which were numerous, two Knights were chosen, probably by the rest of the Tenents in Capite for the Shires, and two Citizens, and two Burgesses for Burroughs, to represent all those that held in Capite, and it is likely all other their Subfeudatary Te∣nents; yet the number was not constantly observed, there be∣ing sometimes Knights, and no Citizens or Burgesses, sometimes one Knight, one Citizen, and one Burgess, other times two or three Knights, left as it seems to the Sheriffs, or the Chusers Election, till after it was fixed as it now is, for two Knights, two Citizens, and two Burgesses, unless in some places of Wales, where to this Day, some two or three Burroughs chuse but one or two Burgesses.

Likewise it is worth the observing how gradually the Ad∣vice and Assent hath pass'd from the Advice of the Bishops and Nobles to the Assent likewise, and sometimes at their request, on∣ly the King ordains; and then from the Potition of the Commons to their joyning in Advice, and after to their Assent, and many other material progressive alterations, which in this recapitulation I cannot insist upon, till it hath come to that constitution so much to be valued by all wise Englishmen, as it is the product of the generous condescensions of Gracious Kings, and the wise con∣trivance of our considerate Ancestors. Therefore I shall now pass to consider our present Constitution of Parliaments.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of the modern rightly constituted Parliaments.

SECT. 1. Of the General Ʋse of Parliaments.

I Have before given an account how the Persian Laws, were made by the(a) 1.1490 King, his Princes, Governours, Nobles, and Captains, as in a great Council of several Orders with the Sovereign; but we have an older example in Scripture,* 1.1491 that seems to be the Pattern of all great Councils, such as we call Parliaments, under a Monarchy. For it is said,(b) 1.1492 Moses commanded us a Law, even the Inheritance of the Congrega∣tion of Jacob, and he was King in Jesurun; when the Heads of the People, and Tribes of Israel were gathered together. Here is the King, Moses, commanding a Law, and the Heads of the People, the Princes, or House of Lords, and the Tribes; that is, some to represent the chief of the Tribes, like our House of Commons.

The Roman Senate, under the Emperors, resembled our an∣cient Great Councils that consisted of such as the King conve∣ned, and of the Patrician and Equestrian Order. The Comitia bore no resemblance with our Commons, and the Amphicty∣onican(c) 1.1493 Assemblies, the Achaian, Boo••••an, and Pan Aetolian, were Assemblies of Deputies, as the States General of Hol∣land.

Such Assemblies, in all sorts of Governments are necessary;* 1.1494 for be the Empire never so vast, and the Sovereigns Power ne∣ver so great and uncontroulable; yet without Consultation had with the Princes and wise Men, for the constituting Laws, and modelling the frame and methods of his Government, it would soon without such(d) 1.1495 Buttresses and Undersetters, sinking in its Foundation by its own weight, with an hideous rush be crushed into an heap of Rubbish.

In Democracy Great Councils are needful, that thereby the(e) 1.1496 Precipitancy and fury of the Common-People, by their gravity may be attempered, the common sort being apt to do every thing with a willful Violence, which never succeeds well, when not directed to a right end. If their publick af∣fairs were not committed to a select number of Trustees, no∣thing would be brought to any Issue, since none can be heard, where all speak, nor any good Product be from a jumble of those Atoms.

Aristocracy it self consists in a select number of the wisest and ablest to govern;* 1.1497 who in publick Consultations have no pri∣vate ends: Yet in the great Councils, of neither of these forms

of Government, is there to be found that stayedness, order∣liness, or resolution for the public good, as in Monarchy.

Why such Assemblies are not only convenient,* 1.1498 but necessary under Monarchy, there are many weighty Reasons.(f) 1.1499 Xeno∣phon observes that a single Person sees or hears but little, and Princes must have many Eyes and Ears, which in a special man∣ner these Great Councils are; from all parts of the Dominions bringing notice of what is amiss, and wants redress, as well as what is orderly, and wants encouragement.

Besides, Princes thereby have the opportunity to give their Subjects satisfaction in their Administration, preventing the surmises and jealousies of the Nobility, Gentry, and common People, that he sleights them in not calling them sometimes to consult about affairs of Moment.

Furthermore the Prince by such congress,* 1.1500 consults his own Interest, in coming to the Knowledg of the most able, active, and popular Subjects, whereby he may single out such as are most fitted for public Imployments, to serve him in the several offi∣ces of Government, and all (who thus have a share in the de∣bating, and consulting about Laws) will not only be witnes∣ses of the Prince's Grace and Favour, in granting such as they have desired, and assented to; but will be so many Heralds of his Wisdom, and care of his Peoples good Government, and so many vigorous enforcers of the Execution of those Laws they have so lately assisted to prepare.

Likewise,* 1.1501 as Privy-Counsellors, and other Officers, are sometime as Skreens to Princes, to ward off the Obloquy of the Mobile, when something is imposed that may be wholesome, though something bitter to their Palates: So especially are these great Conventions necessary, where useful Laws, though severe, are to be enacted, Money to be raised, or other Im∣positions laid upon the People, who do much more chearfully, and less repiningly obey, when they know(g) 1.1502 the Nobility, and their own Representatives, have judged them convenient. All Men naturally loving that such Impositions may immediately result from themselves, rather than they should be enjoyned by the Princes Arbitrary power, according to that of Clau∣dian,

—Observantior aequi Fit Populus, nec ferre negat, cum viderit ipsum Auctorem parere sibi.

The General use of good Parliaments is summed up in the(h) 1.1503. Chancellors Speech, 2 Eliz. thus: That the principal cause of their Assembly was, that things there proposed, may be orderly, and diligently debated, deeply considered, and thereupon wisely concluded. To examine whether any Law, already made, be too sharp and sore, and so over-burthen∣some to the Subject, or over-loose and soft, and so over-dan∣gerous

to the State: For that acriores sunt morsus intermisseae Libertatis, quam retentae. He further adds, The use of them is to consider the want and superfluities of Laws, whether Graft, Malice or Covetousness hath devised any ways or means to defraud the Benefit and Force of Laws; and in matter of Po∣licy, for the more perfect upholding and establishing the Sove∣raigns Royal State, and the Preservation of the Common∣weal committed to the Princes care.

Bodin(i) 1.1504 commends the Constitution of the Government in England and Spain, that they have Parliaments once in three Years; whereby Princes upon any imminent danger, may have recourse to their Council and Assistance, to defend their Coun∣tries from Hostile Attempts, to raise Money for public Necessi∣ty, cure the Diseases of the Commonweal, confirm the State, appoint Laws, hear the Complaints of the grieved, amend Male-Administration, by calling ill Mannagers to account, un∣derstand what the Prince otherwise may be ignorant of, and generally to have counsel in all things, which in Prudence are necessary for the happy Government of the Commonweal.

Sir(k) 1.1505 Tho. Smith saith, As in War, where the King himself is in Person, with the Nobility, Gentry and Yeomanry, the Pow∣er and Force of England is: So in Peace and Consultation, where the Prince is to give Life, and the last and highest Com∣mandment, the Nobility for the higher, the Knights, Esquires and Gentlemen for the lower part of the Commonwealth, and the Bishops for the Clergy, be present to advertise and consult, and shew what is necessary for the Commonwealth; every thing being advised with mature Deliberation, every Bill be∣ing thrice read and disputed upon, in either House apart, and after the Prince himself doth consent thereto, that is the Prin∣ce's and whole Kingdoms Deed: whereupon no Man can just∣ly complain, but must accommodate himself to find it just,* 1.1506 good, and obey it; and concludes, that whatever the People of Rome might do, either in Centuriatis, or Tribunitiis Co∣mitiis, the same may be done by the Parliament of Eng∣land, which representeth, and hath the Power of the whole Kingdom. Thus far of the general use, now to the Constitu∣tion.

Concerning the word Parliament, it is concluded by most,* 1.1507 to come from the French word parler, to speak; therefore be∣fore the word was used by our Historians, as appliable to this great Convention, the Latin word Colloquium was frequently used, to signify a Conference betwixt the King and the great Men summoned to consult, advise, and take Counsel with the King, and among themselves.

Yet before the word was used to signifie these great Assem∣blies, we find it applied to other Meetings in William Rufus's time; For Ingulphus, Abbat of Croyland (speaking of private Consultations in that Abby) saith, That Semannus de Lek,(a) 1.1508 coming before the Convention in their publick Parlia∣ment,

took his Oath of Fidelity to them, as Serjeant of their Church.

The First that is noted to use this word among all our Hi∣storians, is(b) 1.1509 Matthew Paris, Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. where he saith, There came to the most general Parliament to London, the whole Nobility of all the Kingdom of England.

The first Mention of it on Record, is in the(c) 1.1510 Writ of Summons to the Cinque Ports, summoning them ad instans Parliamentum nostrum: and the next is in the Writ of Proroga∣tion of the(d) 1.1511 Parliament, 3 E. 1. where it is twice men∣tioned in the Writ, generale Parliamentum nostrum, & eodem Parliamento.

Having premised thus much concerning the Name and first usage, I shall now discourse of it in particular.

SECT. 2. Of the Summons of the Prelates.

THAT the King is Caput, Principium, & Finis Parliamen∣ti, as Sir Edward Coke notes, is obvious to all. The Summons have been constantly from the King,* 1.1512 or in his Name.

In the former Chapters I have discoursed out of our Histo∣rians, that the Great Councils were always convened by the Kings: Now I come to prove it by Records, and shall note, first the Summons to the Prelates, then of the Nobles, and thirdly, of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses; only noting some of the remarkablest of them from Mr. Prynn, who hath so fully writ of them in his brief Register of Parliamentary Writs, in four parts, and his Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva, to whose indefatigable pains in transcribing such an infinite of Records, all Antiquaries, Lawyers, and Statesmen will be always be∣holding; though in the use he made of such, before the late King's Restauration, or at least, while he sate in the long Par∣liament, few Loyal Men can follow his Doctrines.

All the Writs before the Sixth of King John, whereby any were summoned to great Councils, are utterly lost: that runs(e) 1.1513 thus, Mandamus vobis, rogantes, quatenus omni occasione & dilatione postposita, sicut nos, & honorem nostrum diligitis, sitis ad nos apud London, &c. nobiscum tractaturi de magnis & arduis negotiis nostris, & communi Regni Ʋtilitate—vestrum habere consi∣lium & aliorum Magnatum Terraendstrae—Abbates & Priores con∣ventuales toti Diuoecesis citari fa••iatis.

The second Record is(f) 1.1514 26 H. 3. directed to Walter Arch∣bishop of York; differing from the former in these particulars: Sicut nos & honorem nostrum; here is added, Pariter & vestrum diligitis, in fide qua nobis tenemini.

Anno 38 H. 3. the Writ is directed to the Archbishop of Canterbury—Paternitatem vestram omni qua possumus affecti∣one

rogamus, quaten••s nos, & Jura nostra totaliter inde∣••ensa non deserentes, cum omni celeritate convocetis coram vobis Capi∣tulum vestrum Cathedrale, Archidiaconos, Viros Religiosos, & Cle∣rum vobis subjectum, inducentes eos omnibus modis quibus poteritis quod nobis in tanta necessitate liberaliter subveniant.

I do not bring in this as a Writ of Summons to a Parliament,* 1.1515 out only as a special Writ to excite the Clergy, to a free, vo∣luntary and liberal Contribution for defence of Gascoign, and so to show the Customs of Benevolences in that Age, out of Parliament.

The next(g) 1.1516 Writ of Summons of the Prelates to a Parlia∣ment, was that of 49 H. 3. directed to the Bishop of Duresm, wherein the occasions of summoning are reckoned to be after the great Troubles, being quieted by giving the Prince Hostage, for establishing the Peace; therefore to provide with whole∣some Deliberation, and to establish, and totally to compleat with full Security a Peace, &c. Et super quibusdam aliis Regni nostri negotiis quae sine consilio vestro & aliorum Praelatorum & Magnatum nostrorum, nolumus expediri, cum eisdem tractatum ha∣bere nos oporteat, vobis mandamus, Rogantes in Fide & Dilectio∣ne quibus nobis tenemini, &c. 14 Nov.

The next(h) 1.1517 Writ is that of 23 E. 1. to the Archbishop of Canterbury, thus, Quia super quibusdam arduis negotiis, nos & Regnum nostrum, ac vos, caeteros{que} Praelatos de eodem Regno tan∣gentibus, quae sine vestra aceorum praesentia nolumus expediri, Par∣liamentum nostrum tenere ac vobiscum super hiis colloquium habere volumus & tractatum, 24 July.

The same Year 23 E. 1. there was another(i) 1.1518 Parliament sum∣moned by this memorable Writ, directed to the Archbishop of Canterbury: Sicut Lex justissima provida circumspectione sacrorum Principum stabilita hortatur, ut quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus ap∣probetur, sic & innuit evidenter, ut communibus periculis per reme∣diae provisa communiter obvietur: Then reciting the King of France his frauds concerning Gascoign and his Hostile preparations, adds, provisa jaculaminus laedunt; so commands him in fide & di∣lectione, to be personally present, &c. Praemunientes Priorem & Capitulum vestrae Ecclesiae, Archidiaconos, totumque Clerum vestrae Dioecesis, facientes quod iidem Prior & Archidiaconus in propriis personis & dictum Capitulum per unum, idemque Clerus per duos Pro∣curatores idoneos plenam & sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis Capitulo & Clero habentes, una vobiscum intersint modis omnibus tunc ibidem ad tractandum, ordinandum, & faciendum nobiscum, & cum cae∣teris Praelatis & Proceribus & aliis Incolis Regni nostri, &c. 30 Sept.

The Variations of the Writs are mostly these,* 1.1519 That the cause of the Summons is diversly expressed, according to the present emergence. Sometimes the word is Mandamus rogantes, other∣while as 27 E. 1. m. 16. Effect••ose requirimus, & rogamus, Rogamus specialius, Nihilominus injungendo mandamus, as the same years m. 9 dorso. Injungentes the same year: firmiter in∣jungendo,

30 E. 1. m. 9. dorso: Iterato mandamus, Cl. 33 E. 1. m. 8. dorso, Firmiter injungendo mandamus, Claus. 11 E. 3. part 2. m. 10. dorso, Rogantes mandamus, Cl. 38 H. 6. m. 29. dorso, Rogando man∣damus, Cl. 22, 23 E. 4. m. 11 dorso. and so 15 Caroli 1. fol. 20.

These are the greatest variations in the Mandatory part, which was mostly to be personally present themselves, the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Deans, and Archdeacons, and one Proctor for the Chapter, and two for the Clergy of the Diocess. Some∣times the word is, Sitis apud nos omnibus praetermissis, as 27 E. 1. m. 16. dorso, or, Personaliter intersitis, the same Year, m. 9. dorso, and 30 E. 1. m. 7, 9. dorso, and several other, or, Sitis in propria persona vestra, vel per sufficientem procuratorem a vobis plenam potestatem habentem, as Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 2. dorso, or, qua∣tenus omni excusatione voluntaria cessante, as 4 E. 3. m. 13. dorso, or, propter arduitatem & magnitudinem negotiorum absentiam vestram n••quimus nec volumus aliqualiter excusare: other times, especially Sede vacante, to send a Proctor, or Proxy, thus, Sufficientem Procuratorem plenam a vobis potestatem habentem, mit∣tatis, as 27 E. 1. m. 9. dorso. But(k) 1.1520 other times thus, Scientes pro certo, quod nisi evidens & manifesta necessitas id exposcat, non in∣tendemus Procuratores se•• excusatores pro vobis admittere; and gives the reason why, as they loved the King, and his Honour, and the tranquillity and the quiet of the Kingdom, they would be pre∣sent, because of the(l) 1.1521 arduity, or difficultness of the business.

Another reason is given, Claus. 11 E. 3. part 1. m. 15. lest by their absence the expedition of the Kings Affairs should be retarded or deferred; and in another, because of the absence of them, oftentimes(m) 1.1522 the great Affairs have been retard∣ed, to the disprofit of the King and his Kingdom.

In the 12th of E. 3. it is very strict thus,(n) 1.1523 Attentis prae∣missorum arduitate, & imminentibus periculis, quacunque excusa∣tione cessante, personaliter intersitis. And 14 E. 3. after the King had taken upon him the Title of King of France, the charge for their appearance was very strict—Nos sicut hono∣rem nostrum, & salvationem ejusdem Regni nostri Angliae, caetera∣rumque terrarum, ac jurium nostrorum praedictorum, ac negotiorum expeditionem diligitis, nullatenus omittatis; and so in many others.

There is a prevalent Argument used in the(o) 1.1524 16 E. 3. when he summoned a Parliament in his absence, to induce the Pre∣lates, and other Members to appear personally, That the King lets them know, that he will more weigh the Gratitude or In∣gratitude, which they shew him in his absence, than if he were present, and he will take care to reward them according to their merit.

Another, the Cl. 2 R. 2. m. 3. dorso, That the King would in no wise have them excused, unless they were detained with such an Infirmity as they could not labour. The words are, nisi tanta infirmitate tunc detenti fueritis, quod aliqualiter illuc laborare non poteritis, nullo modo excusatos habere volumus.

The ends of these Summons were sometimes general, and sometimes special. The general Causes were expressed by the common(p) 1.1525 Profit of the Kingdom, the Ardua negotia nos & statum Regni tangentia. Other times, as 25 E. 1. M. 6. dorso, Ar∣duis & urgentibus negotiis nos, & vos, & totum Regnum nostrum tangentibus. Other times,(q) 1.1526 ad salvationem Coronae nostrae Re∣giae, & communem utilitatem populi Regni nostri.

The Preamble to the Writ of Summons 4 E. 3. is very(r) 1.1527 re∣markable. Rex, &c. Qualiter negotia, nos & statum Regni no∣stri contingentia, postquam suscepimus gubernacula Regni nostri huc∣usque in nostri dampnum, & dedecus, ac depauperationem populi nostri deducta erant, vestram credimus prudentiam non latere: propter quod, non volentes hoc, urgente conscientia, ulterius susti∣nere, ac desiderantes toto corde, statum & Regimen Regni nostri, secundum juris ac rationis exigentiam, ad honorem Dei & tranquil∣litatem, & pacem Sanctae Ecclesiae, ac totius populi ejusdem Regni reformari; Ordinavimus, &c. Parliamentum, &c.

The 22 of E. 3. hath a peculiar(s) 1.1528 Clause, Quod dictum Parliamentum non ad Auxilia seu Tallagia a populo dicti Regni nostri petenda, vel alia onera eidem populo imponenda, sed duntaxat pro justitia ipsi populo nostro, super dampnis & gravaminibus sibi illatis facienda.

Another considerable(t) 1.1529 Clause is to be found 31 E. 3. Et quum praedicta negotia perquam ardua sine maxima deliberatione tam Praelatorum & Cleri, quam Magnatum, & Communitatis ejus∣dem Regni, nullo modo expediri poterunt; ad quorum expeditio∣nem Auxilium & Consilium tam a vobis, &c. habere necessario o∣portet.

The(u) 1.1530 Preamble 3 H. 6. is to enquire how Justice hath been done, &c. Quia nos jam dum in Annis degimus teneris, an pax & justitia ubilibet inter Ligeos nostros Regni nostri Angliae (sine quarum observatione Regnum aliquod prospicere non potest) de∣bite conserventur, & exhibeantur necne, &c. Therefore he sum∣mons a Parliament.

The cause(w) 1.1531 of the Summons 22 E. 4. is thus expressed, Quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, nos, securitatem, & de∣fens••onem Ecclesiae Anglicanae ac pacem, tranquillitatem, bonum pub∣licum, & defensionem Regni nostri, & Subditorum nostrorum ejusdem concernentibus. Therefore he summons them.

The special causes are mostwhat to have supply against the Kings Enemies,* 1.1532 the French or Scotch Kings: and it is to be noted, that in the Summons of King E. 2. mostly the(x) 1.1533 Scots are not only called the Kings Enemies but his Rebels, which implies them Subjects by vertue of the Homage done to his Fa∣ther, and so 8 E. 2. M. 24. dorso, it is called, Terra nostra Scotiae, though he was the most unfortunate of all our Kings in his Expeditions against that Kingdom.

The first(y) 1.1534 Writ I have found, wherein it is said, the King called his Parliament with the Advice of his Council, was 14 E. 3. quia de avisamento Concilii nostri ordinavimus, and so

in 46 E. 3. and afterwards sometimes used, and often omit∣ted, but in later times generally used.

The last considerable thing in their Writs, is what the Prelates, &c. summoned, were to do at these Parliaments, which most∣what is comprehended in these Words, That it is(z) 1.1535 expedient to have their Counsel, or nobiscum super dictis negotiis tractaturi, vestrumque consilium impensuri, 23 E. 1. m. 9. dorso; or, ad tractandum, ordinandum, & faciendum nobiscum, Cl. 24 E. 1. m. 4. dorso; Ad ordinandum de quantitate & modo subsidii, Ibid. m. 7. dorso; habere colloquium & tractatum, Claus. 2 E. 2. m. 20. dorso, & ad tractandum & consentiendum, Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 2. dorso. So in(a) 1.1536 another, Ordinabimus quod juxta consili∣um vestrum, & aliorum Praelatorum, Magnatum, caeterorumque ibidem convocatorum viderimus opportunum. In the(b) 1.1537 20 of E. 3. it is thus expressed, Ad consentiendum hiis quae tunc praedictos Praela∣tos, Comites & alios Proceres ordinari contigerit super negotiis ante∣dictis, and the like. 46 E. 3. m. 11. dorso. In the Writ, 38 H. 6. m. 29. dorso, it is, Ad tractandum, consentiendum & praeclu∣dendum super praemissis & aliis, and 23 E. 4. Et concludendum; and so in the 15th. of K. Ch. the First, Ad tractandum, consenti∣endum, & concludendum.

SECT. 3. Of the Summons of the Temporal Lords.

I Have been the longer upon these Writs of Summons to the Clergy,* 1.1538 because those to the Nobles differ'd not much, and the material differences will be all I need note in their Writs, and in these we may find the gradual alteration; from giving Counsel and Advice only, it came to Treaty, Ordain∣ing, Consenting, Doing, and Concluding. I shall refer the curious Reader for the remarks that may be made from all these Writs, to Mr. Prynn's(c) 1.1539 Collection of them, and only note some few, most to my purpose, of the Earls, Barons, and the greater Tenents in Capite's Writs, and then proceed to the Writs of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses.

The first Writ of Summons to a Parliament, now left upon Record, as(d) 1.1540 Mr. Prynn notes, is that of 49. H. 3. those of the(e) 1.1541 45th. being only Summons to assist the King, cum Equis & Armis, & cum Posse vestro (as that to W. de Bello Campo de Aumel, and others shew) being only to afford him aid against his Enemies and Rebels.

In most of the Writs to the Princes, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and Peers,* 1.1542 we find the Mandamus is, Vobis in fide & homagio quibus nobis tenemini. But sometimes, as to Edmund Earl of(f) 1.1543 Cornwal, it is, Mandamus in homagio, fide & dilectione, and that to Thomas de(g) 1.1544 Furnival 36 E. 3. is fide & ligeancia quibus nobis tenemini. That to Edward, Prince of Wales, 49 E. 3. 6 m. dorso is directed Carissimo primogenito suo Ed. Princi∣pi

Walliae, and the Mandamus neither hath adjoined to it, fide, homagio, or any other Word,* 1.1545 but only commands him to be present, in propria persona, though others have fide & homagio or ligeancea.

It is to be noted; that the clause in Homagio & Ligeancia qui∣bus nobis tenemini, is peculiar to the Temporal Lords. But that in fide & dilectione is not so peculiar to the Ecclesiastical Lords, but is inserted into the Lay Lords Writs sometimes. The rea∣son why Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Parsons, Prebends, and other Ecclesiastic Bodies Politic, when they do Homage (saith(h) 1.1546 Littleton) do not say Jeo deveign vostre Home, I be∣come your Man (from whence Homagium or Hominium comes) is(i) 1.1547 because he is solely the Homager of God, and so Glan∣vil, Lib. 9. c. 1, 2. Bracton, fol. 78. F. Britton, c. 68. lesta, L. 3. c. 16. resolve that no Man,(k) 1.1548 elected Bishop, after Con∣secration doth Homage, whatever he hath done before, but on∣ly Fealty, and no Convent, or Abbat, or Pri••r ought to do Homage, because they hold in anothers name, viz. the name of the Churches. But that these Ecclesiastics swore Fealty, ap∣pears by many examples produced by Mr. Prynn,(l) 1.1549 and what Oaths they took, in his abridgment of the Records of the Tower. But this is now of little use, and so I leave it and shall observe some Particulars which Mr. Prynn and others have noted from the several Writs of Summons to Temporal Lords.

First it may be observed,* 1.1550 that a Summons by Writ, though for two or three Generations, from Father to Son, did not ennoble the Blood to make them Barons. So Ralph de Camois 49 H. 3. was summoned by Writ, and ranked in the Roll above all Barons, and Ralph his Son, Anno 7 E. 2. But(m) 1.1551 Tho∣mas the Grandchild, being chosen one of the Knights for Sur∣ry, was discharged by the King's Writ, because he and many of his Ancestors were Bannerets, and King Richard the Second summoned him to that very Parliament, and he was summoned ever after during Life; yet his Posterity, as others, were omit∣ted, which if they had been Barons properly, (as those by Creation and Tenure of Lands) had not been omitted, but might have challenged Summons ex debito Justiciae. But I can∣not enter into this long Controversy,* 1.1552 the curious may per∣use Mr. Prynn, and Elsyng's ancient method of holding Parlia∣ments, Page 33. who is of opinion that every degree of Ba∣ron passed with actual Ceremony, and those Patents some had (whereof the first upon Record he saith, was 11 R. 2. to the Lord John Beauchamp of Rolt) was an entailing of the Ho∣nour, rather than the Creation, because the words are, ipsum Johannem in unum Parium & Baronum Regni praeficimus; where∣as if he had been then created, the words should have been, per praesentes praefecimus. Besides, we find Henry Brom∣flet Knight, was created by special Writ, and his Heirs Males, Barons de Vescy, 27 H. 6.(n) 1.1553 ••ntred after the

names of the Temporal Lords, in the very Summons in com∣mon Form, to which is added, Volumus enim vos & haeredes vestros masculos de Corpore vestro legitime exeuntes Barones de Vescy. Now this special Writ and Clause of Creation had been meerly void and nugatory, had the general Writ alone ennobled him and his Po∣sterity. Yet in all the(o) 1.1554 subsequent Summons, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38 H. 6. He is only called Dominus, not Baro de Vescy, as also may be noted of Beauchamp.

Secondly,* 1.1555 It may be observed, that the word Baro and Ba∣rones are frequently met withal in Histories, the Clause-Rolls of King John, and H. 3. and in the Preface of Magna Charta, and several Statutes applied to all the(p) 1.1556 Temporal Lords of Parliament; yet in all the Clause-Rolls, and Writs of Summons, Mr. Prynn hat not observed any particular Persons amongst them, summoned by the Title of Barons, but only the Barons of Graystock, and Stafford, from Ed. 1. to H. 6. as Johanni, Willielmo, Rad••••pho Baroni de Graystock, and so in Ed. 1. and 3. Edmundo & Radulpho Baroni de Stafford.

Thirdly,* 1.1557 as to the Title of Dominus, Mr. Prynn saith, It is not to be found given to any but two before the time of H. 6. The first is John de(q) 1.1558 Moubray, stiled Dominus Insulae de Axholm, none else having this title till after the Reign of Richard the Second. The next so stiled, is 11 H. 4.(r) 1.1559 where a Writ issued, Johanni Talbot Domino de Furnival, which though omit∣ted in some Summons after, was again used in the Summons to him,(s) 1.1560 4 H. 5. and H. 5. after which, none is found stiled Dominus till(t) 1.1561 22 H. 6. that Robert Hungerford Chevalier, is stiled Dom. de Mollins, as he is in 25 H. 6. which gave the Title of Dom. de Poynings to Henry Percy, and in Cl. 27 H. 6. m. 21. dor∣so, this Title Dominus is given to Hungerford Percy, and four more, after which it grew more common to them, and others summoned, as may be seen in Sir William Dugdale's Summons lately Printed, who(u) 1.1562 49 H. 3. reckons Dom. Hugo, Dom. Humet, and Dom. Stanford.

Fourthly,* 1.1563 Another Title given to Barons of the upper House is that of Chevalier, which was not given to any Temporal Lords or Barons, in any Writs, or Lists of Summons to Parlia∣ment, before 49 Ed. 3.(w) 1.1564 wherein Summons issued, Willi∣elmo de Morle Chevalier, Willielmo de Aldburgh Chevalier, Joh. de Welle Chevalier, Hugoni de Dacre Chevalier. After which it grew more common under King Richard the Second, Henry the Fourth and Fifth.

After the beginning of H. 6. and during the Reign of H. 6. and Ed. 4. there was scarce any Temporal Lord in the lists of Summons, but was stiled Chevalier or Miles, and so it con∣tinues to this day, though not as Mr. Prynn saith, because they were all generally Knighted for their greater Honour; for it is apparent in the Lists exhibited by Sir William Dugdale, that most of the Barons by descent, though never Knighted, had the Title.

Fifthly,* 1.1565 There is great difference betwixt Writs of Sum∣mons to general Parliaments, and particular Councils upon e∣mergent occasions, which are not properly Parliaments. All Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Lords, Barons, together with Judg∣es, and King's Council, Citizens, Burgesses of Parliament, and Barons of the Cinque-Ports being usually summoned to the one; but to the other, some few Spiritual and Temporal Lords only, without(x) 1.1566 any Judges, Assistants, Knights, Citizens, Bur∣gesses, or Barons of the Cinque-Ports, or some few of them only, and divers who were no usual Lords, or Barons of Par∣liament, as Mr. Prynn hath made evident, and the Rolls them∣selves in the Margin notes them by de Concilio summonito, or deveniendo ad Concilium: which some Antiquaries having not noted, have confounded them.

SECT. 4. Of the Judicature of the House of Lords.

IT is evident that the Lords in Parliament have ever been the usual Judges, not only in all criminal and civil causes,* 1.1567 pro∣per for Parliaments to judg or punish, and Writs of Errors, but likewise in all cases of Precedencies, and Controversies concerning Peers and Peerage, which Power was in them as the King's Supreme Court, before there were any Knights, Ci∣tizens, or Burgesses summoned to our Parliaments. So Hove∣den(y) 1.1568 is express in the case of Sanctius, King of Navar, and Alphonsus, King of Castile: Comites & Barones Regalis Curiae Angliae adjudicaverunt, Anno 1177. 23 H. 2. So Fleta in Ed. the First's time, writes(z) 1.1569 thus; The King hath his Court in his Council, in his Parliaments, there being present the Prelates, Earls, Barons, Nobles, and other skillful Men (viz. the Judg∣es Assistants) where are ended the doubts of Judgments.

This Particular of the Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, is so fully in every Branch of it proved by Mr. Prynn in his Plea for the Lords House, that it were an Injury to the inquisitive Reader, not to referr him to that Treatise for full Satisfaction; therefore I shall only pick out a very few out of a Manuscript I have of the Priviledges belonging to the Baronage of England, and Mr. Prynn.

In the fourth of King(a) 1.1570 Edward the Third, the Peers, Earls and Barons assembled at Westminster, saith the Record, have strictly examined, and thereupon assented and agreed, that John Mautravers is guilty of the death of Esmon Earl of Kent, Uncle of our Lord the King that now is: wherefore the said Peers of the Land, and Judges of Parliament, judged and awarded, that he the said John should be drawn, hanged, and beheaded.

In the first of R. 2. John Lord of(b) 1.1571 Gomenys, and William de Weston, were brought before the Lords, sitting in the white

Chamber,* 1.1572 and were severally charged at the Commandment of the Lords, by Sir Richard Scroop Knight, Steward of the Kings House: William Weston being accused for rendring the Castle of Outhrewike, and John Lord of Gomenys for rendring the Castle of Ards. They both made plausible defences, and Sir Rich. Scroop Steward, tells William, that the Lords sitting in full Parliament do adjudge him to death. But because our Lord the King is not yet informed of the manner of this Judgment, the execution thereof shall be respited till the King be informed thereof; and the like Sentence he passed upon John Lord of Gomenies, only adding, that he being a Gentleman, and Banneret should be beheaded.

There are many more Examples of Judgments given in Ca∣pital matters upon Bergo de Bayons, 4 E. 3. m. 7. num. 4. Tho∣mas de Gurny eadem membrana num. 5. and others; and for Of∣fences not Capital, of Richard Lions, 59 E. 3. m. 7. William le Latymer, 42 E. 3. m. 2. William Ellis, ibid num. 31; John Chi∣chester and Botesha, 1 R. 2. num. 32. Alice Piers, Ibid. num. 41.

Mr.* 1.1573 Prynn(c) 1.1574 shews this Jurisdiction out of Historians, even from Cassibellan, out of Geoffrey of Monmouth. Also, Anno 924. of Elfred a Nobleman, who opposed King Aethelstan's Title, and had his Lands adjudged by the Peers forfeit to him; the Words of the King are, Et eas accepi(d) 1.1575 quemadmodum judicave∣runt omnes ••ptimates Regni Anglorum.

So Earl Godwin having murdred Prince Alfred, Brother to King Edward the Confessor, being fled into Denmark, and hear∣ing of King Edward's Piety and Mercy, returned, and came to London to the King, who then held a Great Council, and de∣nied the Fact, and put himself upon the(e) 1.1576 consideration of the Kings Court, and the King speaks to the Earls and Barons thus, Volo quod inter nos in illa appellatione rectum judicium decernatis, & debitam justiciam faciatis, and after it is said, Quicquid ju∣dicaverint per omnia ratificavit.

So in the Constitutions of(f) 1.1577 Clarendon, it is appointed, That the Archbishop, Bishops, and those Clergy that held in Capite, as by Barony, should be Parties in the Judgments of the Kings Court as other Barons ought, with the other Barons, till it come in Judgment to the loss of Member, or to Death.

So in the Case of Tho. Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, Anno 1165. 11 H. 2. we find in Hoveden, parte post, p. 494, 495. that, Barones Curiae Regis judicaverunt eum esse in misericordia Regis: and afterwards, when he would not yield to the Kings Will, he(g) 1.1578 saith to his Barons, Quickly make to me Judg∣ment of him who is my Liege Man, and refuseth to stand to the Law in my Court: The Barons going out judg'd him fit to be seiz'd on, and sent to Prison, and the Historian saith, tunc misit Rex Reginaldum Comitem Cornubiae & Robertum Comi∣tem Leicestriae ad indicandum ei judicium de illo factum.

Anno 1208. King(h) 1.1579 John exacted Pledges of his Subjects; and amongst others of William de Breause, who said, If he had

offended the King, he would be ready to answer his Lord, and that without Hostages, secundum judicium Curiae suae & Baronum Parium suorum.

So Anno 1240. 24 H. 3.(i) 1.1580 Matthew Paris saith, That Hu∣bert de Burgo, Earl of Kent, was grievously accused before the King and his whole Court, and it was adjudged he should resign to the King four of his Castles.

I cannot omit one memorable passage, that,(k) 1.1581 Anno 1260. 44 H. 3. there falling out a difference betwixt King Hen. 3. Prince Edward his Son, Simon Montfort, and other Nobles, the King called his Baronage to St. Pauls, and there it being urged, that Prince Edward had done some injuries to the King, he offered to prove himself innocent before the King and his Uncle, who was King of the Romans; saying,* 1.1582 That none of(l) 1.1583 the rest of the Barons and Earls were by right his Peers, nor ought to exercise upon him their Discussions of the matter. By which it appears, that he judged himself to be something more than a Peer of the Realm, being the Heir apparent of the Crown.

I might fill a large Volum with the Histories and Records, to prove this; but since Levellers, and the House of Commons that voted the House of Lords dangerous and useless, have re∣ceived such deadly wounds by Mr. Prynne in his Plea for the Lords, who was once one of their own Champions, I think it needless to whet those Weapons again, since they always will be in readiness for any one to make use of if need require; and shall only obviate one objection that may be urged, That whatever the usage was before the Representatives of the Com∣mons,* 1.1584 yet the Commons after were often admitted to a share of Judicature in some cases: But I shall give a few Instances, how, after this change of the Constitution of Parliament, still this power of Judicature remained in the King and House of Lords.

Roger de(m) 1.1585 Mortimer being accused of High Treason, 4 E. 3. for the Murther of King Edward 2. after his resignation and unlawful deposition; Knighton(n) 1.1586 giving an account of the proceedings agreeable to the Parliament Roll, saith, Rex prae∣cepit Comitibus, Baronibus, & caeteris Magnatibus Regni justum ju∣dicium ferre super praedicto Rogero de Mortimer: So at the Par∣liament held at Salisbury, 7 R. 2. W. de Zouch is said to be cal∣led to the Parliament, to stand to the Judgment(o) 1.1587 of the King, and the Lords: So Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, and Chancellor of England, 10 R. 2.(p) 1.1588 was accused by the Commons in full Parliament, before the King, Bishops and Lords; and at last it is said, The Lords in full Parliament gave judgment against him.

In the Parliament 11 R. 2. Thomas Duke of Gloucester offered to put himself upon his Tryal as the Lords of the Parliament would award, &c. After which the Lords, as well Spiritual as Temporal, claimed their Liberties and Franchises, namely, That

all weighty matters in the same Parliament which should be after moved touching the Peers of the Land, should be judged and determined by them by the course of Parliament, and not by the Civil Law, nor yet by the Common Law of the Land, used in other Courts of the Realm.

Yet this seems a very high Demand; for they have not Juris dandi but dati Jurisdictionem, as they are a Court of Mini∣sterial Jurisdiction, being the Court of the King's Barons in Parliament. And though, when upon Writ of Error(q) 1.1589 any Judgment in the King's Bench is examined in the House of Lords, and there affirmed or reversed, the Judgment is said to be affirmed or reversed in Parliament; yet we cannot con∣clude, they have the Power of the High Court of Parliament, that their Decrees (if against the Law) should be as binding as Acts of Parliament.* 1.1590 And though the same House, in the same Session, may not have Power to review again their own Judgment, nor to restore again any Judgment they have re∣versed, because they judge ministerially, and not sovereignly, and so bind their own Hands, as well as their Inferiors; where∣as an Absolute Supreme Court is never at the last Period of Ju∣risdiction: yet we see Attainders in one Parliament reversed in another; and so may their Judgments be. But this obiter.

I shall but add one proof more, being full and express to the purpose, to prove the House of Lords sole Jurisdiction with the King, (who must always be understood to give Judgment by them:) The Record is 1 H. 4.(r) 1.1591 where it is said, That 3 Nov. the Commons in this Parliament shewed to the King, Come les joggements du Parlement apperteignent soulement au Roy & Seignieurs, & nient aus Communes, &c. That the Judgments of Parliament appertained only to the King, and to the Lords, and not unto the Commons: Thereupon they prayed the King, out of his special Grace, to shew unto them the said Judgments, and the cause of them; that so no Record might be made in Parliament against the said Commons, which are or shall be parties to any Judgment given, or hereafter to be given in Parliament, without their Privity. Whereunto the Archbishop of Canterbury gave them this Answer by the Kings Commandment, That the Commons themselves are Petitioners and Demanders, and that the King(s) 1.1592 and Lords from all times have had, and shall have of right the Judgments in Par∣liaments in manner as the Commons have shewed.

How far the King and House of Lords have been Judges of the Priviledges of the House of Commons, I shall declare in that part of this Chapter wherein I treat of that House.

SECT. 5. Of the Assistants to the House of Lords.

HAving thus far treated of the Constituent Parts of the House of Lords, I come now to the Assistants to this most Honourable House; which were mostly the(t) 1.1593 King's Great Officers, as well Clergy-men as Secular Persons, who were no Lords or Barons of the Realm, as, namely, his Treasurer, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Judges of his Courts at Westmin∣ster, Justices in Eyre, Justices Assignes, Barons of his Exchequer, Clerks, Secretaries of his Council, and sometimes his Serjeants at Law, with such other Officers and Persons whom our Kings thought meet to summon.

The first Writ that Mr. Prynne finds extant in our Records, and which Sir William Dugdale mentions, is entred in the Clause-Roll 23 E. 1. dorso 9. directed to Gilbert de Thornton, and thirty eight more, whose Names are in Sir William Dugdale; whereof there are eleven by the name of Magistri, three Deans, and two Archdeacons: only I find them differently ranked in Mr. Prynne, to what they are in Sir William Dugdale.

The Writ runs thus: Rex dilecto & fide••i suo Gilberto de Thornton, salutem. Quia super quibusdam arduis negotiis, nos & Regnum nostrum, ac vos caeterosque de Concilio nostro tangentibus, quae sine vestra, & eorum praesentia nolumus expediri, &c. Vobis manda∣mus in fide & dilectione, &c. as in the usual Summons to the Bishops.

Sometimes, as 25 E. 1. there(u) 1.1594 was no Writ directed to them; but we find under the Name of Milites, with a Lines space betwixt them and the Barons, thirteen named, which by other Records are known to be the King's Justices.

The differences in their Writs are mostly these: Sometimes,* 1.1595 as in 27 E. 1. it is, Cum caeteris de Concilio nostro habere volumus col∣loquium & tractatum; or, as in 28 E. 1.(w) 1.1596 showing the spe∣cial Cause, Quia super Jure & Dominio quae nobis in Regno Scotiae competit, &c. cum Juris peritis, & cum caeteris de Concilio nostro speciale colloquium habere volumus & tractatum, vobis manda∣mus, &c. cum caeteris de Concilio nostro super praemissis tracta∣turis vestrumque consilium impensuris.

At the same time there are Writs to the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, to send four or five,* 1.1597 de discretioribus, & in Jure scripto magis expertis; and to the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, to send two or three in the like man∣ner qualified: and then follow Writs to several Abbats, Priors, Deans and Chapters; and all these Writs mentioned the Busi∣ness of the King's Claim to the Jurisdiction of Scotland: and in the Writs of Summons to the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Temporal Lords, Justices, and Sheriffs of Counties, that Particular is not mentioned: which shows, that the King sum∣moned

these particular Persons, as most fit to search and •• send their Chronicles to the Parliament: The Occasion and Result whereof, and of sending these Lawyers from the Universities, you may read at large in(x) 1.1598 Matth. Westminster, and(y) 1.1599 Wal∣singham.

In some Writs, as that of 9 E. 2.(z) 1.1600 the Justices are appoint∣ed to expedite their Assizes, that they may not fail to be pre∣sent at the Parliament, or to leave two to attend the Business of the King's Bench: And the 7 of E. 2.(a) 1.1601 That whereas they had appointed the Assizes at Duresm, and other Parts in the Northern Circuit, at certain days after the time the Parliament was to convene, at which he wondred; he orders them to put off the Assizes, and attend. By which two Writs it appears, their Summons by Writ to attend and counsel the King in Par∣liament, was a Supersedeas to them to take Assizes during the Parliament; and that the Assizes and Suits of private Persons ought to give place to the publick Affairs of the King and Kingdom in Parliament. Whoever desires to know who were summoned in this manner, and the further variety of Summons, may consult Mr. Prynne, and Sir William Dugdale's Summons.

From these Writs we may observe,* 1.1602 first, That sometimes the Persons summoned were many in number, sometimes very few, and always(b) 1.1603 more or less at the King's Pleasure. Secondly, in latter times the Clergy-men were wholly omitted. Thirdly, That they were never licensed to appear by Proxies. Mr. Prynne hath collected a great many Precedents to prove, that these Persons thus summoned, together with the King's ordinary Council, had a very great Hand, Power, and Authority, not only in making Ordinances, Proclamations, deciding all weigh∣ty Controversies, regulating most publick Abuses, and punish∣ing all exorbitant Offences out of Parliament, in the Star-Cham∣ber, and elsewhere;* 1.1604 but likewise in receiving and answering all sorts of Petitions, determining and adjudging all weighty doubtful Cases and Pleas, yea, in making or compiling Acts, Ordinances, Statutes, and transacting all weighty Affairs con∣cerning the King or Kingdom, even in Parliaments themselves, when summoned to them. Yet these have no Vote, but only are to speak to such Matters as their Opinions are required in, and sit uncovered, unless the Chancellor or Lord Keeper give leave to the Judges to be covered.

SECT. 6. Concerning the House of Commons.

I Now come to consider the Honourable House of Commons, and the Use,* 1.1605 Constitution, and Priviledges of it, and shall first consider the Summons by which they have their Pow∣er to act as an House, and third Estate in Parliament.

Mr.(c) 1.1606 Prynn hath cleared, that all the Writs of Summons directed to Sheriffs (in King John, and Henry the Third's time before 49 H. 3.) to send Knights to the King at set times, were either for Information of the Council what voluntary aid each particular County would grant the King in his great necessity, or to assist with Men and Arms, and were not elected as Repre∣sentatives of the Commons, till 49 H. 3. To whom I shall re∣fer the curious for Satisfaction, as also to Dr. Brady, who hath by his own Inspection, as well as the considerate application of what Mr. Prynn hath amassed (in his Books since his late Majesties Restauration, and after 1648) composed many most useful Observations for the understanding of the ancient cu∣stoms, usages, and practices relating to Parliaments. There∣fore I shall endeavour to be as short as possibly I can, and with∣out obscurity contract what they and most others that treat of the House of Commons, have at large filled Volumes with.

The form of the Writ, 49 H. 3. to the Sheriffs is not(d) 1.1607 ex∣pressed, but after the recital of the Writ to the Bishop of Du∣resm and Norwich, and the eodem modo to the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Deans, Earls, Lords, and Barons, there follows this entry in the Record, Item mandatum est sing••lis Vicecomitibus per Angliam quod venire faciant duos Milites delegalioribus, probioribus, & discretioribus Militibus singulorum Comitatuum, ad Regem Lon∣don, in forma praedicta.

Item in forma praedicta scribitur Civibus Ebor. Lincoln. & cae∣teris Burgis Angliae, quod mittant in forma praedicta duos de discre∣tioribus, legalioribus, & probioribus tam Civibus quam Burgensi∣bus suis: and so to the Barons of the Cinque-Ports, which runs thus; Rex Baronibus & Ballivis Portus sui de Sandwico. Cum Prae∣lati & Nobiles Regni nostri tam pro negotio Liberationis Edwardi Primogeniti nostri, quam pro aliis Communitatem Regni nostri tan∣gentibus, ad instans Parliamentum, &c. Vobis mandamus in fide & dilectione quibus nobis tenemini, firmiter injungentes, omnibus aliis praetermissis mittatis ad nos ibidem, 4 de legalioribus & dis∣certioribus Portus vestri, &c. Nobiscum & cum praefatis Magnatibus Regni nostri tractatum & super praemissis consilium impensuri.

From all which, it is observable, first,* 1.1608 that in all probability the Writs then issued to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, were the same in form and substance, with those to the Spiritual and Temporal Lords, and in those to the Sheriffs, &c. Secondly, the Qualifications of those to be elected are limited: Thirdly, It doth not appear whether the Counties themselves, or the Sheriffs alone were to elect. Fourthly, The Writs for electing Citizens and Burgesses were directed immediately to the Citizens and Burgesses themselves, not to the Sheriffs of the Counties. Lastly, that no Writ issued to the Citizens of London, their Liberties then being seized in∣to the King's Hand, and that York and Lincoln are the only Ci∣ties mentioned particularly in the Roll.

The first Writs, entred at large in the Rolls, are those(e) 1.1609 22 E. 1.

wherein is expressed, that the King intending a Colloquium & Tractatum with his Barons, and great Men, he commands that the Sheriffs cause to be elected two Knights,* 1.1610 of the more discreet and more able to take Pains, &c. to come to Westminster, &c. with full Power for themselves, and the whole Communi∣ty of the said County, to consult and consent each for himself and the said Community, to those things, which the Earls, Ba∣rons, and Nobles aforesaid unanimously ordain in the Premis∣ses; so that for want of such like Power, the Business remain not undone.

I shall now insert what Variations I find in the Writs of Sum∣mons, promiscuosly, whether to Knights, Citizens, or Bur∣gesses, unless there be some remarkable difference to be ob∣served.

First,* 1.1611 As to their Qualifications, generally, both Knights, Citi∣zens, and Burgesses are to be de legalioribus & discretioribus, & ad laborandum potentioribus. In the Writ 25 E. 1.(f) 1.1612 it is probioribus & legalioribus; and some two, or all of these Epi∣thetes are generally used, till(g) 1.1613 22 E. 3. m. 7. dorso, where it is expressed, that the Knights be gladio cinctos & ordinem mi∣litarem habentes & non alios, & de qualibet Civitate, & de quoli∣bet Burgo duos Burgos de aptioribus, discretioribus, probioribus, & fide dignis Militibus, Civibus & Burgensibus,* 1.1614 and in the Twen∣ty fourth of E. 3. there is an addition and limitation,* 1.1615 Qui non sunt Placitorum, aut querelarum manutentores, aut ex hujusmo∣di quaestu viventes, sed homines valentes, & bonae fidei, & publicum commodum diligentes eligi: and the self-same Limitations are in the 25, 28, and 29 E. 3. So that it was used so long as the King thought fit. In(h) 1.1616 26 Ed. 3. it is unum Militem de provectioribus, di∣scretioribus, & magis expertis Militibus, and so for Citizens and Burgesses: by which it appears the King desired not any under Age (as now is allowed) to be chosen. In 31 Ed. 3. besides(i) 1.1617 the usual words de discretioribus & probioribus, there is ad∣ded de elegantioribus personis eligi. Which in no Writ else before or after is to be found. In the 36 E. 3.(k) 1.1618 it is de meliori∣bus & validioribus Militibus, &c. That of the Forty fourth of(l) 1.1619 E. 3. runs, Duos Milites gladiis cinctos & in Armis & Actibus Armorum magis probatos & circumspectos & discretos.

It appears by the Parliament Roll, 46(m) 1.1620 E. 3. That it was accorded, and assented to in that Parliament, and an Or∣dinance made, That no Lawyer pursuing Business in the Court of the King, nor any Sheriff while he was Sheriff, should be returned, or accepted Knights of the Counties; and if any were so returned, they should have no wages. Therefore in the fourteenth Number of the said Roll, it is thus expressed, Mes voyet le Roy, que Chevalers & Serjaunts, (i. e. Esquires, not Serjeants at Law) des meulieur valeurs du paiis soiz retornez desore Chevalers en Parlement, & quils sount esluz en plein Counts. That Knights and Esquires of greatest value in their Country should be chosen in the full County.

The very next Writ 47 E. 3.(n) 1.1621 runs thus, Duos Milites gla∣diis cinctos se•• Armigeros, (which explains the word Serjaunts before, as in that Age being reputed Servants to Knights, as holding Lands in such a Tenure of them) de dicto Com. dignio∣res & probiores, & in Actibus Armorum magis expertos, & discretos, & non alterius conditionis, & duos Cives & Burgenses, qui in navigo & exercitio mercandisarum notitiam habeant meliorem, eligi; and then in the Close, follows, Nolumus autem quod tu seu aliquis alius Vicecomes Regni praedicti, aut aliquis alteri••s con∣ditionis quam superius specificatur, aliqualiter sit electus; and the last Clause, till the 11 Rich. 2. was used, and from the 12th. to the last of Rich. 2. the words alterius conditionis are omit∣ted, and so in Ed. Fourth's time; but the Clause, that the Sheriff be not chosen, is retained.

To these we may add, That Bannerets were not to be cho∣sen Members of the House of Commons,(o) 1.1622 7 R. 2. in the case of Thomas Camoys thus, Nos advertentes quod hujusmodi Banneretti ante haec tempora Milites Comitatuum ratione alicujus Parliamenti eligi minime consueverunt; ipsum de Officio Militis ad dictum Parliamentum pro Communitate Com. praedicti venturi, exonerari volumus, and so commands the Sheriff to chuse ano∣ther.

In the 11 R. 2. we find a(p) 1.1623 new qualification in the Writ, That the Knights, &c. should be Gladio cinctos, idoneos & dis∣cretos, & in Debatis modernis magis indifferentes;* 1.1624 but the King being informed, that this new Clause, indifferent in the mo∣dern Debates (which only was to the Knights, not to the Ci∣tizens or Burgesses) was contrary to the forms of Elections an∣ciently used, and against the Liberty of the Commons, he su∣perseded, and revoked that Clause by another Writ.

In the 5 H. 4. an unusual new(q) 1.1625 Clause was added to the prohibition of Sheriffs, Nolumus, &c. nec Apprenticius a••t aliquis alius homo ad Legem aliqualiter sit electus: Concerning this and that in the 46 Ed. 3. the curious Reader may peruse Sir Ed.(r) 1.1626 Coke, whose opinion Mr. Prynne(s) 1.1627 from the Roll, and from Walsingham, clearly confutes, however that Parliament is since called indoctum.

After this, upon making the Statutes 7 H. 4. c. 15.11 H. 4. c. 1. upon the Commons Petition, the ancient form for the Writs was somewhat altered and enlarged, though little as to the qualifi∣cations, but as to the manner of Elections, &c. of which I shall discourse by it self.

23 H. 6. c. 15.(t) 1.1628 a Statute was made concerning Elections of Knights, therefore in the Writs of Summons 25 H. 6. it runs thus, Milites notabiles, seu saltem notabiles Armigeri, hominesve generosi de natu eorundem Com. qui habiles sunt Milites fieri, & nullus homo de gradu valettae, & gradu inseriori de essendo Milites hujusmodi existant.

Having thus treated of the Ancient Qualifications,* 1.1629 I shall subjoin the modern, which are comprised in short, To cause

(u) 1.1630 two Knights girt with Swords, the most fit and discreet of the County aforesaid, and of every City of that Country two Citizens, of every Burrough two Burgesses of the discreeter and most sufficient to be freely and indifferently chosen, &c.

Having thus discoursed of the Qualifications of the Persons elected; before I make any remarks upon the whole, it is fit to note the Electors and manner of Election. Some are of opini∣on, that, as the greater and lesser Tenents in Capite, after King John's Charter, were the only Lay constituent Members of Par∣liament, so the still smaller Tenents to those that held in Capite, and the smaller Tenents in Capite, if not they only, did elect the Knights of Shires.

But I shall, as fair as Records will give me light, by particu∣lars clear this, and the power that was given them by the Com∣munity of the County to the Knights.

The first(w) 1.1631 Writ hitherto found, is only, That the She∣riff shall cause to be chosen two Knights, and that they have power, &c. as I have before related in the Writ to the She∣riff of Northumberland;* 1.1632 it is to cause two Knights to come, chosen by the consent of the County, and to have full power for themselves singly, and the Community of the County; and so likewise, two Citizens and two Burgesses with the Assent of the Community of the City or Burrough. The Knights were elected by the Community of the County, that is, as Dr. Brady makes it clear in his(x) 1.1633 Glossary, the greater and less Tenents in Capite; and as for Cities and Burroughs, such were the chu∣sers as held Lands in Free Burgage of the King, or some great Lords who held in Capite.

Ann. 26 E. 1.(y) 1.1634 expresseth no more but the Election in gene∣ral, and the power to be given the Elected, Ita quod dicti Mi∣lites plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro se & Communitate Com. praedict. & dicti Cives & Burgenses pro se & Comunitate Civita∣tum & Burgorum praedictorum divisim ab ipsis tunc ibidem ha∣beant, &c.

Before I proceed any further,* 1.1635 we must note, that in the Re∣turns made by the Sheriffs to these Writs, there are found 26 E. 1. four Manucaptors for every person elected, and in others two: these did engage themselves, that the Knights, Citizens, or Burgesses so elected should appear at the Parliament according to the time appointed.

In the County of Bedford, I find Rich. de Rous Knight elect∣ed, and no Manucaptors returned, but that the Sheriff distrain∣ed eight Oxen, and four Horses of him, that he should come at the Day, &c. This was done by vertue of that Clause in the Writ, & eos ad nos ad praedictos diem & locum venire facias; and this way of having Manucaptors, continued till the 12 E. 4.(z) 1.1636 though many had none in latter times. Mr. Prynne ob∣serves, That the Knights in every Shire were elected in the full County, by and for the whole County, and that the Citizens and Burgesses were then also elected per totam Communitatem.

In all the Writs of Richard the Second, there is this Clause more fully inserted than in any before, That the Election be in pleno Comitatu tuo de communi assensu ejusdem Comitatus.

Upon the making the Statutes 7 H. 4. c. 15. and 11 H. 4. c. 1.* 1.1637 for regulating abuses in Elections, the Writs of Summons 8 H. 4. and all his time, and so(a) 1.1638 1 H. 5. were accordingly al∣tered, that Proclamation should be made by the Sheriff, in the next County day after the receipt of the Writ, and the Knights to be chosen libere & indifferenter,* 1.1639 free and indifferently by those that were present at the Proclamation; and shall return the names of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses,* 1.1640 in certain In∣dentures betwixt the Sheriff, and those that were present at the Election, whether the persons elected were present or not, &c.

The Returns to the Writs 1 H. 5.* 1.1641 shew the Election to be by common assent and consent of those present, as that for Lestwy∣thiel, where 32 Electors are named, and that for Surry hath only four, but adds, & omnium aliorum fidelium ibidem existentium. The Indenture for Sussex is in French, and saith, Les Gentilles homes & Communes, the Gentlemen and Commons had chosen Richard Sayvile, &c.

The Sheriff of Bristol saith, Coadunatis discretioribus & ma∣gis sufficientibus Burgensibus, ex assensu Johannis Clive Majoris Villae praedictae, & aliorum plurimorum existentium eligimus, &c. The elected were two Burgesses of Bristol, Thomas Norton and John Leycester, both for Knights for the County of Bristol, and Bur∣gesses for the Villa of Bristol; and in another these are called Burgenses and Mercatores.

The next alteration that I find, is after the Statute of the(b) 1.1642 8 H. 6. c. 7. which agrees with that of 23 H. 6. that every Knight to be chosen within the Kingdom of England to come to the Parliament, shall be chosen by such as live in the Coun∣ty; whereof every one have a free Tenement to the value of Forty Shillings per annum, beyond all Reprizes; and that those who are elected be abiding, and resident in the said County, and the Sheriff have power upon Oath to examine the Electors, what yearly Estate they have, and that the Sheriff incur the pe∣nalty of 100 Marks for his false return, and the Knights so re∣turned lose their Wages.

There are several Precepts that command, that at such E∣lections(c) 1.1643 no person come there Armed, or arrayed in War∣like manner, or do, nor attempt any thing that may be in disturbance of the Kings Peace, or the Election; as particular∣ly is expressed in the Writs, 2 E. 3. m. 31. dorso, and several others to be perused in the first part of Prynne's Brief Register, a p. 27. ad 28, 177, 214. Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 22. dorso, 18 H. 6. and several other places which were prohibited, that Elections thereby might be made free.

That it may appear, that the Elections in ancient times were not made by such as we now call Freeholders of forty Shillings

a Year (which now is established by Statute Law) I think it not amiss to insert what I find of a particular usage in York∣shire;(d) 1.1644 where•••• it appears by the first Indentures of the Electi∣ons and Returns of Knights for the County of York, that the Atturnies of the Archbishop of York, and of sundry Earls, Lords, Nobles, and some Ladies, who were annual Suitors to the County Court of Yorkshire, were sole Electors of the Knights, as appears by the Return 13 H. 4. upon the Writ of 12 H. 4. betwixt Edm. Sandford Sheriff on the one part, and Will. Holgate Attorney of Ralph Earl of Westmorland, Will•• de Kyllington Atturney of Lucy Countess of Kent, Will. Hesham Atturney of Pet. Lord de M••lolacu, William de Burton Atturney of William Lord de Roos, Rob. Evedal Atturney of Ralph Baron of Graystock, William do He∣ston Atturney of Alex. de Metham Knight, Henry de Preston Atturney of Henry de Percy Knight, chuse John de Ever Knight, and Robert de Plompton Knight.

Also 2 H. 5. The Indenture is betwixt William de Harring∣ton Knight, Sheriff of Yorkshire, and Robert Maulevere•• Attur∣ney of Henry Archbishop of York, William Fencotes Attur∣ney of Ralph Earl of Westmorland, William Archer Atturney of John Earl Marshal, and so the Atturnies of Hen. le Scrop Knight Lord of Masham, of Peter de Mulolacu, Alexander de Metham. Robert Roos, of Margaret, which was Wife of Henry Vavasor Knight, and of Henry Percy.

The like are found in the Eighth and Ninth of H. 5. and the 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 H 6. in all which the Atturnies only of No∣bles, Barons, Lords, Ladies, and Knights, who were Suitors, made the Elections of the Knights of Yorkshire, in the County Court, and sealed the Indenture. I have a French Letter of Atturney from the Lady Ross, to that purpose; concerning which, if God give me Life, I shall give an account in my An∣tiquities of Yorkshire,

This Method ceased before 25 H. 6. at which time the Re∣turn made by Robert Ʋghtred Sheriff of Yorkshire, hath the Names of Forty two Gentlemen, most of which are of very ancient Families, and such as had great Estates then, and so continue to have; though I doubt not but (as it is the Custom now) the much lesser part of those present were only inserted as Parties to the Indentures. However by the Community we may understand, who elected were not like the Freeholders now.

The next thing we are to consider in the Writs of Summons to Parliament,* 1.1645 is what the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses so elected, were by the Writ authorized to do.

The first Writ(e) 1.1646 that we find for Election of Knights of Shires, expresseth their convening to be, To consult, and con∣sent for themselves, and the Community, to those things which the Earls, Barons, and foresaid Nobles unanimously should ordain in the premisses; and the Writ to the Sheriff of Northumberland is ad a••diendum & faciendum quod & tunc ibi∣dem

plenius injungemus, to hear and do what we shall then and there fullier enjoin.

In the Writ 25(f) 1.1647 E. 1. the King intending to confirm the great Charter, and Charter of the Forrest; that he might levy the eighth part of all the Goods of his Lieges, for his most urgent necessity against the French; convenes the Parliament before Prince Edward his Son, and the Knights are to meet to receive the said Charters, & facturi ulterius quod per dictum Filium nostrum ibidem fuerit ordinatum; to do further what should be ordained by the Prince.

The Writ 25 E. 1.(g) 1.1648 expresseth that the Knights, Citi∣zens, and Burgesses, are to do what then shall be ordained in the Premisses by the Common Council; and so the Returns are ad faciendum quod tunc ibidem ordinabitur.

In 17 E. 2.(h) 1.1649 it is enjoyned, that the Knights, &c. be there, ad faciendum & consentiendum hiis quae in dicto Parlia∣mento ordinari contigerit super negotiis antedictis.

Anno 21 E. 3.(i) 1.1650 there is some more Power granted to the Knights, &c. ad tractandum, consulendum, & consentiendum hiis quae tunc favente divina Clementia contigerit ordinari. Where∣as before it was only to hear and do what was ordained by the King, the Prince, or the great Council; here it is to treat, con∣sult and consent to what then should be ordained. But the Writ Anno 36.(k) 1.1651 explains who had the ordaining Power, for it runs, ad consentiendum hiis quae per nos, ac dictos Praelatos, Magnates & Proceres ordinari contigerit. So here the King, the Bishops, and the Nobles ordain, and the House of Commons are to assent. Anno 47 E. 3.(l) 1.1652 the words are, ad facien∣dum, & consentiendum eis quae tunc de Communi Concilio Regni no∣stri favente Domino contingant ordinari; which Form is continu∣ed to this day: so that according to the import of the Writ, the Commons are to do and assent to what shall be ordained in Parliament; by which two words I suppose they have the full Power to frame Bills, and to assent, which also implies a Power of Dissent to the Bills sent to them by the House of Lords.

Having thus drawn into one Scheme, the most material Al∣terations, and variety of Expressions, from all the Writs of Summons, of Mr. Prynne and others, that fill so great Volumes, and truly (as I hope) quoted all the Records, which illustrate these Particulars, and in a very clear Landscape represented the most material Parts of the two so noble and wisely constitu∣ted Houses; from whose great Wisdom (with the Sovereigns Authority and Fiat) all those wholesome and necessary Laws are derived, that establish this great Monarchy: I shall now pass to some general Remarques, and from thence to the anci∣ent and modern Priviledges of the House of Commons.

First it is very obvious,* 1.1653 that the Kings of England formerly were not confined to summon only two Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses as now; for Anno 22(m) 1.1654 E. 1. the King issued out his Writs of Summons for two Knights of every County, after

which, follows a second Writ, entred immediately after in the same Dorse, for other two Knights in these words, Praeter illos duos Milites eligi facias alios duos Milites legales, &c. So 28 E. 1. three Knights, or other three de probioribus, legalioribus, & discretioribus Liberis Hominibus, &c. eligi. These probi & le∣gales homines were such as held in Capite. So in the(n) 1.1655 26 of E. 3. the King considering that it was Harvest time, that he might not withdraw Men from that Employment, unum tan∣tum Militem de quolibet Comitatu ad dictum Concilium mittendum habere volumus ista vice. So(o) 1.1656 45 E. 3. the King in his Writ saith, That he might spare the Labours and Expences, he will have treaty with some only of the Magnates, (by which the Knights of Shires here are to be understood) Citizens and Bur∣gesses,* 1.1657 therefore appoints one Knight for the County of Kent, one Citizen for Canterbury, and one for Rochester, whom he names, if they be alive, otherwise the Companion of him that was before.

In 18 E. 3. the Writs issued only for two(p) 1.1658 Knights in every County, and no Writ for Electing Citizens or Burgesses; and 26 E. 3. the Writs are for one Knight in eve∣ry County, and no Citizens or Burgesses: yet in(q) 1.1659 this the King issued out particular Writs to Mayors and Bailiffs o•• Cities and Burroughs, to elect, and return one Citizen for e∣very City, and one Burgess for every Burrough.

Secondly, That the Kings of England had a Power to super∣sede particular Persons being chosen, to resummon those that returned without leave, or appoint others in their places, and omit sending Writs to some Cities and Burroughs that had for∣merly sent, and to create new Burroughs.

So the Lord Camoys,(r) 1.1660 as I have instanced before, being elected by the King's first Writ, the King by new Writ declared it null, and ordered to proceed to a new Election, and the King appears in that Age to be the sole Judge of void, and dou∣ble Elections. So in the(s) 1.1661 28 Ed. 1. Phillip de Geyton, be∣ing chosen one of the Knights for the County of Northampton, and could not attend, the King orders another to be chosen. So 5(t) 1.1662 E. 2. because the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of Yorkshire, went away for certain causes not there expressed (it is probable without the Kings Leave) therefore he sends his Pre∣cept to the Sheriff, to cause them to return, vel alios ad hoc ido∣neos loco eorum si ad hoc vacare non possint. But this more espe∣cially is to be taken notice of when I come to discouse of Privi∣ledges of Parliament.

As to the last particular of the King's appointing new Bur∣roughs,* 1.1663 impowering them by special Charters to send Citizens and Burgesses to all Parliaments to be afterwards held by the King, his Heirs, and Successors, Judge(u) 1.1664 Hobarts hath clea∣red it, and(w) 1.1665 Mr. Prynne hath reduce them all into Chro∣nological Tables, and he makes it a certain Note, that where the Sheriff makes his Return, nulli sunt Cives nec Burgenses

in Com. praedict. or non est alia Civitas vel Burgus, or non sunt alii Burgi, we may certainly conclude that every City or Bur∣rough omitted then out of those ancient Returns, and since returned for Cities or Burroughs, were made Cities and Bur∣roughs since that time, as the curious may see at large in his(x) 1.1666 Brevia Parliamenta Rediviva.

But on the other side,* 1.1667 we find many Burroughs who elected Burgesses in 26 E. 1. (as particularly Pontefract and Malton in Yorkshire) had no Summons that are yet found, from 26 E. 1. to 12 E. 4. Now whether this were by the King's special Di∣rections, the Desire of the Places, (as not being willing to be at the Charge of paying their Burgesses Wages, which were in that Age exacted) or the Carelesness of the Sheriffs, is a Que∣stion not easily to be determined; though it is certain, it might be by any of these Causes. That Poverty was a principal Cause, appears in the numerous Returns of the Sheriffs of Lan∣cashire,(y) 1.1668 when Lancaster and Preston before 33 E. 3. used to return Burgesses; but from thence, till after the Reign of King Edward the Fourth, we find the Return to be, Non est aliqua Civitas neque Burgus in Balliva mea: And the Reason is given in the Return 38 E. 3. Propter eorum debilitatem seu paupertatem, in∣opiam & paupertatem, or paupertatem & debilitatem, throughout the whole. For it was anciently really reputed a great Burthen for poor and small Burroughs to send Burgesses to Parliament, they being bound to defray their Charges.(z) 1.1669 So the Bailiffs and Commonalty of Toriton did repute it, and petitioned the King in Parliament to free them from this Burthen; as likewise did the Abbat of Leicester, Anno 14 E. 3. the Prior of St. James without Northampton, Anno 12 E. 2. by reason(a) 1.1670 of their Po∣verty, and extraordinary Expences in repairing to Parliaments, to be exempted from all future Parliaments, they not holding by Barony; and obtained their Request. So the Abbat of St. Augustine in Bristol, Pat. 15 E. 3. p. 1. m. 13.

Mr. Prynne(b) 1.1671 owns, That the King by his Letters Patents may exempt a Burrough unduely charged by the Practice of Sheriffs or others to send Men to Parliament against Right and common Usage; but not(c) 1.1672 such as by Duty and Custom ought to send and find Burgesses. Under this Head we may consider the Temporary(d) 1.1673 Exemption of R. 2. 6 Regni, to the Burgesses of Colchester, for five years, in consideration of the new building and fortifying their Walls: yet this did not exempt them; for it was against the Statute made 5 Ric. 2.(e) 1.1674 wherein it is expresly provided, That all Persons and Com∣monalties which shall from henceforth have Summons to the Parliament, shall come in the manner as they be bound to do, and have been accustomed, within this Realm of England, of old time: And the Sheriffs are punishable who leave out of the said Returns any Cities or Burroughs which be bound,* 1.1675 and of old times were wont to come to the Parliament. And in(f) 1.1676 23 H. 6. it is said, That divers Sheriffs of the Counties have

sometimes returned none of the Knights, Citizens, and Burges∣ses, lawfully chosen, but such which were never duly chosen, and other Citizens and Burgesses than those which by the Mayors and Bayliffs were to the said Sheriffs returned; and moreover made no Precepts to the Mayors or Bayliffs for the Electing of Citizens and Burgesses to come to Parliament. Which makes Mr. Prynne(g) 1.1677 infallibly resolve, that Sheriffs did before these Acts, arbitrarily issue out their Precepts to what Cities and Burroughs they pleased, which they might the more freely do, because the Precept to them was indefinite de qua∣libet Civitate & quolibet Burgo, used in all Writs since the 23(h) 1.1678 E. 1. without designing the particular Cities or Burroughs by name. By which means Sheriffs might use a kind of Arbi∣trary Power according as their Judgment directed them, or their affections of favour, partiality, malice, or the solicitations of any private Burrough to them, or of Competitors for Citi∣zens or Burgesses places within their County, swayed them; which opinion of Mr. Prynn's, as also that no new Burroughs by the Kings mere Grant, or the House of Commons Order, can be legally created, or old long discontinued Burroughs be enabled by Vote of the House of Commons to chuse and return Bur∣gesses to our English Parliaments, I shall leave to the discus∣sionof those it may concern.

There was one Custom anciently used (which was taken a∣way by the Statute of the 36 H. 6.* 1.1679) that in many Counties, the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses were elected on the same day in their County Courts, by the Suitors or others resorting to it; or by four or five Citizens and Burgesses only (whereof the Mayor, Bayliffs or chief Officer was usually one) sent from every City and Burrough to the County Court, there to elect their Citizens and Burgesses, so soon as the Knights were chosen, returning them often in one(i) 1.1680 Indenture, or the Knights alone, and the Citizens and Burgesses in another, under the Seals of the Citizens and Burgesses electing them, as appears by the Indenture for Cumberland 2 H 5. and that of Kent 12 H. 4. of Wilts 1 H. 5. and Bedford 2 H. 5. Before I dismiss this head, I shall note out of the great(k) 1.1681 Collections of Mr. Prynne,* 1.1682 that the total number of the Cities, Burroughs and Ports, either summoned by the Sheriffs Precepts or Writs to Elect and Return, or actually electing and returning Citizens, Burgesses or Barons of the Cinque Ports, from King Edward the First's Reign, to the end of Edward the Fourth, were but a Hundred and Seventy, and no more, whereof Seven never sent after E. 1st's. time, and Twenty of them but once during these Kings Reigns, and Thirteen of our Abbats, and Twenty Seven of our Priors were summoned to our Parliaments but once, and several Burroughs but twice, thrice, four or five or six times, all the whole time else being omitted: and as some were thus neglected,* 1.1683 so new ones supplied the number. In Edward the Second's time Nineteen new Burroughs being added, and as

many in Edward the Third's time. During the Reign•• of Rich∣ard the Second, Henry the Fourth and Fifth, no new Burroughs created at all; and during the Forty Nine Years Reign of Henry the Sixth, but Five new Burroughs; and in Edward the Fourth's time but one. He saith, that Fourteen new Burroughs have been made in Cornwal since K. Ed. 4.(l) 1.1684

By which is discovered the Error of the Compiler of the absurd gross late Imposture, Intituled, Modus tenendi Parlia∣mentum, so magnified by Sir Edward Coke,(m) 1.1685 beyond all bounds of Truth and Modesty; as also the great mistake of our learned judicious Antiquary(n) 1.1686 Mr. Lambard and(o) 1.1687 others of great note, who affirm that the true original Title and Right of all our ancient Cities and Burroughs, electing and sending Burgesses and Citizens to our Parliaments, is Prescription time out of mind, long before the Conquest; it being a Privilege they actually, and of right enjoyed in Edward the Confessor's time or before, and exercised ever since: Indeed the whole series of the great Councils in the Saxon, Danish and Norman Kings Reigns to the Forty Ninth of Henry the Third, evince the contrary.

As to the Wages of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses,* 1.1688 it be∣ing a thing now obsolete (though not out of force by those that would claim them) I shall only note, that the first Writ for them, is coeval with our Kings first Writs of Summons; and the reason given in the Writ is, That whereas the King had summoned two Knights, &c. and they had stayed(p) 1.1689 longer than they believed they should do, by reason of which they had been at no small Expence: therefore the King ap∣points the Sheriff by the counsel of Four lawful Knights, to provide for the Two Knights of the Shire their reasonable Expences.

The Writ of the 28 Ed. 1.(q) 1.1690 commands that they have ra∣tionabiles expensas suas, in veniendo ad nos, ibidem morando, & inde ad propria redeundo; their reasonable Expences in coming to the King, staying there, and returning to their homes. The like we find for the Citizens and Burgesses in the 1 Ed. 2. there was Four Shillings a day allowed for every Knight, and Two Shil∣lings for every Citizen and Burgess.

Mr. Prynne(r) 1.1691 gives many good reasons why these Wages were allowed, some of which I shall recite: As first, that all Laws allow Sallaries for Services, and those being public Ser∣vants and Representatives or Atturneys for the Counties, Cities, Burroughs, to consult about the great and arduous Affairs, neces∣sary Defence, Preservation and Wellfare of the King and King∣dom, and theirs, for and by whom they were intrusted; it is reason (as they receive the benefit of their good Service, in giving their good Advice towards the redressing of Grie∣vances, and making wholsom Laws) that they should have allowed their necessary Expences. Secondly, It appears in ancient times, there was no such ambition to be Parliament∣men

as of late, but the Persons elected thought it a burthen; therefore lest being elected they should neglect to repair to the Convention, they had Sureties called Manucaptors for their Appearance. Thirdly, This obliged the Counties, Cities and Burroughs to be carefuller in electing the discreetest, ablest, fittest and most laborious persons, who would speediest and best dispatch all Public business, which occasioned the short∣ness of Sessions. Fourthly, It begat a greater confidence, cor∣respondence and dependance betwixt the Electors and Elected. Fifthly, It kept poor petty Burroughs (unable to defray the Expences of their Burgesses) from electing or sending Mem∣bers to our Parliaments, and oblig'd some to Petition to be eased of the Charge; whereby the number of Burgesses was scarce half so many, and Parliaments were more expedi∣tious in Councils, Aids, Motions and their Acts and De∣bates, and so the Sessions were much shortned, the Elections were then fairer, and for the most part unquestionable, the Commons House less unwieldy, Privileges of Parliament less en∣larged beyond the ancient Standard, abuses in Elections, Re∣turns and Contests about them (by reason of the Mercenary and Precarious Voices) less troublesom: whereas now in every new Parliament a great part of the time is spent in the regulating Elections. But Mr. Prynne hints little upon one great cause of that usage, which was that in Burroughs as well as Cities, most what the persons elected were the Inhabitants in the Cities and Burroughs, Merchants, Tradesmen, or the most popular Burghers; as will appear to whoever peruseth the Chronologi∣cal Catalogue Mr. Prynne(s) 1.1692 with no small pains hath collected into his Fourth Part of his Brief Register, where I believe one can pitch upon no City of Burrough from the time of Ed. 1. to the 12 Ed. 4. but he will find by the very names, that they were such as I have mentioned. I am well assured of it for Yorkshire, and particularly for the City of York, they being generally such as we find in the List of their Mayors.

Beverly hath Four of the Sirnames of good Families, and Kingstone upon Hull hath(t) 1.1693 William a S. Pole, from whom the great Family of Suffolk sprung, but it is well known he was a Merchant there.

Now since every part of the Country abounds with Gentle∣men of Plentiful Fortunes,* 1.1694 Generous Education, such as are versed in Affairs of their Country, as Justices of the Peace, Deputy Lieutenants, and have been Sheriffs, Members of Par∣liament, and born Publick Offices; there can be no expecta∣tion or Fear, that those that are Candidates for Parliament Men for Burroughs, will expect any Sallary or Reward, so long as they chuse them. There being generally Competitors, who instead of expecting Wages, are generally obliged now to vast expences to purchase the Votes•• of the Electors; so that now the Honourable House of Commons is quite another thing, than what it was wont to be in elder Ages, when they

were summoned principally to give Assent to what the King and the Lords did, to assent to Aids, and Taxes, and apportion their own Taxes, bring up their Petitions concerning Grievan∣ces to be redressed by the King and his Council, or the King and Lords, and draw up Impeachments against great Offenders, and such like.

Having thus considered the Writs of Summons to the Mem∣bers of the House of Commons before Henry the Seventh's time in all its branches,* 1.1695 I shall give a Transcript of the Writ of Summons used at this day; whereby may be seen how much of the old form is continued, which I shall insert in Latin and English, that the Emphasis of the Original may not be lost.

REX

Vicecomiti Salutem, &c.

Quia de advisa∣mento, & assensu Concilii no∣stri, pro quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, nos, statum & defensionem Regni nostri An∣gliae, & Ecclesiae Anglicanae, con∣cernentibus; quoddam Parlia∣mentum nostrum apud, &c. die, &c. proxime futuro, teneri ordi∣navimus; & ibidem cum Prae∣latis, Magnatibus & Proceribus dicti Regni nostri colloquium ha∣bere & tractatum. Tibi prae∣cipimus, firmiter injungentes, quod facta Proclamatione in proximo Comitatu tuo post re∣ceptionem hujus Brevis nostri, tenendo die & loco praedicto, du∣os Milites gladiis cinctos, ma∣gis idoneos, & discretos Comi∣tatus praedicti, & de qualibet Civitate Comitatus illius, duos Cives, & de quolibet Burgo duos Burgenses, de discretioribus & magis sufficientibus, libere & indifferenter per illos qui Pro∣clamationi hujusmodi interfue∣rint, juxta formam Statutorum inde editorum & provisorum eligi, & nomina eorundem Mi∣litum, Civium, & Burgensium,

sic electorum, in quibusdam In∣denturis inter te & illos qui hujusmodi Electioni interfuerint, inde conficiendis, sive hujusmodi electi praesentes fuerint, vel ab∣sentes, inseri; eosque ad dictum diem & locum venire facias; ita quod iidem Milites, plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro se, & Communitate Comitatus praedicti; Cives & Burgenses pro se, & Communitate Civitatum & Burgorum praedictorum, di∣visim ab ipsis habeant, ad faci∣endum & consentiendum his quae tunc ibidem de communi Conci∣lio dicti Regni nostri (favente Deo) contigerint ordinari, su∣per negotiis ante dictis: Ita quod pro defectu potestatis hu∣jusmodi, seu propter improvi∣dam Electionem Militum, Civium aut Burgensium praedictorum, dicta negotia infecta non rema∣neant quovis modo. Nolumus autem quod tu nec aliquis alius Vicecomes dicti Regni nostri ali∣qualiter sit electus. Et Electio∣nem illam in pleno Comitatu factam distincte & aperte sub Sigillo tuo & Sigillis eorum qui Electioni illae interfuerint, nobis in Cancellariam nostram ad dictum d••em & locum certifices, indilate remittens nobis alte∣ram partem Indenturarum prae∣dictarum praesentibus consutam una cum hoc Brevi. Teste meipso apud Westmonast—

THE King

to the Sheriff, Greeting.

Whereas by the Advice and Consent of our Council,* 1.1696 for certain diffi∣cult and urgent business con∣cerning us and the State and defence of our Kingdom of England, and the English Church, we have ordained a certain Parliament of ours to be held at our City, of &c. the day, &c. next ensuing, and there to have conference,* 1.1697 and to treat with the Prelates, Great Men, and Peers of our said Kingdom. We command and straitly enjoyn you,* 1.1698 that making Proclamation at the next County Court after re∣ceipt of this our Writ, to be holden the day and place a∣foresaid;* 1.1699 you cause two Knights girt with Swords, the most fit and discreet of the County aforesaid; and of eve∣ry City of that County two Citizens;* 1.1700 and of every Bur∣rough,* 1.1701 two Burgesses of the discreeter, and most sufficient,* 1.1702 to be freely and indifferently chosen by them who shall be present at such Proclamation according to the tenure of the Statutes in that case made and provided,* 1.1703 and the names of the said Knights, Citizens and Burgesses so chosen, to be in∣serted

in certain Indentures, to be then made between you and those that shall be present at such Election, whether the parties so elected be present or absent; and shall make them to come at the said day and place;* 1.1704 so that the said Knights for themselves, and for the County aforesaid, and the said Citizens and Burgesses for themselves and the Commonal∣ty of the aforesaid Cities and Burroughs, may have several∣ly for them full and sufficient power to perform and to con∣sent to those things which (by the favour of God) shall there happen to be ordained by the Common Council of our said Kingdom concerning the busi∣nesses aforesaid;* 1.1705 so that the business may not by any means remain undone for want of such power,* 1.1706 or by reason of the improvident Ele∣ction of the aforesaid Knights, Citizens and Burgesses.* 1.1707 But we will not in any case, you or any other Sheriff of our said King∣dom shall be elected.* 1.1708 And at the day and the place aforesaid the said Election made in the full County Court,* 1.1709 you shall cer∣tify without delay to us in our Chancery, under your Seal, and the Seals of them which shall be present at that Election, sending back unto us the other part of the Indenture afore∣said, affiled to these Presents, together with this Writ. Wit∣ness our self at Westminster—

SECT. 7. Concerning the Speaker, and the Privileges of the House of Com∣mons.

IT is not my design to treat of all things relating to the Con∣stitution,* 1.1710 Laws, and Customs of the House of Com∣mons: there are several useful Books extant which are fit for the Honourable Members of the House, to consult. What I most aim at, is to shew what the Ancient Usage hath been, and how from time to time things have been refined to the Mode and State they are now in: and I hope those great Spirits that honour their Countries with their Service, will pardon one that designs nothing more than to give them a Profile of the whole Model, both in the days of our remotest Ancestors, and what it was in more Modern times, under just and undoubted Soveraigns; as also how much it was transformed when the pretended House of Commons being confederated with a suc∣cessful Army, murthered their Soveraign, voted away the House of Lords, and assumed the Title of the Supream Au∣thority of the Nation; of which last I shall treat in the next Chapter.

The Members being according to the Kings Command come to the place appointed; sometimes the Soveraign with the Lords in their Robes have rid in State to the Parliament, which is generally yet observed in Scotland and Ireland.* 1.1711 How∣ever at the opening of the Parliament the King is seated on his Throne under the Canopy with his Royal Crown on his Head, the Chancellor standing something backward on his Right-hand, and the great Officers, as Lord Treasurer, Lord President of the Kings Council, Lord Privy Seal, Great Chamber∣lain, the Lord Constable, Marshal, Lord Admiral, Lord Steward and Kings Chamberlain attend on either side the State, or in their Seats with the Ensigns of their Offices, some of the No∣bles being appointed to carry the Sword and the Cap of Mainte∣nance. Three great Gilt Maces are carried,* 1.1712 and all the Heralds attend in their Cloth of Gold Coats. The two Archbishops, and Bishops in their Robes sit upon Benches next the Wall on the Right-hand, and the rest of the Great Officers that stand not by the State, and all the Nobility in order upon the Bench on the Left-hand, or on the Forms that stand in the middle, where also sit the Judges, Master of the Rolls, Secretaries of State, twelve Masters of Chancery, Atturney General, Solici∣tor General, and Clerk of the Crown, and the other Clerks Assistants; which it is not my business exactly to describe.

The King being Seated, when it's his pleasure,* 1.1713 the House of Commons are sent for, who standing bare at the Lords Bar, attend the King's Speech, and the Chancellor's; and then have leave to chuse their Speaker, whom commonly some of

the Members of the House that are of the King's Privy-Coun∣cil, propose; and if any one oppose it,(u) 1.1714 he is to name another. But I shall refer the curious to Mr. Elsyng, and others that treat of this at large.

Sir Edward Coke(w) 1.1715 saith, That though the Commons are to chuse their Speaker, yet seeing that after their choice, the King may refuse him, for avoiding expence of time, and con∣testating about it, the use is (as in the Conge de eslier of a Bi∣shop) that the King (by some of his Privy-Council) (as in this present Parliament was done by the Earl of Middleton, on of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries) doth name a discreet and learned Man, whom the Commons elect; for without their Election no Speaker can be appointed for them, because he is their Mouth, and trusted by them, and so necessary, as the House of Commons cannot sit without him: So that if he be totally disabled by grievous Sickness, another must be cho∣sen in his place, as he instanceth in Sir John Cheney, 1 H. 4. and Sir John Tirrel,* 1.1716 15 H. 6. But whereas(x) 1.1717 he affirms, that in antient time the two Houses sate together, and the surest mark of the time of the division of them was, when the House of Commons had a continual Speaker: Mr. Prynne(y) 1.1718 in his Animadversions hath made the contrary very clear by several Records, wherein it's expresly said, they consulted apart; as particularly in 6 E. 3.(z) 1.1719 at York, the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and great Men by themselves, and the Knights of the Counties, and the People of the Commons by themselves, treated of the Business propounded to them. Another(a) 1.1720 saith, That if Sir Ed∣ward means the Lords and Commons did sit and vote together in one Body, few will believe it; because the Commons never were wont to lose, or forgo any of their Liberties or Privi∣ledges: and for them to stand now bare, where they were u∣sed to sit and vote, (upon this Supposal) is an alteration not imaginable to be indured by them: and when we consider the sole Power of Judicature in the Lords, and who the Burgesses were in old times, it still makes it more improbable, and it is to me a very remarkable thing, that neither in History or Re∣cord, any thing is to be found that will clear this doubt. How∣ever it is certain that(b) 1.1721 50, and 51 E. 3. the Commons had a Speaker, and Sir Edward Coke(c) 1.1722 saith, that the accustom∣ed(d) 1.1723 place of that thrice worthy Assembly of the Knights, Citi∣zens and Burgesses of Parliament (when held in Westminster) was in the Chapter-house of the Abbat of Westminster, and it continued so till the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. c. 14. which gave the King Colleges, free Chappels, &c. whereby the King enjoyed the beautiful free Chappel of St. Stephen, founded by King Stephen, (which had Lands and Revenues of the old yearly value of 1089 Pound, ten Shillings five Pence) since which time the Chappel thereof hath served for the House of Com∣mons, when Parliaments have been held at Westminster.

As Sir Edward Coke (because he believed the two Houses sate together) will not allow them to have had a Speaker before 50 E. 3. so on the other hand Mr.(e) 1.1724 Elsyng saith, That the Commons ever had a Speaker, none will doubt, for their Consultation apart from the Lords; though, he thinks, they of∣ten met, and did sit together in one Room, and then a Speaker was necessary to avoid Confusion of Speech and Argument. But he brings no better Argument for it(f) 1.1725 than that Petrus de Mountfort,(g) 1.1726 44 H. 3. signed the Letter to Pope Alexander, touching the recalling of Adomar elect Bishop of Winchester from Banishment: Wherein they say, if the King, and the Reg∣ni Majores hoc volent, Communitas tam••n ipsius, in Angliam jam nul∣latenus sustineret: and this was sealed by all the Lords, and by Peter de Mountford vice totius Communitatis; which, he saith, sheweth plainly they had a Speaker.

In answer to which, I suppose it a great mistake to say that Petrus de Mountfort signed the Letter vice Communitatis (which either ignorantly, or willfully, is Printed in Mr. Elsyng, Comita∣tus) for(h) 1.1727 Matthew Paris, who relates the whole Story, saith it was signed by ten Persons, who were all great Barons, vice totius Communitatis, and the Preface of the Letter shews it was Communitas Comitum, Procerum, Magnatum, aliorum{que} Regni Angliae: and this aliorum can mean only the Milites, which held by Military Service of the great Barons, and the lesser Tenents in Capite, which were no Representatives of the Com∣mons, as our Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses at this day are; and the Inscription of the Popes Letter shews, who he understood this Communitas to be, when he superscribes it dilectis Filiis Nobilibus viris, Consiliariis clarissimi in Christo Filii nostri illustris Regis Angliae, ac caeteris Proceribus & Magnatibus Regni Angliae.

Now the Persons that subscribed this, are thus ranked by Matthew Paris, R. de Clare, Gloverniae & Herefordiae, S. de Monte∣forti Legriae, E. Bigod Marescallus Angliae, H. de Bohun Hertfor∣diae, & Essex, W. Albemarle, J. de Placeto Warewici Comitis, H. Bigod Justiciarius Angliae, P. de Sabaudia, J. Filius Gal∣fridi, Jacobus de Audel, & Petrus de Monteforti, vice totius Com∣munitatis praesentibus Literis sigilla nostra apposuimus in Testimonium praedictorum. So that it is plain it was not Peter de Montefort that signed vice Communitatis, but they all did it, and he was a great Baron himself, the Head of whose Barony was Belde∣sent Castle in Warwickshire.

I think it not amiss here to offer my Opinion concerning this Question, and the great Controversie betwixt Dr.* 1.1728 Brady and Mr. Petyt, and those that are so earnest to find the Com∣mons summoned to Parliament before the 49 H. 3. be∣fore King John granted his Charter (wherein he grants that he will cause to be summoned the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Earls and greater Barons of his Kingdom singly by his Letters, and besides(i) 1.1729 will cause to be summoned in general by his

Sheriffs,* 1.1730 and Bayliffs, all others which hold of him in Capite at a certain day) there is no doubt but the Tenents in Capite (such of them at least as were eminent for Parts, or as the King plea∣sed) were summoned to the great Councils; and it being in that Charter said, that the cause of the Meeting should be expressed in the Summons, and that Forty days warning should be given; and in the same Charter, that the City of London should have all its ancient Liberties and free Customs, and that all other Cities, Burghs and Villa's (which was of the same import as a Free Burrough, as we find in Pontefract, which is always stiled Villa,* 1.1731 and the Inhabitants Burgenses, who held a certain Land cal∣led Burgage Land) and the Barons of the Cinque Ports, and all the Ports should have all their Liberties and their Free Customs, & ad habendum commune concilium Regni de Auxiliis, &c. that is as I suppose, to have some of their Members at the great Coun∣cils, where Aids were to be granted to the King, other ways than in three cases before excepted, that is, to redeem the Kings body, to make his Eldest Son a Knight, and to marry once his Eldest Daughter; excepting which three Particulars (reserved before) in his Charter, he had granted that no Scutage nor Aid should be laid on his Kingdom unless by the Common Council of his Kingdom.

From whence I think may be inferred, that such Cities, Burroughs and Villa's, which held in Capite, or the Lord that was principal owner of them, by his Praepositus Ballivus, or some that held immediately under him, and so some for the Dominicae Civitates & Burgi Regis, might be summoned, with the lesser Barons, or the other Tenents inc Capite. But this doth not prove them to come by way of Representatives, nor that they had any more Power than the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses had in after-times, which (as I have made it apparent by the several expressions in the Summons) was only to hear, and assent to what the King and Magnates ordained.

Since there are now extant no Summons in King John's time, or before the 49 H. 3. (except some few that are about the Tenents in Capite aiding the King in his Wars) the subsequent Practices are the best Expounders of ancient Usages.

Upon the whole I do judge, that before King John's Char∣ter, there were many of the Tenents in Capite summoned to the great Councils, but so as the King had his liberty to summon whom he pleased; and that some from Cities, Burghs, Villa's and other Ports did come to the great Council, but still at the Kings pleasure, and that in King John's time, the body of the Kingdom siding with the Lords (that so often rebelled against him) the Lords thinking to make their Party stronger, got the Clause for other Tenents in Capite to be summoned by general Summons.* 1.1732

Now whatever number were convened, before King John's Charter, this general Summons must greatly encrease the House of Commons, as I may call it; and there needs no such strife

about the want of Freemen in these Councils; for after this Charter all who were properly Freemen, were capable, the other were generally Tenents to them, and Homagers, (which was a Tenure that though it might free their Persons, yet their Lands were obnoxious to forfeiture upon every breach of Ho∣mage; and their Lords had the power of taxing them) so that in some sense they were their Tenents Representatives: and as long as they were Freeholders themselves, and were a more numerous body (if they all appeared, as for any thing I see they might do, if not hindred by Impotence, Nonage, or the Kings service) they far exceeded the number of Representatives in the Reigns of King H. 3. E. 1. and E. 2. So that it amounts to the same thing, as to the general Freedom of the Nation, when all these were Members of the Great Councils,* 1.1733 whether the common Freeholder were represented or not, as now (which Dr. Brady hath so nervously confuted every where in his Intro∣duction, that they were not) that I think the Freedom Mr. Petyt, Mr. Pen, and others make so great a coyl about, no ways im∣paired by Dr. Brady; who like a judicious Person, would have us use propriety of Speech, and rather be thankful for the Freedom we now enjoy, and our Ancestors have from time to time obtained, by the grant of Kings, than to make such Claims to native Freedoms and Liberties (as Mr. Pen would have it, that our Ancestors contended for) as if their Ance∣stors had enjoyed them before we had any Kings, and stipula∣ted with their Kings for them, before they admitted them to Soveraignty; which no considering person that will impartially read ancient History, either of our Country or others, can find any certain footsteps of.

To return now to the business (which the foregoing obser∣vation gives some light to) I conceive as the Thegns (the Kings Prepositi and Reeves,* 1.1734 by reason of their Imployments about the Kings Demesn Lands, governing of Burroughs, Stewards of Hundreds, Wapentakes, and men employed in other civil Affairs of the Kingdom) did meet in the Saxon Councils: so from Cities and Burroughs, where great Lords had Fees (as most, if not all of them may be easily proved to have been held immediately of the King, or of some of the very great Barons) there might come before King John's time, some Mem∣bers to the great Council, being in the Charter, to my judgment, reckoned as one of their Franchises, or rather something ex∣ceeding their municipal Liberties and Free Customs, being coupled to them with an and to have a Priviledge to have some of them Members of the great Council of the Kingdom;* 1.1735 for so I think the words & ad habendum commune Concilium Regni de Auxiliis must be understood: But then when it is re∣stricted there with de Auxiliis only; it may very well give a ground to their opinion that think the principal use was to pro∣portion the Aid or Tax, and assent to what the King, the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons and Peers did ordain.

However this was,* 1.1736 it seems clear to me, that this numerous bo∣dy of so different an Order from the Barons majores, must have a distinct Place for consulting apart, and must select Committees to transact with the King and Lords, and must for order sake ap∣point some to speak for them, what they petitioned for or as∣sented to, and could not constantly sit with the Prelates and Lords; and do rather believe that the Prelates had one place where they sate, and the Barons another, and these Tenents in Capite a third, at least for their usual Consultations among their own Order, and met in the public place when there was occasion, or might have access by Committees: which cer∣tainly was the practice in after-times, as appears in that Par∣liament of 6 E. 3.(k) 1.1737 the morrow after the Nativity of our Lady, the King requiring the advice of his Parliament, touch∣ing his French Affairs, and Voyage thither. It is said they thereupon treated and deliberated, that is to say, the Prelates by themselves, and the said Earls, Barons and other great men by themselves, and also the Knights of the Counties by themselves, and then gave their advice. From whence by the way we may observe the true ground of calling our Parliament Houses, without the King, the three Estates.

Having dispatched this, I come now to consider the Speakers of the House of Commons. Hackwel(l) 1.1738 and Elsyng name the first that is found upon Record, to be Sir William Trussel 13 E. 3. Num. 9. where it is said, Les Chivalers des Countes & les Commons responde∣rent per Monsieur William Trussel, but the Record names him not Speaker, however he performed that Office then. Hackwel names Scroope before him 6 E. 3. and Sir Peter de la Mare after him; but the first that Mr. Elsyng or Mr. Prynne(m) 1.1739 finds upon Re∣cord, and by the name of Speaker, is Sir Thomas Hungerford, 51 E. 3. for it is said that the last day of the Parliament, he de∣clared, that during the Parliament he had generally moved the King to pardon all such as were in the last Parliament unjustly convicted: which imports that this was a Petition of the Com∣mons, presented by him their Speaker.

Anno 1 R. 2. Sir Peter de la Mare, being Speaker, made his Pro∣testation, that what he had to say, was from the whole House, therefore required if he should speak any thing haply without their consents, that the same ought to be amended before his de∣parture from the said place.

The first Petition we meet with, that a Speaker(n) 1.1740 made to the King from the Commons, was 2 R. 2. by Sir James Picke∣ring their Speaker, that if he should speak any thing that haply might be ill taken, it might be as nothing, so as the Commons might at any time amend the same, and the like he petitioned for himself: which is the first Petition as to Liberty of Speech, we meet with.

The first Speaker presented to the King in full(o) 1.1741 Parlia∣ment by the Commons, 20 Ric. 2. was Sir John Bushey the King's great Favourite. In this Parliament the Houses sate together

in a long(p) 1.1742 House built of Timber in the Palace-Yard, at the Impeachment of the Duke of Gloucester, the Earls of Arun∣del and Warwick. Sir Arnold Savage was Speaker, 2 H. 4. who is the first upon Record that the Commons were required by the King to chuse as Speaker; and he was again in 5 H. 4. who desired the King in the name of the Commons, that they might freely make complaint of any thing amiss in Government; which was yielded to by the King.

Anno 7 H. 4. Sir John Tiptost was chosen Speaker, who de∣sired to be discharged, because of his Youth; but he was al∣lowed: he forgot to make the usual Protestation, but came up the next day, and made it with this Addition,(q) 1.1743 That if any Writing were delivered by the Commons in this Parliament, and they should desire to have it again to amend any thing there∣in, it might be restored to them; which was granted. While he was Speaker, he Signed and Sealed the Deeds of the entailing of the Crown on H. 4.(r) 1.1744 with these words, Nomine totius Communitatis. He was a Person of extraordinary Parts, Son of John Lord Tiptost, and for all the Apology for his young Age, he was within three Years after made Lord Treasurer of Eng∣gland, and by H. 6. made Marquess of Worcester.

Anno 1 H. 5. William Sturton Esquire, was chosen Speaker, who without the assent of his Companions, did agree before the King to deliver in Parliament certain Articles; but three days after the Commons sent Sir John Doreword(r) 1.1745 with seve∣ral of their Members to the House of Lords, to declare to the King, that their Speaker had no Authority from them to yield thereto, and the King was pleased to accept of it.

There are three Petitions the approved Speaker makes to the King: First, That the Commons may have freedom of Speech, as of(s) 1.1746 right and custom they have had, and all their anci∣ent and just Privileges and Liberties allowed them. In Sir Tho∣mas Moor's Speech 14 H. 8. it was thus worded, That if in com∣munication and reasoning, any man in the Commons House, should speak more largely than of duty they ought to do, that all such offences should be pardoned, and to be entred upon Record; which was granted: only I find that H. 4.(t) 1.1747 said that the hoped, or doubted not, that the Members of Parlia∣ment would not speak any unfitting thing, or abuse this Free∣dom and Privilege.

The second is,* 1.1748 That if he shall commit any Error in any thing he shall deliver in the name of the Commons, no fault may be im∣puted to the Commons, and that he may resort again to them, for Declaration of his good Intent, and that his Error may be pardoned. The third is, That as often as necessity for his Maje∣sties Service, and the good of the Common-wealth shall require, he may by direction of the House of Commons have access to His Majesty.

SECT. 8. Of Priviledges of the House of Commons concerning Liberty of Speech.

HAving thus brought this Honourable Assembly together, and their Speaker placed in his Chair, I shall touch something of their Privileges, which since the days of Sir Edward Coke, and much by his Influence, have been enlarged beyond what was used in antient times. I shall begin with that of Freedom of Speech in their Debates.

It cannot be conceived in so great a Body as the House of Commons,* 1.1749 that what is proposed by one, and seconded by o∣thers, shall not admit of Debate: Though all may aim at the same end, the good of the King and People; yet they may differ in the ways and methods of attaining it, and whoever would straighten a crooked Rod, must bend it as far on the contrary side. I doubt not but the nemine contradicente was put into the Printed Votes, when Mr. Williams had the Chair, rather ad faciendum populum, than that there was such an Har∣monious Concurrence, as then was blazed abroad.

Anno 4(u) 1.1750 H. 8. An Act was made concerning Richard Strowde, Esquire, which declareth that all Suits, Accusements, Condemnations, &c. to be put or had upon any Member of that or succeeding Parliaments, for any Bill, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters concerning the Parliament, to be communed or treated of, be utterly void and of none effect. This by(w) 1.1751 the Lords, 11 Decemb. 1667. was decla∣red a d••claratory Law of the antient and necessary Rights and Priviledges of Parliament, and so the Judgment against Denzil, late Lord Hollis, was nulled, and against others in King Charles the First's time.

Yet it is manifest that Queen Elizabeth in two Cases shewed how far, even motions in Parliament, contrary to her Laws, Prero∣gative, and Pleasure expressed, were to be treated. The(x) 1.1752 first was a motion by Mr. Paul Wentworth, 23 Eliz. for a publick set Fast, and for a Preaching every Morning at Seven of the Clock, before the House sate, and the Preachers to be ap∣pointed by the Privy-Council that were of the House; but the Queen sent them a Message by the Vice-Chamberlain, that she had in great admiration, the rashness of the House, in com∣mitting such an apparent contempt of her express Command, and to put in Execution such an Innovation, without her Pri∣vity and Pleasure first known; so that by Mr. Vice-Chamberlain they sent their Submission to her. Anno 35 Eliz. Mr. Peter Wentworth, and Sir Henry Bromley delivered a Petition to the Lord-Keeper, desiring the Lords of the upper House to be sup∣pliants with them of the lower House to her Majesty, for en∣tailing the Succession of the Crown, whereof a Bill was ready

drawn by them. The Queen was highly displeased, as being against her express Order, and charged the Lords of her Council to call the parties before them, and Mr. Wentworth was by them committed to the Tower, and others, with Sir Hen. Bromley to the Fleet; the Parliament then sitting: and when Mr. Wroth moved, That the House might be humble Sui∣tors to the Queen for their Liberty, it was answered by the Privy Counsellors in the House, that the causes of Commitment were best known to her self, and the House must not call the Queen to account for what she doth of her Royal Authority; for her Majesty liked no such Questions, neither did it become the House to search into those matters. So Mr.* 1.1753 Morrice Attur∣ney of the Court of Wards, was taken out of the House, Feb. 28. and committed to Prison, for delivering in a Bill a∣gainst the abuses of the Bishops; the Queen sending for Sir Edward Coke then Speaker, and charging him upon his Allege∣ance, if any such Bill were exhibited, not to read it.

At another time, long before this, she told the Speaker, and the body of the House of Commons, moving her to Marriage, That if it had been with limitation of place, or person, she must needs have misliked it, and thought it a great presumpti∣on in those to take it upon them to bind and limit, whose du∣ty it was to Obey.

King Charles the First was very infortunate to have so many Firebrands in some, if not all, of his Parliaments;* 1.1754 which if the rest of the Houses had been pleased to have extinguished by timely and nipping reprehensions, we had never seen the Government of Church and State so reduced into Ashes, that there was nothing remained of the beautiful Pile. In some of his Speeches he calls those evil Members, Vipers; but it was his misfortune to anger and exasperate them rather than suppress them; so that at last, they stung him to Death. It is a very ill condition, when a Prince hath such Wolves by the Ears, that he is in danger whether he hold them or let them go. The At∣tacque upon the five Members, and letting fall the pursuit, was one of the false thrusts that left him unguarded.

In the Close of one of the Parliaments of Queen Eliza∣beth, the(y) 1.1755 Chancellor tells them, There be certain of the House of Commons (though not many) who have shewed themselves Audacious, Arrogant and Presumptuous, calling her Majesties Grants, and Prerogatives into question, contrary to the express admonition given in her Majesties name in the be∣ginning of the Parliament, which it might very well have be∣come them to have regard to; but her Majesty saith, That see∣ing they thus willfully forget themselves, they are otherwise to be remembred.

Indeed there seems good reason, that such, who make ad∣vantage of their being Members of Parliament, to sow their Seditious Discourses; and under the Protection of being Mem∣bers, take the boldness to calumniate the Government, and

raise Jealousies betwixt the King and his People, to alienate their Affections, and Allegeance from him, after the expiration of their Protection (if the House will not call them to an ac∣count) should not only lose the Favour of their Prince, but should be punished for Sedition as far as by Law is allowed, as well as they are liable to other proceedings in Law.

It becomes therefore all lovers of the excellent Constituti∣on of Parliaments to be very wary in this point, lest, as Mr. Justice Hutton said in another Case, Things being carried disa∣strously by some Members Ambition, may bring such a distast against the course of Parliaments, as we, and all that love the Commonwealth, have just cause to be sorry for it.

SECT. 9. Of the Privilege from Arrests.

ALthough the Speakers formerly petitioned only, That all their Ancient, and Just Privileges, and Liberties be al∣lowed them; yet we(z) 1.1756 find that Sir Tho. Gargrave, Sir Tho. Richardson, Sir Thomas Crew, Sir Heneage Finch, and all later Speakers have expressed this Privilege particularly, that for better attending the Publick and Importunate Service of the House, themselves, and their necessary Attendants, may be free both in Person and Goods from all Arrests and trouble, according to our Ancient Priviledges and Immunities, which Sir Tho. Gargrave 1 Eliz. is said first to make the first of any.

This indeed is one of the ancientest Privileges the House of Commons may claim, and Mr. Prynne labours to prove it the only Privilege properly so to be called, and Sir Edward(a) 1.1757 Coke mentions no other.

The first thing that appears upon Record, is, the Petition of(b) 1.1758 the Master of the Temple, in which he desires, Quod habeat licentiam distringendi tempore Parliamenti; to which the King an∣swers thus, Non videtur honestum quod Rex concedat quod illi de Con∣cilio suo distringantur tempore Parliamenti, set alio tempore distrin∣gat per hostia & fenestras, ut moris est; that is, The Master petitions, that he may have power to distrein for Rent in time of Parlia∣ment; to which the King answers, That it seems not honest, that the King should grant, that they of his Council should be distrained in time of Parliament, but that he may distrain at another time by the Door and Windows, as the Custom was.

Mr.(c) 1.1759 Prynne in his Fourth Part of his brief Register would have the Privilege to be Personal, and so to necessary Servants attending, and but to take place the first day he is a Member, after he hath taken the Oath, and not to extend to Chancery Suits, and I know not how many diminutions of this Privi∣lege; so I shall only recommend the Inquisitive Reader to his

Collections, and for the full enumeration of all Cases that have been determined by the House of Commons, to(d) 1.1760 Mr. Hackwel, who hath collected all Modern Precedents; it being a Book very useful to understand the modern usage of the House of Commons in passing Bills, and other necessary points, that such as are not versed in the practice of, may find very beneficial to them; and shall add upon this Head, the Summa∣ry of King Edward the Second's Writ to the Sheriff of York∣shire, to take Pledges of Walter Fleming of York, and three others, to appear the next Easter Term, to show why they Ar∣rested the Prior Malton, returning from the Parliament at Lin∣coln to his Priory,* 1.1761 whenas the King ought to protect and de∣fend the Members of Parliament in their coming to, staying there, and returning from the Parliament; the words are, Cum ad Parliamenta in quibus tam nostri, quam Regni nostri ne∣gotia debent pertractari, Praelatos, Comites, Barones, & alios tam Clericos quam Laicos, per quorum industriam super negotio hujusmo∣di, Consilium salubrius poterit adhiberi, ad mandata nostra vocatos, & comparentes, in veniendo ad eadem Parliamenta, ibidem mo∣rando, & exinde redeundo, ab omnimodis inju••iis, oppressionibus & gravaminibus nos oportet protegere & tueri.* 1.1762

This Privilege seems to be grounded upon King(e) 1.1763 Edward the Confessor's Laws, properly applicable to Liberty, to attend Divine Worship, Synods, and Chapter-meetings: the words are, Si quispiam devote ad celebrationem Sancti, pacem habeat eun∣do, subsistendo, redeundo, item omnibus ad Ecclesiam causa Orationis euntibus, pax in eundo, & redeundo sit eis; similiter ad Synodum, ad Capitula venientibus. The curious may see more in the Leges Saxonicae, Sect. 9. and in Frederick(f) 1.1764 Lindebrogus.

It is to be noted, that this, as all other Privileges, in from the Kings Grant,* 1.1765 as Dyer is express in his Argument on this Case, That the person of every such Member ought to be pri∣vileged from Arrest at the Suit of any private Person during the time that he is busied about the Affairs of the King and the Realm; and this(g) 1.1766 Privilege is always granted by the King to his Commons at the Request of the Speaker of Par∣liament the first day; and those that had the benefit of this Privilege, obtained it by a Writ of Privilege issuing out of Chancery; but of late, it is done by the Houses verbal Order, Serjeant or Mace, without any Writ of Privilege, Habeas Cor∣pus, previous complaint, Petition to, or Order from the King and Lords, as in former times; against which usage Mr. Prynne makes loud Complaints.

The first Precedent Mr. Prynne or others can discover, being that of Mr. Ferrers recited at large in(h) 1.1767 Holingshed, which in short is this: Mr. George Ferrers being the Kings Servant and Bur∣gess for Plymouth, was Arrested by a Process out of the Kings Bench, carried to the Counter: Byorder of the House the Serjeant of the Parliament was sent to demand delivery, but was force∣ably resisted, and the Crown of the Mace of Arms was beaten

off in defending the Serjeant. This being declared to the House (of whom there were not a few, as well of the Kings Privy Council, as also of his Privy Chamber) they would sit no longer without their Burgess, but retired to the Upper House, where the whole Case was declared by Sir Thomas Moile their Speaker, before Sir Thomas Audley Lord Chancellor; and all the Lords and Judges there assembled, judging the contempt to be very great, referred the punishment thereof to the Or∣der of the Commons House. The Lord Chancellor offered to grant them a Writ to the Sheriffs of London to require de∣livery; which the House refused, being clear in opinion, that all Commandments, and other Acts proceeding from the nether House were to be done and executed by their Serjeant, without Writ, only by shew of his Mace which was his War∣rant.

The House applying it self to the Lords, (who were, saith Mr. Prynne,(i) 1.1768 the ancient proper Judges of the Vio∣lations and Violators of the Commons Privileges) was the right Parliamentary way for their Members Release; and if they had applied themselves to them at first, they had pre∣vented all Affronts to(k) 1.1769 themselves and Officers, and met with no opposition. And Mr. Prynne humbly apprehends that this Precedent will not warrant an absolute Jurisdiction in the House of Commons without any antecedent Complaint or(l) 1.1770 Petition to the King or Lords in Parliament, to punish any breach of their Members Privileges, not first complained of to,* 1.1771 and adjudged by the King or Lords to be an actual breach, or referred to themselves by the Lords or King, to punish, or without their subsequent Ratification; or that it will justifie the Enlargement of any of their Members or me∣nial Servants out of Execution by their Mace alone, without an Habeas Corpus, Writ of Privilege, or special Act of Parli∣ament, or matter of Record for the Sheriff or Officers Indem∣nity against Actions of Escape, or for the Plaintiffs relief to recover his Debt by a second Execution: for the proof of all this I must refer the inquisitive Reader to Mr. Prynne's(m) 1.1772 Fourth Part of his Brief Register, wherein he hath largely ex∣amined most of the then claimed Privileges of the House of Commons, and disallows of them, when not judged by the King and Lords. In which Controversie I shall not presume to write any thing, because it will be more pleasant and satis∣factory to have recourse to himself.

SECT. 10. Concerning Regulating Elections.

THE first thing I find concerning new Elections, in the place of Absents and Defaulters, is in the 5 E. 2.* 1.1773 as I have touched before; divers Knights, Citizens and Burgesses departing from the Parliament, the King thereupon issued out Writs to several Sheriffs, to summon them to return to the Par∣liament,* 1.1774 or to chuse other fit persons in their places, if they can∣not be at leisure to come up.

The Commons in this Age medled not with the re-summon∣ing, or causing new ones to be Elected, in the rooms of those that could not come.

I have before instanced in several Summons,* 1.1775 wherein the Kings ordain the Sheriffs to re-summon the Members of for∣mer Parliaments, or others, for those who were dead, or un∣able, and sometimes but one of those: By which it appears, that in those days the King solely Authorized new Elections, where any were dead or disabled.

The first Petition against an undue Election,* 1.1776 that I have met with, is Anno 7 R. 2. from the Mayor, Bailiffs, and Commons of Shaftsbury: To our thrice Excellent and thrice Gracious Lord, our Lord the King, and the thrice noble Lords, and sage Commons of this present Parliament, That whereas they had chosen Walter Henly, and Thomas Steward, the Sheriff of Dorsetshire, for the last had returned Thomas Camel, to the great dammage of our Lord the King, and contrary to the Will of the Mayor, &c. So that here the Complaint is to the King, the Lords, and Commons jointly, and the name of this Camel is not endorsed returned in the Writ, but the other two.

In all the Statutes made for regulating Elections, they run,* 1.1777 The King willeth and commandeth, 5 Ric. 2. c. 4. Our Lord the King at the grievous complaint of the Commons, hath ordain∣ed, 7 H. 4. c. 15. and so, Our Lord the King ordained, 11 H. 4. c. 1.5 H. 5. and such like in all the Statutes to 8 H. 6.

So in the Statute, 5 R. 2. Par. 2. c. 4. All Persons which shall from henceforth receive the Summons of Parliament,* 1.1778 and come not at the said Summons (except he may reasonably and honestly excuse himself to our Soveraign Lord the King) shall be amerced, and otherwise punished, as of old time, &c. So that here the Excuse is to be made to the King; so that it was not then in use for the Commons to fine and tax their Members.

In the Parliament holden at Westminster, 5 H. 4.* 1.1779 because .the Writ of Summons of Parliament, returned by the Sheriff of Rutland, was not sufficiently or duly returned, as the Com∣mons conceived, the said Commons prayed our Lord the King,* 1.1780 and the Lords in Parliament, that this matter may be duly exami∣ned in Parliament, &c. Whereupon our Lord the King in full Par∣liament

commanded the Lords in Parliament to examine the said matter, and to do thereupon as to them should seem best in their Discretions. So the Lords called before them the She∣riffs, and Parties, and it was agreed by the said Lords, that the Sheriff should amend his Return, and the Sheriff for his default should be discharged of his Office, and committed Prisoner to the Fleet, and make Fine and Ransom at the King's pleasure.

Upon this and other Precedents Mr.* 1.1781 Prynne saith, That no Sta∣tute doth give the Commons House the least Power or Authori∣ty to judg or determine the Legality or Illegality of any Electi∣ons, but leaves this to the King and Lords to redress, as at first before their making, and gives the Knights duly chosen, but not returned, a hundred Pound Damages against the Sheriffs, and Citizens and Burgesses forty Pound against Mayors and Bailiffs, who make false Returns, by way of Action of Debt in the Kings Courts at Westminster, or in the Star-Chamber, when in being, or before the King, Lords, and Council, as in Bron∣ker's case,* 1.1782 Trin. 1 Eliz. not in the Commons House, as the Statutes and Precedents in the Law-Books resolve. So that he saith, how the Commons are now become sole Judges of all false Returns, and Elections, and that perlegem & consuetudi∣nem Parliamenti, against all these Acts and Precedents, let Sir Edward Coke and others resolve him, and the Intelligent when they are able; for late and arbitrary Priviledges are of no value, but ancient usage, and Law of our Parliaments, and solid Reason, which cannot be produced to justify these late Innovations and Extravagances.

The Statute of 8 H. 6.* 1.1783 to prevent Tumults, Uproars, and Disorders in the Elections, is grounded upon a Petition from the Commons, that the King by advice and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, would seclude all but Free∣holders of forty Shillings a Year Lands above all Reprizals: which was more than forty Pound a Year now, being the twentieth part of a Knights Fee.

In 18 H. 6.* 1.1784 it was shewed to the King and the Lords Spiri∣tual and Temporal, That Gilbert Hore, Sheriff of the County of Cambridge, made no Return of Knights upon the King's Writ: Whereupon the King, by Advice and Assent of the Lord Spiritual and Temporal, ordered a new Writ. So that then there were no other but the King that had the Power to cause new Elections, with Advice and Consent of the Lords; and so the King issued out new Writs.

Anno 29 H. 6. Nicholas Stynecle Knight, Richard Bevel, &c. and other notable Esquires, Gentlemen, and other Men holding Fees, who may expend 40 s. per Annum, beyond Reprizes, chose Robert Stonham and John Stynecle, notable Esquires.

To this is annexed a Petition to the King our Gracious and Sovereign Lord,* 1.1785 signed by 140 Gentlemen and Freeholders, in behalf of those against one Henry Gimber, who was not of Gentile Birth, chosen by the number of 70. and the Under-Sheriff

countenanced him and his Party, and would not suffer these 140 to be examined about their Estates, and give Voice, thoue he might clearly yarely expend 20 Mark, without that we should have offended the Peace of Yow, our most doutye Soveraign Lord, and so we departed, for dread of the said Inconveniences, that was likely to be done of Manslaughter; and what the Sheriff will return in this behalf we can have no notice. For which Causes, we your true humble Suggets and Liegemen, in our most lowly Wise, beseeching you our most douty Sovereign Lord and King, these Premisses may be considered for Your most Aid, and our Freedom; that the said Sheriff may be by Your great Highness streightly charged to return the said Robert Stoneham, &c. Thus far the Petition.

From this memorable Petition Mr. Prynne makes many obser∣vations; the principal of which are, that the King himself was to redress and rectify all false and undue Returns. Secondly, That this is the only clear Declaration and Record, he hath met with, complaining against a Sheriff giving of an Oath,* 1.1786 and Poll to some Freeholders, and denying it to others. Thirdly, That when legal Electors cannot be sworn or polled, without breach of the Peace, or Manslaughter; they may justly de∣part, and ought to make such a complaint and declaration, under their hands and Seals. Fourthly, That Ignoble persons, who are not of Gentile birth, ought not to be elected Knights of Shires. Whoever desires to peruse more concerning the an∣cient usage in Elections, may peruse Mr. Prynne's Plea for the Lords, from page 371. to 416. his Second Part of Brief Register, p. 118, 119, 139, 140. and several other places.

I shall only add what Queen Eliz.* 1.1787 18 Regni said in this case, That she was sorry the Commons medled with chusing and returning Knights of the Shire for Norfolk (it is to be presumed, the like she might have said of any other County, if there had been occasion) a thing impertinent for the House to deal with, and only belonging to the Office and Charge of the Lord Chan∣cellor; from whom the Writs issue, and are returned.

Having thus given a brief account of the ancient Usage, I come to the modern way, which, according to Mr. Hackwell,* 1.1788 is that a general order hath usually been made in the beginning of the Session, to Authorize the Speaker to give Warrant for new Writs, in case of Death of any Member; or of double Returns, where the Party makes his choice openly in the House, during that Session, as it was ordered in the beginning of the Parliament, 18, and 21 Jacobi primi: and where such general Order is not made, Writs have issued by Warrant of the Speak∣er, by Vertue of special Order, upon motion in the House; and this Warrant is to be directed to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, by order of Parliament, 13 Nov. 1601.

The Committee of Privileges, 24 March, 21 Jacobi making their Report, a question was put, Whether Sir Thomas Holland, and Sir John Corbet, were well elected Knights for Norfolk; the House were divided, and it was over-ruled by the House,

that the No's should go forth. So that now the House of Com∣mons are the sole Judges of the validity or invalidity of E∣lections; and I suppose the King and Lords, judging the House the competentest Persons to make enquiry, and being willing to be eased of the trouble of such Matters as relate only to the Members of the House of Commons, have rather by conni∣vence, than by any positive Ordinance in the House of Lords, dismissed this to the House of Commons: against which, Mr. Prynne sadly complains,* 1.1789 saying, That since the Committees of Privileges have interposed in them, their Proceedings have been very irregular, and illegal, in respect all the Witnesses they examine touching them, are unsworn, and give their Testimonies without Oath, upon which they ground their Vote; and for the most part very partially, for which cause it is usual∣ly stiled the Committee of Affection.

In 35 Eliz.* 1.1790 Sir Edward Coke being then Speaker, he was ordered to attend the Lord Keeper, to move his Lordship to direct a new Writ for chusing a Burgess for Southwark, instead of Richard Hutton, supposed to be unduly elected, and ano∣ther for allowing Sir George Carew, who was duly elected, but not returned to be Burgess of Gamelsford in Cornwal, and a third for changing the name of John Dudley, returned Burgess for New Town in the County of Southampton, into the name of Thomas Dudley, the Christened Name being mistaken: But the L. Keeper would allow no alteration, but in that of Dudley. Which makes some observe,* 1.1791 That if the House of Commons had then known they had any Power to mend the said Returns, or punish the Offenders; or Sir Edward Coke had known it had been Law, he had never been sent on that Message. So that what Authority the House hath, it hath accrued since.

SECT. 11. Concerning the House of Commons Censuring, Imprisoning, and Expelling their own Members.

AS to the Commons Imprisoning and Punishing their own Members,* 1.1792 for words by them spoken, or Misdemean∣ors committed in the House, there may be some reason for it: First,* 1.1793 because by Law they are not Punishable elsewhere, for a∣ny rash, indeliberate, and inordinate Speeches in Parliament, which do not amount to Treason, Felony, or Breach of the Peace; which it is supposed none in that rightly constituted House will protect, though done in the House of Commons, begun in 1641. Secondly, It is to be supposed that the Members upon their entring into that House, unanimously agree for order sake, that the lesser number should always submit to the greater. So by such Consent and original Compact, every single Member sub∣mitting himself to the rest, he hath no such reason to complain, although they had no such Authority; for scienti & volenti non

fit Injuria; provided that they exceed not the common Rules of Justice, nor the Bounds of Established Laws: for then no private Act can bind a Subject, though made with his own free Consent, as appears in Clark's Case against the Mayor and Bur∣gesses of St. Albans.* 1.1794

The first Precedent I find that any Member of the House of Commons was complained, and Petitioned against for Misde∣meanors, and put to answer before the King and Lords in Par∣liament,* 1.1795 and there judged, and fined, was 16 R. 2. the Wed∣nesday after the Parliament began; when Sir Philip Courtney,* 1.1796 returned one of the Knights for Devonshire, came before the King in full Parliament, and said that he understood how certain people had accused, and slandered him to the King and Lords; therefore prayed to be discharged of the said Im∣ployment, until the accusations, &c. were tryed: and because his said Prayer seemed honest to the King and the Lords, the King granted him his Request, and discharged him in full Par∣liament;* 1.1797 and the Monday following, at the Instance and Pray∣er of the Commons, the King granted that he should be resto∣red, and remitted to his Place. In the Parliament, 4 H. 4. the accusations against him being re-inforced, the King and Lords adjudged, that he should be bound to his good Behavi∣our, and committed to the Tower for his Contempt.

By which, saith Mr. Prynne, it appears,* 1.1798 That only the King and Lords in full Parliament can suspend or discharge any Knights or Commoners sitting in Parliament, and have Power of restoring and re-admitting a suspended Member of the Com∣mons House: and he answers the Precedents that Sir Edward Coke brings, 4 Instit. p. 23, and 3 Inst. p. 22.* 1.1799 and many others which would be tedious here to insert.

The first Precedent he finds,* 1.1800 that the Commons began to se∣clude one another, upon Pretence of undue Elections, and Returns, was in Queen Elizabeth's time, when Thomas Lucy, 8 Eliz. was removed out of the House for giving four Pound to the Mayor of Westbury to be chosen a Burgess, and the May∣or fined and imprisoned; and 23 Eliz. Mr. A. H••ll for publishing the Conferences of the House, and writing a Book to the dis∣honour of the House, was committed to the Tower for six Months, and fined five hundred Mark, and expelled the House; and in King Charles the First's time, this Power over their Fellow-Members was greatly improved; in which how far Mr. Prynne then concurred I know not, but after he was secluded, he every where writes with great ear∣nestness against this usage; but whether with Judgment, Law, and Reason, I shall leave others to judge, only I think fit to insert some of his Invectives against the Proceedings of that unparallell'd house of Commons.

First, he saith, There can be no legal Trial or Judgment given in Parliament, in Criminal Causes or others,* 1.1801 without Examina∣tion of Witnesses upon Oath, as in all other Courts of Justice,

which the House of Commons cannot do.* 1.1802 Secondly, That it is a Rule, both of Law and Justice, That no Man can be an In∣former, Prosecutor, and Judge too, of the persons prosecuted and informed against: the Commons being in the nature of the Grand Inquest,* 1.1803 being summoned from all parts of the Kingdom, to present Publick Grievances, and Delinquents to the King and Peers for their Redress.* 1.1804 Thirdly, That all the objected Precedents are of very puny date within time of memory, therefore unable to create a Law, or Custom of Par∣liament, or any right of sole Judicature in the House of Com∣mons. Fourthly,* 1.1805 That all these Precedents were made by the Commons themselves, unfit Judges in their own Cases, much less over one another, being all of equal Authority: so that, in his opinion, they could no more expel or eject any of their Members by their own Authority, without the King and Lords concurrent consent,* 1.1806 than one Justice of Peace, Com∣mitteeman, or Militia-man can unjustice, or remove another; since par in parem non habet potestatem, neither in Ecclesiastical, Civil,* 1.1807 Military or Domestick Affairs. Fifthly, That they are all against Law, because coram non Judice; he having throughout the whole Discourse, endeavoured to prove, That the Com∣mons have no right or power of Judicature, much less of sole Judicature in our Parliaments, but only the King and Lords. Sixthly, That these Precedents are but few, never judicially ar∣gued, and rather connived at, than approved by the King and Lords, taken up with other more publick business; there∣fore passing sub silentio, they can make no Law or Right, as is resolved in Long, 5 E. 4. fol. 110. Cook's four Rep. fol. 93, 94. Slade's Case, and six Rep. fol. 75. Drurie's Case. Se∣venthly, In the long Parliament of King Charles the First, they began to seclude Projectors,* 1.1808 Monopolists, &c. though duly elected; then suspended and ejected such who were Royalists, and adhered to the King; then they proceeded to imprison and eject those Members,* 1.1809 whom the Army-Officers impeached or disliked, as a corrupt Party, or corrupt Majority: and so fifty or sixty, by the power of the Army, secured, secluded, and expelled near 400 Members; and made themselves the Com∣mons House, without them, and so proceeded to vote down, and seclude both King and House of Lords, and voted them∣selves to be the Parliament of England, and sole Legislators, and Supream Authority of the Nation. The consequences of all which are too well known to the whole Kingdom, whose Ca∣lamity of Civil War, and all the unspeakable Tragedies of it, flowed from the packing of Members in the Commons House, and the Assistance the People (relying upon their Sageness, and Authority) afforded them.* 1.1810

We had of later Years a fresh revival of the same method in the House of Commons, expelling those they called Abhor∣rers: which is so well known, that I need say nothing of it; yet I would recommend to all interessed Persons, the perusal of

two Treatises, which though they pass for Pamphlets, yet have been writ by Judicious Authors, and those are, The Lawyer outlawed, and the Three parts of the Addresses, which are Books very fit for Gentlemen to peruse.

How full and unquestioned a power the Commons have to represent Grievances to the King, and petition for Redress;* 1.1811 to impeach any Person of the highest Quality that is a Subject, for Treason, or high Misdemeanors; to have the sole Power in ha∣ving all Bills, for Subsidies, Aids and Supplies, to begin, and, I think, be perfected in their House; and the Privileges they peti∣tion for by their Speaker] are so well known, that they need no Discourse upon.

But I find several Judicious Persons will not allow the House of Commons to be a Court; which Sir Edward Coke affirms,* 1.1812 and uses this only one Argument for it, Because it is not Prorogued or Adjourned, by the Prorogation or Adjournment of the Lords House; but the Speaker upon signification of the Kings Plea∣sure, by the Assent of the House of Commons, doth say, This Court doth Prorogue or Adjourn it self. But to this it is an∣swered,* 1.1813 That if this were sufficient to denominate a Court, every Committee of Lords and Commons, though never so few in number, must upon this account be a distinct Court; be∣cause they may thus adjourn and prorogue themselves without their respective Houses. In another place,* 1.1814 the same Chief Ju∣stice offers to prove the House of Commons not only a Court, but a Court of Judicature and Record; for that the Clerks Book of the House of Commons is a Record, and so decla∣red by Act of Parliament 6 H. 8. c. 16. But this House had no such Book as a Journal, much less any Authentick Re∣cord,* 1.1815 before the first Year of Ed. the Sixth; all their material proceedings till then, being drawn in Minutes, by a Clerk ap∣pointed to attend them, for that purpose; and by him entred of Record in the House of Lords. Therefore the Words of the Statute are, That the Speakers Licence for Members going into the Country, be entred of Record, in the Book of the Clerk of the Parliament, appointed for the Commons House: and this Journal is rather a Register of what passeth, than such a Record as denotes a Court of Judicature, as the Author of The Lawyer outlawed endeavours to prove;* 1.1816 because there is no Court but what is established by the Kings Patent, by Act of Parliament, or by the Common Law, i. e. the constant immemorial Custom of former Ages: for by that the House of Lords is the sole supream Court of Judicature; it having ne∣ver been heard of before Sir Edward Coke's fancy, That there were two distinct Courts in the same Parliament. Also there is no Court without a power of tryal; but the House of Com∣mons have no power to try any Crime or Offence, because they cannot examine upon Oath: and there can be no legal Tryal without Witnesses, nor are any Witnesses of any force in Law, unless examined upon Oath.

But I shall not enter into these Controversies,* 1.1817 but shall now lay down some general Observations and Rules, which Judicious Persons have noted as worthy the consideration of the Honou∣rable House in point of their claims of Privileges and Judica∣ture.

First, King James the First in his Declaration, touching his pro∣ceedings in Parliament, 1621. resolves, That most Privileges of Parliament grew from Precedents, which rather shew a Toleration than an Inheritance: therefore he could not al∣low of the Stile; calling it their Ancient and undoubted Right and inheritance; but could rather have wished, that they had said,* 1.1818 Their Privileges were derived from the Grace and permis∣sion of his Ancestors and him; and thereupon concludes, That he cannot with patience endure his Subjects to use such Anti∣monarchical Words, concerning their Liberties, except they had subjoyned, That they were granted unto them by the Grace and Favour of his Predecessors: yet he promiseth to be care∣full of whatsoever Privileges they enjoy by long Custom, and uncontrolled and lawful Precedents.

Secondly,* 1.1819 It is to be considered, That by the Great Charter it is declared, That no Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or diseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or his Free Customs, or be Outlawed, or Exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.* 1.1820 So 28 E. 3. it is Enacted, That no Man, of what estate or condition he be, shall be put out of his Land, or Tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor dis-inherited, nor put to death without being brought to answer by due Process of Law. So 42 E. 3. c. 3. it is assented and accorded for the good Government of the Commons, that no Man be put to an∣swer without presentment before Justices, or matter of Re∣cord, or by due course of Law, or Writ Original, according to the Old Laws of the Land.* 1.1821 So Sir Edward Coke saith, Courts which are not of Record, cannot impose a Fine, or commit any to Prison, because these only belong to Courts of Record; for which see Beecher's Case, fol. 60. 120. Bonham's Case, and lib. 11 fol. 43. Godfrey's Case: So in the First Parliament of Q. Mary it is declared, That the most Ancient Statutes of this King∣dom do give, assign, and appoint, the correction and punish∣ment of all Offenders against the Regality and Dignity of the Crown, and the Laws of this Realm, unto the King; which manifests,* 1.1822 that all such things are to be tried in his Courts. So that surely the Commons Privileges must be included; for to trouble any (saith the Author of The Lawyer outlawed) that doth not offend against the Crown, or Laws of the Land, is very Illegal and Arbitrary,* 1.1823 and an high breach of the Liberty of the Subject. It would therefore be considered, how im∣probable it is, that after our Ancestors have struggled for many Ages,* 1.1824 to preserve themselves and posterity, from the unbound∣ed Rule of Arbitrary Pleasure; and having obtained that from

their Soveraigns, in so much, that they can neither be fined or imprisoned by their Soveraign (unless for transgressing some known Penal Law of the Land) should leave any Arbitrari∣ness in the House of Commons, who are but the Peoples ho∣nourable Deputies, Trustees, and Atturneys.

Thirdly,* 1.1825 It is to be considered that the Law hath expresly provided, where and how Breaches of Privilege ought to be punished, 5 H. 4. c. 6. and 11 H. 6. c. 11. about any Assault upon a Parliament man, or his menial Servant, to be in the Kings Bench. Since therefore such Assaults are far more Criminal than Arrests of them, or words spoken against them, or inferi∣our misdemeanours (to argue a majori ad minus) it should seem rational that in the Courts of Justice (being open to redress all sorts of Illegalities) matters should be rather tryed, than that persons should be punished by Imprisonments of the House of Commons alone. For if this Arbitrariness were allowed, it would argue a great defect in our Laws, that they are not the entire Rule of the Subjects Civil Obedience; and if the ordinary Courts of Justice can try the greater, they may cer∣tainly try the lesser Crime, as they have done in the Case of Done against Welsh, River against Cosyn, Shewish against Tre∣wynnard.* 1.1826 But I have sufficiently shewed before, that in old time the determination and knowledge of the Privileges did belong to the Lords.

How agreeable these ways of Proceedings were to the Usage of the House of Commons in 1640. and 1680.* 1.1827 are fresh in every ones memory, when not only they ejected and imprisoned their own Members, but by Messengers sent for several Gentle∣men, and others, no Members, for acting according to the known Laws, and King's Proclamations; and often for Persons having spoke angrily or slightingly of some Member, as in the Case of Abhorrers.

It is to be hoped those very Gentlemen now wish it might be forgot, as I hope it will never be put in practice again; when, after a chargeable sending for up by the terrible Messengers, after being detained in Custody during the Pleasure of the House, and brought to receive their Sentence on their Knees at the House of Commons Bar, they were dismissed: So that I knew one who principally to avoid the Charge (his Crime be∣ing for speaking Words against a Member, in his Cups) was forced, upon notice of the Messenger's coming for him, to fly into Ireland.

Fourthly,* 1.1828 It is worthy great Consideration by all the Mem∣bers of the Honourable House of Commons, that it is an un∣doubted Maxim both in Law and Reason, and is necessary to the Obligation of all positive Constitutions, That they should be published in express Words: The immediate Laws, even of God Almighty, in the Opinion of Learned Men, being not obligatory where they were never promulged. Now since it hath not been hitherto published to the People, what this Lex

& Consuetudo Parliamenti is,* 1.1829 (which Sir Edward Coke saith out of Fleta, is to be enquired into of all, is understood by many, and known to few) it would not only be obliging, but most necessary, that the Honourable House would give a true and full Description of this Law and Custom of Parliament, and an exact Account of their Privileges, that People might in some measure, for the future, shun those dangerous Rocks, and not be surprized or shipwrack'd on such hidden Shelfs.

I shall close this long Chapter (wherein, according to my Talent, I have endeavoured to comprise what hath been volu∣minously treated of by all the Authors I am furnished withal, and digested things into an easie Method) with some Asserti∣ons of Mr. Prynne, whose Writings in this Particular are better esteemed than many others.

He saith,* 1.1830 The Parliament being the Supremest Court of Law and Justice, ought to proceed legally, according to the Course of Law, and not to enlarge or extend the Privileges of Parlia∣ment beyond their Ancient, Just, and Legal Bounds, nor alter the Law therein by their absolute Power: Much more ought the House of Commons themselves to follow their Precedent, and not to extend their old, or vote up new Privilege, to the delay,* 1.1831 retarding, or deluding of Common Right and Justice. Therefore he condemns the writing of Letters by the Speaker, 18 Jacobi 1.* 1.1832 to stay a Tryal betwixt Sir William Coxe and Mr. Humphrey Aylworth; as likewise in other Cases, the same Year,* 1.1833 3 March, and 20 April: which, he saith, is diametrically opposite to the Judges Oath, and against the Great Charter, which saith,* 1.1834 Nulli negabimus, nulli differemus Justitiam & Re∣ctum: To which I may add the Hardship used to Mr. Sherridon,* 1.1835 who being in the Custody of the Serjeant at Arms, the War∣rant of Commitment being during the Pleasure of the House of Commons,* 1.1836 without any Cause shown; now the Habeas Corpus Act is express, That all Persons are Bailable, by what Person soever committed, not excepting the King and Council, much less the House of Commons, unless for Treason or Fe∣lony: One of the Judges made application to the House of Commons, to know whether he might grant the Writ of Ha∣beas Corpus to him. The Debate lasted three days, by reason of the Difficulty of the Cause: For if they openly declared against the Habeas Corpus, the Nation would be much alarm'd, and suspect these Gentlemen, instead of securing, intended to invade the Subjects Liberties; but if they allowed the Writ, the delicious Power of Imprisoning such as they had a Pique to, was utterly lost, and all Persons referred to the ordinary Courts of Justice, or, upon their failure, to the House of Lords,* 1.1837 the Supreme Tribunal of England.

Sir William Jones insisted much upon the Power of the House, and that they did not intend by that Act to bind themselves, (which yet must bind the King) though it might as well be alledged, That he did not intend to bind himself by it. How∣ever,

Sir William persisted, urging,* 1.1838 That whatever Reasons may be given for discharging such as are not committed for Breach of Privilege, (if grounded on the Act for the Habeas Corpus) will hold as strong for discharging of Persons for Breach of Privilege, and so consequently deprive the House of all its Pow∣er and Dignity, and so make it insignificant; and said, That was so plain and obvious, that all the Judges ought to take notice of it: and so judged it below the House to make any Resolution therein, but rather to leave the Judges to do otherwise at their peril, and let the Debate fall without any Question. But Ba∣ron Weston had the Courage to grant the Habeas Corpus,* 1.1839 as ra∣ther willing to expose himself to the Displeasure of the House, than deny or delay Justice contrary to his Oath.

I could not omit this remarkable Passage, as a Specimen of the Arbitrariness of the Leading Party in that House;* 1.1840 and now shall proceed to Mr. Prynne's Remarks upon the Proceedings of the long House of Commons.

He observes,* 1.1841 That Privileges may be lost by the abuse of the Power; and that whatever Privilege the House hath, is from the King's Grant, or Toleration. Therefore, according to the Canonists Rule, If the Privilege granted be expressed in ge∣neral, dubious, or obscure Words, then it is in the power of him to interpret, who hath the power to grant. Now the Petition of the Speaker is, That the Commons in this Parlia∣ment may, and shall have all their Ancient and Just Privileges allowed them. Therefore the King,* 1.1842 being the sole Granter of these Privileges, must be the only proper Interpreter and Judge of them, as he is of all his other Charters of Privileges, Li∣berties, Franchises, and Acts of Parliament themselves, after his Regal Assent thereto; not the Commons, or Persons to whom they are granted; and that both in and out of Parliament, by Advice of his Nobles, or Judges of the Common-Law.

Therefore he saith, first,* 1.1843 That if the Commons by Petition to the King and Lords in Parliament, complain of the Breach of their ancient Privileges and Liberties, as they ever did in the Cases of Lark, Thorp, Hyde, Clerk, Atwyll, and others; the King, by Advice of his Lords in Parliament, assisted with his Judges, hath been, and (as he humbly conceives) is the sole proper Judge of them and their violations; not the Commons, who being Parties, Prosecutors, and Complainants, are no legal indifferent Judges in their own or Menial Servants cases, if they will avoid partiality, which is the reason the Law allows Chal∣lenges to Jurors in Civil and Criminal causes. Therefore he ob∣serves,* 1.1844 that the House of Commons, taking Informations with∣out Oath, may be easilier abused by misinformation, and some∣times thereby are put upon over hasty Votes, which, upon find∣ing out evil Combinations, they are forced to retract.

Secondly,* 1.1845 If the complaint of the breach of Privilege be made in the Commons House, and thereupon an Habeas Corpus, Writ of Privilege, or Supersedeas prayed under the great Seal,

for the Members or menial Servants release, whose Privilege is infringed; the Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the great Seal, representing the Kings person in Chancery (the Court for relief in cases of Privilege) is the properest Judge, and Examiner of the claimed Privilege, and its violations upon Oath, and other sufficient Evidence, assisted by all the Kings Judges in cases of difficulty, who thereupon will grant or deny the Writs.

Thirdly,* 1.1846 When these Writs of Privilege, Supersedeas, or Habeas Corpus, are granted to any Member, or menial Servants, and directed to any of the Kings Courts to enlarge their restrained Persons, or stay any Arrests, Process or Judgments against them; the Kings own Judges in his respective Courts, to which they are directed, are then the proper Judges of the Privileges of Parliament, and of their breaches suggested in these Writs; who may examine, not only all matters of Law or Fact com∣prised in them, which are Traversable; but likewise adjudge, allow, or disallow the very Privilege it self, if no real ancient Parliamentary Privilege allowed by the Laws and Customs of the Realm.

How far he is in the right, I will not undertake to judge; but I remember, somewhere he wisheth an Act of Parliament to pass to adjust these matters: which possibly would prevent many of those chargeable attendances about false Returns, and save much expence of time in the discussing of them, and enable the Subjects to pay a right and due obedience to them.

SECT. 12. Concerning the Royal Assent to Bills.

I Have treated so much of this elsewhere, as to the sole Power in the King, the ancient Custom of Sealing the Acts with the Kings Seal, and of some of the Prelates and Nobles, as Witnesses of their Assents; that I shall only now speak as to the usual formality of passing the Bills into Acts by the Kings last Act.* 1.1847 For Mr. Hackwell hath given a full account of the man∣ner how Statutes are enacted in Parliament by passing of Bills; to which Book I refer the curious Reader that would un∣derstand the order that is used in the debating and passing of them.

When Bills are passed by both Houses, upon three several Readings in either House,* 1.1848 they ought for their last approbation, to have the Royal Assent, whereby every Statute is, as Mr. Hackwell observes, like Silver seven times tryed.

The Royal Assent is usually deferred to the last day of the Session: and because some have been of opinion, that the pas∣sing of Bills,* 1.1849 puts an end to the Sessions, so that what ever Bills are ready, and pass not the Royal Assent, must be again read three times in either House; for the more security, it is usual to insert a Proviso, That the Session is not thereby concluded.

The Royal Assent is given two ways: First,* 1.1850 by Commission since the Statute of the 33 H. 8. c. 21. wherein it is expressed, That the Kings Royal Assent by his Letters Patents under the Great Seal, Signed by his hand, and declared and notified in his absence to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and to the Commons Assembled in the higher House; is and ever was of as good strengh and force, as if the King had been there per∣sonally present, and assented openly and publickly to the same.

The manner of the King's giving his Publick Assent is in this manner. The King cometh in Person, in his Parliament-Robes,* 1.1851 and sitteth in his State, and the Upper House sit in their Robes: The Speaker, with all the Commons House, cometh to the Bar of the Lords House; and in Sir Thomas Smith's time,* 1.1852 the Chancellor for the Lords, and the Speaker for the Commons, in set Speeches, returned the Prince Thanks, for that he hath so great Care of the good Government of his People, and for calling them together to advise of such things as should be for the Reformation, Establishing, and Ornament of the Com∣monweal. After which, the Chancellor, in the Prince's Name, giveth Thanks to the Lords and Commons, for their Pains and Travel taken, which he saith the Prince will remem∣ber, and recompense when Time and Occasion shall serve; and that the Prince is ready to declare his Pleasure concerning their Proceedings, whereby the same may have perfect Life and Accomplishment by his Princely Authority.

I think now, mostly,* 1.1853 the Speaker of the House of Commons makes a Speech, acquainting the King with the purport of the Bills. Then the Clerk of the Crown readeth the Title of the Bills, in such Order as they are in Consequence. After the Title of every Bill is read singly,* 1.1854 the Clerk of the Parliament pronounceth the Royal Assent, according to certain Instructi∣ons given from his Majesty in that behalf.

If it be a Publick Bill to which the King assenteth, the An∣swer is, Le Roy le veult, The King willeth. If a Private Bill, allowed by the King, the Answer is, Soit fait, comme il est de∣sire, Let it be done as it is desired. And upon a Petitionary Bill the like is used.

If it be a Publick Bill (which the King forbeareth to allow) he saith, Le Roy se avisera, The King will advise.

To a Subsidy Bill the Clerk pronounceth, Le Roy remercie, ses loyaux Subjects, accepte leur Benevolence, & aussi le veult, The King thanks his Loyal Subjects, accepts their Benevolence, and also willeth.

To a general Pardon is pronounced, Les Prelates, Seigneurs, & Communs, en cest Parlement assembles, au nom de touts vous autres Subjects, remercient tres humblement vostre Majesty, & prient Dieu vous donner en sante, bone vie & longe: The Prelates, Lords, and Commons, in this Parliament assembled, in the name of all your other Subjects, thrice humbly give thanks to your Majesty,

and pray God to give you in health, a good Life, and long.

These,* 1.1855 saith Sir Thomas Smith, be taken now as perfect Laws and Ordinances of the Realm of England, and none other, and as shortly as may be, are printed, except it be some Private Acts, made for the Benefit or Prejudice of some Private Man; these be only exemplified under the Seal of the Parliament.

CHAP. XXIX. Of Factious Combinations in Parliaments.

I Hope in the foregoing Chapters, I have so explained the Constitution of Parliaments, and the Legislative Power, that unbiassed and unprejudiced Persons will no more be mis∣led by the Sophisms, and plausible pretences, which to ag∣grandize the Power of the two Houses at first, and after of the Commons House only, the Penmen of the long Parlia∣ment made use of; yet because many of late were furbishing the rusty Armour of their Demagogues, and trimming their Helmets with fresh Plumes, I conceive it necessary to take notice of some of their chiefest Arguments, and examine those which had greatest Influence upon the People.

The great and venerable name of Parliament, and its Autho∣rity, was constantly used as Shield and Buckler, to ward off all the Force of the Loyal Assaults; and Mr. Prynne writ a large Volume, which he stiled, The Soveraign Power of Par∣liaments: and when the very Lees and Dregs of the Commons House was put in Ferment, that very Kilderkin would admit no lower Stile, than the supreme Authority of the Nation to be pearched on its Bunghole.

Therefore to disabuse the less considerate,* 1.1856 and to detect the Frauds of those, which under that great Name applyed what∣ever they met with in the Laws, or History, to the House of Commons; I think it necessary in the first place to clear the acceptation of the Word.* 1.1857

Sometimes the word Parliament is used for the House of(a) 1.1858 Lords only; as when upon Writ of Error, any Judgment in the King's-Bench is examined in the House of Lords, the Judgment is said to be affirmed or reversed by Parliament.

The Appellation of Parliament is likewise used for the two Houses,* 1.1859 in regard they are the gross Body, whereof the Parli∣ament consists, there only wanting the Sovereign Head to com∣pleat it. But they are so far from being the High Court of Parliament, that they cannot co-unite to be an entire Court, either of Sovereign or Ministerial Justice, but only in concurring in Votes in their several Houses, for preparing of matters, in

order to an act of all the Body; which when they have done, their Votes are so far from having any legal Authority in the State, as in Law there is no Stile or Form of their joynt Acts, further than Bills, nor doth the Law so much as take no∣tice of them, till they have Royal Assent; without which, the Votes of the two Houses dye in the Womb, like an Embryo.

So that the proper use of the word Parliament,* 1.1860 (as Au∣thority of Law-making is annexed to the name) is only when the King and the two Houses concurr in one Act, and in that sence only is the Parliament the Supream Court, the highest Judica∣tory, and the most Sovereign Power: Not for any Soveraignty in the two Houses, and from them transferred to the King by their joining and consenting with him; but because every com∣pleat and perfect Act of it, is the Act of the personal Will and Power of the Sovereign himself, standing in his highest Estate Royal.

Therefore whoever reads the Authors that writ in defence of the Parliament, must consider this Fallacy they frequent∣ly used, that he do not apply the Authoritative Act of the King, with the Consent of the two Houses, to the Houses without the King.

From the Co-operation of the two Houses in preparing Laws,(b) 1.1861 the late 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (since King Charles the First's time) of the words,* 1.1862 Be it end••ed by the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons (as if they were all Fellow-Commissioners) and the unwariness of some of the Penners of the King's Answers to some of the Papers of the two Houses, wherein they stiled the King the third Estate; the Commonwealths-Men have taken the advantage to reckon the King but as a third Legislator.

Therefore I think it necessary to remove this Rub e're I pro∣ceed further. Although the Author of the Imposture,* 1.1863 called the modus tenendi Parliamentum, makes six degrees of constituent Members of the Parliament, viz. The King first, then Secondly, the Archbishops; Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and other Clerks, who held Baronies. Thirdly, the Proctors of the Clergy. Fourth∣ly, the Earls, Barons, and other great Men, who held to the value of a County or Barony. Fifthly, the Knights of Shires. Sixthly, the Citizens and Burgesses, to which he might have added the Barons of the Cinque-Ports; yet he saith the King is the Head, Beginning and End of the Parliament, and so hath no(c) 1.1864 Peer in his degree. Yet it plainly appears, that these we now call the two Houses, were by reason of their distinct Orders, most frequently divided into three. For in(d) 1.1865 6 E. 3. at his Parliament at York, the Record saith, That on the Fri∣day before the Feast of St. Michael, the Prelates, or the Clergy by themselves; the Earls and Barons by themselves; the Knights of the Counties, and the Commons by themselves treat∣ed, &c. Othertimes we find the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and great Men, and the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, to have sepa∣rate Consultations by themselves; and to give their several an∣swers

to Articles, and business propounded to them in Parlia∣ment, as Mr. Prynne out of the Abridgment of the Records of the Tower, hath given us above twenty instances.

At the making of the Statute of Praemunire, 16 R. 2. the Commons pray,* 1.1866 That the Lords, as well Spiritual as Tempo∣ral, severally, and all the Estates of Parliament might be exa∣mined, how they thought of that matter; and the Lords Spi∣ritual answered by themselves, and the Lords Temporal by themselves; and the King was Petitioned to make this Exa∣mination. So in 40 E. 3. the King asking the Houses, Whether King John could have subjected the Realm, as he did; the Pre∣lates by themselves, and the Dukes, Earls, and Barons by them∣selves, gave their Answer. Besides, we find (as at large I have before instanced in the last Chapter) the Writs of Summons of the Bishops and Clergy, were only, in side & dilectione; and the Barons generally,(e) 1.1867 in fide & homagio, or Ligeancia; and the Clergy granted their Subsidies apart, and distinct from the Nobles.

Besides, that the Bishops are to be esteemed the Third Estate, is clear by Act of Parliament: for it being questioned(f) 1.1868, whether the making Bishops had been duly and orderly done according to Law; the Statute saith, That the questioning of it is much tending to the slander of all the Clergy, being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the greatest States of the Realm.

So Sir(g) 1.1869 Thomas Smith (as in the last Chapter I have noted) distinguisheth the two Houses into three Estates, and Sir Ed∣ward(h) 1.1870 Coke saith expresly, That the High Court of Parlia∣ment consisteth of the Kings Majesty sitting in his Royal Poli∣tick Capacity, and the three States of the Realm, viz. the Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons; the like the learned(i) 1.1871 Cowel affirms.

Sir Henry Spelman(k) 1.1872 calls it a Colloquy of all the Orders of the Kingdom, convened by the sole Authority of the King, to consult and appoint in the Affairs of the Kingdom.

This was also known to Foreigners, uninteressed Persons; for the Lord Argenton speaking how Subsidies were granted in England, saith* 1.1873, Convocatis primis Ordinibus, Clericis & Laicis, & assentiente Populo: And Bodin‖ 1.1874 whenever he speaks of the Constitution of our Parliament, calls it the King and the three Estates of the Realm.

But to put all out of doubt, in King Charles the Second's Reign, it is determined in the Act for the Form of Prayers for the Fifth of November, For the Preservation of the King, and the Three Estates.

Now the reason why in King Charles the First's answer,* 1.1875 we meet with the expressions of making the King the third Estate, was, because at that time, the Bishops being voted out of the House of Lords, and the two Houses setting themselves in all the points of Controversie in opposition to the King, the notion of a Triumvirate was more intelligible (as it may be thought)

to the People, and those who were so bitter Enemies to the King, and had such a Rebellious force, would have still in∣creased the Peoples aversion, if the King had asserted his Roy∣al Prerogative otherwise. Whether this were the true reason, or the oversight of the Penners of his Majesties Answers, I will not undertake to determine; but I am induced to believe the first, because, I find the King, and those that writ in de∣fence of his Cause, using frequently this way of Argument.

In every State there are three Parts (saith(l) 1.1876 one, the King or∣dered to write for him) capable of just or unjust Soveraignty, viz. the Prince, Nobles and People. Now through the Piety of our Lawgiving Princes, a just and regular course of Government being obtained, the stability of which being found to be more concerned in the Power of making Laws, than in any other Pow∣er belonging to the Soveraign; for preventing of Innovations, that might subvert that setled regularity, the frame and state of Government was in such a sort established, as that the Prince should be limited from using the legislative Power, without con∣current assent of the Peers and Commons. By which means the constitution of our Parliaments, is so equal and geometrical, and all parts so equally contribute their Offices, that no part can have an extream predominance over other: Therefore to pre∣vent any evil that might come by the admission of two such Bodies, to a participation of Power, in this particular of making Laws (if they should combine against the Soveraign) the Law gives them an equal Power to assent or dissent;* 1.1877 so that opposing the single Power of every one of them, to the Votes of every o∣ther two, there might be so secure a balancing of the Power of one against the other, that no practice of any two of them, should do any prejudice and diminution to the third, without the third Party it self did give consent unto it: otherwise the King and Peers might oppress the Commons, the King and Com∣mons oppress the Peers, or the Peers and Commons oppose the King; and the Peers being easily oppressed by the Commons (as we saw in our late calamitous Times) an Appian Decemvirate, or the 30 or 300 Tyrants might get the Power into their own hands.

In another place he saith, Though properly Laws be the Acts of the King in Parliament, yet are they also truly the Acts of the whole Parliament; because every of the Estates contribute their Power according to the diversity of their Office and Inte∣rest, and so as from a sacred Tripos, the civil Oracles of the Law are delivered.

It is therefore to be considered (saith a Judicious(m) 1.1878 Au∣thor, in answer to some other passages of his Majesty that the Parliamentarians wrested) That if his Majesty, out of a desire to save the effusion of Blood, used such gracious Expressions as were most likely to prevail with the People, and consolidate their Minds, they ought not in Equity to prejudice the Rights of the Crown, although he had abdicated therein, some parts of

his Authority, and granted things destructive to his own Prero∣gative. From his Majesties saying, That the Power, legally pla∣ced in both Houses, is more than sufficient to prevent, and re∣strain the Power of Tyranny, they infer, This cannot be made good without a Power of Resistance; for that Tyranny cannot otherwise be restrained. Which is easily answered. For it cannot be understood, that the King means by this, a forceable resistance or restraint,(n) 1.1879 but a legal one, so far as Humane Prudence can by lawful and just ways provide. The Power they have by Law, being to inflict punishments on evil Instruments, whereby others may be afraid to take upon them such Imployments; and they may refuse to give the King Subsidies, and other necessa∣ry Assistance, if he refuseth to moderate excesses, which are Powers more efficacious than resistance; the success of the one being more probable and likely than the other.

However,* 1.1880 in my poor opinion, it had been more honourable, and probably more efficacious, to have spent less time in this kind of defending the Kings Interest by the Pen, and have im∣ployed it in asserting the true Prerogative of the King, and his undoubted Rights, to have let the People, as well as the Houses know, what he would reform, and out of Princely Clemency grant, for his Peoples ease, and at their earnest Petition; but neither to have depreciated, or descended so much below the Majesty and Dignity of his place, to enter into Reply and Du∣ply, Altercation, and Apologies with his Subjects. But that King, composed all of Mercy, Justice, and Tenderness to his Sub∣jects, judging others by his own Royal Standard of Integrity, let the Houses seize his Ships, Magazines, and left them the Ci∣ty of London's Purse, while he retired to the North, and plied the Houses with Declarations and Messages, to have reduced them to their Duties: and though his condescensions were great, and the way of Argument such as before I have instan∣ced in; yet I cannot find (except in that particular of making himself one of the three Estates) that he yielded any part of his Royal Prerogative, till he was made Prisoner; that in his re∣straint he condescended to a temporary divesting himself of the Militia, and other things, which all sorts of Subjects (except the very chief of those in Rebellion against him) found infinite∣ly more tending to the enslaving, and utter ruine of the People, than ever they could have been, if the King had ma∣naged all by his absolute Will, and the direction of those they accounted his worst Instruments.

I having in several places cleared the Kings Soveraignty, shall only on this Head endeavour to answer the principal of those popular Reasons the Writers for the Parliament used, not grounded upon any Law or Constitution of the Government, but only upon the false supposition, That the Wisdom of the two Houses was to be valued above the Wisdom of the King and Council, in proposing matters for the Royal Assent, which were conducible to the Liberty of the Subject, which they pre∣tended

was their whole design, and that they would establish the Kings Throne in more Glory and Splendor than had ever been in any Ages.

The first and principal Topick they used, was,* 1.1881 That the Mo∣narchy of England was in its Constitution allayed, and the Pow∣er of the two Houses, in making Laws, had such a Copartner∣ship, and radical mixture, that they had something more than a Consultive and Assenting part; and that the King was oblig'd in the duty of his Office, and by his Coronation Oath, to grant what they desired.

Mr. Sherringham(o) 1.1882 hath culled out the prime Arguments of the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, The fuller Answerer, and others upon this Head, and so fully answer'd them, that I must re∣fer the Reader to him for satisfaction, and shall only select some of the chiefest of these Arguments, more for the orderly continu∣ance of this Discourse, than for any need of repeating them.

First, They say, That King Charles the First owned the Law(p) 1.1883 to be the Measure of his Power, and if so, it is limited. But this concludes no more, than that his Power is of such a size and bigness as the Law hath ordained; and if the Law give the King absolute, full, and entire Power, and limits him only in the exercise of it, this is a restraint, and limitation ac∣cording to such Laws as the Soveraign hath established in that particular alone, and is the happiness of the English Subject, that Kings act not Arbitrarily: but this gives no Power to the two Houses, to be any checks upon the King, who by the same Laws hath the Power of putting in execution, and suspending the execution of the Laws in many Cases; or that Aristocracy, or Democracy have any such mixture with the Monarchy, as they can impose their Laws upon him. For to suppose a mixed Monarchy, consisting of Three Estates, independent for their Authority upon one another, and to have several shares in the Rights of Sovereignty, and to say, The Government of three Estates, is the Government of one Monarch, is perfect non∣sence: for when(q) 1.1884 Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy are melted and allayed together, that which resulteth can take its name from none of the simple species, or kinds of Govern∣ment, but must have some other Appellation.

Whoever will consider aright of the concurrence of the two Houses, in preparing Bills, will find,* 1.1885 That though the Houses be as the Causa sine qua non; yet the efficient, procatarctick Cause, and the Authoritative Power in passing these into Laws, is the King only; and what the two Houses do without his As∣sent, is but as the Counsellor at Law's framing a Deed, and the Clerks Ingrossing the Indenture of Conveyance; but till the Seal be set to it, and delivery made, as the Act and Deed of Donor or Conveyor, it is of no force and virtue; neither do we call it the Act and Deed of the Counsellor or Clerk, but of the Person that seals it.

Another Objection those Champions for the two Houses

made great noise with, was,(r) 1.1886 That the Power where the Le∣gislative is in all Three, is in the very Root and Essence of it compounded and mixed of those three: so that where this height of Power resideth in a mixed Subject, that is, in three concurrent Estates, the consent and concursus of all being most free, and none depending on the Will of the other, that Monarchy is in the most proper sence, and in the very model of it, a mixed Constitution. And that such is the State of the Monarchy of England, the Objector thinks clear, because the House of Peers are an Aristocracy, and the Commons a Demo∣cracy; and this mixture of Interests and Powers being in the ve∣ry Legislative Power, he concludes the mixture is in the Root and Supremacy of Power, and not in the exercise alone.

In answer to which it must be considered,* 1.1887 That though the concurrence of both the Estates with the Monarch in the ma∣king and promulgation of Laws, be such as our Laws describe; yet it is no otherwise than in the precedent Chapters, by unde∣niable proofs, I have made it out, That what participation so∣ever the two Houses have with the King in the Legislature, it is only derivative from the Crown by the King's Summons, and the restriction of those Summons to do and consent.

It is known to be the common Assertion of(s) 1.1888 Canonists,(t) 1.1889 Civilians, and(u) 1.1890 Schoolmen, That the Legislative Power is communicable by the Princes allowance, and that such a con∣currence as our Kings have allowed, is no Argument of Supre∣macy; such a mixture of the three Estates hath been in other Monarchies,* 1.1891 which every where are owned to be absolute in re∣spect of Power. For as they are summoned by the Princes single Authority, and dissolved at his own pleasure, they can claim no sort of Right, during their Session, further than to consult about, and prepare Bills for the Royal Assent. There∣fore(w) 1.1892 Grotius saith, Istam Legislationem, quae aliis quam Sum∣mae Potestati competit, nihil imminuere de jure Summae Potestatis, quod in Scholis dicunt, cumulative datum censeri non privative. So in our Kingdom, every Corporation hath Authority to make Ordinances and Constitutions within their own Liberties, for the good Order and Government of the Body; and the Inhabi∣tants(x) 1.1893 of every Parish, to make By-Laws and Ordinances among themselves for their own profit, where they have Custom for it, and for the Publick Good, where they have no Custom: Surely this is a sort of Legislative Power; yet thereby it can∣not be inferred, that they have any Co-ordinate Power with the King in the Rights of Soveraignty.

So that allowing the Power of the two Houses as large as can be proved by the Laws (for the stretch that the Parliamentarians would make, is by the Tenters they only have set up,) the whole latitude of the Nomothetical Power is not jointly in the two Houses; for none but Strangers to our Laws can deny, That the King hath sole Power to dispense with the Statutes, and abate their Rigour, where a mischief would other∣wise

insue, he alone hath Power by Edicts and Proclamations, to order all Affairs for which there is no order taken by certain and perpetual Laws.

The Legislative Power is either(y) 1.1894 Architectonical, or Pre∣ceptive. The Architectonical is that which layeth Materials of Law, and consisteth in two things; First, in determining what is just, convenient, or necessary: Secondly, in declaring, and promulgating that to be actually made a Law, and Enact∣ed, which upon consultation is thought to be just, conveni∣ent, or necessary. The first shews no Jurisdiction in the Per∣sons who have it, but only an Office and Imployment to delibe∣rate and consult. But whoever hath the Second Power, hath a Jurisdiction to define Authoritatively what shall be Law; and this Preceptive Power is that which makes the Law sacred and inviolable, and which giveth it force to oblige the Conscience.

Now it is evident by undeniable Testimony and Authority, that the exercise of the Architectonical Power is only commit∣ted to the two Houses, who have votum consultivum & decisi∣vum, but it is derived from the King, who hath only the Pre∣ceptive Power. So that the Writers for the two Houses, ge∣nerally did use a Sophistical way of arguing, not discovering what they could not but know, the difference betwixt the King's, and the two Houses Powers in the making of Laws. For subordinate Agents, that are but Instruments of another, and work by a derived Power, when they concur with the Principal and supream Agent, have their causality in producing the Effect; yet this doth not prove the Authority to be radically in them. As in an Estate of Lands (saith(z) 1.1895 Mr. Sherringham,) wherein a Man hath a perpetual Right in Fee, his Right is distinguished from the King's Right, of whom he holds; the King having the demean of the Land, and the other the demean of the Fee.

So it is in an Estate of Power and Authority; If the King grant∣eth an Estate of Power, Authority and Jurisdiction in Fee-simple, or in Fee-tail, for term, longer or shorter, the King hath the demean of Power, and the other the demean of Use; the King hath Dominium directum, the other Dominium utile; which he ap∣plies to the two Houses: but it must be likewise considered, that this distinct Authority they have, is wholly derivative, and so much the more depending on the Sovereign, as he can at his Pleasure totally deprive them of the Exercise of it by Pro∣rogation, or totally annihilate it by Dissolution.

Another Objection they made,* 1.1896 was from the Answer the King authorized a Gentleman to make to the Observer, That the three Estates are constituted to the End that the Power of the one should moderate and restrain the excess of the Power in the other. From which he infers, That this is an Allay and mixture in the Root and essence of the Constitution.

To this it may be answered,* 1.1897 That there is no such Power in the two Houses; they are called to consult, and to consent. All they can do is, that they have the opportunity of ha∣ving

grievances redressed, because they may otherwise deny the King the assistance he desires. But they have no Authority of themselves, to redress them, or to restrain and moderate his Excesses by Force, nor can they moderate the Excesses of one another by any Act of their own singly, further than the exor∣bitant Estate shall be willing to be moderated.

It is a most absurd thing to imagine, that when the Law hath placed the Sovereign Power in the King, it should again for a space of time, during the Session of Parliament, unsovereign Him, and place in the two Houses the same Sovereign Trust, and with a second absurdity, leave in the King's Hands the sum∣moning and dissolving, the Power by which himself should be constrained; and to make up all, should by Authority of that Power constrain all the Heads of the People, and even the Re∣presentative Body of that Power, by Solemn Oath, to declare that the King is not only supreme Governour, but that he is only supreme Governour.

Besides the Arguments they sued upon this Head of a deba∣sed Monarch, that was not only to admit some of his Subjects into the Participation of his Burthen, but of his Soveraignty (whereby they pleaded for both the Houses being joynt-Sove∣reigns for the time) they used other Arguments singly for the House of Commons, which they endeavoured to aggrandize, and raise to a strange over-towring heighth, above both King and Lords; and they grounded all their Arguments upon the immense Power of their being the Peoples Representatives.

The Observer saith,* 1.1898 That the vertue of Representation, is the great Privilege of Privileges, that unalterable Basis of all Honour and Power, whereby the House of Commons claims the entire Right of all the Gentry and People; and that there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing of God, which can be more perfidious, and more pernicious to the People, than the withdrawing from them; and doth acknowledge that the Arbitrary Rule was once most safe for the World: But now, since most Countries have found out an Art, and peace∣able Order for publick Assemblies (he means by Representa∣tives) whereby the People may assume its own Power, and do it self Right, without the disturbance of it self, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and Order.

In answer to which it ought to be considered, That the Re∣presentative Body deserves the highest Honour and Observance that can be given to the Body Represented;* 1.1899 but this Honour will depend upon two things: First the quality and condition of the Body represented, and Secondly, on the quality of the Representative it self. If therefore the Body at large were an absolute Sovereign (as in Republicks,) the true Representative of that Body were to be observed with all Sovereign Honour, and due Subjection: But when the Body at large it self is but a Subject (as it is in Monarchy) the Honour and Authority of the Representative, cannot exceed the Honour and Authority

of a Subject; for none can make the Image more than the Ori∣ginal, or, without Adulterating Arts, appear so. Therefore however abhorrent a Crime he makes it, in such as concurr not in their Judgment with their Representatives that exceed their Authority and Commission: yet all sober and just Persons ought to consider that the Subjects by giving Authority to some of their own Order, to represent them, and advise, and consent for them, gave them no such Power above that of Subjects; yea so much above the condition of their Sovereigns, that neither breach of Faith, nor the Oaths of Allegiance and Su∣premacy (which they never took to them) or any other Duty to their King, was comparable to the withdrawing from the Vote, or Act of their Representators: as if the Rights of the Crown and Kingdom, and the Laws made by the King, with the assent of the three Estates in Parliament, did not so much concern the Commons of the Land; but that against all these they stood solely bound to the Representatives, as the only Sovereign of their Obedience. I shall now offer some Reasons against this dangerous Opinion.

First, It is to be considered,* 1.1900 That in our Kingdom the Repre∣sentors are not equally chosen (as in the united Provinces, and other Commonwealths) but it lies in the Power of the Sove∣reign here to make a Town equal in number of Burgesses to a County: which doth vehemently demonstrate, That the first In∣stitution and end of such Representatives was rather to mini∣ster Information of the State and Condition of that particular place, and advise and assist the Sovereign, and to consent with him, and not to determine Sovereignly.

Secondly, The cockering the People in that Opinion, that the Soveraignty lies in Materia prima in them, and by their Re∣presentatives, that they may exert it, is the certain way to ruin not only Monarchy, but all government: as was evident in the case of the Rebellious House of Commons, in King Charles the First's time, who prided themselves so much with the Ti∣tle of Representatives; and by pretext of that and the Assi∣stance of their Army, having unyoked themselves from all Subjection to their Lawful King, and disengaged themselves from their dangerous and useless Collegues, the Lords (as they then voted them) after some while they lost their Honour and Reverence with their own Army, who then would be the People, and pulled them out of their House; justly charging them with a design to perpetuate themselves. And so the Tyran∣nical Supremacy was exercised by Cromwell, and his Council of Officers a while, and after by himself, and his mock-Repre∣sentatives, by Councils of State and Safety, and such new Names and Powers, as our Laws never heard of; and all this under pretence that they Acted by the Peoples Authority and suffrage; and all the sad Devastations of that Age resul∣ted from the confiding so much in the pretended Represen∣tatives of the People. Which(a) 1.1901 one some Years before the

sad Catastrophe, plainly foretold; tho' like belief was given to him, as of old to Cassandra. His Words are, That the so much exalting the Power of the Representatives, was first to de∣stroy the King by the Parliament, and next the Parliament and Kingdom by the People. Thus ignorant Politicians that build upon such Quick-sands, soon live to see their Insanae Structurae ruinously fall about their Ears.

Thirdly, Whereas the Advocates for the Representatives, would gladly have possessed the People that they could rely upon none so securely and safely, as upon those they had themselves chosen; they being less subject to private ends and affections, than any particular man, such a Body being not likely to coun∣sel or consent to any thing, but what is publickly advantage∣ous.

It is to be considered, that it is a false Postulatum: Such a Bo∣dy being but an Aggregate of particulars, may have as many private ends as any other number of Subjects; it being well known, that Communities themselves are subject to dange∣rous Inclinations from private Incitements; and I the Represen∣tatives subject to misleading Factions, and Ambitions of private Men; and by coalition of Parties (when they fall into designs) they are most dangerous and fatally violent: and tho' it may, at first View, seem to be repugnant, that an Universality should have private ends; yet seeing it is not the number of Agents, but the capacity in which they act, and the quality of the A∣ctors, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue (with the publick end and weal) which makes the Actions of men public or private: It must needs follow, That if without Authority, or out of the way of Public Ordinances, men pur∣sue any thing, though the whole Community concur in the pur∣suit; yet it is all of the nature of a private Action, and done to a corrupt and private end.

Because the Author of some Observations upon some of K. Charles the 1st. Messages, was reputed the great Champion of the two Houses, I shall content my self with culling out some of the daringest assertions,* 1.1902 he and some other of their Triarii used, and apply such of those Answers and Reasonings, as the Learned and Loyal offered then against them, though they could not be heard, while the Torrent bore all down the stream. The hide∣ous noise of Tumults, and after of Drums, Trumpets, Cannons and Fire-Arms hushed and silenced all the still voice of Law and Reason: But now it is to be hoped, when Mens Eyes are unsealed, the Mask and Vizard dropped or pulled off, the fa∣tal Consequences of such pernicious Principles throughly mani∣fested, and the loud Thunder of the Two Houses Ordinance al∣layed, mens Spirits will be better fitted to hear them refuted.

Besides what I have endeavoured to answer before, concern∣ing the Authority of the Representative, which they would make an Assembly; in which the People, in underived Majesty, are by these Proxies convened to affirm an Imaginary Power,

supposed to be theirs originally, and in such a convention to be put in execution: I say besides this, which in several places I have refuted, That filled all their Declarations, Messages and Treatises, when they were contriving the setting up the Com∣mons House Topmost, to prove, That they were a Body that was not easily corrupted, byassed, tempted, or prevailed upon, to Act any thing but what was the best for the Peoples advan∣tage. Therefore I think fit in many particulars to shew, how such Bodies may be warped to sinister ends, and especially how that House not only deceived, but tyrannized over, the whole Nation.

Private(b) 1.1903 Quarrels and the memory of former Sufferings may work upon some; discontent and envy at other mens pre∣ferment may transport others; the fear of the lash, and desire to secure themselves have forced some to personate a part; great Offices and Honours have been a Pearl in some Mens Eyes to hinder their Fight; others have been like Organ Pipes, to whom the wind of popular Applause hath only given a sound; others who have premeditated their Parts before their design was dis∣covered, have upon some pretences or other (suppose of an un∣lawful Election, being Monopolists, Abhorrers, or such like) got those excluded by Vote, whom they conceived to be likely to oppose their designs. The bewitching Power of Oratory pre∣vails upon many. In others there is a Speechless Humour of fol∣lowing the Drove.* 1.1904 Can we not easily conceive several of this Body may be ambitious, which would prompt them to alter the old way of bestowing Offices, and collating of Honours? so by disservice as well as service in Parliaments, some Men have ob∣tained Honours, Offices and Estates, finding it a good way to get preferment, by putting the King upon necessity of granting. Good Woodmen say, That some have used Deer-stealing as an Introduction to a Keepers place. So we have seen a Non-con∣formist's mouth stopped (I might instance in other Professions) with a good Benefice; whereas, before he was satisfied, he could gape as wide as his Neighbours. Others by more only ways slip into Preferment; for Covetousness and Ambition will sail with any Wind. The Covetousness of the Members of the long Parliament by woful experience was found insati∣able; witness their Voting for one anothers Offices, Govern∣ments, satisfaction for their losses out of Delinquents Estates, sharing the Kings Lands and Revenue, the Bishops, Deans and Chapters Lands, and the Estates of the Royal Party: hence together with the itch of Arbitrary rule, they drew the deter∣mination of Causes out of the ordinary Courts of Justice, be∣fore their Houses and Committees of them, and in every Coun∣ty had their Sub-committees to Tyrannize over the People and fleece them.

Their cruelty appeared in their erecting High Courts of Justice, Major Generals, and other Arbitrary Courts,* 1.1905 where many a Loyal and brave man, for serving his King, against such

Rebels, either lost his Life or his Liberty and Estate; and when they were the gentlest, yet they could show hatred enough, by Imprisoning, upon I know not what suspicion, and at leasure prosecuting such as they had a pique against.

The partiality of Members in such Conventions are very frequent,* 1.1906 in shielding their friends from being questioned, though their Corruptions were notorious to all the World. So in the fatal Parliament of 1641. A Monopolist, if a Loyal man, was sure to be expelled the House; but if a favourer of the Cause, he was never recriminated with that or any other by-past or present ill disposition.

In such Assemblies there often happen one sort of People, who are always representing grievances, complaining of Male-administration, troubling the Church and State, shaking up the Lees and Dregs in the richest Vessel of Wine, these have learned to catch Eels.

Tacitus notes the corruptions of the Roman Senate,* 1.1907 which ne∣cessitated the change of that State into a Monarchy under Augu∣stus, fully, significantly, and concisely after his manner, Suspecto Senatus Populique imperio ob certamen Potentium, avaritiam Magi∣stratuum, invalido legum auxilio, qua vi, ambitu, postremo pecuniaturba∣bantur. The Provinces observing in this Supremacy of the Senate and People, the contests of the most Powerful, the Covetousness of the Magistrates, the feeble help the Laws afforded (by the Ar∣bitrariness of the Senate, we may presume) by what force and moyen; and lastly, how all things were distracted by Bribery, they were the more easily induced to admit of one Soveraign. These particulars were most obvious in the fatal House of Commons.

Besides these things I have hinted at,* 1.1908 in such a body as we are speaking of (where there cannot want men designing some dangerous Revolutions, for the establishing their own greatness) though some few wise men may be apprehensive of their de∣signs, yet we know maxima est pars artis celare artem. Such contrivers will be sure by all imaginable Arts to conceal their intentions, and obtain an Ascendent over the Judgment of the gross Body, who either are not so quick-sighted, or aiming at no such things themselves, judge others candor by their own, and so by their helps the designers may carry the Vote against even such as penetrate further into the aims of the Contrivers, than the Ma∣jority do; so that those that have good ends may be hood wink∣ed by others whose ends are worse,* 1.1909 and private ends will steal upon well affected: for all grand Conspiracies are veiled un∣der the Mask of Reformation, of removing Grievances and evil Counsellors. Gallant and vertuous actions do not more often ingratiate men with such a mixed body, than a rolling Tongue, a precipitate Head, vain-glorious profusion, oyly insinuations, feigned devotions, sufferings (though deserved) from Superiours, and above all, opposition to the present State.

So the memorable long Parliament of 1641. by the specious pretences of redressing Grievances,* 1.1910 taking care of the Public,

and particularly of the Liberty of the Subject and their Privi∣leges, together with vehement Expressions of their Resolutions of Establishing the Kings Throne, upon more firm foundations of the peoples Hearts and Affections; by insensible Screws wound themselves into the credit of Patriots, and being there∣by able to carry a numerous party with them in all their Votes, by little and little made such encroachments upon the Soveraignty, that having undermined it, past support, they took the advantage of its fall and ruine (out of the same specious pretence, that the Commonwealth might suffer no detriment) to propose their long designed Model of Government, not as by them forethought on, but as a necessary expedient to ac∣complish the end (as they pretended) they had all this while been aiming at, viz. the Peoples prosperity, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they endeavoured to make the World believe they were most Zealous for: when God knows, the upshot of all was the total dissolu∣tion of the best constituted Government, and the Establishing themselves a fattened Commonwealth out of the rich spoils of Monarchy.

Yet these very men were they who some years before pos∣sessed as many as they could delude, with an opinion,* 1.1911 that none knew better, nor affected more the sweetness of so well ballan∣ced a Monarchy, than they; and that the Kings just Authority was Sacred to them that they would make him more rich and glo∣rious than any of his Predecessors. The Observer told the World, That it had been often in the Power of former Par∣liaments, to load the Government with greater Fetters and Clogs, but they would not; and that change of Government could not be in their desires, because the advantage of the Lords and Commons in the State was so great, that no change of Government could better them, except each one could ob∣tain an hereditary Crown. But these were but vain flourishes and empty aiery offers: success altered their Principles, and they were ill troubled to find out excuses and evasions after the Murther of the Blessed King, and change of Government, for these their so hypocritical Declarations. From all which I shall only desire that Posterity may be cautious how they credit the truth of those, who in such Conventions are the most active for any Innovation, if they see that they zealousliest pretend some greater happiness to the People, by lessening the Authority of the Crown. It is reported of Frederick the Emperour,(c) 1.1912 that in the Speech to the Senators, he desired them before they en∣tred into the House of their Assembly, they would leave two things behind them, and then they would give right Judgment; and being asked what those were, he told them,* 1.1913 Counterfeiting and Dissembling.

Another of their Arguments,* 1.1914 for the preference of the Houses Counsel before all other Councils, was, that many Eyes of so many choice Gentlemen from all parts, see more than fewer; which Sophism easily midwived in the conclusion,

that then the two Houses judgment of Affairs was to be pre∣ferred before the King and his Privy Councils, and the Com∣mons before the Peers; and by a parity of Reason (though they desired not it should be urged so far home) that the body of the People was to be preferred before the Commons House, which might be urged upon as common a Proverb, That By∣standers see more than Gamesters.

But who are so blind as those that will not see? Those very Seers if they would have made use of their Eyes, to have peru∣sed the Histories of former Ages, on what specious pretensions Rebellions had begun, and how the Laws had settled the Go∣vernment in an unparallel'd security of the Peoples Rights, as well as the Prerogative of the Crown, or by serious considera∣tion foreseen the certain and inevitable miseries that would fol∣low the weakning of the Crown, and the necessitating the King for his defence to take up Arms: these quick-sighted Commo∣ners might have prevented all those Calamities that ensued.* 1.1915

Whoever considers how easie it is to possess a People with preju∣dices against the Government (of which elsewhere I must enlarge) will soon find that it is no difficult matter to have such Elections of Members as were like to be of the same perswasion with the E∣lectors; So that in such cases, it is not to be wondred at, that a majority of Votes might be opposite to more judicious and fore∣seeing Members judgments; neither is the Maxim universally true, for it must be caeteris paribus, if all things be alike. For it is not sufficient for an Adviser to see, unless he can let another see by the light of Reason. A man ought not implicitely to ground his Actions upon the Authority of other mens Eyes, whether many or few, but of his own. One Physician may see more into the state of a mans body than many Empiricks. One ex∣perienced Commander may know more in Military Affairs than ten fresh-water Souldiers. One old States-man in his own Ele∣ment is worth many new Practitioners. One man upon a Hill may see more than an Hundred in a Valley. And who will de∣ny but among an Hundred, one of them may have a stronger Eye, and see clearer and further than all the Ninety Nine? So one Paphnutius in the Council of Nice, saw more than many greater Clerks. And it is no new thing to find one or two men in the Parliament change the Votes of the House. Therefore nothing is got by this way of arguing, though it be one of the plausiblest, and most improveable of any of the Topicks they choose. And if we could be sure that all the Members of such Assemblies were free from all the imperfecti∣ons such are liable to, much might be yielded to it.

All these Arguments were used for that sole end, that they might possess their Party with the reasonableness of their desires to the King, that he would implicitly yield up his reason to the guidance of their Councils.

They were not so frontless at first,* 1.1916 as positively to deny the Kings negative Vote in Parliament, that had never been

doubted, and there is good reason it should be a most sure Fundamental of the Government, since nothing can be Statute∣law but that to which the King assents, Le Roy le veult. For who can be said to will that hath not the Power to deny?* 1.1917 But they affirmed that in Cases extraordinary, when the King∣dom was to be saved from ruine, the King seduced, and preferring dangerous men, it was necessary for them to take care of the Publick. And then the Kings denying to pass their Bills, was a deserting of them;* 1.1918 Otherwise they alledged Parliaments had not sufficient Power to restrain Tyranny, and so they boldly affirmed they had an absolute indispu∣table Power in declaring Law; and (as their Observer words it) they are not bound to Precedents, since Statutes cannot bind them, there being no obligation stronger than the Ju∣stice and Honour of Parliaments. And to summ up all, he tells us, if the Parliament (meaning the two Houses) be not ver∣tually the whole Kingdom it self; if it be not the supreme Judicature, as well in matters of State as matters of Law; if it be not the great Council of the Kingdom as well as of the King to whom it belongeth, by the consent of all Na∣tions, to provide in all extraordinary cases, ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: let the brand of Treason, saith he, stick upon it. Indeed because by all these most false, and impious as∣sertions, and those horrid Acts built upon them, they brought so great a ruine to the Kingdom, they are and ever will be (u••less a Platonick year return again) branded with Rebellion in the highest degree.

To answer this Accumulation of Treasonable Positions (for such I hope I may call, in some sence,* 1.1919 what is against the Kings Crown and Dignity) is no ways difficult from the discourse of right constituted Parliaments: For those of them that carry any shew of Reason, are such only as may be under∣stood of Acts of Parliament compleated by the Royal As∣sent; but being spoken of either or both Houses in opposi∣tion to the King, they are most false, as I shall shew in par∣ticular.

For First, If the two Houses are not bound to keep any Law, no man can accuse them of breach of any: What ob∣ligation can Justice lay on them who by a strange vertue of Representation are not capable of doing wrong? But it is well known that Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses, as being not void till repealed by a joynt consent of the King and the two Houses. It would be much for the credit of the Observers desperate Cause, if he were able to shew one such Precedent of an Ordinance made by Parliament without the Kings assent, that was binding to the Kingdom in nature of a Law. Our Kings can repeal no Laws by their own Prerogative, though they may suspend the Execution. It seems the Houses would have Power to do both; and our Au∣thor in another place, thinks it strange that the King should

assume or challenge such a share in the Legislative Power to himself, as without his concurrence the Lords and Com∣mons should have no right to make Temporary Orders, for putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence. These were strange Phrases never heard before by English Ears. Our Laws give this Honour to the King, That he can joyn or be sharer with no man. The King like Solomon's true Mother, challeng∣eth the whole Child, not a divisible share, but the very life of the Legislative Power. The Commons present and pray, the Lords advise and consent, the King Enacts.

Secondly,* 1.1920 As to their claiming an absolute Power in decla∣ring Law, it is as bold and false an Assertion as the other, when spoken of the two Houses. They may vote in order to a new Bill, the explaining or repeal of any Law formerly made, or prepare a Bill for any New Law, and that is all they can do; but authoritatively to declare any Law, is most contrary to the Constitution of the Houses, and never was adjudged one of their Privileges.

Thirdly, As to the Justice and Honour of a Parliament, when the State is in quiet, and the Conventions only for making wholsome Laws for the Publick weal, there are no Factions in Court or Country, no private Intriegues to be managed, the People neither uneasie nor discontented; then it is to be ex∣pected, That none but the wisest, and wealthiest of the Gen∣try will be chosen Members of that August Assembly, and their Justice and Honour will be conspicuous in all their Actions. But have we not known Houses of Commons composed of other kinds of Persons, who have voted their own Justice and Honour to be, to imprison their fellow Members, and fellow Subjects in an Arbitrary way? How(d) 1.1921 could a generous Soul, conscious to himself he had transgressed no Law, kneel at the Bar of such a House with the same submission, as if he believed the Speaker infallible, and every Member an An∣gel!

But the Observer,* 1.1922 and his Pewfellows urge, That if the Houses can do no Act for publick good without the King's con∣sent, and if the King may reject their Counsels and Advice; it were needless to put the Country to the charge of choosing Members of Parliament. And if the King may prefer other opinions before Parliamentary Motives, then Parliaments are vain and useless helps, Princes are unlimited, and the People miserable.

These Objections are of such an odious nature,* 1.1923 That no good Subject can take delight in them, whose duty is to pray for the like consent among the several Orders of the Kingdom, as is supposed to be among the several Orbs of Heaven: The King undoubtedly the Primum movens; the Great and Privy Council the lower Spheres.

The usual (but not the only) form of the Kings Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to pass, Le Roy s'avisera,

proves,(e) 1.1924 That after the advice of this his Great Council, he is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions, as his own Wisdom shall think meet. But these Authors will by no means take notice, That the use of Council is to perswade, not to compel; as if a Man in business of great concernment might not very prudently consult with many Friends, and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one, if it appear more proportio∣nable to the end he aims at.

If it were because they are a more numerous body, there∣fore their Counsel is upon that account to be yielded to; then the liberty of dissenting may be denied to the House of Peers, in comparison of the House of Commons; and to that House too in comparison of the People: and so both King, Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament.

Besides Natural Wisdom and Fidelity, there is a thing called Experience, of high concernment in the managery of Publick Affairs. He that will steer one Kingdom aright, must know the right Constitution of all others, their Strength, their Af∣fections, their Counsels and Resolutions, that upon each diffe∣rent Face of the Skie, he may alter his Rudder. The best Governments have more Councils than one: One for the Publick Interest of the Kingdom, another for the Affairs of State, a Council for War, and a Council for Peace.

Let them be as wise and faithful Counsellors as the Observer pleaseth, only let them be but Counsellors.* 1.1925 Let their conlusions have as much credit as the premisses deserve; and if they can necessitate the Prince by weight of Reason, and convincing Evidence of experience, let them do it on Gods name. But it is not to be done upon the Authority of a bare Vote, as I think all uninterested persons are satisfied in the Votes of the Houses in 1641. about the Militia, Church-Government, and the voted Nineteen Propositions, or the late Votes about the Bill of Se∣clusion, the Repealing of the branch of the Statute of Queen Elizabeth against Protestant Dissenters, and the Loans upon the Kings Revenue. There are other ends besides Counsel, for which Parliaments are called, as consenting to new Laws, fur∣nishing the Public with Moneys, and maintaining the Interest of the Government and liberty of the Subject: from the removing one social end, to inferr that an Action is superfluous, deserves no answer but silence and contempt.

This should teach the Electors Wisdom not to chuse such as have Factious Bents, or are not truly qualified in their Allegi∣ance to their Prince; or Malecontents, who render such Con∣ventions useless to the Publick Ends of Government, and the Peace, Tranquillity, and Prosperity of both Prince and People.

Because the Long Parliament Writers would have no Stone unturned, nor any specious Argument uninforced,* 1.1926 that might bring the King to their Lure, to consent to what they propo∣sed; they endeavoured to make the World believe, that the King was bound by his Coronation Oath to pass all such Bills

as they presented, or tendered to him, grounding, as Mr. Prynne, and others alledged, on a promise of the Kings at his Coronati∣on, to grant and keep the Laws and Customs which the Com∣monalty shall chuse. Before I come to give the particular An∣swer, I think it not unfit to take this opportunity to give a full account of the Coronation Oaths of our Kings, and how the same from Age to Age were varied, by which the Ingenious Reader will find, what the respective Kings by their Oaths did promise.

That I may deduce, as high as I have yet found, the Origi∣nal of Soveraign Princes taking Oaths at their Coronations; it may be noted, that the first Emperor that was Crowned, and had any Coronation Oath prescribed, was(f) 1.1927 Anastasius the Greek Emperor, who being elected by the Senate and Soldiers about Ann. 486. Euphemius, Patriarch of Constantinople, (suspect∣ing him to be addicted to the Heresy of Eutychius and the Ma∣nichees,) would not consent to his Coronation, till he should de∣liver him a Writing under his Hand, ratified with his Oath, wherein he should plainly declare, That if he were Crowned Emperour, he would maintain the true Faith, and Synod of Chalcedon during his Reign, and bring in no Novelty to the Church of God. This Writing, ratified with his Oath, Ma∣cedonius the Treasurer was to keep; and after he was made Pa∣triarch, the Emperor demanded it, and said, It was a great discredit unto his Subjects, that his Hand-writing should be kept to testifie against him, or that he should be tied to Pen and Paper.

There is no mention of any Coronation Oath used from thence, to the Year 804. that(g) 1.1928 Stauratius, (Son to Nicephorus, slain in his Wars against the Bulgarians) being declared Em∣peror by some: Michael Curopolata was adorned by the Patri∣arch, with the Diadem, a Writing before being desired, in which he promised to violate none of the Statutes of the Church, &c. Which is the first Precedent of a Promise, not an Oath, demanded from, or given by any Roman King for confirming the Laws of the Church, &c.

The first Emperor Crowned at Rome by any Pope,(h) 1.1929 was Charles the Great, Anno 800. but without an Oath; and Henry the Fifth(i) 1.1930 refused to take any Corporal Oath, saying, That an Emperor ought to Swear to none: for that Oath, i. e. of Fealty, ought to be made to him from all.

I shall not with Mr. Prynne (in his Epistle Dedicatory to his third Tome of Chronological Vindication,) meddle with the dis∣pute, how the Canonists argue from the Popes Crowning of Emperors and Kings, that they acquire a Spiritual and Tempo∣ral Monarchy over them, as their Sovereign Lords. For that however some may hold the Doctrine, yet it is exploded by most.

As to the Crowning and Anointing of some British and Saxon Kings, I must refer the Reader to Mr. Selden(k) 1.1931, and Mr. Prynne in the forecited Epistle.

The first of our Kings that is recorded in History to have ta∣ken an Oath at his Coronation, was Can••tus; of whom Sim.(l) 1.1932 Dunelmensis, and others give this account, That after the death of Aethelred, the Bishops, Abbats, Dukes, and the No∣bles of England, and the most part of the men of the King∣dom, as well of the Clergy as Laity, met together with one consent at Southampton, and chose Canutus for their King, and swore Fealty to him: to whom he also swore,* 1.1933 that according to God and the World, (that is the Laws of God and the King∣dom) he would be a faithful Lord unto them. Mr. Prynne here no••es, that Usurpers more frequently used to take such Oaths than lawful hereditary Kings. So when the Citizens of London, and some few Noblemen, with unanimous consent, chose(m) 1.1934 Edmond, called Ironside, the eldest Son of Aethelred, who was right Heir, there is no mention of an Oath. So when Harold reputed Son of Cnute was Crowned, there is no Oath recorded, nor of any taken by Hardicnute, right Heir of Cnute.

So, Anno 1041.(n) 1.1935 Edward the Confessor, annuente Cleno & Po∣pulo, Londoniis in Regem eligitur, and was Crowned, Anoint∣ed, and Consecrated; yet not any of our Historians, besides William of Malmsbury de gestis Regum, Lib. 2. c. 13. p. 80. speaks of an Oath, who saith, that he being sent for by the Nobles, upon terms proposed to him by Earl Godwyn, there was(o) 1.1936 nothing that King Edward did not promise, by reason of the necessity of the time; so that Faith was given by either Party, and what was desired, he confirmed by Oath: but this was in their private Consultation. Yet Archbishop(p) 1.1937 Stratford in his Epistle to King Edward the First, saith, that St. Edward be∣ing raised to be King of England, first Swore inviolably to keep the Laws of Canutus.

We find no Coronation Oath of Harold mentioned. Matt. Westm. Flor. Hist. p. 433 saith, that extorta fide a Majoribus, Capiti proprio imposuit Diadema; that having exacted Fealty of the great Men, he put the Crown on his own Head: and after when Crowned by Archbishop Alfred,* 1.1938 he took no Coronation Oath; but as my Author saith, Leges aequas coepit condere.(r) 1.1939

As to King (q) William the Conqueror; Aldred Archbishop of York Crowned him, and imposed on him an Oath. The words of the Authors are, Ipsa nativitatis die ab Aldredo Ebor. Archiepis∣copo, apud Westmon. in Regem totius Angliae sublimiter Coron••um inunxit, & consecravit honorifice: Having before (as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Archbishop required from him) before the Altar of St. Peter the Apostle, before the Clergy and People, by Oath promised, That he would defend Holy Church, and the Governours of it (which Clause occurs not before) and likewise govern all the People subjected to him, with a Just and Regal Providence, and appoint and hold right Law, and wholly remove and inter∣dict all Rapines, and unjust Judgments.

The Oath which he took to observe St. Edward's Laws, was afterwards, Anno 1072. when he entring into a Parly with the English Nobility (who intended to have set up Edgar Atheling, because King William had violated their ancient Laws, and in∣troduced new ones) he, by the Advice of Archbishop(r) 1.1940 Lan∣frank, Swore that bonas & antiquas Leges Regni, sc. Leges quas Sancti & pii Angliae Reges, & maxime Rex Edwardus statuit, in∣violabiliter observare. Only William of Malmsbury(s) 1.1941 saith, that Aldred the Archbishop would not consecrate him, before he had exacted from him, before all the People, this Oath, That he would modestly deport himself towards all his Subjects, and with an equal Law treat the English as he did the French.

William Rufus promised to Lanfranck,(t) 1.1942 If he were King,* 1.1943 in all his Affairs, through all his Kingdom, to preserve Ju∣stice, Equity, and Mercy, and to defend the Liberty and Se∣curity of the Church in Peace, against all. H. Huntingdon, Lib. 7. fol. 213. b. and Hoveden, Anno 1088. fol. 264. b. say, That when he needed the help of the English, he promised them such desirable Laws, or better than they would chuse. But Malmsbury and others say, he kept them not; for Usurpers (such as he was) rarely observe the Laws, or their Promises, further than they serve their own Interest. Therefore Mr. Prynne notes that the Promise Eadmerus, and(u) 1.1944 Simeom Du∣nelm. mention, was before he was King; and the other Promise was, when most of the Norman Nobility, except the Arch∣bishop Lanfranck, designed to make Robert his Brother King; and then he called them together, and then told them, If they would be Faithful to him,(w) 1.1945 Meliorem Legem quam vellent eligere, eis concederet, & omne injustum Scottum interdixit.(x) 1.1946 Huntingdon saith the promised them exoptabiles leges, and that they should have their Woods and Hunting free.

It is recorded of Henry the First,* 1.1947 that having gathered to London the Clergy of England and all the People, he pro∣mised them an amendment of the Laws, with which they were oppressed in the time of his Father, and his Brother lately de∣ceased, that he might obtain their(y) 1.1948 good Wills to his Pro∣motion, and that they might receive him for their King and Fa∣ther: to which the Clergy and all the Nobility answered,* 1.1949 That if with a willing Mind he would grant them, and with his Charter confirm all the Liberties, and ancient Customs, which fl••rished in the Kingdom, in the time of the Holy King Ed∣ward, they would consent to him, and unanimously consecrate him King; and he freely yielding to his, and affirming by his Oath that he would do it, he was consecrated King, the Cler∣gy and People favouring it.

Eadmerus saith, That in ipso consecrationis die, bonas & Sanctas omni Populo Leges se servaturum, & omnes oppressiones & iniqui∣tates, quae sub fratre suo emerserunt, in omni sua dominatione tam Dei Lege, quam in secularibus negotiis prohibiturum, & subver∣surum, sposponderat; & haec omnia Jurisjurandi Interjectione formula

per totum Regnum divulgata ire praeceperat, and when he was Crown∣ed, he granted the Laws recited by(z) 1.1950 Matthew Paris, to be held in his Kingdom, for the exalting of the Holy Church, and Peace of his People: which Laws being at large recited by Matt. Paris, may be perused by the Inquisitive, wherein he will find how far the old Laws were confirmed, and what a Foundation there was laid for Magna Charta.

Concerning King Stephen,(a) 1.1951 Malmsbury saith,* 1.1952 That Henry his Brother, Bishop of Winchester, was a great help to his ob∣taining the Crown, having great hopes that he would follow his Grandfather, King William's Steps, in the Government of his Kingdom, especially in matters of Ecclesiastical Discipline; therefore he saith, William, Archbishop of Canterbury, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 exacted a solemn Oath from him, of granting and preserving the Liberty of the Church: the Oath it self is long, and the Im∣munities to the Church many; those to the Laity are conceiv∣ed in these words, Omnes Exactiones, & Mescheningas, & In∣justitias, sive per Vicecomites, vel per alios quoslibet male inductas, funditus extirpo. Bonas Leges, & Antiquas, & justas Consue∣tudines, in Murdris, & Placitis, & aliis Causis observabo, & ob∣servari praecipio & constituo. Malmsbury saith, That the King swore according to the tenor of the Writing he there produceth, Dated at Oxford, Anno Dom. 1136. 1 Regni.

I find no mention of an Oath taken by K. H. 2. at his Co∣ronation; but(b) 1.1953 Brompton saith, that he confirmed the Charter of his Grandfather King Henry the First,* 1.1954 and that he was sollicitous, ut Lex quae extincta videbatur, paulatim exsur∣geret: and Matt. Paris(c) 1.1955 saith, That Anno 1172. he swore before the Cardinals, that he would abrogate all the evil Customs in∣troduced in his time against the Church.

We find that Pope Alexander(d) 1.1956 the Third Excommunicated several Bishops, and suspended the Archbishop of York, for his rash Presumption in the Coronation of a new King, in con∣tempt of the Archbishop of Canterbury, to whose Office of an∣cient Right it was known to belong; and for that in the Coro∣nation, according to Custom, there was no sworn Caution offered or exacted by them for the keeping of the Liberties of the Church: but afterwards(e) 1.1957 it is said to be confirmed by Oath, that the ancient Customs of the Kingdom (from which the dignity of the Church was in danger) should invio∣lably be kept in all time to come.

The Solemnities of King Richard the First's Coronation are fully described by the Abbat of Jorval:(f) 1.1958 and as to his Oath,* 1.1959 he saith that he swore and vowed (the Holy Evangelists, and the Reliques of many Saints being set before him) that he would bear Peace, Honour, and Reverence, all his Life, to God and the Holy Church, and its Ministers; and then he swore that he would exercise right Justice to the People committed to him: and after he swore that he would blot out, or abolish evil Laws, and perverse Customs, if any were in his Kingdom, and he would keep good Laws.

I find that King John took an Oath as Duke of Normandy,* 1.1960 that he would defend Holy Church and its Dignities in good Faith, without evil Intention, and would honour all the Or∣dained, and that he would destroy all evil Laws, if any were, and substitute good ones; the words(g) 1.1961 are, quod ipse Sanctam Ecclesiam & ejus dignitates bona fide, & sine malo Ingenio defende∣ret, & ordinatos honoraret, & quod Leges iniquas, si quae essent, destrueret, & bonas surrogaret.

At his Coronation(h) 1.1962 he took another Oath, that he would love Holy Church, and the ordained of it, and would preserve it indempnified from the Incursions of the Malignant; and that the perverse Laws being destroyed, he would substi∣•• good ones, and would exercise right Justice in England. Besides these, Matth. Paris, p. 189. of the Old Edition, saith, That he was sworn by the said Archbishop ex parte Dei & di∣stricte prohibitus, ne honorem hunc accipere praesumeret, nisi in mente habeat opere quod juraverat adimplere; that is, On the part of God, by the Archbishop, he was strictly forbid, that he pre∣sume not to take this Honour, unless he had a resolution to ful∣fil in work, what he had sworn: To which the King promised, That, by the help of God, he would in good faith observe what he had sworn.

In the Fifteenth of his Reign he was forced by the Barons to take another Oath,(i) 1.1963 Quod sanctam Ecclesiam ejusque ordi∣natos diligeret & manuteneret, contra omnes adversarios suos pro posse suo: quodque bonas Leges Antecessorum suorum, & praecipue Leges Edwardi Regis revocaret, & iniquas destrueret, & omnes homines suos, secundum justa Curiae suae judicia, judicaret: quod∣que singulis redderet jura sua. Juravit praeterea Innocentio Papae, ejusque Catholicis Successoribus, fidelitatem & obedientiam: And that he would make restitution of those things he had taken away by reason of the Interdict. This Clause of restoring King Edward's Laws (which had been disused from the time of the Conquest) being thus inserted in King John's Oath, was after inserted into the Coronation-Oath of Edward the Third, and so continued.

The best Account of the Coronation-Oath of King Henry the Third, is in(k) 1.1964 Matthew Paris, That he swore before the Clergy and People,* 1.1965 the Holy Evangelists and the Reliques of several Saints being laid before him, and Joceline Bishop of Bath reading the Oath, which was very little different from that which King John took, Quod honorem, pacem & reverentiam prae∣stabit Deo, & sanctae Ecclesiae, & ejus ordinatis omnibus diebus vitae suae; and so word for word as in King John's: only for perversas consuetudines, here is iniquas consuetudines.

It was in relation to the preceding Oaths, that(l) 1.1966 Bracton saith, The King ought at his Coronation, in the Name of Je∣sus Christ being sworn, to promise these three things to the Peo∣ple being his Subjects: First, To command, and to his power see it performed, that the Peace shall be kept to the Church,

and all Christian People in all his time. Secondly, That all Ravages and all Iniquities, in all degrees, shall be by him for∣bidden. Thirdly, That in all his Judgments he shall command Equity and Mercy, and that by his Justice all may enjoy firm Peace, & per Justitiam suam firma gaudeant Pace universi.

None of our Historians mention the Oath of Edward the First, that I have met with,* 1.1967 nor Mr. Prynne: Therefore I think it very probable that it was conceived in the same Form, as that of his Fathers and Grandfathers;* 1.1968 for it is most certain that he took one, by the Expressions in sundry of his Prohibitions, to the Legates of Popes, to Bishops, and others in these Words: Torpescere non possumus, quia exhaeredationem quae statum Coronae nostrae contigit, sicut ex Sacramenti vinculo adstringimur, pro viri∣bus evitemus, ne Coronae & dignitatis nostrae Jura depereant, stu∣diosam(m) 1.1969 nos debet operam adbibere; & ad ea manutenenda & conservanda, eo potius debemus esse solliciti, quoad hoc vinculo ju∣ramenti teneri dignoscimus & adstringi; that is, We cannot be slothful, because we should avoid to our power, our dis-inhe∣riting, which appertains to the State of our Crown, as we are tied by the Bond of our Oath; which to maintain and pre∣serve, we ought to afford our studious help, lest the Rights of our Crown and Dignity perish; and we ought the more to be solicitous in this, as that we know our selves to be held and bound by the bond of the Oath.

Hitherto we find nothing of the Vulgus elegerit, besides what is mentioned in King William Rufus his promise, That he would grant his Subjects a more desirable Law, and better than they could chuse; which is no ways to be interpreted of such a choice as the Republicans would have understood.

Our Historians are generally silent what the Oath was that Edward the Second took,* 1.1970 but it is to be found in the Clause Rolls of the Tower(n) 1.1971, 1 E. 2. in French thus, which I shall ren∣der into English as well as I can.* 1.1972

SIRE, Volez vous granter, & garder, & per vestre serement confirmer, au People d' Engleter, les Leys, & les Cu∣stumes a eux grantes per les An∣ciens Rois d' Engleter, voz Pre∣decessours droitas, & devotz a Dieu; & nomement, les Leys, les Custumes, & Franchises grantz au Clergie, & au People, par le glorieus Roy Seint Ed∣ward, votre Predecessure?

Respons.

Jeo les grants & prometts.

Sire, Garderez vous a Dieu & a Seint Eglise, & au Clergie, & au Poeple, Pece, & accord en Dieu entirement selons vostre Poair?

Respons.

Jeo les garderez.

Sire, Freez (or perhaps fe∣res) vous faire, en tous voz Juge∣ments, ovels & droit Justice, & discretion en misericorde, & ve∣rite a vostre Poair?

Respons.

Jeo les fray.

Sire, Grantez vous a tenir & garder des Leys & les Custumes droitureles, le quels la Commu∣nate de votre Roiaume auras eslu, & les defenderz & inforciers al honeur de Dieu, a votre Poair?

Respons.

Jeo les grants & prometts.

SIR, Will you grant and keep, and by your Oath confirm, to your People of Eng∣land, the Laws and Customs granted to them by the Anci∣ent Kings of England, your pre∣decessors righteous, and de∣vout to God, and namely, the Laws, and Customs, and Fran∣chises granted to the Clergy, and the People, by the glori∣ous King St. Edward your Pre∣decessor?

Answer.

I do grant and promise this.

Sir, Do you keep to God, and his Holy Church, and to the Clergy, and to the Peo∣ple Peace, and accord in God entirely, according to your Power?

Answer.

I shall keep these.

Sir, Will you suffer to be done in all your Judgments, e∣qual and right Justice, and Discretion, with Mercy and Truth according to your Pow∣er?

Answer.

I will do it.

Sir, Do you grant to hold, and keep the Laws, and the Customs that are lawful, which the Community of your Realm shall have chosen, and defend, and enforce these to the Honour of God, to your Power?

Answer.

I grant and promise them.

Several Answers have been given to the Objection raised from this last Clause,* 1.1973 as they found it in the Latin(o) 1.1974 Records; therefore, before I apply those, it is needful to note the Latin, which, as we find it 1 R. 2. was this, Capto per Archiepiscopum Cantuar. Sacramento Dom. Regis Corporali, de concedendo, & ser∣vando cum sucra confirmatione, Leges & consuetudines ab antiquis, justis, & Deo devotis Regibus Angliae, Progenitoribus, Plebi Regni Angliae concessas, & praesortim leges & consuetudines, & li∣bertates a gloriosissimo & sanctissimo Rege Edwardo, Clero Populo∣que Regni praedicti concessas, & servando Deo & Ecclesiae Sanctae Domini, Cleroque & Populo pacem, & concordiam integre in Deo juxta vires suas, & de faciendo fieri in omnibus judiciis suis, aequam & rectam Justitiam & discretionem in misericordia, & veritate; & otiam de tenendo & custodiendo justas Leges & Con∣suetudines Ecclesiae, & de faciendo per ipsum Dom. Regem, eas esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas, quas vulgus juste & rationabiliter elegerit juxta vires ejusdem Dom. Regis.* 1.1975

This is verbatim the Latin for the preceding French, except in the additional Clause, and the Conclusion which makes the just Laws and Customs both to relate to those of the Church,

and those that the Vulgar shall have justly and reasonably chosen.

The like we find,(q) 1.1976 1 H. 4. and in the Pontificale of the Archbishops and Bishops; and it is added, after the King hath,* 1.1977 as before expressed, answered to the Proposals, Pronunciatis omnibus, confirmat Rex se omnia servaturum, Sacramento super Attari praestito coram cunctis; i. e. that the King by his Oath, ta∣ken upon the Altar before all present, to observe these, con∣firms them.

The Solemnities and Ceremonies used at the Coronation of King Richard the Second, may be perused at large in Tho.(r) 1.1978 Walsingham, and he saith, he swore before the Bishops and Nobles there present, for they only could hear his Oath, that he would permit the Church to enjoy its Liberties, and would honour it and its Ministers, that he would hold right Faith, and would forbid Rapines, and all Iniquities in all their De∣grees. 2ly. That he would make to be kept, every where, the good Laws of the Land, and especially, the Laws of St. Edward King and Confessor, who was buried in that Church, and would make all evil Laws to be abrogated. 3ly. That he would not be an accepter of Persons, but would make right Judgment betwixt man and man, that especially he(s) 1.1979 would observe Mercy, as the Clement and Merciful God might grant Mercy to him.

Having thus given an account of these Coronation Oaths, I come to the Objections. First, They(t) 1.1980 say, that the word Vulgus doth signifie the two Houses, and the word elegerit is to be taken in the Future Tense; so that the King is obliged to consent to such Laws as the two Houses, especially the Com∣mons do chuse.

It is a wonder to me, how men that pretended to any read∣ing or learning in Antiquities, or in the Constitution of the Go∣vernment, could defend their Cause with such pitiful Reason∣ings, especially against King Charles the First, who neither had taken such an Oath, nor many of his Predecessors before him.

The Latin Translation of two French words gave all the oc∣casion of dispute; for that which is called Communate, is ren∣dered Plebs and Vulgus, and aura eslu is translated elegerit; whereas, were it to have been understood in the Future Tense, it should have been eslira: and agreeable to that in all the Au∣thentick Records of the Exchequer, the word elegerit is Eng∣lished in the Preterperfect Tense. Thus much may suffice as to the word elegerit. Dr. Brady's Glossary will satisfie the Curious about the import of the word it self.

Concerning the word Vulgus, one solid(u) 1.1981 Author saith, That we may be confident, that neither the Bishops, Privy Council, Parliament, or any other whosoever they were, that framed or penned this Oath, ever intended in this word the Commons in Parliament, much less the Lords: they would ne∣ver so much disparage the Members of Parliament, as to dis∣grace

them with a Title both base and false. It had been enough, if not too much, to have called them Populus, the Peo∣ple; but Vulgus, the Vulgar, the rude multitude (which hath the Epithete of ignobile vulgus) is a word as dishonourable to the Composers of the Oath to give, or for the King to use, as for the Members of the Parliament to receive; therefore he judg∣eth, that by Vulgus must be meant the Common People, not the Lords and Commons.

But then, saith the same Author, the doubt will be, what the Common People, or Vulgus, out of Parliament have to do to chuse Laws. In answer to which, the preceding word is to be considered; Consuetudines quas Vulgus elegerit, the Customs which the Common People have chosen. If we observe the nature of Custom,* 1.1982 it is the Vulgus, or Common People only who chuse Customs. Common usage, time out of mind, cre∣ates a Custom; and the commoner the usage is, the stronger and the better is the Custom. No where can so common an usage be found, as among the Vulgar, who are still the far greatest part of every multitude. If a Custom be common through the whole Kingdom with us, it is all one with the Com∣mon Law of England, which is often called Common Custom; so that to protect the Customs which the Vulgar chuse, is to swear to protect the Common Laws of England.

Agreeable to this, is what the learned Dr. Brady(w) 1.1983 notes, That upon the whole, it signifies no more than that the Com∣munity had chosen, that is owned, submitted to, and desired still to use their Old Customs, which by use, time out of mind, they had enjoyed for the better management of Affairs, and Conveniency betwixt Man and Man, all the Nation over, or in any particular County, Hundred, Town, City or Burrough, such long practices being the foundation of all Customs: but these are to be just, which intrench not upon the Govern∣ment or Laws, and by permission and sufferance only become Laws.

But the same(x) 1.1984 Author judiciously affirms, That the Commu∣nity here intended was the Community of the Bishops,* 1.1985 Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, Great Men, and the whole body of the Te∣nents in Capite, expressed by those words, in the former Questions, Clergy and People; for by them these demands were made, and no doubt they would first ask for themselves, for the Vulgar or Rabble could not come near to make their Demands at such a Solemnity as this was, so(y) 1.1986 great and splendid; there being at it, Charles and Lewis, Earls of Clermont, two of the King of France's Brothers, the D. of Brabant, the Earl of Fens, and the other great Men, both of France and England, with the Countess of Artois.

Whoever desires further satisfaction, may consult the same learned(z) 1.1987 Author, who makes it clear, That the word Plebs, Vulgus & Populus in the Writers of that Age was used for the Laity in way of contradistinction from the Clergy.

I shall at present leave this, and note, that for any thing ap∣pears to the contrary, the same Interrogations, Oath, &c. pre∣sented to Edward the Second and Third, (without the additions of King Richard's) continued without any alteration to Henry the Eighth's(a) 1.1988 time, and in that we find the King promiseth he shall keep and maintain the Liberties of the Holy Church of old time granted by their Righteous Kings of England;* 1.1989 and that he shall keep all the Lands, Honours, and Dignities righteous and free of the Church of England, in all manner Holy, without any manner of minishments; and the rights of the Crown hurt, decay, or loss, to his Power shall call again into the ancient estate; and that he shall keep the Peace of Holy Church, and of the Clergy, and of the People with good ac∣cord; and that he shall do in his Judgment, Equity and right Justice, with Discretion and Mercy; and that he shall grant to hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm, and to his Power keep them, and affirm them, which the People and Flock have chosen; and the evil Laws and Customs wholly to put out, and stedfast and stable Peace to the People of this Realm keep, and cause to be kept to his Power. In this Oath King Henry the Eighth interlined, for the right explication of it, instead of People and Flock, these Words, which the Nobles and People have chosen with my Consent.

The Oath of King Edward the Sixth,* 1.1990 so far as relates to my purpose was this, Do you grant to make no new Laws, but such as shall be to the honour and glory of God, and to the good of the Commonwealth, and that the same shall be made by the consent of the People as hath been accustomed?* 1.1991

I have not seen any Transcripts of the Oaths of Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth, those which King James and King Charles the First took, run thus; Will you grant to hold and keep the Laws and Rightful Customs which the Commonalty of this King∣dom have; and will you defend and uphold them to the Ho∣nour of God, so much as in you lyeth?

That Branch of the Oath which relates to my purpose, taken by King Charles the Second, runs thus: Sir, Will you grant to keep the rightful Customs which the Commonalty of your Kingdom have, &c.

The Oath that our present King James the Second took at his Coronation,* 1.1992 was in the same Words as that of his Royal Brother; wherein the Word Customs is to be taken in the lar∣gest extent, to include Laws also.

Now upon the whole we must consider First,* 1.1993 That in the Eye of the Law the King never dyes, so that he is King before any Solemnity of Coronation. Secondly, The variety of Forms and Precedents, seem to prove that one precise form is not simply necessary; so the interlining of Henry the Eighth upon Record also shews. And if it had been of consequence to have retained the old form, we should have heard of it ei∣ther then or in some succeeding Parliaments. Lastly, it cannot be

denied, that if the King be bound by a lawful Oath to pass all Bills, it is not the form of denying it, but the not doing of it which makes the Perjury. And so when the King is tender of a flat denial, and attributing so much to the judgment of his great Council, that he only useth the words avisera; it would be a strange Doctrine, that all the Kings of England who have gi∣ven this Answer, have been forsworn, and neither Parliament nor Convocation taken notice of it in so many Ages.

But when by dint of Argument the Parliament Champions were driven from these Holds, they fled to their last Burrow. So one of them confesses, that in Acts of Grace the King is not bound to assent, nor in Acts wherein he is to depart from the particular right and interest of his Crown; and lastly that if he do not consent (however bound by Oath) yet they are not binding Laws to the Subject.* 1.1994 But then comes the handful of Gourds which spoils the Pottage: Except in cases of necessity; If the safety of the People be concerned; If it may prove dangerous or inconvenient to them, then an extraordinary course may be taken.

This was the plausible Plea of 1641. to get the Militia into their hands: for they urged that in case of apparent and imminent danger, the Peoples safety was not to be neglected; They might not be exposed as a prey to their Enemies, there∣fore must be put into a posture of defence. This was grateful to the People, out of that real love they bare to themselves, they must favour that side which pretends to take care of their safety. Give to any Person or Society a Legislative Power with∣out the King in case of necessity,(b) 1.1995 permit them withal to be sole Judges of necessity, when it is, and how long it lasts: and then it is more than probable, the necessity will not determine, till they have their utmost desires, which is the same in effect as if they had the Legislative Power.

Further it must be considered that necessity upon that sup∣position must be very evident, there needs no such great stir who shall be Judge of it; when it comes indeed, it will shew it self; when extream necessity is disputable, it is a sign it is not real. Secondly, The Agent must be proper, otherwise it cuts in sunder the very Sinews of Government, to make two su∣premes in a Society, and to subject the People to contrary com∣mands.

But to claim such a Power over the King in extraordinary cases alone,* 1.1996 doth not much vary the case: for at the same time they voted themselves the proper Judges of such necessities, and the erecting of any superintending Power in the circum∣stances of those times, and in all parallel cases, would not on∣ly unsoveraign the King (by making this Power the Soveraign) but the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous ex∣travagances than Regal Power is, and yet less capable of Re∣gulation than it. For the Law knowing there is none but God, qui custodiat ipsos custodes, concludes from the weakness and

imperfection of every other form of Government, that the So∣veraignty of Law-making was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, than in a Popular or Aristocratical hand; and that a positive known Law without any coercive Superintend∣ent was a sufficient, and the best boundary of Regal Power: For the Law and the Transgression of it, being both at once made manifest and notorious, it will be so sufficient(c) 1.1997 security of the future observance of the Law, that Princes will not offer to violate it. Now if such a Supreme Power, as these would have in the two Houses, in what case soever, be once enacted, that must either be boundless or circumscribed by a Laws; and if that be circumscribed with a Law, then must that Law also have a Superiour Power to enforce it: and so there must be a Superiour Power over Superiour Power in infinitum, and yet at last leave the most Superiour Power in that liberty which the Ob∣server calleth boundless, Arbitrary and Tyrannical.

If this Principle were true,* 1.1998 all is but misleading formality of Law, the Soveraignty is not in the King but in the People; the King is the only Subject and but a common Voucher, whose concurrence is unavoidably implied; his Will, his Understand∣ing and his Power are all subject to the Body of the very Sub∣ject that in Parliament doth swear subjection to him: and these pretended Rights being hid ever since the beginning of the Kingdom, the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hath by the injury of our Laws been most impiously mis-sworn in their Allegiance. And whereas the trust is irrevocably commit∣ted to the King and his Heirs for ever, how can it be con∣ceived it should sleep during the sitting of a Parliament, unless that jocular saying of King James were to be understood real∣ly, That during the Sessions of a House of Commons there were five hundred Kings? And if any such Power were in the Houses, it was a strange oversight to leave it to the Kings dis∣posal, when to call the Body together, and when to dissolve it (as before I have touched) whereby the King might solely de∣termin where, and how long he would be over-ruled, and when King again: whereas by the false suggestion of the Observer (that it was fit the Houses should have a Superintendent Power, in case of extraordinary danger, and they only to be Judges of that danger) he cunningly turns the Tables, and makes the Houses to be Soveraigns as long as they pleased; and when they were weary of reigning, the Kingdom should be out of danger, and then it should be the Kings turn to command a∣gain.

But to draw to a conclusion on this subject, which cost so much Blood and Treasure: There(d) 1.1999 neither is nor can be the same necessity of observing an old Law, to which a King is obliged by his Charter and his Oath, and of a new Law to which he hath not given his Royal Assent. If Magna Char∣ta extended to this, it were Charta Maxima, the greatest Charter that ever was granted. To be be denied nothing, is a

Privilege indeed as good as Fortunatus his Purse; or as that old Law which one found out for the Kings of Persia, That he might do what he would.* 1.2000 The taking away the Kings Nega∣tive Voice, may indeed secure us against Tyranny, which ne∣ver can come in upon us, as long as the two Houses(e) 1.2001 Negatives ballance it; but it leaves us open and stark naked to all those Popular evils and Epidemical diseases, which flow from Popu∣lar Government, as Tumults, Seditions, Civil Wars, and the Ilias of Evils which attends them; the Negative Voice being the Soveraignest remedy against such great Mischiefs.

One Wheedle I find more they used, since the King was so tender of violating his Coronation Oath, in giving Assent to their new Bills, which were diametrically opposite to the old fundamental Laws, made in defence of Episcopacy, and the Kings Prerogative in the Militia, &c. they quit their Title of Parliament men,* 1.2002 and would be Casuists to resolve his Consci∣ence, telling him that where the People by Publick Authority, will seek inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it was more inconvenience and injustice in the King to deny than to grant it.

Thus the Houses would have granted the King a Dispensation to have acted against the dictates of his Reason, Conscience, and the fundamental Laws. And because he would not own their Commission for it, they persecuted him to the Scaffold. This was an unheard of Villany to be offered to so Pious and Religious a Prince, that as Father of his People, would not give them a Stone instead of Bread, or a Scorpion instead of a Fish. The Heathen was much honester, who prayed Jupiter to give him good things, though he never opened his Mouth for them; and to withhold bad and prejudicial things, though he petitioned never so earnestly for them. This was a strange Principle, that the King should be bound by Law to destroy his People, or not preserve their Right, unless he not only violate his own Conscience, but their very Liberties. Can a man ima∣gine those People, of whom Juvenal speaks,

—evertere domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles—

if they had understood their own Prayers, would have accused the Gods for denying them.

As they thus sought to hush the Kings Conscience, so that endeavoured to find a quaint salvo for their own more brawny ones: For when it was urged, that to deny the Kings Nega∣tive Voice, was to dissolve the excellent constitution of Parlia∣ments, and was directly against the settlement of it upon the true basis of the Ballance, and the mutual stipulation of the King and his People, as they loved to phrase it they answer by their Prolocutor, that those who contract to their own ruin, or esteem such Contracts before their own preservation, are

felonious to themselves, and rebellious to Nature. Inferring from thence, That if the legal Constitution of Government,* 1.2003 be not agreeable to the Liberties the House conceives needful for them, they are obliged to contend to alter them: which is no more nor less, than if a Criminal being condemned to be hanged, should be guilty of another Felony and Treason a∣gainst Nature to yield to the Sentence, but that he ought in his own defence to kill as many as he could, that he might there∣by save his life by escape.

Thus I hope I have made apparent the falshood of the Posi∣tions ranged in defence of that dismal Parliament,* 1.2004 who made use of them as Platforms upon which to plant the Artillery of their Acts and Ordinances. For under the pretext of their obligation to preserve the Kingdom, they voted to put it in a posture of defence; and they voted from the King his Navies, Officers, Privy Counsellors, and Revenues, pretending the Navies were still reserved for the King, in better hands than he would put them, and for the other they would furnish him with better principled Ministers. Whereas by the same Prece∣dent, the Subjects were bound to give up their Estates to their ordering, as often as they pretended they could dispose of them more wisely. For they might alledge, the State (which they reputed themselves) had an interest paramount in them in case of publick extremity: so that as they pretended the Head without the Body was the State before, so now it was fit the Body should be without the Head; whereas the Law hath provided against either exorbitances: and if there was necessity we must fall into one, we ought in reason to chuse the former, because being better acquainted with that, we could better digest it; and it would be less burthensom to our Estates to satisfie one than five hundred, nay ten thousand, as it appeared when the greedy Commonwealths men with their Committees, Armies, &c. was that flat Vermine in the Bowels, which (how true soever it is of the lumbricus latus) was certain∣ly true of this Monster, That it was every where Head and Mouth.

It is to be well weighed,* 1.2005 that as Parliaments are in the highest degree beneficial, when they keep within the bounds of duty and sobriety; so when they will have their Ordi∣nances to have the force of Laws, and not govern themselves by known Laws, they are the cause of many Distempers in a Kingdom, and the Subjects condition is most unhappy in the Multitude of Physicians: for extraordinary Remedies, such as they always pretend to use, are, saith Sir Henry Wotton, like hot Waters which may help at a pang, but being too often used spoil the Stomach.

A Compleat Parliament is that(f) 1.2006 Panchreston or Soveraign Salve for all Sores; but some would make the name of Parli∣ament a Medusa's Head to transform reasonable men into Stones, and subordinate Monarchy to the two Houses, who

must be denied nothing; but with their good will would claim for them a paramount interest with the Soveraign, whom they would advance only to the height and mighty Dignity of a Doge of Venice, or a Roman Consul, whilest they must be the Tribunes of the People their Supervisors. So that we cannot be content to gather the blessed fruits right con∣stituted Parliaments would afford us, but we must rend away the top Branch, yea stub up the Tree that we may scramble for the Fruit.

Tacitus(g) 1.2007 gives a Caution how a Prince may support his Au∣thority, that he do not vim Principatus resolvere, cuncta ad Sena∣tum revocando.* 1.2008 It is fit a Prince should have the Glory of performing those things himself which are his Prerogatives, and not to refer such things to Conventions of Parliament, which properly belong not to their Cognizance. Since there∣fore by the condescensions of our Wise and Gracious Princes, there are several things in England, the King cannot by Law do alone, it is a most requisite Wisdom in Princes, that as they observe the Laws in securing the Peoples Liberties and Privileges; so by no Arbitrary Assumption of either or both Houses, to let their Prerogatives be invaded: for those are now no more than are rationally and politically necessary for orderly and established Government.

The Encroachments of the never to be forgotten long Par∣liament, (several of which I have in this and the foregoing Chapter hinted) may be sufficient documents to Princes, not to yield such a body too much Power: for if the ballance once decline, a little weight will sink it.

Therefore though Princes are not to enlarge their Prero∣gatives, nova siti ad alia aliaque properare; yet they ought to preserve those that remain. For any Raveling once yielded, will make the Royal Cittadel defenceless. Testudo ubi collecta est in suum tegmen, tuta est ad omnes ictus; ubi exerit partes ali∣quas, quodcunque nudavit, obnoxium & infirmum est: The Tor∣toise as long as it keeps within its shell and coverture is safe; but if it unbare any part, it is obnoxious to danger.

Above all things a Prince should he careful never to part with the Prerogative of Summoning and Dissolving Parlia∣ments. For we cannot forget that the Houses of 1641. not content with a Bill for Triennial Parliaments, got an Act for perpetuating themselves; and that would not satisfie, but they prepared a Bill for the certainty of future Parliaments, whe∣ther the King had occasion for them or not: so that if the King omitted the sending out of Writs and Summons, the Chancellor might, and for failure the Sheriff, and I know not what inferiour Officers; of which the Blessed King com∣plains.

I cannot dismiss this Subject without taking notice of the Fundamental cause of Factious Members of Parliament.* 1.2009 In England there is no such powerful Engine to make Faction and

Sedition formidable and dangerous to Government, as when the Majority of the Freeholders are wrought upon (by the Arts I have in some measure hinted before, and shall more largely in the Chapter of Faction) to chuse Members of the House of Commons of their own Temper: for such a Num∣ber being imbodied in that House, give and receive mutual strength from one another. For when such are met, they do not take care to unite the minds of the Subjects to their Prince, or one to another, or imploy their time upon the great concerns of the Nation; but are drawn to promote private Animosities under(h) 1.2010 pretence of the Publick; and are so far from proceeding calmly and peaceably to curb the motions of unruly Spirits that endeavour to disturb them, that they expose the King to the Calumny and danger of those worst of men, who endeavour to render him and his Government odious to the People. I shall now touch upon some of the Artifices used to bring in such Members in the Parliament of 1678. and some succeeding ones whereby their Conventions were rendred useless for the King and People, and inglorious to themselves, though they pretended to as much Loy∣alty and Publick good as those in 1641. did at their first sitting.

The King having dissolved the long Parliament and sum∣moned this to sit the 6th of March, 1678.* 1.2011 the industry of the Dissenters, Male-contents, and we may suppose Common∣wealths men, was extraordinary great, as now hoping they should be able to chuse such Members as would be more favourable to them.

They had been long instilling into the Peoples Heads,* 1.2012 that in the former House there had been a Court and Country Party, the former were for Arbitrary Government, fleecing the People, Persecution, and such as gave no great credit to the Tragical representation of the Popish Plot: The latter were moderate men, and not so much for Ceremonies as the purity of Religion, would stand for the Peoples Liberties and Pro∣perties, by riding night and day about the Villages, and trudging about Corporations, and the weekly Conventicles, they spread this Character abroad, and with all the Arts ima∣ginable, endeavoured to proselyte(i) 1.2013 all that were not sharp-sighted enough to pierce into their designs. If any seemed not to believe those Characters, or declared himself for the Government, Civil or Ecclesiastical, established by Law, and neither for Popery or Arbitrary Government, nor yet for a Commonwealth or Dissenters, they run them down with noise, traduced them behind their backs as Papists in Masquerade and men of Arbitrary Principles.* 1.2014 And if any were so bold as to scruple the coherence of the Narratives of the Popish Plot, he was vilified as a Defamer of the Kings Evidence, as stifler of the Plot; and from hence they concluded to insinu∣ate into the Populace, that those Loyal Gentlemen who had been Members of the late long Parliament, had joyned with

the Court to hinder the Discovery of the Plot; and if any gainsaid them, they used such questions, What, Are you for Popery? Will you give your Voice for a Papist? Are you willing to have your Throat cut? Are you for Arbitrary Go∣vernment? By which means they won over too many to joyn with them,* 1.2015 to exclude many Loyal and Orthodox Gentle∣men from being chosen Members of Parliament.

Their design was advantaged because some were their friends of old, others had come the half way over to gain the reputation of moderate men, others had been disgusted by the Government. The Conventicle Teachers rallied up their Flocks, and they all joyned to slander the Clergy as if they had a kindness for Popery in their hearts, though they durst not discover it for the present: And generally blasted all the Loyal Gentry as Popishly affected, the Court-Party Pensioners, &c. So that if any one bore any Publick Office Military or Civil, he was eo nomine to be rejected. The Per∣sons they recommended to the People to be chosen, were first all those Gentlemen, who called themselves the Country(k) 1.2016 Party, who had appeared most zealous against his present Majesty, the Queen Dowager, and Ministers of State. To these they added as many as they could of the reliques of the old Rebellion, or their Children, and made up the num∣ber out of the moderate and discontented Gentlemen, Bur∣gesses and Tradesmen. It was sufficient recommendation if the Government had displaced any, for these were looked upon as not to be corrupted or bought off: and here and there they took in an honest Gentleman, in hopes to win him to their side by this kindness.

After the dissolution of this Parliament, when his late Majesty issued out his Writs for another to convene, 17 Oct. 1679. they added to their former Arts the loud clamours against French Pensioners,* 1.2017 Popery, Arbitrariness, and all those who voted against the Bill of Exclusion, as Popishly affected, or downright Papists; traducing his Majesty, the Court, the Ministers of State, and almost all the Loyal Gentry and Clergy for endeavouring to have those men chosen. The second advantage they made was the pretended discovery of(l) 1.2018 Sir Stephen Fox of the Pensioners of the late long Parliament: which discovery being hastily made, and no Record of it be∣ing entred,* 1.2019 they took the confidence to add to it whomso∣ever they pleased to have so thought; They made the Peo∣ple believe they knew who would be Pensioners likewise, and led the diffidence to that height, as to exclude as far as they could possibly, not only all the Courtiers and other Per∣sons who had any places of profit and advantage under his Majesty, but their Relations too, and wanted not much that they had excluded all those who bore any Honorary Imploy∣ment. So that nothing recommended a man so effectually for a Parliament man, as that he had not been thought fit

to be trusted in the least by his then Majesty, or their Neighbour Gentry, these they cried up as true Friends to the Protestant Religion, and the Country; and he was an hard∣hearted Man in their Dialect, who called the Sincerity of their Loyal Intentions in question: However by their Actings, many of them have been discovered to be but cold Friends to the Government.

But Intending to discourse more fully of the several Arts us'd by designing Men in the Chapter of Factions, I shall at present quit this Subject, and only desire Kings to consider, that they can condescend no lower to gratifie Importunities of Parlia∣ment or People, in yielding up any of their Privileges.

The Philosopher of old hath noted, how Kingly Authority was lessened among the Grecians, which was no ways profita∣ble to them. He speaking of Kings. in the Heroick times,(m) 1.2020 That then they had the Government and Administration of Matters in the Cities, and the adjoyning Territories within their Dominions, and what extended without the Limits of the Empire (viz. to preserve and protect their Subjects against their Enemies, make War and Peace, &c.) But after, partly by the spontaneous Concessions of the Princes, and partly by the En∣croachment of the People, they came to be lessened in Power, and in some Cities had only the Power of Sacrificing left, in others the Command of their Armies. This, as well as other Reasons, must needs demonstrate, That if ever any two Hou∣ses of Parliament should by Arts of Insinuation (as that of 1641. did, That unless the King would grant they might not be dis∣solved without their Consents,* 1.2021 they could not have time to settle his Throne, and redress Grievances) or by denying ne∣cessary Supplies, force a King to grant them a Power of pro∣longing their own Sitting, or meeting at stated times without his Writ, or yielding to their Bills implicitly, (as the Black Par∣liament of 41. endeavoured) and then to have the Power of nominating the Great Ministers of State, and the Officers of the Militia, an end would be soon put to Monarchy.

Therefore every one that loves their Country,* 1.2022 the continu∣ance of that most excellent Frame of Government, for the Subjects security, as no other Country enjoys; those who would avoid the sad Ravages of Civil War, who would make their Prince Glorious, their Country Renowned, themselves and their Posterities Happy: let them be careful to elect Loyal and Judicious Members, neither tainted with Faction, Ambition, or Self-ends; and if any such be elected, let the Wise and Loyal, when they meet in that Great Assembly, watch over the De∣signs of such ill Members, discover their Intriegues, be careful not to be circumvented by their Artifices, stick close to the Fundamentals of Government; and then all things will be pro∣sperous, and they will have the honour of being stiled True Patriots of their Country.

Sir(n) 1.2023 Edward Coke hath noted, That Parliaments succeed not

well in five Cases.* 1.2024 First, when the King hath been in displeasure with his Lords or Commons; therefore it was one of the Peti∣tions of the Commons to Edw. 3. That he would require the Archbishop, and all other of the Clergy, to pray for his Estate, for the Peace and good Government of the Land, and for the con∣tinuance of the King's Good-will towards the Commons; to which the(o) 1.2025 King replied, The same prayeth the King. The like Petition he saith, many times the Lords have made, and further adds, That the King in all his weighty affairs, had used the ad∣vice of his Lords and Commons, always provided, that both Lords and Commons keep within the Circle of the Law, and Custom of Parliament.

The second is when any of the great Lords are at variance among themselves, as he instanceth in the third(p) 1.2026 of H. 6. in the Controversy betwixt John Earl Marshal, and Richard Earl of Warwick, and 4 H. 6. betwixt the Duke of Gloucester and Bishop of Winchester, whereby little was done in any Par∣liamentary Court, and that little of no moment.

The third,* 1.2027 when there is no good Correspondence betwixt the Lords and Commons; which happens, when some People out of design to render the meeting of the two Houses in∣effectual, do project some matters, whereby the Houses may clash about Privileges, as was lately in Shirley's Case, about the Mony-Bill from the House of Lords, and many other Par∣ticulars might be instanced in; therefore Sir Edward Coke saith, That when it was demanded by the Lords and Commons, what might be a principal Motive for them to have good success in Parliaments,* 1.2028 it was answered, They should be insuperable, if inseparable, Cum radix & vertex Imperii in Obedientium con∣sensu rata sunt. The very root and top of Government con∣sists in the consent of the Obedient, and the Subjects Happiness is in that Harmony, when it is betwixt the two Houses, and a∣mong themselves: but much more happy, when it is likewise betwixt the Sovereign, and the two Houses. It is that which compleats their own, and the Peoples Felicity. But when the two Houses, or one of them, are for wresting the Sovereigns Prerogative from him, as in Forty one, then it is the most fatal and ill-boding sign of any other.

The fourth is,* 1.2029 when there wants Unity in the House of Com∣mons, as we had not long since Experience, when within those Walls (from whence wholesome Counsels are expected, and all things tending to the preservation of the King's Peace, Crown, and Dignity;) such Heats were amongst the Members, that if one Sword, that was half drawn, had been wholly unsheathed, it was thought a very bloody Battel had been fought.

The last he makes,* 1.2030 is when there is no preparation for the Par∣liament before it begin; for which purpose the Summons of Par∣liament is forty Days or more before the Sitting, to the end that Preparations might be had for the considering the arduous and urgent affairs of the Realm. And Sir Edward saith it was

an ancient custom in Parliament, in the beginning thereof, to appoint a select Committee to consider of the Bills in the two preceding last Parliaments that passed both Houses, or either of them, and such as had been preferred, read, or committed, and to take out of them such as were most profitable for the Commonwealth.

To these may be added a most material one,* 1.2031 that makes un∣fortunate Congresses of Parliaments, viz. When the Members come up, with strong Resolutions to provide Remedies for some Grievances, either real or surmised, and at the same time the Sovereign is in great Straights, for supplies for the safety, repute, or necessary occasions of the Government; for then (as in most of the Parliaments of King Charles the First) the Houses are for redress of Grievances, before supply, how pressing and urgent soever, and do not credit the King that he will give them time to redress them, after he is supplied; and they from design, rather than this diffidence, will not suffer sup∣ply and grievances to go pari passu, Hand in Hand, as we may remember in those Parliaments, wherein the popular Men made such Harangues, that they would know whether they were Free∣men, or Slaves, or had any thing to give before they entred up∣on the giving part: The like we saw in King Charles the Second's Reign, in some of his last Parliaments, whereby all their Con∣sultations were abortive; and both the Kings had no other Ex∣pedient but Prorogation, or Dissolution; and disuse of Parlia∣ments for some Years followed.

How much happier have we been in the last Session of the Parliament, under our most Wise,* 1.2032 Magnanimous and Gracious King, wherein no strife or contention was, but who should be forwardest to supply the necessities of the Crown, to shew all Loyal Dutifulness to their Sovereign, whereby a most dange∣rous Rebellion in both Kingdoms was the easilier crushed; and which endears them to the King, that there can be no danger, but whatever good and wholsome Laws they shall propose for the general good of the Kingdom, will find a chearful allowance by him.

How happy had our Forefathers been if King Charles the First had met with such considerate Parliaments, who by a seasona∣ble supply and compliance, might have had (without that vast effusion of Blood and Treasure) all their Grievances redressed, and the flourishing State of the Kingdom preserved, and the Memories of a great many Noblemen and Gentlemen had been transmitted without stain to their remote Nephews.

But to draw towards a Conclusion of this Discourse,* 1.2033 Some that may not be willing to hear of the Miscarriages of some Par∣liaments, wherein probably they were concerned, may say, what need is there now, to bring again upon the Stage the rigorous Proceedings of the two Houses of Parliament, or more proper∣ly of the leading and designing Men in the House of Com∣mons, in the Years 1640, and 1680. since we are now happi∣ly

past these Rocks, Quicksands, and treacherous Shores.

All the World indeed must acknowledg we have a Royal, wise Pilot,* 1.2034 who knows full well to steer the Soveraignty of the Commonweal. He hath weathered out high going Seas; so that neither their over-whelming liquid Mountains, nor the terrible Shot from the floating Castles have daunted him; mag∣nanimity, unparallel'd Courage, and an Experience be∣yond most Crowned Heads, have raised him great Trophies of his Victorious toils: He is served with sage Councils, both private and National. So that all must confess we have less cause to fear any more dangers of Hurricanes and Shipwracks.

But though we now enjoy Halcyon days,* 1.2035 under a Sovereign, enriched with Royal abilities to the heighth of our Wishes; though he is blessed with a Parliament, as Loyal as can be de∣sired, betwixt whom there is no other Strife, but who shall out-pass the other in mutual Obligations: Yet are we secure, that no ill Exhalations may be gathered in after-Ages?

Can we expect always temperate Weather, pleasing Sunshine, and fruitful Showres? No, in small revolutions of Years we find Epidemical Diseases return; excesses of Drought, Rains, or Frosts, are often marked in our Annals, even after promising Configurations of the Coelestial Bodies.

I write not an Almanack for a Year,* 1.2036 or Pamphlet for a time, my Design is not Infandum renovare Dolorem out of any Pique; but as much as in me lies to show from the by-past Irregulari∣ties, and Exorbitances of some Men, how Loyal, good, and Just Men may measure things by the Golden Standard of the Laws; how mischievous Practices and Principles may be ob∣viated; how every one may see what the upshot of rebellious Principles will be; how to detect, and how to avoid the same kind of Rocks and Sands in after-Ages.

I know some Persons recovered from a valitudinary Condi∣tion,* 1.2037 love not to hear of the Torments they have undergone, nor of the Extravagances of their delirous State: Yet this should not hinder but the Healthful, and those that would a∣void the Calenture, should patiently endure to hear a Descrip∣tion of the Causes and Symptoms.

In this Discourse I have only culled out such Particulars,* 1.2038 as I find Judicious Authors have insisted upon, against the unpre∣cedented Proceedings of some late Houses of Commons; which I think all Loyal Persons disapprove; and I believe a great many as well as my self, have heard many of the then sitting Members dislike, when things were carried with an impetu∣ous Torrent, that it was more dangerous to speak against their proceedings, or question the unlimited Power assumed by that House, than it was to speak Seditious (I had almost said Trea∣sonable) Words against the King.

Therefore I hope none of this present Honourable House of Commons (who have so signalized their Loyalty in the last Ses∣sion) will take offence at what, from such judicious Persons as

I have met with, I have delivered the Sentiments of. My inten∣tion is no ways to lessen the Rights, or necessary Privileges of that venerable Assembly; which never can be unbeneficial to the King, or People, but when Discontent, Faction, and Se∣dition hath too spreadingly infected the Electors.

The continuance of that worst of Parliaments of 1641.* 1.2039 in their disloyal Practices so long, by the overgrowing of the Tares, which were only suffered to thrive, occasioned so much corrupt seed to be sown, as in twenty years there was no wholesom grain left. We saw too late, how by some evil Seedsmen, a fertile, but dangerous Crop was shooting up apace. It is not a little Labour, nor small diligence, will howe and weed out the Briars, Thistles, and destructive Shrubs, and poysonous Weeds, that shoot their spreading Roots so far: But I hope the great Wisdom of this Loyal Parliament, will find out ways and me∣thods to prevent the danger of their thriving in a Soil, worthy of better Plants, than any will be set by Republican Hands.

CHAP. XXX. Of the Kings most Honourable Privy-Council.

I Find by several Authors,* 1.2040 that there are reckoned Four Coun∣cils of the King. First, The Magnum Concilium, consisting of the Prelates and Nobles in Parliament; of which Bracton(a) 1.2041 may be consulted, and what I have writ in the Chapter of Parlia∣ments.

Secondly, A Convention of the Peers of the Realm,* 1.2042 Lords of Parliament, yet not meeting as a Parliament, which appears manifestly in the Record, 25 Aug. 5 H. 7. upon an exchange made of some Lands betwixt the King and the Earl of Nor∣thumberland; the King promiseth to deliver the Earl Lands to the value, &c. by(b) 1.2043 the Advice of the Estates of his Realm of his Parliament (if the Parliament be convened before the Feast of St. Lucy) or otherwise, by the Advice of his Great Council, and other Estates of his Realm, which the King shall Assemble before the said Feast, in case the Parliament be not called: which well agreeth with the Act of Parliament, 37 E. 3. c. 18. where it is said, before the Chancellor, Treasurer, and Great Council.

Thirdly, The Kings Privy Council, which appears to be dif∣ferent from the last Great Council, by many Records, and particularly, by that of(c) 1.2044 16 E. 2. where it is said, Hen. de Bellomont Baron of the Kings Great and Private Council was sworn.

This Council is called Concilium Privatum, secretum & con∣tinuum Regis.* 1.2045 The First Member of this Council, is the Lord President, who was anciently called Principalis Consiliarius, and sometimes Capitalis Consiliarius. The first Lord President Sir Edward Coke(d) 1.2046 mentions, was the Earl of Lancaster 50 E. 3. 1 R. 2. then he reckons these in order, the Duke of Bedford, 1 H. 6. the Duke of Gloucester, 10 H. 6. the Duke of York 11 and 22 H. 6. John Russel Bishop of Rochester, and after of Lincoln is called President 13 E. 4. John Fisher Bishop of Rochester 12 H. 7. Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk from the 25th. to the 37th. of H. 8. the Lord Pawlet 1 E. 6. the Duke of Northumberland 5 and 7 of E. 6. the Earl of Arundel 1 and 2 Ph. and M. in Q. Elizabeth's time we find none; but in this Catalogue Mr. Prynne(e) 1.2047 hath truly noted, That the Bishop of Rochester was not made President of the Kings Council, but of the Prince's, and was his Tutor, as appears by the Patent it self there cited, dated the 10th. of Nov.

This Office of Lord President was never granted but by Letters Patents under the Great Seal, durante beneplacito. In the Statute of 21 H. 8. c. 2. he is said to be attendant on the Kings most Royal Person; the reason of which, saith Sir Ed. Coke, is, That of latter times he hath used to report to the King the Passages, and the State of the business at the Council Table.

The Lord Privy Seal is the next Principal Person that hath Precedence in the Kings Council,* 1.2048 concerning whose Office my Lord(f) 1.2049 Coke hath discoursed at large, to whom I must refer the Curious Reader, as also to him for the Acts of Parliament, Orders of the same, and Acts of Council (together with Mr. Prynne's(g) 1.2050 Animadversions) whereby the Privy-Council was to be regulated; and concerning the Jurisdiction, and Proceed∣ings of the Kings Council, Mr. Lambard's(h) 1.2051 Archaion, and Mr. Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts may be consulted; the several Bundels of Petitions to the King and his Council in the Tower of London, and the Answers to them, the Placita Par∣liamentaria coram Rege & Concilio, in the Tally Office of the Exchequer, and in the Parchment Book of them in the Tower under King Edward the First, printed by Mr.(i) 1.2052 Ryley.

Of this Privy Council there seems to me to be two sorts, one constantly attending the King, and his Affairs, the other in Par∣liament time only; which had their particular Summons, as I have before at full discoursed of: and these two I find so ob∣scurely distinguished, that it is difficult in some places to under∣stand which are meant; but I think in time of Parliament these were joyned to the Kings Council; for besides that they had a distinct Summons, and in them (as a specifical distinction) the word caeteris was omitted, in that part of the Summons which runs, dictis die & loco personalitor intersitis nobiscum, ac cum cae∣teris Praelatis, Magnatibus, &c. because they were not Parlia∣mentary Barons, there was also added in proceedings and judgments upon them, these words, coram ipso Domino Rege &

ejus concilio ad Parliamenta sua, or, ad Parliamentum suum, or coram Concilio nostro in praesenti Parliamento.

For the particular Instances of which, being they are very numerous, Mr. Prynn's(k) 1.2053 brief Register may be consulted, wherein it seems to me upon the perusal of the several Records, that these Assistants to the House of Lords were likewise joyned to the rest of the Kings standing Council in Parliament time: so it is expressed in the Case of(l) 1.2054 John Sal••eyn and Margaret his Wife, and Isabel her Sister, Daughters and Heirs of Robert de Ross de Work, thus, Habito super praemissis diligenti tractatu, per ipsum Dom. Regem, & totum Concilium: and in the same it is thus also worded, videtur Dom. Regi, & Concilio suo, & concor∣datum est, & consideratum per ipsum Dom. Regem & Concilium suum. So in others, per Concilium Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Comitum, & Baronum, caeterorumque(m) 1.2055 de Concilio suo existenti∣um, & singulis de Concilio suo, & totius Concilii Domini Regis. So in 21 E. 1. the Archbishop of York's Case: videtur Domino Re∣gi in pleno Parliamento praedicto, Comitibus, Baronibus, Justiciariis & similiter toti Concilio ipsius Dom. Regis; and so it is said, Mag∣nates & alios de Concilio ipsius Domini Regis rogavit.

This is further cleared by sundry(n) 1.2056 Prefaces to, and pas∣sages in our Printed Statutes, as formerly I have noted; So the Statute of Bigamy 4 Oct. 4 E. 1. saith, In the presence of cer∣tain Reverend Fathers, Bishops of England, and others of the Kings Council, the constitutions under written were recited, after heard and published before the King and his Council; for as much as all the Kings Council, Justices, and others did agree. So the Statute of Quo Warranto, 30 E. 1. Cum apud Westminster, per nos & Concilium nostrum provisum. So 33 E. 1. it is agreed, and ordained by the King, and all his Council. So 42 E. 3. c. 3. the Statute made on Petition of the Commons in Parliament begins,(o) 1.2057 Pleaseth it our Lord the King, and his good Council, for the better Government of his People, to ordain.

By great store of Records it is apparent, that in old times, the Kings and their Councils gave Judgment in divers Cases of difficulty; and other Common Cases, concerning the Law of the Realm,(p) 1.2058 calling those who were learned in the Laws, for Assistants therein, as Mich. 53 and 54 H. 3. rot. 37. in the Case of Assise of Mort d'auncester brought by Alexander King of Scots, against John de Burgo. But as hereafter I shall shew, much of the Power of the Kings Council is now taken away.

The Fourth Council of the King,* 1.2059 are the Kings Judges at Law, who are his Council at Law in all Cases wherein he hath occasion to consult them, as appears in the Law Books, and particularly may be found in(q) 1.2060 Sir Edward Coke, of which I may have occasion to speak in the Chapter of Judges.

I thought to premise these things for the better understand∣ing of the differences of the Kings several Councils, and shall now proceed to discourse of the most Honourable Privy Coun∣cil in general, as Counsel is necessary for Princes to have, and

as they ought to be qualified, what their Office and Imploy∣ment is, and ought to be, both in Relation to all Princes Se∣cret Councils, and particularly, according to the constitution of England, according to my poor Abilities.

The most Honourable Privy-Council consists of Noble and Wise Persons, chosen by the Prince to assist him with their sage and faithful Advice, in the weighty Affairs of Govern∣ment.

Kings cannot by their own personal knowledge compre∣hend(r) 1.2061 all things, therefore it is needful for them to assume others in participationem curarum; especially great and weighty Affairs need great Coadjutors, as Paterculus(s) 1.2062 well notes; and the* 1.2063 grave Historian tells us, That Labours of Princes, by which they manage their vast Countries, need helps; that being free from Domestick Cares, they may consult for the Publick. Whoever looks only upon the Port and Grandeur of Princes, their soft Raiment, and feeding delicately, may think it a pleasing and desirable State; but they never reflect on the anxious Cares, the difficulties of managing Matters, upon which great and momentous events, and ordering of vast bo∣dies, of different Interests, depend. Therefore the(t) 1.2064 Philosopher well noted, That to give give good Counsel is one of the Di∣vinest things among Men. Whereas on the other Hand, when Counsel is supine, Government must be tottering; but a Mind(u) 1.2065 setled in Resolves, safely attempts any thing. That Rea∣son being the soundest, which useth Cunctation and Deliberati∣on, and forefears as well as foresees, what will happen; be∣cause in acting, it will produce Confidence. For they must be a great Defect, where Counsel is not taken before Action; It being for Sword-Players, not those that bear the Sword of Ma∣gistracy, In arena Consilium capere.

As to the use of Counsellors,(w) 1.2066 Vegetius tells us it becomes a Prince to treat of those things which ought to be considered with many; but those which are to be executed, with few, or rather by himself: agreeable to which, is what the learned Lord(x) 1.2067 Chancellor notes, That some Affairs require ex∣tream Secrecy, which will hardly allow to go beyond one or two Persons, besides the King; neither are those Councils un∣prosperous: for besides the Secrecy, they commonly go on constantly in one Spirit of Direction, without Distraction; but such are only to be used by a prudent King, who can grind with an Handmill.

A great part part of the(y) 1.2068 Skill of a Prince is discovered in the choice of wise Counsellors; and the managing of their Counsels, require the greatest Address, Ability, and Dexteri∣ty of Sovereigns.

Therefore the Antients feigned Jupiter to marry(z) 1.2069 Metis, viz. Counsel, and she being with Child by him, he eat her up, and was delivered of Pallas out of his own Head: The Moral of which is, That Princes refer matters to Council; and when the

Council grows ripe, they are not to suffer their Council to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it depended on them; but to take matters back again into their own Hands, and so make them appear to issue from themselves, with Pru∣dence and Power, as from their own Head and Advice, as Pal∣las came forth armed, fitted for present Action.

It is in vain for Princes to take Counsel concerning matters,* 1.2070 if they take not Counsel likewise concerning Persons; for the greatest Errors are committed, and the most Judgment shown in Individuals.

There was never King bereaved of the Benefit of Counsel, except when there hath been an over greatness in one Coun∣sellor, or an over-strict Combination in divers: which are things soon found out, and helped; therefore Principis maxima est virtus nosse suos.

In Council the King presiding,* 1.2071 should not open his own In∣clination too much in that which he propoundeth, if he de∣sire sincere delivery of the Counsellors Judgments, lest his Au∣thority sway too much. Therefore Princes should take the Opinion of their Council, both separate, and together; pri∣vate Opinion being more free, and Opinion before others more reverend.

It is therefore a Prince's greatest Interest to be unprejudicate, and to keep an open Ear to all wholesome Counsel; for as Ca∣pitolinus(a) 1.2072 saith, Miser est Imperator apud quem vera reticentur, That prince is in a very bad Condition, from whom the true Estate of his Affairs is concealed.

Several wise Princes have with an even Hand distributed their regards to Counsellors that have mortally hated one another,* 1.2073 as some observed in Louvoy and Colbert; and it is a certain sign of a good Workman, that can work with any Tool. The ad∣vantage a Prince hath, is that they are Spies one upon another, and will be both aemulous, who can do their Masters Services best; but if they grow to be the Heads of different Factions, they will prove most dangerous.

Having thus far proceeded as to the Interest of a Prince, in his Counsellors, and their advice, I shall speak to the Quali∣fications of Counsellors.

In(b) 1.2074 secret affairs, faithful, temperate and close Persons, are most fit Counsellors, and who have no private Interest;* 1.2075 for Se∣crecy is that invisible Clasp that buckles great Affairs, the hid∣den hinge, upon which they are moved, according to(c) 1.2076 Valerius. For he can never atchieve great matters, to whom it is irksome to retain Secrets. So Aemilius Probus, amongst the praises of Epa∣minondas, relates, that he was Commissi celans: and Albertus King of Poland said he would change his Shirt, if he thought it were privy to his Counsels.

He is a leading eminent Man (saith(d) 1.2077 Livy) who is a∣ble to give Counsel; and Second unto him, is he that yields to good Counsel; but he is in the lowest form of Wit, who neither can give good Counsel, nor obey it.

The true Composition of a Counsellor,* 1.2078 (saith my Lord St. Albans) is rather to be skilled in his Masters Business than his Nature; for then he is like to advise him, and not to flat∣ter him, and find his Humour. For knowledg and Prudence in affairs, are principally requisite in Counsellors, who should be well acquainted with the(e) 1.2079 Constitution of the Govern∣ment, the Laws, Rules, and Policy of it; both to be able to advise in all things relating to his Princes managment of matters at home and abroad:(f) 1.2080 Mores animosque Provinciae quaerere, To be curious to dive into the Spirits, manners, and Dispositions of all those his Prince hath to deal with; whereby he may the better suit his Masters occasions, by humouring and timing eve∣ry thing with a quiet Industry, and making every matter be ad∣apted to his end, without tumultuation, and rude Shocks, but rather by insensible Screws.

The noblest design and endeavour any Privy-Counsellor can have,* 1.2081 is to serve his King and Country upon Principles of pub∣lick advantage; for it is the worst of Poysons to the Judgment, and regards to Truth in all Consultations, to aim at private Profit, ac∣cording to that Excellent remarque of(g) 1.2082 Tacitus, That private design of Profit is the worst Poyson of Judgment, and attaining Truth. For when private Prosit holds the Ballance, the Princes Standard is little regarded; there being no weight so deadly heavy, as when a Man's self, and his private Interest are cast into one Scale.

Uprightness and Faithfulness are two Master Ingredients in all Counsellors.* 1.2083 So Pliny(h) 1.2084 tells Trajan, That he is the best Man that is most faithful to his Trust; for by the Eyes of Coun∣sellors, Princes see, by their Ears they hear, and if those Or∣gans be depraved: the Princes Apprehensions of things must be a∣dulterated; and the King passing his Judgment according to their Representation, may proceed upon very uncertain or false Grounds. Counsellors indeed are the Speculators of Princes, they have therefore need of the clearest Sight, not to be taint∣ed with false Colours; they are to be quick-sighted, to pry into the Consequences of Things while in the obscure Shop of the First Causes: they are the Pilots that are appointed to steer the Ship of the Commonwealth, and so must be skilled in the Chart, to know to veer and change with Emergencies; to know the rolling Sands, and under Sea-Rocks; to know the Coast and Creeks, the Measure of all things relating to the Government, both preceding, by-past, and to come.

The(i) 1.2085 most politick Historian notes, 6. To pursue the Design of the Prince by several ways. That a wise Counsel∣lor, though he may pass in several Tracts, yet must never be out of that Path which will lead him to the accomplishment of his Designs; and in the necessary Traverses he must make, not to be found so much to change, as to suit himself to the Work he is about.

It is a great piece of self-denying Wisdom in a Counsellor that desires to keep his Station,* 1.2086 to leave to his Master the Ho∣nour

of the contrivance of those advantagious things he sug∣gests:

—Aliis(k) 1.2087 magni reputantibus, ipse Negligit, & modico factum metitur honore.

So Agrippa admonisheth those that would be safe in Courts, to eschew the difficulties of things, and leave the glory of the accomplishment of them to those that have the Supremacy.

It is too hazardous a curiosity in some Princes Counsellors to enquire into the hidden sence of their Masters,* 1.2088 or what they reserve in their own dark thoughts: It being difficult to at∣tain the meaning of what they leave doubtful, according to that of the curious Author,(l) 1.2089 It is doubtful and unlawful to en∣quire into the hidden Sence of a Prince, or what he more curi∣ously designs.

But this falls out only under a Tiberius, or some Mysterious Prince; though it may happen under a Good and Wise Prince, who to leave the greater liberty of Debate, discovers not his own inclinations: and under such an one Counsellors are safe, espe∣cially when by conjectual Inferences they promote the end, though they may differ in the Medium.

Pliny saith,(m) 1.2090 three things are required in a Counsellor,* 1.2091 Liberty, Faith, and Truth.

Liberty is the Life and Essence of Council, which being ta∣ken away, all Counsel vanisheth; for as good Counsel is the Soul of the State, so he that hath not a Liberty (being bound by private Interest) is but a Palsied Member; and if Counsel∣lors want Faith and Verity, they hide and disguise the Truth, which is full of danger both to the King and(n) 1.2092 themselves.

Such fear as doth not fall in constantem virum, is a great ene∣my to good Counsel; for fear is a betraying of such succours as Reason and Counsel should afford.

King(o) 1.2093 Edward the Third would have his Counsellor to have four Properties: 1. To be Parcus sui, knowing he would never be provident for Him, that would not be a good Husband for himself. 2ly. That he should not be Cu∣pidus rei alienae, no covetous or greedy man; for ei nihil turpe, cui nihil satis. 3ly. That he should be Avarus Rei Pub∣licae, covetous for the Kings Treasure and Commonwealth. 4ly. That he super omnia sit expertus, that he be expert in what place the King shall imploy him; for great Offices are never well managed by a Deputy,* 1.2094 where the Officer himself is but a Cypher.

As to Counsels themselves, Livy(p) 1.2095 excellently notes, That in matters that are ground to an edge, or drawn to a sharp point, and where hope is only left in the bottom, the boldest and quickest Counsels are safest; yet it must be with great cir∣cumspection well considered, when, and upon what occasions such Counsels must be taken: for the same(q) 1.2096 Author notes

elsewhere, That subtile and bold Counsels on the first view may be pleasing, but are difficult in handling, and in the event often Calamitous: therefore rashness can never consist with Counsel; duo adversissima rectae menti (saith(a) 1.2097 Thucydides) Cele∣ritas & Ira, Haste and Passion are of all things most opposite to Right Counsel: therefore Curtius(b) 1.2098 speaking of such, saith, Fiery and furious Spirits are more fit to innovate things, and create Factions, than to manage Affairs steddily.(c) 1.2099 So hasty Counsels are rarely Prosperous, because Resolution should never go before Deliberation, nor Execution before Resoluti∣on.

When(d) 1.2100 upon Debate and Deliberation it is by the Coun∣cil-Table well resolved, the change thereof upon some private information, is neither safe nor honourable, nor that after timely Resolution timely Execution be delay'd.

Violent(e) 1.2101 courses are like to hot Waters that may do good in an extremity; but the use of them doth spoil the Stomach, and it will require them stronger and stronger, and by little and little they will lessen their own operation.

To leave this great Theme as too illustrious and sublime a Subject for one to treat of that hath lived in the Shade: I shall now proceed to make some other remarks why our Laws give our Kings the sole power of chusing to themselves a Privy-Council, and how the designers of 41. would have wrested that Power from the King.

Besides(f) 1.2102 what is common to all men to have a free liber∣ty to whom they will impart their private Affairs, and desire Counsel upon them; our Laws being built upon firm founda∣tions of reason, considering, that in the power of making of Laws, the power of two numerous bodies were opposed against the Person of the single Soveraign: it foresaw, and found, that by the Soveraigns consenting to Laws, for the ease and benefit of the Subject, things might pass to the prejudice, and diminution of the Soveraignty. If his single Person (sur∣charged with the care of the manifold Affairs of the Kingdom) should be left all alone to advise, and dispute his right, against all the Wisdom and Solicitation of the Representative Body of the Subject.* 1.2103 Therefore, to prevent that, it ordered, That the King should at his discretion swear to himself a Body of Coun∣cil (sometimes in our Laws called his Grand Council) to ad∣vise him in matters of State, and concernments of his Sove∣raign Right and safety; and a Body of Council at Law to ad∣vise him in matters of Justice, that he might neither do, or suffer contrary to the Rule of Laws; especially sitting the two Houses, when the wrong might be perpetual: and seeing the Go∣vernment must be continually upon its Guard and Watch, without intermission, molding, and forming all things for its safety and prosperity, and consequently of the Peoples; this Council must be constantly attending upon the Kings plea∣sure, and daily and hourly considering the best ways and me∣thods

of promoting the Kings and Commonweals advan∣tage.

As to the(g) 1.2104 first particular, we find it frequently in several Statutes expressed, That the King by himself and by his Coun∣cil, at his Parliament, made and ordained.* 1.2105 That this was not the great Council of Parliament appears by that of Edward the First,(b) 1.2106 These are the Establishments of the King by his coun∣cil, and by the Assent of the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, and the whole Commonalty of the Land thither summoned: and Edward the Second saith, he cau∣sed the Articuli Cleri to be rehearsed before his Council, and Answer given, &c. and much more may be observed in the Acts of the great Councils, not fit here to be repeated. From hence it is that the Law defines, The King can do no wrong;* 1.2107 for if any evil be committed in matter of State, the Privy-Council, and if in matters of Law, the Justices and Judges must answer for it.

As to the second particular, the Parliament of 1641. cast the odium of most of the management of Affairs of State,* 1.2108 that were ungrateful to them, upon the Kings evil Counsellors, as they called them: which was a great artifice of the designers of that Rebellion; for thereby (being then not hardned enough to caluminate the King openly) they would make the World believe they paid a just deference to his Majesty: yet slily wounded his Reputation through his Counsellors sides, leaving the application to the People. Tacitly insinuating, that the King being mis-led by such Councils, was not so Just, or Wise, as to be wished: and when afterwards they had got Power, they always made it one of their propositions, That the two Houses should have the nominating,* 1.2109 or approving and removing the Privy-Council, or great Officers of State; pre∣tending they would set such just and righteous Persons in those places, as would execute them for the publick good only: and upon the same score (though on another pretence) they were importunate, that the Judges should hold their places tam diu quam se bene gesserint, rather than be removeable at the Kings pleasure. Thus by vote, without legal proof of Crimes, they blackned as many of the Kings Privy-Council as they foresaw would thwart their designs, as Seducers of the King, and men of Arbitrary Principles; thereby to have them wholly removed from him (as we have had Addresses of a later date from an House of Commons against some great wise and Loyal Lords) by which severing from him such a body of his faithful Advi∣sers,* 1.2110 and dangerously depriving him of the constant means (which the Law hath specially ordained him for his support) some of them endeavoured to get into their places, as was no∣toriously known to have been proposed, that if several of the leading men might have had chief places and honours, they would have let the Earl of Strafford live (as in another Treatise I hope to make clear) and by that mean•• not only have enriched themselves, but have had the guidance of Affairs

of State, and so by little and little brought about the Promotion of their friends, without regard to the Publick.

If we impartially consider the unreasonableness of this pro∣posal, we shall find,* 1.2111 that by granting it, we must expect to suffer all the evils which Faction can produce. This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our bowels, which would first break out in our Country Elections, and divide the Fa∣milies by irreconcileable hatred. For it cannot be imagined but that Power would bandy against Power, and Relations against Relations,* 1.2112 to put a Son or Kinsman into the road to preferment; nor could the flames be quenched, but burn more vehemently even in the house: to which the insolence of some (obtaining Offices to which they are not fit) the shame and discontent of others repulsed, and the ambition of all, would be continual fuel; and the greatest misery of all would be, that were the corruption never so great, we could have but slender hopes of redress, since the prevailing Party (jealous of their honour) would constantly maintain their choice; and perhaps it would be necessary for them, one to wink at another, as it was manifestly seen in the long Par∣liament, when the most known Offenders, and active In∣struments of the Peoples miseries, by striking in with the pre∣vailing Party, were more safe than innocency could make them.

It is enacted by King(i) 1.2113 Charles the First, that neither his Majesty nor his Privy-Council have or ought to have any Jurisdiction by English Bill, Petition, Articles, Libel or any other Arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine or draw into question, determine, or dispose of the Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, Goods or Chattels of any of the Subjects of this Kingdom; but that the same ought to be tried and determined in the ordi∣nary Courts of Justice, and by the ordinary course of the Law.

In the Oath of a(k) 1.2114 Privy-Counsellor, his duty is best ma∣nifested. First, That he shall as far forth as cunning and dis∣cretion suffereth,* 1.2115 truely, justly, and evenly counsel and advise the King in all matters to be commoned, treated and demanded in the Kings Council, or by him as the Kings Counsellor. There∣fore Henry the Eighth wisht that his Counsellors would commit simulation, dissimulation and partiality to the Porters Lodg, when they came to sit in Council.

Secondly,* 1.2116 That in all things generally which may be to the Kings honour and behoof, and to the good of his Realm, Lordships and Subjects (without particularity or exception of persons, not fearing or eschewing so to do for affection, love, meed, doubt or dread of any person or persons) that he shall with all his might and power, help and strenghthen the Kings said Council, in all that shall be thought good to the same Coun∣cil for the ••niversal good of the King and his Land, and for the peace, rest and tranquillity of the same. Therefore my

Lord Cook(l) 1.2117 saith, these Counsellors, like good Sentinels, and Watchmen, consult of, and for the publick good, and the honour, defence, safety, and profit of the Realm: they are his true Treasurers, and profitable Instruments of the State.

Thirdly, That he shall keep secret the Kings Counsel,* 1.2118 and all that shall be commoned by way of Counsel in the same; without, that he shall not common it, publish it or discover it by word, writing, or in any otherwise to any person out of the same Council, or to any of the same Council if it touch him, or if he be party thereof. So Valerius M.(m) 1.2119 saith, Nothing is more to be desired, than that the Counsels of things to be done, as much as possible, be secreet. So Vegetius(n) 1.2120 hath of old pronounced, That no Counsels are better than those which the Adversary is ignorant of before they be executed: for un∣less Counsel be hidden and secret, they rarely attain their end.

Fourthly, That(o) 1.2121 he shall not for gift, meed, nor good, nor promise of good, by him nor by means of any other per∣son, receive or admit, for any promotion, favouring, nor forde∣claring, letting or hindring of any matter or thing to be treated, or done in the Council. Therefore the part of a Counsellor is, Tu civem patremque geris, tu consule cunctis—Non tibi, nec tua te moveant, sed publica vota.

Fifthly, That he shall withstand any person or persons, of what condition, estate or degree they be of, that would by way of feat, attempt or intend the contrary to the good of the King, peace of the Land, &c. and generally that he shall observe, keep, and do all that a good and true Counsellor ought to do to his Soveraign Lord.

CHAP. XXXI. Of Ministers of State.

I Joyn to the Privy Council Ministers of State, being they dif∣fer from them very little; some in name, others in degrees. For there(a) 1.2122 are several qualifications of Subjects that serve a Prince. As first, those that are participes curarum, upon whom Princes discharge the greatest weight of their Affairs,* 1.2123 as Mi∣nisters of State, and Privy-Counsellors. Secondly, Duces Belli, such as Princes imploy in their Armies and Militia. Thirdly, Gratiosi, Favourites, such as are a solace to the Prince, and harmless to the People. Fourthly, Negotii pares, such as not only have great places under the Prince, and execute them sufficiently, but also Judges and all sorts of Magistrates. For as Plutarch well observes, As the Master of the Ship chuseth the

best Mariners,* 1.2124 the Architect the best workmen; so a Prince should imploy those that are fit to administer the Affairs of the Commonweal(b) 1.2125. Generally it is requisite that Princes chuse such as are more sensible of duty than of rising, and such as love business rather on Conscience than upon Bravery: and it is fit to discern a busie nature from a willing mind; for some are im∣patient of privateness, saith my Lord St. Albans, even in Age or sickness; like old Towns-men, that will be still sitting at the street-doors, though thereby they offer Age to scorn.

Therefore as it is necessary that Ministers of State should be subservient to the Soveraign; so it is most requisite that a Prince should be careful in his choice of such as may most beneficially serve him and the Publick. Some seem fit for Im∣ployment, and yet in places disappoint expectation. Omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset, saith(c) 1.2126 Tacitus of Galba; That in the opinion of all he was capable of Empire, if he had not discovered his insufficiency when he was Emperor. There∣fore it is noted as a good Character of Piso(d) 1.2127, That none more vehemently loved recess from business, or with more ease underwent imployment, or effected those things, which were to be done, more actively and without any ostentation. So(e) 1.2128 Tacitus saith of Otho when he governed Portugal, that he was one loosely given, when he had little to do; but in Office and Rule, more stayed and temperate. Such a person is truly qualifi∣ed for great Managery; it being an assured sign of a worthy and generous Spirit, whom Honour amends: Vertue in the Ambi∣tious being violent, and in those in Authority, settled and calm. For Honour is, or should be, the place of Vertue; power to do good being the true and lawful end of aspiring, and Conscience of the same is the accomplishment of Mans rest.

Men in great places (saith one(f) 1.2129 who made a great figure in his time) are thrice Servants: First to their Soveraign or the State. Secondly, Servants of Fame. Thirdly, Of business. So that they have no freedom either in their Persons, Actions or Time: their rising is laborious, their standing slippery, their recess either a Downfal or Eclipse; so that they had need borrow other mens opinions to think themselves happy: for if they judge by their own feeling, they cannot find it; for though Tacitus saith, Sunt plerumque Regum voluntates vehementes, & inter se contrariae; and though they serve a more benign Prince: yet they will find many they deal with, either vehement in their Wills, or irresolved. However the fatigue is so much the grea∣ter, when the Port cannot be gained without doubling, and tacking to save the Wind.

Therefore it is most necessary,* 1.2130 that great Ministers of State have extraordinary Accomplishments both in dexterity of dis∣patch, vast comprehension, vertuous resolvedness, and prudent cunctation;* 1.2131 For as Pliny well notes, In most matters the Deity hides the seeds of things; and mostwhat the causes of good and bad things lye hid under the contrary appearances: So that it

requires a great sagacity in a Minister of State, to foresee what the effects will be, of Causes and Councils, when there may intervene so many by-accidents, that can neither be fore∣seen nor prevented. Therefore not only great wisdom is re∣quired,* 1.2132 but great experience; and when Ministers of State are endowed with these qualifications, whatever the e∣vent be, yet they are not to be blamed, and mostly such grounded resolves succeed well: For a wise man(i) 1.2133 over-rules the Stars. So a Minister of State, who with sufficient ability, Diligence, Care, Fidelity, Prudence, and Affection,* 1.2134 serves his Prince and his Country (which are no ways incompatible) needs not fear the Detraction of some, the mining of others, or an inglorious downfal: for the Government loseth more by such an ones laying aside, than he that hath served his Prince Conscientiously, justly and wisely, shall lose. Those whom either their lucky Stars, or conspicuous accomplishments have placed within the Circle of the Court, are subject indeed to the greatest danger of inglorious Exits, if they be not the most circumspect of Mortals. For the envious and ambiti∣ous (who torment themselves that they are eclipsed by those who interpose betwixt the Sunshine of the Princes favour) envy them the Glory of Administration, and by cunning and artificial Insinuations of ill Conduct, false measures and designs, are assiduously heaving them out of their places; which if up∣on false Suggestions they prevail to effect, by successive Remo∣vals (under pretence of reforming matters) all things are dis∣jointed, the Cement of Government dissolved, and greater Errors committed by too frequent fresh Applications,* 1.2135 whereby the Malady is made incurable by the multitude of Physicians.

Amongst other Rules, which Princes may find it convenient to observe, in chusing ministers of State; It is one of no small Moment (provided they can be as well sitted) that they(k) 1.2136 be of antient Houses, and persons of Fortune. For Tacitus(l) 1.2137 notes, That it is inbred to men to look asquint on the Ad∣vancements, not so much new, as of new Men; who coveting too much Power and Honour, by that means contract Envies. For as he further(m) 1.2138 observes, The Power that is in Excess, is not to be confided in, being mostwhat Treacherous. There∣fore(n) 1.2139 Pliny adviseth, That Ministers of State should take their measures by their own, and not their Princes Fortune; for it is a certain Truth, That the Power wears best, and is most stable and durable that is founded upon Vertue, and purchased by it, not by any little Arts, Wealth, or Dissimulation, ac∣cording to that of Claudian,

—emitur sola Virtute Potestas.

When Ministers of State desire to keep their Station, they must studiously endeavour to avoid Envy and Aemulation, especially, not to give any occasion by their own Arrogance.

(o) 1.2140Tacitus describing the qualifications of Germanicus (who had the Command of a great part of the Army, and the ma∣nagement of some Provinces) saith, That he was courteous and affable to his Companions, merciful and mild to his Enemies, ve∣nerable in his Aspect and Discourses, and that while he re∣tained the greatness and Port of the highest Fortune, he a∣voided Envy and Arrogance; which Character will very well become any great Minister of State.

privy-Counsellors are very well to consider that they are cho∣sen to manage the weighty parts of Government, and ease their Prince: but they are not to make it their Business by lit∣tle Arts of ingratiating themselves with their Sovereign, to study only to get Honour and Wealth, and serve a Princes time; but so to act, as not only the present Prince, but his Successors may feel the advantage of their Administration, remembring that of Tiberius,(p) 1.2141 That Princes are Mortal, but the Govern∣ment Immortal; which is most true in hereditary Monar∣chy.

It is an odd account that(q) 1.2142 Tacitus gives us of Sallustius Crispus, that he imitating Mecaenas, without Senatorian Dignity, out-stripped in Power with the Prince, many of the Consuls, and such as had triumphed, and that by a different way, than had been before used; by richness of Garb, delicateness, living splendidly, even bordering upon Luxury: yet he retained a vigorousness of Mind, fit for great Employments, and so much the smarter, by so much as he seemed more sluggish and unactive. Yea he was next to Mecaenas, on whom the Se∣crets of the Emperors rested. But withal he lets us see what old Ministers of State may expect, and what they must not be troubled at, if they find happen to them, That in their old Age they retain the Countenance rather of the Princes Friend∣ship, than Power, as he expresseth it, aetate provecta speciem magis, in amicitia Principis, quam vim tenuit.

The State Mountebanks of 1641. (that they might make the Ulcer seem greater,* 1.2143 and more dangerous for the advantage of larger Application) first aggravated the Grievances the People lay under, by the ill conduct of the prime Ministers of State, and by the representing a plausible Idaea of better Government (if they might have the modelling of it) courted by little and little the well meaning, and captivated them with a fair view of its speculative Excellence, whereby their Fancies were rai∣sed to the expectation of a golden Age, and the cunning and intrieguing Factors (pretending to have no other design but to take care of the publick) gained to themselves the Honoura∣ble name of Patriots.

Having thus tickled their Proselytes, and gained their applause, their next work was to pickeer some great Officers, and Black∣ening them with the name of Male-Administrators, or corrupt Officers, slily endeavoured to obtain an Opinion of their own incorruptness; whereas their great design was only to displace

such, to make Niches for their own Statues; and when they found it was difficult to get such outed of their Prefer∣ments, the People were acquainted that such and such were the only Rubs, and close Enemies to the State: and when they could have no particular Evidence against them, then they made the People believe, that such managed their Designs so much more closely and secretly, whereby they could get no publick Proof against them; and so they left them to the Pre∣condemnation of the People, which served for Jury and Wit∣nesses: and being thus presented, as ingrateful Monsters to their County, they were baited in every Coffee-house, and Ale-bench, till at last the loud Cry runs through the Woods and Lawns; and every one was armed to destroy those reputed Wolves and Foxes that were believed would destroy their Flocks; and all the Umbrages of Mis-Government, the real or imaginary Infelicities, were heaped upon the Animals design∣ed for Sacrifice, and they were singled for victims to concili∣ate better times. And thus such Designers being prosperous in their Undertakings against the great Minister of State, the most renowned Earl of Strafford, (whose Fall succeeding Ages will never forget) they singled out others by way of Impeach∣ment, both Bishops and Judges, as was most conspicuous in our late Troubles, imitated by the Slingers of Paris; which is, and ever will be the usual Method of all who design to in∣troduce a change of Government.

Therefore wise Princes, when they have chosen and had Ex∣perience of the Ability and Fidelity of such Ministers of State, are careful to shelter them from the Attacques of the Envious and Ambitious.

For these of all others should be such as have an humble, du∣tiful, and diligent Love for their Prince, and his true Service; therefore it is unsafe to abandon them, if such. That of Mi∣cipsa(r) 1.2144 being most true, That neither Armies or Treasures are so sure Defences of a Kingdom, as true Cordial Friends. So(s) 1.2145 Pliny tells Trajan, It is the chief work of a Prince to procure Friends.

Of such as these it is that(t) 1.2146 Sallust saith, he hath found that all Kingdoms, Cities and Nations, have had Prosperous Empire, while true Councils have prevailed; but where Fa∣vour, Fear, or Pleasures have corrupted them, they have grown poor, and lost their Rule.

Above all, Princes should avoid Flatteries; for these always give them the wrong end of the Perspective: therefore(u) 1.2147 Ta∣citus gives that Commendation to Lepidus, That he converted most things to the better, from the cruel Flatteries of others, and yet needed no attemperament, for that he continued in equal Authority and Favour with his Prince: and of Corne∣lianus Piso* 1.2148 he saith, Nullins servilis Sententiae sponte Auctor, & quoties necessitas ingrneret, prudenter moderans; He never was willingly Author of any servile Opinion, and as often as there was need, he prudently moderated.

I shall only annex to this, what may in general serve as a Character of an able and useful Minister of State, faintly drawn from a great Original.

Whoever designs to serve his Prince and Country, in the Administration of Affairs,* 1.2149 must have had a liberal Education, spent a great portion of his time in diligently perusing Anci∣ent and Modern Histories, Memoires of great men, the Laws and Government of his own and Foreign Countries, and the best Treatises of Politicks, and then consider the most judici∣ous and accomplished Persons; and amongst them, such prin∣cipally, as in their several Stations have the Practical Part of Affairs committed to them, both in Courts of Judicature, the Exchequer, and Admiralty; and in these especially note their dexterity for their Imployments, wherein their Eminencies ap∣pear, how their Interests are interwoven, or independent; what their dispositions and inclinations are, especially in their obedience to the Government, usefulness to it; their Treat∣ableness, Avarice, Pride, Ambitious or Factious Propensities; as well prying into the Vices they conceal, as the laudable Qualities they make themselves conspicuous by; distinguishing betwixt the natural and constrained tempers of every one.

If such an one be not Consiliarius natus, he ought to get him∣self early chosen a Member of the House of Commons, and then diligently read all such Books as treat of that Honourable House, peruse the Journals, note well and weigh, not only what he finds there, but also all the Speeches of the leading men, the force of their Arguments, and the tendencies of them: Mark well who are forwardest to supply the Govern∣ment, whose Talent lies in contriving wholesom Laws for the benefit of the Subject, who are the best Orators, who the subtilest or solidest, who affect Popularity, who are suggesting suspicions of the increase of the Kings Power, who the great∣est informers of Grievances, who cut the Thred evenest betwixt the Royal Prerogative and the Subjects Liberties; in all these well pondering the grounds upon which every one bottom their Arguments, contenting himself to be an Auditor and Register for some while; in his Votes following the wisest and least by∣assed by private Interest.

During the time he is under the Discipline of this Noble School, he must fill up the intervals of his vacant hours, either in perusing such learned Authors as treat of the Subjects have been debated in the House, or in conversation with the emi∣nentest experienced Members, or with such of the Court as he may be best informed from.

During all which time, he must intermingle the Study of the Laws of those Foreign Countries his Prince hath Correspon∣dence with, and obtain true Characters of their Ministers of State, their regulation of Trade, their Taxes and Gabels, their Military Force, the disposedness of any Parties to Faction; and consider wherein his own Prince, or a Foreigner hath bet∣ter

Laws for the good Government of the Subjects, and for the preserving the Crown in Splendor and Power.

A Person thus qualified and fitted for his Masters Service, and the publick good of his Country, cannot long want an opportunity of being noted; and in peacable times, some Mi∣nisters of State will be desirous to obtain his assistance, and will be ready to befriend him for their own advantages, to alle∣viate their own burthens, and his Prince will be desirous to be served by a Person of such a Fund.

If the times be turbulent and factious, it is not amiss for such a Person (during his Noviceship) to mingle himself with the popular, and Male-content Nobility; whereby he may know the bottom of their designs, and the plausibleness of their Pretences, the strength of their Reasons, as well as of their party, and the tendencies of the distinct Interests, that may be united, in rendring the Government ingrateful to the People, though not in the methods of modelling or subvert∣ing it.

This, I must confess, is a dangerous point, and requires one that hath an Heart and Brain all Amulet against the infection of Disloyalty, and is dexterous enough to cajole such a Party; which he may the easilier do, by appearing only as a rasa Ta∣bula, and desirous of following others conduct, and a well wisher to his Countrey; and then he shall be sure not to miss a serious courtship from that party.

How then to extricate himself from those Thickets, Bram∣bles, Coverts, or Earths, (wherein he hath entred to unken∣nel the Foxes) will be a great Master-piece, and requires no common agility, and deliberate forethought. One of the Houses of Parliament is the fittest Theatre for him to unmask himself in, where he may at one great step pass over to the Loyal side: which will be done with more advantage, if he take some Critical time, when the signalizing his Loyalty will be more useful, as well as endearing to his Soveraign; and when Courage and Resolution will best bestead his Affairs.

Then he is to discover his Talent by demonstratively mani∣festing his true Zeal for, and justifying the Government in con∣curring with the faithfulest and ablest Ministers of State; or putting himself in the Van, and without Affectation or Pas∣sion, with weighty Reasons, bold and natural utterance, smart∣ness of Judgment, and Learning, fully determine the point in debate; and as often as there is occasion, re-inforce his Argu∣ment with fresh matter.

Here he is to set up his rest, being resolved, for his whole life, never to desert the Interest, after he hath upon so good deliberation resolved upon it.

This Action will soon he discovered to his Prince, of whose Privy-Council (if he were not before) we may suppose he will soon be admitted. Hither he must carry a resolution, fixed and unalterable, to intend solely his Masters Service, and the

benefit of his People, that nothing of the Rights of the Crown be diminished, or of the Liberties of the People be invaded. Here no double or sinister dealing must enter his thoughts, he must be the same in his Prince's Cabinet, as at the Council-Board; he must use a true and dutiful diligence above his fel∣lows, in attending his Prince's Person, and his Councils; must be free from unlawful Ambition, Bribery, and By-Ends; all over Oyled, that none may fasten a gripe upon him; be free, debonaire and affable to all he converseth with; but withal, wholly reserved as to the discovery of his Masters Designs: Ready to prefer none but such as may be truely serviceable to their King and Country; culling out, and recommending to his Imployment, only Sober, Discreet and Useful Persons, in their several Capacities, and never supporting or countenan∣cing any that once falsify expectation.

By the practising of all the respective qualifications I have (according to my poor Ability) set down in this Chapter, and that of the Privy-Council, and those more excellent Methods and Rules his own great Wisdom will suggest, he shall attain to a great trust with his Master, and a great respect and venera∣tion from all the Wise and Sober, and shall transmit a noble Example, and durable Pattern to Posterity.

If it so fall out, that such a Minister of State, cannot in some particular Affair conform his Judgment to that of his Collegues, or the Resolutions of his Prince: It will be glo∣rious in him, (after the laying open, with all modesty and strength of Reason, the grounds of his Opinion) to submit qui∣etly to his Prince's Pleasure, with that resignedness a Servant doth to a great Master, and he will be sure to reap the bene∣fit of it: For if his Prince, in the Sequel, find his Counsel was sound, and not ill timed, he will imploy him in greater matters, and with more confidence than before; and if such a Minister of State find that he hath been too partial, or byas∣sed in his Opinion, he will soon find his own errour, and be less apt for the future to commit the like.

However, he is, and ever will be, a true Servant to his Prince, and a good Minister of State, who, ex animo, and with all possible sincerity, can take as much pleasure in obey∣ing his Soveraigns Will, when he is laid aside, as he did in serving of him so long as he was imployed by him:

Tu Marcellus eras.—* 1.2150

CHAP. XXXII. Of the Kings Soveraignity in appointing Magistrates.

IF it were possible, saith(a) 1.2151 Libanius, that Princes in their own Bodies could be every where, there would be no need of Magistrates to be sent into the Provinces: they themselves being able to administer Justice unto all, as the Sun is sufficient to give light unto them: but seeing that cannot be (no more than they can fight all their Battels with their own Hands and Swords) therefore they must execute their Authority by others, and determine Justice, and causes of right and wrong, not by their own Tongue and understanding, but by the Sentence of others; so (as the(b) 1.2152 Philosopher observes) making to themselves many Eyes and Ears, Hands and Feet.

It is incumbent upon the Prince in his safe keeping of his Empire (saith the(c) 1.2153 Orator) that he do not exhibit himself only, but all the Ministers likewise of his power to be useful to the Publick; and, as Plutarch(d) 1.2154 adds, to place every one ac∣cording to his capacity in his several imployment.

For one(e) 1.2155 man though he have never such alacrity in body and mind, cannot be sufficient to undergo the greatness, and multitude of business which every day do flow upon the neck of another, unless they chuse co-adjutors, out of the best men of known Wisdom, Courage, Prudence, and Piety, who not only are free from Pride (the frequent concomitant of Power) but are abhorrers of it, as an hateful, and exceeding great evil. For such men are most fit helpers and assistants to good and worthy Princes.

Therefore(f) 1.2156 Bodin, Arnisaeus(g) 1.2157, and other Digesters of Politicks, make it the third right of Majesty to appoint and constitute Magistrates, who having their Authority flowing from the Prince as the fountain, derive from him all their Power of command. So(h) 1.2158 Mecaenas adviseth Augustus, ut so∣lus sine Plebe, Populo, ac Senatu, Magistratus crearet, that he alone, without the People and Senate create Magistrates: and Zonaras rightly affirms, that creatio Magistratuum maxima pars est muneris Imperatoris, the creation of Magistrates is the greatest part of the Office of an Emperor. The Soveraign possessing his proper Power without a Superiour;(i) 1.2159 the Magistrates are Instruments, by which the Soveraign executes his Commands: for it is rea∣son he alone have the power of appointing them, who hath the right(k) 1.2160 to redress the unjust Actions of the Magistrates, and to make void whatsoever ought not to have been done by them.(l) 1.2161 Hence it is, a Prince is to be very solicitous in the choice of Magistrates; for it is better for a Commonwealth, and almost safer, when a Prince is evil, than when the Prince's Ministers are so: Therefore in the choice of them, the indoles,

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aptness and ability of the persons for their respective Offices are principally to be regarded; for(m) 1.2162 omnia non pariter rerum sunt omnibus apta. Some are fit for(n) 1.2163 Military, and others for Ci∣vil commands;* 1.2164 some for the Consulting, Contriving part, others for the Executive; some because there is use of their Popula∣rity, others of their Prudence, others of their Justice; some to conciliate the Subjects dutifulness to their Prince, others to re∣present the Prince gracious to the People; some for the care of the Prince's Revenue, that he never want a Fund against all contingencies; others to see the dispending of it for the Princes honour, and his own and the Peoples benefit. So that in(o) 1.2165 whomsoever any, or especially all Vertues, are conspicuous, much is to be attributed to him, and a Prince's Eye should soon discover him to imploy him according to his Talent.

Some Magistrates are absolutely necessary for the Admini∣stration of the Government, without whom there cannot be that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Philosopher calls it: such are Lord Chan∣cellors, Lord Treasurers, Lord Lieutenants, Judges, Sheriffs, &c. others for the more splendid part of the Government, which are Officers of the Court rather than Magistrates, as Master of the Horse, Grooms of the Stole, Bed-chamber and Privy-Chamber Gentlemen, Master of Ceremonies, Kings of Armes, &c.

Therefore the Philosopher(p) 1.2166 rightly observes, That without necessary Magistrates a City cannot subsist; and without those who are for Ornament and Beauty, the City cannot be ad∣ministred honourably.

It is of excellent use to the Publick, as well as advantagi∣ous to themselves, that the young Nobility and Gentry be bred up in Learning,* 1.2167 Military Discipline, and all other ways that might accomplish them for the service of their Prince and Country: for where a Prince can be served by the No∣bility and ancient Gentry, it much facilitates the execution of their trusts; but in some cases it may be requisite to im∣ploy those of great Wisdom, Judgment and Diligence (the Endowments of noble Minds) though not of so noble Ex∣tract. So(q) 1.2168 Mecaenas advised Augustus that he should chuse the praefectus praetorio, out of the Horsemen, lest if he were one of the Nobility he might attempt something against the Prince: and so it is noted in(r) 1.2169 Tacitus, That the Province was given to Sabinus, not for any excellency, but that he was fit and not above the imployment. But this caution is unnecessary where Kingdoms are hereditary, and depend not upon the approbation of Soldiery or Senate.* 1.2170 Above all things Princes should take care that they commit not any of their Royal Prerogatives to the Magistrates, or their Curators: 'Tis not safe for a Prince to intrust any of these in a Sub∣jects hands; for it is by many Histories apparent, that when by reason of a Prince's Captivity, Minority, his prosecuting some War out of his Country (whereby a Kingdom cannot

be governed without a Viceroy or Protector, with the whole Authority of a Prince) the sweetness of this Power hath tempted them to usurp or do ill Offices to their Prince or People.(s) 1.2171 Hence the Philosopher adviseth not to make such great, who in Wit and Manners are bold and daring.

Therefore it is not safe for Princes to keep Viceroys long in their imployments, especially if there be any danger of their Ambitious aimes to get the Soveraignty into their own hands; or that they will not be observant of the due Execu∣tion of the Laws, or for private ends will suppress the No∣bility,* 1.2172 or oppress the People; by their Interest pervert the course of Justice, or introduce new Laws, by surprizing the Soveraign in gaining his consent. In all such cases the rule of the(t) 1.2173 Philosop••er is most true, They that for a short time obtain the Magistracy, cannot so soon hurt, as they which en∣joy it long; as he instanceth in Demagogues in Popular Go∣vernment, and the Dynastae in Oligarchies, which by that means became Tyrants.

Julius Caesar(u) 1.2174 and Augustus made all their Magistrates annu∣ally; whereby they gratified all the eminent men of the Commonwealth by rotation: but(w) 1.2175 Tiberius did otherwise, giving this reason for it, That Horse-leeches having sucked much blood are at quiet, and so the biting of fresh men are most sharp. Some think, saith Tacitus, he did it only to seclude others from injoying of them, and to prevent his yearly trouble in chusing, which as it would oblige the Elected, so would dis∣oblige the Candidates; but most ascribe it to the subtilty of his Nature, quod nec(x) 1.2176 eminentes virtutes sectabatur, & rursum vitia oderit; ab optimis periculum sibi, à pessimis dedecus publicum metuebat; He did not make great search, or take much care to find men of the most eminent Vertues, and yet he hated the Vi∣tious; fearing from the best danger to himself, and from the worst disgrace to the Commonweal.

In our constitution of Government,* 1.2177 a most excellent tem∣per is observed, where by the Princes Power is reserved to change the prime Ministers of State and Judicature at his pleasure; which obligeth them to great care to act justly in their Places, and prevents Sedition, where any other had the Power of Electing: for it is the Power of chusing in any other than the Soveraign, that is the only cause of Faction; not what the(y) 1.2178 Philosopher notes against Socrates, That the same continually being Magistrates, is the cause of Sedition, by reason of the Envy of the rejected Candidates, and also among Spirited and Martial People that expect those im∣ployment.

The Kings of England have undoubtedly the sole Power of creating, and appointing Magistrates,* 1.2179 and Officers of greatest Authority. So(z) 1.2180 the grave Author of the Com∣monwealth of England affirms, That in the appointing all the great Officers and Ministers of the Realm, whether Spiritual,

or Temporal, the highest are immediately in the Kings Power to nominate, and the inferiour by Authority derived from him.

So the Kings of England appoint the High Commissioner, and all other the great Ministers and Officers in Scotland; the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Justices, and other great Ministers and Officers in Ireland, and by Letters Patents appoint a Prorex, locum tenens, or Guardian of the Realm in their absence, before whom even Parliaments have been held: but it were endless to descend to the particular imployments of Magistrates under the Soveraign. Therefore I shall only note what the(a) 1.2181 Chancellor in the Queens name said to Sir Thomas Gargrave, chosen Speaker of the Commons House, That to the head of every body Politick, b••••ngeth immedi∣ately or mediately the assignment, and admitting of every Member of the Body to his Ministry, and Duty; the contrary whereof were monstrous in Nature and Reason.

It is both a great glory and happiness to a Prince when he is served by Magistrates of great probity: for the skill and watchfulness,* 1.2182 as well as indulgent care of a Prince is thereby discovered, and revered in such a choice; and the evil Complexion of the People is chargeable mostly on the Magistrates. Therefore what the Chancellor(b) 1.2183 in a Speech in the Star-Chamber, by the Queens direction told the Justices, is applicable to all sorts of Magistrates, That the not, or re∣miss doing of Justice, must by the Prince be charged upon their shoulders, as the immediate Executors of the Law.

The qualifications of Magistrates may be the Subject of a Common place; I shall only hint some more necessary, re∣ferring the rest to the succeeding Chapter. First they ought to be Persons undisturbed with Passions; for as they are ap∣pointed to correct the Vitious, so they should begin the Reformation at home. Chilon's(c) 1.2184 Brother desiring to know why he was not chosen at Sparta as well as Chilon, he an∣swered that he knew how to bear an Injury, which his Bro∣ther did not; for in Publick imployments those who are the Censores morum, and chastise the Infringers of the Laws, must expect Calumnies and evil Entreaties from the incorrigi∣ble and debauched: and such must be resolved to perform their duty without any other by-end of Revenge, Tyranny and Imperiousness on the one hand; or hasty, rast Cholerick∣ness, Partiality or Corruptness on the other.

Plato(d) 1.2185 adviseth that the wealthiest be chosen for the bet∣ter support of the Dignity; but withall, that they be such as are exemplary in obeying the Laws. For none are more fit to serve their Prince and profit the Subjects, than such as are o∣bedient to the Laws, which when they make a rule of their own Actions, they will be sure to exact it of others.

It is great disparagement to a Prince, to chuse men of vi∣tious or uncommendable lives, or such as have not worth and

honour to commend them. So the Princes of Europe think the Grand Seignior not so well served by Slaves, nor was it so commendable in the Roman Emperors to make their Freemen of greater Power with them, in the managery of greater affairs, than Consuls or Senators; which made(e) 1.2186 Pliny say, It was the principal sign of a Prince not great, where the Freemen were great.

The Prince cannot be presumed to chuse his Magistrates by his own knowledge of their abilities, and fitness for their seve∣ral Imployments, but must trust such as are about him: therefore it becomes them well to know the qualifications of such as are to bear Office; for the Rule of Tacitus(f) 1.2187 is to be observed, That it is better not to prefer to Offices and Admini∣strations such as will transgress, than to condemn them who have transgressed.

CHAP. XXXIII. Of the Soveraigns appointing Judges, Courts of Justice, and other Officers.

HAving treated in the last Chapters of such as have a ge∣neral inspection into, and (by the Soveraigns Election, and placing them) a power of advising, at least, how the whole frame of Government is to be disposed, as both Prince and People may be happy: I come now more particularly to the Ministerial Officers of Justice, such as are the Lord Chan∣cellor or Keeper, Lord Treasurer, the two Lord Chief Justices, and the rest of the Judges, whether they be the Judges at West∣minster, or those of Assises, Oyer and Terminer, to try Causes in their respective Circuits.

I undertake this Task, Lugduni tanquam Rhetor dicturns ad A∣ram,* 1.2188 or one that procul profanus adorat: The Subject being on∣ly fit to be handled by such as have read and digested the whole Body of the Laws, and are eminent in the Profession of them: whereas I must own my self to have tasted only so much of that Ornamental and most useful Study, as may quick∣en a dull and languid Appetite, to praise, or rather admire it; than that I can hope to benefit the judicious Reader, by an imperfect Description of their Calling and Office, who by the Sovereign are appointed to be the Oracles of the Law, and the Ministers of his Justice, whose great Wisdom and Know∣ledge all ought to reverence. But as they make so great a Fi∣gure in the Government, I could not omit them, though it be but to salute the Skirts, and hold up the Train of their Scarlet Robes.

SECT. 1.

IN Edward the Elders Days, those that gave Judgment un∣der the King,* 1.2189 had the name Gerefa, under which name, Al∣dermen, Earls, Presidents, Prefects, Governours, &c. were comprehended. From whence with the Germans, the word Grave is used, for an Earl, President, Judge, &c. and our Sheriff is from Scyre gerev, Raeve, or Graeve of the Shire. The Charge in that Kings Laws, runs thus,(a) 1.2190 Eadward the King wills, that all his Graeves give so right Judgment as they can most Righteously, as it stands in their Judgment Book, (that is, as we may suppose, in the written Laws) fearing for no thing or cause, to declare or pronounce Right or Justice to the People. The which publishing of Justice, they shall appoint at certain times or Terms when they will perform it, and declare the same. So that in this seems to be comprehended what is more at large in the Oath of a Judge in After-Ages.

We must principally consider that the King is the Fountain and original of all Justice in his Kingdom;* 1.2191 therefore Bracton(b) 1.2192 saith, That the King, and not another, ought to judge, if he alone were sufficient to do it, being bound by his Oath to it; therefore the King ought to exercise the Power of the Law, as Gods Vicar. But if our Lord the King be not sufficient to determine all Causes, that the Burthen may be lighter, di∣vided among several Persons, he ought to chuse Men wise, and fearing God,* 1.2193 and appoint them Justiciaries.

Yet this surrogating of Judges in the Kings respective Courts, doth not divest the King of his Power; for as the same(c) 1.2194 Bracton saith, The King hath ordinary Jurisdiction, and all Laws are in his Hands, which cannot be so delegated, but that they re∣main with the King. From which, and other Authorities, Mr. Lambard saith,(d) 1.2195 That the Courts derive their Powers from the Crown, their original; and drawing by one and one (as it were so many Roses) from the Garland of the Prince, leave nevertheless the Garland it self undespoiled of the Sovereigns Vertue in the Administration of Justice.

Therefore saith Sir Edward(e) 1.2196 Coke, By the Common Law all Pleas were discontinued by the Death of the King; and Pro∣cess awarded, and not returned before his Death, was lost—For by the Death of the King, not only the Justices of both the Benches, and the Barons of the Exchequer, but Sheriffs also, and Escheators, and all Commissions of Oyer and Terminer, Gaol-Delivery, and Justices of Peace, are determined by the Death of the Predecessor that made them.

Therefore the Statute of 25 Ed. 3. declares it to be Treason, if any man kill the Chancellor,* 1.2197 Treasurer, or the Kings Ju∣stices, of the one Bench or the other, Justices in Eyre or Assise, or any other Justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their places, doing their Offices. The(f) 1.2198 reason whereof is as∣signed,

because all these represent the King's Royal Person, in his own Courts, by his own Commission under the Great Seal, in the very Execution of the Kings Royal Office, viz. Admini∣stration of publick Justice to his People.

As therefore the King at his Coronation,(g) 1.2199 taketh an Oath to make to be done, in all his Judgments, equal and right Ju∣stice, and Discretion in Mercy and Truth, according to his Power: So he lays the Burthen thereof upon the Judges, ac∣cording to that of E. 3. for the Pleasure of God, and quiet∣ness of our Subjects, as to save our Conscience, and keep our Oath, by the assent of our great Men, and other of our Coun∣cil, we have commanded our Justices, that they shall from henceforth do even Law, and Execution of right to all our Subjects, Rich and Poor, without having regard to any Per∣son, &c. Therefore before this in(h) 1.2200 Magna Charta we find, that the King will sell, deny or defer Justice to none.

Yet from hence it doth not follow, that if in the opinion of some, the King doth not do Justice, that therefore any Subject should conclude, as the Master of the Hospitallers of Jerusa∣lem in England, at Clerkenwell, Anno 1252. 37 H. 3. did. The Story is thus told by(i) 1.2201 Matthew Paris:

The Master waiting a time, when he might discourse with the King, he complained of some Injuries done him,* 1.2202 and shewed the King some Charters of Protection, of himself and his An∣cestors. The King answered with an Oath, and in Wrath; You Prelates and Religious, especially Templars and Hospitallers, have so many Liberties and Charters, that they make you proud, &c. Therefore they ought prudently to be revoked, which imprudently have been granted to you; for even the Pope oftentimes revokes his Grants, with a non obstante: and the King told him, so he would do. To all which the(k) 1.2203 Master (saith Matt. Paris) answered chearfully, and with a lifted up Countenance, What is this you say, my Lord the King? far be it from you to speak so ab∣surd a thing. As long as you observe Justice you may be a King; and as soon as ever you break this, you cease to be a King. Thus he would make Dominion founded in Justice, as others in Grace. But I need not add many Authorities upon this Head; for by the universal Suffrage of the profound Lawyers, the Kings of England solely nominate, create, and(l) 1.2204 appoint all the Judges of the great Courts at Westminister, and may remove them at their Pleasure, and alone make(m) 1.2205 and appoint Justices of Oyer and Terminer, of Gaol-delivery, Justices of the Peace, She∣riffs, and the like Officers, and(n) 1.2206 remove them when they see Cause: and the(o) 1.2207 Prerogative of making Judges cannot be given or claimed by a Subject.

The King hath also Power to name, create, make,(p) 1.2208 and re∣move the great Officers Ecclesiastical and Civil, by Sea and Land, as Archbishops, Bishops, (by way I suppose of Conge deslier,* 1.2209 and Translation) Lord Chancellor or Keeper, Lord Treasurer, Lord President, Lord Privy-Seal, Lord High Steward, Lord

Admiral, Lord High Constable, Earl Marshal, Lord Chamber∣lain, Privy Counsellors, the Marshal or Steward of the Kings House, and the rest of the Officers of his Houshold, Master of the Horse, Officers of the Mint, of the Castles, Port-Towns, and Shipping, Lord Lieutenants, and many more too tedious to be named. So that either mediately or immediately, all Of∣ficers are by the Kings appointment; which is not only a mani∣fest badge, but a necessary appurtenance of the Soveraignty.

SECT. 2 The Court of High-Steward.

THE Kings Courts have been various,* 1.2210 as that of the Privy-Council, called the Council-Board, of which I have spoke before. The Court of the High-Steward of England, intituled, Placita Coronae coram — Seneschallo Angliae, disused since the Reign of Henry the Fourth; and now a Lord High-Steward is only appointed, pro hac vice, with limitations for the Tryals of some Peers of the Kingdom upon Inditement. His Power anciently was(q) 1.2211 Supervidere & regulare sub Rege, & immediate post Regem, totum Regnum Angliae & omnes Mi∣nistros Legum, infra idem Regnum, temporibus Pacis, & Guerra∣rum. The next Court which is now totally suppressed, was the Honourable Court of Star-Chamber,* 1.2212 of ancient time stiled Co∣ram Rege & Concilio suo, & coram Rege & Concilio suo in Came∣ra stellata, of which I shall have occasion to write something in the Chapter below.

SECT. 3 The Court of King's-Bench.

AS to the great and standing Courts,* 1.2213 the first of them that is mentioned in Ancient Writers, is that of the Kings Bench, coram Rege. This,(r) 1.2214 Bracton saith, was the Kings proper Court, called the Kings Hall, and had for Judges in it Chief-Justices, which determined the Kings proper Causes, &c. The same(s) 1.2215 Author speaking of the Justices of this Court, saith, That some of them were Capital, General, perpetual, and the greater sitting by the Kings side, which were to cor∣rect the injuries and errors of all others.

Fleta in describing this Court, saith My Lord Coke, gives this account, That the King in this Court hath his Justiciaries, as well Knights as Clergy-men, as the Kings Lieutenants in England (as the Lords Justices were sometimes I suppose in Ire∣land) before(t) 1.2216 whom, and no where else, unless before the King himself, and his Council or special Commissioners, false Judgments and Errors of Justices are reversed and corrected: and there are determined Breeves of Appeals, and other

Breeves upon Criminal Actions, and Injuries against the Peace of the King. And Bracton saith, That in Criminal Matters, if they touched the King's Person, as Treason, they were tried coram Rege; if concerning private matters, then before the Justices only.

By many Records it appears,* 1.2217 that the King sometimes sate in this Court, and that sometimes the King ordered it to follow his Court, as particularly in 28 E. 1.(u) 1.2218 it was established in the Statute of Articuli super Chartas.

Robert de Bruis was the first Capitalis Justiciarius ad placita co∣ram Rege, 8 March(w) 1.2219 52 H. 3. the Title of Justiciarius Angliae (of whose great Power the learned(x) 1.2220 Spelman and(y) 1.2221 Mr. White have given an account) having an end in Phillip Basset, who was advanced to that place 45 H. 3.— Who desires fur∣ther satisfaction, may consult Mr. Crompton's Jurisdiction des Courts, c. 4. Sir Ed. Coke, Sir William Dugdale, Mr. Prynne, and the Authors they cite, who are many and learned, and do at large treat of its Jurisdiction and the Practice in it, which are foreign to my Design.

SECT. 4. The Court of Common-Pleas.* 1.2222

THis Court of Common-Pleas appears to be as antient as Henry the First's time; for in his Charter to the(z) 1.2223 Abbat of B. he grants Connusance of all Pleas; so that neither the Justi∣ces of the one Bench, or of the other, or Justices of Assize should meddle. Bracton(a) 1.2224 saith, This Court had Cognizance of all Pleas, of which Authority is given them, without warrant, they neither having Jurisdiction, or Coercion. Therefore Sir Edward Coke saith, That regularly this Court cannot hold any Common-Plea in any Action, real, personal, or mixt, but by Writ out of Chancery, returnable in this Court.* 1.2225

Those that treat of this Court, agree, That it was for hear∣ing and determining all Controversies in matters Civil, be∣twixt Party and Party; called the Common-Pleas, as contra∣distinct from Pleas of the Crown, and was anciently kept in the Kings own Palace.* 1.2226

In Magna Charta it is granted, That the Common-Pleas shall not follow the Kings Court, but shall be held in a certain place. The Exchequer having been the place where these Causes were heard, till(b) 1.2227 28 E. 1. that by Statute it was provided, that no Common-Plea shall from henceforth be held in the Exchequer, contrary to the form of the Great Char∣ter.

The first, who had the Appellation of Capitalis Justiciarius in this Court, according to Sir William Dugdale, was Gilbert de Preston, who by that Title had his Livery of Robes,(c) 1.2228 1 E. 1.

The number of the Justices(d) 1.2229 3 E. 2. were Six, 14 E. 3. they were Nine; the latter end of Henry the Fourth, and all the Reign of Henry the Seventh they were but Four. Those that would be satisfied about the Jurisdiction of this Court, may have re∣course to Mr. Richard Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts c. 7. fol. 91. the Year-Book quoted in Ash his Promptuary, Sir Hen∣ry Spelman's Glossary tit. Bancus, & Capitalis Justiciar. de Banco Communi, p. 417. Sir W. Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales, Prynne's Animadversion, p. 52. and many other good Authors cited by them.

SECT. 5. Court of Chancery.

THE Court of Chancery in some Writers is placed the first,* 1.2230 in others as I have placed it. Although it is true what Sir Edward(e) 1.2231 Coke saith, That Kings had their Chancellors in the Saxon times (indeed he adds the Brittish al∣so, of which little can be known;) yet I dare not avouch with him, that the Court of Chancery was then, as now, the only Court out of which Original Writs do issue: it is true, that to the Charter of King(f) 1.2232 Edward the Confessor ma••e to the Ab∣bat of Westminster, amongst the Witnesses it is said, Ego Swardus(g) 1.2233 Notarius ad vicem Reynbaldi Regiae dignitatis Cancellarii hanc cartam scripsi, & subscripsi: So(h) 1.2234 Adulph is accounted Chan∣cellor to King Edgar, and T••rketil to King Edred, and King Edmund, and Wolsine to King Athelstan; and that the Chancel∣lor had a Court, may be presumed from what is found in the Book of Ely (writ as it is supposed about King Stephen's time) that King Aethelred who Reigned about Anno 978. appointed, and granted,* 1.2235 that the Ch. of Ely, then, and ever after in the Kings Court, should have the dignity of the Chancery: which albeit, as Sir Edward Coke saith, it was void in Law, to grant the Chancellourship of England in Succession; yet it proveth, that then there was a Court of Chancery. As to the first, it is apparent, that the Chancellor then had the power of com∣posing the Charters; and before Seals were in use, might also subscribe with the Sign of the Cross, as other of the Kings Of∣ficers did; but this doth not prove what kind of Court he was made Judge of: for there the Notary in the Chancellors room signs last, and in the(i) 1.2236 Councils of Sir Henry Spelman's Edition, I find Adulph stiled Herefordensis(k) 1.2237 Ecclesiae Catascapus, sign∣ing last of the Abbats.* 1.2238 As to the Book of Ely, I know not how to understand that the Church should have any dig∣nity of Chancellorship in the Kings Court; and if it be meant of the Bishop of that See only, it might possibly be meant to be the principal Chirographer, or drawer of the Kings Charters. As to what is found in the Mirror, it is of no great validity, be∣ing writ according to the then custom of the Age; wherein

the Author saith, That Enrollments(l) 1.2239 of Pardons of the King, were in the Chancery in the time of King Alfred; Altho' Mau∣ricius Regis Cancellarius, by that title subscribes as witness to the Charter of King William the Conquerer, to the Abby of West∣minster; yet none of these prove, that such a Court was in those Ages constituted, as we now call the Chancery. For Sir Henry Spelman(m) 1.2240 proves the Chancery was no Court, but only the Ship (as he calls it) of the Kings Writs and Charters in old time, now consisting of three Parts, sc. è Collegio Scribarum Regiorum, è Foro Juris communis, & è Praetorio boni & aqui.

Mr. Lambard(n) 1.2241 hath proved that till the Reign of King Ed∣ward the First, we find nothing of the Chancellors hearing and determining of Civil causes: for till then the Justiciarius Angliae had the great Power,* 1.2242 which being then restrained ad placita coram Rege tenenda, the King, together with the trust and charge of the Great Seals, appointed him to represent his own Royal and extraordinary Preheminence of Jurisdiction in Civil Causes: and he gives this particular reason for his opinion, That Britton, a Learned Lawyer in Edward the First's time, writing of all other Courts, from the highest Tribunal to a Court Baron, maketh no mention of this Chancery. Yet to∣wards(o) 1.2243 the latter end of his Reign we find it enacted,* 1.2244 That the Chancellor and Justices of the Bench should follow the King (that is, remove with the Kings Court) so that he might have at all times near him some Sages of the Law, which were able to order all such matters as should come unto the Court at all times when need should require.

Yet this Act did not give an absolute Power to the Chan∣cellor alone, of determining in such Civil Causes; as may seem by that Law, which was made 20 Ed. 3.(p) 1.2245 where it appears the Treasurer was joyned with him, to hear complaints against Sheriffs, Escheators, &c. something like this about Purveyors, and Escheators, that they might not oppress, was enacted(q) 1.2246 36 Ed. 3.

Nevertheless Mr. Lambard observes,* 1.2247 that it doth not appear in the Reports of the Common Law, that there is any frequent mention of Causes usually drawn before the Chancellor for help in Equity, till from the time of King Henry the fourth; nor are there found any Bills and Decrees in Chancery before the 20 of H. 6. such Causes as since that time were heard in that Court, having formerly been determined in the Lords House of Parliament.

So Sir Edward Coke saith, In the Chancery are two Courts; First, the ordinary coram Domino Rege in Cancellaria, where in the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal proceeds accord∣ing to the right line(r) 1.2248 of the Laws and Statutes of the Realm. Secondly, extraordinary according to the Rule of Equity, Secundum aequum & bonum.

But it is not my business to enter into particulars. The curious may consult Sir Edward(s) 1.2249 Coke, Mr. Richard Cromptom, cap. 3.

Sir Henry Spelman 1. glossar. 1. de Cancellario à pag. 105. ad pag 113. Ryley's Appendix, Ash's Repertory tit. Courts, Sect. 2. Roll's Abridg∣ment, p. 374. to 587. Prynne's Animadversions, p. 48.

Anno 5 Eliz.(t) 1.2250 it was Enacted that the Lord Keeper for the time being hath always had, used and executed, and so may for the future,* 1.2251 the like place, Authority, Preheminence, Juri∣sdiction, Execution of Law, &c. as the Lord Chancellor of Eng∣land for the time being, lawfully used.

The Oath of the Chancellor or Lord Keeper, is to be found(u) 1.2252 10 R. 2. consisting of six Parts: First, That well and truly he shall serve our Soveraign Lord the King and his People in the Office of Chancellor,* 1.2253 or Lord Keeper. Secondly, That he shall do right to all manner of people, Poor and Rich, after the Laws and usages of the Realm. Thirdly, That he shall truly coun∣sel the King, and his Counsel he shall layen, i. e. hide or keep secret. Fourthly, That he shall not know, nor suffer the hurt, or disheriting of the King, or that the Rights of the Crown be decreased by any means, as far as he may lett it. Fifthly, That if he may not lett it, he shall make it clearly and expresly to be known to the King, with his true Advice and Counsel. Sixthly, That he shall do and purchase the Kings profit in all that he reasona∣bly may, as God help him, and by the Contents of this Book.

SECT. 6. Of the Court of the Exchequer.

SIR Edward Coke saith, the Authority of this Court is of original Jurisdiction without any Commission. Bra∣cton mentioneth nothing of this Court, and Fleta giveth a very short account, that the King hath his Court and his Justiciaries residing at his Exchequer, but descends to no particulars of the Jurisdiction.(w) 1.2254 But (x) Britton (who lived in Edward the First's Reign, (and all along writes in the name of the King, as if his whole work had been the Kings) gives us an account of the Nature of this Court in several particulars, To hear and deter∣mine all Causes which touch the Kings Debts, his Fees, and the incident Causes, without which these cannot be tried: So of Purprestures, Rents, Farms, Customs, and generally of whatever appertained to the Revenue of the Crown, the Tenants and Receivers of it; so that the Court is divided into two Parts, viz. Judicial Accounts, called Scaccarium Computorum, and into the Receipt of the Exchequer.

The principal Officer is the Lord Treasurer of England, who formerly had this great Office,* 1.2255 by delivery of the Golden Keys of the Treasury, and hath the Office this day by delivery of a white Staff at the Kings Will and Pleasure; his Oath is much∣what the same as the Chancellors, differing principally in that clause, That the Kings Treasure he shall truly keep and dispend.

The other great Officers are the Treasurer of the Exchequer, the Chancellor and Chief Baron and other Barons of the Exche∣quer; The rest of the Officers are particularly reckoned in Sir(x) 1.2256 Edward Coke.

The Oath of the Barons of the Exchequer is to be found in the Statutes(y) 1.2257 20 Ed. 3. cap. 2. whereof the principal parts are, That he shall truly charge and discharge all manner of People, as well Poor as Rich, that for Highness, nor for Riches, nor for Hatred nor Estate of no manner of person or persons, nor for any Deed, Gift, nor Promise of any person, the which is made to him, nor by Craft, nor by Ingen, he shall let the Kings Right, nor none other Persons right he shall disturb, let or respite, contrary to the Laws of the Land, nor the Kings Debts he shall put in respite, where that they may goodly be levied; that the Kings need he shall speed above all others; that neither for gift, wages, nor good deed, he shall layne, disturb nor let the profit, or reasonable advantage of the King, in the advantage of any other person, or of himself; that he shall take of no person, for to do wrong or right, to delay or to deliver, or to delay the People that have to do before him, &c. where he may know any wrong or prejudice to be done to the King, he shall put, and do all his power, and diligence that to redress; and if he may not do it, that he tell it to the King, or to them of the Council, that may make relation to the King, if he may not come to him.

Sir Edward Coke(z) 1.2258 hath commented on the Mirror, to explain all the Power and particular business of the Court, and further observeth that the Patent of the King to the Chief Baron, the rest of the Barons, Atturney General, and Sollicitor, are not so long as the King pleaseth, but quam diu se bene gesserint, which is interpreted a place for life; and there is good reason, being too many changes would give too many an insight into the Kings Revenue.

There is a Manuscript(a) 1.2259 of Gervasius Tilburiensis, writ in the time of Henry the second, which gives an account, how it came to be called the Exchequer, from a checked Covering of the Table, at which the Officers of the Court sate; and saith, That it is lawful for none to infringe the Statutes of the Exche∣quer, or by any rashness to resist them; it having that common with the Court of the Lord the King, in which he in his pro∣per person gives Judgment, that it is not lawful for any to con∣tradict, either the Record or Sentence. By which it ap∣pears that this Court was distinct from the Kings Bench, where the King sate in person, and that by the Institution of William the Conqueror, not only the great Barons of this Realm as well Ec∣clesiastical as Secular, but also the Justice of England, as Pre∣sident thereof, by his Office, were Members of this Court, and so continued to do long after, as the Judicious(b) 1.2260 Sir William Dug∣dale hath by Precedent shown: Mr. Prynne hath given us two Re∣cords (out of the Exchequer(c) 1.2261 34 H. 3. and Rishanger 40 H. 3.)

that that King in his proper person sate, and gave judgments in the Court of Exchequer, and gave not only Rules to be obser∣ved about the Revenue, Sheriffs and Bailiffs, but also concern∣ing punishing Blasphemy, defending Pupils, Orphans and Wi∣dows, and how the Magnates deported themselves to their Te∣nents: and if(d) 1.2262 they found them transgressing, that they cor∣rect them as they can; and if they cannot fully correct them, they show the same transgressions to the King.

He hath also given an account how, 54 H. 3.(e) 1.2263 the accounts of the Sheriffs into the Exchequer were to be digested, and in Michaelmass-Term, the same Year, how the Barons of the Ex∣chequer were to administer the new Oath to the Mayor Elect of the City of London: likewise in the same(f) 1.2264 Author there is a large refutation of Sir Edward Coke's Opinion, that the Sta∣tute of Rutland, as he calls it, was a Statute made by the King, Lords, and Commons; where it is proved against Sir Edward, that it was made for the ordering of the Exchequer at Rothelan in Wales, by the King and his Council, and not at Rutland: but I shall not enter into such Particulars.

There are several other Courts, which have peculiar Juris∣dictions by the King's Grants, and Prescription, as the Court of Requests, abolished 17 Car. 1. The Court of Chivalry, Court of Marshalsea, of the Admiralty, and that for redress of delays of Justice, which Sir Edward Coke and others have treat∣ed of at large, and fall not so necessarily for me to discourse of: So I shall proceed to the Itinerant Justices, and of Assizes, and Gaol-delivery.

SECT. 7. Of Itinerant Justices, and Justices of Assize, and Nisi Prius.

SOme Shadow of this we find in the time of the Conque∣ror, when Geofrey,* 1.2265 Earl of Constance, and some other Barones Regis, did sit at(g) 1.2266 Kenteford, to hear and determine the Claim touching the Rights and Liberties of the Church of Ely, at that time disputed before them.

But the settlement of the Constitution of them, was not till 22 H. 2. Anno 1176. as Roger Hoveden(h) 1.2267 hath related, when the King held his Great Council at Nottingham, & communi om∣nium Consilio divisit Regnum suum in 6 partes, per quarum singulas, Justiciarios Itinerantes constituit: and the Twenty fifth of his Reign, at his great Council at Windsor,(i) 1.2268 he divided Eng∣land into four Parts, and over every Part he appointed Wise∣men to do Justice, and hear the Complaints of the People.

The Form of the special Writ from the King to impower them to act, and of the Writ directed to the Sheriffs, to sum∣mon all such Persons as were concerned in this Service, to ap∣pear before the Justices, may be seen in Sir William Dugdale's O∣rigines Juridiciales, fol. 52. a.b. In which latter Writ(k) 1.2269 the Persons

summoned to appear, were Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Earls, Barons, Knights, & libere tenentes, and in every Village four Legales Homines, & Praepositum, & de quolibet Burgo, 12 Legales. Burgenses.

Sir Ed. Coke(l) 1.2270 calls these Justices in Eyre, and saith, they had Jurisdiction in all Pleas of the Crown, and of all Actions real, per∣sonal, and mixt, and they rode from seven Years, to seven Years. These Justices in Eyre continued no longer than till Edward the Third's time; for then as Mr.(m) 1.2271 Selden notes, Justices of Assizes came in their Places, though it is manifest that Justices of Assize were sooner begun.

For(n) 1.2272 Bracton mentions these Justices of Assizes in his time in these words, Sunt etiam Justitiarii constituti ad quasdam As∣sisas, duo, vel tres, vel plures, qui quidem perpetui non sunt, quia expleto negotio Jurisdictionem amittunt. The form of the Writ in(o) 1.2273 9 H. 3. is set down by Sir William Dugdale, in which the King constitutes his Justitiarii to take the Assizes of new disseising, and Delivery of the Gaol; and the Command to the Sheriff, is to cause(p) 1.2274 four legal Men, and the Provost out of every Village, and twelve lawful Men out of every Market-Town, and Borough, and all the Knights, and Free-Tenents, that is, all that held in Capite, to do what the Justices should on the King's part appoint.

In 21 E. 1.(q) 1.2275 another settlement was made; that either discreet Justices should be assigned to take Assizes, Jurats, and Certificates, throughout the whole Realm, viz. for the Counties of York, Northumberland, Westmoreland, Cumberland, Lancaster, Nottingham, and Derby, two. In the Counties of Lincoln, Leicester, Warwick, Stafford, Salop, Northampton, Rutland, Glouce∣ster, Hereford, and Worcester, other two. In the Counties of Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Dorset, Wiltshire, Southamptom, Ox∣ford, Berks, Sussex, and Surrey two. For the Counties of Kent, Essex, Hertford, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Bed∣ford, and Bucks two: and that the Assizes, &c. of Middlesex should be taken before the Justices of the Bench.

(r) 1.2276Bracton speaking of the Writ called Assiza novae disseisinae saith, it was found out and contrived by much Vigilance, for the recovering of Possessions, by a summary or speedy Conusance, without great Solemnity of the Law, that the business might be compendiously determined. For before at Common-Law, Assizes were not taken, but either in the Bank, or before Justices in Eyre, which was a great delay to the Plaintiff, and a great molestati∣on, and vexation of the Recognitors of the Assize; therefore in Magna Charta, the Assizes are appointed to be taken in the respective Counties, and the Patents to Justices of Assize run thus,(s) 1.2277 Sciatis quod constituimus vos Justiciarios nostros, una cum hiis quos vobis associaverimus, ad omnes Assisas, &c. in Com. &c. arainandas capiendas, &c. facturi inde quod ad Justitiam pertinet, secundum legem & Consuetudinem Regni vostri Angliae. Salvis nobis amerciamentis inde provenientibus.

The Justices of Nisi Prius(t) 1.2278 were first instituted by the Statute of Westm.* 1.2279 2. and their Authority is annexed to the Justices of Assize. These Justices were instituted for two principal Causes, for the ease of Jurors, and for the speedy exhibiting of Ju∣stice.

SECT. 8. Justices of Oyer and Terminer.

AS to the Justices of Oyer and Terminer, they are appointed either by(u) 1.2280 general or special Commission. By general Commission they are to enquire of Treasons, Mis∣prisions of Treason, Insurrections, Rebellions, Murders, Felo∣nies, Manslaughter,(w) 1.2281 Killing, Burglaries, Rapes of Women, unlawful Assemblies, Conventicles,(x) 1.2282 false News, Combinations, Misprision, Confederacies, false Allegations, Riots, Routs, Retainings, Escapes, Contempts, Falsities, Negligences, Con∣cealments, Maintenances, Oppressions, Combinations(y) 1.2283 of Par∣ties, Deceits, and other ill Deeds, Offences and Injuries what∣ever, and to do thereupon what appertains to Justice, accord∣ing to the Law and Custom of the Kingdom.

Special Commissions were not granted, unless for enormous(z) 1.2284 Transgressions, where there was a necessity of speedy Re∣medy: In some cases we find the Justices of Oyer and Terminer have upon an Indictment found, proceeded the same day a∣gainst the Party indicted. So Thomas () Marks, Bishop of Carlisle, before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, was In∣dicted, tryed, and adjudged all in one day for High-Treason. Likewise Sir Richard Empson was indicted of High-Treason, and tried all in one day. So Robert Bell, 10 Dec. 3 E. 6. and 10 Eliz. 4 Aug. John Felton was before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer in London, indicted of High-Treason, and tried the same day, by the advice of all the Judges of England.

SECT. 9. Of the Kings Erection of Courts.

IN some Cases the King may erect new Courts of Justice,* 1.2285 and grant Conusance of Pleas to a Corporation, to be kept after the Rules of the Law, not in a way of a Court of Equity but may not alter the great Courts at Westminster, that have been time out of mind, nor erect a new Court of Chancery, Kings-Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, &c.

Although in a proper Court, such as our Chancery, a Judge of Equity be allowed, yet if it were permitted in all other Courts, to expound the Law against the letter, and perhaps the meaning of the Makers, according to Conscience, as we speak, there would soon be introduced absoluteness and Ar∣bitrary Power.

Therefore great Care is taken by those that understand the Law, that matters be not left to the discretion of any Persons Commissionated by the King to adjudge of any Causes. So the plausible Statute(b) 1.2286 of H. 7. to put in Execution the Penal Laws, impowering Justices of Assize and of Peace, upon Information for the King, by their Discretion to hear and deter∣mine all Offences, and Contempts against any Statute unrepeal∣ed, was found to have Authorised Empson and Dudly to com∣mit upon the Subject unsufferable pressures and oppressions. So that(c) 1.2287 soon after that Kings death it was repealed, and those two brought to Tryal, and executed for their oppressions. So the Statute(d) 1.2288 8 E. 4. of Liveries, &c. by the discretion of the Judges to stand as an Original is deservedly repealed. In the Commission of Sewers by Law(e) 1.2289 3 H. 8. allowing the Commis∣sioners to make Orders, &c. according to their Judgments, and Discretions; the word Discretion is interpreted by Lawyers, to discern by Law what is Just; as appears when a Jury do doubt of the Law, and desire to do what is Just, they find the special matter, and the entry is, Et super tota materia petunt advisamentum & discretionem Justiciariorum; that is, they de∣sire that the Judges would discern by Law what is Just, and give Judgment accordingly.

It was resolved in the Court of Common-Pleas (when a new Court was(f) 1.2290 erected, 31 H. 8. to hear and determine accord∣ing to Law and Custom, or otherwise to their sound discretion) That the last Clause was against Law. For when Laws are writ and published, Magistrates know what to command, and the People to obey; otherwise the Law must necessarily be er∣rant, wandring, uncertain, and unknown; which is a(g) 1.2291 mise∣rable, yea, the most miserable Slavery.

This was the ground of the taking away the most August and very Ancient Court of the Star-Chamber;* 1.2292 though appoin∣ted by Act of Parliament,(h) 1.2293 and consisting of very great Per∣sonages, as the Lord Chancellor, Lord President of the Coun∣cil, Lord Privy-Seal, Bishops, Lords, and Justices. For (tho' there were other Reasons that moved the Houses to be so pres∣sing to get that Act pass) the grounds of its Repeal alledged in the(i) 1.2294 Preamble of the Act, are, That the Judges have not kept themselves to the points limited by the Statutes, and have undertaken to punish where no Law doth warrant, and to make Decrees for things having no such Authority, and have inflicted heavier punishments than by Law warranted; and that all matters Examinable and Determinable before them, had their proper Remedy, Redress, and Punishment by Common Law, and in the ordinary Courts of Justice elsewhere. In the like manner, and on the same reason were the Court of Re∣quest(k) 1.2295, before the(l) 1.2296 President of the Marches of Wales, of the President and Council in(m) 1.2297 the North, and of the County-Palatine(o) 1.2298 of Chester, either totally abolished or much eclipsed.

Having thus far discoursed of the several standing Courts, I think it necessary to give an account of the Oath the Judges of either Bench are enjoyned to take; having before spoke of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and Barons of the Exche∣quers Oath.

SECT. 10. Of the Judges Oath.

COncerning this Oath, there is a Controversie betwixt Mr.(p) 1.2299 Prynne and Sir Edward Coke, the latter affirming it to be in our Printed Statutes, but not upon Record; which Mr. Prynne disproves thus, That the Oath of the Judges, Barons of the Exchequer, and Justices Itinerant, and the Ordinances annexed to the Oath were made by the King (because of di∣vers complaints to him) by the assent of the great men, and other wise men of his Council, and commanded to be openly published by the Sheriffs of every County, by(q) 1.2300 special Writs issued to them, for the Reasons specified in the beginning and close of the Writs, at least three Months before the Parliament was held that Year; and they are all entred upon Record (as they are Printed in the Statute Books at large)(r) 1.2301 20 E. 3. in the Clause-Rolls, but not in the Parliament or Statute-Rolls of that Year, because not made in, but before the Parlia∣ment. From whence I note a good Argument of the Kings Pre∣rogative in appointing Judges, and Commissionating them himself, without any Parliamentary concurrence, since he ap∣points the very Oath which was to direct them in their Office out of Parliament.

We find the Commons so well pleased with this Oath, that in the(s) 1.2302 Parliament 20 E. 3. they petitioned the King, that the Justices of Assise and Enquiry might be sworn by the same Oath as the Justice of the Bench,* 1.2303 and that the chief of them might have power to swear the rest: which the King assented to with some Qualifications: but when in the Twenty first of his Reign, they petitioned that his other Ministers might take the Oath, and might be sworn to take nothing from any other; the King answered, that he would advise what other Ministers shall be fit to take the Oath.

Mr. Prynne refers us to the Cl. 18 H. 3. m. 19. Cl. 35 E. 1. m. 7. Cl. 1 E. 2. m. 19. and Cl. 5 E. 3. m. 27. for some Clauses of the Oaths of Justices, agreeing with those prescribed to the Kings Council. But the Oath as it hath been after used, is to this purpose:

That they shall swear well and lawfully to serve our Lord the King, and his People in the Office of Justice, and lawfully counsel the King in his Business; not counsel or assent to any thing, which may turn him in damage, or disherison, by any manner, way, or colour, and shall not know of any such

thing, but cause the King to be warned thereof by themselves, or others; shall do equal Justice, and Execution of Right to all the Subjects, and take neither by themselves nor others, privily, or apertly, Gift or Reward, of Gold or Silver, nor of any thing which may turn to their profit, unless it be Meat or Drink, and that of a small value, of any man that shall have any Plea, or Process hanging before them, &c. shall take no Fee as long as they are Justices, nor Robes of any man great or small, but of the King; give no Advice to any man, great or small, where the King is Party.

If any, of what condition soever come before them in their Sessions, with force and Arms, or otherwise against the Peace, or against the Statute thereof made, to disturb the exe∣cution of the Common Law, or to menace the People, that they may not pursue the Law: That they cause their Bodies to be Arrested, and put in Prison; and if they cannot be Arrest∣ed, that the King be certified: That they themselves, nor others maintain no Plea, or Quarrel hanging in the Kings Court, or elsewhere in the Country: That they deny to no man Common Right by the Kings Letter, nor none other mans, nor for none other Cause; and in case any other Letters come to them contrary to the Law, they do nothing by such Letters, but certifie the King thereof, and proceed to execute the Law, notwithstanding any such Letters: That they shall procure the profit of the King, and of his Crown, and if in default, shall be at the Kings Will, of Body, Lands, and Goods, thereof to be done as shall please him.

There is in this Oath as great Security taken,* 1.2304 as morally can be, that the Judges perform their Office uprightly, and judge according to the Law; and if this will not make them wary how they give Judgment contrary to Law, there are other Con∣straints upon them: As, first, That the King may displace them when he pleases, they holding their Places only durante bene∣placito. Secondly, The House of Commons may question them for any false Judgment and Miscarriage in their Office; which must be a great Check and deterring of them from giving any unjust Judgment, either for Lucre-sake by Bribes, or Partiality of Affection.

There are, besides others, two illustrious Examples of punish∣ment of Corrupt Judges, the one of Sir William Thorp,(t) 1.2305 con∣demned for breach of his Oath in taking Bribes.* 1.2306 He was In∣dicted before the Earls of Arundel, Warwick, and Huntingdon, the Lord Gray, and Lord Burghers, 24 E. 3. and the Record saith, Ideo consideratum per dictos Justiciarios assignatos, ad judi∣candum secundum voluntatem Regis, & secundum Regale posse suum; because he broke the Oath which he took to the King, and so was adjudged to be hanged. The(u) 1.2307 Record of this Judgment was brought into the Parliament 25 E. 3. (the King having by a Writ under the Privy-Seal stayed his Execution) and it was read ope•• before the Lords and all the Lords

affirmed the Judgment to be good, provided this Judgment should not be drawn into example against any other Officers who should break their Oaths, but(z) 1.2308 only those that took the said Oath of Justices and broke it; such to whom the Royal Laws of England are committed.

The other is the Famous Sir Francis Bacon Lord St. Albans, who being Lord Chancellor was found guilty of taking Bribes by his Servants; whom though many (for his great Learn∣ing) would acquit, as leaving too much to his Servants, yet he fell an illustrious example of Justice against the highest Judges: and in the forecited Record against Sir William Thorp, it is apparent that the Lords (who in those days were the sole Judges in Parliament) thought no persons breach of Oath was capi∣tally to be punished but only the Justices.

Before I come to speak to some of the long Parliaments wri∣ting Champions misapplication of the Kings Power in his Courts, I think it expedient to give some Characters I have met withall of the qualifications of Judges.

In a Speech made to Justice(a) 1.2309 Manwood, when he was cho∣sen Lord Chief Baron, the Chancellor tells him, There are four things requisite in a Judge: First, His knowledge of the Law, which is presumed every one hath that the King appoints to be his Justiciary. Secondly, Discretion, that though in his Judg∣ment he may vary from the letter of the Law, yet he may never judge contrary to the intention of it, which is Animus Legis. Thirdly, Integrity, for it were better to have a Judge of con∣venient learning and discretion, that would command and rule his Affection and Judgment, than one of excellent know∣ledge and discretion, that will submit the same to his corrupt Affections. Fourthly, Care and diligence. For if a judge be furnished with all the preceeding qualifications; yet if he be slothful, and do not expedite his Judgment, all the former serve to little purpose, for qui di•• distulit, di•• noluit.

My Lord St.Albans(b) 1.2310 (though he fell, as before I have noted, under great censure) yet in his Essays tells us that a Judge's Office is Jus dicere, non Jus dare, that they ought to be more wise than witty, more reverend than plausible, more advised than confident; and above all things that Integrity was their Portion and proper Vertue; The unjust Judge being a Capital remover of Land-marks: Injustice making Judgment bitter, and delay sowre.

Another famous(c) 1.2311 Chancellor (whose unexpected exile, after he was raised to the happiest Estate of a Subject, may teach all to judge no State of Felicity assured upon Earth) tells us that Judges are presumed by Education to be fitted for the under∣standing of the Laws, and by their Oaths bound to judge ac∣cording to Right, and so must be the most competent to ex∣plain the difficulties of the Law; which no Soveraign, as Sove∣raign, can be presumed to understand and comprehend; and that the judgments and decisions, those Judges make, are

the Judgment of the Soveraign, who hath not qualified them, but Authoritatively appointed them to judge in his stead, and are to pronounce their Sentence according to the reason of the Law, not the reason, or will rather he means, of the Soveraign. But now I proceed to other matters.

The Long Parliament impeached all the Judges that had voted the legality of Ship-mony,* 1.2312 as also brought to their Bar the Lord Chancellor, that thereby they might strike a greater terror on the Kings Loyal Subjects, especially in the House, to make them comply with them: and though they would have had the Power of nominating and removing the Judges, and have rent that branch of his Royal Prerogative from him; yet they not trusting, if they effected this, that it would do them any service (when they had put in such Judges as they liked) if the King might still Commissionate them according to old form pro beneplacito: Therefore they pressed hard,* 1.2313 that every Judge should continue quamdiu se bene gesserit; which I only note, to show they were desirous to new model the whole Govern∣ment.

As the long Parliament of 1641. by their dissolving of Church-Government, gave birth to varieties of Opinions,* 1.2314 Schisms, and Heresies in Religion; so by their design of un∣loosening mens Obligation to the Monarchy, they were forced to make use of many false Inferences and Judgments, of the known Laws: Amongst which one was, when they were beaten off from the several pretences of having some Para∣mount Power over the King, whereby he stood obliged to resign his reason to their Votes; they alledged that since the King could not reverse a Judgment given in an inferior Court, a fortiori, he could not frustrate their Votes, being the Supreme Court as well as Council.

In Answer to which it is to be considered,* 1.2315 that in other Courts the Judges sustain the Person of the King, the Law is deposited in the hands of the King, and all Justice is ad∣ministred by him, and in his name: so that his consent is by Law involved in what by Law they do. Authoritas rei indi∣catae vim legis habet. So that can be no Appeal from the King to himself; the King delegates his Power to them, & quod Rex facit per Officiarios, per se facere videtur, they give Judg∣ment for the King not for themselves; to that the Laws Authorize them and none but them: so that the Kings assent or dissent cannot frustrate their Judgment, which they ren∣der in invitos, against the will of one of the Parties at least, because expedit Reipublicae ut finis sit datus. Therefore as to the Power of declaring Law, the King is restrained ordinarily to the Mediation of the Judges, who are to give the genuine sence, and Interpretation of the Law, according to Art, and rules of science; and so by their Interpretation and Judgment therein, they bind both King and Subject.

Yet in some(d) 1.2316 cases the Judge do not only consult among themselves,* 1.2317 to determine a doubtful case, but must have recourse to the King as the Fountain of Justice: so(e) 1.2318 si disputa∣tio oriatur, & Justiciarii non possunt interpretari, sed in dubiis & obscuris Domini Regis expectanda est Interpretatio, & voluntas, cum ejus est Interpretari cujus est condere.

It is, saith Sir Thomas Smith,(f) 1.2319 to be taken for a Prin∣ciple, that the Life and Member of an English man is in the Power only of the Prince, and his Laws: so that when any of his Subjects is spoiled either of life, or limb, the Prince is endammaged thereby, and hath good cause to ask account how his Subjects should come to that mischief; and forasmuch as the Prince, who governeth the Scepter, and holdeth the Crown of England, hath this in his care and charge, to see the Realm well governed, the Life, Member, and Possessions of his Subjects kept in peace, and assurance; he that by vio∣lence shall attempt to break that Peace, and assurance, hath forfeited against the Scepter and Crown of England.

So that from hence it appears how equal and just it is that the King should have the appointment of Judges, Ju∣stices of Peace,* 1.2320 &c. that neither his Peace should be broken, his Subjects injured in their Persons, or Estates, nor his Laws be violated.* 1.2321 There being sufficient Provision in the Law against the violating of Justice by the Judges who are to observe these following statutes. 1. Magna Charta, That no Freeman shall be taken or Imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or liberty, or Customs, or be Out-lawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed: That the King(g) 1.2322 will not pass upon him or condemn him but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land: and by another, 5 E. 3. That no man shall be Attached by any Accusation, nor fore∣judged of Life or Limb, nor his Lands, Tenements, Goods, nor Chattles seized into the Kings hands against the form of the Great Charter, and the Law of the Land: and 25 Ed. 3(h) 1.2323 That none shall be taken by Petition, or Suggestion, made to the King, or to his Council, unless by Indictment or Pre∣sentment of good and lawful People of the same Neighbour∣hood, where such deed be done in due manner, or by Pro∣cess made by writ original at the Common Law: and so by(i) 1.2324 another, That no man, of what State and Condition soever he be, shall be put out of his Lands or Tenements, nor taken, nor Imprisoned, nor disinherited, without being brought to answer by due Process of Law: and in another,(k) 1.2325 That no man be put to answer without Presentment before Justices, or matter of Record, or by due Process or Writ original, according to the old Law of the Land.

But I must leave this to the Learned in our Municipal Laws, and shall note some few things from old Authors that may dis∣cover how much just Judgment hath ever been valued.

The impartiality, and yet the tenderness and compassion in

inflicting Punishment, is notorious in Zeleucus,* 1.2326 who while he governed the Locrians, made a Law, That whoever committed Adultery, should have both his Eyes put out; and his Son be∣ing found guilty, he commanded the Law to be put in Execu∣tion: and the body of the Citizens interceding, he ordered one of his Sons Eyes to be put out, and likewise one of his own, that the Law might not be broken, and yet that he might not be over rigid to his Son.

The(l) 1.2327 Orator tells us, That Justice should neither be warped by Favour, nor broken by Power, nor adulterated by Money; and in another place(m) 1.2328 saith, That he puts off the person of a Judge, who assumes that of a friend. He indeed is an upright Judge in whose hand the Ballance of Justice neither totters nor falls, by the Authority of any Person. Talis debet esse Juris minister, ut in ejus manu nullius authoritate per∣sonae, titubet aut vacillet librae Justitiae.

Besides the avoiding of Partiality,* 1.2329 it is necessary in every Judge, that he fully examine what is brought before him, and not with too great Precipitancy determine matters upon(n) 1.2330 the hearing only of one side: for though he may chance to do Justice in such a Case; yet he doth not do justly, that fully hears not both Parties Allegations.

It is a very mischievous things, when Judges delay the Exe∣cuting of Justice.(o) 1.2331 Causinus, out of the Chronicles of A∣lexandria tells us, That Juvenalis a Widow, complaining to Theodorick King of the Goths and Romans, that a Suit of hers in Court, was drawn out for the space of three Years: Theodorick called the Judges before him, and acquainted them with the Complaint, and commanded them to do her speedy Ju∣stice, which within two days they did; and being again called by the King, he asked them how it came to pass that they had dispatched that in two days, which had not been done in three Years. They answered, that His Majestie's Recommendation had made them finish it so soon. To whom the King replied, That when he put them into Office, he consigned all Pleas to them, and other Proceedings; and since they had spun out the Business for three Years, that required but two days dispatch, they should die, and at that Instant commanded their Heads to be smitten off.* 1.2332

We find in Sir Edward Coke(p) 1.2333 a Court for redress of De∣lays of Judgment, in the Kings Great Courts, raised by Statute, 14 E. 3. whereby one Prelate, two Earls, and two Barons, the Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, the Justices of both the Benches, and other of the Kings Council have Power to call before them the Tenor of Records, and Processes of such Judgments so delayed, and to proceed to take a good accord and Judgment, and so remand all to the Justices before whom the Plea did depend.

He likewise(q) 1.2334 tells us, That by the Common-Law, it is requi∣red, that both plena & celeris Justitia fiat, and all Writs of Praecipe quod reddat, are quod juste, & sine dilatione reddat, &c, and that

there did, and yet doth lye a Writ, de pracedendo ad Judicium, when the Justices or Judges of any Court of Record, or not of Record, delayed the Party, Plaintiff, or Defendant, Justice; and in Case the Prelate, the two Earls, two Barons, the Chan∣cellor, Treasurer, &c. may not for the Difficulty, determine it, then to bring it to the next Parliament, there to have a fi∣nal accord.

From this whole Discourse I hope it is apparent, that as our Kings authorize the Justices to do right to every one, according to the Laws and Customs of England; so the Judges cannot well fail of performing it. Before I end this Chapter, I can∣not omit the inserting of some of the Expressions that I find in the Saxon Laws, whereby the desire those Kings had that equal Justice, should be administred, is very manifest. The eighth Law of King Ina inflicts a mulct of thirty Shillings up∣on every(r) 1.2335 Shireman or other Judge, that grants not Justice to him that requires it, and besides that, within a Week he af∣ford him right; in Saxon thus, & binnan seoffon nihte gedo hine rihtes wrythe.

The first of the secular Laws of King Edgar, runs thus: That every one enjoy the Benefit of right Judgment (whether he be Poor or Rich) but in exacting of Punishments, let there be that Mode∣ration, that they may be attempered to Divine Clemency, and may be tolerable to Men. The Saxon runs thus, That ole màn sy folc rihtes wyrth. (ge earm geeadig) and him mon righte Domas deme. & sy on thaerebote swylec forgyffenysse, swylec hit fore God ge beorglice sy, and for weoruld aberendlic.

The third Law of the same King is, that the Judg who shall pass false Judgment on any, shall pay the King a Hundred and twenty Shillings, unless he confirm it by Oath, that he did it by Error and Ignorance, not for Malice. However he shall be re∣moved(s) 1.2336 out of his place, unless he obtain the same again of the King. By which it further appears, that in those days the King removed and placed Judges at his Pleasure.

The first of the secular Laws of King Canutus runs thus:

First I will that Man(t) 1.2337 set up right Laws, and unjust Laws be suppressed, and that every one according to his Power, pluck up utterly by the Roots, all unrighteousness, and set up Gods Right, i. e. Divine Justice; and for the time to come, the Poor as well as the Rich enjoy right Judgment, and to both of(u) 1.2338 them right Dooms be deemed.

Then the next Law is for exhibiting Mercy in judgment, that even in Capital Matters, such moderation be used in imposing the mulct, that it be(w) 1.2339 attempered to divine Clemency, and be to be born by Men, and that he that judgeth, think in his Mind what he asks, when he saith in the Lords Prayer, and forgive us our Debts or Trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us: and he forbids that any Christian be put to Death for any small or contemptible cause; that for a(x) 1.2340 small mat∣ter they suffer not to perish, the work of Gods Hands, which he hath redeemed with a great price.

In the Eleventh Law we find that the King saith, That by all help and work it is to be endeavoured by what reason prin∣cipally he may gain Counsel that may(y) 1.2341 confirm such things as are for the profit of the Republick, and may confirm Christi∣an Piety, and may totally overthrow Injustice from hence, that Profit at last coming to the Kingdom, that Iniquity may be suppressed, and Justice may be set up in the Presence of God and Men.

I could add more, but I shall have occasion in the next Chap∣ter to mention something of this Subject, and shall only close with that Admonition of King James(z) 1.2342 the First to the Judges in the Star-Chamber, 1616. wherein he gave them in Charge to do Justice uprightly and indifferently without delay, with∣out Partiality, Fear, or Bribes, with stout and upright Hearts, with clean and uncorrupt Hands, and not to utter theirown Conceits, but the true meaning of the Law, not making Laws, but in∣terpreting the Law (and that according to the true Sence thereof, and after deliberate Consultation) remembring their Office is Jus dicere, not Jus dare.

CHAP. XXXIV. Of Justices of Peace, and their Sessions.

SIR Edward Coke(a) 1.2343 observes, that the Constitution of Justices of Peace is such a form of subordinate Govern∣ment, for the Tranquillity, and quiet of the Realm, as no part of the Christian World hath the like; which may be true in the particular Limitation of the Power.* 1.2344 But that in other Countries such like Officers have been appointed, particularly for the preservation of Peace, is evident in the ancient Laws of the Wisigothes,(b) 1.2345 compiled by Theodoricus their King, a∣bout the Year of our Lord, 437. which constituted Pacis As∣sertores, and appointed them Judges to hear and determine those causes, quas illis Regia deputaverit ordinandi Potestas. So in the Sicilian(c) 1.2346 Laws, compiled by the Emperor Frederick the Second, we find one Title, de cultu pacis, & generali pace in Regno servanda, and another, de(d) 1.2347 officio Justiciaratus; where the Title, Office, and Commission of the Justiciarii Regionum is at large recited, almost in Parallel terms, with ours at this Day.

The Capitularia Caroli(e) 1.2348 magnis, the Burgundian, Alman, Bavarian, Saxon, Longobard, Ripuarian, and Frisons Laws, mention such Officers, for preserving the publick Peace, and(f) 1.2349 punishing all Malefactors, and infringers of the publick Peace, as we have.

At the Common-Law, before Justices of Peace were made, there were sundry Persons, to whose Charge the maintenance of the Peace was recommended, and who with their other(g) 1.2350 Offi∣ces, had (and yet still have) the Conservation of the Peace an∣nexed to their Charge, as incident to, and inseparable from their said Offices: yet they were only stiled, and so now are, by their Offices; the Conservation of the Peace being in∣cluded therein.

First, the King is the principal(h) 1.2351 Conservator of the Peace within his Dominions,* 1.2352 and is properly Capitalis Justiciarius An∣gliae; in whose Hands at the beginning, the Administration of all Justice, and all Judicature in all Causes, first was, and afterwards by, and from him only was the Authority derived and given to all; yet the Power nevertheless remains still in himself, inso∣much that he may himself sit in Judgment, as in ancient times the Kings here have done, and may take Knowledg of all ca∣ses and causes.

Before I leave this Head, I cannot pass by the Act of(i) 1.2353 H. 7. wherein is so fully declared the King's Care, to have due Ad∣ministration of Justice, as in the close of the last Chapter I have only hinted.* 1.2354 The Preamble saith, The King considereth that a great part of the Wealth and Prosperity of the Land, standeth in that, that his Subjects may live in Surety, under his Peace, in their Bodies, and Goods, and that the Husbandry of this Land may encrease, and be upholden, which must be had by due Execution of Laws and Ordinances, and so commandeth the Ju∣stices to execute the tenor of their Commission, as they will stand in Love and Favour of his Grace, and in avoiding the pains that he ordained, if they do the contrary. If they be lett or hindred, they must show it to the King; which if they do not, and it come to the Kings knowledg, they shall be out of his Favour, as Men out of Credence, and put out of Commission for ever.

Moreover he chargeth and commandeth all manner of Men, as well Poor as Rich (which be to him all one in due Admini∣stration of Justice) that is hurt or grieved, (in any thing that the said Justice of Peace may hear, determine, or execute in any wise) that he so grieved make his complaint to the next Justice of Peace, and if he afford no remedy, then to the Justices of the Assise; and if he find no remedy there, then to the King, or Chancellor, &c. and as a further security it is added, And o∣ver that his Highness shall not lett, for any favour, affection, costs, charge, nor none other cause, but that he shall see his Laws to have plain and true execution, and his Subjects to live in secu∣rity of their Lands, Bodies and Goods, according to his said Laws.

Thus we see who is the Principal,* 1.2355 and Royal Conservator of the Peace: others are the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, Lord Treasurer, Lord High Steward of England, Earl Marshal, Lord High Constable of England, every Justice of the Kings Bench, and Master of the Rolls, who have the power included in

their Office, and over all the Realm, when they are present, may award Precepts, take Recognisances for the Peace; of which and others Lambard in his Eirenarche may be consul∣ted, and how far Justices of Assise, Stewards of the Sheriffs Turn, and Court of Pye-powders, the Sheriffs, Chief Constable, Coroners, and Petty Constables may commit to Ward break∣ers of the Peace in their view, though they cannot take surety at the request of any man, that being peculiar to the Justices of Peace's Office.

Sir Edward Coke(k) 1.2356 saith, that the first institution of Justices for the preserving the Peace, was 6 Ed. 1. but Mr. Prynne will have it of older date, because he finds that King Henry the Third by several Patents, or Writs from the 17th to the end of his Reign, did constitute and appoint several persons in most Counties of the Realm, to be Guardians and Preservers of the Peace of the Realm; and in the Patent 51 H. 3. m. 10.13. dorso, it is dilectis & fidelibus suis custodibus pacis Com. Linc. North. Ebor. & Vice∣com. eorundem Comitat. and the like 54 H. 3. m. 21. d.

But the first regular settlement of them seems to be Anno 1327. 1 Ed. 3. c. 16. The Authorities afterwards were fur∣ther explained 4 Ed. 3. c. 2. 18 Ed. 3. c. 2. 34 Ed. 3. c. 1.

Sir Edward Coke(l) 1.2357 tells us that the Commission of Peace stood over-burthened, and incumbered with divers Statutes, some whereof were before, and some since repealed, and stuf∣fed with many vain and unnecessary repetitions, and many o∣ther corruptions crept into it by mistaking of Clerks, &c. for amendment and correction whereof,(m) 1.2358 Sir Christopher Wray Chief Justice of England, assembled all the Judges of England, and upon perusal had of the former Commission of Peace, and due consideration had thereupon, and often conferences be∣twixt themselves, they resolved upon a reformation of the form, with divers additions and alterations, both in matter and method, as it stood in Sir Edward's time; and he saith, It needed another Reformation by reason of Statutes since repeal∣ed, and others expired; of which he gives several instances.

Therefore he saith, It is a good rule for all Judges, and Justices whatsoever, that have Jurisdiction by any Statute, which at the first was Temporary or for a time, to consider well before they give Judgment, Whether that Statute hath been continued or made perpetual; and if at first it was made perpetual, Whether it be not repealed or altered by any later Statute.

What Commissions, Patents and Writs were issued out by King Edward the First, for preserving the Peace of the Realm, suppressing, seising and punishing of those who disturbed it, may be found Cl. 9 Ed. 1. m. 10. d. in Rylies(n) 1.2359 Appendix, so there is a Patent 14 Ed. 1. m. 15. 15 Ed. 1. m. 13. de militibus constitutis ad Articulos in Statuto de conservatione pacis edito con∣tento•• observandos, constituting persons of note in every County to observe them, named in the Record: and so for other Kings

Reigns, in the Authors in the(o) 1.2360 Margent, the exact Abridgment of the Record of the Tower, Tit. Justices of Peace, and Prynne's Irenarchus Redivivus.

The constituting, and making of Justices of Peace, is in∣herent in, and inseparable from the Crown, as appears by the Statute 27 H. 8. c. 24.

(p) 1.2361Some are Justices by Act of Parliament, as the Archbishop of York, Bishop of Duresm, and Ely, and their Successors: others by the Kings Charters, as Mayors and other Officers of Corportion Towns.

Others are by Commission, which are properly Justices of Peace, to take care not so much of the publick Discipline, and correction of manners, as for the Peace, and security of the High-ways; they being at their Quarter-Sessions to hear and determine of Felons, Breakers of the Peace, Con∣tempts and Trespasses, to suppress Routs, and Tumults, restore possessions forceably entred, &c.

They(q) 1.2362 are elected out of the Nobility, Knights, Esquires, and Gentlemen, and such as be learned in the Laws, such and such number as the Prince shall think meet, and in whom for wisdom and discretion he putteth his trust, being mostly Inhabitants within the County, saving that some of the High Nobility,* 1.2363 and chief Magistrates for honour sake are put in all or most of the Commissions. Those have no time limited but by Commission from his Majesty, alterable at pleasure.* 1.2364 At first they were but four, after eight, and now thirty or forty in a Shire, either by increase of riches, learning, or activity in Policy and Government: more be∣ing found than anciently, who have either will or power, or both to do their King and Country service; and they are not too many to handle affairs of the Commonwealth, especially for the benefit of the Subject,* 1.2365 that they may have in all parts of the County, one or more, not very remote, to apply themselves to.* 1.2366 Each of them hath Authority, upon complaint to him made of any Theft, Robbery, Manslaughter, Murther, Violence, Complots, Routs, Riots, unlawful Games, forceable Entries, Excess in Apparel, Conventicles, evil order in Ale-houses, and Taverns, of Idle and Vagabond Persons, Masters and Servants not observing the Laws, Rapes, false Moneys, Extortions, or any such Disturbances of the Peace, quiet and good order of the Shire, to commit the Persons supposed to be Offenders to the Prison, and to charge the Constable or sheriff to bring them thither, and the Jaylor to neceive them till the next Quarter-Sessions when the Sheriff or his Under-Sheriff with his Bailiffs be to attend him,* 1.2367 where Informations are given in to them by Bill, which is shown to the Juries: and if they find just cause for the complaint, they find the Bill, and the Party is In∣dicted, and Tryed by a Jury of twelve men, at the Kings Suit; for the King is reckoned the one Party, and the Priso∣ner the other.

They are also to order the repair of Bridges, High-ways, the Poor, the lame Souldiers pensions, and do many things besides according to the Power given in their Commissions, which particularizeth all things they are to take Cognizance of; sometimes, upon suspicion of War, to take care for the order of the Shire, and sometimes to take Muster of Harness, and able men.

Once in a year or two the Prince with his Council,* 1.2368 saith a Manuscript I have seen, chuseth out certain Articles (out of Penal Laws made to repress the pride and evil rule of the People) and sends them down to the Justices, willing them to meet together, and consult among themselves, how to order the matter most wisely, and circumspectly; where∣by the People might be kept in good order and obedience according to Law: and they after a certain space meet, and certify the Prince, or his Privy-Council, how they do find the Shire in rule and order touching those points, and all other disorders.

There was never, saith Sir Thomas Smith(r) 1.2369, in any Com∣monwealth devised a more wise, a more dulce and gentle,* 1.2370 or more certain way to rule the People, whereby they are kept always as it were in a Bridle of good order, and sooner looked to, that they do not offend, than punished when they have offended: for seeing the chief Persons of Quality and Interest among them, have such charge and Authority given them by the King; and if occasion be, do commit, cause to be Indicted and punished, or sent to Prison for disobedience, Offenders against the Laws; It curbeth and terrifieth Offenders so, that it is a new Furbishing of the good Laws of the Realm, and a continual repressing of Disorders, which the Common sort of People are too prone to, if it were not for this impending lash, which every where is held over Criminals.

The Law it self, as registred and printed, is but a dumb and dead thing; the Ministers of the Law are those that give life to it: and for that end were Justices of the Peace Constituted, who being Gentlemen of Interest, and parts, are the fittest Instruments to see the Laws duly Executed,* 1.2371 which are Committed to their Charge: and it is greatly advan∣tagious to the Country, that at every Quarter-Sessions, in the face of the Country, one of the Justices of the Peace gives a charge to the Jurys; wherein, with learning and Judg∣ment, he acquaints them with the Excellency, Antiquity, and Utility of Monarchical Government, the usefulness of those Laws, Wise and Gracious Princes have granted to their Subjects, the excellent Composure, Contexture and Harmony in the Government, and many other particulars fit for them to know, as good Subjects and good Neighbours.

Having met with some Speeches made in Queen Elizabeth's time which relate either to Justices of the Peace, or the Exe∣cution

of Laws in general; I think it may not be unaccept∣able to the Reader to understand in what manner that Queen caused her Chancellor to quicken the execution of the Laws: Some touches of which follow.(s) 1.2372 By the Conservation of Peace and Concord, every Commonweal hath a perfect Foundation to begin, marvelous good course to increase, a strong Pillar to sustain it, and a strong Buckler to defend it. The plain and good order of each County consisteth in the well or evil Executing of Justice: for thereby either every man enjoyeth his own, and the whole Commonweal is in a calm and even Temper; or by remisness in Execution, the Free-Booters and Beasts of Prey are let loose to rob and despoil some, and affright the rest, and leave all in un∣security.

How can, saith he, Justice banish(t) 1.2373 Enormities when her Ministers are slothful, making no account of any of the Common Causes of their Country; and under the notion of being accounted quiet men, they seek only ease, profit, and pleasure to themselves, and to be sustained by other mens care and labour: whereas the Horse-Master provideth for the good Government of his Horse, Bits or Brakes, accord∣ing to the hardness or tenderness of his Mouth.

If (continues he) in the richest soil, the usefullest and delightfullest Flowers,* 1.2374 Shrubs and Fruits be planted, and no care be taken to weed out what would choak and over-grow them, what pleasure or benefit could be had of all ones cost and labour? a crop of weeds would soon such out all the nourishment from their roots, over-shadow them from the cherishing Sun, and smother the curious Plants: so that they would soon dye and wither. Therefore is there a great need of chusing able, careful and active Gardiners to howe and root out all such rank Weeds.

In another(u) 1.2375 Speech (after advising great care in chu∣sing Officers, as Justices of Peace, &c. that have the Execu∣tion of the Laws) he tells the noble Assembly, That sharp Laws should be made for banishing sloth and corruption,* 1.2376 and adviseth there should be through the Kingdom Biennial or Triennial Visitations of all the Temporal Officers and Mini∣sters, that ought to see to the Execution of the Law by Commission, to try the Offences of those that have not seen to the due Execution of the Laws, according to the Office and charge committed to them; as in Church-Visitations: and that a Roll should be kept,* 1.2377 wherein all the Justices names should be set down to every Offence he hath caused to be punished, that it might appear who is diligent; and that those that are negligent might be removed to their per∣petual Ignominy, and such pains set upon them as by Law may be. Another time(w) 1.2378 he urgeth, that it ought to be considered whether it be a greater Cruelty, to execute the Penal Laws, so as thereby a few shall be unwhipped, and

many hanged; or some shall be whipped, and thereby few hanged.

In another(x) 1.2379 I find this swasive, It would be strange to make Laws to reform manners, and prune away the ill branches, and Members of the Commonweal, and then to ••ye them in boxes and books; it were better to have no Laws, than them not Executed: for besides other incon∣veniences, it breeds contempt of Laws and Law-makers.

(y) 1.2380A Prince, continueth he, that is careful of the discharge of his great Office, leaveth nothing undone, meet for him to do, for the Execution of the Laws, making choice of Per∣sons of most Credit, and best understanding through the Kingdom, to whom for the great trust he reposeth in them, he giveth Authority by Commission to Execute a great part of the Law: Therefore the Burthen of all Enormities, Absurdi∣ties, and Mischiefs that grow in the Commonwealth, for the not executing of Laws, must needs light upon those Persons that have Authority to execute them: and if remisness be, if the Prince should be driven to commit the Execution of the Laws to those who in respect of Practice, and gain, would see them executed with all severity, what a burthen would that bring to the Realm?

In this manner Queen Elizabeth caused the Execution of her Laws to be recommended both to the Justice of Assize, and to the Members of Parliament, that at their recess they might take care to see them put in Execution. As a close to this Chapter, and an Introduction to the next, I shall give a short account of the Laws in the Saxons time, that were made by several Kings for the preservation of the Peace, and of how great value the due keeping of the Peace was. The Sixth Law of King Ina appoints, that he that fights in the Kings(z) 1.2381 Palace, shall lose all his Goods, and it shall be at the Kings pleasure whether he shall be Capitally punished, or not: it also ordains several Mulcts of Money for fighting in the(a) 1.2382 Church, in an Aldermans House, or the House of a(b) 1.2383 Country-man. And the next Law is against Theft, and in the 13th. against Thieves, and Robbers, from the number of Seven, if they be 35 they are counted a(c) 1.2384 Troop, if more an(d) 1.2385 Army; and so in the 26th. Law appoints a Reward for apprehending(e) 1.2386 a Thief: So in the 46th. Law, of the Peace violated in(f) 1.2387 a Town of the Kings, or a Bishops, 120 s. and so proportionable in the Town of an Alderman, of the Kings(g) 1.2388 Minister, or any Land-holders(h) 1.2389 Town.

So in the 15th. Law of King Alfred, 150 s. punishment is laid upon his that(i) 1.2390 fights in the presence of an Archbishop, and 100 if in the presence of a Bishop or alderman; and in the next against the stealing a Mare or Cow, the price, and 40 s. Mulct, and in the 26th. against(k) 1.2391 Man-slaying in Companies, to pay the price of his Head, and all present 30 s. a piece; and in the 35th. against breaking the Peace in a Town as be∣fore.

fore. The 38th. Chapter is long, That no Man assault his Ene∣my in his House till he hath(l) 1.2392 demanded right of him, which if he deny he may besiege him seven Days, but not(m) 1.2393 assault the House; and if he yield, he must keep him Thirty Days, and then restore him to his Friends. This care was taken to pre\vent Bloodshed. There are many particulars besides, worth observing in this, as well ad the 40th. Chapter(n) 1.2394 against wounding.

I shall speak of that of King Edward hereafter.

The first Law of King Aethelstan is against Theft, that is ma∣nifest, where the(o) 1.2395 and so of other particulars worth reading.

The Third Law of King Edmund prohibits any Man-killer to come into the Prince's presence, altho' his Servant, till he have made satisfaction(p) 1.2396 for the Crime, as it is appointed him by the Bishop, and he makes Seven particular Laws together a∣gainst Man-killing; those that assault other in Towns, holy pla∣ces, &c. and the several punishments prefacing these Laws thus, That to him, and the Clergy and Laity met, it seemed most profitable, that love and mutual benevolence, through his whole Dominion should be cherished; for it was(q) 1.2397 irksom to them all that there should be unjust fighting among Christians; and begins the Seventh Law thus, It is the part(r) 1.2398 of the pru∣dent to extinguish Capital Enmities.

For the better preservation of Peace, King Aethelred appoin∣ted that every(s) 1.2399 Freeman have sureties that if he be called in question for any Crime, these Sureties may do justice to each one, that is satisfie for the offender, the Title of which is, Be Borgum. In the Law, the duty of these Sureties is described at large; and it appears by other Laws in after times, that Nine Men were bound for every Tenth Man.

Whoever desires further satisfaction in this particular, may consult the 19th. Law of Canutus, wherein he appoints(t) 1.2400, that every Free-man enter himself into an Hundred, or into the Collegueship of the Ten. In other matters of preserving Peace, they may consult the Second, the Eighth, and Twelfth Laws of the same Canutus; the which Eighth Law is thus expressed, Peace is so to be considered, as that nothing can be more de∣sirable that it to the Inhabitants, and nothing more contrarily is offensive as Thieves, which in the Saxon is thus, Swa ymbe fry∣thesbote. Swathan bundan si selost & tham Theoffon sy lathost, & swa ymb Heosbote.

Having met with a passage in the Laws of King(u) 1.2401 Ethelstan, which both illustrates the Care of the King, to have the Peace preserved; and likewise shews the readiness (according to their duty) of the Subjects to assist the King with their Persons and E∣states: I thought it not amiss to insert it as a Close to this Chapter, and an Introduction to the next.

The words (as to be rendred from the Saxon, and the Latin Version of Mr. Lambard) run thus, I Aethelstan King, do to all

clearly signifie [Cyth] that I have diligently enquired the Cause wherefore our(w) 1.2402 Peace was not kept as I desired, and at Grantelee it was appointed; and I received this Answer from(a) 1.2403 my Wise Men, that it happened by my(b) 1.2404 forbearance; i.e. too much lenity in not punishing now of late, when I staid at Exceter in the(c) 1.2405 Feast of the Nativity of our Lord, attended by my Wise Men, I found(d) 1.2406 them •• most ready themselves, with their Heirs, with their Wives and all their Estates, to go thither, whither I will, and will purge out, or expel those Outlaws, i. e. breakers of the Peace, that are against this, in such order, or with such wisdom and consideration, that they never after come on the Earth again, i.e. that they be banished. The Saxon of the latter part is thus, Bretan hi offer this geswi∣can willan, on tha gerade the heo naefre aest on sorda ne cumen; which Mr. Lambard translates thus, Ʋt isti tandem pacis violato∣res Regno hand unquam redituri pellerentur.

Then it further is added, And if these Men(e) 1.2407 hereafter in these Lands be met with, or found, that they shall be so guilty as they are that are found hand having; that is Stealing; which Mr. Lambard renders, Ac si eorum aliquis postea in Regno deprehenderetur, pariter ac qui est in furto manifeste deprehensus plecteretur.

From all which we may observe, That the Counsel of the Witan, Nobles, and Wise Men, was at one of the times the King kept them in course: viz. at Christmas, called here Mid-winter. Secondly, That the King asks the Members of the Council their advice. Thirdly, They tell him, that it happened, that his Peace was not kept, because of his forbearance in not put∣ting the Laws in Execution, that were established at Grantelee. From whence we may observe, that the King was to put these in Execution, and that his Remisness, Clemency, or Indul∣gence increased the numbers of the breakers of the Peace. Fourthly, That for the suppressing of these breakers of the Peace, the Nobles who met in Council at Exceter, promi••e they will be in readiness provided, themselves and their who••e Families, and all things they have, to faerenne, that is, from faer, to go forth in Expedition Armed, as the King will ap∣point; the signification of which word I have found in several Letters about the Wars betwixt England and Scotland in Henry the Eighth's and Edward the Sixth's time, where when any considerable party of the Scots made an inrode into England, to seize upon Men, burn Towns, or Houses, or carry away Cattel, it was called running a Forray. Fifthly, We may note, that this shews that the Militia of the Subjects was at the Kings disposal to go whither then the King will; which saves me a labour in the following Chapter to deduce the Kings Power over the Militia higher, though I doubt not but a little looking into the Saxon Laws would afford me more Precedents, as the Fifty ninth Law of William the(f) 1.2408 Conqueror doth expresly; as before I have touched on another occasion, but here think

fit to recite it at length, viz. The King appoints, and firmly commands all the Free-men of his Kingdom, that they be sworn Brothers, to their Power to defend, and manfully to keep his Monarchy, and his Kingdom according to their might and Estates against Enemies, and to observe or maintain the Peace and Dignity of his Crown entire; and without delay, without deceit to do right Judgment and Justice constantly, all man∣ner of ways, according to their Power. So that here we find these liberi Homines, Conservators of the Peace also, which I sup∣pose was incumbent on them, as well as they were Lords of Mannors, where they had their Courts, as likewise they were Hundredaries, &c.

CHAP. XXXV. Of the Kings Soveraignty in making War and Peace.

THE great(a) 1.2409 Philosopher observes, That in a Common∣wealth, that part is most powerful in which the strength of War consists, and which is in possession of Arms; for those, he saith, that have no Arms, are the Servants of the Armed.

Plato(b) 1.2410 affirms it as a standing Law, That he, who with∣out Authority, innovates a Peace, or makes War, shall be ad∣judged to punishment; and gives this reason for it, That he who hath in his Hand the Militia, it is in his Power that the Commonwealth subsist, or be dissolved.

Bodin makes this one of the greatest badges of Soveraignty; because, without the power of declaring War, and making Peace, no Prince can defend himself or his Subjects, the Esta∣blishment, or Destructon of the States depending upon it: therefore it is Capital to do the least thing in that kind with∣out the Kings Commission. There being nothing more dange∣rous in War, than to betray Counsels, it is not fit the order∣ing of War, and consequently of Peace, should be in any but the Soveraign.

In the Greek and(c) 1.2411 Latin Histories it appears, that all Wars were undertaken, and performed by the Counsel, Will, and Pleasure of the Soveraign, whether Senate, or Emperor, and by them solely was decreed, unless in some extraordinary Cases, that the Peoples consent was required in comitiis Populi centuriatis; and when the Republick was changed by the Juli∣an Law, it was Treason to make War without the Command of the Prince; the words of the Law being, Nulli, nobis insciis, atque inconsultis, quorumlibet armorum movendorum copia tribue∣tur.

The reasons why this Power should be in the Soveraign sole∣ly, are many, and just; for without it no Prince can provide

against intestine Seditions. For if he wanted that Authority,* 1.2412 as often as Ambitious or Seditious Men perswade the People they were in danger of Oppression by the Government, or they had a mind to remove great Officers that they might enjoy their places, or that the Rule in Church or State did not please them; They might resort to Arms, to the ruining of their fol∣low Subjects, who would otherwise live peaceably and dutiful∣ly. By this liberty, greatest Convulsions would be in the King∣dom upon every predominancy of ill humours, and we should never be without the Plague of War in one place or other, and all the miseries of a torn, dis-joynted and mangled confusion would be upon us; neither should a Prince be able to defend his Subjects from Foreign Invasions, or perform that great and necessary Work of assisting the Allies to his State, and Te for∣midable to his Enemies.

Polybius(d) 1.2413 notes, That there are two things which preserve Government, viz. Fortitude against Enemies, and Concor•••••• home; but neither of these can be performed, if the Prince have not the disposal of the Militia. This is it which preserves the Kings Authority, makes his Laws to be observed, keeps the Factious and Seditious at quiet, gives repute abroad, and Peace at home.

All the Calamities of War are prevented, when an Armed Prince, that hath the sole disposal of his Military Power, can extinguish the Flame at its first blaze; therefore St.(e) 1.2414 Austin saith, That the natural order of Mortals, accommodated to Peace, requires this, That the Authority and Counsel of ma∣king War be in the Prince.

That in the time of the Saxon Kings, the Power of the Mi∣litia was in the Crown, doth not obscurely appear in all the Laws for preserving the Peace, and in that particularly I have instanced in of King Aethelstan; besides which, we find the Tenth Law of King Canutus ordained, That Fenced Towns,* 1.2415 or Burghs and Bridges be repaired, and there be preparations for defence both of Land and Sea-Forces, so often as the ne∣cessity of the Commonweal requires it.

The 69th. Chapter of Hereots runs thus, Every Earl to pay Eight Horses, whereof four with Saddles, and four without Saddles; four Helmets, and so many Coats of Mail, eight Spears and eight Shields, four Swords, and twelve Mancusae of Gold: and a principal Thane, half the number, and other Thanes a lesser proportion, as may be there seen: By which there seemeth some beginning of a Feudal Tenure, which in William the Conqueror's time was so settled, that (as elsewhere I have noted) all Persons held of him their Lands in Knights Service, to be ready at his pleasure with Horse, Men, and Arms; the which was practised in succeeding Ages.

The Statute 30. Octob. 7 E. 1. saith, That it being accorded of late, that in our next Parliament, Provision should be made, that in all Parliaments, Treaties, and other Assemblies which

should be made in the Realm of England for ever, that every man shall come without all Forces, and Armors, peaceably to the Honour of us, and the Peace of us and our Realm. Now all Prelates, Earls, &c. have said, that to us it belongeth, and our part is through our Royal Signiory to* 1.2416 defend force of Arms, and all other force against our Peace at all times, when it shall please us; and to punish them which shall do contrary, according to our Laws, and usages of our Realm: and here∣unto they are bound to aid us their Soveraign Lord at all seasons.

In 3 Ed. 3.(f) 1.2417 the Commons decline the having Cogni∣zance of such matters, as guarding the Seas, and Marches of England, but refer it wholly to the King; and 25 E. 3. it is High Treason to levy War against the King, or aid them that do it. Also the Statute of(g) 1.2418 H. 7. saith, Every Subject by duty of his Allegiance is to serve and assist his Prince and Soveraign Lord, at all seasons when need shall require.

There is nothing more indisputably owned by all that under∣stand the Laws, than that it was High Treason by the Common Law, before the Statute of 25 E. 3. for any Subject to levy War within the Realm, without Authority from the King; it being one of the Rights of Majesty, Badges of Supreme Power, and incommunicable Prerogatives of the Crown, saith my Lord* 1.2419 Coke, and with him consent all the long Robe.

In a Speech in the Star-Chamber to the Justices in Queen Elizabeth's time, the Chancellor tells them that the Queen had levied Forces, and Reason willeth, and the obedience of good Subjects requireth, that all things that the Prince commandeth for defence of the State, should by the Subjects diligently, and obediently be performed for dutys sake, either not exami∣ning the cause, or presuming the best cause; but at that time she was pleased to signifie the cause of her doings.

As to the King of England's making War, and Peace abroad, it hath always been owned as the King's sole Prerogative; and when some Parliaments have addressed to our Kings, to make War or Peace, contrary to what the Soveraign judged con∣venient, they have been advertised of their Duties: yet when War is to be made in remote Countries, which cannot be per∣formed without great Expence, much time, and the exhausting of the Kingdoms Forces, That the People may more chearful∣ly serve their Prince and Country, and that the Exchequer may not be too much diminished, whereby the usual Charges of the Government may not be substracted; Kings have upon good Reason, proposed the Matter to their Parliaments, where∣by necessary Aids might be sufficiently supplied.

The Laws now in force concerning the Militia, are, That the(k) 1.2420 King hath the Prerogative alone, to dispose of the Militia of the Nation, to make War and Peace, Leagues and Truces, to grant Safe-Conduct, without the Parliament; and he may issue out Commissions of Lieutenancy, impowering them

to form into Regiments, to lead them, and employ them as well within their own, as other Countries, as the King shall direct, to suppress Insurrections, Rebellions, and Invasions.

He hath the Command of all the Forts, and places of Strength, and alone to have the keeping and Command of the Magazins of Arms, he alone to give Letters of Mark and Reprizal, in times of War, to give Safe-Conduct for Merchants, to make a stop of Trades as he sees cause. In the time of danger, and for defence of the(l) 1.2421 Realm, may command all his Subjects to Arm, and they are to assist him, and for this the Commissi∣on of Array may be made use of, and all the Courts of Officers of War in a time of War, are his Prerogative, and the Sub∣jects are to serve the King within the Kingdom, against Rebels, and Traytors,(m) 1.2422 without Pay or Wages; and this as it seems, in any part of the Nation, especially if the King go himself.

The Subject (except in an extraordinary(n) 1.2423 Case) is not to be forced out of the Realm, unless it be to go with the Kings Person; nor in any case, unless upon the sudden In∣vasion or Assault of an Enemy, to serve the King without wages: and the King in time of War may take any mans(o) 1.2424 House to build a Fort, or make a Bulwark upon any mans Land. But the King may not rate the Nation to pay any money towards any War of his.

It is true in time of Peace the King cannot quarter his Military Forces without the consent of the respective Sub∣jects, nor raise money without Act of Parliament, for the maintenance of any Army: so that the Subject (while they keep dutiful) are in no danger of oppression by such a Power; yet without a competent Standing Force, and Guard,* 1.2425 at the Kings absolute pleasure, what Livy saith of the Senate,(p) 1.2426 would be most true of all Soveraigns, That if the Forces were dismissed, unlawful Assemblies, and covert Conspiracies would be again set on foot.

The longest lived mischievous Parliament, that any Eng∣lish History can record, knowing that they could not effect their designs of weakning the King without the Power of the Militia (though they had a numerous Party prepared to es∣pouse their Interest, and as ready for Rebellion as they could desire) yet that they might have some colour for justifying their proceedings, pretended necessity of putting the Kingdom into a posture of defence, against foreign Invasions (which by sub∣tile Plots, they possessed the people they had Intelligence of) and for fear of any violence to be offered to themselves, or that the King seduced by evil Counsellors, should set up Arbitrary Power: so having obtained that Fatal Act of not being to be dissolved without their own consent, issued out their Commis∣sions for Levying, Trayning, and Exercising Forces in all Counties, where they had power, by no Law, or colour of Law, but that of pretended imminent danger, wherein the King refused to grant Commissions to such as they could confide

in for their aforesaid purposes. All which was but colour and shew to wrest the Power out of the Kings hands.

To obviate such like mischievous practices for the future, upon his Majestys happy Restauration, it was enacted, and declared,* 1.2427 That the sole supreme Government, Command, and disposition of the Militia, and all Forces by Sea and Land, and of all places of strength, &c. is, and by the Law of Eng∣land ever was the undoubted right of his Majesty, and his Royal Predecessors Kings and Queens of England, and that both, or either of the Houses of Parliament, cannot, nor ought to pretend to the same, nor can or lawfully may raise, or levy War, offensive or defensive, against his Ma∣jesty his Heirs and lawful Successors.

So that now that great Controversy which wasso violently disputed to the loss of so much English Blood and Trea∣sure; is I hope eternally determined, never again to be re∣vived without an horrid prosperous Rebellion: and this Pre∣rogative of the Crown being thus guarded by Law, will ne∣ver more be attacked while the Royal line continues; which is to be hoped, and wished, will without interruption, be prolonged while the British Soil exists.

CHAP. XXXVI. Concerning raising of Money upon the Subject, and the obligation of Subjects to supply the Soveraign.

AS to the raising of Money for the support of Govern∣ment, I have discoursed something in the Title of Pro∣perty, and shall here only treat of the necessity in all Go∣vernment, That the Soveraign be plentifully supplyed with a Revenue suitable to the charge.

Although Darius the Persian be reckoned by Herodotus one of the first that exacted Tribute;* 1.2428 yet it cannot be conceived but that ever since there was a Prince who commanded large Countrys, and had potent Neighbours, Tribute, Aid, and such like provision was exacted of the people for the defraying the necessary charges of it. So Tacitus(a) 1.2429 tells us, That we may be preserved in Peace, Arms are necessary, and they cannot be provided for without Taxes.

The Subjects receive the benefit of protection, and by the care of the Government, peaceable possession of their Houses, Fields and Cattle, Liberty of Trade, dispensation of Justice, and other great Emoluments by its guard and vigilance; which require a numerous retinue of Officers of State, Justice, and War, and Multitude of subordinate Ministers. Something also

must be allowed for the grandeur and port is necessary for the regulating it at home and abroad, the maintaining Cor∣respondence by Ambassadors, the providing for defence a∣gainst foreign Invasions, and preserving Tranquillity at home; in all which the Publick is concerned: therefore the reason is very just, and equitable, that besides a standing Revenue for defraying these constant charges, there should be subsidiary supplys upon emergencies, adequate to the occasions. As Cicero justly admonisheth, Da operam ut omnes intelligant si salvi esse volunt, necessitati esse parendum: That the Subjects be made to un∣derstand, that if they will be safe,* 1.2430 they must yield to necessity this absolute necessity of parting with a portion of their E∣states, for securing the rest. For though it be prudence in a private man, justly, and moderately to enrich himself; yet craftily to withhold from the Publick, and to defraud it of such parts of the Wealth, as is by Law required, is no sign of prudence (saith Mr. Hobs as judiciously as any position he lyes down:) but want of knowledge of what is necessary,* 1.2431 for their own defence, and covetousness to part with nothing they can hold, makes this restive humour in many.

That the Kings of England have quitted that Soveraign badge of raising money upon the Subject, by their own Impositions, without consent of Parliament, is manifest since Edward the First's time.(b) 1.2432 The Act for which runs thus, For so much as divers Peo∣ple of our Realm are in fear, that the Aids and Tasks, which they have given us before time, towards our Wars, and other business, of their own grant and good will (howsoever they were made) might turn to a Bondage to them and their Heirs, because they might be at another time found in the Rolls, and likewise for the prices taken throughout the Realm by our Ministers: We have granted for us and our Heirs, that we shall not draw such Aids, Task nor Prices into a Custom, for any thing that hath been done heretofore, be it by Roll or any other Precedent that may be found.(c) 1.2433 The next is thus; Moreover we have granted for us and our Heirs, as well to Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and other folk of Holy Church, as also to Earls, Barons, and to all the Commonalty of the Land; that for no business from henceforth, we shall take such man∣ner of Aids, Tasks, nor Prices, but by the common assent of the Realm, and for the common profit thereof,* 1.2434 saving the an∣cient Aids and Prices due and accustomed.

These being not fully enough expressed, the Statute of 34. E. 1. though as short in words as any to be found, yet is of the largest extent, and as liberal a Boon of Royal bounty, as any People can boast of from their Prince. It is thus, No Tallage or Aid shall be taken or levied by Us, or our Heirs in our Realm, without the good will and assent of Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, Barons, Knights, Burgesses, and other Free-men of the Land. Therefore all those who would enjoy the benefit of this Law, must take care they preserve the Succession and the two Houses of Parliament.

(d) 1.2435The Lord Chancellor in Queen Elizabeth's time, thus by the Queens command discourseth to the Houses, If when any part of the natural Body hap to be in danger, the Head and every part hasteth to the relief; so how inconvenient and unnatural is it, when danger is offered to the whole, that the Head should take the whole care, and bear the whole burthen, and the Mem∣bers remain uncareful and uncharged.

It is certain(e) 1.2436 the Prince can make no War of any great con∣cernment, without the assistance of his Subjects Purses as well as Bodies, unless all would voluntarily serve upon their own char∣ges: for that neither sudden dangers can be evaded, nor Forces raised, and all things necessary for them provided, nor peace be long preserved, when the Prince hath an empty Exche∣quer; for Treasure is Firmamentum Belli, & Ornamentum Pacis.

A late(f) 1.2437 French Author, concerning his own Country, makes this objection, That Princes having assigned for their usual charges of the Government, Tribute and other Incomes, they ought to be therewith contented, and not without occasion raise new Taxes to the detriment of the Liege people, and contrary to the intention of the Trust: Yet he owns this ought to be soberly understood; for a wise Physician applies those Remedies necessary without the Patient's leave, and will force him, though by cutting off a Limb, to save his life. So when there may happen a necessity, urgent and unforeseen, that ei∣ther will suffer no delay, or which ought not for some time to be divulged; in such cases (saith he) the King without the States, and whether they will or no, may lay new Impositions, and make all other necessary provisions, by the absolute Power he hath to rule, and preserve his State and Subjects, he not being able to defend them without necessary Forces: There∣fore in such occasions it is to be supposed, that with the Power of Government, there is transferred to the Prince the Power to do that, without which good Government cannot be ex∣ecuted; but when there is not that kind of necessity, the States are called. Thus far my Author.

Since therefore(g) 1.2438 qui diruit medium, destruit finem, he that takes away the necessary means, for a King to preserve his peo∣ple in uncommon events, hazards the ruine of the People; some have inferred that when dangers should be so sudden, that there could not be time to convene a Parliament, or that such a Par∣liament met, should for some design, deny the Prince Money, then the Kings Prerogative might extend to the raising of Mo∣ney; and they instance in the Loans by Privy Seals, exacted upon the Subjects even in Queen Elizabeth's time.

This indeed was the Plea for Ship-money, and as the case was stated by King Charles the First,* 1.2439 all the Judges once subscribed their affirmative opinions (though Mr. Justice Hutton and Crooke retracted after) and with great learning the case was argued, and Judgment given in favour of the King: Yet he hoping, by the yielding to the abolishing of it, to have stopped the misery

of a War, consented to an Act for that purpose; yet that prevented not the Inundation of blood: and we found those men, that moved Heaven and Earth with their clamours against the King, as governing arbitrarily; when they got the Power, made it their dayly practice, to lay what unprecedented illegal Taxes they pleased on their fellow Subjects, to the value, as some compute, of Forty Eight Millions.

Therefore all Judicious persons, lovers of their King,* 1.2440 Country and Posterity, finding the sad effects those disputes brought to the Blessed King and the whole Kingdom, will think it a necessary prudence in a Prince, to have always such a provision of Money ready, as will enable him in all difficul∣ties, that may occur in the Administration of the Government, without being obliged to part with any of his Royal Preroga∣tives, when any discontented or designing Factious Members shall be able to take advantage of his Wants, whereby to drive their barter with the Crown; for thereby he shall de∣feat their ends. On the other side it will be the most prudent and dutiful course both for their own security, and the Princes honour, for Parliaments upon all just and honourable Wars, or occasions of assisting Allies, preparing Fleets in readiness, upon necessary defence, to assist the Prince liberally, and repay out of the Publick, what for publick Service he hath expend∣ed out of his own Revenue, rather than he should be in dis∣esteem with his Neighbours and Allies; whereby the honour of the Prince, and consequently of his Subjects, should be Eclip∣sed, or he be necessitated to take any unusual course for raising Money, or be compelled to make any inglorious Peace: for we can never forget, how the want of supplies to King Charles the First, brought not only Ship-money, and Knight-hood∣mony, Monopolies, and the long disuse of Parliaments, but at last that most calamitous War upon the whole Nation.

We cannot forget how zealous an House of Commons was of late to prevent any Arbitrariness, as it was insinuated,* 1.2441 in the late King, so that they voted a Bill to be brought in against ille∣gal Exaction of Money upon the People, under the Penalty of Treason, not foreseeing that the Charters of the City of Lon∣don, and many other Corporations, were forfeitable upon that account; which if it had been made Treason, the King had got a good Revenue, against the intentions of those who in all ap∣pearance voted for a contrary end: which further appeared in their Vote Jan. the 7th following(h) 1.2442 That whosoever should lend, or cause to be lent, by way of advance, any Money up∣on the branches of the Kings Revenue, arising by Customs, Excise or Hearth-money, (the three principal branches) should be judged to hinder the sitting of Parliament, and be re∣sponsible for the same in Parliament. So that they would give nothing themselves, but as much as in them lay, terrified o∣thers from lending, or advancing any Money to him; which was not according to their Writ, to advise, but by duress

and force to compel the King to submit to their Judgments: and instead of giving him Assistance to support his Allies, and enable him to preserve Tangier, they tended to the disenabling him from contributing to either by his own Revenue and Cre∣dit; not only exposing him to the dangers that might happen either at home or abroad, but endeavouring to deprive him of the Possibility of supporting the Government it self, and re∣duce him to a more helpless Condition than the meanest of his Subjects, as the King sadly and justly complained; and in that Vote the Subjects Liberty and Property was invaded, in that he could not dispose of his Money to his own Profit, and the Benefit of the Government, if either Insurrection or Re∣bellion happened in the interval of Parliament, or a foreign Force on a sudden should attacque us: yet these Gentlemen would be counted Loyal and Dutiful Subjects.

It is not to be denyed, but that if a Prince's standing Reve∣nue were so great, that by it he might not only support the ordi∣nary expences of the Government, but lay by a summ sufficient to defray all extraordinary incident Charges, either occasion∣ed by intestine Rebellions, or foreign Invasions; that a King should not have occasion to have so often recourse to Parlia∣ments for Aids.

Yet when we confider, that there would be many other oc∣casions of frequent convening that great Council, for making wholesom Laws, which is one great Portion of their Business; and that the Subjects never can be happy under a poor Prince, who thereby should be brought into contempt, and how much greater mischiefs accrue to the Subjects, by rendring their Prince impo∣tent, and unable to preserve them from factious disturbers of their Peace and Repose, and the preserving their Properties, as well as the defending them from the designs of foreign Princes who would injure our Merchants, lock us in our Island, and force us to sell our own native Commodities, and receive theirs at what Rates they pleased, if our Soveraign were not able to keep a sufficient Fleet, and infinite other Mischiefs, which would ac∣company a starved Exchequer; we should too late find that the Expence of many Millions would not again restore us to that condition of Prosperity and Renown, that one, timely bestowed on our Prince, would preserve us in. It is much less Charge to keep in good Repair, a well-built Fort, Castle, or Man of War, than to build a new one, especially if, upon the demolishing of the old, we were to fight for the Ground and Materials, whereupon and wherewith we should build the new.

It is a singular Security to the English Subject, that no Money can be levied upon him, but by Act of Parliament, to which in his Representatives he gives his Consent: and the House of Commons is generally careful that they understand a great ne∣cessity, ere they pass any Money-bill; yet we have known in our Age some, that have stood upon such terms with their Sove∣reign,

that either he hath chosen rather to want Supplies, than have them upon such hard Terms, or their Principals have suffered a thousand times more by such denials, than they had done if they had been granted.

So was Constantinople lost to the Turks, for want of furnishing the Emperor with the hundredth part of that which the victo∣rious Enemy plundered the Citizens of; and so the Count Pala∣tine, elected King of Bohemia, lost that Kingdom, and all his Hereditary Seigniories, by unfurnishing his Soldiers with present Pay, when he had it by him. And how many suffer by the want of a liberal and proportionable Supply, to pay off the Debts of the Exchequer, is too sadly felt by many; and if the Parliament of 1639. had furnished King Charles the First with twelve Subsidies (as it appears by the sequel,) the Expence of four times as many Millions, besides the infinite quantity of Christian Blood shed in the ensuing War, had been prevented in all humane probability.

Therefore it is to be hoped that both Parliaments will be careful to supply the wants of the Crown; and Princes will for the future, be as careful so to imploy the Monies given, that they may encourage their Subjects (as often as the urgency of Affairs may require it) to give freely what may be useful, and sufficient for their Kings urgent occasions.

(i) 1.2443It is noted by Tacitus, that Nero coming to the Empire, told the Senate that he being not brought up in Civil Wars, or dome∣stical discords, would bring with him neither hatred nor grudge, nor desire of Revenge, and promised them many good things, which were very acceptable(k) 1.2444 to the Senate and People; but doubting with himself whether it were best to command that no more Subsidies or Tributes should be levied, but he should bestow so fair a Donative on the World; though this commended the Bounteousness of his Mind; yet the Lords of the Senate stayed him from such a Resolution, telling him, It would be the Dissolution of the Empire, if the Revenues, by which it was sustained, should be diminished.

These, and such Considerations, that ever to be Renowned House of Commons, convened 23 May, 1685. have had, and with an unaccustomed speed, supplied the King plentifully; which was a most effectual means to stifle the Rebellion of the late Duke of Monmouth, and the Earl of Argile: and such chearful Aids will render his Majesty able to pursue his most Princely Design, not only of making the English Name more considered and respected abroad;* 1.2445 but of carrying the Reputa∣tion of it yet higher in the World, than it has been in the time of many of his Royal Ancestors.

Which induced the most wise King to tell them, That the readiness and chearfulness that attended the dispatch of it, was as acceptable to him as the Bill it self; and that he would not call upon them for Supplies, but when they should be of pub∣lick use and advantage; and that he would manage what they

gave, with good Husbandry, and take care to employ them to the uses for which he asked them.

So long as such a considerately liberal Mind continueth in the two Houses, and the Money is lodged in the Exchequer of such a Prince, we may presage a most happy time, and neither fear intestine Rebellions, nor foreign Enemies; and besides the un∣speakable Benefits to our selves, the advantage must redound to his Majesties Allies, and the general Repose of Christendom may depend much upon it: there being little doubt to be made, but if our late Soverereign of Blessed Memory, had been seasona∣bly and effectually supplied, the Lilies of France had not been so rankly planted and secured in Flanders, nor been watered with so much Christian Blood; nor probably had we at home been in so imminent a danger of a Civil War, as we were by the subtile Devices of those who knew that the Royal Eagle could make no extraordinary flight, when his Golden Pinions were shortned.

CHAP. XXXVII. Of the Nobility.

HAving hitherto treated of the Excellency of Govern∣ment, and particularly of that of England, and the just and beneficial Soveraignty of the Prince, under several Heads; Method requires that I speak something of the Subjects, who they are and their Duties; and lastly of the causes of Di∣sturbance, or Dissolution of Government, by Faction, Sedi∣tion, Conspiracy and Rebellion: of which in order, and first of the Nobility, as those who justly make the greatest Figure in the Government, next to the Royal Lineage.

The(a) 1.2446 Philosopher makes four kinds of Nobility. First, such as have the Possession of great Riches,* 1.2447 and are abbe to bear a great Port. Secondly, such as have been so from great Antiquity. Thirdly, those that by Vertue, and great Atchieve∣ments, have acquired Honour and Renown. Lastly, such as in Learning are Eminent. Under these Heads the Nobility may yet be ranked, if we take it in a large Sence, as the fit Subject upon which the Sovereign may impress that Character. But my design is to speak of the second and third Order only.

How the Word Nobiles hath been used in the Latin and Greek Empire, when it was the addition to Caesar in the Branch∣es of the Emperors Families, and how in later times, I shall not trouble the Reader with, but refer the curious to the most Learned Selden, and to what I shall note in the Chapter of the Gentry.

Great Vertues have sublimed their Bloods,* 1.2448 and separated them from the dregs of the Crowds. Others are Vessels of Common Clay; they are all China and Porcellane: others of Lead, Iron, Brass, or Silver; they of pure Gold, or Dia∣monds of the old Rock. They are Stars of the first Magnitude in the Firmament of Government, yea the Firmament it self, be∣twixt the upper and the nether Waters; betwixt the pure Aether of Celestial Intelligences (the Sovereign and Princes of the Blood) and the terrestrial Waters of the Commons. The Bles∣sed Medium, the double Trench to defend the Crown and the People.

That there should be such illustrious Persons is absolutely ne∣cessary, for that in a Multitude there must be some,* 1.2449 who design∣ing to live vertuously, and having Souls of a richer Compo∣sition, by their own proper uncommon Atchievements, and the transcendency of their Vertues, shall lay the Foundation of that Nobility, which afterwards enriched and augmented by the noble Actions of their Successors, will make their Fa∣milies splendid, and Illustrious. So that Soveraigns (the Foun∣tains and Disposers of all Honours) justly reward them with the Ensigns of Nobility. The present Nobility, or their noble Ancestors, (by fidelity and their great Capacities to serve the Crown and Commonweal) have been gilded with those Rayes, and have Characters impressed upon them undefaceable by any thing but Treason, which taints their Blood; or De∣generacy, which smuts their Esteem. They are the Buttresses of the Throne, the Gold and Silver work of the Regalia.

(b) 1.2450It is a Reverend thing (saith the ingenious Chancellor) to see an ancient Castle, or Building, not in Decay,* 1.2451 or a fair Timber Tree, firm and sound; how much more to be∣hold a noble ancient Family, which hath stood against the waves, and weather of Time.

New Nobility is but the Act of Power, the ancient, the Act of Time. Those who are first raised to Nobility, are com∣monly more vertuous, but less innocent; for there is rarely any rising, without a Commixture of good and bad Acts; but it is reasonable that the Memory of their Vertues remain to Po∣sterity, and their Faults dye with themselves.

(c) 1.2452It is glorious in the Progeny of the old Nobility, and useful to themselves, their King, and Country, to study to i∣mitate the Perfections, and eschew the Imperfections of their noble Progenitors, who were Founders of their Families and Honours: They no doubt were Learned, Judicious, and able Ministers of State, such as eased their Prince of their other∣wise unsupportable Burthen of Government; such as were sensible of the true Fountain of Honour, true Patriots of their Country, because zealous for the established Government, and coveted not to make themselves popular in opposition to their Prince.

Honour is one of the prime Badges of Nobility;* 1.2453 the win∣ning of that (saith(d) 1.2454 the learned Chancellor) is the revealing of a mans Virtue without disadvantage. If a man perform that which hath not been attempted before, or attempted and given over, or hath been atchieved, but not with so good Circumstances; he hath purchased more Honour, than by ef∣fecting a matter of greater difficulty, or Virtue, when he is but a follower.

Honour that is gained, broken upon another, hath the quick∣est reflection, like Diamonds cut with Fucets; therefore its commendable for any to exceed his Competitors in Honour, by outshooting them in their own Bows.

(e) 1.2455A Monarchy, where there is no Nobility at all, (as a∣mong the Turks) is ever a pure and absolute Tyranny. For No∣bility attempers Soveraignty: a great and potent Nobility ad∣deth Majesty to a Monarch, but diminisheth Power; putteth Life and Spirit into the People, but presseth their Fortunes. It is well when Nobles are not too great for Soveraignty, or Ju∣stice, and yet maintained in that heighth, as the Insolence of Inferiors may be broken upon them, before it come on over fast upon the Majesty of Kings.

A numerous Nobility causeth Poverty and Inconvenience in a State,* 1.2456 brings a surcharge of Expence; and some falling to be weak in Estate, it makes a kind of Dis-proportion betwixt Honour and Means.

To keep Nobles at some distance is not amiss; but to despise them,* 1.2457 may make a King less safe, and less able to perform any thing he desires. This Henry the Seventh did, and though they continued Loyal to him, yet they did not co-operate with him in his Business.

The reason of State, that we may presume, swayed with so wise a King, was, for that the Wars betwixt the Houses of York and Lancaster had been carried on by the sidings of the Nobi∣lity, who had in those Days numerous Retinues; the younger Sons of the Gentry, and sometimes the elder, making a great part of the vast Families of Noblemen, and their Tenents hold∣ing their Lands by small Rents, and due Service, enabled them to make great alterations in the State, accordingly as the chief of the Nobility were combined. So that he made Laws against the number of Retainers to lessen such dependences; and likewise bringing in use the making of Leases, made the Tenents less obliged to their Lords, paying their Rents; and by such Tenures for Years,* 1.2458 they grew Rich: so that there∣by Freeholders exceedingly encreased, and all this helped to subduct from the Power of the Nobility.

Honours are not rashly to be made common, or prodigally given; otherwise they grow dis-esteemed, and unregarded: rare and few Honours are more glorious (saith(f) 1.2459 the judicious Comentator;) diffused, and common, bring Contempt and Sleight.

Consentaneous to which is, what the forementioned Chancellor saith, That States which aim at greatness,* 1.2460 must take heed how the Nobility and Gentry multiply too fast; for that maketh the common Subject to grow to a Peasant, driven out of Heart, and in effect but a Gentleman's Labourer. As in Cop∣ice Wood, if you leave the Stadle too thick, you shall never have clean Underwood, but Shrubs and Bushes; and so you bring, that the Hundredth Poll is not fit for the Helmet, espe∣cially as to the Infantry, which is the State of France, not of England.

But in this Particular, the Custom of other Nations, a Prin∣ces Service, and incident conveniences are to be considered. For some will be won as much by Honours, as Offices of Profit; and it is less Expence to a Prince in the gratifying his well-deserving Subjects. Besides, something must be allowed to Aemulations, and a rich Soil will bring a greater Crop than a barren.

In all Ages likewise some of the ancient Nobility are extin∣guished, and it is fit to plant new Standards in the room of the decayed: So that what these Learned Men assert concerning spare Distribution of Honours, is to be considered with just Limitations.

The Splendor, Magnificence, and great Retinues of Noble∣men, conduce much to Martial greatness;* 1.2461 except in Poland, the State of Free-Servants and Attendants upon Noblemen, and the richer Gentlemen, hath been observed to be no where so peculiar in former times, as in England. Those Retainers and humble Friends are fitted for all gentile Employments, and are a Seminary of the more polite Yeomanry; whereas a close and reserved living of Noblemen, and Gentlemen, caus∣eth a Penury of Military Forces, and well-bred Yeomanry.

The Nobility may be Eclipsed, by sinking beneath their Orbs in affecting Popularity in opposition to their Prince,* 1.2462 or rearing their Heads among the Clouds in Ambition.

Whenever by Malevolent Aspects of other Planets, their In∣fluence on the State is less benign; or that the putrid Breath of some Male-contents taint their Allegiance, the Contagion is of a large Spread; their Blood being mingled with so many others of Power, takes Fire at once, and can neither be shed or rectified alone.

Sometimes their Blood may be chilled, when they conceive o∣thers interpose betwixt them and the warmer Gleams of the Throne, and they will not want Factious Torpedoes, that will be∣num their brisker Souls,* 1.2463 if they be not wary to avoid their touch. But when their Lordships consider that as they and their happy Ancestors have had a plentiful Portion of their Princes Regards and Bounty, so they should be content that others share with them in their Princes Munificence, and should not expect that their Families should be every Ages Darlings: they will have more honourable and contented Thoughts, and own not only

the Truth, but yield to the necessity of that of(g) 1.2464 Tacitus, That as our Birth s are ascribed to Fate, or Chance; so the In∣clinations of Princes to some, and their dislike to others, as he instanceth in Lepidus, under Tiberius.

We see in the great Oeconomy of the World (which we must believe is disposed by the Universal Monarch) some noble Families in every Age are Extinct, and other new ones by their Vertues and great Accomplishments are raised, and the Cadets of others like some Rivers are hid for some space under Ground, till when they appear again, they are know by their refined Parts to be of noble Abstract.* 1.2465

The Sun is the same most luminous Body, though some Ma∣culae are observed in it by curious Telescopes; and if Princes Beams shine not always with the same Serenity upon the district of some Families that it hath done, it is no more than the Sun in the great Vortex doth, and is no more to be repined at. There∣fore it becomes those noble Souls to be content with their large allotments, and shake off all those Vipers that would sting them with Envy and Discontent.

It is well worth such Noblemens Consideration how their In∣terests are interwoven with that of the Crown, and if any un∣happily have loosened the twine, or frozen the Zeal they have for its support, let them call to Mind the Vertue and Bravery of their Ancestors, and observe what Gemms or Gold-work they were of it, and strive to fasten themselves there again, and out of the Embers kindle again that Loyalty they have derived ex traduce from their generous Ancestors: so that

(a) 1.2466Fervidus hac iterum circa praecordia Sanguis Inacleat.—

And as the Crown hath bestowed Honour and Wealth upon their noble Families, so let them never be wanting with their utmost Industry, to support it in all its splendid Preroga∣tives; and of all the Infamy of Mortals, let not ingratitude be laid to their Charge.* 1.2467

The Nobility are Conciliarii nati, and as their Birth and pla∣ces give them easy access to the Princes Privy-Chamber and Cabinet, though they be not of his secret Council; so they have opportunities to present the State of Affairs, and ill mana∣gery or grievances of the People, when they conceive them con∣cealed from their Prince, both better and more effectually than others of a lower Rank.

But then it should be done like Persons of Honour with all Respect and Duty to their Prince, and the ostentation of this sort of Charity, should not lessen the usefulness of it; much less should they blow a Trumpet when they perform it, either to aggrandize the Enterprize, or to raise discontent at the denial.

In every Kings Reign, it hath been a flourishing time, and happy, when the Nobility studied with a refined laudable Con∣tention to aemulate one anothers Vertue, striving to out-do one another in the Service of their King and Country, uniting in that glorious Testudo, to defend their Princes Prerogative, and the Laws that adjust their own, and the Peoples Privi∣ledges.

It is never to be forgot, how in our late Commonwealth,* 1.2468 the House of Peers was by the very Posteriors of the Commons, Voted useless and dangerous. No sooner was that sacred Head separated from them, but they were degraded to Com∣moners (as to any Legislative Power:) and though those No∣blemen that were content to fit in the lower House, were highly caressed and applauded; yet a few Years hath changed the note, and their Names will be recorded to Posterity, in far less Lustre than if they had more strenuously espoused the affli∣cted Kings Quarrel: and it is not to be doubted, but the Sence of that will be a most prevalent Antidote against the Defection of any of the Nobility, that will consider the naturalness of such a degrading, if the Commonwealth-Men should ever ap∣pear again without their Vizors; and it will be an excellent a∣mulet to keep them from the Infection of such Principles and Practice.

It is worth noting, that William the Conqueror giving to his Nobility great Fees to be held of him in Capite,* 1.2469 for some A∣ges the Nobility had great Interests, and numerous dependences, and had special Jurisdiction over great Baronies; and while they served the Crown according to their Tenures, the inferi∣or Gentry and Commoners being one way or other Tenents to them, could do little in opposition to the Crown. But when in King John and Henry the Third's time, their greatness was dan∣gerous to the Crown, the Commons were brought in to be a part of the Parliament. Yet for some while after they retain∣ed their Grandeur, till (as I have hinted) Henry 7. retrenched them, and Queen Elizabeth preferring so many new Men, make∣ing less use of the ancient Nobility, studied to gain the common Peoples Affections by all Arts and Bounties she could use: and in after-Ages the Nobility being less valued by the Freeholders, and encreased in Number, and some of them adhering to the two Houses against their Sovereign, their in∣terests both with the Parliament and People grew less.

But now under a Prince who sets a true value upon the No∣bility, if they he not wanting to themselves, they may hope to attain the lustre of their noble Ancestors, and the Common∣ers be no ways abridged of their Priviledges. For then the Government is in the happiest Condition, when the Nobility are great without Ambition, rich without Oppression, emi∣nent in Vertue as in Character. The Gentry so deporting themselves to the Commonalty as they desire the Nobility may to them; and the Commonalty with humble Industry,

peaceably enriching themselves, and enjoying that freedom and liberty, which may keep them in Heart and Courage to serve their Prince and Country with chearful Alacrity, and out-do those of their Rank in all other Dominions; which in the En∣glish Soldiery is observed in all Wars to be their peculiar Excel∣lency, ascribable principally to the Benignity of the Govern∣ment which dispirits them not: and when this liberty is not abu∣sed to Licentiousness, but restrained within the Bounds of hum∣ble Candor and Modesty, Reverence to their Superiors, and thankfulness to their Prince; all is in an happy Frame.

CHAP. XXXVIII. Of the Gentry of England.

I Shall not detain the inquisitive Reader upon the derivation of the Word Gentilhom, or Gentleman, but refer him to(a) 1.2470 Mr. Selden, who at large discusseth the point; whether with Velserus and some others, it be derived from Gentilis or Heathen, as introduced when the Goths, Hunns, and Vandals having o∣verrun the Roman Provinces, were in a better Condition, though Gentiles, than the Christians, under the Romans; or that it is derived from Gens.

I am more inclined to be of the latter Opinion, finding it more agreeable to the common Use.For Cicero(b) 1.2471 calls those Gen∣tiles, qui ex eadem Gente; Ingenui, qui nunquam Capite sunt diminuti. Gens consisting of a multitude which have sprung from one Generation, and of many of these Gentes consists a Nation; to which agrees that of(c) 1.2472 Festus, that Gentilis is one born of the same Gens, or Kindred, and who is called by the like Name. So we find the Horatii, the Corvine, Julian, Flavian Fami∣ly. &c.

So the Greeks use the words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for one nobly descended from great Parentage. So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 was Nobility, which(d) 1.2473 Aristotle calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Antient Wealth and Vertue, or the(e) 1.2474 Dignity of the Ance∣stor. The first Authors of it being stiled famous Men, and Ho∣nourable, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

In the largest acceptation of the Word, as it is now used (saith the judicious(f) 1.2475 Selden) it denotes one that either from the Blood of his Ancestors, or the Favour of his Sovereign, or of them that have Power from the Sovereign, or from his own Vertue, Employment, or otherwise, according to the Laws and Customs of Honour in the Country he lives in, is ennobled, made Gentile, or so raised to an eminency above the Multitude, perpetually inherent in his Person.

These are stiled the Nobiles minores, for distinction sake,* 1.2476 the word Nobiles being now appropriated to those of the higher Rank. The ancient use of Nobilis (especially before the Roman Monarchy) was such, that it was justly given to none but him that had Jus imaginum, or some Ancestor at least that had born some of the great Offices, or their Magistratus Cu∣rules; as(g) 1.2477 Censorship, Consulship, &c. From whose Image kept he had the Jus Imaginum. Therefore the preceding An∣cestor was called novus Homo, or Ignobilis.

Some Ages after the Romans were under a Monarchy, the Title of Nobilis was given to such as by the Emperors Patents of Offices, or their Codicilli Honorarii, were first raised out of the lowest Rank. After that, Arms of Ensigns of Distinction, born upon Shields, grew to be in may Families Hereditary, (which was about four hundred Years since, as Sir Edward Bish in his Aspilogia avoucheth) it came into frequent use, that he, who was either formerly ennobled by Blood, or newly by acquisition, either assumed, or had by Grant from his Sove∣reign, or those deputed by him, some special note of Distinction, by Arms also to be transmitted with his Gentry to his Poste∣rity.

Yet(h) 1.2478 Mr. Selden notes, that in the Proceedings in the Court of Chevalry, betwixt Reginald Lord Grey of Ruthin, Plaintiff, and Sir Edward Hastings Defendant, concerning the bearing of a Manch Gules in a•• Field Or, in the depo∣sitions taken in the Moote Hall at Bedford, it is recorded, that John Botiler of the County of Bedford, and Roger Tenstal, Mayor of Bedford, having been the Plaintiffs Servants, several∣ly deposed, Il est Gentilhom d' Auncestrie, mas nad point, d' Armes.* 1.2479 That he was a Gentlemen of antient time, but had no Arms. But I shall pass from this.

That which I desire the Gentry to observe is,* 1.2480 That they are the Seminary of our greater Nobility, and that from Loyal, Wise, Learned, Valiant and Fortunate Persons, of their Order, in all Princes Reigns, the Nobility have sprung. Therefore as some of them are derived from as numerous Ancestors, as any in other Kingdoms, and have by Hereditary Succession greater Estates than many foreign Counts, and as they desire either to conserve the Repute their Ancestors have honourably en∣tailed on them, or to transmit them to their Posterities; so it will be their Interest and Glory to accomplish themselves in all sorts of useful Learning, whereby they may be Serviceable to their King and Country.

There are Bodily Exercises they should be well skilled in, as Fencing, Riding the great Horse, and all Military Exercises, to enable them to serve in the Militia of the Nation; and their diligent perusing all sorts of History, and the Laws of the Land, will fit them for the managing of Civil affairs, and dis∣pensing the Kings Laws, as Justices of Peace, Sheriffs, Com∣missioners, Representatives in Parliament, as also for the great∣er Offices of State.

Since they are born to large Patrimonies, and thereby have a more generous Education, and derive a more refined Spirit from their Ancestors, they can with infinite more Ease enter in∣to publick Employment, having none of those sinking(i) 1.2481 weights of Poverty, and mean Education, which enforce others to use extream Diligence e're they can mount the first half Pace, the Gentleman is seated on, by that time he leaves his tutors.

It is true the Priviledges of the Gentry of England, proper∣ly so called, are not so great as in some Countries, where they have power of Life and Death over their Servants, or are ex∣empted from Taxes, and enjoy other Immunities which are de∣nied to the Commons; yet they have others as beneficial in that they make up a great share of the Ministerial parts of the Go∣vernment.

It is required by God and their Prince, that they should so deport themselves as they may be singular(k) 1.2482 Examples to their Tenants and Neighbours, of Wisdom, Temperance, Ju∣stice, Loyalty, and all the System of Vertues; and by a gene∣rous Hospitality, without Debauchery, preserve their Interest in the affection of their Neighbors, and that the Poor may daily and zealously pray for them, being made the Voiders, and receiving the Sportula of their plentiful Tables. By this way of living they will sow among their Neighbours the Seeds of all useful Vertues, and enrich their Countries, and be able in time of need to serve their Prince with their numerous Depend∣ants.

It is for the use of the blooming Gentlemen I write this. The more sage and ancient need only such Intimations to refresh their Memories. I have made Observations how fatal it hath been to themselves, and the whole Kingdom, when the Gentry have been seduced to sleight at first, and after, (as they have been wrought upon by Designers) to over-awe or overturn the Government, and either by Piques among themselves, or Aemulations, Envies, and Discontents, have been brought into the Combinations and Conspiracies with those, who under the specious Pretences of enlarging their Priviledges, have sub∣jected themselves as well to the slavery of Red-coats, and the Tyranny of a Corps du guard, or Council of War, as they had their Prince under their Committees and Armies: which con∣siderations I hope will be worth their remembring.

What I have writ in most of the Chapters of this Treatise, less or more appertains to the Gentry, out of a true and cordi∣al desire, that if any such Critical time should in any Age re∣turn, as that of Forty and Forty one, or Eighty and Eighty one; the Gentry may consider the History of former Ages, and be able to distinguish betwixt Realities, and feigned Pre∣tences, and will well weigh what I have writ in the preceding Chapter of the Nobility: for that it is in most particulars ap∣plicable to to them, which makes me shorter in this; and that above all things they will seriously consider, that though in e∣very

(l) 1.2483 Generation new Men do arise, that to carry on their Factious Design, pretend different Causes; yet the ends of all that are Male-contents, and seditiously displeased with the Government, is the same, and commonly their Fate is paral∣lel.

Therefore above all the Infections, let them study to avoid that of murmuring and repining against the Government, or that of being seduced by those, who cover their dark Thoughts and Designs too close to be discovered by common Eyes.

The more such pretend Zeal for the common Good, the more they pretend publick Spirits, and care of Religion. If they be found to have any the least Tincture of Immorality, Envy, Ambition, Revenge, Cruelty, or aspiring in their Tempers. the more they are to be suspected and avoided.

CHAP. XXXIX. Of the Commonalty of England, of the lower rank especially.

THESE are more especially the subject matter of Govern∣ment. The Employments they are engaged in,* 1.2484 makes it more profitable for them to look downwards, and cultivate their Freeholds and Tenements, and reap the golden Fruits of their Toil; than to spend their time in the fruitless enquiries after the managery of States and Empire: for whereover Soveraign∣ty lodgeth, they must still be Subjects.

Obedience (saith a well observing(a) 1.2485 Author) not Exa∣mination, is the destined Function of the Common People, which Laws preserve them in. The Industrious would soon be ruined by the Free-booters in every Hamlet, if the Laws and Govern∣ment were not their Guard. By the several Rebellions (pro∣perly of the Commons) in Richard 2. H. 8.* 1.2486 and Edward the Sixth's time, we have sad Examples of the Calamities they brought, not only on their Neighbours, and the disturbance they gave the Government; but likewise the ruins they brought upon themselves: and when they had wearied themselves with Rapine, Murthers, and a Hundred cruel Ravages, and Butche∣ries, they were at last either totally subdued, and their Chief∣tains Executed, and the rest Fined, or they perished in the Fight; being never able to effect any of their pretended Liber∣ties, they made the Insurrections to have obtained.

It is for want of Consideration, that they are decoyed into such barbarous Outrages, which in such Rebellions they gene∣rally commit. They ought to consider,* 1.2487 and that very seri∣ously, that it is from their Princes sollicitous Care, that they enjoy Peace and Plenty: to them they owe not only Al∣legiance

and Obedience, as they are their Soveraigns; but espe∣cially Gratitude, Loyalty, and all dutiful Services. For the good Laws from time to time have been confirmed by their Kings, for their Prosperities; without which, they would be in a continual State of War and Feuds one against another.

They owe to the Paternal Care and Prudence of the Sove∣reign and his Government, those Methods and Rules, where∣by they are so benignly ruled, (in England especially) where∣by they are in a freer and more plentiful Estate than any other Commoners in the World. By the vertue of those Priviledg∣es granted to them by their Kings, they have Propriety in their Goods, none can out them of their Possessions, imprison, or molest them, while they observe the equitable Laws.* 1.2488

They have according to their several Capacities and Abilities, a participation of Offices in their particular Hamlets, Parishes, Wapentakes, or Counties, either relating to the assistance to the Justice of the Land in Juries, or conserving of the Peace, in being petty, or chief Constables, or other Officers; and have a pecu∣liar Priviledge, many other Commoners want, of chusing their Representatives, whereby they are only subject to such Laws, as they or their Ancestors have given consent to.

The Government (worthy Country-men) makes fertile your Enclosures, protects your Flocks and Herds, secures your going out, and coming in, makes your Sleeps undisturbed, guards your home-bred Commodities when you send them abroad, secures those are brought home to you, appoints you Markets for buying or selling your Corn and Cattle, and your own Manufactures.

Let those among you,* 1.2489 that are not ashamed they were Se∣questrators, Membrs of the Parliaments Army, or active Offi∣cers, Oppressors, Plundereres, or Informers against their Loy∣al Neighbours, consider what they reaped in the late unhappy Wars, begun with all the specious Pretences of redressing grie∣vances, securing Propriety, and reforming Religion (precious Names most wickedly abused.) Remember how unsupportable were the Taxes and Sequestrations. What affrightments were you continually in by the Quartering of imperious Soldiers, and their Plunders, where they neither left Food nor Rayment for your Wives and Children; and what they could not devour, or carry away, they destroyed? Consider the effusion of so much Blood in the cruel Battles, and their most unjust High-Courts of Justice how all the Laws either were stifled, or miserably distorted.

The best Preservatives against the relapse into such miserable times,* 1.2490 is to reflect upon them often, to live quietly under your Sovereign, to give him no occasion to unsheath any of his Swords against you, to reduce you to Obedience. Avoid all Factious Whisperers of discontent. You were within these six Years by past, wrought so upon by cunning Designers of a Commonwealth, that you made choice of such Representa∣tives

as neither would supply that Prince o immortal Memo∣ry, who had preserved them and you in that Peace he had re∣stored them to, when nothing but War, and miserable Devas∣tations were in all the Countries of the Continent; nor admit our present Gracious Soveraign (who had adventured his Life so often for their Safety) to succeed in the Throne of his Roy∣al Ancestors.

Remember I beseech you (dear Countrymen) these things, and consider how near the Gulph and Pits Brink of inevitable Miseries you were. Be thankful to those Loyal Persons, who by their Counsels and Addresses withheld you from the imminent Ruine. Be mis-led no more by such as can sow nothing but Darnel, Cockle, Poppy and Tares among your Corn; would consume your Grain, and leave you nothing but the Chaff. Such as by instigating you to Insurrections, under Pretence of Religion, or any other Wheedles, would necessitate the Government for your own Security, to rule you with a Scepter of Iron; whereas now you are under one of pure Gold, beset with all the Jewels of Heroic Vertue.

Would you avoid the Slavery of the French Commoners, and be never in danger of being Peasants? Would you enjoy what you and your happy Fore-fathers have done in peaceable times? Then study your Duty of Obedience to the Laws, ba∣nish all Murmurings, and Repinings, heartily pray for the King's Prosperity, heartily endeavour to serve him with your Lives and Fortunes against his Enemies; live quietly under his careful and merciful Conduct; adore that divine Providence that hath established him peaceably in his Throne, and out of infinite Compassion to these Nations, hath prevented a Civil War.

Be sincerely and cordially thankful that you are under the Government of such a Prince, who so freely and spontaneous∣ly promiseth to defend your Religion, secure your Properties, and adventure his Person for your Defence: Who is justly re∣verenced abroad, ought to be as entirely honoured, and affe∣ctionately loved, and dutifully obeyed at home. So shall the Government be Easy, Beneficial and Merciful to you; so shall you have full Barns and Purses, and all the Blessings of Peace and Security in the long Enjoyment of them.

CHAP. XL. Of the Temper and Disposition of the Common People of the lowest Rank.

I IVY(a) 1.2491 tells us that the Common People Fear and Hope generally is in excess. They want skill to make Observations of the true Causes of Matters, and conclude Effects from wrong Cause. They are ignorant of their duty to the Publick, never meditating any thing (with Reflection) like their particular Profit. If a wet Season happen of conti∣nuance, they murmure and repine, as if their whole Tillage were lost, and a long Drought produceth the like effect.

As to the publick, it is their Nature(b) 1.2492 slavishly to fear, or proudly to domineer, affrighting the Government, if they be not brought to some degree of Awe; and if they be brought to fear, their Governours may with more safety despise them: for they are wholly Strangers to the Golden mean of Liber∣ty, which they neither know how to enjoy or want; despi∣sing and sleighting the Freedom they possess, and wrought up∣on by Seditious Arts of Popular Men, vainly hoping to at∣tain to some Enlargement of that Liberty, which they fondly dream of.

In their own temper (saith(c) 1.2493 Sallust) they are changea∣ble, Seditious, full of Discord, desirous of Novelty, impatient of Peace and Idleness: and if we allow them at some Seasons at least to be a calm Sea, yet as that by Winds, so they are easily swelled by the blasts of Seditious Persons; to receive which, they hoist up all their Sails. According to that of the(d) 1.2494 Orator, Ʋt Mare quod sua natura tranquillum, ventorum vi agitari videmus, ac turbari; sic populus sua sponte pacatus, homi∣num Seditiosorum vocibus violeutissimis tempestatibus concitari so∣let.

They are too credulous of Reports, and the Designers to put them into ferment need no more, but to put in practice what(e) 1.2495 Tacitus mentions of the false news of Otho's being slain; That at first a wandring and uncertain Rumour, then as in great lies, some say they were present, and saw it; the rejoicers and curious being aptest to believe the Report. So that at last a general belief is given, few being willing to take the pains to make strict Enquiry. And when such Rumours are forbidden, more horrid things are invented than at first, and so are more difficultly suppressed; for there is a wonderful propensity in them, to receive(f) 1.2496 and believe all new Reports, stretching all Rumours vastly beyond the reality of matters: fame being with them as sure a ground of Belief, as Realty.

Res auget cuncta, ut mos est, fama in majus credita.

If in things they fear the Rumour once be broached, how swift is the Alarm! all the Air is full of Speaking Trumpets, though nothing to be seen.

—Sic quisque pavendo Dat vires famae, nulloque Auctore malorum Quae finxere timent.

This quality of the Vulgar,* 1.2497 the Designers of Forty one well understood, and most industriously improved. The tumult•• of the multitude were governed by them, all the great mischiefs were facilitated by the Midwivery of these contrived Re∣ports; Jealousies and Fears preparing Peoples Minds for every ill Impression.

The breaking of a Plank by two Corpulent Gentlemen, oc∣casioned a Report that the Parliament-House was undermined; and others were so quick-scented, that they smelt Po••der. This was carried with that swiftness into the City, that the Rab∣ble in excessive manner flocked to Westminster, full of revenge∣ing Fury.

So they pret••nded Intelligence of foreign Invasions, to put the Kingdom into a posture of Defence, and the miserable Coun∣try armed with great forwardness upon every Alarm, little for••seeing what the ends of those dismal Acts would be.* 1.2498

We of late had an Experiment of this in the Story of the lsl•• of Purbeck, when the report of the landing of the French raised many Thousands of Men, whom the noble Peer said he could have conducted whither he would by a Letter. We can∣not forget how the report of the Fireworks, sound in Somer∣set House, the forty Thousand Pilgrims, and Black Bills alarmed the Credulous. Such Mormos and Spectres ever will be made use of by those who intend to work upon the Mobile.

If the Multitude could be made Wise,* 1.2499 to rely upon their Governours Wisdom,(that can better foresee Danger than they, and have greater share in the present State, and having more to lose, will more carefully endeavour to prevent Mischiefs,) they would not be so appalled at imaginary Dangers, suggest∣edly crafty Men, or be so suspicious that they are not so well governed as they should be, or so apprehensive of Oppression; and if they should miscarry under such Conduct (which they can have no reason to suspect) they would perish with a great deal of Discretion.

But alas there is in all the common People (as(g) 1.2500 Plutarch hath noted of old) something malignant, and querulous against Government; they yield open Ears to detracting and blackening Speeches against their Governours. They are generally strong in Will, weak in Judgment, their Affections commanding their

Belief, and presaging as they believe, short-sighted in disco∣vering Consequences of matters, and easy to receive Impres∣sions from their Demagogues.

Some Birds are whistled into the Snare, others driven: Apes and Dottrels caught by imitation of such Postures as others assume. They are the subject matter of all Seditions, and when they are wrought upon to believe they are like to be op∣pressed, they can easily find among themselves a Cade, Straw, Ty∣ler, or Masinello to head them.

The general Temper of the People is well described by(h) 1.2501 Tacitus, in that Speech of Galba to Piso, Thou art to com∣mand, saith he, over Men, that neither will endure absolute Servi∣tude, nor absolute Liberty. In another place of the same Book, he tells us, Vulgus, ut mos est, cujusque motus novi cupidus: It is the cu∣stom of the Common-People to be desirous of Changes. All which is only in hopes that they shall be at more Ease and Li∣berty, though they are mostly mistaken in the means to at∣tain it.

It is true,(i) 1.2502 Liberty is desirable by the Good as well as the Evil, the Strenuous as well as the Slothful; but the great difference is, that the good and wise know the Extent of it, and know, it no ways is more happily enjoyed, than by Obedience to the Government and the Laws. But the common sort judge it to con∣sist in doing as they list, and being under no Rule or Correction; whereas(k) 1.2503 Livy tells us, The Force and Strength of Empire, is in the Consent of the Obedient.

We find another Character of the Common Peoples Deport∣ment in dubious times, such as were those in Rome, when Otho was supplanting Galba,(l) 1.2504 Mixtis servitiis & dissono clamore, cae∣dem Othonis & Conjuratorum exilium poscentium; ut si non Circo & Theatro ludicrum aliquod postularent, neque illis judicium aut veritas, quippe eodem die diversa, pari certamine postulaturis; sed tradito more quemeunque Principem adulandi licentia Acclama∣tionum, & studiis immanibus.

CHAP. XLI. Of Subjects Obedience.

CƲrtius(a) 1.2505 saith, That in some Countries there is an in∣bred Obedience, or Veneration to their Kings. To this day we find the Eastern Monarchs, as the Grand Seignior, Sophy of Persia, and others, to have a more absolute Power than the Christian Kings, and that their People hold their Race some∣thing Divine.

Obedience to Authority by(b) 1.2506 Aeschylus is rightly termed the Mother of Felicity; for by it we enjoy whatever Benefits the Prince, the Father of his Country, and all the fruitful Bles∣sings of Peace and Plenty, the indulgent Mother of our Hap∣piness here on Earth can bestow upon a People.

(c) 1.2507Philo the Jew stiles it the best, and most profitable thing in our whole Life. Therefore(d) 1.2508 Theopompus, King of the La∣cedaemonians, hearing one attribute the safety of Sparta to the Skill the King had in Government, made answer, That it was rather to be ascribed to the obedience which the People so chearfully payed to their Governours; for is Sparta above all other places, the most powerful Citizens shewed themselves most obsequious to their Magistrates, and by their Example, drew the rest to do the like, as knowing Obedience to be the greatest requisite both in Cities, Armies, and private Families. To which purpose we find the Speech of(e) 1.2509 Chrysantas to his Country-men the Persians, telling them, They can take no Town of their Enemies, nor keep any City of their Friends, if they be disobedient: No Army if they be tumultuous or irregular, can obtain Victory; nor can any good be effected by those that are not obedient to Superiors. By this their Citizens were well governed, their Houses preserved, Ships brought to the Coasts to which they were bound: following their Prince, they carried all things before them, leaving nothing half done; by this they not only purchased good things, but preserved them.

(f) 1.2510Cicero tells us, That Plato likened disobedient Persons to the Titans; for as those set themselves in Opposition to the Gods, so these to the Magistrates.

The grave Historian(g) 1.2511 counts it the Infelicity of Otho, That though his Soldiers under Titian ere full of Spirit, yet withal, they chose rather to interpret the Commands of their Captains, than to obey; and(h) 1.2512 likewise tells us, That if e∣very one might dispute Commands, Obedience ceasing, the Go∣vernment would be dissolved.

To govern, and to be governed, are of so near Relation, that from the Composition of them together,(i) 1.2513 Crito the Pytha∣gorean well noteth, both the Strength and Concord of the State ariseth.

Two both wholsome and necessary things (saith the great(k) 1.2514 Caesar) Nature hath established among Men, to Rule, and be Ruled, without which it is impossible that any thing, for ne∣ver so little a while, shall hold out.

Qui imperium libere excipit, Partem servitutis acerbissimam ef∣fugit; facere quod nolit non qui jussus aliquid facit, miser est, sed qui invitus facit, saith Seneca:(l) 1.2515 He that chearfully and willingly obeys Commands, escapes the bitterest part of Servitude, to do that which he would not; for he is not miserable, who doth what he is commanded, but he that doth it unwillingly.

All the Office of the chief Magistrate is corrupted and dis∣solved, if any, with due Obedience, do not that which ought to be done, but instead of chearful Observance, require time for advice, and Deliberation; for all such as make an hesitation in their Duty, and puts off, have no other inducement to it but Fear, which is an oblation without an Heart, spiritless, and palled.

M.(m) 1.2516 Terentius told Tiberius, That to the Emperor the Gods had given the highest Judgment of things, and to the Sub∣jects the Glory of Obedience is left.

(n) 1.2517Aulus Gellius gives an excellent Rule how Subjects should behave themselves in Cases, where they are not free to act and obey, viz. That in those things which it behoves us not in our Opinions to obey, we are to decline by little and little, mildly and reverently, without shewing of too much Detestation, or bitter reprehension, and opprobry; leaving the things rather un∣done, than rejecting them.

These wise Directions of so great and ancient an Author, are worth Imitation by our sturdy Beggars of Liberty, who do or have done it in so imperious a way, as if they were in a con∣dition to command it; and yet when they had the Power, most Tyrannically exacted both Civil and Spiritual Obedience from all others, that were not of the same Mold and Cut with themselves.

The Excellent Seneca saith, That Disobedience would be the Destruction of the Roman Commonwealth, and so long the People would be out of Danger of it, as they endu∣red the Bridle; which if once they broke, or being by any chance broken, they suffered not to be again sitted on:(o) 1.2518 the u∣nity and Contexture of the greatest Empire would fly in Splinters, and the same end there would be of the Cities Dominion, that there was in obtaining it. For of old the Commonwealth was so constituted, that the Ligament betwixt the Sovereign and Subject could not be dissolved, without both their De∣structions; for as the Prince stands in need of the Peoples Strength, so the People of the Headship of the Prince.

To the which,(p) 1.2519 Caesar saith, He so embosomed, and in∣weaved himself into the Commonwealth, that the one could not be disjointed from the other, without the Destruction of them both.

But every Malecontent will be ready to say they are for Go∣vernment, and can chearfully obey good Princes; but such as exercise Arbitrary Government, or are Vicious and Irreligeous those they cannot obey. To such I would recommend the Saying of(q) 1.2520 Marcellus about Vespasian, We ought to desire good Princes, but to submit to whatever they be. So(r) 1.2521 Cerealis told his Soldiers, As we endure Barrenness, and orecharging Rains, and the rest of the Evils of Nature, so ought we to undergo even the Luxury, and Covetousness of Princes. For Vices will be while there are Men, but those are not continual, but by the in∣tervening of good Princes are recompenced.

Mr.(s) 1.2522 Hobs truly Observes, That the vertue of a Subject is com∣prehended wholly in Obedience to the Laws of the Common∣wealth; for to obey the Law is Justice and Equity, which is the Law of Nature; and to obey the Laws, is Prudence in a Subject: for without such Obedience, the Commonwealth (which is every Subjects Safety and Protection) cannot subsist. Indeed Mischief more often happens to any Kingdom, from the waywardness, or factious Disobedience of Subjects, than from the ill Government of Princes.

Therefore(t) 1.2523 Cleobulus rightly observed, That the Repub∣lic is well composed, where the Subjects fear Infamy more than the Laws; for then it may be presumed; they are Obedient out of a Principle of Vertue, rather than Awe.

Plutarch(u) 1.2524 saith, That City or Kingdom is famous, where every one performeth his Office. If the Prince do what be∣comes him, the Magistrates exercise their Places, and the Commonalty obey their Magistrates, and the Laws.

This is the Blessed Harmony, wherein this sublunary Go∣vernment imitates the great Oeconomy; the nearer to which eve∣ry Government comes, the more beautiful and stable it will be.

CHAP. XLII. Of Faction and Sedition in the State: the Causers and Causes of them.

IN every Body, whether Natural, Artificial, or Political, the Beauty, Gracefulness, and Use of it consists in its Sym∣metry, Firmness and Union. The Fragments of the most ex∣cellent Statue, the Rubbish of the most magnificent Pallaces, the crumbled Dust and Atoms of the Beautifullest Bodies, are the Objects of our Pity and Condoling: even so ought to be the Discords, Factions, and Seditions of a Commonweal; or Kingdom; for by these the whole Compages of the Fabrick is dissolved.

It was the Consideration of this that made the(a) 1.2525 Orator say, That those who delight in Discords, in the slaughter of their Fellow-Citizens, and a Civil War, neither think their private Hearths, i. e. their Properties, the publick Laws, or the Rights of Liberty, dear to them; therefore ought they to be spewed out from the Society of rational Men, and to be ex∣terminated out of the Confines of humane Nature.

Faction and Sedition being a Composition of several mis∣chievous Ingredients, I shall single them out, and give short Characters of them particularly, that the Reader may with more ease know their Tendencies.

The Persons that are apt to be Seditious,* 1.2526 are first the Debauch∣ed, as Tacitus excellently observes, Privatim degeneres, in

Publicum exitiosi, nihil spei nisi per discordias. Such as give them∣selves to Luxury, degenerate from the Virtue of their An∣cestors, are unbridled in their Appetites, live without Rule and Order, have no regard to the Laws that should restrain them, where nothing remains but the instrumenta vitiorum, as the Curious(b) 1.2527 Historian elegantly observes of those that in Galba's time were to refund Nero's Donative.

Such having emancipated and withdrawn themselves from all subjection to the Laws of the Soveraign of the Universe, no wonder they yield obedience to nothing but the Impetus of sen∣sual Appetites; and orderly Government curbing these, makes it uneasy to them.

Secondly,* 1.2528 The vain and light Airy headed Persons are fit∣ted to feather the Seditious Arrows that subtiler Heads do fashion: these rush into Action without deliberation, weary of things long used, rather(c) 1.2529 chusing (for the sake of Novelty) doubtful and uncertain matters, than such as are the issues of stay'd Councils. Lampoons, Libels, and Pamphlets are their chief Studies: They traffique most at the Booksellers Stall, they desire no acquaintance with the seriouser Books of his Shop; the Play∣house and Coffee-houses entertain them more than the Church or Westminster-Hall. They are brittle Tools, but sharply edged, where they are to cut Feathers and Chaff: They are not made to work upon Marble, or write Laws in Tables of Stone.

They are the puffing Whirlwinds that raise the Dust, the Ignes Fatui that mislead poor Mortals by a little glaring light. They are the Lapwings that whirle about you, and no sooner stoop at you, as if they would let you know what they meant, but they whisk off again.

Thirdly,* 1.2530 The Indigent are fitted in all respects for Sediti∣on and Tumults. They are conscious of their low Estates, and hope to better them in the Scramble, according to that of the Poet(d) 1.2531,

Hinc usura vorax, avidumque in thempora Foenus, Et concussa fides, & multis utile Bellum.

In the Cities, saith(e) 1.2532 Salust, those that have no Riches, envy the Good and Rich; they hate the ancient order of things, and are greedy of change, studying Innovations by th uneasi∣ness of their present condition, in hopes of bettering them∣selves.

According to the excellent(f) 1.2533 Historian, Those who have little credit in Peace, are joyful in disturbance, safest in un∣certainties: for they know, in the condition they are in, they are certainly undone; and adventures may chance to be pros∣perous to them.

So the Philosopher(g) 1.2534 observes, That those who live intem∣perately, sand consume what they have, study Novelties, and either themselves attain to a Tyrannical Government, or impel

others to exercise it; as he instanceth in Dionysius among the Syracusans, in the Hi••parians, and the Amphipoli in Aegina: So Cleotimas headed the Chalcedonian Poor against the Rich. So Tacitus ascribes Sylla's boldness and undertakings to his Poverty: so of Cataline, Salust(h) 1.2535 tells us, The Indigent is the most at hand useful to Men that covet Power; and gives the reason, Because their own Fortunes being of small, or no value, the hopes of Reward and Gain makes every thing ho∣nest to them.

So Cicero speaking of Cataline's Conspiracy, tells us,(i) 1.2536 That there were none in Rome, or any other corner of Italy, who was in Debt, but he was receiv'd into Confederacy, having spent profusely their Patrimony, and debauched their For∣tunes; Patrimonia sua profuderunt, fortunas suas abligurierunt.

So Plato(k) 1.2537 observes such to be Seditious, in hopes, that if they prevail, they may elude their Creditors; so Pericles is censured that he fomented the Pelepone••sian War against his Country, and Cicero objects the same against Anthony.

Tacitus(l) 1.2538 saith of Otho, There was no hopes in Matters composed; Hope and Counsel was in the Tumult and Huddle of Affairs; he being luxurious above the State of a Prince, and poor below that of a Private Person.

To which we may annex what the Blessed King(m) 1.2539 observes, That some Men thirst after Novelties, others despair to relieve the necessities of their Fortunes, or satisfie their Ambitions, in peace∣able times(distrusting Gods Providence as well as their own Me∣rits) were the secret (but principal) Impulsives to those popular Commotions. These indeed were the Men, who having glut∣ted themselves with the spoils of the Royal Party, by Asses∣ments they drained all the Wealth of the Freeholders, and were never heard to say, Oh•• jam satis est.

These are Tools fitted for all Factious Handles and Hafts; and being always sharp, cut deepest with a forceable Hand. Necessitas ad turpe cogit; nothing is so Villainous, that Reward, and the hopes of bettering their Fortunes, well not tempt them to perpetrate.

The Fourth Cause of Faction and Sedition, is Ambition.* 1.2540 The Philosopher joyns them to the Covetous, and Giphanius calls them the Pestes & publicae fontes Seditionum, the Plague of a Commonwealth, and the Fountains of Sedition. So Timon in Stobaeus saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 omnium malorum & calami∣tatum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 elementa sunt.

Ambitious Persons are the Touch-wood and Tinder of Se∣dition; a little Spark inflames them. Ambition is a prime In∣gredient in all Factions, leading Men naturally to change the model of all things Civil and Sacred, that is not the product of their Counsel. This excites them to seek the removal of such, who enjoy more Honorary or Beneficial places than themselves. Those(n) 1.2541 Honours which they despair to enjoy in a composed, they judge they may acquire in a disturbed State.

These (saith a late(o) 1.2542 Author) are generally the Incendiaries which kindle the Fire of Intestine War. They are the worst pests a People can be Plagued with, having rarely either Reli∣gion, Conscience or Honesty. If they rise, they are the worst companions; they caress and flatter the People only for their own advantage. If they miscarry, they leave the poor deluded Vulgar to sink, and they get the Prey. So that no∣thing is got by these sort of Men, but much may be lost. All the People of the World, that have been free, and are not, have been ruined by these sort of Men, except those conquered by Foreigners.

It is an high commendation that(p) 1.2543 Livy gives to the Ro∣man Commonweal, That unless the love of his undertaken Work might byass him, there was never a Commonweal great∣er, or holier, or richer in good Examples, nor into which so late, Avarice and Luxury entred, or where Poverty and Par∣simony had such a durable Honour.

But Salust as truly observes, that after they had destroyed Cavthage, Discordia atque Ambitio, & caetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, maxime aucta fuere; Discord and Ambition, and the rest of the Evils that usually attend Prosperity, were encreased. These indeed are the Cankers of Peace and Plenty, as it is usual in temperate years, that with the abundance of Fruits, swarms of Locusts, Caterpillars, and other mischievous Insects encrease.

The Character of an Ambitious Man, in a great(q) 1.2544 Au∣thor, is, That he is always searing, always careful lest he say what will displease, counterfeiting Humility, Honesty, Affabi∣lity, and Bountifulness; cringing to all, frequenting Courts of Princes, visiting the Nobility, obsequious to all, that he may be praised of all: But when he hath attained his ends, he is quite another Man, proud and haughty, not(r) 1.2545 caring to pro∣fit others, but to preside over them; not so much caring to do good in his Office, as to be great,(s) 1.2546 tantum ut noceat cupit esse potens.

Fifthly,* 1.2547 the Envious are canker'd Branches in a Common∣wealth. Envy (saith my(t) 1.2548 Lord St. Albans) is a gadding Passion, walketh the Streets, seldom is at home. Those that are Gossip∣ers, and spend their time in carrying News(u) 1.2549 betwixt one another, in their Evening Chat, mostly enviously detract from the Fame of others.

Men of noble Birth, are noted to be Envious towards new Men when they rise; for the distance is altered, and it is like Deceit in the Eye, when others come on, they think themselves go back.

Envy is a Disease, spreadeth like Infection upon that which is sound, and tainteth it so, that when it is once got into a State, it traduceth the best(w) 1.2550 Actions, and hath this ad∣dition to its Mischief, that it incessantly is at work. As the Vul∣ture feeds on Carrion rather than fresher Meats, the Flies seek

Dung and rotten Matter: so the Envious is always Preying on what is putrid in the Commonweal, of which he is the Scavin∣ger, contaminating the best Administration by his loathsome Blasting; corroding and eating like a Canker, ever detract∣ing from the present(x) 1.2551 management, and admiring what is by-past. Envy is always working, finding new and new mat∣ter to work upon. One Man's higher Place troubles him, ano∣thers greater Endowments, Offices, or popularity; so that to the Envious there are no(y) 1.2552 Holy days.

Sixthly the Discontented. They are always unquiet, nothing pleaseth them, wherein they have not the Share they covet in the Administration; they are uneasy to themselves, to others, and the whole State.

Discontents in the Body Politick, are like to ill humours in the Body natural, which are apt to gather into preternatural heat, and inflame, grow dangerous, and ill=boding, when the causes of them are long pent up before they be observed, or are really given to Man of great Spirits, and the Multi∣tude.

The discontented (saith a(a) 1.2553 late Author) are the silliest Animals in the World. If the Government hath injured me, I ought to take it as the injuries of the Weather, not to rage and fret at it. Kingdoms and Nations have been ruined by such Fools, who have ever pay'd dear for such revenge, and been buri∣ed in the ruines they plucked down about their own Ears. These Malecontents are under the dominion of the strongest Passions, and are not Masters of their own Reason; which is no part of the Case of others, who furnish them with Brands and Grana∣does, without which these Gentlemen might possibly after a little sullen rage, have come into their Wits again. But when they see their Passions are not only pitied or cherished, but ap∣plauded; it is a thousand to one, they never recover out of their distemper, or not to be sure, till they, or the Publick have smarted for their folly, and those who have caressed the devilish humor in them.

Seventhly, Emulous Persons (who can neither endure equals,* 1.2554 or superiours) are great promoters of Factions; for when Men of great or over-weening Parts, such as have been great Commanders, or Ministers of State, by the interposing of others, are obstructed in the sole managery of publick Af∣fairs, or any other ways disobliged, they are egged on to make the opposite Faction, and so the Commonweal is shaken by them: and though this discontent begin in smaller matters, wherein the State is not so much concerned, or the subverting of Government is to be feared; yet Ambition stepping in, Discon∣tent grows to Revenge, and then calls in all the Auxiliaries of Faction; which being rendezvouzed, they are most diffi∣cultly reformed, before one side be Conqueror. And so from a few personal Dissatisfactions, proceed those rude Shocks which endanger the whole Government.

So in Athens we read of the aemulous Dissentions betwixt Nicias and Alcibiades, Themistocles and Aristides, and after of Demosthenes and Eschines, and others; and so in Rome betwixt Capio and Metellus, Scipio Asricanus and Metellus, Gracchus and Scipio, Pompey and Caesar: of which I have at large treated in the Chapter of Commonwealths.

So Tacitus speaking of Cecinna, who having command of a Legion under Galba, being laid aside, upon an Accusati∣on that he had misimployed the Publick Mony to his own use;(b) 1.2555 grew Malecontent, and endured it ill, and in the tumul∣tuous times, having got the Soldiers good will, he was busy to promote all kind of Seditions, designing to cover his own Wounds with the mischiefs to the Commonweal.

Eighthly,* 1.2556 The popular Men are Engines fitted for Sedition, if they be not well principled to the Government; for by them the(c) 1.2557 Populace is easily and effectually moved, and they give Beginning to the Rage of the People, the rest being mad by Contagion, and Infection.

These having by many good and plausible Deeds, gained Credit with the Mobile, and using all their Arts to captivate their affections, can lead and guide them with as much ease, as the small Rider doth the bulky Elephant, or the Keeper doth the Rhinoceros, or the Bearward his Bear, by their Rings and Chains. So Tacitus gives frequent Examples of such Mens courting the People, and ingratiating themselves with them, when they needed their Hands to help them to attain their Aims; especially in the Conspiracy(d) 1.2558 of Otho a∣gainst Galba, where he tells us, that Otho besides his Feasting and giving Largesses to his Soldiers, was not wanting (even after he had taken Arms) to stretch out his Embraces to the People, humbly to salute them, give all tokens of intimate affecti∣on, and all servility, in hopes of obtaining thereby the Rule.

Such popular Men are most to be feared, who are like(e) 1.2559 Antonius, one of Vespasian's great Captains, of whom Taci∣tus saith, That to him alone the Soldiers Ears were open; for he had Eloquence, and the Arts of making gentle, and paci∣fying the Multitude, and had Authority with them.

Ninthly,* 1.2560 The cunning close Men, who can best dissemble their evil Intentions, are dangerous Ingredients of Faction; such as(f) 1.2561 speak fair and plausible things of the Government, but in their Bosom, and to their Confidents, and secret Friends, are framing Mischief. Of such, Livy speaks, that by little Arts they strow their(g) 1.2562 ways to Credit, that when it is for their purpose, they may deceive with so much more advantage to their publick or private Designs.

These are such as speak not openly against the Government but can afford it some good words; but then you shall be sure they will subjoyn some sighing Wish, That such or such a thing were amended, or better managed.

Tenthly, Innovators in Religion are the most dangerous of all others, to kindle Factions;* 1.2563 their Fire is pretended to be from Heaven, their zeal warmed with a divine breath from the Altar.

Diversity of Religions (saith a late grave(h) 1.2564 Writer) cause the greatest Ferment of the People. From hence the Part-taking, and Part-making, ill Will, Hatred, Contentions and Jealousies spring, one Party hoping to rise, another Party fearing it may be so, and striving to pull down or keep down another.

Presbytery, saith he, is a State-Faction hatched in Rebellion, and a popular State; the whole Scheme of it adapted to those ends, totally inconsistent with Monarchy, and the freedom and liberty of any People that will not be Slaves to the Clergy: and this is not so much the Doctrine, as the necessary effects of its ill Principles.

Independency sprung out of it, as luxuriant Suckers from the roots of the Tree; every Minister of that perswasion, desiring only to be Head of his own Congregation, advanced the Banner of Toleration, so that some'reckoned one hundred and forty several Factions and Heresies; the Seeds and Reliques whereof are still scattered among us, ready upon any benign Vote of an House of Commons (as that was about the taking off the Penal Laws, and the Union of Protestants) to sprout out of the Soil they lay covered in. So that a worse Crop than that of Cad∣mus's armed men may be expected, when ever any cherishing warmth enlivens them.

This too manifestly appeared of late, when such as for above twenty years, had lived Separatists from the Church established by Law; yet to be qualified for places of Trust, Authority or Preferment, and to imploy them to the ruin of the Church and Monarchy, could take the Sacrament, Test, &c. with all the Formalities required by the Act.

We find none of those Pamphlets that inveigh against Arbi∣trary Government, but they generally are against the Church and Monarchy; such as these took advantage at the consterna∣tion of the People at the Plague, Fire, and their Plot, to push their designs forward; which they might do with the greater safety, because of the confusion the People were in. So that the Scourge (which as far as any man can judge) was sent for the sins of the former Rebellion, was made by them a means of disposing them to commit the same over again, when time and opportunity serve, as the same Author observes. Thus far my Author.

Having under these Ten general Heads ranked the several causes of Sedition, I shall refer the Reader to the(i) 1.2565 Philoso∣pher and his Commentators, to consider several others that are less material to my purpose; noting only, that he divides the causes into such as are real causes, and naturally produce such effects in the ill managery of Government, and such as by designing men are the pretended causes, which are

Blinds and false Colours to muster the Parties under.

The pretences that Factious and Seditious persons generally use, are, That the Government invades the Property of the Peo∣ple, by illegal impositions of burthens upon them; That the Laws and Customs are altered, There is Innovation in Religion, Un∣worthy Persons are advanced, who promote Oppression and Arbitrary Rule.

Liberty and ease(k) 1.2566 of the People from some pressures or grievances are pretended. This is the Tabret, and the Horn∣pipe to the Mobile, this sets them all on gog. The weather∣cock common-man thinks himself set upon the Spires of Stee∣ples, or the tops of common Halls, though he sees not a span length before him. He is easily(l) 1.2567 puffed up with vain hopes of liberty, and when the Factious designers have once pos∣sessed the People, that such and such Actions of the Magistrates have a tendency to deprive them of their Properties, Privi∣ledges and Liberties, their jealousies hurry them into all the acts of Rage and Madness, which prove so fatal to Kingdoms. For when the Rabble (that bellua multorum Capitum) once feels their strength, and finds the reigns loose on their Necks, they are ungovernable, wild and untameable. The hard-mouthed Crea∣ture despiseth the Bitt, and casts the Rider; though it's the ircer∣tain Fate to be mouthed by a much greater Oppressor that so jades them, that they are blessed if they may obtain the benefit of their former despised Masters rule.

The Nurseries of Sedition are great and populou•• Cities,* 1.2568 being bodies aggregated of all dispositions. Hence the Philosopher(m) 1.2569 well observes, That if the Citizens be rich, they can spare time to hear the Orations of the. Demagogues, to club in Consultati∣ons and Combinations, and bestow some parts of their wealth to carry on their designs. If poor and wanting imployments, they are ready for all evil impressions and tumults; they are ready to ascribe the want of their Trade, and their poverty, to the ill administration of the Government.

All sorts make it a relaxation of their toils and cares in the ma∣naging their Trades, to refresh themselves with occurrences of State; here seditious Libels, half whispers, false News, licentious discourses, jealousies, murmurings and repinings are forged, to be Repast for every Palate; Oglios here of several kinds are cook∣ed by the Seditious; so they such Poyson with their very racy Liquors; they grow as wise as Statesmen, by drinking Tea and Coffee, and by telling and hearing shreds of News. Their Ale and Claret makes their Political heads settle affairs of State; and according to their own inclinations, they furnish their Cor∣respondents with News by retail, casking them up with their Wares, and the Plague spreads into the Country by that means.

Besides, in this vast multitude, it cannot be wondred there should be diversities of Opinions, as well as Interests: Some, and those the wisest, favouring(n) 1.2570 their Prince, others the Patriots (as they call them) and study Factions. Yea the very

heads of several Companies and Societies, often bandy one against another by emulations first, and after by siding into Parties: so that it is observable, that by their natural proneness to Factions, where nothing but Rivers, low and high grounds, have divided the Inhabitants, those local distinctions have been sufficient to discriminate them into Parties. So it hap∣pened betwixt the Inhabitants of the Pyroeus and Athens, also at Syracuse betwixt the City and Cittadel; At Rome betwixt the Cis and Trans-Tyberini. So at(o) 1.2571 Paris the Inhabitants on one side the Seyne were for the Faction of Orleance, and the other for Burgundy; The like we have known between London and Southwark, and Westminster and London. A judicious(p) 1.2572 Author saith, A great City is the fittest En∣gine to turn an old Monarchy into a new Commonwealth: and the reason is obvious; for Corporations and Cities are so many Republicks within a Monarchy, which when by their Combinations in numerous swarms they attcque, they much en∣danger: though being composed of the Loyal as well as Facti∣ous, after they have found the tyranny of their fellow Citizens, and the difference betwixt the mild Rule of their Princes, and the Arbitrary one of their fellows, they mostly return to their Senses and Allegiance again.

CHAP. XLIII. Of the Symptoms and Diagnostick signs of Sedition and Faction.

THE learned(a) 1.2573 Athanasius Kircher, in his curious Book or Sounds tells us, That in Japan there is a Bell, which tol∣eth of its own accord, so often as great Seditions and Tumults are forming or beginning in the Kingdom. And in Spain in a Town called Vibilla, in the Diocess of Caesar Augusta(b) 1.2574 (Varius tells us) there is a Bell which they call Miraculous, for that some Months before any mischief or calamity befalls Christendom, it sounds by it self without any one that is known to ring it, as in seve∣ral calamitous periods he mentions.

As to matter of fact (though attested by grave Authors) I shall not make any enquiry, whether the Relations be true or not. But if God Almighty had vouchsafed such a vertue to every Parish Bell, it might supersede all enquiries into the signs of ap∣proaching Sedition and Faction: Yet I question whether it would enable Governours to prevent them; for the most would be apt to conclude, That as they were by a supernatural Power, or from the Deity appointed to be the presages of Factions and Seditions; so they would conclude that God Almighty had

destined such Commotions, and would be the more ready to promote and push them forward.

Shepherds of People (saith the ingenious(c) 1.2575 Chancellor) had need know the Kalenders of Tempests in the State. There are certain hollow blasts of winds, and secret swellings of Seas that forerun them, and so there are in States.

First,* 1.2576 Hatred to the Government is a certain sign of intended Sedition. It is not easie to be conceived, saith Seneca(d) 1.2577, how great a Rage may arise when the hatred is over-grown: it is then ready to teem, and the Poison will break forth. Therefore Cicero saith, No Government can be lasting, which is much fear∣ed, be it grounded or ungrounded: for(e) 1.2578 men naturally hate whom they fear, and whomsoever one hates on such an occa∣sion, he wisheth his destruction.

Secondly,* 1.2579 This secret hatred acquires an efficaciousness by Contempt; for Fear is slow and undaring, but Contempt puts on the Armor: Fear is an extinguisher of an Attempt, and a Prince is in Sanctuary while his Enemies fear: but when a Factious man is emboldened to contemn his Prince, he shaketh off fear, and consequently reverence. This happens most to mild Princes and criminally merciful, by which they do them∣selves and the(f) 1.2580 publick great harm; liberty is thereby taken of trangressing, and the Reverence of the People is thereby laid aside.(g) 1.2581 While Honour to the Prince lodgeth in the Subjects breasts, the veneration to him daily encreaseth; but when he is once contemned, his Authority and Power sinks in the Socket, For Reverence is that wherewith Princes are girt of God, and when Discords, Quarrels and Factions are carried openly and audaciously, it is a sign that reverence to Government is lost.

In Tiberius's time,* 1.2582 when Julius Fl••rus headed the Gallick Rebel∣lion(h) 1.2583 Tacitus gives us an account how the Male-contents at Rome received the news of it, whereby we may learn some Symptoms of Seditions. For all things (saith he) done by Florus were believed to be worse; many for the hatred they bore to the present management, and out of the desire of changes, even rejoyced in their own dangers.

Thirdly,* 1.2584 Other great signs of Troubles and Factions, are sholes of Libels and licentious discourses against the State, spreading false News to the disadvantage of it, the often running up and down of such, and the greedy embracing them; for Seditious Tumults and Seditious Fame, are but Brothers and Sisters.

The Presses are pestered with Seditious Pamphlets, deluding, abusing, flatterring, enticing, terrifying, or(l) 1.2585 affrighting, ac∣cording as they may be serviceable to the Faction they wish for. The Illustrious Saint and Martyr felt the heat, and suffer∣ed the scorchings of those Tongues set on fire by Hell, and after of those Pamphlets sparks and flakes which raised that fatal fire in his three Kingdoms: and when the Kings Ministers, his Judges, Officers Civil and Military, were represented in the most odi∣ous

manner that malice could invent, with a thousand false and ridiculous Lies of fear of Popery, and Arbitrary Government (which was, and ever will be, the burden of those Syrens Songs) it was easie to discover the approaching Storm, and an evident Symptom of a distempered People on the Tiptoes of Frenzy.

The grave(m) 1.2586 Historian describes secret murmurers, and spreaders of false News, thus, That they begin with secret Speeches, as is usual in matters forbidden; then with wandring Rumours, fitted for the open ears of the most unskilful, and then adapted for the turbulent, and those that are desirous of change. Thus they raise their Trumpets till they sound to Arms, and Onset.

Fifthly, These are open contagious Airs,* 1.2587 Shafts flying by Night and Day, but they arise from the hollow Caverns, where Clubs and Associations sit brewing of them, and feathering those Bolts. So Tacitus(n) 1.2588 observes of the Ga••ls, In little Consults they debated Seditious Matters. Where obiter we may note, how congenial the Actions of Seditious Persons are in all Ages; which he further describes in the method of(o) 1.2589 Porcen∣nius when he excited the Souldiers of Pannonia to Rebellion, That by Nightly Conferences, and Evening Clubs, when the better sort were retired, he gathered the worst, and such as he could confide in, to work them to his purpose, and confede∣rate them to carry on his Designs.

Sixthly, The Method(p) 1.2590 Otho took to supplant Galba,* 1.2591 the same Judicious Historian describes thus: That he had practi∣sed before to get the Favour and good will of the Souldiers, calling them Mates, and Companions, relieving, and being bountiful to them, inserting now and then complaints, and glancings at Galba, with Speeches of doubtful Construction, or what other way he could bethink him, to stir up, and alter the Vulgar sort by disquieting and affrighting them.

Thus the Designers of changes in any State, fit their Dis∣courses to the present emergencies of Affairs, and finding any sorts of grievances to complain of, with innuendo's aggravate them, and excite the People to believe that they only are for∣ward to redress them.

Seventhly, It is a sign of a Seditious Spirit,* 1.2592 when he is busie in Calculating the Nativity of a Prince. Therefore Firmicus gives it in charge to his Astrologer, not to answer such Questi∣ons. Tertullian(q) 1.2593 tells us, That there is no need that any curiously enquire after the health of Caesar, unless it be one that meditateth or wisheth something against him, or hopes for some advantage after him. So Tribonius was sent into Exile, because he enquired of the Chaldaeans the end of the Prince. So Domitian slew Pomposian, because he had the Emperors Nativi∣ty, and carried about him the Speeches of Kings and Cap∣tains out of Livy, and called his Servants by the names of Mago and Hannibal.

Although Prophecies, Prodigies, and Prognostications are like Mercenary Souldiers, that may be listed to fight on any side; yet every Mans Superstition interprets them to his own advantage, or according to his wishes, hopes or fears. So that when the Designers have a mind to make impressions of fear on the People, they bring in some ill-boding Signs, as Apparitions, raining of Blood, Oxen speaking, Battels in the Air, and such like, to keep the People either in fear of Cala∣mities, or in hopes of more prosperous times by changes: both which would be equal disturbances to Government.

Tacitus(r) 1.2594 speaking of Otho's confiding in the predictions of the Astrologers, tells us, They are a sort of men unfaithful to the Great, deceitful to the Hopers, which always will be for∣bid, and always retained.

That the Romans judged such as gave credit to the Chaldae∣an Promises, the Ceremonies of the Magicians, and Interpre∣ters of Dreams, to be practicers against the State, and guilty of Treason; we have a memorable example of Libo(s) 1.2595 Drusus, of the Scribonian family, whom the Astrologers put in mind, that Pompey was his Great-Grandfather, Scribonia, wife of Augustus, his Great Aunt; the Caesars his Cousin Germans; that his House was full of Images and Monuments of his Pre∣decessors: then they brought him to Licentious Riot and De∣baucheries, and to raise Infernal Spirits by Inchantments. And though my Author judge there were some of Tiberius's Arts in his Accusation before the Senate, yet we find he killed himself, to avoid the infamy of a Sentence of the Senate; and upon it a Decree was made to expell Astrologers and Magicians out of Italy.* 1.2596

Before I come to treat of the Prognosticks of the Mischiefs of Factions, I must take notice of two of the certainest, most demonstrative, and dangerous signs of Faction running up to Seed that can be, and those are Tumultuous Petitioning and Tumults.

These will the better be illustrated, both separately and in conjunction,* 1.2597 by laying open the Methods the Long Parlia∣ment took to effect their designs against their Gracious King. First, With great shew of Compassion and Commiseration for their fellow Subjects sufferings, they eagerly debate the Grie∣vances, which by a correspondence betwixt the Members of the House of Commons, and their Friends in the Country, by Petitions, many thousands strong, were daily represented to them, every one striving to be foremost in representing, and outstrip his Neighbour in exaggerating the Grievances (as they called them) that they lay under. In these Petitions to the Houses (but mostly to the House of Commons) were Bead-rolls of Complaints against the oppression of the Subject, both by the Kings Council, President, and Ecclesiastical Courts, the Star-Chamber, High Commission Court, the Judges counte∣nancing exorbitant Power, that the Property and Liberty of

the Subject was invaded by Monopolies, Ship-money, Knight-hood-money, &c. illegal Sentences in the Star-Chamber, the Innovations of the Bishops, their severity against pious Noncon∣formists, and People of peaceable and tender Consciences, as they called them; and the baser sort of the People were permitted, or rather invited to come to the Parliament-House, to back these strong Petitions.

By this Artifice, they exposed the Government to obloquy and contempt among the People, and raised in them a confi∣dent Opinion that their only Redress was to be hoped from the Parliament, and so brought themselves into a popular esteem, by so much more loosening the Peoples Affections, and Alle∣giance to the King, by so much as they faster knit the Peoples Hearts and Hands to their Representatives, using all their in∣dustry to make the Subjects believe they were the only Patriots and Liberators.

They pass Votes conformable to the Petitioners desire, a∣nimate them to search for more, and especially to fix them up∣on Persons they were mindful to remove out of places of trust. Then they begun to impeach several Ministers of State, and the Judges, that they might weaken the King in his Councils, and terrifie others into compliance: always taking care to charge the misdeeds upon the Kings evil Counsellors, magni∣fying the Kings Natural Goodness, and declaring, That if he would consent to redress those Grievances, and to punish the Authors, they would make him a richer and more glorious King, than any of his Predecessors. Seditious(t) 1.2598 Pamphlets daily came out, and the Printing-Press laboured Night and Day to abuse the King and his Mini∣sters, and bring the Government, Ecclesiastical and Civil, into obloquy. Their Preachers in the mean time, like so many De∣magogues, plied their business so effectually, blowing the Trum∣pet as they phrased it, for the Lord and Gideon, that by them the Houses Interest prevailed every where, especially in the Populous City, which was in a manner wholly at the Houses devotion.

Having removed the Great and Noble Earl of Strafford by great Industry and Art, and the Midwifery of Tumults, and got themselves (by as strange an Art as oversight) perpetuated, they set themselves to Remonstrate; in which they odiously re∣count all the miscarriages (as they called them) in the Blessed Kings Reign, charging him (though covertly) with them, and all the very Misfortunes of his Reign. They revive the Bill a∣gainst the Bishops sitting in the House of Lords, which had been rejected, and in a Parliamentary way ought not again to be set on foot that Session; the better to effect which, they cause the Rabble and their Confederates to menace and assault them, and other Loyal Members of the House; they Post up seve∣ral names of Lords and Commons, who opposed their proceed∣ings: and having driven the King, and his whole Family away by

most outragious Tumults; they declare their Ordinances to be binding during their sitting, and assume the Power of inter∣preting, and declaring what was Law; and by all these Arts they brought the People, not(u) 1.2599 so much to joyn with, as to conspire with them.

Then they pretend a necessity of putting the Kingdom into a posture of defence, to secure it against Popery, and Arbitra∣ry Government, and the Invasion of Foreigners, which they pretend were to be brought in to assist these. They single out the most confiding and daring in every County to be their Commissioners of the Militia; so(w) 1.2600 much as every one was forwarder in boldness, and more hardy, by so much the more he was to be confided in, and sitter to help forward the tur∣bulent work they were about.

Having first got the Peoples affections to revere them as their Deliverers, they the more easily obtained their Bodies, Ar∣mour, and Moneys, and so prosecuted a Rebellious War open∣ly; yet with that shameful pretence, that they were fighting for the King against his Evil-Counsellors, and, amongst hands, court him with most Dethroning Propositions: and success Crowning their arms, they wholly destroyed that Monarchy they had all along pretended to establish upon surer founda∣tions for the Honour of the Crown, and benefit of the People, than former Ages had known. Instead of which, they made themselves Masters of all their Fellow-Subjects, seizing their Estates, Imprisoning and Murthering their Persons; altering the established Ecclesiastical Government, and all the funda∣mental Laws, enriching themselves, and over-awing the King∣dom by a standing Army.

Thus I have drawn that in Miniture, which was the Trage∣dy of many Years, and the Subject of numerous Volumes, and I shall tack to it something parallel in later Years, to let all Posterity see what a Characteristick Mark it is of Turbulent and Factious Inclinations, when Petitions against the Will of the Government are violently promoted.

The great mischief of tumultuous Petitions being considered by the Loyal Parliament,* 1.2601 upon the late Glorious King's happy Restauration, Provision was made, that the number of deli∣verers of Petitions should not exceed ten; that three of the Justices of Peace in the County, or the major part of a Grand Jury at an Assize, or General Sessions; or in London, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common-Council have the ordering, and consent to such Petitions, which shall be for alteration of things established by Law, in Church or State, by way of Pe∣tition, Complaint, Remonstrances, Declaration, or other Ad∣dress to the King, or either Houses of Parliament.

It cannot be forgot (in the interval of a later Parliament) how zealous and busy multitudes were to get Petitions with Hun∣dreds and Thousands of Hands, to the late King for the sitting of a Parliament, before the King in his Wisdom thought sit.

This occasioned the King to issue forth a Proclamation against tumultuous Petitions, and other Loyal Persons to express an ab∣horrence of such Petitions, that would press the King to preci∣pitate their Sitting.

Those that petitioned the King for convening of a Parlia∣ment, could not but foresee the ungratefulness of such Peti∣tions to the King; yet the Designers gave it not over: for they had other Ends. As first, to engage Men by their Subscripti∣ons to be more fast to them: Secondly to try whether the Peo∣ple might be brought to Tumults: Thirdly to incense the Peo∣ple more against the Government, if their Petitions were denied: Fourthly to shew in terroreon, the number of their Adherents: Fifthly, That through every County the confiding and zea∣lous might be known each to other: and Lastly, that whenever that Parliament should sit, they might have their Thanks, and by their Numbers the Parliament might be encouraged to pro∣ceed in such things as they desired, knowing hereby the Strength of the Party.

When the House of Commons met, nothing was so much clamoured against, as the Proceedings upon the late Proclamati∣on; as if all the Liberties of the Subjects of England had con∣sisted in this. Therefore they vote that it ever hath been the undoubted Right of the Subjects of England,* 1.2602 to Peti∣tion the King, for the Calling, and Sitting of Parliaments, for redressing of Grievances; and to traduce such Petitioning, was a violation of Duty; and to represent it to his Majesty as tumultuous, and Seditious, was to betray the Liberty of the Sub∣ject, and contribute to the design of subverting the Legal an∣cient Constitution of the Kingdom, and introducing Arbitrary Power, and so a Committee (called of Abhorrence) was ap∣pointed to enquire of all such Persons as had offended against the Rights of the Subjects.

This was it that explained their Vote, for all the Controver∣sy was, Whether a sew private Men might agree upon a Petition, then send Emissaries abroad to procure the Subscriptions, and then tender them, as it were by their number to affright the King to a Compliance; or that the King (to whom the Execution of the Laws, or suspension in some measure surely appertains) might not forbid such Petitions.

They singled out Sir Francis North, then Lord Chief Ju∣stice of the Common-Pleas, after Lord Keeper, and Earl of Guilford, Sir George Jefferies, then Recorder of London, now Lord Chancellor, Mr. Justice Withins, and others, as Subjects of their displeasure, for disliking, and abhorring the irregular dangerous way of Petitioning. But they received more Lustre and Regard in the Eyes of their Soveraign, and all Loyal Sub∣jects, by their Censure, than they did discredit by it. It seems worth the while for Persons that have regard to the quiet and repose of the Subject, to the Honour and Establishment of the Government, and for the Tranquillity and Liberty of their Po∣sterity

to consider, whether any mortal Man can either pro∣duce Precedent or Law to justify the Imprisonment of those Gentlemen Abhorrers; of which I have spoken something be∣fore, in the Chapter of Parliaments.

I shall now conclude with the last and formidablest sign of Sedition,* 1.2603 viz. Tumults, which are but unarmed, and Pen-fea∣thered Rebellion. They have the Mien and Standard of it, only want the Artillery. The fatal black Parliament disciplined them to be ready at any watch word, and whatever they voted a∣gainst the King or Church, was ushered in by thousands of all sorts, flocking out of the City and Country, braving and threatning all along as they went by White-Hall, and so in Sholes crowding to the Houses, promising to stand by them, and crying out for Justice. They were so insolent and rude, that they forced the Merciful King to withdraw from his Pallace, to which he never returned, till they brought him to his Barbarous Tryal and Murther.

That Blessed Kings Sence of them can be expressed by none so emphatically as by himself; therefore I shall extract some of his feeling Expressions.

I(x) 1.2604 never thought any thing (except our Sins) more omi∣nously presaging all those mischiefs which have followed, than these Tumults. And this was not a short Fitt or two of an Ague, but a quotidian Feaver, always encreasing to higher In∣flammation, impatient of any Mitigation, restraint or remissi∣on. Those who had most mind to bring forth Confusion and Ruin, upon Church and State, used the Midwifery of Tu∣mults, by which they ripped up with barbarous Cruelty, and forcibly cut out abortive Votes, to crowd in by force, what reason would not lead. Some Mens Petulancy was such, as they joyed to see their Betters shamefully and outragiously a∣bused. So the Blessed King finding they invaded the Honour and Freedom of the two Houses, and used such contemptuous words and Actions against him, thought himself not bound by his Presence to provoke them to higher Contempt and Bold∣ness. For he saith it was an hardiness beyond Valour to set himself against the breaking in of the Sea; being daily bait∣ed with Tumults, he knew not whether their Fury and Discon∣tent might not fly so high, as to worry him, and tear him to pieces, whom as yet they played but with in their Paws: Therefore thinks himself not bound to prostitute the Majesty of his Place and Person, &c. to those who insult most when they have Objects, and opportunity most capable of their rude∣ness and petulancy.

Our late gracious Sovereign in later times, when some Men were endeavouring to practise the same Methods, found some offers of the like at Windsor (a place of all others, in which one would have thought he should have had the most Honour for the Benefits he did to that Town by his so frequent resi∣dence) when first the Boys, and then the Rabble were set on

to shout for a Burgess of Parliament, in opposition to a Loyal Person His Majesty favoured, even in his own Presence.

The Prophetick Observation of the Martyred King is worth noting, That he believes the just Avenger of all Disorders, will in time make these Men, and that City, see their Sin in the Glass of their Punishment: which needs no application, but only to desire they would be so just to themselves and their Posterity, as to follow no such Precedents, and that none will encourage such outragious doings.

I shall dismiss this ingrateful Subject with the Description(y) 1.2605 Tacitus gives of the mutinous Tumult of Drusus's Soldiers, That the Ring-Leaders when they looked to the multitude with outragious Voices made terrible noises, but viewing Caesar, shrunk again: and of the whole multitude he saith, an un∣certain Murmur, an horrible cry, and suddenly a calm, by divers emotions of Mind they feared and did affright.

CHAP. XLIV. Prognosticks of Sedition and Faction.

BOdinus(a) 1.2606 tells us, That Sedition once kindled, is sud∣denly fanned, and blown by popular fury into a Flame, which is wont to set all on Fire, ere it can be extinguished.

The danger therefore of Faction is not to be sleighted, but the Government should be watchful over the least Sparks, which no Man can forbid, or tell whence they may come, or how far they may ravage, when there is a Propensity to Faction. Therefore Governours should not suffer matter of Trouble to be prepared or hatched, but crush the Cockatrice in the Egg, and the Monster in the Embryo; especially(b) 1.2607 when the Scars of late Wounds are not healed, or hardned, as after a Civil War, when Factions are most dangerous.

The danger is less, saith my Lord(c) 1.2608 St. Albans, when it springs only from the Discontent of the People, being slow of Motion, and the greater sort, of small Strength without the Multitude, can do little; but the danger is greatest, when those of higher Rank wait but for the troubling of the Waters. So Jupiter by Pallas's Advice, when the other Gods would have bound him, sent for Briarous with his Hundred Hands: an Emblem to show how safe it is for Monarchs to make sure of the Good Will of their People.

The motions of the greatest Persons in Government, ought to be as the motion of the Planets, under the Primum Mobile (according to the old Opinion, that every of them is carried swiftly by the highest Motion, and slowly by its own.) There∣fore

when great Men, in their own particular motion, move violently, Liberi usque ut Imperantium meminissent, as Tacitus speaks, It is a sign the Orbs are out of Frame.

Where Factions are not Combinations against the Govern∣ment,* 1.2609 but only private-Animosities betwixt some of the Nobi∣lity, wherein the Government is not much concerned, there may be some allowance for my Lord Verulam's Opinion: That Princes being Common Parents, should not lean to one Party; because a Boat that is overset by the unequal Weight on one side, may carry such Passengers in it, as the Prince would not lose. Therefore to study ways to piece them, and solder up the flaws, is better than to side with one, to the Ruin of the other, and sometimes of themselves also. As we may observe in Hen∣ry the third of France, who entred into the League, and it was shortly after turned against himself: which may be a docu∣ment (saith that wise Lord) to Kings how they make them∣selves a Party: for by that a Prince makes himself unus ex no∣bis, which makes an Obligation Paramount to that of Sove∣raignty. So that a Prince must be very cautelous (when he must side with one Party) which he espouseth,(d) 1.2610 lest he lean upon a ruinous Wall.

But if there be a Party, by whose fall the Prince(e) 1.2611 likewise shall be sure to be ruined, (as in case of Factions against Go∣vernment, as I mean in this whole Discourse) it is necessary for him strenuously to support it.* 1.2612 Upon this Consideration, it seems to me, that it ever will be the great Interest of the Kings of England to defend and support the Episcopal Govern∣ment; for that by fatal Experience it was found, that the over∣throw of it was the Praeludium to the Destruction of the Blessed King and Monarchy. For although he was a very great Cham∣pion of the Church of England, as established by Law; yet he too fatally yielded to take away the Bishops Votes in Par∣liament, whereby he lost a considerable Party in the House, that would never have deserted his Interest. So that in this case I may apply that of Galba(f) 1.2613 to his Soldiers, It is ma∣nifest that undivided or alone, they can neither be Saved, or Perish, in times when they are attacqued.

But to return to the Prognosticks of dangerous Seditions. I shall mention some that Tacitus hath noted and described: Speaking of the Revolt of the Legions in Germany, under Germanicus at the Beginning of Tiberius's Reign,* 1.2614 he saith, Those that looked deeply into the Disposition of the Soldiers, judged it a strong Argument of an unappeasable Revolt,(g) 1.2615 that they were not scattered or divided, nor any attempt given by a few; but grew insolent together, were quiet at once, with such moderation and constancy, that one would have thought they had been governed by one Head. For when any Sedition is carried on with such Unanimity, it is a certain Sign that the Poyson hath a large spread, and there are few sound Parts left.

The Progress(h) 1.2616 Augustus made to establish the Sovereignty in himself,* 1.2617 is the usual Method by which such as intend sub∣verting of Government, may proceed; which, according to the same Author, was, That to ingratiate himself with the People, he contented himself with Tribunitian Authority to de∣fend the Common People.; that he wound himself into the Fa∣vour of the Soldiers, by Gifts; of the People, by Provision of Sustenance; and of all in general, with the sweetness of Ease and Repose; by little and little taking upon him the affairs of the Senate, the Duty of the Magistrates and Laws: and so with∣out the Contradiction of any, he obtained the Empire.

This in Augustus was commendable and Politically done, being to alter a Commonweal into a Monarchy, and Wise∣men by his method might have foretold his Design. So in Se∣ditious enterprises against Monarchy, the way is to court the People, and insensibly cajole them with the sweetness of Li∣berty under a Commonwealth, and the heaviness of the Yoak of Monarchy; and having possessed them with this, they have no more to do but to await some critical time or revolution that may suit their Design, as some new Imposition laid, some publick Calamity, the displacing some great Officer, or Death of some great Man, or their Prince: such(i) 1.2618 Revolutions being the sittest times for great Attempts, as Tacitus speaks of Otho's Conspiracy, by Galba's Covetousness to the Soldiery, &c.

Concerning Sejanus the same Judicious(k) 1.2619 Author gives us the Saying of Drusus, That the first hopes of attaining Command, or working themselves into Power by Sedition is difficult; but after the Entrance there will not want aids of Council, and assisting Hands. Therefore it is most necessary,* 1.2620 that Princes diligently watch the motions of all kind of Seditious aspiring Persons, to prevent their first Entrance upon their Designs, lest they prove afterwards too Powerful.

In such a State of affairs the Council of(l) 1.2621 Tacitus is to be followed, That nothing is safer in Seditions, and Civil Discords, than quickness of dispatch, when there is more need of Acti∣on than Consultation.

The misfortune is great which happens to the Subjects by Faction and Sedition;* 1.2622 for such things once begun, are not in a short time hushed, but the Animosities are durable, and when one(m) 1.2623 Party overcomes, yet the Conquered retains his old grudge, and is always catching at opportunities to promote his Interest; and there is rarely (in that Generation at least) a sin∣cere amnesty, and union of Affections. Therefore as Princes by Acts of Pardon endeavour to put all into a State of Unpu∣nishableness, though they cannot into a State of Innocence; so those that have assisted the Seditious Party, ought with a ge∣nerous Repentance and Fidelity to their Prince, endeavour all their Lives, to be rubbing out those Stains by their Loyalty; For he that(n) 1.2624 repents he hath offended, is in the next degree to the Innocent.

It is one of the dangerousest signs of a strong and prevailing Faction, when a Prince hath notice and apprehension of it; yet either for want of courage, or easiness of temper, to be∣lieve better of the Factious than they deserve, quiets his resolu∣tion of opposing them at some critical time: whereby they find∣ing their Prince to yield to their importunities, in granting some one thing he hath declared against, readily interpret it a fear in him; and when they have taken him at low water-mark, they flow amain upon him with new and new Floods.

Such Princes thinking to make themselves easie by complying, embarrass themselves the more with fresh troubles, strengthen the hands of the Factious, and by deserting their best Coun∣sels and Friends, open their own retrenchments, dismount their own Artillery, and give such ground to the Factious, as at last they are either forced to quit their Throne, or with too late rally'd resolutions, fight for that Post they have so supinely quitted.

CHAP. XLV. The Remedies of Faction and Sedition.

AS no Malady in the natural Body can be cured without the knowledg of the proper causes; so the prevention, of the growth of Faction and Sedition unto Rebellion, is best effected by substracting the matter, and taking away the fun∣damental causes of it.

First it is to be observed,(a) 1.2625 That all budding evils are sooner stifled, than those that are not only run up to Seed, but suffered to shake in a rank Soil. Therefore the Historian(b) 1.2626 saith, That young and not grown up Sedition is bent with easier Councils. So beginning Ulcers are easilier cured, than those that are festered to the Bone, or are Callous Fi∣stulas.

Sedition is a personal Crime; but because it consists in the several qualifications of the Persons, I shall treat of the Cure in the same method as I have of the Causers and Causes. The signs being as so many Symptoms, which will require also some remarks.

First as to the debauched,* 1.2627 they are but the Velites, the light∣armed Vancouriers, there is small danger from them. They grow as Tares in every Country and Age, they are the luxuri∣ant branches of a rank Soil and long peace; They are the Sutlors of the Camp: There is a curse of peace that brings such weeds, but the Howes of the Laws and Ecclesiastical discipline will hinder their growth, and eradicate them.

The best Antidote against the mischiefs these people can

bring to the Common-weal, is the Prince's example to put vice out of fashion and countenance; for a Prince's Vertue and Piety influenceth much.

No doubt his Majestie's great care to forbid and discredit all kinds of Vice, will work a greater(c) 1.2628 reformation among the dissolute, than his Laws, and will engage the hearts and affecti∣ons of all vertuous, sober and considerate Persons: for as the passage among the Romans to the Temple of Honour was through that of Vertue; so must that be to Loyalty and Chri∣stianity through Morality.

Secondly, The light-headed airy Persons,* 1.2629 as they are something a kin to the debauched (the one pleasing his sensual Appetite, and the other feeding the Chimaeras of his Brain, as their pe∣culiar Province) so they are as little dangerous. The suppres∣sing Libels and Pamphlets would starve them. But if they want∣ed them, it is likely they would be worse imployed; Therefore it is necessary in all Governments, to countenance and set on work ingenious Persons, who are well principled to the State, to ridicule the Factious, and feed these flutterers of the Air with Canary-seed; and they will never fly against the wind, or out of their Aviary, but there sport themselves with as much va∣riety of hopes, flights and short Notes, as the Birds do; and yet other mortals be as ignorant of the impulsive causes, as we are of the motives of the frisks and flutters of those Choristers of the Air.

However these are not to be countenanced and indulged, lest their wild Notes be imitated, or that airiness grow too fashionable, whereby solidity and stayedness be ridicul'd; as we have seen it too much in our age, when the Military educa∣cation made the Schools and Universities less frequented, and the licentiousness of those times is not yet forgot. So that whereas in one(d) 1.2630 Corporation before the War, the Earl of Arundel found three Aldermen, that used their Greek Testa∣ments at Church; it may be there are not three in a County that do so: and Gentlemen have too much disused the reading of Latin Authors, from whence our Language hath received the greatest improvement: and yet to cover their unkilful∣ness, many are too prone in this Age to decry the use of quota∣tions out of such choice Authors. But this in transitu.

Thirdly,* 1.2631 The necessitous and indigent (being the Infantry of Faction, and the gross Body) require the Governments greater circumspection, to prevent their being arrayed by the Factious Chieftains.

Necessitas ad turpe cogit, Robbing and Stealing are their Ma∣ster exploits in times of Peace. Those which will adventure to stretch an Halter, will adventure upon Bullets for a small constant Salary; and being Mercenary will pass on either side, where the greatest prospect of gain is: therefore the Govern∣ment is too take all possible care that Prodigality and Luxury bring not the better sort to want.

The way to enrich a People in general, is to open and well ballance Trade, cherish all sort of Manufacture, banish Idle∣ness, repress wasts and excess, improve and husband the Soil, regulate all things vendable, moderate Taxes and Tributes, to invite the Indigent to people new Plantations, or those that are fit for it, to serve abroad in Military imployments.

These are such Remedies, as being vigorously put in execu∣tion, will leave few in want, but such as by their laziness will chuse to freeze on Horseback, rather than take the pains to go on foot to get them heat.

A Prince that would enrich his Subject (saith my(e) 1.2632 Lord St. Albans) must take care that the Treasure of money in the State, be not gathered into few hands; otherwise a State may have a great stock and yet starve: Money being like Dung, not use∣ful unless spread.

The best Mine above ground is when a Country affords not only the Commodity, but the Manufacture and carriage; for then treble hands are set on work. Thence in all projects of cutting Rivers, for the transporting of Commodities further within Land, it ought to be well considered, whether it be not more profitable, to have many poor men and their Cattle imployed in Land carriage, than by the cheaper way of Water only, to enrich the Tradesmen, and starve a hundred heads for one.

If the wholsom Laws for setting on work, and relieving the Poor by the labour of their own hands, and forcing sturdy Beggars and idle Vagabonds to work, or be confined to their own Parishes, were strictly put in Execution, we should have less reason to complain of them.

It is true it is not from the poor and lazy that the Govern∣ment is so much in danger; for those are not fitted for Souldiers. It is the spirited poor that have spirits above their fortunes, or by living above their income, have wasted their Estates, that are Instruments fit to be made use of by the Factious; yet their numbers are not so great, but vigilant Magistrates may have an eye upon them, and the Government may imploy the ablest of them in collecting the Revenue. Others may be made inferior Officers in the Militia, and the rest must be left to better hus∣hand what they have remaining, and kept in hopes that if they pay due respect to the Government, at one time or other they may be provided for: and the Loyal Gentry may find ways to oblige them in their Services; so that every one that is fit to be made good use of, may by one way or other be set to gain a better livelyhood, than they are like to get by santring and flandring the Government; which if they do, some severe Ani∣madversion may amend them, or deter others.

It is not possible that the Government can provide for all the Indigent, without strict execution of the Laws. But the care of the Justices of Peace, injoyned by the Soveraign, may do much good; however they may keep such from molesting the Government.

Since therefore that of Tacitus is so true,* 1.2633 That the least pro∣vident to prevent future want, build Castles in the air, and are big with vain hopes and expectations; their hopes and desires are to be so directed that they may hope for more advantage from their Prince, than from Factious Oppressors.

Fourthly,* 1.2634 Ambition is so near a kin to Nobleness, that it seems a Nobility and unvulgarness it self, being an Inmate only of Souls elevated above the level of the common sort of man∣kind.

Ambitious men are the Field-Officers and Brigadeers of Facti∣on; and by so much as they are commonly persons of Birth and Parts, they the more require a Prince's regard above all other Factious persons.

If they find (saith my Lord St. Albans) the way open to their rising, they are rather busy than dangerous; but if they be checked and stopped, like ill humours they grow Malignant. These (faith(f) 1.2635 the Chancellor) become first secretly discon∣tented, looking upon men and matters with an evil eye, and are best pleased when things go backward; and so are the worst Servants of Princes or States.

Therefore it is good for Princes if they use ambitious men, so to handle the matter, as they be still progressive; which because it cannot be without inconvenience, it is good not to use such natures at all: for if they rise not with their Masters service, they will take care to make their service fall with them.

There is less danger caeteris paribus, of ambitious men, if they be of mean Birth, than if Noble; and if they be new rai∣sed, rather than grown cunning, and fortified in their great∣ness.

It is less danger (saith the same great Chancellor(g) 1.2636 whose wise observations on this head I cannot omit) to have an ambitious man stirring in business, than great in depen∣dance. He that seeks to be eminent amongst able men, hath a great task, but such as is ever good for the Publick; but he that plots to be the only figure amongst Cyphers, is the decay of a whole Age.

Princes may make use of Ambitious men in pulling down the greatness of any Subject that over-tops, as Tiberius used Macro in pulling down Sejanus. Also they make use of them as Screens in matters of danger and envy: But no man will take that office, unless he be a seeled Dove, that mounts and mounts, because he cannot see about him.

Commanders in Wars, though Ambitious, are useful; for their Service dispenseth with the rest: and to take a Souldier without it, is to pull off his Plumes and his spurs.

Favourites are remedies against ambitious great ones, and they are well corrected also, by ballancing them by others as proud as themselves: but then there must be some middle Counsellors to keep them steddy; for without that Ballast the Ship will roll too much.

These, and such like, may be the cures of Ambitious Men, while they are of the Council of Princes, on Ministers of State. But when they want Imployment, and are tainted in their Principles, or entertain designs of altering the State, or by the unboundedness of their aspirings, aim at the sole direction of Affairs, and care not what mischiefs befall their Prince, or Country in the pursuit of their Designs; a Prince should look upon them as in the next degree of most dangerous Traitors.

In this case a Prince hath but two ways, either to set wise men to work, who cambring them to their Service, and make them sensible, that their advantage will be greater by studying the Service of their Prince in consort with other experienced Statesmen, than by heading of any Faction against the Go∣vernment; and letting them see by the many examples in Hi∣story, how unprosperous it hath been to all that have striven to wrest Honours and Employments from their Prince, with∣out proportionable Service: That they are not to presume to be wiser than the Government: That Kings have long Hands, can reach Malefactors at a great distance, and unprovided: how unable they are to vie with Majesty; and make them sen∣sible, that never any durable Renown or Wealth was got by courting the People, in opposition to the Prince; and demon∣strate the Justness of the Government in such Particulars as they most quarrel at. And if this will not bring them to their right Senses, then either send them abroad, or give them some ticklish Employment at home, wherein, if their Ambition tempt them to outdo their Commission, they may be run into a Praemunire, whereby they may be crushed at once.

Still a Prince hath a difficult task how to comport himself, to cast off Ministers of State, who having been accustomed to be very leading, and much credited in Councils, have been imployed in great and weighty Affairs, got themselves great Estates, and Dependences. If such (upon some Reasons the Prince best knows to himself) be softly to be laid aside, whereby his Partisans may be induced to believe, it was for no Guilt, but to make room for others advancement; a Prince is in danger to have his Affairs much obstructed by them.

For these (upon every ill succeeding Affair of State after their removal) will suggest to the People, the evil tendency of it; and they shall be sure to have their repute for Judgment and forecast much valued by the People, because it was so once by the Prince: and so the vulgar instantly credit his Sen∣timents as Oracles; so that he having already acquired an easy belief, with the greatest facility in the World, puts a false gloss upon the Princes best designed Actions, and retaining his old dependences, they will whisperingly disperse his sence of things.

Let him then make himself heads of the Country Party, and the true Protestants (as of late some affected to be called) and he is presently without further labour and industry adored as

the Peoples prime Patriot. Having got Tools enough to work with, still pretending his concern for the Publick weal of the People, and at the same time, tacitly insinuating some reflections upon his Quondam-fellow Counfellors, depreci∣ating their Wisdom, and Honesty, and leaves the applicati∣on to his Admirers: They will be sure to aggravate all ap∣pearances of Male-Administration (since his laying aside, and insinuate that Affairs have a tendency to oppression of the People, altering Religion, or such like plausible Subjects; and so by little and little the Peoples affections will be estranged from their Prince, and shall be set upon this new Idol, the fal∣len Lucifer.

If the Soveraign upon some emergences by necessitated to call a Parliament, he shall obtain a great, if not a major part of the Members, chosen (according to the Common Peoples by as, he shall put upon them) most opposite to the Kings In∣terest. In such an Assembly he shall be sure to have great In∣terest, and under some pretences of Grievances of the Subject, render useless to the Affairs of the Soveraign, and upon its ne∣cessary dissolution, improve still his Interest, that the succeed∣ing Parliament shall be as wayward; and by promoting Bills, he knows his Soveraign can neither in Honour or Conscience assent to, still more alienate the Peoples affections from him, till at last he get to be sole Director of such Assemblies; having all this while the Wisdom and cunning to keep himself within the compass, and reserve, that for Words or Actions he be not obnoxious to the Laws.

Having obtained this height, he is able to influence the E∣lected of City Magistrates, secure himself by them, and at last to form Conspiracies against his Prince; till which time, he being the Idol of the People, is only feared and suspected: but nothing of Traiterous Designs being yet pregnantly discove∣red, he runs on his risk till some fortunate discovery of his de∣signs force him to abscond, and then his whole machinations come to light; and if he escape the hand of Justice, he is for∣ced to leave his Countrey, and ends his life ingloriously a∣broad.

This is the common exit of such, who had much better have offered violence to these headstrong Passions, and been con∣tent with a quiet retreat, and dieted and physicked their viru∣lent distempers with the applications of sage Counsel, and the Precepts of Judicious Men, finding out the cure for their Di∣seases in Books, and Solitude; than thus to live in the Pangs and Throes of Ambition, to the disquiet of their Prince, and the emptying of their Country.

Of such we may not only say with(h) 1.2637 Drusus, That Modesty must be prayed to, that they be content with their Greatness; but Justice must be invoked to prune such luxuriant Branches, as not only overtop and Shade all the rest, but suck away from them all their Sap and Nourishment.

In(i) 1.2638 Dio Cassius I find it, advised, That such Criminals as these, that are above the stroke of Justice, and whom a Prince cannot with security to himself bring to a Publick Trial, should not be arraigned, but as open Enemies instantly punished.

So some Princes, finding such subtle ambitious Men, beyond the reach of their Justice, by way of publick Arrest and Trial by the Law, being satisfied in their Consciences that they were hatching great mischiefs to their State, and the subversion of their Government, have commanded by their Soveraign Pow∣er, execution of them by private hands.

So fell Frier(k) 1.2639 George, newly made Cardinal, for tampe∣ring with Solyman the magnificent to bring him into Transilvania, and exclude King Ferdinand, by direction from the King to Castald his General there.

So fell the Duke of Guise, and the Cardinal of Burbon; but this sort of Justiec brought as great mischiefs afterwards to their Crowns, as they could in probability have sustained by their lives, at least, if the Prince had with watchful oversight so timed the Execution, that they had let them live till they had made their Treasons more manifest.

So Tacitus(l) 1.2640 speaking of Galba's putting to death Cingonius Varro, and Petronius Turpillianus, saith, That they being not suffered to be heard, and defend their Causes judicially, pe∣rished in the repute of Innocents.

Therefore there are other ways more just and safe for Prin∣ces to take with so great and subtile Criminals. As to toyle them into some great errours, give them opportunities to shew their ill Conduct and Council, or to do something ungrateful to the People, that they may go out of their places with such a scar as will stick by them in their retirement, and study to enjoy a quiet recess, lest they be called to an account for what they connived at when they fell; so if they can be ren∣dred unuseful, and of little credit with the People, they will have none to back them in their attempts, but Persons of small Reaches, and Interest; and then for smaller Transgressions they may be called to an account; and if they be conscious to themselves of any guilt, they will quit their undertakings, for fear of a suddener Catastrophe than Ostracism.

If such Ambitious Persons have gained so great Interest, that neither by setting Spies upon them, or by other Arts their secret drift can be sifted out,* 1.2641 then Aristotle's Rule is to be ob∣served, by compassings and windings to remove them, and not to tak all their Power away at once, or to remove them to some higher place, where they may have a new Admini∣stration to begin, in which they are not so well versed, on wherein they can do nothing without the Prince and his Councils daily inspection, and where no dependences are to be gained.

Above all, a Prince is to take care to follow the(m) 1.2642 Philo∣sophers Rule, to make no man too great: for as he saith, It is

the safeguard of the Principality to make no one Man great. For Tacitus(n) 1.2643 well observed. It is most inconvenient, and dange∣rous, to have any one more in vogue than the Prince; for if such have not powerful Principles of Loyalty lodged in their breasts, they have great temptations and opportunities to do Mischiefs, especially, if after the obtaining great Authority and Power, they are sensible of parties-making against them. For then, self-preservation is mixed with their Ambition, and that prompts them to dangerous undertakings, as it did the Earl of Essex, in Queen Elizabeth's time.

For as Dio(o) 1.2644 Cassius notes, Long and lasting Command lifts up mens Spirits, and induceth them to alter Affairs. So the long continued Favours of the Queen, and the great Imploy∣ments under her, made that unfortunate Earl impatient to see himself eclipsed, and whether out of pure envy to the pre∣sent Ministers of State, or upon greater Designs (I enquire not) seek to remove at least those with a violent Hand, that he thought were his Enemies: in which attempt he fell worthily under the Severity of the Law, which will allow no Man to expound the goodness of his Intentions, when he offers force to his Prince.

When therefore there is any Necessity of State to make any great,(p) 1.2645 Livy's Rule is to be observed, That his Authority be short; for that is Safety to the Liberty of the People, as well as to the Sovereignty of the Prince. So the Lord Lieu∣tenants of Ireland, and elsewhere, are not only removable at the King's Pleasure; but they have not been used to be continu∣ed long: for more durable Commands too much elevate am∣bitious Mens Genius's, and gain them great Dependences, who will be apt to own their Honour, and places of Profit, rather to such great Ministers, than to the King himself; whereby if they have a mind to make Innovations, they have Opportunities, and Coadjutors.

Sejanus is a great Example of Ambitious aspiring, and most deserved, violent, and praecipitate Ruin. Tacitus(q) 1.2646 gives us his Character thus, That he was of Body able to endure Labour, of Mind bold, in his own Actions secret, an Informer against others, as proud as flattering, in shew Modest, but inwardly greedy of Aspiring: for which Cause he used sometimes larges∣ses and lavishing, but more often Industry and Diligence; means, saith he, dangerous alike, when they are dissemblingly used to win a Kingdom.

This Sejanus poisoned Drusus, by corrupting Livia his Wife, and practised to destroy Agrippina and Germanicus's Children, from whom he endeavoured to alienate Tiberius's Mind. He request∣ed Tiberius, that he might Marry Livia, widow of Drusus, by which means he thought to get himself incorporated into the Royal Family; and having destroyed the whole Race of Ger∣manicus and Drusus, the next Heirs of Augustus, he might the easier have usurped the Empire in Tiberius's old Age, whom he

had got to retire to Capraea, and commit the management of af∣fairs to himself.

But for all these gradual and high Steps, when he was al∣most at the top of his Ambition, snatching the very Diadem, having already got his Image with Tiberius's, decreed by the Senate, to be set about the Altars of Clemency and Friendship, he was at last by Tiberius's Authority, and Macro's Diligence, utterly destroyed:(r) 1.2647 Though he had so overcome Tiberius by his Arts, that though he was reserved to all others, yet to him alone he was cautionless and uncovered. For as by his cunning (by which he was also circumvented) saith Tacitus, so by the Anger of the Gods to the affairs of Rome, with equal mis∣chiefs to it, he flourished and fell. So Juvenal(s) 1.2648 tells us.

—Sejanus ducitur unco Spectandus, gaudent omnes— —nam qui nimios optabat honores, Et nimias poscebat opes, numerosa parabat Excelsae Turris tabulata, unde altior esset Casus, & impulsae praeceps immane Ruinae.

Fifthly,* 1.2649 The Envious are very carefully to be watched over; they secretly sow the Tares that choak the Fruitful Crop of peaceable Government.

There are some Envies that are less prejudicial to a State, as being against some Ministers of State only, and not against the Government; and these are so natural, that in the calmest times they are practised: and to prevent this, it is only needful for Princes to take care of the choice of such as they commit matters of publick Administration to, and that Persons envied so deport themselves, as they may not deserve it.

Publick Envy (saith the Learned(t) 1.2650 Chancellor) is an Os∣tracism, that Eclipseth Men when they grow too great, and is a Bridle to great ones to keep them within Bounds.

Those above others are most subject to be envied,* 1.2651 who car∣ry the greatness of their Fortunes in an insolent, proud, and imperious manner; whereas wise Men will rather sacrifice to Envy in suffering themselves to be crossed, and overborn in things that do not much concern them. So the carrying great∣ness in a plain and open manner without Arrogance, and Vain-glory, doth demolish Envy. Therefore the wise sort of great Persons ever bring upon the Stage somebody, upon whom to derive the Envy, which otherwise would fall upon themselves.

Persons of eminent Vertues,* 1.2652 when they are advanced, are less envied: for their Fortune seemeth but due to them, especially if they be of noble Blood, being that much is not added to their Fortune; so those advanced by degrees, are less envied than those per saltum.

Those that have joined with their Honours,* 1.2653 great Cares and

Perils, are rarely envied; son Men think they earn their Ho∣nour dearly, and pity them sometimes, and Pity healeth Envy. There fore the more sober sort of Politick Persons, in their Greatness, are ever bemoaning themselves, quanta patintur! not that they feel it so, (though certainly to discharge great places honourably, is a vast Fatiegue) but to abate the Edge of Envy, as my Lord St. Albans wisely observes.

Unworthy Persons are most envied at first;* 1.2654 whereas Persons of Worth and Merit, are most envied when their Fortunes con∣tinue long: for by that time, though their vertue be the same, yet it hath not the same Lustre; for fresh Men grow up to shade it.

These are not the Envies that are so perilous to States, for that they are terminated on particular Persons only; but that Envy which is dangerous to a State, is when it is great upon the Ministers of State, when the(u) 1.2655 Causes of it, especially, are small, and the Fear greater than the Feeling; for that shews the Envy raised upon Design, and to be general upon all, or most of the Ministers: and then however it may be disguised, it is upon the State it self.

It is this kind of Envy that principally forebodes Mischief, and requires greater Skill and Dexterity in the Prince, and his Ministers, to avoid the Malignity of the Blast of these black Souls, and the Sting of such Asps, Vipers, and Scorpions.

Therefore it is no small Skill to chuse out such, for publick Negotiations, as will be less subject to be envied; which in Part may be understood by electing those that have Worth, A∣bility, and Vertue to commend them, and not private Affecti∣on or Interest only.

Sixthly,* 1.2656 The discontented are File-leaders of Faction, The best foresight and prevention of Mischief from them is, that there be no fit Head, that hath Reputation with the discontent∣ed Party, upon whom they may turn their Eyes. Such are either to be won off, or affronted with some other of the same Party, that may oppose them, and so divide the Reputation, and make distinct Interests among them: for Factions generally subdivide, as that of the Optimates and Lucullus did against Pompey and Caesar; and when the Senates Authority was pulled down, Caesar and Pom∣pey after broke upon one another. So Antonius and Lepidus a∣gainst Brutus and Cassius; and after they were overthrown, Antonius and Augustus divided. So in the late War, the Pres∣byterians and Independents clashed, till at last the Contest be∣twixt them two so weakned both, that it much facilitated the Restauration of the King.

To give moderate Liberty for Grief and Discontent to eva∣porate (so it be without too great Insolence, saith a Wise Man)(w) 1.2657 is safe, especially if a Prince noting the Causes of Discon∣tent, be removing of them insensibly, during his Connivence, so as he seem aliud agere; to let them see it was not for want of Foresight, or Good-will, that he set not on the Work sooner, but that he waited the critical time.

The neglect of this, some think, was one of the great mis∣fortunes of King Charles the First's Reign: That his Ministers (who could not but be sensible how universal the discontent of the People was from the beginning of his Reign; yet suffered them fifteen years to be fermenting, and the causes not to be in∣sensibly removed, till when it was done at last, all at once, Anno 1640, 1641. the King got no thanks for it, as seeming to be fa∣vours rather extorted than freely granted. For by the long lodging of discontent in the bosom of the People, the humour turned back, made the wound bleed inwardly, and ingendered dangerous Ulcers and malignant Imposthumes. However it is too apparent (though that was a great oversight) yet the back∣wardness of the Parliaments to afford Supplies, and the de∣signers of the Civil Wars, who had been at work all along, were the true Cause of those Miseries, together with the blessed Kings Clemency.

Carrying men from hopes to hopes of redress (so as it be not too tiresome) is one of the best Antidotes against the poy∣son of discontentment; and when it ariseth not so much from malice as mistake,(x) 1.2658 a Prince may respite a while the Prosecu∣tion, to give space to the evil to repent, and to the good to consent or be convinced: perhaps a little time will mellow and meliorate humours, diem forsitan tempusque ipsum leniturum iras, sanctitatemque animis allaturam, as Livy judiciously ob∣serves.

Yet this is to be admitted with some restriction: For as Tacitus notes,(y) 1.2659 in another case of Valens Lieutenant to Vitellius, That using delay in prosecuting the Enemy, to the great danger of his cause, he spent the time of Action in Consultation; and then rejecting the extreams of Counsel, he took the middle course, which, saith he, in cases of danger and doubt, of all other is the worst.

So in punishing Authors of Faction, it is better use severity at first for a terror, than to suffer smaller Symptoms of discon∣tent to pass so long unrectified, that at last they sprout out with Hydra's heads, and grow too numerous to suppress: for in such cases all delays are dangerous, and soft quiet dealing brings more evil, than hazarding rashly; as in another case about(a) 1.2660 Otho's Conspiracy and the quickness of the execution of it, he relates; which might have been prevented, if Galba or Piso had well observed Otho's popularity, and his ingratiating himself with the Souldiery, whom Galba had discontented about the Donative.

Seventhly,* 1.2661 The Emulous being such as think themselves equally capable of their Prince's Trust and Regard, make great ruptures in a State. Therefore Tacitus condemns the Politicks of Caius Caesar(b) 1.2662 that divided the Proconsulship of Africk be∣twixt the Proconsul and the Legate, giving the latter the Le∣gion: for by parting the Office thus betwixt two, without sub∣ordination; their charge and points of Commission lying in∣termingled, and running joyntly together, bred and nourished

discord and quarrel; and through sinister emulation the Legat Valerius Festus (who had command of the Legion) murthered Piso the Proconsul of Africk. So by the reason of that emu∣lous hatred betwixt Vinius and Lucro, (c) Galba knew not what Council to follow, and was ruined.

Eighthly,* 1.2663 Popular men are to be noted of what Principles they are, and to which of the qualifications of the Factious Persons they are inclined, or how many of Factious Ingredi∣ents are in their composition: It is worth the Prince's care (saith a great(d) 1.2664 Author) to discover the inclinations of his Sub∣jects, especially those who over much affect popularity, for their wheedles easily twine and hurry the common peoples minds whither they please, despising the Government out of a greedy desire of liberty.

If these (being covetous) cannot be set upon some Collections of Taxes and Duties on the Subject, which may be heavy upon them, though laid on by Authority, whereby they may be render∣ed ingrateful to the people, who often bestow their ill will upon such; or if they cannot be trapped in some escapes of their words or actions, whereby fear of punishment may make them slacken their Sails, lest they be over-set and cannot ride the storm: Or if they be not guilty of some great immorality, which being dis∣covered, may render them less acceptable; it will be necessary that the Prince chuse fit Persons to make applications to them, by such as have some Authority over or with them, and can recti∣fie any mischiefs of the intention of the Government, and by dint of reason make such out of love with the Contagion of popular breath, to suck in the vitabler air of the Court, or by rectifying their Judgments, oblige them to manage the mul∣titude in their duty to their Prince, rather than encourage them in the sullen Malecontentedness of their nature. By such means these popular persons might be made as good Instruments as ever they were evil.

For certainly were the generality of people once brought to a sence, that established Government is infinitely less oppres∣sive to them, than when Faction giving it a disturbance, for∣ceth it to arm for their suppression, at the common Peoples charge, they would neither lend an Ear to the pragmatical and idle Persons, who never are in their Element but when they are sowing Dissentions, or making Parties, either in their Pa∣rishes, (especially in Corporations), or busying themselves with Officers of State, which is another kind of business than their shallow understandings can apprehend. But the itch of ap∣pearing some body in the rout, makes them scrub upon every log and post, rather than lose the pleasure of spending that little Salt in their Blood.

Ninthly,* 1.2665 The cunning close men are either such who are no great lovers of the Government, yet dare slily nibble at it, or they are the Achitophels. As to the first, their strength lyes in the Art of wheedling, shrugs and insinuation, they

being afraid to show their morphewed. Complexion, never put off their Vizard but when they are among their Confidents: which shows how lit∣tle courage they have, unless in a Croud, or Tumult, and then they are no longer assured than the whole body is succesful. If it come to dispute and hazard, they are the first that fly to their Burrow. They are Moles indeed: But if their walks be once discovered, they are easily catcht, and are so blind they neither know how to avoid the Trap, or their own destruction, and when uncased are the despicablest of Vermin.

The Achitophels are presumed to be of quicker sence, and nimbler parts, and have always some private(c) 1.2666 end that they eagerly pursue, though it be to the ruine of the Publick: yet they have a peculiar short sightedness, In that they neither look back on former Precedents of unsuccessful attempts of that nature; nor forward to consider how many contingences may happen, whereby the whole design may be disap∣pointed; or how many and different Engines are to be imployed, to rear that new Frame of Government. So that if any few, that have generousness or honesty, scent the design, the whole machine, by the unloosing of some few pins, falls in confusion, and buries in its rubbish the Architects who(d) 1.2667 have no half paces betwixt height and precipice.

These are presumed to have plotting heads, and all the wiles of the subtilest Foxes, and not to want courage, resolution, and conduct; rarely undertaking such designs, but when there is some general discontent, or pretensions of redressing Grievances. Therefore wise Princes are to substract the subject matter of their pretences, and to set on work able Counterminers, whom they are in some publick manner to disgrace, or disoblige, whereby they may the easilier be admitted into the inmost Councils of the Achitophels, and by secret Intelligence on the one hand advertise the Prince of the methods, drift and design of those men; and on the other side push things forward to some overt Acts, in which these Miners may be surprized. During which time the Prince is to en∣courage, strengthen and impower all who are true to his interest; which done, it will be a strange fatality, if he in a little time triumph not over these cunning Intriguers.

As to I novators in Religion, it is found by long expetience how difficult it is to suppress them.* 1.2668 For though it be true what Lipsius saith, That danger to Empires happens from nothing more, than from Re∣ligion innovated, or treacherously dissembled; yet neither he nor any Prince could yet find a sufficient means, either to prevent the Ingress, or stop the spreadings of different Modes of Religious worship, and of Doctrines that are judged conducible to a more Pious living, when they are not too chargeable or too difficult to be performed. Therefore most Princes in Europe (whose Subjects are numerous of different Religi∣ons) considering the inconvenience of dispeopling their Countries, or endangering Civil Wars, countenance one form of Discipline, that appears to them the best adapted to the constitution of their Secular Government, by capacitating only such as adhere to it, to enjoy Offices and Preferments, and permitting others in a private way to enjoy the liber∣ty of their Opinions, so as they may not be dangerous to the State. In∣terdicting publick Orations upon controverted Points; or when they find danger of Seditions by them, retrenching some of their privileges to keep them in subordination.

Having thus gone through these ten particulars, I shall say something of Libels and Corporations, and so close this Chapter.

As to Libels, we find in Tacitus,* 1.2669 That Crematius Cordus be∣ing accused that he had commended Brutus and Cassius as the last of the Romans; this was thought to reflect upon Tiberius: and in his defence, Cordus(f) 1.2670 saith, That Livy had commended Pompey, that Messalla Corvinus had spoken honourably of Cassius, that Catullus and Bibaculus's Verses were read, which were stuffed with Calumnies against Julius and Augustus; yet those Empe∣rors suffered them, and left them unpunished, whether with more moderation or wisdom, he would not determine: For such things being slighted, grew stale and unregarded; but if the Prince be incensed against them, they take fire faster.

Such Libels therefore as in a slight manner only make inge∣nious Reflexions upon select Persons,* 1.2671 or attack not the Govern∣ment enviously, and in such a way as the Government is not in danger, may be connived at. But the Authors of malicious witty Libels are principally to be sought after, as the Trum∣pets and Kettle-drums that call together the whole Array against the Government: And if they cannot be dispossessed of that Evil Spirit by gentler means, they are to undergo the severity of the Laws which are made against Incendiaries of a Kingdom, which is of more dangerous consequence than the firing of a Private Man's Habitation.

The danger from these Libels are the greater, because(g) 1.2672 in times of Faction, and the often Changes of Government, the People being unfixed, fluctuating betwixt Liberty and Licen∣tiousness, small Matters are transacted with great Emotions.

As to Corporations, they have all of them been endowed with their Privileges by the Grace and Bounty of the Sove∣reign, from whence all Immunities and Honours do flow. The first Institution of them was, no doubt,* 1.2673 that Justice might be executed in them, for the better governing their numerous In∣habitants; that they might be the Places of Traffick, where the adjacent Country might be supplied, and their Neighbours might vend their Growth and Manufacture. And thus being enriched by Commerce, separated from their Country-Neigh∣bours by Honours, Offices, and Liberties; something a Gen∣tiler Education might be expected there, whereby they might be Patterns to their adjoyning Neighbours of good and vertu∣ous Deportment, being exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Justices of Peace, and attendance upon Assizes, whereby Le∣gal Matters, in order to the necessary Administration of Ju∣stice, are executed in their Precincts, by their own Members; and many of them (besides the Privileges to be found at large in the Statutes and Law-Books) have power to chuse as many to represent them in Parliament, as the whole County hath. It would fill a large Volume, to recount the particular Powers and Freedoms have been granted to them by the Royal Favour of the successive Kings of England, whereby they are erected into little Commonwealths.

Therefore there is good reason, as they may do much good

or harm, and they have all the enriching Streams and Conduits from the Sovereign Spring and Fountain; so they should have a strict dependence upon the Sovereign, that they may not em∣ploy those great Privileges against the Laws and Government; nor the rich pragmatical Magistrates, Citizens, and Freemen, animate Factions and Seditions against it; or presume to obtrude their impertinent Advices upon their Sovereign, or by their clamorous Petitions for Redress of pretended Grievances, and Male-administration, or by their Election of Factious Repre∣sentatives, dispose of the Fate of the Empire, as they did in 1641. by their general Combinations with the then Parliament, which they so effectually assisted in their Rebellion.

It is too manifest how little Justice the two last Kings could have in the great Metropolis, the King's Imperial Chamber, or in other Corporations, although they had all, less or more, re∣ceived great Instances of their Royal Favours and Graces. And tho' the great City, by the late King of Immortal Memory's Royal Munificence, and Princely Care, as much as in him lay, by Act of Parliament, and his own particular Bounty, (after it was so fatally reduced to Ashes) was raised into one entire Pa∣lace, so beautiful and splendid, as all People must acknowledge it the Eighth Wonder; yet the grateful Returns were unpro∣portionable.

This great City enjoyed as ample and beneficial Privileges as any could wish for; and though it be deprived of some of them, yet, by the Munificence of our late and present Sove∣reign, it enjoys what is needful for its well governing in subordi∣nation to the Publick.

Since therefore the Corporations, mostly, were found to have made ill Returns to their Sovereigns, for all their special Gra∣ces; by a most wise Council it hath been judged fit to enquire by what Warrant they enjoyed those Privileges, and to recall those Charters, that new ones might be granted, mostly with Additions of Privileges; only that the Magistrates (if they should abuse their Authority) might be displaced at the King's Pleasure: A most necessary Resumption of Power, whereby they might not be in a capacity for the future to give any Di∣sturbance to the Government.

Elsewhere I have given short Hints of the Practice of former Kings, in vacating the Charters of the great City, and shall only add what I find in the most Judicious Historian was done in a like Case, by the Senate of Rome, in Tiberius his Reign.

The Licence(h) 1.2674 and Impunities of ordaining Sanctuaries and Privileged Places encreased, saith my Author, throughout the Cities of Greece; the Temples were filled with most lewd Bondslaves; in the same were received Debtors against their Creditors, and Men guilty of Capital Crimes were protected; neither was there any powerful Authority able to bridle the Sedition of the People: Villanies were protected no less than the Ceremonies of the Gods. Therefore it was appointed,

That the Cities should send their Agents with their Laws. Some, by way of Resignation of their Charters, freely remit∣ted those things they had falsely usurped; many did confide in the Antiquity of their Superstitions, and their Deserts to the People of Rome. The Pomp of that Day (saith the Hi∣storian) was great in shew: In which the Senate (for Tiberius had left the Senate a Shadow of their ancient Estate, by send∣ing the Requests of the Provinces to be examined by them) considered of the Privileges granted by their Predecessors, the Agreements with their Confederates, the Decrees of the Kings, before the Countries became subject to the Romans, and the Religion of the Gods themselves, to confirm or alter all.

By which it may appear, to be no new thing, for Sovereigns to enquire into the Privileges of Cities, tho' claimed by Divine Original, as many of those were, from their Gods, or by the Bounties of Princes.

As to Conventicles, the Nurseries of Seditions, since the Laws are obvious by which they may be suppressed, and that in another Chapter I have treated of them, I shall take no fur∣ther notice of them here; being as unwilling that truly con∣sciencious mis led People (that endanger not the Government) should be severely punished, as I heartily wish they would give no Disturbance to it.

CHAP. XLVI. The Preservatives against Faction and Sedition.

THE general Amulets, Preservatives, and Antidotes a∣gainst the Poison and Infection of Faction and Sediti∣on, are a Prince's innate Virtue, his Prudence, Justice, Provi∣dence, Political Capacity, Wealth, Militia, Fortunateness, Fame, and the harmony betwixt him and his Great Councils of which, in order.

As to a Prince's Genuine Virtues,* 1.2675 they are many, and where they meet in a Constellation, they out-shine the Jewels of the Crown. The Majesty and Awfulness of these, commands sometimes where Armies cannot; they win upon all. Nothing(a) 1.2676 is more amiable, nothing more universally loved and ho∣noured than Virtue: even the same of it when the Person is un∣known, gains an applause; how much more must it be revered in a Crowned head.

Laws do not preserve all things (saith(b) 1.2677 Antisthenes) but the Rule of Virtue teacheth every where what is honest, and unbecoming. So Epictetus compares a Soul, throughly imbued with Virtue, to a Spring of Water, which is always pure,

sweet, plentiful, and endued with no evil quality. There∣fore(c) 1.2678 Charilaeus being asked, Which was the best Common∣weal; answered, That wherein many Citizens strive who shall excel in Virtue without Sedition.

As in the Opal the colour of several precious Stones are found, the smaller Fire of the Carbuncle, the shining Purple of the Amethyst, the green Sea of the Smaragd: so in a truly Vir∣tuous Prince, all the Sunbeams of Light, Warmth, Beauty, and Celestial Influence, for his Peoples cherishing, comfort, Glory and Prosperity, are contained.

So the(d) 1.2679 Poet tells us, That it shines with unsullied Honours, neither assuming, or laying down the Ensigns of Soveraignty, at the suffrage of the Populace, having a firmer Basis than the Fleeting Bubbles of their Breath.

Pliny(e) 1.2680 tells Trajan, That we learn by experience, That a Prince's own Innocence is his faithfullest Guard. By this word I understand, not only his gentleness in not oppressing his Sub∣jects, but the whole complex of Virtue, whereby he is guil∣ty of no enormous Vices, but hath the Soveraignty over his own passions, as well as over his Subjects.

As to a Prince's Prudence,* 1.2681 I have elsewhere spoken at large, and shall now add upon so copious a Subject, some gleanings out of good Authors.

In these things, saith(f) 1.2682 Seneca, Prudence is best discove∣red, when by-past times are collated, by observing the Annals, and Histories of former Ages, by ordering present Affairs, ac∣cording to the best Reason, and providently forecasting future effects of present Counsels.* 1.2683 So a Prince will know how for∣mer Seditions have sprung, and what hath been the cure of them, how parallel the present are to by-past, and how for the future to provide, That the Roots and Fangs of them be digged up: for foregon(g) 1.2684 deeds give certain instructions for the future; former miscarriages teach such a Prince sufficient caution.

Other Virtuous Qualifications may be common to the Sove∣raign, and Subject; but Prudence is his peculiar Province: therefore(h) 1.2685 Jamblichus calleth this, The very Prince of Virtues. So when(i) 1.2686 Archidamus was commended, that he had over∣come the Arcadians in Battel; he answered, That it had been much better if he had overcome them by Prudence. So An∣tisthenes(k) 1.2687 saith, Prudence is the safest Wall; it neither falls down, or is betray'd: all Walls, Bulwarks, or other defences by Batteries, Mines, or Treacheries, may be taken; but the de∣termination of a Prudent Prince is inexpugnable. The Coun∣sels and Actions of a Prince, endowed with this Virtue, are never like to have the misfortune of those(l) 1.2688 which are never known to be best, till they have passed the season of being put in execution.

Justice in a Prince's Government, and Faith in the Sacred observance of their Royal Words, are not to be reckoned a∣mong

the lesser Stars, but are the two great Luminaries, without(m) 1.2689 which, there would be nothing but Gloominess, Tem∣pests and Showres: yet, though Justice be that Sun, Faith is not to be reputed that Moon, that is changeable as to us, by the interposition of the Earth, but as it is in it self always enligh∣tened by the Sun.

Faith is the companion of Justice, and that(n) 1.2690 secret Divi∣nity lodging in a Prince's Breast, which must needs be reveren∣ced of all: Acts of State, and Power, may alter according to emergencies; but a Prince, that makes the Just Laws, and his Promises the Standard of his Actions, is surely possessed with that Divine(o) 1.2691 Wisdom which every where is reputed Sacred: for his Subjects have thereby as sure a foundation to rely upon, as his Laws; for they may be mis-interpreted by corrupt Judg∣es, but nothing can vitiate, corrupt, or extinguish that vestal Fire which burns in the Breast of a Prince, who is the Defender of his Laws and his Faith.

Therefore Cato Censor tells us, That the Romans placed Faith next to Jupiter in the Capitol; for that they both are the de∣fenders of Mankind, nothing so efficaciously preserving Go∣vernment in its force, stability, and titeness, as Justice and Faith.

As to a Prince's Providence, it is a sure Rampire;* 1.2692 for who will rebel against him, whom they judge to do all things cir∣cumspectly, and with cunctation? The opinion conceived of such a Prince,(p) 1.2693 slides into the Souls of Men, shaded with admiration, and the Subjects soon fall from suspecting to ad∣miring his Conduct: for such a Prince is in his own nature wa∣ry, and better pleased with cautelous(q) 1.2694 Counsel with rea∣son, than happy ones by chance, as the great Historian ob∣serves.

A Provident Prince passeth vigorously, from the beginning of his Affairs, to the end; and disposeth all things with easy order (having by his forecast removed all difficulties by a fore∣plotted Chart, and fore-ordained Chain of Causes) that cer∣tainly will produce their effect. Nothing(r) 1.2695 can happen to him new or sudden, or that he is not provided for; so that he is free from the imperfection of those that being surprised, have no excuse, but that they had not thought.

Seneca saith, Nothing living is so morose as man, none to be treated with greater Arts: and Xenophon(s) 1.2696 tells us, It is easier to command all Creatures else, than man: Therefore prudent and provident circumspection is more necessary for Princes, than for all conditions of men besides.

This it is that makes them confident, and boldly to under∣take any Action, when the design is plotted out before, and all Circumstances measured by Scale and Ballance. For as Thucydides(t) 1.2697 observes, When with a negligent confidence any matter is proposed, in the performance it totters of fails.

Therefore Herodotus(u) 1.2698 rightly describes a provident Per∣son, That he is upon that account, the best, if in deliberating he prolong time, and be fearful of what may happen; but in Action be confident.

As to a Prince's Political Capacity, it is a Theme too bulky for this Treatise: it consists of all the Wisdom, Forecast, Cir∣cumspection, Adroitness and Dexterity a Prince can use: not only to obtain a repute of Wisdom, but also to govern his People in difficult times, with such Art, as they may feel they are brought into a state of Tranquillity, when they were whol∣ly despairing of arriving at it. Every ordinary Pilot can steer the Ship in an open Sea, and fresh Gale; it is Tempests, Quick-sands, and Rocks that require Skill. King James the First called it King-craft. It is indeed the Royalest of all Arts, and they are the happiest Princes, who, with a good Consci∣ence, can best use it: All the observations through this whole Treatise, are but an illustration of this Political Skill; which, though collected by a weak Judgment, yet being the observa∣tions of Wise and Learned Men, may I hope not want their use.

In those dextrous Hits, his late Majesty of Glorious Memo∣ry, was very fortunate in the Transactions with some of his Parliaments, and stemming those Troubles, too many endeavour∣ed to involve his Reign with. In which none doubts but his pre∣sent Majesty, (who was particeps Curarum) had a great Stroke: when every Period in those turbulent times were so ordered, that a Civil War was prevented; so that we now reap the Be∣nefit of them in enjoying a Blessed Calm (which we hope and pray for, it may continue) after so threatning a Storm.

Another primary Prevention of Sedition is for a Prince to be Wealthy.* 1.2699 Riches(w) 1.2700 are not unelegantly called the Life and Blood of Mortals. when a private Man is possessed of them, we observe how many he obligeth, what Respect is paid him, how easily he accomplisheth any thing he undertakes •• How much more therefore must it be advantageous to a Prince, O∣bedience is not more generally paid to Shrines than to rich Cof∣fers—Te columus Regina pecunia. Thousands of Hands are set on Work, thousands of contriving Heads consult the best for the Prince's affairs, Millions of Weapons are fitted for his use who hath a full Exchequer: Fleets are equipped,(x) 1.2701 and scour the Ocean, defending a Prince's Territories, and carrying his Victorious Ensigns into remotest Lands, when their Admiral is ballasted with Silver. When all Engins of Battery fail, the strongest City may be reduced by an Ass laden with Gold.

The(y) 1.2702 Philosopher tells us, It is not only necessary to have Wealth, according to Phaleus's Constitution, suitable to the Extent of the Command; but also for the Uses abroad, to de∣fend the Country against the next Neighbours and Stran∣gers.

Above all other means to prevent and suppress Sedition,* 1.2703 the keeping up a sufficient Force, is the securest, and most efficaci∣ous means; for thereby the Person, and the Government of the Prince, are surely defended. Therefore Dio(z) 1.2704 Cassius saith, There are two things that maintain, keep, and encrease any Government, viz. Military Force and Riches.

So(a) 1.2705 Aristotle tells us, That all forms of Government are so to be ordered, that they may have sufficient Warlike Force. Therefore the keeping in good Discipline a competent Force, and having good Guards, are most necessary for a Prince. So that I think it was but a part of Tiberius's Art of Dissimulation, when Togonius moved, That so often as he came into the Senate, twenty Senators armed, should be appointed for his Guard; and he made reply,(b) 1.2706 That his Life was not of that worth, that it should be sheltered or defended with Arms.

Sloth never preserves(c) 1.2707 great Empires, but Arms, and Men of Valour; for it is a certain Rule, That in all Countries, where Enemies are wanting abroad, Peace, Riches, and the Factions that they produce, without a Competent Militia, will endanger Civil Wars at home. Therefore a Prince must always keep subsidiary Forces, to prevent such Mischiefs; for at one time or other, Seditious Men will be troubling the State, and such times may happen,(d) 1.2708 as Tacitus describes in Otho's Insurrecti∣on against Galba, That such was the disposition of their Minds, that some few durst commit the greatest Wickedness, more willed it, and the most, or all, did quietly suffer it: where∣as by the readiness of standing Forces, the Prince may top the Poppy Heads, and over-power Insurrections at their first Peeping; and so terrify all the rest, that they may keep their Huts and Cabins.

There is more need for a Prince to have a well disciplined, competent Force, for that new raised Men are not to be relied upon. Besides(e) 1.2709 many other Proofs of this, we may find one memorable instance in Tacitus, who tells us, That Herenni∣us having in his Camp, certain tumultuary cohorts of the Bel∣gians, and a great number of Peasants, and followers of the Camp, (brave Men, saith he, before the danger appears, but in danger pitiful Cowards) as soon as Julius Civilis's Army could advance, they were soon defeated: and he ascribes the cause of it to the hasty choice of Men to supply the Legions.

Such new(f) 1.2710 Men make a glittering show at a Muster, and will brag more than any, of their Courage; but they will sooner unsheath their Tongues than their Swords: the Slothful∣lest, and those that dare do least with their Hands, being for∣wardest to boast of their Exploits.

(g) 1.2711Cicero comparing the Soldiery, and the Gownmen, gives Preference to the Military Sagum. For he saith, All the Law∣yers Study, Industry, and Commendation of Pleading, is owing to the safe-guard of Warlike Vertue; the one consults for, and

defends his Client; the other is exercised in the defence of the City, and propagating the Limits of the Empire: and the arts of the long Robe are silenced upon the very suspicion of Tu∣mults.

Vegetius(h) 1.2712 tells us, That nothing is more firm, more happy, or more commendable, than that Commonwealth which a∣bounds with Soldiers; the brightness of their Arms, striking Terror into their Enemies: whereas their rustiness tempts them to be assaulted, as being unprepared, and unprovided.

A standing Force (proportionable to the occasion, and no greater) is as a Nursery to educate the growing Youth in Feats of Arms, to inure them to Labour, Watchfullness, Di∣scipline and Courage; for few Princes live their whole time, without some occasion of War, either at home, or abroad.

In this Kingdom the standing Force is not so great, as to be oppressive, or formidable to the People, and the Militia, be∣ing a Portion of the People themselves, armed by the King's Authority, can never be repined at, by such as are Lovers of their King and Countries Safety. To have them kept in good Discipline, by training twice a Year, more earefully and indu∣striously, would be for the safety and ornament of the Govern∣ment.

Only it is requisite that great Care be taken, that the Soldi∣ery be not only skillfully trained, but be exquisitely(i) 1.2713 obe∣dient to their Prince, and the Officers be well assur'd, and of good repute, not in the least inclinable to Faction, and Sedi∣tion, holding also good Correspondence with other great Men in the State; for the most excellent Historian saith, The(k) 1.2714 Faith of Soldiers is unstable, and there wants not danger from them single, much more if they should make any formi∣dable Conjunction.

There are infinite Examples how the standing Armies have altered the Government, as in the Roman Empire was most usual, the Armies setting up one or other, mostly after Ne∣ro's death; so that we find scarce a Succession of three in many Ages.

As to a Prince's fortunateness,* 1.2715 it is an happy thing, and much for his Security, that his Subjects have an Opinion of it, or, as we ought to speak, that he is the care of Heaven, and that Divine Providence is his Tutelar. Therefore the great Orator(l) 1.2716 saith, That to greatness and Glory, and the atchieving great things, Fortune divinely sent, is to be joined; that even to them sleeping and waking, the Deity is Beneficial, and Victo∣ry from Heaven descends into their Lap.

(m) 1.2717Ancus Martius first built a Temple to Fortune, in a mans ha∣bit, and Tullus the King ascribed all his actions to the guidance of Fortune. So Pliny(n) 1.2718 tells us, The Image of good Fortune, made by Praxitiles, was kept in the Capitol. By all which we may note, how advantagious they thought good luck or fortune to be for the preservation of the Government; and

lest it should forsake them (according to the opinion of that Age, that the Deities lodged in the Statues, as the Souls in the Bodies) they chained the Image, that it might not remove from them.

That is only reputed good Fortune among the common sort, when Princes(o) 1.2719 affairs succeed well and according to their wishes; and when they are so, all strive to show obedience: and when adverse fortune or evil things happen, all do semblably withdraw their Service from their Prince.

It is of this, Horace so elegantly writes, under the name of Fortune:

Te Dacus asper, ••e profugi Scythae, Urbesque & gentes, & Latium ferox Regumque matres Barbarorum, & Purpurei metuunt Tyranni.

To this fortunateness, as near akin,* 1.2720 I subjoyn the fame and good reputation of a Prince; It fans away the Pestilential air of Factions and Seditions; keeps young even the old age of Princes. So Tacitus(p) 1.2721 saith of Tiberius when he grew old, and was retired to Capraea, to indulge himself, and had contract∣ed much hatred, His affairs rather subsisted by fame than other force; which, if it were true of such a Prince, how much more may it be advantagious to one that hath acquired a good fame upon the constant practices of laudable and Princely Actions?

Therefore the same great(q) 1.2722 Historian saith, That the Coun∣sels of other Mortals consists, in doing what they may judge conducible to their private Affairs; but the lot of Princes is different: for they must direct their principal actions to attain fame, which must necessarily be that which is commendable and of value.

Yet there lies some difficulty in the make of the speaking Trumpet of a Prince's fame; for sometimes it must be fit∣ted to vulgar conception; for they mostly misinterpret it, as(r) 1.2723 Thucydides well notes, That modesty with them, carries a shew of Idleness or Cowardise, the circumspect and provi∣dent is reputed slothful, and whatever is suddainly under∣taken and hasty, is counted vigorous and manly. Therefore a Prince that expects a good fame and report, must some∣times anticipate expectation in his proceedings, and by sur∣prise gain a repute of great sagacity, and in some seasons and actions accommodate himself to the inclinations of his Peo∣ple, and gratifie them in their desires. So Queen Elizabeth got more money by remitting one Subsidy (thereby gaining the opinion that she would exact no more than was abso∣lutely necessary) than many Princes have got by downright re∣presenting the necessities of Supplies.

Lastly, One of the greatest preservatives against Faction and Sedition, is when there is a blessed Harmony betwixt the Prince

and his great Councils; which when it happeneth otherwise, requires great prudence in both: On the Prince's part, so to propose his demands, as the Equity, Convenience and Justice of them may be understood; and when he finds they are unreli∣shed, and heats are like to arise, either to bring some new matter upon the Stage, that the former proposal may insen∣sibly be forgot; or by some whiles intermission of such great Councils, give respit to his own and their second thoughts: and on the great Convention's part, to entertain a reverend opi∣nion of their Prince's Judgment, and with real assurances of their Loyalty, humbly and dutifully offer their grave Counsels without exasperation; so that the Prince may demonstratively know, that they have no other ends in the non-compliance, but the common good of Prince and People.

CHAP. XLVII. Of Conspiracies and Treasons.

I Have hitherto treated of Faction and Sedition, both as they tend to the disquiet of the Government in general, and as they may influence the Court only, or particular persons, and so we may consider them marshalled and distinguished, Faction to be the siding of Parties, Sedition the drawing them into Tu∣mults; and now I come to Conspiracies and Treason, or Rebellion, as Overt-Acts. The first two are the Root and Plant, the latter the prickly heads, and Seeds of those Thi∣stles.

Conspiracy differs from Rebellion, because the one may be managed by a few, and primarily aims at the Assassinating the Prince, and secondarily at the overthrow of the Government; whereas the other armes Multitudes against him in hopes to worst him in open Battle.

Uncovered Hostilities, saith(a) 1.2724 Tacitus, may be openly avoided, but Deceit and Treachery are hidden, shrouded Armes, and by so much the more inevitable. It is not so difficult for a strong well prepared man to master his open Adversary, as it is for a valiant and vigilant man to avoid hidden dangers: The Snake may lye in the Grass he treads on, the Scorpion may sting him to death in his Bed; a Felton or Raviliack lodge a Knife in his Bosom, when he(b) 1.2725 neither suspects, nor fears, or can avoid it; of which, the great Caesar is a most eminent Example.

The condition of Princes, that have Seditious Subjects, is the more hazardous, when guarded, as they think, by their own Innocence, they are too confident of their own Safety. When as(c) 1.2726 Livy saith, the Conspiracy in part detected, is not

believ'd till perpetrated. A single Arm, or a few Br••t••, who value not their own lives (as Seneca(d) 1.2727 elegantly) may be Lord, or Butcher of anothers.

The danger is so much the greater when the Conspirators are many, provided they be equally resolute.* 1.2728 They have many(e) 1.2729 Hands, and the Prince but one Life to lose; even in the Life-guard, and among the Halbardiers Conspirators may be listed, if the Officers be not most circumspect to know the Incli∣nations and Tempers, as well as Faces of the Souldiers.

The Life of the Prince is so valuable a Blessing, that no care, foresight, and circumspection, can be too much to preserve it; for by such a death,(f) 1.2730 the happiest fortune of a great People may be brought into instant ruine.

Against these kind of Conspirators, the Clemency, Heroick Virtue, obligingest Temper or Piety of a Prince are scarce suf∣ficient Mail. Therefore when such have Factious and Seditious Subjects, it ought to be their special care, and of all their Ministers of State, and all their Subjects, to double and treble their dili∣gence, and use all their probablest means, to prevent, and fore∣slow it; and generally such rational(g) 1.2731 diligent caution will have a prosperous event.

It may be useful to Princes to conceal the first Intelligence of Conspiracies, till more fully discovered; according to that of(h) 1.2732 Tacitus, That the only remedy against Treachery, of∣ten is, That they are not understood: by which, I suppose, he means not only pure ignorance of them, but that they mis-ken, and conceal their knowledge of them. Yet in the interim, it is requisite to have trusty Spies, securely mingled in all suspicious Companies, that as the(i) 1.2733 Philosopher saith, It be not conceal∣ed from them, whatever his Subjects (especially the Malecon∣tents) say or do. This Cromwell made one of his Master-pieces,* 1.2734 and by it prevented many generous designs against his Person and Usurpation.

Salust observes, That of all mischiefs to a Commonwealth, that of Conspiracy is the worst; therefore such(k) 1.2735 impious and barbarous Treacheries are to be punished with a swift Hand, and Unrelenting Heart; as also with the severest tortures:* 1.2736 for as the Orator saith, No kind of death can be unjust to a Tray∣tor, and a Thief.

However in the first place, it is convenient, not only that the Prince be secured, but that all the suspected be in arcta & salva custodia, in close and safe custody, before a Prince pro∣ceeds to Regular Justice, according to that of the excellent(l) 1.2737 Tacitus, To consult Security before Revenge.

In detecting Conspirators, and exposing them to the hatred of the People, great future security comes to a Prince; there∣fore strict examination, bolting out the Truth, undeniable Testimony, and a fair open Tryal, render the Conspirators more odious, and the Prince's Justice more conspicuous, as well as his future security more permanent. Otherwise a Prince

may b•• ••alumniated(m) 1.2738 That he destroyed the innocent for envy or fear. However it may be rationally presumed, that whoever clandestinely whispers such things against a Prince, may either be reputed a confederate, or wisher of success to such a Conspiracy.

It is to be considered, that it is natural to the Common People, to have a Commiseration of those when they suffer, whom they have pursued with the direst imprecations to the Scaffold. It is the custom of the vulgar, changeable on sud∣den occasions, to be as prone to pity as they were immeasu∣rable in Cruelty, as the excellent(n) 1.2739 Historian observes in Cos∣sus's appeasing the Souldiers, who were enraged against the Helvetians.

It were indeed much better (if the safety of the Government would suffer it) to heal the vitious(o) 1.2740 parts, rather than cut them off; but it's a most certain Rule of the same(p) 1.2741 Orator, That the sentencing of Criminals, should not relate to him that punisheth, but to the profit of the Commonweal; that is, not to be so ordered, as the Prince should be judged to consult on∣ly his own Revenge or safety, but the Peace, Tranquillity, and Prosperity of his People.

Therefore the excellent(q) 1.2742 Seneca saith, It becomes not Princes to chastise only, that the guilty may perish, but that others may be affrighted from perishing. For it is a ferina ra∣bies, saith he, to rejoice in Blood and Wounds. Hence all good Princes unwillingly, and with great torment to them∣selves, inflict Capital Punishments; nor is execution in most cases performed while the Prince's Wrath, and Rage, (how just soever) is upon him; because that Mediocrity then cannot be observed, which ought to be, betwixt much and little; therefore all Punishments are most kindly that are more patrio, lest that Sarcasm of(r) 1.2743 Seneca be verified, Though the cause of punishment be great, yet a Mean or Measure is not ob∣served.

So Tacitus instructs us, That though it be against the guilty, and such as deserve to be extream examples; yet a Prince should have mercy, not so much for the profit of the Repub∣lick, but that multitudes should not be consumed, for the cruelty of one, as the People in an overglutting revenge will be apt to censure.

Therefore caution should be used, that the punishment be not overspreading, as to Heads of many Families, lest if they be illustrious, and of great Interest, the Prince attract more Ene∣mies, and as the Latin Philosopher(s) 1.2744 saith, The Parents, Chil∣dren, Kinsmen, and Friends of the slain succeed in their places, to meditate revenge, if there be any hopes of success by it. Such an Hydra especially is despairing Rebellion. Yea, though in China, Japan, and other of the Eastern Countries, whole Families are commonly extirpated for the crime of one, yet no Civilised Nations imitate it, no not when Rebellion proves most formidable.

If an illustrious Person be in Conspiracy, to whom a Prince and his Subjects have been oblig'd (if it may safely be done) the punishment may be(t) 1.2745 attempered, if the Crime cannot be pardoned. So Livia told Augustus, That the Crimi∣nal being secured, cannot hurt, but in his Pardon the Prince might augment his Fame: as King James the First did to the Lord Colha••, and his Companions, when he concealed the dis∣covery of their Pardon, till the Prisoners were upon the Scaf∣fold, and expected nothing but the last stroke of the terrible Axe.

As Physicians in Blood-letting and purging (if in so great a Theme so low an example may be used) with the bad hu∣mours, must necessarily evacuate some of the good: So in Conspiracies and Rebellions, some may not be so maliciously inclined in their own natures, but by their popular(u) 1.2746 tem∣per, or easiness to be seduced, be caressed to be partakers in some pretended reformations, the black Arts and Designs be∣ing hid from them, and so be made properties. If therefore the Prince can be secured, that either, in their own natures, they are not prone to Rebellion, or while they are alive, they can never expect to head parties again; Banishment may be sufficient punishment for them.

So when, in Nero's(w) 1.2747 time, upon the appearing of a Co∣met, it was bruited that it portended the change of a King, and R••belli••us Plautus was celebrated as the Person: Nero writ Letters to Plautus, That he should consult his own good, and withdraw himself from the Rabbles defaming of him to his pre∣judice; and having Possessions in Asia, he might enjoy his bloom∣ing Years, undisturbed, and in safety. Which was most humanly done, for by that he spared Plautus, and yet provided for the quiet of the Commonwealth.

But as the merciful temper of a Prince in some cases is most Christian and Prudent; so in others, too much Clemency may encourage Sedition; and consequently Treason. For as the Ora∣tor(x) 1.2748 saith, The hopes of escaping punishment is the greatest allurement to do evil, a wicked Subject fearing that Prince(y) 1.2749 little, who wears a Padlock on his Sword.

There are few that eschew evil for the Turpitude of it, but for the fear of punishment: therefore in such dangerous mat∣ters as Conspiracies, and Rebellion, the edge of the Prince's Sword is always to be sharp: and the Council of Tiberius(z) 1.2750 in his Epistle to the Senate is to be followed, That the cor∣rupt, and the corruptor, the sick and burning Soul, is scarce to be quenched with milder remedies, than such as bear propor∣tion to the lusts it burns with, of what kind soever it be.

The punishment of a few wicked Persons restrains the male∣volent effects of many, as Cicero(a) 1.2751 notes: Nor, saith(b) 1.2752 Taci∣tus, is there any other remedy of glowing Discord, than that one or other of the most forward be orewhelmed, and examplary Justice be executed upon them. Though the Gangreen begin

but in in a Toe or Finger; yet it may require Amputation, lest a Leg or an Arm be in danger: so the skillful Gardiner prunes his cankered Branches more speedily than the luxuri∣ant.

By punishing the Advisers, Fomenters, and Actors of horrid things (as purging Sacrifice(c) 1.2753 of publick Hatred) atone∣ment is made to publick Justice, and the less crimmal have the greater Obligations to dutiful Repentance; for the Punishment of such Ring-leaders and Coryphaei, is not so much the revenge of the Prince as of the Commonwealth. Otherwise the Prince by(d) 1.2754 sparing a few Wretches, will be Prodigal of his better Subjects Blood, which those Criminals would, as soon as they had obtained Power, more profusely shed.

Therefore it becomes all good Subjects to bestir themselves for the safety of the Prince, to hasten, saith(e) 1.2755 Seneca, to his Standard, esteeming him as a luminous and beneficial Constellati∣on, and most ready for his safety, to expose themselves betwixt the Traytors unsheathed Swords, and his Royal Person.

I cannot more emphatically express the clemency of our Prin∣ces, and their Laws against Treason, or better discover the Limits and Bounds of Punishments, and the desire that our Prin∣ces have had, That none should fall under the guilt of Trea∣son, than by reciting the Preambles to the Statutes, made in King Edward the Sixth's, and Queen Marys time, con∣cerning Treasons.

The words of the Statute of King Edward(f) 1.2756 the Sixth, are, Nothing being more Godly, more sure, move to be wish∣ed and desired, betwixt a Prince, the Supream Head and Ru∣ler; and the Subjects whose Governour and Head he is, than on the Prince's Part great Clemency and Indulgence, and rather too much forgiveness, and remissness of his Royal Power, and just Punishment, than exact Severity and Justice to be showed: and on the Subjects part, That they should obey rather for love, than for fear of his strait and severe Laws: yet such Events some∣times happen in the Commonwealth, that it is necessary and expedient, for the repressing of the Insolence and unruliness of Men, and foreseeing, and providing Remedies against Re∣bellion, Insurrection, or such mischiefs, that sharper Laws, and an harder Bridle should be made, to stay those Men, that might else be occasion, cause, and Authors of farther Inconveni∣ence.

That as in Tempest, or Winter, a coarse Garment is convenient; in calm or warm Weather, a more liberal, race, or lighter Garment, both may, and ought to be followed and used: So that sometimes there have been occasion at divers Par∣liaments, to make and enact certain Laws and Statutes, which might seem and appear to Men of exteriour Realms, and the Subject, very strait, sore, extream and terrible; although they were then, when they were made, not without great Con∣sideration and Policy moved and established, and for the times,

to the avoidance of further inconvenience, very expedient and necessary; and when Princes are more indulgent, it is to pro∣voke the Subject, with Clemency shewed on the Prince's behalf, to more love and kindness to him, and upon Trust they will not abuse the same, but rather be encouraged thereby, more faith∣fully, and with more diligence to serve him, &c.

In the Statute of Queen Mary,(g) 1.2757 of the repeal of certain Treasons, Felonies, and Praemuni••e's, wherein she reduceth all to 25 Ed. 3. the words are; Forasmuch as the State of every King, Ruler, and Governour of every Realm, Dominion, or Com∣monweal, standeth, and consisteth more assured by the love and favour of the Subject towards their Sovereign Ruler and Governour, than in Dread and Fear of Laws, made with ri∣gorous Pains, and extream Punishment, for not obeying of their Sovereign Ruler and Governour: and Laws also justly made for the Preservation of the Commonweal, without ex∣tream Penalty, or Punishment, are more often for the most part obeyed and kept, than Laws and Statutes made with great and extreme Punishment, &c. Therefore some are repealed.

By these the Clemency of the Princes is discovered, and the reason of enacting severe Laws in such Cases, in Terrorem, is cleared.

I must refer all other Discourses of the Laws against Treason, to the Learned Books writ on that Subject, and only note what a(h) 1.2758 grave Author saith, That if we peruse all our Books, Records, and Histories, we shall find it a Principle in Law, a Rule in Reason, and truth in Experience, That Treason doth ever produce fatal and final Destruction to the offenders, and never attains the desired End, although infinite mischiefs are effected by it. For Conspirators and Traytors one way or other have generally come to condign Punishment.

If what I have hitherto laid down, work any good Effect upon the Subjects in general, to keep them in their Duty to their Sovereign, and his Laws, or have afforded them such Rules for Obedience, or dehortments from Faction, Sedition, Conspiracies, and Rebellion, as I wish; I have attained the end for which I write: which is only to satisfie all sorts of Subjects, how excellently composed the Government is, that our Kings cannot, or have any Interest, to rule Arbitrarily.

Therefore it will be the duty, advantage, and true Interest of all Subjects, so to comport themselves to the Government, as to consider the excellent Foundations upon which it is built, that neither by the Cunning of unquiet Spirits, the pretenders of Reformation of abuses, the ambition of the aspirers, nor especially by the plausible Charms of the Republicans, they be ever induced to disquiet the Government, or rebel against it; lest in conclusion they bring upon themselves, and Posterity, such a Slavery, as we had too bloody an Example of in the late Calamitous times: and that above all things, they consider that excellent Saying of the best of(i) 1.2759 Historians, That to stir up

Dissentions, and troubles, the worst Men commonly have the greatest Influence; but Peace and quietness are not established, but by Men of rare gifts, and excellent Vertue.

FINIS.

THE Author being at great distance from the Press, and sending up his Coppy by Parcels, which (by reason of his Imployment in his Profession) he was constrained sometimes to com∣mit to the Care of others; The following Chapter was not sent up till most of the Treatise was Printed. Therefore he chuseth rather to place it at the end, than to disturb the order of the Pages, and desires the Candid Reader will peruse it next immediately after the 15th. Chapter, it being designed to have preceded the 16th. Chapter of The King's Soveraignty.

CHAP. (XVI.) Of the Benefit and Excellency of Hereditary Monarchy.

THE(a) 1.2760 Philosopher dividing Kingly Government into four kinds, as I have before instanced, allows all to be Hae∣reditary, except the Aesymnaetian, which was Elective; and since in many places, he affirms Kingdoms to be more durable than Commonwealths, we may conclude that the fundamental cause of that duration is the Lineal Succession.

We experience in private Families (where a long Series of Ancestors have transmitted Inheritances to Posterity) how by the settledness, and encrease of their Estates, their alliances, and the Employments they have had in their respective Ages, they have acquired Honour, Renown, Interest and Stabi∣lity; that not only a greater Respect is payed to them, than to others of a later Rise, but they are thereby enabled, upon ma∣ny accounts to manage publick, or private affairs, with more sure success, and repute, than those than have not acquired such a nodosam Aeternitatem.

(b) 1.2761Aristotle makes that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or natural Love of Parents to their Children, to be one reason of the Succession of Sons to Fathers, in their Kingdoms: thence he makes it improbable, that they who have obtained the Soveraignty, should not de∣liver it to their Children, because it would discover a Vertue beyond the ordinary Elevation of humane Nature, to prefer

the Benefit and good of the People, by leaving them the Li∣berty of chusing, upon every avoidance, the most worthy, (if such a Prince's Son appeared not so) rather than to establish the Principality in their own Family.

(c) 1.2762Polybius speaking of Kings being most eminent for Wis∣dom,* 1.2763 Justice, and Valour (whereby they drew the People to reverence them, and consequently to submit themselves to their Conduct and Command) saith, That the Son (having his educa∣tion under such a vertuous wise Father, whereby he had been present with him when affairs of the greatest Importance had been debated) in common presumption was judged to be better capacitated to govern, than any of a strange Family, and so none would envy him his dignity, but all readilier judged him the fittest to succeed. And there is good reason to consider the cause of it; for Government is an Art not easily attained to, and by the un∣skilfullness in the proper Rules and Maxims, the wrong Appli∣cations, the Ignorance in pursuing the right Methods, and chusing fit Instruments, the Factious and Populace get advan∣tages to make unfortunate times. Therefore those Monarchs, who from their Infancies are trained up, and accustomed to In∣structions in the Rudiments of Government, as they grow up, must more readily comprehend them, must attain the better un∣derstanding of the great affairs, and secret reasons of St••••••, be more quick, apprehensive, and sagacious, in perceiving what is conducive to the common good, and what not; and so more ready in all publick Dispatches, than such who have not been educated with all these Advantages. Besides, Governours at first must be to seek in understanding the nature of great Affairs; so that one may as well expect(c) 1.2764 a Man taken from the Plough should be able to Conn a Ship, and carry her an East-India Voy∣age, as that a Person (though of the greatest natural and ac∣quired Parts) should at first be fit to Pilot the Government, or skilful and dexterous in the steerage of the important affairs of a publick State: and (as in Republicks it falls out) by that time he hath arrived at a competent Skill, he must resign his Place and Power to others, as raw and unexperienced as he was. Whereas Succession in Monarchy doth effectually prevent this Inconvenience, and (which is of great moment) it gives them an Interest, and desire of designing well for the publick good, safety, and security of the People, and the opportunity of fi∣nishing whatever is well begun.

For though it have happened by the Succession of a weak, or vitious Prince, that damage and infelicity have befallen the Peo∣ple; yet it is very rare in History, that two such succeed one a∣nother. So we find in this Kingdom, that Ed. 1. and Ed. 3. brought as great Honour and Renown to their Countries, as their Fathers had Misfortunes; and even in such Princes Reigns, the Calamities that have befallen their Kingdoms, have rather sprung from the Potency of Factions (that took the advantage by the weakness of the Prince, to bring him to Contempt, that

they might obtain the managery of affairs) than from other Causes. For even under such unfortunate Princes, if it were not for factious Disturbances, the Laws and good Order might, during their Reigns, conserve their Kingdoms in Peace.

Whereas in Kingdoms that are Elective,* 1.2765 Competitors and Candidates cause not only great Disturbances and Mischiefs at the Instant (as we have infinite Examples when the Roman Emperors were chosen by the Factions of the Senate or Army, as also in Germany, before the expedient of chusing a King of the Romans, and in the Miseries that have befallen Poland) but Aemulations and Animosities have been continued for Ages a∣mong the prime Nobility: and thence it is that the(d) 1.2766 Philoso∣pher so long since hath ascribed it one of the Principal Causes of the Destruction of a Kingdom, when there is Discord in the Royal Family, or, as his Interpreter saith among the par∣ticipes Regni, as Brethren and Kindred of the Royal Family, as(e) 1.2767 Plutarch tells us in the Kingdom of Sparta, and as Justin gives us an account of the slaughter of Brethren and Kinsmen in the Kingdom of Syria, and as it occasioned the Destruction of the flourishing Kingdom of Egypt, by the Competition be∣twixt Ptolomy and Cleopatra, and as our Ancestors sadly expe∣rienced in the Civil Wars betwixt the Houses of York and Lan∣ca••••••, and France in the Faction of Orleance and Burgundy, and of later Date in the Kingdom of Hungary, betwixt King John and the Emperor Ferdinand.

If therefore such Calamities befal Countries, where Factions ruine their Peace; how much more shall we judge the miserable Confusions will be, when any shall challenge a Power to make a Breach in the Royal Chain of Succession, especially when we find even at Rome, upon the Election of the Pope, by custom the People plunder the Pallace of the Cardinal who is elected Pope: and since that outrage is committed where such an one is chosen, as is owned by so great a part of Europe to be Christ's Vicar, we are not to wonder, that at the Death of the Otto∣man Heir, the Janizaries and Soldiery rifle and plunder Jews and Christians, and cease not to commit all manner of Outra∣ges, till the new Grand Signior, by his Presence, and Bounty, puts an end to them.

Therefore as a grave(f) 1.2768 Author observes, He that hath not deposed Reason, the King of his Soul, and elected in its place Prejudice and Passion, to govern there, or dare credit the u∣niversal Experience of the World, must be convinced of the great, necessary, and desperate Inconveniences of a long In∣terregnum, and elective Monarchy; and that a lineal Succession is the best Barrier against assaults from abroad, and is that sacred, perpetual, vital Energy, which preserves Government from in∣ternal Putrifaction, and secures us from one most dangerous In∣convenience, of having another Family to provide for. There∣fore the(g) 1.2769 Excellent Historian most wisely observes, That Mi∣noris est discriminis, Principem nasci quam sumi; That Subjects,

more naturally submit to an undoubted, unquestionable Title (when the Government descends in the same manner as other Inheritances, with due respect to the singleness of Sovereignty) than to new Princes, the worth of whom, and their Families are untried.

This leads me to consider, that this right of Succession flows from the Law of(h) 1.2770 Nature, is founded on the Law of God, and Nations.

First, That is accounted to flow from the Law of Nature,* 1.2771 which every Man finds grafted in his own Heart, and which is obeyed without any other Law, and for which Men neither seek, nor can give any other distinct reason: all which holds in this case. For who doubts, when he hears of an hereditary Monarchy, but that the next in Blood must succeed, and for which we need no positive Law? nor does any Man enquire for a further Reason, being satisfied therein, by the Principles of his own Heart. From this ground it is, that though a re∣moter Kinsman did possess as Heir, he could by no length of time, prescribe a valid right: because no man (as Lawyers conclude) can prescribe a right against the Law of Nature; therefore the Law(i) 1.2772 saith, Cum ratio naturalis, quasi lex quae∣dam tacita, liberis, parentum haereditatem adjecerit, veluti ad de∣bitam successionem eos vocando: propter quod suorum haeredum no∣men eis indultum est, adeo ut ne a parentibus quidem ab ea Successio∣ne amoveri possint. So in the(k) 1.2773 Parable, the Husbandman (who is presumed to understand nothing but the Law of Na∣ture) is brought in, saying, This is the Heir, let us kill him, and seize on his Inheritance. So the(l) 1.2774 Law further saith, Praetor, naturalem aequitatem sequutus, iis etiam bonorum possessionem, con∣tra 12 Tabularum leges, & contra jus civile permittit. By which it is apparent, that this right of Nature was stronger than the Laws of the twelve Tables; though these were the most anci∣ent, and chief Statutes of Rome.

This holds also in the Collateral Succession of Brothers, and others, according to that,(m) 1.2775 Hac parte, Proconsul, naturali aequitate motus, omnibus cognatis permittit bonorum possessionem, quos sanguinis ratio vocat ad haereditatem. For those who are now Brothers to a present Prince, have been Sons to the for∣mer; therefore as St. Paul says, If a Son, then an Heir, except he be secluded by the Existence, and Succession of an elder Brother.

Secondly,* 1.2776 That the Law of God gives right of Succession to proximity of Blood, is manifest, in that, if a Man hath no(n) 1.2777 Son, or Daughter, his Inheritance shall descend upon his Brother; and so God determines in the case of(o) 1.2778 Zelophead's Daughters; and so(p) 1.2779 Ahaziah was made King (though the youngest) in his Fathers stead, because, says the Text, The A∣rabians had slain all the eldest: which clearly shews, That by Gods Law, he could not have succeeded, if the eldest had been alive. So we see the birth-right was owned in Esau, but

that he sold it, the priviledge of which is there fully discove∣red, not only in discovering the right of Primogeniture, but likewise in the Donation of Parents to their Children; that Bles∣sing being like the last Will and Testament.

Thirdly,* 1.2780 As to the Law of Nations, it might be made clear by the recital of all the Laws of Kingdoms that are Heredita∣ry, and not Elective, That degrees of Succession were exactly observed, according to that of(q) 1.2781 Bodin, Ordo, non tantum naturae, & divinae legis, sed omnium ubique gentium hoc postulat. So Pope(r) 1.2782 Innocent, In regnis haereditariis caveri non potest, ne filius aut frater succedat; and so in all Histories of Hereditary Mo∣narchies, we find it where Potent Usurpation hath not obstruct∣ed the free current, or by some violent means derived it into another Channel.

If Successions of so great importance had not been fixed by immutable Laws of God and Nature, the various and incon∣stant inclinations of present Governors (saith a very(s) 1.2783 Judi∣cious Author) had made the Nations whom they govern∣ed very unhappy: If they yielding to the importunities of Mothers, or Stepmothers, or clouded by the Jealousie of Flat∣terers, or Favourites; or upon some unaccountable aversion, should place the Crown upon what Head they pleased. There∣fore God did very justly and wisely settle this Succession, that both King and People might know, That it is by him that Kings Reign, and Kingdoms are secured in Peace against Factions.

To come more particularly to our own Country: The Mo∣narchy of great Britain and Ireland,* 1.2784 is undoubtedly as firmly established hereditarily in his Majesties Blood and Family, as it is in any Monarch's in Europe.

A late French(t) 1.2785 Author, speaking of the Succession of the Crown of France, saith, That the Election of the King∣dom is not of one Person only, but of the blood, and operates so far, as there is life in that blood; The blood being chosen with the Prerogative of Primogeniture: So that when one Person of the blood is dead (the Power by the same Preroga∣tive being transferred to the blood) remains and rests in the blood still living, and in him of the blood who succeeds by that Prerogative, and in none else.

The Majesty Royal (saith a(u) 1.2786 profound Lawyer and Anti∣quary upon the murther of King Charles the First) expired not, nor was left adhering to the bloody Axe or Block. It wandred not like Adrian's Ghost, nor hovered in an Airy ab∣straction. For the King, or rather the Kings line (saith another(w) 1.2787 great Lawyer) is a name of Continuance, which, as the Law presumes, shall always remain as Head and Governour of the People. For the English Monarchy(x) 1.2788 knows no Interreg∣num, being Successive by inherent Birthright, whereby infinite in∣conveniences are avoided: so that the young Phenix stays not to arise out of the Spicy ashes of the old, but the Soul of Royal∣ty,

by a kind of Transmigration, passeth immediately out of one body into another; and in the same manner, will every right Heir acquire the Royalty after his Predecessor ceaseth to be.

Therefore the judicious Lord(y) 1.2789 Verulam observes, That H. 7. knowing that the Laws permit not any interim, suspension, or stay of the Title, and having no mind to own his Queens Title the best, (She being the Heiress of the house of York, as he in some respects was Heir of the House of Lancaster) he ordered the Act so, that it should neither be by recognition, nor his Title be established by a new Law:(z) 1.2790 but chose a milder way, viz. of simple Establishment in covert words, interpreta∣ble several ways, that the inheritance of the Crown should re∣side, remain, and continue in him.

So King James in his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 209. tells the Prince, That at the very moment of the expiring of the King Reigning, the nearest and lawful Heir entreth in his place; and so to re∣fuse him, or intrude another, is not to hold out the Successor from coming in, but to expel and put out their Righteous King.

So Sir(a) 1.2791 Edward Coke affirms, That it is a known Maxim of the Laws, That in the moment of the descent of the Crown, the person on whom it descends (which is the next immediate Heir only) becomes complete and absolute King, to all intents and purposes. And so he saith, The second Son of the King of England after(b) 1.2792 the death of the first-born is eldest Son, within the Sta∣tute of 25 E. 3. as it was resolved in the case of Prince Charles, concerning the Dutchy of Cornwall.

It would be a tedious work to recite all the Authorities in this Case may be found in the Statutes and Law-Books. I will content my self, instead of all others, with the Act of(c) 1.2793 Recog∣nition 1 Jacobi primi, wherein,* 1.2794 after the two Houses had enu∣merated the benefits by the Conjunction of the Houses of York and Lancaster, and the uniting of England and Scotland in the Kings Person, and that They agnize their constant Faith, O∣bedience and Loyalty to him, and his Royal Progeny, The worlds of the Act are, In most humble and lowly manner, do beseech your most Excellent Majesty (as a memorial to all poste∣rity among the Records of your High Court of Parliament for ever to endure, of our Loyalty, Obedience, and hearty humble affection) it may be published and declared in the High Court of Parliament, and enacted by Authority of the same, That we (being bound thereunto by the Laws of God and man) do recog∣nize and acknowledge (and thereby express our unspeakable joyes) that immediately upon the dissolution and decease of Eli∣zabeth late Queen of England, the Imperial Crown of the Realm of England, &c. did by inherent Birthright, and lawful un∣doubted Succession, descend and come to your most Excellent Majesty, as being lineally, justly, and lawfully, next and sole Heir of the blood Royal of this Realm, as is aforesaid, &c.

and thereunto we most humbly and faithfully do submit and oblige our selves, our Heirs, and Posterities for ever, until the last drop of our blood be spent; and do beseech your Majesty to accept the same as the first-fruits of this High Court of Par∣liament, of our Loyalty and Faith to your Majesty, and your Royal Progeny and Posterity for ever.

By which, it first appears that the Crown of England is an unalterable Entail, and the reversion in him only by whom Kings reign, without any Election or consent of the People, otherwise than by acknowledging the lawful Right of the Kings, derived from God by their blood to them.

Also from this Recognition we may consider,* 1.2795 Secondly, what to think of that Act of Queen Elizabeth, That if any Per∣son shall affirm that the Parliament of England has not full power to bind, and govern the Crown in point of Succession and descent, that such a Person, during the Queens life, shall be guilty of High Treason. For we must consider that by the words bind and govern, we may conceive the sence to be, That the Parliament is Judge where there are differences(d) 1.2796 betwixt Competitors in nice and controvertible points, which cannot be otherwise decided. So that such temporary Acts as these, are to be interpreted, and restrained by other uncontroverted Laws.

We must also look upon it as made to secure the Queen a∣gainst Mary Queen of Scots, and to let her know it was to no purpose for her to design any thing against the Right or Person of Queen Elizabeth; upon that ground, as may be presumed, the Queen of Scots might claim, for that Queen Elizabeth by Act of Parliament had been declared a Bastard. Therefore to let her know, that it was to no purpose to insist upon any such claim, and that her other Right as next undoubted Heir by blood to the Crown, might be altered or governed, this Act was made: So that we must from hence conclude, That it was to be reckon∣ed only as one of those Statutes which the Law says are made ad terrorem, & ex terrore only; which may appear the more evi∣dently, because it was never made use of. For it is to be mainly considered, that this Law being made to exclude Queen Mary and the Scotish Line, as appears by that clause wherein it is de∣clared, That every Person or Persons of what degree or Nation soever they be, who shall during the Queens life, declare or publish that they have Right to the Crown of England, shall be disinabled to enjoy the Crown in Succession. Therefore it was never valid:(e) 1.2797 For if it had been good, King James might have thereby been excluded by that person who should have succeeded next to the Scotish Race: For it is undeniable, that Queen Mary, did during Queen Elizabeth's life, pretend Right to the Crown, upon the account that Queen Elizabeth was declared Bastard. Therefore the calling in of King James, after this Act, and the acknowledging his Title, do clearly evince, that the Parliament of England knew, they had no

Power to make such an Act; and we may conclude, That such Politick and Temporary provisions find no approbation, either by the Laws, or succeeding ages (who in all such cases judge more impartially:) therefore it is much more honourable, for the Legislative Power, to found their Laws upon Justice and Right, rather than upon the humours and Interests of those, who desire but the shadow of a Law to countenance their de∣signs.

It must be owned that King Edward the Second was depo∣sed,* 1.2798 for making use of Gaveston and the Spencers. But how il∣legally, all succeeding ages have acknowledged; and it rather shews how extravagant the People, and their Representatives are in their humors, than how just their Powers are: For by the same parity of Reason, the horrid Murther of the blessed Martyr, or the Murther of Edward the Second, may be justified as his de∣posing may be; and the like may be said of King Richard the Second, against whom the Fourteenth Article was, that he re∣fused to allow the Laws made in Parliament; which had been in effect to consent, that the two Houses should have been the So∣veraign, and that he had transferred the Royal Power on them. Whoever desires further satisfaction, may consult Arnisaeus in that Treatise, Quod nulla ex causa subditis fas sit contra legitimum Principem arma sumere.

Whereas Richard Duke of York in Henry the Sixth's time, after he had been declared Heir Apparent, was by another Act of Parliament declared uncapable of Succession; all that can be inferred from it is,* 1.2799 That Acts of Parliament (when they are bottomed upon private affections to Parties in times of Faction and civil War) are not to be looked upon with that veneration, as when they regularly pass, in times that are calm, when no po∣tent Persons oppress Justice, or usurping Powers hinder faithful Judges from expounding the Laws soundly. Therefore we find, in the claim of the said Duke of York, that it is more consen∣taneously to Law expressed, That no Act taketh place, or is of force against him, that is right inheritor of the Crown, as ac∣cordeth (saith the Record) with Gods Laws, and all natural Laws: and we may observe that though there was a Succession of three Kings of the House of Lancaster, who had usurped the Crown for Sixty Years; yet all our Historians, and the Laws call those Kings de facto and not de jure. Such a true sence of just and right the uninterested Ages have had of that Usurpati∣on ever since: although there were Acts of Parliament carefully penned, to corroborate ••he Title of the house of Lancaster du∣ring that time, and all ways and means used to have established that Line; yet by vertue of the Right of Lineal Succession, Edward the Fourth, Son to the said Duke of York, came to be owned lawful King of England, though the Right of his Family had been interrupted ever since Henry the Fourth usurped the Crown: which might have been a sufficient document to all Ages, not to have attempted any sort of praeterition of the Right Heir.

Yet we find that unsuccessful attempts were made by H. 8. contrary to the fundamentals of Succession, which, when right∣ly considered, I hope will convince all, of how little validity, even such Acts are to be reputed. Therefore because these have been made use of for Precedents, I shall speak a little more fully to them.

In the 25 of H. 8.(f) 1.2800 the Marriage with Queen Katherine is made void,* 1.2801 and that with Queen Anne's declared good, and an Entail made on the Issue Male or Female, and the Penalty for hurting the Kings Person, disturbing his Title to the Crown, or slandering the present Marriage is judged High Treason; and Anno 26.(g) 1.2802 a strict Oath is injoyned to observe the Succession there appointed.

But 28 H. 8.(h) 1.2803 it is declared that the former Act was made upon a pure, perfect and clear foundation, thinking the Mar∣riage then had between his Majesty and the Lady Anne, (they are the words of the Act) in their Consciences, to have been pure, sincere and perfect, and good, &c. till now of late, that it appeareth that the said Marriage was never good or conso∣nant to the Laws, but utterly void and of none effect; and so both the Marriage with the Princess Katherine and the Lady Anne are declared void, and their Issue made illegitimate; and the perils are enumerated that might ensue to the Realm, for want of a declared lawful Successor to the Crown; and the Act impowers the King (if he dye without Issue of his body) that he may limit the Crown to any, by his Letters Patents, or his last Will in Writing: and it is declared Treason to declare ei∣ther of the Marriages to be good, or to call the Lady Mary or Lady Elizabeth Legitimate, and the former Oath is made void: and this may be judged to be procured when he resolved to settle the Crown on Henry Fitz Roy, Duke of Richmond, his na∣tural Son.

But after the Birth of Prince Edward, 38 H. 8.(i) 1.2804 another alteration is made, whereby the Crown is entailed on Prince Edward, and for want of his Issue on the Lady Mary, and for want of her Issue, on the Lady Elizabeth; and for want of Issue of the King, or them, then the King is impowered by his Let∣ters Patents, or last Will, to dispose of the Crown at his free will.

It is therefore to be considered, that in such a juncture of affairs, when the legality of the Kings Marriages were so dispu∣table, by reason that two of the legal Successors (upon niceties not of nature, but of the Popes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for Divorcing) were declared Bastards, there was some ••eason(k) 1.2805 that the Act should express that the Ambiguity of several Titles pretended to the Crown (then not perfectly declared, but that men might expound them to every ones sinister affection and sence, contrary to the right legality of Succession, and Poste∣rity of the lawful Kings and Emperours of the Realm) hath been the cause of that great effusion and destruction of mens

blood; and the like cause will produce the like effect, as the words are.

Upon such grounds it was very plausible to declare by Act of Parliament the Succession. But this does not prove that where the Right of nature is clear, that the Parliament may invert the same: and they teach us how dangerous it is to leave Parliaments to the Impression of Kings (when it is too obvious, the first of these Laws was made to gratifie the Kings affection to Queen Anne) in the case of naming a Successor; as it is also to expose Kings to the Arbitrariness of Parliaments. And we may well infer (H. 8. taking such care by his Parliaments to legitimate and illegitimate his Issue, according to the present interests of his Affairs and Passions) that such contradictory Acts could not be all true; and though the Responses from Delphos or any Oracles of the Gentile ages, might miss the truth as much, yet by their dubious answers, they forfeited not their reputations so much.

We may also note(l) 1.2806 that by God Almighty's Providence, and the care of his own Laws, the Duke of Richmond was removed by death, to prevent the unjust Competitors, and Prince Edward was born; and by the same Providence, and the sence the Subjects had of the great Fundamental of Hereditary Succession, contrary to some of these Acts, and what Edward the Sixth did in setling the Crown upon the Lady Jane Grey, proved of no force: for Queen Mary succeeded, though she was a Papist, and Queen Elizabeth succeeded her, though she was declared Bastard. The rights of Blood prevailing over the Formalities of Divorce and the Dispensations of the Popes, and the Laws made to gratify Henry the Eighth's pleasure, as the strength of nature doth often prevail over Poisons; and to evince the greater certainty of their being void, so little notice was taken of those, and the subsequent Acts, Anno 1535. that the Heirs of the Blood succeeded without repealing that Act, as an Act in it self invalid from the beginning: For such Acts are past by without being repealed, as we find in the Act of Recognition of Queen Elizabeth, no notice was taken of the Act of Parliament against her; and Blackwood(m) 1.2807 ob∣serves very well, that so conscious were the makers of these Acts,* 1.2808 of the illegality of them, and of their being contrary to the immutable Laws of God, Nature, and Nations, that none durst produce that Kings Testament, wherein he did nomi∣nate a Successor conformable to the power granted by those Acts; but that as soon as they were freed by his Death, from the violent oppressions that had forced them to alter a Suc∣cessor three several times, and at last to swear implicitly to whomsoever he should nominate, they proclaimed first Queen Mary, and after her decease Queen Elizabeth.

Therefore all these Acts, both of Henry the Eighth, and Ed∣ward the Sixth, are to be looked upon as Politick interims, to serve for some present ends. And as we observe the trepida∣tions,

vibrations, and as we may say, uneasiness of things in all that have been displaced, till reseated again (whereby we have a certain Indicium of any thing Natural) so may we note the naturalness of Hereditary Succession by the Tragical Convulsi∣ons, and unsetledness of things in any State, where great force and policy have usurped the Crown, till it hath returned to the right owner. So we see after the force was removed by the expiration of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth, things returned again into their pristin State, according to the Laws of the Crown.

I shall now pass to consider other Reasons; and First it may be observed,* 1.2809 That the Venerable Age of such Fundamental Laws, should have another kind of respect pay'd to them, than to be made obsolete, because they will not sort with some new-fashioned Intrigue. For it is a most true Maxime, Non magis aliunde floret respublica, quam si legum vigeat Authoritas. So in the first Parliament(n) 1.2810 of King James the First, it is fully ex∣pressed, That to alter and innovate the Fundamental ad Ancient Laws,* 1.2811 Priviledges, and good Customs of the Kingdom, (where∣by not only the Kings Regal Authority, but the Peoples secu∣rities of Lands, Livings, and Priviledges (both in general and particular) are preserved and maintained, and by the abolish∣ing or alteration of the which, it is impossible but that present confusion will fall upon the whole State and frame of Go∣vernment) is of most dangerous consequence: whence we may well infer, That to endeavour to alter the right of Succession of the Crown, in the direct line, is one of the most dange∣rous Innovations of all others, as drawing innumerable mis∣chiefs after it.

Now there can be no greater fundamental right than the Succession of our Monarch.* 1.2812 That our Monarchy is Heredita∣ry, is the great Basis upon which most of all the positions of the Laws are established, which every where we meet with in the Writings of Lawyers, viz. That the King never dies, the next Successour in Blood is legally King, from the very mo∣ment in which the last King dies; that there needs neither Co∣ronation, or Recognition of the People, to intitle him to the exercise of his Regal Authority; that his Commissions are va∣lid, all Men are liable to do him Homage, and hold their rights of him, and his Heirs; he may call Parliaments, dispose of the Lands belonging to the Crown; and all that oppose him are Rebells: Generally this Principle runs through all the Veins of our Laws, it is that which gives Life and Authority to our Statutes, but receives none from them, which are undeniable marks and Characters of a Fundamental Right in all Na∣tions.

Secondly, Such further provision hath the Law made, to se∣cure the Succession in the direct line, that if the right Heir of the Blood, or the Father or Mother of the right Heir be attainted of High Treason, by Parliament, the Attainder is no

obstruction to the descent. If he, who were to succeed had committed Murther, or were declared Traytor formerly to the Crown, for open Rebellion against the King and King∣dom; yet upon his coming to the Crown he need not to be re∣stored by Act of Parliament: but his very right of Blood would purge all these Imperfections. For tanta est Regii sanguinis prae∣rogativa, & dignitas, ut vitium non admittat, nec se contami∣nare patiatur; saith a(o) 1.2813 learned Lawyer: and the Reasons given are, For that no Man can be a Rebel against himself, nor can the King have a Superior; and consequently there can be none whom he can(p) 1.2814 offend: and it would be absurd, that he, who can restore all other Men, should need to be re∣stored himself. Also the Punishments of Crimes, such as Con∣fiscations, &c. are to be inflicted by the Kings Authority, or to fall to the Kings Treasury; and it would be most absurd, that a Man should exact from himself a Punishment.

So Richard Plantaginet Duke of York, and Edward the Fourth his Son, were both attainted; yet Edward the Fourth was rightful King, and no impediment in the Succession accru∣ed by it.

So Charles the Seventh of France (though banished by Sen∣tence of Parliament) did afterwards succeed to the Crown; and though Lewis the Twelfth forfeited for taking up Arms against Charles the Eighth, yet he succeeded: and Alexander Duke of Albany, and his Descendants, being declared Tray∣tors, by his Brother, King James the Fourth; yet his Son John being called home upon his Uncles Death, was declared Tu∣tor and Governour, without any remission, or being restored; and if his Cousin King James had died without Issue, he had been declared the true Successour of the Crown.

We have a memorable Instance of this in H. 7. who when he came to the Crown, called his Parliament; and the Judges having determined, that those Members of the House, that had been outlawed by the Parliament in Richard the Third's time, and been declared Rebels, should absent themselves, till a Bill were brought in for their restoring: It was moved a∣mong the Judges what should be done about the King, who had been condemned, and declared Traytor, &c. and it was by the unanimous consent of all the Judges (saith the learned(q) 1.2815 Chancellor) declared, That the Crown removed all the ob∣structions in the Blood, which might in any manner impede its descent; and from that time the King took the Crown,* 1.2816 the fountain of his Blood was purged, and all the Corruptions and Impurities taken away: so that he had no need of any Parliamentary help to supply him.

Thirdly, The Consideration of the Oaths, which the Sub∣jects are bound to take and observe, gives some further Proof of the Obligation of all the Subjects to maintain this lineal Suc∣cession.

The Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy bind the Subjects to bear Faith and true Allegiance to the King's Highness,* 1.2817 his Heirs, and lawful Successors, and that to their Power they shall assist and defend all Jurisdictions, Priviledges, Preheminences and Authorities granted to the King's Highness, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm, and of those Priviledges, &c. I think none will deny, but that Hereditary Succession is one of the principal Prerogatives intended by those Oaths.

We are not in these only sworn to His Majesty, but his Law∣ful Successors; which word, Lawful, is inserted, to cut off the Pretences of such as should not succeed by Law, and the insolent Arbitrariness of such, as being but Subjects themselves, think they may chuse their King.

These being promissory Oaths, as well to the Successors, when their Right shall fall, as to the present King; they have every of them in their respective degrees and orders, and indispensible Right confirmed to them by this Oath. So that the Predecessor hath no legal right to deprive his Successor, as hereafter I shall clear, nor to remit the Peoples Obligation to him as lawful Heir and Successor:(r) 1.2818 much less can the two Houses do it; for they are all within the Obligation of this Oath, and it is unreasonable, that Men should dispence with their own pro∣missory Oaths to others: for this would destroy all Faith and Confidence amongst Men, and pull up the very roots of Socie∣ty and Government

Whereas some object out of my Lord(s) 1.2819 Coke,* 1.2820 That none is Heir before the death of his Ancestor, but Heir apparent: It is to be considered,* 1.2821 that it must be the Heir presumptive, or apparent, that is here understood; otherwise the inserting the word, Heir, were superfluous, if by the Oaths were not intended, he that is next Heir upon the Death of the King; and if any Person think to evade it by affirming, that if the Parlia∣ment declare any Person to be no next Heir, he ceaseth to be so; as also not to be lawful Successor, because by such an Act he is outlawed: Let such Persons consider that this is neither better nor worse than palpable Aequivocation. For we swear in the common Sence of the words, and so by Heir we understand such as by proximity of Blood, have greatest right to succeed in the Inheritance.

It may be farther considered that the Lord Chancellor, Trea∣surer, and Judges,(t) 1.2822 all the great Officers of State, the Privy-Council, &c. are all sworn to defend the Rights of the Crown, and that they shall not concurr or assent to any thing which may turn to the King in Damage or Dis-herison. How then can any of these, much less the Judges (who are to expound, and interpret the Law) consent without palpable violation of their Oaths, to the changing of the Essence of the Monarchy.

I shall now endeavour to prove,* 1.2823 that no Parliament, by a compleat Act, can legally alter the Succession in an Hereditary Monarchy.

For first all(u) 1.2824 Kings and Parliaments are subordinate to the Laws of God, the Laws of Nature, and Nations. So that unless we give the Inferior Power and Jurisdiction over the Superior, no Act of Parliament can be binding to overturn what those three Laws have have established; and I hope I have proved under all these Heads, in the preceding part of this discourse, that the right of Succession is founded on them. As to the Law of God, it is clear not only from the general dictates of Religion; but 28 H. 8. c. 7. the Parliament uses these words, For no Man can dispence with God's Laws, which we also affirm and think.

As to the Laws of Nature they are acknowledged to be im∣mutable from the Principles of Reason. So the(w) 1.2825 Law it self confesseth, Naturalia quaedam Jura, quae apud omnes gentes obser∣vantur, divina quadam providentia constituta, semper firma atque immutabilia permanent: Certain natural Laws, which are ob∣served by all Nations) and such is that of Primogeniture) by Divine Providence being constituted, remain always firm and immutable. So when the Law declares that a supreme Prince is free from the obligation of Laws (solutus Legibus) yet Law∣yers(x) 1.2826 still acknowledge, that this does not exclude these Supream Powers from being liable to the Laws of God, Nature, and Nations, as is evident by all that treat of that Point.

Nor can the Law of Nations be overturned by private muni∣cipal Laws; so all Statutes to the prejudice of Ambassadors (who are secured by the Law of Nations,) are confessed by all to be null, and the highest Power whatsoever cannot take off the denouncing of a War, before a War can be lawful.

Besides, secondly, a Parliament cannot do more than(y) 1.2827 any absolute Monarch in his own Kingdom; for they, when joyned, are but in place of the supreme Power sitting in Judgment. We must not think our Parliaments have an unlimited Power de jure, so as they may make a forfeiture, or take away Life with∣out a cause, or pass Sentence against the Subjects, without citing or hearing them. For if they had such Power, we should be the greatest Slaves, and live under the most arbitrary Govern∣ment imaginable.

Therefore an absolute Prince cannot, in an Hereditary King∣dom (where the Successor is to succeed Jure Regni,(z) 1.2828 pre∣judge the Successors right of Succession; for the same right, the present King hath to the Possession, the next of Blood hath to the Succession. Therefore Hottoman Lib. 2. de Regno Galliae affirms, That ea quae, Jure Regni, primogenito competunt, ne Testamento quidem Patris adimi possunt: That in the absolute Monarchy of France, The Father cannot by his last Will deprive the First-born of those things which belong to him by Royal right. So when the King of France designed to break the Salique Law of Succession, as in the Reign of Charles the Fifth, it was found impracticable by the three States. So when Pyrrhus would have preferred his younger Son to the Crown;(a) 1.2829 the Epirots (fol∣lowing

the Law of Nations and then own) refused him. So Anno 1649. when Amurat the Grand Signior left the Empire to Han the Tartarian, passing his Brother Ibrahim, the whole Officers of State did unanimously cancel the Testament, and restored Ibrahim the true Heir, though no other than a Fool. So if Kings could have inverted their Succession, Saint Lewis had preferred his own Third Son to Lewis his Eldest; and Al∣phonsus King of Leon in Spain, had preferred his Daughter to Ferdinand his Eldest Son; and Edward the Sixth of England, had preferred, and did actually prefer the Lady Jane Grey to his Sisters Mary and Elizabeth.

Thirdly, It is undeniable, in the opinion of all Lawyers, That a King cannot in Law alienate his Crown, but that the Deed is void, nor can he in Law consent to an Act of Parliament de∣claring that he should be the last King: For if such consents and Acts(b) 1.2830 had been sufficient to bind Successors, then weak Kings by their own simplicity, and gentle Kings by the Re∣bellion of their Subjects, or being wrought upon by the im∣portunity of their Wives, or Concubines, or the mis-represen∣tation of Favourites, might do great mischiefs to their People, in raising up continual Factions; of the miseries of which I shall speak hereafter.

This is owned in Subjects, That the Honour and Nobility that is bestowed upon a man and his Heirs, doth so necessarily de∣scend upon those Heirs, that the Father or Predecessor cannot exclude the Successor, or derogate from his Right, by renoun∣cing, resigning, following base, or mean Trades, or such like. For,* 1.2831 say the Lawyers, since he derives his Right from his old Progenitors, and owes it not to his Father, his Fathers Deed should not prejudge him; so much more in Kings (the ill con∣sequences of such violations of Justice and Right being infinitely more destructive) the Predecessor should not do any Act to pre∣judice his Successor: For that right of blood which makes the Eldest First, makes the other Second; and all the Statutes that acknowledge the present Kings Prerogative, acknowledge that they belong to him and his Heirs. For as a Prince cannot, (even ex plenitudine potestatis) legitimate a Bastard, in prejudice of former Children, though they have only but an hope of Suc∣cession; much less can he bastardize or disinherit the Right Heir, who is so made by God, and honoured from him with the Character.

If therefore Kings (how absolute soever) cannot de jure in∣vert the natural order of Succession, there is no reason that the States of Parliament should have such a Power. For by the known Laws they have no Legislative Power otherwise than by assenting to what the King does, and all that their assent could do, would be no more than that they, and their Successors should not oppose his nomination, because of their consent: but that can never amount to a Power of transferring.

For if the States of Parliament had this Power originally in

themselves to bestow, why might they not reserve it for them∣selves, and so perpetuate the Government in their own hands? So Judge Jenkin asserts, according to Law, That no King can be named, or in any time made, in this Kingdom,(d) 1.2832 by the People, Kings being before there were Parliaments: and there is good reason; for then the Monarchy should not be Hereditary, but E∣lective: the very Essence of Hereditary Monarchy consisting in the Right of Succession: whereas if the Parliament can prefer the next save one, they may prefer the last of all the Line; and the same reason by which they can chuse a Successor (which can only be, that they have Power above him) should likewise (in the opinion of a very(e) 1.2833 learned Person) justify their deposing of Kings; as we saw in the last Age, that such reasons as of late have been urged, to incapacitate the Children of King Charles the First from the hope of Succession, viz. Popery and Arbi∣trary Government, did embolden men to dethrone and murther the Father, who was actual King. For if it were once yielded that the Houses had a Right in themselves, to take care for the Salus populi, that none but such Princes should succeed, who were approved of by the prevailing Faction in their body, nothing but confusion would follow, one Party having their Votes seconded by force one time, and a quite contrary another; yet all pre∣tending the Publick Weal: and so a large breach should be made (by pretending to stop one dangerous Successor) to the inflow∣ing of successive Usurpers, and thereby the Crown should not on∣ly by ambulatory, but unstable upon every head that wore it, and alwaies in danger of a bloody surprise; till at last the Re∣galia being secured from the expectant Heir, the Factious would find a way to pillage them from the present Soveraign, and con∣vert them into a Mace for an House of Commons.

I writ this Part with greater Enlargements, in answer to the plausiblest Arguments for the Bill of Seclusion, while that matter was in the hottest agitation. But since there will be no need of dilating upon that Subject (now that God Almighty hath so sig∣nally determined the Controversie, by the peaceable settlement of his Majesty upon his Throne) I shall close this Chapter, with some few remarks of the miseries have been brought upon King∣doms, and especially upon this, by the disjoynting the Succession.

So we read what dreadful(f) 1.2834 mischiefs arose from Pelops preferring his younger Son to the Kingdom of Mycene:* 1.2835 from Oedipus commanding that Polynices his Youngest Son should reign interchangeably with the Eldest: From Parisatis the Queen of Persia's preferring her Youngest Son Cyrus, to her Eldest Artaxerxes: From Aristodomus admitting his two Sons Proclus and Euristhenes, to an equal share in the Lacedemonian Throne. The like observations are to be made in the Succession of Ptolomaeus Lagus, and Ptolomaeus Phisco; In the Sons of Severus, in the Succession of Sinesandus, who killed his brother Suintill rightful Heir of Spain, and that of Sforza and Francis Duke of Mi∣lain, and thousands more; in all which, either the Usurpers, or the

Kingdoms that obeyed them, perished utterly, or were brought to great ruine.

In Britain the whole nation of the Picts were extirpated, by the endeavour of that People to hinder Keneth Son of Alpinus, from possessing the Kingdom as right Heir of Fergusiana, Sister of Mordred their King. In England the Usurpation of Harold, upon the Right of Edgar, opened the passage to William the Conqueror. The Usurpations of William Rufus, and Henry the First, upon their Brother Robert, and of King Stephen, upon the Empress Maud, were accompanied with great effusion of Blood: So that a great part of the ancient Norman Nobility, (both such as resided there, or were transplanted hither) were slain or grievously ha∣rassed. The Usurpation of King John, upon his Nephew Ar∣thur, caused great disquiets, during his Reign, and the effects lasted a great while after. The removal of King Richard the Second by Henry the Fourth, occasioned those lasting Wars, and most miserable devastations, betwixt the Houses of York and Lancaster; during which Usurpation (before the Crown was setled upon Edward the Fourth) Historians reckon no less than seventeen pitched Battels, and eight Kings and Princes of the Blood slain, and put to death; and that forty six Dukes and Earls, besides innumerable Barons and Gentlemen, and above 200000. common People were slain and destroyed, in the space of Sixty Years. To which we may add the cruel death of Edward the Fifth, and his Brother, by their bloody Unckle, and his own miserable end; and the calamitous fall of the Lady Jane Grey, and her Noble Relations.

All which Princes (although for the supporting their unjust Claims, Invasions and Usurpations of the Crown, they procured Parliamentary concurrence, and popular Establishments yet) after so great effusion of blood, could not, in reality, trans∣fer the Right from the next Heir of the blood, but at last all centred again in the Right Heir.

Notes

• (a) 1.1

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. Polit. lib. 1. c. 5.
• (b) 1.2

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ib.
• * 1.3

  Comparison of the natural with the Po∣litic body.
• (c) 1.4

  Sic orbem Reipubli∣••e esse conversum, ut vix sonitum audire, vix impressam orbi∣tam vi••ere possumus. Cic. •••• Attic. Ep. 36.
• (*) 1.5

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.6

  The Scheme of the whole work.
• * 1.7

  My Lord President.
• (d) 1.8

  cap. 2.
• (e) 1.9

  cap. 3.
• (f) 1.10

  cap. 4.
• (g) 1.11

  cap. 5.
• (h) 1.12

  cap. 6.
• (i) 1.13

  cap. 7.
• (k) 1.14

  cap. 8.
• (l) 1.15

  cap. 9.
• (m) 1.16

  cap. 10.
• (n) 1.17

  cap. 11.
• (o) 1.18

  cap. 12.
• (p) 1.19

  cap. 13.
• (q) 1.20

  cap. 14.
• (r) 1.21

  cap. 15.
• (s) 1.22

  cap. 16.
• (t) 1.23

  cap. 17.
• (u) 1.24

  cap. 18.
• (w) 1.25

  cap. 19.
• (x) 1.26

  cap. 20.
• (y) 1.27

  cap. 21.
• (z) 1.28

  cap. 22.
• (a) 1.29

  cap. 23.
• (b) 1.30

  cap. 24.
• (c) 1.31

  cap. 25.
• (d) 1.32

  cap. 26.
• (e) 1.33

  cap. 27.
• (f) 1.34

  cap. 28.
• (g) 1.35

  cap. 29.
• (h) 1.36

  cap. 30.
• (i) 1.37

  cap. 31.
• (k) 1.38

  cap. 32.
• (l) 1.39

  cap. 33.
• (m) 1.40

  cap. 34.
• (n) 1.41

  cap. 35.
• (o) 1.42

  cap. 36.
• (p) 1.43

  cap. 37.
• (q) 1.44

  cap. 38.
• (r) 1.45

  cap. 39.
• (s) 1.46

  cap. 40.
• (t) 1.47

  cap. 41.
• (u) 1.48

  cap. 42.
• (w) 1.49

  cap. 43.
• (x) 1.50

  cap. 44.
• (y) 1.51

  cap. 45.
• (z) 1.52

  cap. 46.
• * 1.53

  The Authors Apo∣logy for himself.
• * 1.54

  A Parallel betwixt the Humane Body and Government.
• (a) 1.55

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. lib. 2. Polit. c. 2.
• * 1.56

  Leges a ligando.
• * 1.57

  The first Society of Man and Wife.
• (a) 1.58

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 1 Polit. c. 1.
• (b) 1.59

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Sit Domusimprimis, vxor & Taurus arator.
• (a) 1.60

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Idem c. 8. The second society of a Family.
• (b) 1.61

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Pol l. 1. c. 1.
• * 1.62

  The Fathers Go∣vernment.
• (c) 1.63

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. P. lib. 1. c. 8.
• (d) 1.64

  French Monar∣chy, p. 68.
• * 1.65

  Society of Families.
• (e) 1.66

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 1. c. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. ib.
• * 1.67

  State of France p. 1.
• * 1.68

  Why Man is Sociable.
• * 1.69

  People the Subject of Government.
• (a) 1.70

  Polit. lib. 4. c. 4. lib. 7. c. 4. lib. 6. c. 1.
• (b) 1.71

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 1. cap. 1, & 3.
• (c) 1.72

  Sine imperio nec dom••s ulla, nec civit••s, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura om∣nis, nec ipse mundus potuit. Lib. 3. de. L••. initic.
• * 1.73

  The necessity of Go∣vernment.
• (d) 1.74

  Tom. 2. p. 391.
• (e) 1.75

  Genus hominum agresle sine legibus sine imperio.
• (f) 1.76

  Incerti nimium so∣luti{que} megis sine Do∣minoquamin libertate.
• (g) 1.77

  Ab exalibus Sey∣tharum Parthorum Im∣pirium suisse dedu∣dum. lib. 22.
• * 1.78

  The Evil of Liber∣ty.
• * 1.79

  Neque sera hominum pectora fr••geseunt, do∣nec vim senserint im∣perii.
• (h) 1.80

  Levi ••han.
• * 1.81

  The state of Nature, not a state of War.
• (a) 1.82

  Earl of Clarendon's Survey, c. 13, 14, 15.
• (b) 1.83

  Review of obser∣vations. p. 20, 21. Whatever the state of Nature was, yet Government is ne∣cessary.
• * 1.84

  The reasons why all must. quit the state of Nature, to submit to Government.
• (c) 1.85

  De laudibus LL. Angliae, c. 14.
• * 1.86

  Government neces∣sary for Preservati∣on.
• (d) 1.87

  Adversus Mathe∣maticos lib. 2. Stobaei Serm. 42.
• (w) 1.88

  Nalson Common Interest.
• * 1.89

  The Common Peo∣ple not to be order∣ed without Govern∣ment.
• (x) 1.90

  Cicero pro Planeio.
• (y) 1.91

  Sallust. ad Casa∣rem.
• (z) 1.92

  Cum nec Imperii majestas ulla nec Ma∣gistratuum aut Cura∣torum est Imperium. Bodinus de Repub. l. 4. c. 1.
• * 1.93

  Against Anarchy.
• * 1.94

  Omnium deterrima plebis impotentissima potestas; ex his tamen omnibus nihil Anar∣chiae magis pestife∣rum. Idem.
• (a) 1.95

  Xenoph. de Rep. Athenarum. Thucyd. lib. 3.
• (b) 1.96

  Polit. l. 4. c. 4.
• (c) 1.97

  Coeius hominum Juris consensu & uti∣bitatis communione sociatus. De Civitate Dei, c. 23.
• (d) 1.98

  Populus negligit rempublicam, magni∣tudine nimia commu∣nium curarum expers. 1. Hist. Privata cuique stimu∣latio vile decus publi∣cum. 2. Annal.
• (e) 1.99

  Quod omnia aetatis membra, familiasque singulas in unum cor∣pus cogit. De Rep. lib. 1.
• * 1.100

  How Superiority and Government founded in Nature.
• * 1.101

  Dominion given to Man.
• (f) 1.102

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 1. Po∣lit. c. 5.
• * 1.103

  Some born to Em∣pire.
• * 1.104

  No Nation so Sa∣vage, wherein some Government hath not been.
• * 1.105

  The Mischiefs of tumultuous voting, and want of Magi∣strates.
• (g) 1.106

  Ea demum libertas Romae est, non Sena∣tus, non Magistratus, non Leges, non Mores Majorum, non Institu∣ta Patrum. 1 Annal.
• * 1.107

  Salva esse Roma non potuit, nisi benesicio servitutis.
• (a) 1.108

  Mr. Algernon Sydney.
• * 1.109

  The Power was gi∣ven from God to One, and not to Ma∣ny; there neither was nor is Natural Freedom.
• (b) 1.110

  Dr. Hammond's Address to the Lord Fairfax, p. 8, 9. The State of Go∣vernment in the first Ages Kingly.
• * 1.111

  Gen. 3.16.
• * 1.112

  Gen. 4.7.
• (c) 1.113

  Dudley Digs, p. 15.
• (d) 1.114

  Review of Ob∣servations, p. 2.
• * 1.115

  God appointed Kings.
• (e) 1.116

  Jus Reg. p. 15. 21.
• (f) 1.117

  Rom. 13. v. 13, 14.
• * 1.118

  The Testimony of Authors.
• (g) 1.119

  Contra Gentes.
• (h) 1.120

  De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. cap. 21.
• (i) 1.121

  Cod. de veteri Co∣dice enucleand.
• (k) 1.122

  Novel. 6. Instit. Nov. 40, 45, 46, 133. pr.
• (l) 1.123

  Dr. Hammond's Address, p. 10, 11.
• (m) 1.124

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Rom. 13.2.
• (n) 1.125

  Homer, Hiad. 6.
• (o) 1.126

  French Monar∣chy, p. 16.
• (p) 1.127

  Lib. 6. Histor. p. 197. Edit. Basil.
• * 1.128

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.129

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (q) 1.130

  Idem, pag. 198.
• * 1.131

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.132

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.133

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.134

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (r) 1.135

  French Monar∣chy, or Absolute Power, p. 20.
• (s) 1.136

  Idem, pag. 199.
• * 1.137

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (t) 1.138

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.139

  Idem, pag. 200.
• * 1.140

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (u) 1.141

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. de Repub. l. 5. c. 10. initio.
• (w) 1.142

  Bishop of Lincoln, Preface to the Pow∣er of Princes.
• (x) 1.143

  D. Digs Unlaw∣fulness of Resistance, p. 3.
• (y) 1.144

  Institut. de Jure naturali Gent. & Civ. 56. Ʋlpian, lib. 1. sect. De Constitutione Princi∣pis.
• (a) 1.145

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.Rhetor. ad Alex. c. 1.
• (b) 1.146

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ethic. Nicom. c. 5.
• (c) 1.147

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. De Repab. l. 2. c. 6.
• (d) 1.148

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (e) 1.149

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (f) 1.150

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (g) 1.151

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (i) 1.152

  Regis nutus & Ar∣bitrium pro Legibus, lib. 10.
• (k) 1.153

  Romulus ad libi∣tum imperitaverat, de∣in Numa Religionibus & Divino Jure Popu∣lum devinxit. Sed praecipuus Servius Tullius sanctor Legum fuit, quis etiam R••g ••s obtemperarent. 3 An∣nal.
• (l) 1.154

  Nalson, Common Interest, p. 14, 15.
• * 1.155

  The Benefits Socie∣ties enjoy by Laws.
• (m) 1.156

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 1. c. 2.
• (n) 1.157

  Lib. 12. de LL.
• * 1.158

  Lib. 5. & ult. E••kic.
• (o) 1.159

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 13.
• * 1.160

  The Usefulness of Laws.
• (p) 1.161

  1 de Oratore.
• (q) 1.162

  Major hareditas unicuique nesteum a Jure & Legious quam aliis a quibus illa bona relicta surt. Id. pro Caecinna.
• (r) 1.163

  Civil Wars.
• (s) 1.164

  Fr. Whyte, Sacred Laws.
• * 1.165

  The Honour given to Law-makers.
• (t) 1.166

  Stephanus Niger Exposit. Carm. Py∣thag. Leges primo rudibus hominum animis sim∣plices eram. Maxi∣meque fama celebra∣vit Cretensium quas Minos, Spartanorum quas Lycurgus; ac mox Atheniensibus qu••siti∣ores jam & plures So∣lon praeseripsit. T••••it. 3 Annal.
• (u) 1.167

  De Republica:
• (a) 1.168

  Arist. Polit. lib. 2.
• (b) 1.169

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 1. c. 3.
• (c) 1.170

  Sicut coelum Diis, ita terras generi mor∣talium datas; quaeque sunt vacuae, e••s publi∣cas esse. Annal. l. 13.
• (d) 1.171

  Arist. Polit. lib. 2. c. 3.
• * 1.172

  Against Communi∣ty of Wives.
• (e) 1.173

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ib.
• * 1.174

  Subjects now very sollicitous to pre∣serve their Proper∣ties.
• * 1.175

  The Privileges of the English Subjects in their Property.
• * 1.176

  Whether Property was before Govern∣ment, or not.
• (f) 1.177

  Bishop of Lin∣coln's Preface to Power of Princes.
• * 1.178

  Against Arbitrary Sovereignty.
• (g) 1.179

  Survey of Levia∣than, p. 110.
• (h) 1.180

  Seneca. Jure civili omnia Re∣gis sum, & tamen illa quorum ad Regem pertinet universa pos∣sessio, in singulos domi∣nos discerpta sunt, & unaquaeque res habet possessorem suum. Ita{que} dare Regi domum & mancipia & pecuniam possumus, nec donare il∣li de suo dicimur. Ad Reges enim po••stas omnium pertinet, ad s••gula proprietas.
• (i) 1.181

  Errat si quis tu∣tum sibiesse Regem pu∣tat, ubi nihil a Rege tutum est. Securitas securita••e paciscenda est.
• (k) 1.182

  De laudibus Le∣gum Ang. c. 37.
• (l) 1.183

  Quis enim poten∣tior liberiorve esse po∣tesi, quam qui non so∣lum alios, sed seipsum sufficit debellare? Ib.
• (a) 1.184

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 7.
• (c)) 1.185

  4. Annal.
• (d) 1.186

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 7.
• (e) 1.187

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. li. 4. c. 8.
• (f) 1.188

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (g) 1.189

  Polit. l. 4. c. 4.
• (h) 1.190

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.191

  Subdivisions of De∣mocracy.
• (i) 1.192

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.193

  Concerning the De∣mocracies in Corpo∣rations.
• (k) 1.194

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 5.
• * 1.195

  1. Argument against Democracy, Inju∣stice.
• (l) 1.196

  Ʋbi plebs est domi∣na, necesse est ut quod plurimis visum sit, hoc quoque sit ratum & hoc sit jus. Polit. l. 6. c. 2.
• * 1.197

  2. Against the Com∣mon Peoples Liber∣ty of Elections.
• (m) 1.198

  Plerisque jucun∣dius est licenter vivere quam modeste. Ib. c. 2.
• (n) 1.199

  In Licurg. Vide Giphanii Com. in c. 7. l. 2. Polit. Arist.
• (o) 1.200

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. L. 2. Polit. c. 9.
• (p) 1.201

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (q) 1.202

  Rempublicam pe∣rituram in qua viri Principes consultant, Populus vero & impe∣rita plebecula decernit.
• * 1.203

  3. Their Faction.
• (r) 1.204

  Giphanii Comment. in lib. 5. c. 5. Polit.
• (s) 1.205

  Lib. 13. c. 9.
• (t) 1.206

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Pol. l. 4. c. 4.
• (u) 1.207

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Id. l. 5. c. 5.
• (w) 1.208

  Neminem plebem injuria afficere.
• * 1.209

  Of the Ephori.
• (x) 1.210

  Saepe valde paupe∣res accidit esse in hoc Magistratu, qui prop∣ter paupertatem sunt venales. Polit. lib. 2. c. 7.
• * 1.211

  The Tribunes of Rome.
• (y) 1.212

  Giphan. Comment. in c. 7. lib. 2. Polit.
• * 1.213

  Democracy least du∣rable.
• (z) 1.214

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 6. c. 4.
• (a) 1.215

  Vicissim parere & imperare.
• * 1.216

  Where Aristotle al∣lows of Democracy.
• (b) 1.217

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 6. c. 4.
• * 1.218

  The plausible Pleas for Democracy an∣swered.
• (c) 1.219

  Dudley Digs of Resistance p. 22. 1. That Justice is not so impartially administred.
• (d) 1.220

  Suaden'o docent, non docendo suadent.
• (e) 1.221

  Ʋtilitas Justi pro∣pe mater & Aequi est.
• * 1.222

  2. True Liberty is wanting in Demo∣cracy.
• (f) 1.223

  Non an servirent, sed an servirent uni vel pluribus.
• (g) 1.224

  Platarc. in Vita Marii.
• * 1.225

  Concerning Equali∣ty.
• (a) 1.226

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 15.
• (b) 1.227

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (c) 1.228

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 4. c. 7.
• * 1.229

  Several kinds of Ari∣stocracy.
• (d) 1.230

  Polit. lib. 4. c. 5. Four kinds of Oli∣garchy.
• (e) 1.231

  A••ist. Polit. lib. 4. c. 8.
• * 1.232

  Of the Government called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (f) 1.233

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (g) 1.234

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 4. c. 8.
• (h) 1.235

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (i) 1.236

  Lib. 4. Polit. c. 13.
• * 1.237

  Of the Roman Se∣nate.
• (k) 1.238

  Alexand. ab Alex. Genialium Dierum, lib. 9. c. 2.
• (l) 1.239

  Rosini Antiq. Rom. lib. 7. c. 9.
• (m) 1.240

  Pighius.
• * 1.241

  Of the Tribunes of the People.
• (n) 1.242

  Rosini Epitome rerum Rom. lib. 7. c. 25.
• (o) 1.243

  Pighius Tyranno∣fugio.
• (p) 1.244

  Stadius in Florum, lib. 3. c. 2. Eorum Au∣toritas magis in inter∣cedendo, quam juben∣do.
• (q) 1.245

  Pighius ut supra.
• (r) 1.246

  Godwyn's Roman Antiqu. lib. 3. sect. 2.
• (s) 1.247

  Hubert in Lib. 1. Cicer. Epist. Serm. 2.
• (t) 1.248

  Tacit. Annal. 11.
• (v) 1.249

  Sigonius de Jure, lib. 3. cap. 1.
• (a) 1.250

  Nalson's Com∣mon Interest, c. 3. The Benefits design∣ed in all Societies.
• * 1.251

  1. Securing Dome∣stick Peace.
• * 1.252

  Ibid. Covetousness in Commonwealths∣men causes Discords.
• (b) 1.253

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit lib. 5. c. 4.
• * 1.254

  Factions among them.
• (c) 1.255

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 7.
• (d) 1.256

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 15.
• * 1.257

  The Athenian Chan∣ges and Factions.
• * 1.258

  Concerning the 30 Tyrants of Athens.
• (e) 1.259

  History, p. 278.
• * 1.260

  Of Factions in Car∣thage.
• (f) 1.261

  Livius, lib. 2. An. V.C. 281.
• (g) 1.262

  Idem, lib. 3. An. V.C. 297.
• (h) 1.263

  Inter patres ple∣bemque certamina ex∣arsere, modo turbulen∣ti Tribuni, modo Con∣sules praevalidi, & in Ʋrbe ac Foro tenta∣menta Civilium bel∣lorum, mox e plebe in∣fima C. Marius & no∣bilium saevissemus L. Sylla.
• (i) 1.264

  Victam armis li∣bertatem in Domina∣tione•••• verterunt. Ta∣cit. 2. Histor. lib. 3. c. 14, 15, 16.
• (k) 1.265

  Cum dissentionibus omnia centurbari in m••ltorum Imperiis necesse est. Pacis in∣terest omnium potesta∣t••n conserre ad unum.
• (l) 1.266

  Discordanti sape Pa•• i.e non aliud re∣medium fuisse, quam si ab uno regeretur.
• * 1.267

  1. Annal. Livius, lib. 2. Necessity of chusing a Dictator.
• (m) 1.268

  Jus vitae penes unum illum esse, nec adversus Dictatoriam vim, aut Tribunus Plebis, aut ipsa Plebs attollere coulos, aut hiscere audebat. Lib. 6.
• (n) 1.269

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 5. c. 11. Heinsti.
• (o) 1.270

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 6.
• * 1.271

  That a Common∣wealth cannot so well defend it self against a Foreign Enemy.
• (p) 1.272

  Lib 8.
• (q) 1.273

  Nalson's Com∣mon Interest, c. 3.
• * 1.274

  In Miscarriages, the Authors difficultly known.
• * 1.275

  Great Injustice and Oppression in Com∣monwealths.
• (p) 1.276

  Polit. lib. 5. c. 6.
• * 1.277

  Example in our late Republicans.
• (s) 1.278

  Malson's Com∣mon Interest.
• * 1.279

  No just Distributi∣on of rewards or Punishments.
• * 1.280

  Ingratitude of Com∣monwealths.
• * 1.281

  The ill usage of The∣mistocles.
• (t) 1.282

  Sir Walt. Raleigh b, lib. 3. cap. 8. sect. 7.
• (u) 1.283

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 13.
• * 1.284

  Of Ingratitude to Miltiades.
• * 1.285

  The ill Treatment of Phocyon.
• * 1.286

  Lib. 4. c. 3. sect. 15.
• * 1.287

  The Ingrati•• the Athenians to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 metrius.
• * 1.288

  The ill usage of So∣phocles and Phthiodo∣rus.
• (w) 1.289

  Idem, Lib. 3. c. 8. sect. 8.
• * 1.290

  Ingratitude to Alci∣biades.
• * 1.291

  The ten Athenian Sea-Captains.
• * 1.292

  Concerning the Ro∣man Ingratitude.
• * 1.293

  Coriolanus.
• * 1.294

  Furius Camillus.
• * 1.295

  The Two Scipio's
• * 1.296

  Concerning Publius Scipio, the elder Bro∣ther.
• (x) 1.297

  Sir Walter Ra∣leigh, l. 5. c. 3. sect. 18.
• * 1.298

  Concerning Lucius Scipio, the younger Brother.
• * 1.299

  Summary of the Re∣man Discords.
• (y) 1.300

  Liv. lib. 2.
• * 1.301

  Concerning three Modern Common∣wealths.
• * 1.302

  The Antiquity of Monarchy illustra∣ted in Adam's Sove∣reignty.
• (a) 1.303

  Ovid. Metam.
• (b) 1.304

  Natura commenta est Reges, quod ex ali∣is animantibus, & Api∣bus praesertim, licet dignoscere.
• * 1.305

  Monarchical Go∣vernment most na∣tural.
• (c) 1.306

  Virgil. Georg.
• (d) 1.307

  Cap. 2.
• (e) 1.308

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 6. c. 12.
• (f) 1.309

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (g) 1.310

  Pater vitae necis{que} potestatem habebat. in filios. Cicero.
• (h) 1.311

  Numb. 11.
• (i) 1.312

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Odyss. 11.
• * 1.313

  The Antiquity of Monarchy from Hi∣story and Testimo∣ny.
• (k) 1.314

  Vide Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae.
• * 1.315

  Polit. lib. 5. c. 11.
• (l) 1.316

  De Antiquis Fa∣miliis Regum.
• (m) 1.317

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. L. 1. c. 1.
• (n) 1.318

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (o) 1.319

  In terris nomen Imperii primum fuit.
• (p) 1.320

  Principio rerum Nationum{que} omnium imperium penes Reges erat. Lib. 1.
• (q) 1.321

  Certum est omnes Antiquas Gentes Re∣gibus paruisse. Lib. 3. de LL.
• * 1.322

  The first Common∣wealths.
• (r) 1.323

  Ʋrbem Romam a principio Reges habu∣cre. 1. Annal.
• (s) 1.324

  Dr. Nals••n's Com∣mon Interest.
• * 1.325

  Authors deducing Monarchy from a Divine Original.
• (t) 1.326

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Theog. v. 91.
• (v) 1.327

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Hymn. in Jovem.
• (w) 1.328

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ihad. 6. v. 277.
• (x) 1.329

  Absolute Power, p. 63.
• (y) 1.330

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Iliad. 4. v. 738.
• (z) 1.331

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (a) 1.332

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. In Politico.
• (b) 1.333

  Absolute Power, p. 66.
• (c) 1.334

  2. de LL.
• (d) 1.335

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Menander.
• (e) 1.336

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Apud Stob. Ser••. 46.
• (f) 1.337

  Idem, 121.
• (g) 1.338

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. c. 37.
• (h) 1.339

  Augustin's Numis∣mata per totum.
• (i) 1.340

  Pan••gy.
• (k) 1.341

  Octavius Strada de Imp. Rom. p. 294, 338.
• (l) 1.342

  Principis potestas publi••t est in terris 〈…〉〈…〉 Ma∣jest 〈…〉〈…〉. Caris∣buriensis. l. 4. c. 1.
• (m) 1.343

  Com in 13. Rom.
• (n) 1.344

  Cujus jussu homi∣nes nascuntur, hujus jussa & Reges consli∣muntur. Lib. 5. c. 24.
• (o) 1.345

  Apolog. cap. 31. Inde est Imperator, un∣de homo antequam Im∣perator; inde porestas illi, und & spiritus.
• (p) 1.346

  Absolute Power, p. 46.
• * 1.347

  Aristotle's Division of Kingly Govern∣ment.
• (q) 1.348

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 14.
• (r) 1.349

  Pag. 384.
• * 1.350

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.351

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (s) 1.352

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 10. H••insii.
• (t) 1.353

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Optiva tyrannis, i. suffragio 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (u) 1.354

  Halicarnass••us, lib. 5.
• (w) 1.355

  Lib. 3. de Officiis.
• (x) 1.356

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 3. Polit. c. 10. Heinsii.
• (y) 1.357

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (z) 1.358

  Comm••nt. in lib. 1. Polit. initic.
• * 1.359

  Other commendable Qualifications of Mo∣narchy.
• (a) 1.360

  Tacitus, 1. Annal.
• (b) 1.361

  Arduum sape eo∣dem loci potentiam & concordiam esse. Idem.
• (c) 1.362

  Omnem potestatem ad unum conferri pa∣cis interfuit. Tacitus, 1. Histor.
• (d) 1.363

  Perculsum undique ordinavit Imperii cor∣pus, quod ita haud du∣bie nunquam coire & consentire potuisset, nisi unius Praesidis nutu quasi anima & mente regeretur. Lib. 4. c. 3.
• (e) 1.364

  Nalson's Com∣mon Interest.
• * 1.365

  Monarchy more du∣rable.
• * 1.366

  Ʋrbem Romam a prin∣cipio Reges habuere. Libertatem & consu∣latum L. Brutus insti∣tuit. Dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur, neque Decemviralis Potestas ultra bien∣nium, neque Tribu∣norum militum Con∣sulare jus diu valuit. Non Cinnae, non Syllae longa dominatio; & Pompeii, Crassique po∣tentia cito in Caesa∣rem; Lepidi atque An∣tonii arma in Augu∣stum cessere, qui cun∣cta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit. Tacit. l. 1. Annal. Monarchy hath no Private Ends.
• (f) 1.367

  Finis justi Im∣perii, utilitas obedi∣entium & salus. Am∣mianus, lib. 30.
• (g) 1.368

  Nalson's Com∣mon Interest, p. 111.
• * 1.369

  Objection, That Mo∣narchy is apt to turn to Tyranny.
• (h) 1.370

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 5. Polit. c. 10.
• * 1.371

  Comparison betwixt a King and Tyrant.
• * 1.372

  Comparison betwixt a King and a Com∣monwealth.
• * 1.373

  More Inconvenien∣ces under Common∣wealths, than under Kings, cateris pari∣bus.
• * 1.374

  Another Objection answered.
• (i) 1.375

  Idem, p. 23.
• (k) 1.376

  Jus Regin••, p. 58.
• (l) 1.377

  Idem.
• (a) 1.378

  Ethic. 8. c. 10. Polit. lib. 3. & 5. c. 4.
• * 1.379

  Difference of a King and a Tyrant.
• * 1.380

  The ancient Au∣thors Description of a Good King.
• (b) 1.381

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.
• (c) 1.382

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (d) 1.383

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (e) 1.384

  Lamprid. in vita. Molliorem sibi pote∣statem & contemptibi∣liorem, sed securiorem & diuturniorem.
• (f) 1.385

  Ille Reipublicae status optabilis & fir∣mus est, in quo & pri∣vatim sancte innoxie{que} vivitur, & publica Justitia & Clementia vig••m. Polyb. lib. 6. Histor.
• (g) 1.386

  Verendus potius subditis est, quam me∣tuendus. Stobaeus.
• (h) 1.387

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polyb. Hist. lib. 5.
• * 1.388

  The Satisfaction and content a good King takes in his Admi∣nistration.
• (i) 1.389

  Cum omnia possu∣mus, sola credimus li∣cere nobis laudanda. Variarum lib. 50.
• * 1.390

  The Subjects Bene∣fit the End of good Kings.
• (k) 1.391

  Beata civium vita praeposita. Attic. l. 8. c. 11. & 5. de Repub.
• (l) 1.392

  Nihil in penatibus ejus vaenale aut Am∣bitioni pervium. 13. Annal. initio.
• (m) 1.393

  Cogitare quid aut nolue 〈…〉〈…〉 Prin∣cipe, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••olueris, 1 Histor.
• (n) 1.394

  Panegy.
• (o) 1.395

  Non minus homi∣nem se, quam homini∣bus praesse 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Ib.
• (p) 1.396

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Dio. in Nerva.
• (q) 1.397

  Nec tihi, quod ra∣rissimum, aut facilitas Auctoritatem, aut se∣veritas Amorem dimi∣nuat. Vita Agricolae.
• (r) 1.398

  O vere justum & legitimum illum Prin∣cipem! qui in summo fastigio non minus ma∣gnus quam bonus au∣dire desiderat, & duas res diversissimas, po∣tentiam ac modestiam miscet! quem pro∣deuntem certatim ve∣lut beneficum quoddam Numen aspi••nt in∣ter amorem timorem{que} medium. Praefat. ad Imperator. Reg. &c.
• (s) 1.399

  MS. Speech, 1571. Such Princes dear to their People.
• * 1.400

  Degrees of Sove∣reign Honour.
• (t) 1.401

  Essays of Honour and Reputation. 1. Conditores Imperi∣orum.
• (u) 1.402

  2. Legislatores perpetui Principes.
• (w) 1.403

  3. Liberatores & Salvatores.
• (x) 1.404

  4. Propagatores vel propugnatores.
• * 1.405

  Character of King Charl••s the Second.
• (y) 1.406

  Rem pepuli esse, non suam privatam. Dio. vita Hadriani.
• * 1.407

  Character of King Jar•• the Second.
• * 1.408

  Religion in a Prince, his Duty and Ad∣vantage.
• (a) 1.409

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit lib. 7. c. 8.
• (b) 1.410

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Diog. ••pud. Stohae••m.
• (c) 1.411

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.
• (d) 1.412

  Omnia prospere e∣veniunt sequentibus deos, Adversa autem spernentibus. Lib. 5.
• (e) 1.413

  Atque hac una sa∣pientia, quod Deorum Immortalium numine omnia regi, guberna∣rique perspeximus, gentes nationesque su∣peravimus. De Aru∣spic.
• (f) 1.414

  Machiavel's Disc. lib. 1. c. 12.
• * 1.415

  Usefulness of Reli∣gion to civilize Sub∣jects.
• (g) 1.416

  Omnium primum ut rem ad multitudinem imperitam & illis se∣culis rudem essicacissi∣mam, deorum metum inji••iendum ratus est. Lib. 1.
• (h) 1.417

  Numa Religioni∣bus & divino jure po∣pulum devinxit. 3. Annal.
• (i) 1.418

  At ego rem divi∣nam facio. Plutarch. in vita Numae. Numa's Fiction.
• (k) 1.419

  Qui cum descende∣re ad animos sine ali∣quo commento miraculi non posset, simulat sibi cum Dea Aegeria cun∣gressus nocturnos esse, ejus se monitu quae ac∣ceptissima diis essent sacra instituere. Lib. 1.
• * 1.420

  Mahomet's Fictions, to gain Credit to his Imposture.
• * 1.421

  The Heathens Zeal for Religion.
• (l) 1.422

  Valerius Maxim. lib. 1. c. 1.
• (m) 1.423

  Herodotus, lib. 9.
• (n) 1.424

  Antiq. Judaic. lib. 14. c. 8.
• * 1.425

  Disasters hapning to such as contemned the Heathen Gods.
• (o) 1.426

  Diodorus Siculus, lib. 20. p. 698.
• (p) 1.427

  Herodor. lib. 3. p. 887.
• (q) 1.428

  Lampridi••s. Here∣dian.
• (r) 1.429

  Of the Prince, cap. 18.
• * 1.430

  Machiavel would have his Prince only pretend Religion.
• * 1.431

  Answer to it.
• (s) 1.432

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 5. c. 11.
• (t) 1.433

  In Philipp••.
• * 1.434

  The Credit a Prince gains that is truly Religious.
• (u) 1.435

  Discourse, lib. 1. cap. 12. 〈◊〉〈◊〉's Opini∣on of the Bencht of the Heathen Reli∣gion.
• (w) 1.436

  Id. lib. 2. c. 5.
• * 1.437

  The Answer.
• * 1.438

  Concerning Numa Pompilius.
• (x) 1.439

  Livius, lib. 40. Decad. 4.
• (y) 1.440

  Cum animadver∣tisset pleraque dissol∣vendam Religionem esse. Ibid.
• (z) 1.441

  De disciplina sa∣pientiae, quia aliqua ex parte ad solvendam Religionem pertinere existimabantur: no∣luerunt enim prisei viri quicquam in hac asservari civitate, quo animi hominum a de∣orum cultu avocaren∣tur. Lib. 5. de Re∣ligione, num. 12.
• (a) 1.442

  Dionys. Halicar∣nassaeus, lib. 11.
• * 1.443

  The good things Numa established in order to Govern∣ment.
• * 1.444

  Moral Vertues ve∣ry useful to Govern∣ment.
• * 1.445

  Better than Hypo∣critical Holiness.
• * 1.446

  That Religion doth not dis-spirit Men.
• * 1.447

  True Piety lessened by subtile Disputes.
• * 1.448

  The Government of the Church of Eng∣land agreeable to the English Monarchy.
• * 1.449

  The King's Com∣mendation of the Principles of the Church of England, as to Monarchy.
• (b) 1.450

  Diutius durant exempla quam mores. Tacitus, 4. Histor.
• (c) 1.451

  Josephus de Bello Judaico, lib. 4. c. 5. & lib. 7.
• * 1.452

  The Evils by Rebel∣ling upon pretence of Religion.
• * 1.453

  Wherein the Sove∣reign's Care of Re∣ligion consists.
• * 1.454

  The Roman Hea∣thens not for change of Religion.
• (*) 1.455

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Dio Cassius, lib. 52.
• (d) 1.456

  Paulatim insurge∣re, munia Senatus, Magistratuum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in se trabere, aullo ad∣versante. Tacit. 1. An∣nal.
• (e) 1.457

  Majorum instituta tueri sacris caeremoni∣is{que} retinendis sapientis est. Patrios ritus mi∣grare aut violare, ubi∣que gentium nefari∣um sir. Cic. de Divi∣natione.
• (f) 1.458

  Omnes Religione moventur, & deos pa∣trios quos a majori∣bus acceperunt, colen∣dos sibi diligenter & retinendos arbitran∣tur. Cic. in Verrem.
• * 1.459

  Concerning Diver∣sity of Religions.
• * 1.460

  Fanaticalness in Re∣ligion dangerous to Government.
• (g) 1.461

  Mr. Fr. White's Sacred Laws.
• * 1.462

  Idem.
• * 1.463

  Concerning Tolera∣tion of Religion.
• (h) 1.464

  Polit. lib. 4. c. 3.
• (i) 1.465

  Publice peccare di∣co, qui & ipsi de deo receptisque sacris sen∣tiunt, & alios ad sen∣tiendum per turbas im∣pellum: Priva••im, qui pariter male sentiunt, sed sibi. Ibid.
• (k) 1.466

  Melius est ut pe∣reat unus quam ut pe∣reat unitas.
• (l) 1.467

  Violatarum Reli∣gionum aliubi atque aliubi diversa poena est, sed ubique aliqua. De Benef. l. 3. c. 6.
• (m) 1.468

  Quod in Religio∣nem divinam commit∣titur, in omnium fer∣tur injuriam. Lib. 4. Cod. de Haereticis.
• (n) 1.469

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Apol.
• (o) 1.470

  In morhis ni••il est magis periculosum quam immatura medi∣cina. Sen. Consol. ad Hill.
• (p) 1.471

  Tacitus, 12. Annal.
• (q) 1.472

  Quis impon it mibi necessitatem vel cre∣dendi quod nolim, vel quod velim non cre∣dendi? Lib. 5. c. 4.
• (r) 1.473

  Docendo magis quam jubendo, monen∣do quam minando. E∣pist. 65.
• (s) 1.474

  Tacere liceat; nul∣la libertas minor a Rege petitur. Sen. Oedip.
• (t) 1.475

  Peccata sic compe∣scas, ut sint quos pec∣casse poenitea••. Ad A∣fricanum Proconsu∣lem.
• (a) 1.476

  Character of King Charles the Se∣cond. Anno 1660. His Clemency.
• (b) 1.477

  Tyrannorum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & dementis Principis saccedent is Imperio, ni∣••il ju••undius, nihil utilius subditis accide∣re potuit.
• * 1.478

  The Benefit of Mo∣derate Govern∣ment. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (c) 1.479

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 5. Polit. c. 11.
• (d) 1.480

  Qui benignitate a•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Imperium temperavere, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 can∣dida & lata omnia su∣isse: etiam ••ostes a∣quiores quam aliis ci∣••es. Ad Caesarem.
• (e) 1.481

  Nec ulla re propius homines ad deum ac∣cedunt, quam salute hominibus danda. Cic. pro Ligat.
• (f) 1.482

  Se••ales civibus prabeant, quales sibi dens esse volunt. 1. de Clem. c. 5.
• (g) 1.483

  In Octa••.
• (h) 1.484

  Vim temperatam Dii provehunt in ma∣jut. Horat. Od. 3.
• (i) 1.485

  Potentia mediocri∣t•• exer••ita omnia quae∣si••a conservat. D. Cass. lib. 43.
• (k) 1.486

  Remissius imperan∣ti melius paretur. Sen. de Clem.
• * 1.487

  Amorem apud po∣pulares, m••tum apud h••sies quara••. Annal. 11.
• ‖ 1.488

  Claudianus ad Ho••or.
• * 1.489

  A Prince having the Love of his Sub∣jects, yet must have Guards.
• (l) 1.490

  Senec. Trag. Overmuch Clemen∣cy dangerous.
• (m) 1.491

  Omnia s••ir••, non omnia prosequi, par∣vis pe••cat••s veniam, magnis ••••••eritatem commodare. Tacitus vita Agric.
• (n) 1.492

  Salutaris severitas vincere inanem speci∣em clementix. Ci••ero ad Cl••••ent.
• (o) 1.493

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 ager crudelem facit medi∣cum. Publius.
• (p) 1.494

  Meus hic suror subditos sanos reddit. Stobaeus de Regno.
• (q) 1.495

  Ingenia nostra, ut ••obiles & generesi e∣qui, melius 〈…〉〈…〉. Sen. 1. de ••••em.
• (r) 1.496

  〈…〉〈…〉 de 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (s) 1.497

  Basilicon Doron.
• * 1.498

  Who deserve not Clemency.
• (t) 1.499

  Plut, in Lacon.
• (u) 1.500

  Panormitanus in vita Alphonsi.
• (x) 1.501

  Phil. de Comines.
• * 1.502

  Kings may forgive Offences against them before they were Kings.
• * 1.503

  The••se of Prudence in Government.
• * 1.504

  Authors commend∣ing Prudence.
• (a) 1.505

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Po'••••. lib. 3.
• (b) 1.506

  Plura in summa fortuna auspi••••is & consiliis quam telis & manibus geri. 13. An∣nal.
• (c) 1.507

  Proprium est pru∣dentiae conci••are sibi animos homi••um, & ad usus suns adjungere, cum virtutes spec•••• dispares prudentia junguntur. 2. de Of∣ficiis ad Brutum.
• (d) 1.508

  Jamblichus Epis••. ad Aphalum.
• (e) 1.509

  Damippus lib. 1. de Prudentia.
• * 1.510

  The Particulars wherein Prudence useful to a Prince consists.
• * 1.511

  The Diseases of a State 〈…〉〈…〉 by a Prudent Prince.
• (f) 1.512

  Sic••ipsam soelici∣tatem, prasens vitae temperat regitque prudentia. Stobaeus.
• (g) 1.513

  Quam multis vir∣tutibus opus est, qui∣bus velut anchoris 〈◊〉〈◊〉 navis firmatur? quam varia prudentia, qua velut clavo guberne∣tur? Ep. ad Imp. Reg. &c.
• * 1.514

  The Benefits to the Subjects under a Martial Prince.
• (a) 1.515

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Pol. lib. 2. c. 7.
• (b) 1.516

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Id. l. 7. Pol. c. 2. Laws for encoura∣ging Soldiers.
• (c) 1.517

  The necessity of having a Standing Force, is for pre∣venting Rebellion, and defending a∣gainst Foreigners; as appears in Aristotle. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lib. 7. c. 8.
• (d) 1.518

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Di••. l. 13.
• (e) 1.519

  Non ignavia ma∣gna imperia contin••ri, sed virorum armorum∣que faciendum certa∣men.
• (f) 1.520

  Sua retinere, pri∣vatae domus; de alie∣nis certare, regi••m 〈…〉〈…〉. 15. Annal.
• * 1.521

  How a Military Prince prevents Re∣bellious of his Sub∣jects.
• * 1.522

  How a couragious Prince secures his Subjects from Fo∣reign Enemies.
• (g) 1.523

  N••m•• provocare au let aut facere in ju∣riam ei Regno aut po∣pulo, quem intelligit expeditum atque prom∣ptum ad vindicandum. Vita Alex.
• (h) 1.524

  Objicient se mu∣cronibus insidiantium, & se suaque jactabunt, quocun que desiderave∣rit Imperantis salus. Sen. 1. de Clem.
• (i) 1.525

  Cic. pro Manilio. Quibus etiam venti tempeslatesque obse∣cundant.
• (k) 1.526

  Vehementer enim pertinet ad bella ad∣ministranda, quid ho∣s••es, quid socii, de Im∣peratoribus existi∣ment. Idem.
• * 1.527

  Of King Richard the First.
• * 1.528

  Of King Edward the Third, and the Black Prince.
• * 1.529

  Of Henry the Fifth.
• * 1.530

  Why our three last Kings could not ap∣pear so Formidable abroad.
• * 1.531

  What we may ex∣pect under King James the Second.
• * 1.532

  Character of a Mar∣tial Prince.
• (l) 1.533

  Tanti esse exerci∣tum, quanti Imperato∣rem. Florus, l. 2. c. 18.
• (m) 1.534

  Nullum genus bel∣li sit in quo illum non exercuerit fortuna. Cicero pro lege Ma∣nil.
• (n) 1.535

  Labor in negotio, industria 〈◊〉〈◊〉 agendo, celeritas 〈◊〉〈◊〉 consicien∣do, &c. Ibid.
• (a) 1.536

  Nihil aliud est Imperium, nisi cura salutis alienae. Lib. 29.
• * 1.537

  The Benefit of Sub∣jects by their Prince's Care.
• (b) 1.538

  Omnium otium il∣lius labor, omnium de∣licias illius industria, omnium vacationem illius occupatio. Vt re∣missam aliquando ani∣mam ••abe••it, nunquar•• solut•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Senec. Con∣sol. ad Polyb.
• (c) 1.539

  Vnius curam ex∣cubare pro sdute sin∣gulorum atque univer∣sorum.
• (d) 1.540

  Hae•• immensa mul∣titudo, unius Anima circundata, illius spi∣ritu regitur, illius ra∣tione flectitur. Id. de Clem. c. 3.
• (e) 1.541

  Plut. in Apop.
• * 1.542

  The Weight of Go∣vernment.
• (f) 1.543

  Non licet do••mi∣tabundum esse qui cla∣vo asside••••emper itaque assidue Principi vigi∣landum est, ne quid er∣ret, quia non nisi pluri∣morum p••rnicie delin∣quit. Lipsius Epist.
• (g) 1.544

  Alia ex aliis cu∣ra fatigat, Vexatque animos nov•• tempe∣stas: Non sic Libycis Syrtibus furit alter∣nos volvere fluctus, Non curarum somnos domitor p••ctora solvit.
• (h) 1.545

  Aelian. Variar. Histor. lib. 2. Lampridius in vita. Who not fit for Go∣vernment.
• * 1.546

  Many Particulars wherein the Burthen of Government is discovered.
• * 1.547

  Governours to be endowed with vari∣ous Qualifications.
• * 1.548

  A Prince's Care in preserving his Peo∣ple at home and a∣broad.
• * 1.549

  The Imployment of many under a Prince.
• * 1.550

  A Prince much con∣cerned fo•• his Fame.
• (i) 1.551

  Suum cuique de∣cus pos•••••• it is repen∣dit. Tacit. 4. Annal.
• (k) 1.552

  Praesenti potentia extingui posse sequer∣tis avi m••moriam. Id.
• ‖ 1.553

  Post fata nullus est locus, nullum tempus quo funestorum Prin∣cipum manes a posteris exe••rationibus conqui∣escent.
• * 1.554

  A•• virtutem ille praeit? sequimur: a•• vitia? inclinamus: bene beateque agit? slorem••s: improspere? labimur aut ruimus cum illo. Epist. ad Polit. Flexibiles in quam∣cunque partem du••i∣mur a Principe & se∣quaces. Panegyr.
• (l) 1.555

  Omnia facta dicta∣que Principis rumor excipit, nec magis ei quam Soli latere con∣tigit. 1. de Clem.
• (m) 1.556

  Cordati & magni Principis est nihil com∣mittere quod ipsius dignitati aut famae de∣trahit.
• * 1.557

  A Prince to be Ex∣emplary in Vertue.
• (n) 1.558

  Vita 〈…〉〈…〉 ad 〈…〉〈…〉, ad 〈…〉〈…〉 perio nobis 〈…〉〈…〉 quam exemplo. Pane••••••.
• (o) 1.559

  〈…〉〈…〉 suasurus 〈…〉〈…〉 quibus 〈…〉〈…〉 essemus. Lib 3. Annal.
• (p) 1.560

  Majus aliqued & excelsius a 〈…〉〈…〉. Ibid.
• * 1.561

  A Prince to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 care that hi•• Subjects be Vertuous.
• (q) 1.562

  Majoribus meis dignum, rerumque ve∣strarum providum, const ant•••••• in pericu∣lis, offensionur•• pro u∣tilitate publica non pavidum credant. Ta∣cit. Annal. lib. 4.
• (r) 1.563

  Maximo Imperio maximam esse cur 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Ad Caesarem.
• (s) 1.564

  Sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad∣stricti moris A••ctor fuit antiquo ipse cul∣tu victuque; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 inde in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & aemulandi amor va∣lidior quam poena ex legibus. & met••••. 3. Annal.
• (t) 1.565

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 5. Polit. c. 10.
• * 1.566

  King James the Se∣cond's discouraging Vice.
• * 1.567

  The Sublimeness of The Subject.
• (a) 1.568

  Magnum propius{que} noscendum id eruditis∣simo viro visum. Lib. 6. Epist. 16. Jam navibus cinis in∣ciderat, quo prepius ac∣cederet, calidior & densior. Jam pumices nigrique & ambusti, fracti igne lapides. Ib.
• * 1.569

  The Flattery of some, especially of Valerius Maxim••••.
• (b) 1.570

  Penes quem homi∣num deorumque con∣sensus, maris ac terrae Regimen esse voluit: cujus coeles••i providen∣tia virtutes de quibus dicturus sum benignissi∣me foventur, vitia se∣verissime vindicantur. Prologo.
• (c) 1.571

  Mea parvitas eo justius ad favorem tu∣um decur••it, quod ca∣tera divia•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 opiai∣one c••lligitur tu••, pra∣senti side, paterno a∣vitoque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 par vi∣detur. Idem.
• (d) 1.572

  Valid••s alioqui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••onoribus, & re pond••••dum ratus iis qu••rum rumore 〈…〉〈…〉. 4. Annal. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••enies Tem∣ples to be built to his Honour.
• (e) 1.573

  Quia ••ultui meo veneratio Senatus ad∣j••ngebatur.
• (f) 1.574

  Caeterum ut seme•• recepiss•• veniam habu∣erit; Ita per omnes Provinci is effigie nu∣minum sa••••ari, ambi∣tiosum & superbum; & van••scet Augusti honor si promiscuis 〈…〉〈…〉 vulgatur. Idem.
• (g) 1.575

  Haemihi in 〈…〉〈…〉, pro se∣pu••••••ris ••pernuntur. Idem. Vain-glorious Prin∣ces.
• * 1.576

  Vain-glorious Prin∣ces.
• (h) 1.577

  Zo••aras Annal. Tom. 2. fol. 54.
• (i) 1.578

  Plutare. in Vita.
• (k) 1.579

  Se quidem Jovis silium di••i, sed corpo∣ris agri vitia sentire. Curtius lib. 4.
• (l) 1.580

  Coelius Rhodig. lib. 3. c. 5.
• (m) 1.581

  Pezell. Mellif. Tom. 1. p. 228.
• (n) 1.582

  Suetonius, cap. 22.
• * 1.583

  How Princes may admit Honours.
• (o) 1.584

  Optima quippe mortalium alti••ma cupere: sic Herculem & Liberum apud Gra∣cos; Quirinum apud nos deum numero ad∣ditos—unum insati∣abiliter parandum, prosperam sui memori∣am: nam contemptu Famae contemni Vir∣tutes. Ibid.
• * 1.585

  Honour due to So∣vereign Princes.
• (p) 1.586

  Majestas Imperii salutis est tutela.
• (q) 1.587

  Tolle Majestatem. omnisque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Imperii contextus in multas partes diss••••iet. 1. de Clem.
• (r) 1.588

  Tot mortalium mil∣libus una anima prae∣sideat. Ille enim vinculum per quod Respublica co∣baeret; Ille spiritus vi∣talis quem haec tot millia trahunt; nihil ipfa per se futura nisi onus & praeda, si mens illa Imperii subtraba∣tur. De Clem. lib. 1. c. 3.
• (s) 1.589

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 phant. apud Stobaeum, Serm. 46. Kings called Gods, as deriving Authori∣ty from God, or his Vicegerents.
• (t) 1.590

  Contzen de Rep. lib. 7. c. 4.
• (u) 1.591

  Sueton. in Domit. c. 13.
• (w) 1.592

  A••••mian. Marcel. Hist. 17.
• (x) 1.593

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Apol. 6. adv. Mah••met.
• (y) 1.594

  Sthenid. Pythag••a∣pad Stobaeum. Ser. 46. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (z) 1.595

  Hist. Eccles. lib. 6. in Pr••••••m. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (a) 1.596

  〈…〉〈…〉 im∣peratorem qui d••um dici••; nisi homo sit, non est Imperator. Apol. c. 33.
• (b) 1.597

  Joseph. Archaeol. 12. c. 7.
• (c) 1.598

  Act. Apost. 12. v. 22.
• (d) 1.599

  Cato in Orig. a∣pud Macrob.
• (*) 1.600

  Titles of Honour, part 1. c. 4.
• * 1.601

  Swearing by the Prince.
• (e) 1.602

  Const it. Alex. Sev. c. De rebus creditis.
• (f) 1.603

  Citius per omnes Deos, quam per unum Genium Caesaris peje∣ratur. Apol. c. 28.
• (g) 1.604

  Nam Imperatori cum Augusti nomen accepit, tanquam prae∣senti & corporali Deo sidelis prastanda est devotio, & impenden∣dus pervigil samula∣tus: Deo enim vel privatus, v••l militans servit, cum sideliter eum diligit, qui Deo regnat autore. Veget. de Re milit. c. 5. The Names of Hea∣then Deities in the Names of Kings.
• * 1.605

  Titles of first Found∣ers of Empires con∣tinued to Successors. Caesar.
• * 1.606

  Titles of first Found∣ers of Empires con∣tinued to Successors. Caesar.
• (h) 1.607

  Cujus memoriae hunc honorem Parthi tribuerunt, ut omnes exinde Reges suos Ar∣sacis nomine nuncu∣pent. Hist. lib. 41.
• (i) 1.608

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 In vita.
• (k) 1.609

  Non tatum novo, sed etiam ampliore, cognomine, quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quaeque Religiosa & in quibus Augurato quid consecratur, Augusta dicuntur.
• (l) 1.610

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 In vita.
• * 1.611

  The Reason of such Titles.
• * 1.612

  Of the first Kings from Adam.
• (m) 1.613

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ce∣drenus.
• (n) 1.614

  Lib. 2. c. 11.
• * 1.615

  The first Kingdom from Nimrod.
• (o) 1.616

  Tit. Hon. ••. 1. p. 1••.
• * 1.617

  Kings first Gover∣nours in all Coun∣tries.
• (p) 1.618

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (q) 1.619

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. In Boeoticis.
• * 1.620

  The Title of Kings.
• * 1.621

  The Title of Kings.
• * 1.622

  Daniel, c. 2.
• (r) 1.623

  Eustach. ad Dio∣nys. & Strab. Geog. 15.
• (s) 1.624

  Diodor. bibl. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (t) 1.625

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Earth and Water gi∣ven as Tokens of Homage.
• (u) 1.626

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Her••dot. in Melpom.
• (w) 1.627

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lib. Judith.
• (x) 1.628

  Malmesh. de Ge∣stis Reg. lib. 3. Hist. Norman. apud Camd.
• * 1.629

  Kissing the Teet, Knees, and Hands of Princes.
• (y) 1.630

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• (z) 1.631

  Retentus est a Ma∣cedonibus mos salutan∣di Reges, explosa ado∣ratione. Jam coepisset Helioga∣balus adorari Regum more Persarum.
• (a) 1.632

  Tit. Hon. c. 3.
• (b) 1.633

  Cicero in Varr. Act. 5. Lucret. lib. 1. Sape salutantum, &c.
• (c) 1.634

  Dio Cass. Hist 59.
• (d) 1.635

  Homo natus in hoc, ut mores liber•••• civi∣tatis Persica servitute mutaret. 2. de Benef. c. 5.
• (e) 1.636

  Vbi omnes sine gene∣ris discrimine pro•••• rati pedes exos••ularentur, exornans calceamen∣ta auro, gemmis & margaritis.
• (f) 1.637

  Dii prohibeant ut quisquam ingenuorum pedibus meis osculum figat. Capitolin.
• (g) 1.638

  Lib. 10. Epig. 72.
• (h) 1.639

  Inest in aliis par∣tibus quaedam Religio sicut dextra osculis a∣versa appetitur, fide porrigitur. The Romans, after they were a Com∣monwealth, hated the Name of King.
• (i) 1.640

  Veriti ne quid nun••inis collecta uni∣versitas, ob Regis d••∣siderium, novaret. Sa∣turnal. c. 13.
• (k) 1.641

  Regem Romae post∣hac nec Dii nec homi∣nes esse patientur. De Divinatione, cap. 2.
• (l) 1.642

  Tit. Hon. cap. 2. Augustus denies the Title of King.
• * 1.643

  Because the Abso∣luteness of Kings was against their Liber∣ty.
• * 1.644

  Title of Emperour first as General.
• (m) 1.645

  Honores nimies recepit, ut continuum consulatum, perpetuam Dictaturam, praefectu∣ramque morum, insu∣per praenomen Impera∣toris. Sueton. de Jul. Caesare.
• (n) 1.646

  Vita Jul. Cas. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (o) 1.647

  Cassius, Hist. 53.
• * 1.648

  Title of Prince.
• (p) 1.649

  Augusius cuncta discordiis civilibus∣fessa, nomine Princi∣pis sub Imperium ac∣cepit.
• (q) 1.650

  Titles of Honour, par. 1. c. 2.
• (r) 1.651

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 F. ad Leg. Rhod. The Roman Empe∣rours not Lords of all.
• (s) 1.652

  Totius orbis ter∣rarum spacium Impe∣ratoris subjacet pote∣statibus, etiam ipsum eorum Deorum nume∣ro constitutum esse quem ad sacienda & con••ervanda omnia, Divinitas statuit uni∣versalis. Mathes. lib. 2. c. 33.
• (t) 1.653

  Adolphus O••••a, p. 552.
• (u) 1.654

  Tit. Hon. cap. 4.
• * 1.655

  Of the Title of Lord. How odious to the Romans.
• (w) 1.656

  Nedum sermo••um stet honos & gratia vi∣vax. Horat. de Arte Poet.
• (x) 1.657

  Domini Appella∣tionem ut maledictum & opprobrium semper exhorruit.
• (y) 1.658

  Tacitus 2. Annal.
• (z) 1.659

  Sylvar. 1.
• (a) 1.660

  In Domit. c. 13.
• (b) 1.661

  Act. Apost. c. 25. v. 26.
• (c) 1.662

  M••••t. F. ad Leg. Rhod.
• (d) 1.663

  Diocletianus se primus omnium, Cali∣gulam post Domitia∣numque Dominum pa∣lam ••ici passus, & a∣dorari se, app••••arique uti Deum.
• (e) 1.664

  A••olph. O••••a. p. 537.
• (f) 1.665

  Principis sedem obtines, ne sit Domino locus.
• (g) 1.666

  Domini Appellati∣one continetur qui ••a∣bet proprietatem, e••si usus fructus alienus sit. Ulp. F. de Sc. Silaniano, l. 1. sect. 1.
• (h) 1.667

  Lucan. Pharsal. lib. 5.
• * 1.668

  Multa renascentur quae jam cecidere, ca∣dentque. Quae nunc sunt in ho∣nore vocabula si vole•• usus. Horat••de Arte Poet. v. 70.
• * 1.669

  The Appellations in the Plural Number.
• (i) 1.670

  Tit. Hon. par. 1. c. 7.
• * 1.671

  Title of Majesty.
• (k) 1.672

  Fastorum lib. 5.
• (l) 1.673

  Quasi privata 〈…〉〈…〉, clare∣rum virorum sine Tri∣bunalium fasiigio. Lib. 3. c. 10.
• (m) 1.674

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. In legatione in Foed. Aeto∣lorum.
• (n) 1.675

  Gruteri Inscr. p. 246. n. 3.
• (o) 1.676

  Majestatis crimen illud est, quod adversus Pop. Rom. vel adversus securitatem ejus com∣mittitur. P. ad L••g. Jul. Majest. lib. 5.
• (p) 1.677

  Majestatem minu∣isti quod Tribunum Plebis de Templo de∣duxisti. De Invent. lib. 2.
• (q) 1.678

  Lex Julia Maje∣statis in eos qui contra Imperatorem vel Rem∣publicam aliquid moli∣ti sunt, suum vigorem extendit. Instit. Tit. de Publico Judicio.
• (r) 1.679

  Hujus in metum penitus sustulisti, con∣tentus magnitudine, qua nulli magis caru∣ere, quam qui sibi ma∣jestatem vindicabant. Panegyr.
• * 1.680

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• (s) 1.681

  Vide Codin. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. M••ursi∣um in Glossar. Gra••o-Barb.
• * 1.682

  Other Attributes given to Princes.
• (t) 1.683

  Albertus Stadensis in Chron. Anno 1179.
• (u) 1.684

  Canis. Antiq. ••ect. Tom. 5. p. 2.
• (w) 1.685

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Came∣rar. ad aure ••m And••o∣nic. Bullam, p. 9.
• (z) 1.686

  Treatise of Ab∣solute Power, p. 32, 33.
• * 1.687

  Objecti••••s against the A••tributes gi∣ven to Princes.
• (a) 1.688

  Marcus Antonius surgens Neapoli illu∣strata. Lib. 1. c. 19. sect. 10.
• (b) 1.689

  Jo. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de Idololatr••a Politica, c. 1.
• * 1.690

  Answer to the first Objector.
• * 1.691

  Answer to the other Objectors.
• (c) 1.692

  Divi Christiani vocari possunt, eo modo quo Dii, quia Dei sunt vicarii, & Dei voce judicant. Polit. lib. 7. c. 4. sect. 4.
• (d) 1.693

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ethic. 7. c. 1.
• (e) 1.694

  Antiquitus Recto∣res Reipublicae Divini vocabantur, quasi Di∣vinae providentiae mi∣nistri 2a. 2ae. Quaest. 99. Art. 1.
• * 1.695

  Concerning the Style of Dei gratia.
• (f) 1.696

  Vide Capitular. Aqu••••••ranens. p••. 30. Tom. ••. Concil. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (g) 1.697

  Tit. Hon. par. 1. c. 7.
• (h) 1.698

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Vide Eginhard. An∣nal. Franciae, Anno Anon. vita Car. M.
• * 1.699

  Given to Spiritual Lords.
• (i) 1.700

  Rosula Novella, 〈◊〉〈◊〉. cap. 111.
• (k) 1.701

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Just. No••. 6. init. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ibid.
• * 1.702

  The Kings of Eng∣land have used all the Titles proper to So∣vereign Princes.
• * 1.703

  As King, Emperour, Lord.
• (a) 1.704

  Cod. Wigorn.
• (b) 1.705

  Mon. Ang. par. 1. p. 64.
• (c) 1.706

  Lib. MS. Roberti de Swapham, &c. Fun∣dationis Burgensis Coe∣nobii p. 38.
• (d) 1.707

  Id. p. 39.
• (e) 1.708

  Coke Praefat. 4. Reports. Rex Anglo∣rum & totius Britan∣niae Telluris Guber∣nator & Rector. Angligenum Orcada∣rum, necnon in Gyro jacentium Monarcha, & Anglorum Indupe∣rator.
• * 1.709

  Kings of England as much Sovereigns as Emperours.
• (f) 1.710

  Ipse omnes liber∣ta••••s 〈◊〉〈◊〉 R••gno habe∣bat suo, quas Impera∣tor vendicabat in Im∣perio. Matt. Paris in vita Willielmi 2.
• (g) 1.711

  R••g••um Angliae ab om••i subjectione Imperiali liberrimum. Claus. 13 E. 2. m. 6. dorso.
• * 1.712

  The Statutes for it.
• (h) 1.713

  Stat. Anno 23 E. 3. c. 1. Vide Coke Instit. 2. 111. 4 part. 6. 8. 3. Instit. 120, 125.
• (i) 1.714

  Anno 35 Regni.
• (k) 1.715

  16 R. 2. c. 5.
• (l) 1.716

  24 H. 8. c. 12.
• (m) 1.717

  25 H. 8. c. 21.
• (n) 1.718

  28 H. 8. c. 7.
• (o) 1.719

  Stat. Hil••••••. 〈…〉〈…〉 8. c. 2.
• (p) 1.720

  Tit. H••••. p. 21, 22.
• (q) 1.721

  Quod R••x Anglix non se submisit ad os••ula pedum suorum.
• (r) 1.722

  Rex inunctus & habet vitam & mem∣brum in potes••ate sua, & ideir•••• non debet se submittere tantum si∣cut Rex alius.
• (s) 1.723

  Bien assi come el Emperador en su Im∣perio. Partid. 2. tit. 1. Ley 5. & 8.
• * 1.724

  Wherein the King's Sovereignty consists according to our Laws.
• (t) 1.725

  Cok•• 11. 86. Cal∣vin's Case, 215.
• (u) 1.726

  Co•••• 2 part. 1, 2. 24 H. 8. c. 1. 24 Eliz. c. 1.
• (w) 1.727

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 8••. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 177.2••8, 212 〈…〉〈…〉
• (x) 1.728

  〈…〉〈…〉 Grand Ab••i••gment, part. 3. p. 44.
• (y) 1.729

  St. Albans vita ••en. 7. p. 29.
• (z) 1.730

  Sheppard ut supra.
• (a) 1.731

  C••k 2.44.5.29.
• (b) 1.732

  Bracton lib. 1. c. 8. Stat. 25 H. 8. c. 21. Nemo terram nisi Au∣thoritate R••gia possi∣••et. Plowden 136. Jenkins Cent. 7. Case 77. & 2. Case 16.17 E. 2. c. 17. Nevil 101.174.
• (c) 1.733

  Co••e 12.8.30.2. part. Instit. 262.496.5. part. 11.2.8.
• (d) 1.734

  Quod Rex est 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Lex est Regi; Rex est Amma 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & Lex est Anima Regi.
• (e) 1.735

  Jus Regium p. 42.
• (f) 1.736

  Quando aliquid ••oneditur, omnia con∣cessa videntur sine qui∣bus concessum explicari nequit.
• (g) 1.737

  Jus Regium p. 77.
• (h) 1.738

  Part 1. c. 16. sol. 34.
• (i) 1.739

  Idem, lib. 1. c. 8. p. 5.
• * 1.740

  By the Grants and Condescensions of our Kings, their Ab∣soluteness lessened.
• (k) 1.741

  Alii Principes Re∣ges hominum, ipse Rex Regum.
• (l) 1.742

  〈◊〉〈◊〉, lib. 2. c. 8. The Particulars of Royal Abatements.
• (m) 1.743

  Stamford's Pleas of the Crown.
• (n) 1.744

  H••ghs's Reports, 254.263. Cous••uetudo l••galis plus habet quam concessio Regalis.
• (o) 1.745

  Petit. of Right, 3 Car. 1.7 Car. 1. c. 17.
• (p) 1.746

  2 Car. 1. c. 1. Coke 12.46.2 part. Brown lib. 2. c. 2. Coke Instit. 2 part. 47, 48. Petition of Right. Dyer 176.
• (q) 1.747

  21 Jac. c. 31. Coke 11.87. Plowden 497.
• (r) 1.748

  Coke 11.87.
• (s) 1.749

  Sheppard's Grand Abridgment, part 3. fol. 49.
• (t) 1.750

  Fleetwood, lib. 1. c. 8.
• * 1.751

  No Power co-ordi∣nate with the King's.
• (u) 1.752

  Observations on His Majesty's Mes∣sages, &c. The Rebels in 1641. would have lessened the King's Sove∣reignty, and placed it in the People, or their Representa∣tives.
• (w) 1.753

  Answer to Ob∣servations, p. 10.
• (x) 1.754

  Jus Regium. p. 68.
• * 1.755

  The necessary Mo∣tive to treat of the Unaccountableness of Kings, the Murther of King Charles the First.
• (a) 1.756

  Vsher's Power of Princes, part 4. pag. 196. Edit. Cracovian. Divine and Humane Authorities to prove it.
• (b) 1.757

  Psal. 8. 5. with Heb. 2.7. and Psal. 97.7. with Heb. 1.6. Exod. 21.6. & 22.8.
• (c) 1.758

  Job 1.6. & 2.1. & 38.7.
• (d) 1.759

  1 Pet. 2.13, 15.
• (e) 1.760

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Orat. 3. de Regno.
• (f) 1.761

  In Antiq. v. 11 27.
• (g) 1.762

  Xiphilin. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (h) 1.763

  Power of Prin∣ces, a pag. 47 ad pag. 65.
• (i) 1.764

  Xiphilin. excerpt. ex Dionys. M. Aureli••. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (k) 1.765

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Dion. Hist. Rom. l. 53.
• (l) 1.766

  Ereptumque Prin∣cipi illud in Principa∣tu beatissimum, quod nihil cogitur. Panaeg.
• (m) 1.767

  Vsher's Power of Princes, p. 73.
• (n) 1.768

  Idem, p. 96.
• (o) 1.769

  Clarendon's Sur∣vey, c. 29. p. 163.
• (p) 1.770

  Comment. in 12. Johannis.
• (q) 1.771

  Quando Rex de∣linquit, soli Deo reus est, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hominem non habet qui e••••s facta dijudicet. In Psal. 51.
• (r) 1.772

  Nesas est in dubi∣um deducere ejus pote∣st ••em, cui omnium Gubernatio superno constat del••gata judi∣cio. P. 514.
• (s) 1.773

  In cujus solius pc∣testate sunt, a quo sunt s••cundi, post quem pri∣mi. Apolog. c. 3.
• (t) 1.774

  Colimus Imperato∣r••m ut hominem Deo secundum, solo Deo minorem. Ad Scap. c. 2.
• * 1.775

  Adversus Parm. l. 3.
• (u) 1.776

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Hom. 2. ad Pop. Antioch.
• (w) 1.777

  Ʋ••pote constituti supra l••ges divino ex∣amini reservati, secu∣li l••gibus non cohiben∣tur. Praefat. Chron. Reasons to prove it.
• (x) 1.778

  D. Digs against Resistance, p. 39, 40.
• (y) 1.779

  Jus consistens in impunitate delictorum.
• * 1.780

  This Unaccounta∣bleness to Men hin∣ders not their Obli∣gation ••o God's 〈…〉〈…〉 makes 〈…〉〈…〉.
• (z) 1.781

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 3. Polit. c. 12.
• (a) 1.782

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. De Cre∣atione Princ.
• (b) 1.783

  Neque ullis ad poe∣nam legibus vo••antur, tuti Imperii potestate. Apol. pro Davide.
• (c) 1.784

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Greg. Naz. Orat. 27.
• (d) 1.785

  Temperans Maje∣statem Caesaris infra Deum, magis illum commendo Deo, cui so∣li subjicio. Ideo ma∣gnus, quia coelo minor est. Apol. c. 35.
• (e) 1.786

  Revera majus Im∣perio est submittere legibus Princip••tum. Lib. 4. c. de Leg. &c. Licet Lex Imperii so∣lennibus Juris Impe∣ratorem solverit, ni∣hil tamen tam propri∣um Imperii est, quam legibus vivere. Lib. 3. c. de Testam.
• (f) 1.787

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Orat. 2. de Fortuna Alex.
• (g) 1.788

  Nec minus homi∣nem se quam homini∣bus praeesse meminit.
• (h) 1.789

  Cui nihil ad augen∣dum fastigium super∣est, hic uno modo cre∣scere potest, si se ipse submittat securus ma∣gnitudinis suae.
• (i) 1.790

  Ipse te legibus sub∣jecisti, Legibus, Cae∣sar, quas 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Prin∣cipi scrip. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (k) 1.791

  Licet legibus so∣luti simus, attamen legibus 〈…〉〈…〉. In∣stit quibus modis Testam. infirment. 8. Vet.
• (l) 1.792

  Non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex na∣tura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus, ad quam non docti sed facti, non instituti sed imbuti sumus. Pro Milone.
• (m) 1.793

  Ʋnus erit commu∣nis quasi Magister & Imperator omnium Deus, ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; ••ui qui non p••rebit, ip••e se fugiet, a•• naturam hominis spernabitur, atque hoc ips•• luet maximas poe∣nas, etiamsi caetera supplicia quae putan∣tur ••ffugerit. Lib. 3. de Repub.
• (n) 1.794

  Ibid.
• (o) 1.795

  Ʋs••er's Power of Princes. p. 70.
• (p) 1.796

  Reges Jolo Dei ti∣more metuque Gehen∣nae coercentur. Isio∣dorus 3. Sent. c. 31.
• (q) 1.797

  Power of the Prince, p. 81.
• * 1.798

  The Preamble to the Treasonable Charge against King Charles the First.
• (r) 1.799

  His Majesty's Speeches and Try∣al, p. 429.
• * 1.800

  Pag. 431.
• * 1.801

  pag. 435.
• * 1.802

  Eccl. 8.4.
• * 1.803

  Pag. 439.
• * 1.804

  The Connexion of this with the fore∣going Chapter.
• (a) 1.805

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Compar. Flaminii & Philopae∣menis.
• (b) 1.806

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Justin. Jun. Imp. praef. Constit. 3.
• (c) 1.807

  Princeps est supra legem adeo quod secun∣dum conscientiam su∣am judicare potest. Cyrus in L. Re∣script. &c.
• (d) 1.808

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Justinian. Novel 105.
• (e) 1.809

  Nota, Imperatorem vocari patrem Legis, under &c Leges sune ei subjecte. Gloss. in Novel. 12. c. 4.
• (f) 1.810

  Princeps est su∣pra legem in quantum si expediens est, potest legem mutare, & in ea dispensare pro loco & tempore. Vid. Thom. in 1.2. q. 96. Ar∣tic. 5. ad 3.
• (g) 1.811

  Gloss. in lib. 4. de Poenis.
• (h) 1.812

  Convenit Impera∣tori Juris rigorem ae∣quitatis fraeno tempe∣rare, cui soli inter ae∣quitatem jusque in∣terpositam interpreta∣tionem licet & incum∣bit inspicere. De Or∣tu & Authoribus Im∣perii.
• * 1.813

  How far the Kings of England may dis∣pense with their Laws.
• (i) 1.814

  Vsher's Power of Princes, p. 76.
• (k) 1.815

  Survey, p. 127.
• (l) 1.816

  3. Rep.
• (m) 1.817

  Q. 115. ex Vete∣ri & Novo Testamen∣to.
• * 1.818

  The Necessity of this Discourse.
• (a) 1.819

  Arnisaeus. Zeiglar de Jure Ma∣jestatis c. 1. n. 12. Salmasii Defensio Re∣gia. Grotius lib. 1. c. 4. de Jure Belli. Dr. More's Divine Dialogues. Dr. Mouliu's Phila∣nax Anglicus. Sam. Petit's Diatriba, &c.
• (b) 1.820

  Non tanti est ci∣vilia bella movere. Arguments against Resisting of Princes.
• * 1.821

  Would make Prin∣ces always jealous.
• * 1.822

  No Judges can be betwixt King and People.
• * 1.823

  It overthrows all Government.
• (c) 1.824

  Just Right of Monarchy, p. 92.93.
• * 1.825

  Not allowed in Fa∣milies.
• * 1.826

  Mischiess of the Peoples Liberties.
• (d) 1.827

  Idem, p. 92. Pretenders to Re∣formation greatest Oppressors.
• (e) 1.828

  Idem, p. 90, 91.
• * 1.829

  The Constitution of England's Govern∣ment Monarchical.
• * 1.830

  No new Govern∣ment now to be fra∣med.
• (f) 1.831

  D. Digs Unlaw∣fulness of Resisting.
• * 1.832

  No Contract be∣twixt King and Sub∣jects, whereby they may exact an Ac∣count.
• * 1.833

  Writers who lived under Common∣wealths, no Guides to us.
• (g) 1.834

  Jus Regium, p. 134.
• * 1.835

  We have more rea∣son to comm••nd our Government, than the Romans or Greci∣ans theirs.
• * 1.836

  The Security we have, that no Arbi∣trary Government can be exercised in England.
• (h) 1.837

  Praeestis homini∣bus, sed hominum cau∣sa, nec domini modo & Arbitri rerum, sed Tu∣tores & Administra∣tores estis. Collata est in sinum vestrum a deo & ho∣minibus Respublica. sed nempe in sinum & ut foveatur. Epist. De∣dicat. ad Imp. Reges & Principes.
• (a) 1.838

  Ab eo, i. Principe, tanquam a fonte, Le∣ges omnes & Jura ••∣manant. Vinii Epist. Dedicat. Id. Comment. in Inst it. lib. 1. tit. 2. p. 13. a.
• * 1.839

  The Plebiscita of the Romans.
• (b) 1.840

  Tributis Comitiis, Centuriatis, aut Cu∣riatis.
• (c) 1.841

  Anno v. C. 304, 305. Howel. In the Curiata Co∣mitia, saith Dionys.
• (d) 1.842

  Anno v. C. 367. Vinnius.
• (e) 1.843

  Inter Legem & Plebiscitum sp••••ies in∣teresset constituendi; potestas autem ead••m esset. Sect. de Origine Juris. Id. p. 14. Senatus consultum, and Power of the Roman Senate.
• (f) 1.844

  Polyb. lib. 6. Dionys. Halic. lib. 4. & 7. Senatus consulta nullam vim legis ba∣behant nisi plebs ea probaret.
• (g) 1.845

  1. de Repub. c. 10.
• (h) 1.846

  Jus Comitiorum non in totum populo ademerat, sed cum eo partitus est. Sueton. in Julio.
• (i) 1.847

  Ex eo igitur tem∣pore legibus & ple∣biscitis quiescentibus Senatus jus facere coe∣pit: quanquam non tam propria Auctori∣tate quam conniventia quadam & indulgentia Principum. Vinnius, p. 14.
• (k) 1.848

  Solus arbiter re∣rum Jure & n mine Regio. 1. Annal.
• (l) 1.849

  Reges dom••ni re∣rum temporumque, tra∣hunt conciliis cuncta, non sequuntur. Lib. 8.
• (m) 1.850

  Insurgere paula∣tim munia legum, & magistratuum ad se trahere. Tacit. 1. An∣nal.
• (n) 1.851

  Senatus Potentiam augendo suae servie∣bant. Suet. c. 29.
• (o) 1.852

  Judicium vestrum (Patres Conscripti) noster comitatur as∣sensus.
• (p) 1.853

  Lib. 3. c. 9. p. 722.
• * 1.854

  Laws of the Twelve Tables.
• * 1.855

  The Power of the Senate and Magi∣strates were weak∣ned in the Civil Wars.
• * 1.856

  Of the Lex Regia.
• (q) 1.857

  Lib. 1. tit. 2. Instit. Quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: quum lege Regia, quae de ejus Imperio lata est, populus ei, & in eum, omne Imperium suum & potestatem concedat.
• (r) 1.858

  Tit. De veteri Ju∣re enucleando.
• (s) 1.859

  Ad ostenden lam enixam suam volunta∣tem, omne Imperium suum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 transferendi. p. 15. a.
• (t) 1.860

  Lib. 4. Hist. c. 1.
• * 1.861

  The Roman Empe∣rours absolute Au∣thority in making Laws.
• (u) 1.862

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lib. 53.
• * 1.863

  The Power of the Roman Emperours.
• (w) 1.864

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Idem.
• (x) 1.865

  Leges jubere, & universis & singulis civil••s dare. De Re∣pub. lib. 1. c. 10. & lib. 3.
• (y) 1.866

  Polit. c. 11. Law-making the Prerogative of So∣vereign Princes.
• (z) 1.867

  Gruteri Inscript. p. 142. A Fragment of the Lex Regia yet ex∣tant.
• (a) 1.868

  Tit. De Legibus, lib. 1.
• (b) 1.869

  Non ab aliis, sed a sese leges abrogatas suisse. Lib. 3.
• * 1.870

  The happy State of England, in the dis∣posing of the Legi∣slative Power.
• (c) 1.871

  Preface to the Reader, Comp. Hi∣story.
• (d) 1.872

  Sheringham's Su∣premacy, p. 51. Anciently Kings called whom they pleased to advise them in making Laws.
• (e) 1.873

  Chron. Sax. Anno 670. fol. 516. And tha haefde getheal mid his witum, & freondam, & mid heora Teymenysse & fultum & gethafunge, Chri∣stes geleassan onfeng. Bed. Eccl. Hist. lib. 3. c. 22.
• (f) 1.874

  Mat. Paris vita Offae, p. 171. Hoc autem per totam suam ditionem teneri in perpetuum consti∣tuit.
• (g) 1.875

  Matt. Paris Auct. additam. fol. 239, 240.
• * 1.876

  The King the Foun∣tain of Laws.
• (h) 1.877

  Sheringham's Su∣premacy, p. 34. Leges vero Anglicanae & consuetudines, Re∣gum Authoritate, ju∣bent quandoque, quan∣doque vetant, & quan∣doque vindicant, & puniunt transgressores. Bracton, lib. 1. c. 2.
• (i) 1.878

  Fuit dit que le Roy sist les Leis per assent des Peres, & de la Commune, & non pas les Peres, & le Commune; & qu'il ne avera nul Pere en sa terre demesne, & que le Roy per eux ne doit estre ajuge. 22 E. 3. c. 1.
• (k) 1.879

  Encounter la Co∣rone & Dignitie le Roy. Stanford's Pleas of the Crown, lib. 1. c. 1.
• (l) 1.880

  Sheringham, p. 35. See Finch lib. 2. fol. 22. Coke 2 II. 7. lib. 7. fol. 14. Stanford lib. 2.101.
• (m) 1.881

  Ejusdem est leges interpretari, cujus est condere. The Amendment was sealed by the Great Seal. 2 May, 9 E. 1. commanding the Justices to do and execute all and every thing contain∣ed in it, though the same did not accord with the Statute of Gloucester in all things.
• (n) 1.882

  Sheringham ut supra.
• (o) 1.883

  Hem, p. 36. The King may pro∣vide for all things necessary for Go∣vernment, where the Law hath not provided, or con∣tradicts not.
• (p) 1.884

  Ea quae Jurisdi∣ctio••is sunt, & pacis, & ea q••ae sunt Justi∣tiae & paci annexa, ad nullum pertinent nisi ad Coronam & Dig∣nitatem Regi••m. Bra∣cton lib. 2. c. 24.
• (q) 1.885

  Suprema jurisdi∣ctio & potestas Regia etsi Princeps volet, separari non pessunt; sunt enim ipsa sorma & substantialis essen∣tia Majestatis, ergo manente ipso Rege, ab eo abdicari non pos∣sunt. Cabedo Pract. Obs. par. 2. decis. 40.
• * 1.886

  Answers to some Objections against the King's sole esta∣blishing of Laws.
• (r) 1.887

  Coke 2 Instit. fol. 525.
• * 1.888

  La Charte des Fran∣chises, & la Charte de la Forest, les queux fuerent faitz per Com∣men de tout Royalm, en le temps le Roy Henry pier, soient tenue, &c.
• (s) 1.889

  General Preface to Compleat Histo∣ry, p. 41. The ancient Kings sealing of Charters of Liberties, reputed Laws.
• (t) 1.890

  Idem, p. 67. The Laws planted by Kings.
• (u) 1.891

  Claus. 1 E. 2. m. 10. dorso.
• * 1.892

  Second Objection.
• (w) 1.893

  Coke 8. Report. s. 20. b.
• (x) 1.894

  Lib. 3. c. 9.
• (y) 1.895

  Lib. 1. c. 17.
• (z) 1.896

  R••ge Authorita∣tem prastante.
• (a) 1.897

  Cum ipse sit Au∣thor Juris, non debet inde Injuriarum nasci occasio, unde Jura na∣scuntur.
• * 1.898

  The Persian manner of making Laws.
• (b) 1.899

  Dan. cap. 6. v. 7, 8, 9.
• * 1.900

  No radical mixture of Power in the two Houses with the King.
• (c) 1.901

  Pag. 39.
• * 1.902

  Third Objection.
• * 1.903

  This will appear a Form of Words late∣ly made use of, in the Twenty fourth Chapter.
• (d) 1.904

  King's Suprema∣cy, p. 89.
• (e) 1.905

  2 H. 7.14.11 H. 7.25. Lambard Ar∣cheion, fol. 271.
• * 1.906

  In this Particular the Writ of Summons is that which gives them all the Power, of which in the Chapter of Parlia∣ments I shall en∣large.
• (f) 1.907

  24 H. 8. 1 E. 6. c. 2.
• * 1.908

  The Encroachments of the Black Parlia∣ment.
• * 1.909

  Preface to the fol∣lowing Chapters.
• * 1.910

  Nec aliud adversus validissimas Gentes pro nobis utilius quam quod in commune non consulunt. Vita Agri∣colae, p. 308.
• * 1.911

  Antiquity of English Customs.
• (a) 1.912

  Regnum illud eis∣dem quibus jam regi∣tur consuetudinibus continue regulatum suit. De laudibus LL. Angliae, c. 17.
• (b) 1.913

  Epistle to the sixth Book of Re∣ports.
• (c) 1.914

  Proem to 2. In∣stit. fol. 1. and 2. In∣stit. fol. 3.
• (d) 1.915

  Leges m••••ibus re∣cept•••• majoris sunt Au∣toritatis quam leges scriptae. Arist. Polit. lib. 3. c. 12.
• * 1.916

  The Benefit to have our Common Laws and Customs ascer∣tained and compa∣red with all Ancient Laws.
• (e) 1.917

  Notes upon For∣tescue, p. 14. ad 22.
• * 1.918

  The Antiquity of all Laws.
• (f) 1.919

  Vbi nihil ex pri∣stina materia supersit.
• (g) 1.920

  De laudibus LL•• Angliae, c. 17.
• * 1.921

  Whence to learn the Manners or Govern∣ment of the Britans.
• (h) 1.922

  2. Geog. & 2. Qu••∣drip. & Pausan. l. 1.
• (i) 1.923

  In vitis Philos.
• (k) 1.924

  In Achaicis.
• (l) 1.925

  De moribus vete∣rum Gallorum, p. 71, 72. De Gall. Imp. lib. 1.
• (m) 1.926

  Lib. 15. De Oir∣gine Gallorum.
• * 1.927

  Q. Whether he mean Britain and Ireland.
• * 1.928

  Quod etiam nos legi∣mus in monumentis in∣cisum.
• (n) 1.929

  Seldeni Janus Ang. c. 3.
• (o) 1.930

  Britanniae Specu∣lum.
• (p) 1.931

  In Euterpe.
• (q) 1.932

  Neque sas esse ex∣is••••mant ea literis mandare, cum in reli∣quis sere rebus public is privatisque rationibus Graecis literis utantur.
• (r) 1.933

  Quamv•••• literarum secreta ignoraverint, attamen celebrabant carminibus Antiquos suns Deos & Reges; ••••que unum apud illos memoriae & Annalium genus eral.
• (s) 1.934

  Lib. 1. De Bello Galli••o.
• (t) 1.935

  De Bello Gallico, lib. 5.
• (u) 1.936

  De moribus vete∣rum Gallorum, p. 74.
• (w) 1.937

  Janus Angiorum, ••••p. 9.
• (x) 1.938

  In Appendice ad Jornandi Goth.
• (y) 1.939

  1. Pharsal.
• (z) 1.940

  In Gall.
• * 1.941

  Cosmog. par. 2. l. 3.
• (a) 1.942

  De moribus vet. Gallorum, p. 81. ad 95.
• (b) 1.943

  Hoc volunt per∣suadere non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem ad alios transire. De Bello Gallico, lib. 6.
• (c) 1.944

  Stoic. Physiologia. lib. 3. dissert. 12.
• (d) 1.945

  Vide Laert. lib. 8. Plut. Orat. 2. de esu Carnium. Reuchl. lib. 2. de Arte Cabalistica.
• (e) 1.946

  Multa praterea de sideribus atque corum motu, de mundi & ter∣rarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de De∣orum Immortalium vi ac potestate disputant, & in virtute tradunt. Lib. 7. de Bello Gal∣lico.
• (f) 1.947

  Sacrisiciis inter∣dicunt; h•••••• p•••••••• apud 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est gravissima. Id. lib. 6.
• (g) 1.948

  Druidibus praeest unus qui summam in∣ter eos habet Authori∣tatem. Id.
• (h) 1.949

  Num. 1.48. Ezra 7.24.
• (i) 1.950

  Magno praeterea apud omnes Gali••s in honore sunt, nam fere de omnibus controver∣siis publicis priva••is{que} constituunt; & si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes factae, si de Haereditate, de sinibus controversia, iidem de∣cernunt, praemia poe∣nasque constituunt. De Bello Gallico 1.7.
• * 1.951

  Pausanias in Pho∣cicis. Druids in Britain.
• (g) 1.952

  Gallorum discipli∣na in Britannia reper∣ta, atque inde in Gal∣liam translata esse ex∣istimatur. Et nunc qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, ple∣rumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur. Caesar, lib. 6.
• * 1.953

  The Druids Cere∣mony in cutting the Misleto from the Oak.
• * 1.954

  Of the Equites, or Nobility.
• (w) 1.955

  Lib. 6. Fa••••ionum Principes sunt qui summam Au∣thoritatem eorum ju∣di••io habere existi∣mantur, quorum ad Arbitrium judicium∣que summa omnium rerum conciliorumque redeat.
• (n) 1.956

  De moribus vet. Gall. p. 116.
• * 1.957

  The Princes Heads of Clans, or of the Pagi.
• (k) 1.958

  In pace nullus com∣munis Magistratus, sed Principes Regionum atque Pagorum inter suos Jus dicunt, con∣troversias{que} minuunt.
• (l) 1.959

  Comment. lib. 5.
• (a) 1.960

  Quodque praecipu∣um fortitudinis inci∣tamentum est, non ca∣sus, non fortuita con∣globatio turmam aut cuneum facit, sed fa∣miliae & propinquita∣tes. 1. Annal.
• * 1.961

  Several Petit Kings in Gaul.
• (b) 1.962

  Regna vulgo in Gallia a petentioribus atque iis qui ad condu∣cendos homines facul∣tates ha••erent, vulgo comparabantur. Several Petit Kings in Britain.
• (c) 1.963

  Britanni olim Re∣gibus parebant, nunc per Principes factio∣ni••us & studiis tra∣buntur. Tacit. vita Agric. c. 12. Therefore he tells us, Their want of agreeing in Com∣mon Councils, occa∣sioned their certain Overthrow. Pro nobis nihil utilius quam quod in••commune non consulunt: rarus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus: it a dum singuli pugnant, omnes vincuntur. Id.
• (d) 1.964

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Hist. Rom. lib. 60.
• (e) 1.965

  Magistrdtus quae visa sunt, occultant, quaeque esse ex usu ju∣dicaverint, multitudini produm.
• (f) 1.966

  De Repub. nisi per 〈◊〉〈◊〉 loqui 〈…〉〈…〉 ur. De 〈…〉〈…〉, l. 6.
• (g) 1.967

  〈…〉〈…〉, ita mos gentis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in Conci∣lium venerunt.
• (h) 1.968

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 21. Sancitum, si quis quid de Rep. a sinitimis ru∣more aut sama acce∣perit uti ad Magistra∣tum deferat, neve cum quo alio commanicet.
• (i) 1.969

  Ʋbi major atque illustrior res incidit, clamore per Agros & Regiones signisicant, banc alii deinceps ex∣cipiunt, & proximis tradunt. De Bello Gallico, lib. 7.
• (k) 1.970

  Sexum in Imperiis non discernunt. Tacit. vita Agric.
• (l) 1.971

  Suos liberos, nisi cum adolever int, ut munus militiae sustine∣re possint, palam ad se adire non patiuntur. De Bello Gallico. l. 6.
• (m) 1.972

  Ʋxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes, & maxi∣me fratres cum fra∣tribus, & parentes cum liberis: sed si qui sunt ex his nati, eorum ha∣bentur liberi, a quthus primum virgines quae∣que ductae sunt. Idem.
• (n) 1.973

  Viri quantas pe∣cunias ab uxoribus do∣tis nomine acceperunt, tantas ex suis bonis, aestimatione facta, cum dotibus communicant, &c. Idem.
• (o) 1.974

  Viri in uxores, si∣cuti in liberos vitae necisque habent pote∣statem. Idem.
• (p) 1.975

  Bodin. de Repub. lib. 1. c. 2.
• (q) 1.976

  Caesar de Bello Gal∣lico, lib. 6. Igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas intersiciunt.
• (r) 1.977

  Preface to the Sixth Book of Re∣ports.
• (s) 1.978

  Servi & Clientes, quos ab iis dile••••os esse constabat, just is fune∣ribus confectis, una ••remabantur. De Bel∣lo Gallico, lib. 6.
• (t) 1.979

  Plerique cum aut aere alieno aut magni∣tudine Tributorum aut inju••ia potentiorum premuntur, sese in servi••utem dicant No∣bilibus. In hos eadem sunt Jura quae dominis in servos. Idem.
• * 1.980

  That the Romans setled Common∣wealths where they conquered.
• (d) 1.981

  Livius, lib. 61.
• (e) 1.982

  Caes. Comment. l. 7.
• * 1.983

  Where the Romans conquered they ••sta∣blished their Laws.
• (f) 1.984

  Apud Britann••s populus magna ex par∣te Principatum tener. Vita Severi.
• (g) 1.985

  De moribus vet. Gallorum, p. 77. The Romans intro∣duced their Lan∣guage where they conquered.
• (h) 1.986

  Idem, p. 95, 96, 97. Why the Druids were abolished, with their wicked Rites.
• (i) 1.987

  Lib. 5. Comment.
• (k) 1.988

  Tiberii Caesaris Principatus sustulit Druidas Gallorum. Hist. Nat. l. 30. c. 1.
• (l) 1.989

  Sueton. Claud. c. 25.
• (m) 1.990

  Non jam illustres istas Druidum scholas, sed clandestinas in specu & abditis salti∣bus efficit.
• * 1.991

  The Romans impo∣sed their Laws where they conque∣red.
• (n) 1.992

  De magnitudine Romana, lib. 1. c. 6. p. 28. Vid. A. Gellium lib. 16. c. 13.
• (o) 1.993

  Hic denique popu∣lus Colonias in omnes Provincias misit; ubi∣cunque vicit, Romanus habitat. Seneca ad Albinum, c. 7.
• (p) 1.994

  Sic tamen ut om∣nia Romam & urbem matrem referrent. Id. Lipsius.
• (q) 1.995

  Colonia Camalo∣dunum ducitur valida veteranorum manu in agros Captivos, ut esset subsidium versus Re∣belles, & imbuendis so∣ciis ad officia Legum. Lib. 12. Annal. Dio Hist. lib. 60.
• (r) 1.996

  14. Annal. Externos fremitus in Curia eorum auditos.
• * 1.997

  Gruteri Inser. Lips. ad lib. 12. Tacit. num. 75. So we read of a Tem∣ple built to Claudius, which was Art (or, as Lipsius, Arra) aeter∣nae dominationis, an Altar or Earnest eternal Command. The Officers sent abroad by the Re∣mans into the Pro∣vinces and Colonies.
• (s) 1.998

  Latias ab eo jura∣re Leges compulsam. De Gestis Reg. l. 1. c. 1.
• * 1.999

  Non Britannia sed Romania censebatur. Excid. Britanniae. The Britans learn the Roman Arts and Language.
• ‖ 1.1000

  Linguam Romanam abnuere, postea elo∣quentiam concupiscere; inde etiam habilus ne∣slri honor & frequens toga, paulatimque dis∣cessum ad delinimenta vitiorum, Balnea, Por∣ticus & conviviorum elegantiam; idque a∣pud imperitos humani∣tas vocabatur, cum pars esset servitutis. Vita Agric. c. 21.
• (t) 1.1001

  In Catalect. vet. Poet. lib. 1. tit. 7.
• (u) 1.1002

  Juvenalis Sat. 7.
• (x) 1.1003

  Satyra 15.
• (y) 1.1004

  Herodian. lib. 3. Juri dicendo rebusque civilibus ut praeesset.
• (z) 1.1005

  Cod. lib. 3. tit. 32. That Laws were not like to be made by the Britans, while un∣der the Romans.
• (a) 1.1006

  Cum has domi a Roman•• Praeside (nec fugien••as quidem) ob∣tineret. Concil. Tom. 1. p. 35.
• (b) 1.1007

  In ludo de morte Cl. Caes.
• * 1.1008

  Vel Scoto-Brigantas. Senec. in Octav.
• * 1.1009

  Concerning the Laws of Hoel Dha, and the Britans in Wales.
• (c) 1.1010

  Laicos viros au∣ctoritate & scientia pollentes & omnes E••∣clesiasticos dignitate baculosos. Spelm. Concil. Tom. 1. fol. 408. Twy gwyn ar Tass, the White House upon the River Tass.
• (d) 1.1011

  Prima Lex Curiae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quotidianae; se∣cunda, Lex patria; tertia, usus utriusque.
• (e) 1.1012

  Cap. 25.
• (f) 1.1013

  Glossar. p. 362. Leges pristinas longa receptas consuetudine abolevit, Britannisque novas dedit.
• (g) 1.1014

  Sacred Laws, p. 76.
• (h) 1.1015

  Jo. Bromp. Coll. 956. num. 10.
• (i) 1.1016

  Lib. 1. c. 50. Concerning the Mer∣cian Laws, not Bri∣tish. See for this, and a∣gainst it, what the Judicious Selden hath writ in his fourth, fifth, and sixth Chap∣ters of his Janus Anglorum, in which the Story of Brute is judiciously confuted.
• (k) 1.1017

  Glossar. tit. Lex. Whence most Laws after the breaking of the Roman Em∣pire.
• (l) 1.1018

  Quis enim victor populus sub victi legi∣bus conquiniscet?
• * 1.1019

  The Gods the Ger∣mans worshipped.
• * 1.1020

  Germani neque Druidas habent qui rebus divinis praesint, neque sacrisiciis stu∣dent.
• * 1.1021

  Although the Ger∣mans, Gauls, and Bri∣tans were Barbarous, yet they were Vali∣ant, and capable of great Improvement.
• (a) 1.1022

  Lanceo ferreo cu∣bitali longitudine, la∣titudine duorum pal∣morum, Aerea Galea caput muni••bant pau∣latim eminentiore, in qua aut cornua impres∣sa essent, aut avium vel quadrupedum essigies sculptae. Caesar. l. 3.
• * 1.1023

  The Religion of the Germans.
• (b) 1.1024

  Silentium per Sa∣cerdotes, quibus tum coercendi Jus est im∣peratum. Tacit. de Moribus Germ. 634.
• (c) 1.1025

  Velut Deo impe∣rante quem adesse bel∣lantibus credunt. Id.
• (d) 1.1026

  Nec cohibere pa∣rietibus Deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem assimulare ex magnitudine coeles••ium arbitrantur. Id. 633.
• * 1.1027

  Their Civil Govern∣ment.
• (e) 1.1028

  Jura per Pagos Vicosque reddunt, cen∣teni singulis ex plebe comites, consilium si∣mul & auctoritas ad∣sunt. Idem
• (f) 1.1029

  Conventus fiat in omni centena, coram Comite aut suo misso, & coram Centenario ipsum placitum fiat. LL. Alaman.
• (g) 1.1030

  Reges ex Nobili∣tate, Duces ex virtu∣te sumunt; nec Regi∣bus infinita & libera Potestas, & Duces ex∣emplo potius quam Im∣perio. Si prompti, si conspicui, si ante Aci∣em agunt, admiratione praesunt. Id. 634.
• (h) 1.1031

  Mox Rex vel Princeps, prout aetas cuique, prout Nobili∣tas, prout decus Bel∣lorum, prout facundia, audiuntur Auctoritate suadendi magis quam jubendi potes••ate: si displicuit sententia, fremitu aspernantar; sin placuit, frameas concutiunt. Honora∣tissimum assensus genus est armis laudari. Id. 636.
• (i) 1.1032

  Vita Germanorum omnis in venationibus, a••qu•• in studiis rei militaris consumitur.
• (k) 1.1033

  Scuto Frameaque juvenem ornant; hac apud illos toga, hic primus juventae honos. De Moribus Germ.
• * 1.1034

  The German Comi∣tes.
• (l) 1.1035

  Magnaque & Co∣mitum aemulatio qui∣bus primus apud Prin∣cipem suum ••••••us: & Principum, cui pluri∣mi & acerrimi Comi∣tes. Haec dignit ••••, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vires, magno semper electorum juvenum globo circundati, in pace decus, in bello praesidium. Id. p. 637. Cum ventum i•• Aci∣em, turpe Principi virtute vinci, turpe comitatui virtutem Principis non adae∣quare.
• (m) 1.1036

  Exigunt enim Principis sui libera∣litate illum bellatorem equum, illam cruentam victricemque ••rame∣am. Id. 538. Sir Henry Spelman derives Vassal from the old German Ges∣sel, Comes, vel sim∣pliciter, vel qui pro mercede servit. Glos∣sar. Fidelis.
• (n) 1.1037

  Nec arare terram aut expectare Annum tam facile persuase∣ris, quam locare ho∣stes, & vulnera mereri; pigrum quinimo, & inters videtur sudore acquirere quod possis sanguine parare. Id. P. 538.
• * 1.1038

  Their Princes pre∣sented with Gifts.
• (o) 1.1039

  M••s est civitati∣bus ultro ac viritim conferre Principibus vel armentorum vel frugum, quod pro ••••∣nore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit: publice mitt••••tur e∣lecti equi, magna ar∣ma, phalerae, torques∣que. Idem.
• * 1.1040

  They went always armed.
• (p) 1.1041

  Nihil neque pub∣li•• •• neque pr••va•••••• r••i nisi armati agunt, tum ad nego••••••, nec minus sape ad convi••ia pro∣cedunt armati.
• * 1.1042

  De reconciliandis in∣vicem i••imicis, & jun∣gendis affinitatibus, & adsciscendis Principi∣bus, de pace denique a•• b••••••, plerumque in conviviis consulcant, tanquam nullo magis tempore aut ad simpli∣ces cogitationes pateat animus aut ad magnas incale cat. Deliberant dum ••in∣gere ne ciunt: consti∣tuunt dum errare non possunt. Id. 642. De minoribus rebus Principes consultant, d•• majoribus omnes; ita tamen ut ea quo∣que quorum p••nes ple∣hem arbitrium est, a∣pud Principes pertre∣ctentur. Id. 636. Their Consultati∣ons.
• * 1.1043

  De Moribus Germa∣norum.
• * 1.1044

  Haec debeamus virtu∣tibus ut non praesent••s solum illas, sed e••••am ablatas e••conspectu co∣lamus. Senec. lib. 4. de Benef. c. 30. Dotem non uxor ma∣rito, sed uxori mari∣tus affert, Idem. Tacitus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 supra. Accisis cri••ibus nuda∣tam Adul••eram coram propinquis expellit d••∣mo maritus, ac p••r omnem vicum verbera agit. Idem.
• * 1.1045

  J••••us Anglorum.
• * 1.1046

  H••••redes successores{que} sui cuique liberi, & nullum testamentum. Si liberi non sunt p••••∣ximus gradus in pos∣s••ss••o••e, sratres, pa∣trui, avunculi. Idem.
• * 1.1047

  Suscipere inimicitias seu patris seu propi••∣qui quam amicitias necesse est. Idem. Nec implacabiles du∣rant, luitur enim eti∣am homicidium certo Arm••ntorum ac peco∣rum numero, recipit∣que satisfactionem u∣niversa dom••s. Idem.
• * 1.1048

  Frumenti modum De∣minus aut pecoris aut vestis col••no injungit. Idem.
• * 1.1049

  In ••••imitivo Regni s••••tu p••st conquis ••••∣nem 〈…〉〈…〉 〈…〉〈…〉 ar∣genti 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed sola 〈◊〉〈◊〉 solvebantur. Dialog. Scaccar.
• (r) 1.1050

  Alter & tertius dies consultatione co∣••••ntium ab••umitur. Id. 636.
• * 1.1051

  Judgments given in their Councils.
• (s) 1.1052

  Li•••••• apud concili∣um accusare quoque & discrimen capitis in∣tendere.
• * 1.1053

  Distinctio paenarum ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉, proditores & tran••fu•••••• ar••ori∣bus suspendunt, igna∣v•••• & im••e•••••• & ••••∣pore (Lips. torp••••••) Infames 〈…〉〈…〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 insup••r crate 〈◊〉〈◊〉. ••acitus de moribus German. In some Places of Germany Drowning is yet a Punishment, as Platerus gives an Account of a Wo∣man tied in a Sack, and cast into the Ri∣ver near Basil, who was found alive af∣ter being taken up at the usual place, half a mile below where she was cast in. Observat.
• * 1.1054

  Several Laws made in several King loms after the declining of the Reman Em∣pire.
• * 1.1055

  Gothick Laws.
• (t) 1.1056

  Sub Erudi•••• Rege, Gothi Legum instituta scriptis bahere c••••pe∣runt; nam antea m••∣ribus & consuetudine tenebantur. Isidor. Chron. Goth. Aera 504.
• * 1.1057

  The Burgundian Laws.
• (u) 1.1058

  Lib. 2. c 33.
• (w) 1.1059

  De Impietate Du∣ellici examinis.
• (x) 1.1060

  Spehaan's Gloss. Lex Baioriorum. Lex Baiuvariorum, Baioriorum, Boiorum, containing Franco∣nia, now Bavaria and Bohemia, according to some.
• * 1.1061

  Lex Aalmannorum.
• * 1.1062

  Lex Francorum.
• * 1.1063

  Lex Longobardorum.
• (y) 1.1064

  Warnefridus Hist. Longobard. lib. 4. c. 44.
• (z) 1.1065

  Glosser, tit. LL. Longobard.
• * 1.1066

  Lex Ripuariorum.
• * 1.1067

  The Salick Law.
• (a) 1.1068

  Anno Dom. 798. Dom. Carolus Rex Francorum incli••••s hunc libellum tracta∣t••s Legis Salicae seri∣bere ordinavit.
• (b) 1.1069

  Gl••sser. Lex An∣glorum. The English Saxon Laws from Germany.
• * 1.1070

  Angela is a Town near Flemshurg, a Ci∣ty of Sleswick; per∣haps our Flamburgh in York••••ire had its Name from some that inhabited that City.
• * 1.1071

  The tripartite Di∣vision of the Saxon Laws.
• (c) 1.1072

  West-Seaxna Laga, Myrcna Laga, Dene Laga.
• * 1.1073

  Danish Laws.
• (d) 1.1074

  Lib. 1. c. 50. Edward the Confes∣sor's Laws composed of all.
• * 1.1075

  When the Roman Imperial Law began to be disused.
• (e) 1.1076

  Notes upon For∣tescue, p. 20.
• (f) 1.1077

  Proaem. de Con∣sirmatione Institutio∣num. Of Justinian's Laws.
• (g) 1.1078

  Non ab Antiquis Fabulis discere, sed ab Imperiali splendore appetere. Breviter expositum quod antea obtinebat, & quod postea desue∣tudine inumbratum, Imperiali remedio il∣luminatum est. Legimus & recogno∣vimus, & plenissimum nostrarum constitutio∣num robur eis accom∣modavimus.
• (h) 1.1079

  Sigon. de Regno Italiae, lib. 11. & 7.
• * 1.1080

  The great Subver∣sion the Saxons made by their Conquest.
• * 1.1081

  A short Glossary of the Names or Titles of the Constituent Parts of Great Councils.
• * 1.1082

  The Witan or Wites. Einhard divides the Germans into four sorts of Degrees, the Noble, Free-men, those made free, and Servants: his words are, Quatuor differen∣tiis gens illa consisti••, Nobilium s••ili••et, Li∣berorum, Libertorum, atque Servorum. A∣dam Brem. H••••t. Ec∣cles. c. 5.
• (i) 1.1083

  Histor. & Privileg. Eccl. Eliensis, fol. 117. b.
• (k) 1.1084

  Lamb. fol. 147. tit. de Heretochiis. Qui Heretoches ••pud Anglo••vo••abantur, se. Barones, Nobiles & insignes sapientes, vo∣cati ductores excerci∣tuum, &c.
• * 1.1085

  Alderman.
• (l) 1.1086

  Spelman's Glossa∣ry.
• * 1.1087

  Thane.
• (m) 1.1088

  Cyninges Thegen. Med mera Thegen. Woruld Thegen. Maesse Thegen. Som∣ner. Dial.
• * 1.1089

  Clergy and Laity.
• (n) 1.1090

  Spelm. 1. Tom. Concil.
• * 1.1091

  Communi concilio tam Cleri quam Populi.
• (p) 1.1092

  Egther ge god∣cundra hada, ge wo∣ruld cundra.
• (q) 1.1093

  Mandavit omni∣bus Majoribus Regno∣rum, & veniunt Win∣toniam Clerus, & Po∣pulus.
• * 1.1094

  Clero Angliae & Po∣pulo universo.
• (r) 1.1095

  Omnes Principes Regni sui Ecclesiastici & secularis ordinis. Flo. Wigor. fol. 651. lin. 21.
• (s) 1.1096

  Quadrilog. lib. 1. c. 26.
• * 1.1097

  Magnates & Proce∣res.
• * 1.1098

  Fideles & Liberi ho∣mines.
• (t) 1.1099

  Cl. 42 H. 3. m. 10. in dorso. So Nithard, lib. 4. speaking of his own time, divides the Germans into Ethe∣lings, i. e. Nobles; Frilings, Free-men; and Lazzos, Servants or Slaves. Thence our Lazie Fellow, which we now un∣derstand Idle.
• * 1.1100

  Communitas Regni.
• * 1.1101

  Communitas Regni.
• (u) 1.1102

  Pro se & tota Communitate ejusdem Regni.
• * 1.1103

  Probi & legales homi∣nes.
• (w) 1.1104

  Cl. 7 H. 3. m. 14. dorso.
• (a) 1.1105

  Ann. Christi 613. Of King Aethelbert's Laws.
• (b) 1.1106

  Eccl. Hist, lib. 2. c. 5. Tha othre god the He his Leodum thurh ge∣theaht gefremede, ea•• sivylcere rightra doma gesetnesse, mid snotera getheabte geset••e af∣ter Romana bysena, & tha het on Englis•• aw∣ritan, tha nu oth this gehaldene synd.
• (d) 1.1107

  Dugdale Orig. Jurid. c. 4.
• * 1.1108

  King In••'s Laws. Lambard's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Editio∣nis Wheeloch, p. 1.
• (e) 1.1109

  I•• Ine mid Godes gyfe West Seaxna Cy∣ning, mid getheaht & mid Laere, Cenredes mines Faeder, & Hed∣des mines Bisceopes, & Ercenwoldes mines Bisceopes, & mid eal∣lum minum Eal••orma∣num, & tham Yldes••an Witan minre theode & eac mycelre.
• (f) 1.1110

  Waes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thaere haele 〈…〉〈…〉 & be th••m st••••h••le ures rices.
• (g) 1.1111

  Not Aew, Nupti••e 〈…〉〈…〉 observes, and appears in the 〈…〉〈…〉. Gefas••ined••.
• * 1.1112

  Awendan.
• * 1.1113

  Observations on this Preface.
• (h) 1.1114

  Spelman. C••ncil. vol. 1. p. 313. Other Great Coun∣cils in the Saxon times of Offa.
• (i) 1.1115

  Id. p. 314.
• (k) 1.1116

  Id. p. 3••0. Ad A••••um 8••••. Kenulph.
• (l) 1.1117

  Idem, f••••. 328.
• (m) 1.1118

  I••em, fol. ••32. 〈…〉〈…〉 rum.
• (n) 1.1119

  Idem, pag. 336. Anno 833. Withlasius.
• (o) 1.1120

  In praesentia Do∣minorum meorum Eg∣berti Regis West-Sax∣oniae, & Aethelwulphi filii ejus coram Ponti∣ficibus, & Proceribus.
• (p) 1.1121

  Majoribus totius Angliae in Civitate Londonia, ubi omnes congregati sumus pro consilio capiendo con∣tra Danicos Piratas litora Angliae assidus infesta••tes.
• * 1.1122

  The Laws of King Alfred.

  Regnare

  • coepit 871.
  • desiit 900.
• (q) 1.1123

  On thissum anum Dome, mon maege ge∣thencean, that he aegh∣wel••re on riht gede∣meth. LL. Alured, p. 21.
• (r) 1.1124

  Haligra Bisceopa & eac othera gethun∣genra Witena. Ibid.
• (s) 1.1125

  Thaes togaeder ge∣gaderod & awritan het.
• (t) 1.1126

  Tha the me ne licodon Ic awearp mid minra witena getheat, & on othre wifan be∣head to heoldanne. Ib. p. 22.
• * 1.1127

  Observations on these Laws.
• (u) 1.1128

  The aerest fulwil•••• underfeng on Angel cynne. Ibid.
• (w) 1.1129

  Tha the me rihtost thuhton, Ic tha her on gegaderod.
• (x) 1.1130

  Idem, p. 36.
• (y) 1.1131

  Ge••weden habbath & mid Athum gefaest∣nod. p. 36.
• * 1.1132

  Observations on this League.
• (z) 1.1133

  Jo. Pi••us qui vixit temp. H. 1.
• * 1.1134

  The Laws of Ed∣ward the Elder.

  Regn.

  • coepit 900.
  • desiit 924.
• (a) 1.1135

  Myd his witan tha hi Eaxanceastre wa∣ron. Id. p. 39.
• (b) 1.1136

  That he aer bebo∣den haefde. That nan mon othrum rihtes ne wyrne; as Lambard translates it, ne quent injuria affi••iant.
• * 1.1137

  The Laws of King Athelstan.

  Regn.

  • coepit 922.
  • desiit 940.

  Ibid. p. 45.
• (c) 1.1138

  Et that ••••e g••do ea•• tha Bis••eop is ••ec∣ra gewhylera & eac mine Ealdormanna & Gereafa. Ibid. p. 45.
• * 1.1139

  Somner Verb.
• (d) 1.1140

  Gif minra Gere∣fena gehwylce this don nylle, &c. Gylde min oferhyrnysse & Ic finde otherne we wille & se Bisceope amanige tha offer ofer∣hyrnyss aet tham Ge∣refan the on his fol∣gothe sy. P. 53.
• * 1.1141

  King Edward's Laws, p. 57.

  Regn.

  • coepit 940.
  • desiit 948.
• (e) 1.1142

  That Ic ••meade mid minra Witena ge∣theaht gegodra hada gelaewedra. Id. p. 58.
• (f) 1.1143

  Spelman. Concil. vol. 1. fol. 194. An∣no 697. Withrad.
• * 1.1144

  Saxon Great Coun∣cils.
• (g) 1.1145

  Aelc had ciricean thaere maegthe acmod∣lice.
• (h) 1.1146

  Lamb. tit. Here∣toch. fol. 147.
• (i) 1.1147

  Spelm. Conc. vol. 1. fol. 333. Beornwulph.
• (k) 1.1148

  Idem, fol. 336. Egbert.
• * 1.1149

  Bertulph. Idem, fol. 344.
• (l) 1.1150

  Ingulphi Hist, fol. 477. King Eldred's Great Council.
• * 1.1151

  King Edgar's Laws. Lamb. Conc. fol. 62.

  Regn.

  • coepit 959.
  • desiit 975.
• (m) 1.1152

  Spelman•• Concil. Tom. 1. fol. 4••5.
• (n) 1.1153

  Idem 490.
• * 1.1154

  The Laws of Ethel∣red, fol. 88.

  Regn.

  • coepit A. 979.
  • desiit 1016.
• (o) 1.1155

  Sp••lman. Concil. vol. 1. fol. 510. The Council of Aen∣ham under King Ae∣thelred.
• (p) 1.1156

  Idem, fol. 529.
• (q) 1.1157

  Spelman. Concil. vol. 1. fol. 507, 508. Anno 1006.
• * 1.1158

  Aet suman is added, but neither Lambard nor Somner interpret it.
• * 1.1159

  The Laws of Canu∣tus, fol. 97.

  Regn.

  • coepit A. 1016
  • desiit 1035
• (r) 1.1160

  Concil. Tom. 1.552.
• (s) 1.1161

  Idem, fol. 562.
• (t) 1.1162

  Monast. Aug. vol. 1. fol. 295. col. 1. num. 30.
• (u) 1.1163

  Spelman. vol. 1. Concil. fol. 537.
• (w) 1.1164

  Gest. Regum, lib. 2. c. 11.
• (x) 1.1165

  Sub interminatio∣ne Regiae mulctae per∣petuis temporibus ob∣servari praecepit.
• (y) 1.1166

  MS. Burgi Sancti Edmundi; Spelman. Conc. vol. 1. fol. 534.
• (z) 1.1167

  Praefat. 4. Report. King Edward the Confessor's Laws.
• (a) 1.1168

  Concil. vol. 1.619, 625.
• (b) 1.1169

  I••em, fol. 627.
• (c) 1.1170

  Id. 631.
• (d) 1.1171

  Id. 636.
• * 1.1172

  As to King Edward's Laws and their Con∣firmation by the Conqueror, and the Add••••ions and A∣mendments, see Dr. Brady, fol. 254. A••∣gum. A••tinorm. 296, 298, 299. As to the ••arallel betwixt the Saxon and Norman Laws, see his Preface to the Norman Story.
• * 1.1173

  Ab his vix alios, ante Saxones, comperio Cu∣stodes, sub eis varie partitos, &c. Explent numerum Rex, Con••••••••••ularius, Cancellarius. Thesau∣rarius, Angliae Alder∣mannus, Aldermannus Provin••••arum & Gra∣vii. Janus Angl. p. 40.
• (a) 1.1174

  Praef••tio ad LL. Willielmi primi, pag. 155. Edit. Wheeloch. Three things the Conqueror design∣ed.
• (b) 1.1175

  Lib. 4. p. 523. About his Militia and Revenue.
• * 1.1176

  Piscos.
• * 1.1177

  Disposed the Lands in Military Service.
• (c) 1.1178

  Statuimus etiam & sirmiter praecipi∣mus, ut omnes liberi homines totius Regni nostri sint fratres cen∣jurati ad Monarchi••m nostram & ad Regnum nostrum pro viribus su∣is & facultatihus con∣tra inimicos pro posse suo defendendum & vi∣riliter servandum, & Pacem & Dignitatem Coronae nostrae inte∣gram observand••m & judicium rectum & ju∣stitiam constanter & omnibus modis pro posse suo & sine delatione ••aciendam. Fol. 171.
• (d) 1.1179

  Monsieur Berault. Custom. Norman. fol. 86.
• (e) 1.1180

  Brady's Preface Norm. History, p. 159.
• * 1.1181

  Of the Feudal Law, and its Mitigation. So Matt. Paris saith, Episcopatus & Abba∣tias omnes quae Baro∣nias tenebant, & ea∣tenus ab omni servitu∣te s••••ulari libertatem habuerant, sub servi∣tute statuit militar••.
• * 1.1182

  Of the Conqueror's Laws.
• (f) 1.1183

  Parte posteriori, fol. 346.
• (g) 1.1184

  Chron. Li••••f. See for the Conque∣ror's Charter and Laws, Dr. Brady, fol. 17, 252, 254, 258, 298, 249.
• (h) 1.1185

  Quo audito mox universi compatriota, qui leg••s edixerant, trist••s essec••i, unani∣miter deprecati sunt quatenus permit••eret l••ges sibi pr••prias & consue••udines ••••iqua halere. Id. num. 10. Hoveden, fol. 347, num. 1.
• * 1.1186

  See Brady's Answer to Argum. A••ti••o••••. p. 298, 299.
• * 1.1187

  I cannot conceive but here were many of the Saxon Nobi∣lity, and Men of best Account; otherwise they could not call them the Laws their Fathers had lived under: and the Nor∣mans could not then know much of our Laws or Speech; but this was before he had subdued all fully.
• (i) 1.1188

  Anglos Nobiles Sa∣pientes & sua••••ge e∣ruditos. Id. fol. 348. Spelm. Concil. tom. 1. fol. 619.
• * 1.1189

  Concerning the Kindness the Con∣queror pretended in his first four Years, and his Rigour af∣ter, see at large. Dr. Brady, in his Answer to the Argumentum Antinormanicum, e∣specially p. 260. and 299.
• (k) 1.1190

  Vt quoad possent recto tramite inceden∣tes, nec ad dextram nec ad sinistram diver∣tentes, nihil addentes, nihil praevarieando mutantes. Omnia quae praedicti ••urati dixerunt.
• (l) 1.1191

  Circa sinem Hist. fol. 519. num. 36. Leges aqui••••mi Regis Edwardi quas Dom. meus inclitus Rex W. authenticas esse & per∣petuas, &c. proclama∣rat.
• (m) 1.1192

  Answer to Petyt, p. 14. Great Officers Nor∣mans.
• * 1.1193

  See for proof of the whole, Eadmer. Hist. Novel. fol. 6. num. 10, 20, 30. Ingulph. fol. 512. a. num. 50. That these Great Barons, as Tenents in Capite, had power to make Laws and Constitutions to bind their Sub-Feu∣dataries, is apparent by what Malmsbury de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Reg. lib. 3. saith, That the Laws of W. Fitz-Ozborn Earl of Hereford re∣mained still in force, That no Soldier for any Offence should pay above 7 s. The Conqueror's Liberality to the Normans.
• (n) 1.1194

  Black Book of the Exchequer. Post regni conquisitio∣nem, post justam Re∣bellium subversionem,—facta est inquisitio di∣ligens qui fuerint qui contra Regem in bello dimicantes per fugam se salvaverint; hiis omnibus & haeredibus eorum qui in bello oc∣cubuerunt, spes omnis, &c. praeclusa.
• * 1.1195

  Ex quo cis Nor∣mannorum adventum praeter ipsum Regem non fuit in Anglia is qui Allodii, ut lequan∣tur, Jure sundum possederit, cum scilicet aliis ad unum omnes siduciarios pro••e dixe∣ris Dominos, superio∣rem investi••urae Anct••∣rem interpesita side perpetuo agn••sc••ntes. Lib. 2. Jan. Ang.
• * 1.1196

  Probe tametsi dixeris eversum, secundum quod disputant Juris∣consulti, Anglicum Im∣perium. Id. Gervas. Til••. c. 23. Oblatis vomeribus in signum desicientis A∣griculturae.
• * 1.1197

  The English com∣pound with their Lords.
• (o) 1.1198

  LL. Gulielm. pri∣mi, Edit. Twysden, p. 170.
• (p) 1.1199

  In pace libere ab omni exactione inju∣s••a & ab omni talla∣gio.
• * 1.1200

  The English have little Benefit by his Relaxation of the Feudal Law.
• (q) 1.1201

  Praefat. Reger Twysden, fol. 155. The English possess their Lands by ••a∣vour, not otherwise Hereditarily. So Mut. Paris saith, Commilitonibus ter∣ras Anglorum & pos∣sessiones affluentiori manu contulit; illud parvum quod reman∣s••rat, sub jugo posuit perpetuae servitutis.
• * 1.1202

  Brady, p. 313.314.
• * 1.1203

  The Conqueror makes written Laws.
• (r) 1.1204

  Decrevit subje∣ctum sibi populum Ju∣ri scripto legibusque sabjicere. Quasdam reprobavit, quasdam autem appro∣bans Transmari••••s Neustriae leges, quae ad Regni p••••••m tuen∣dam effic••teissionae vide∣bantur, adjecit. Gerv. Tilb. lib. 1. c. 29.
• (s) 1.1205

  Fol. 48. num. 20, 30, 40.
• (t) 1.1206

  Argum. Antinorm. p. 261.
• (u) 1.1207

  Fol. 343.
• (w) 1.1208

  Fol. 138, 149
• (x) 1.1209

  In Eadmerum, fol. 172. num. 20.
• * 1.1210

  The Title of the Conqueror's Laws.
• (y) 1.1211

  Ces sont le Leis & les Custumes que le Reis William grantut tut le peuple de Eng∣leterre ••pres le Con∣quest de la Terre. Ice les meismes que le Reis Edward sun C••sin tent devant luy. LL. W. fol. 159.
• (z) 1.1212

  LL. W. 1. p. 170.
• (z) 1.1213

  LL. W. 1. p. 170.
• * 1.1214

  The Terms used by the Conqueror in Law-giving.
• (a) 1.1215

  Fol. 853.
• (b) 1.1216

  Hist, Nov. fol. 6. num. 10, 20, 30. Ʋsus atque leges quas patres sui & ipse in Normannia solehant, in Anglia scrib••re vo∣lens—Cuncta divina si∣mul & humana ejus nutum expectabant. Edit. Gal. de Mou∣lins.
• (c) 1.1217

  Britan. fol. 109.
• * 1.1218

  Brompton's Account of the proper Laws of the Conqueror.
• * 1.1219

  The Members of the Great Councils in the Conqueror's time.
• (d) 1.1220

  Rad. de Diceto, col. 483. num. 30. Concil. tom. 2. fol. 4.
• (e) 1.1221

  Gervas. Dorobern. col. 1653. lin. 5.
• (f) 1.1222

  MS. in Bibl. Cot∣ton. sub essigie Vespas. A. 19. e Chron. Rad. de Diceto. Spelm. Con∣cil. Tom. 2. fol. 14.
• (g) 1.1223

  Fol. 651. lin. 22.
• (h) 1.1224

  Fol. 67. B. 20. Anno 1102. 3 H. 1.
• (i) 1.1225

  Fol. 302.
• (k) 1.1226

  Monast. vol. 1. fol. 44. Anno 1084. 18 W. Conqu.
• (l) 1.1227

  Spelm. Concil. tom. 2. fol. 14. e MS. pe∣nes Dec. & Capit. B. Pauli Lond. A. fol. 1, 2.
• (m) 1.1228

  Leges quae non bene, &c. Communt Concilio & Concilio Ar••••iepisct porum & Epi coporum, & Ab∣batum, & omnium Principum R••gni mei emendand is judi••avi, propterea mando & Regia Au••loritate ••racipio, &c.
• * 1.1229

  Remarks upon what before is laid down.
• (n) 1.1230

  Annal. Binaiae, tom. 3. part. 2. fol. 249.
• * 1.1231

  The great Selden notes as the Mem∣bers of the Great Council in the time of the Norman Kings, for the Barons, such as had 13 Knights Fees and a third part: His words are, Interfuere Parliamen∣tis sub Normannorum tempora quotquot 13 Feudis Militaribus & 3 unius parte investi∣ti Barones, ab amplis praediis ita dicti. Jan. Ang. p. 139.
• (o) 1.1232

  Hist. Novel. p. 6. num. 30. Non sinebat quicquam statuere ant prohibere nisi quae suae voluntati accommoda & a se primo essent ordinata.
• (p) 1.1233

  Pictav. fol. 197. C. Ingulph. 512. a lin. 7. What the Conque∣ror did to secure his Conquest.
• (q) 1.1234

  Id. fol. 2••6 a. 207 c. 2••8 a. b.
• (r) 1.1235

  Nulli tamen Gallo datum est quod Anglo ••uiquam injuste fue∣cit ablatum. Idem, fol. 208. c.
• * 1.1236

  How he comported himself after he had secured his Con∣quest.
• (s) 1.1237

  Jure Belli posse∣dit. fol. 206. a.
• (t) 1.1238

  Adjutoribus suis inclytas Angliae Regi∣ones distribuit, & ex insimis Normannorum Clientibus Tribunos & Centuriones ditissimos erexit. Orderic. Vit. 251.
• (u) 1.1239

  Fundos eorum cum omnibus divitiis obti∣n••imus. Id. fol. 853.
• (w) 1.1240

  Malmsb. fol. 52. a. num. 40. Vix aliquis Princeps de progenie Anglorum esset in Anglia, sed omnes ad servitutem & moerorem redacti essent, ita ut Anglieum vocari opprobrjum.
• (x) 1.1241

  Hen. Hunt. fol. 210 b. num. 10. About the continu∣ing the English Sax∣ons, but changing their Tenures, Ser∣vices, &c.
• (y) 1.1242

  Spelman. Gloss. Feodam.
• (a) 1.1243

  Eadmer. Hist. Nov. lib. 1. fol. 24. lin. 8.
• (b) 1.1244

  Idem, fol. 20. num. 30. Anno D. 1093. 5 W. Rusi. The Contest be∣twixt William the Second and Anselm.
• (c) 1.1245

  Idem, p. 26. num. 10.6 Gul. 2.
• (d) 1.1246

  Paternae consuetu∣dinis eatenus extitisse, ut praeter suam licen∣tiam, aut electionem aliquis in Regno Ang∣liae Papam nominaret, & quicunque sibi hu∣jus dignitatis potesta∣tem vellet praeripere, unum foret ac si co∣ronam suam sibi cona∣retur auferre. Idem num. 50.
• * 1.1247

  The Question mo∣ved, Whether Arch∣bishop Anselm could keep his ••aith to th•• King. saving his O∣bedience to the A∣postolick See?
• * 1.1248

  Idem, num. 10.
• (e) 1.1249

  Rege & suis se∣cretius in Anselmum Concilium stu••iese texentibus; Anselmus autem, Episcopis, Ab∣batibus, & Principibus ad se a Regio secreto vocatis.
• (f) 1.1250

  Id. num. 30, 40, 50.
• (g) 1.1251

  Id. fol. 27. num. 10.
• (h) 1.1252

  Anselmus ad ho∣spitium suum, Curiam manere petiturus, re∣verteretur.
• * 1.1253

  In this Contest is discovered who were the Members of the Great Councils.
• * 1.1254

  Great Council at Pentecost de more.
• (i) 1.1255

  Peractis igitur Fe∣stivioribus di••bus di∣versorum negotiorum causae in medium duci ex more coeperunt. Id. p. 37. num. 40. Ann. 1096. vel 1097.
• (k) 1.1256

  Mense Augusto cum de statu Regni acturus Rex, Episco∣pos, Abbates, & quos∣que Regni Proceres in unum praecepti sui sanctione egisset, &c. Id. p. 38. num. 10.
• * 1.1257

  The King solely summons the Great Councils, and dismis∣seth them.
• * 1.1258

  Omnis jam legum si∣l••it Justitia, causis∣que sub justitio positis, sola in Principibus imperabat pecunia. Florent. Wigorn.
• * 1.1259

  Matt. Paris fol. 74. Edit. penult.
• * 1.1260

  Praecipio ut homines mei similiter se con∣tineant erga silios, & silias, & uxores ho∣minum suorum.
• (a) 1.1261

  Omnes Princip••s Regni sui Ecclesiastici & Secularis Ordinis. Flor. Wigorn. Anno 1102. 3 H. 1.
• (b) 1.1262

  Ipso Rege annuen∣te communi consensu Episcoporum, Abbatum & Principum totius Regni adunatum est Conciltum. De Gest. Pontif. Anno 1102.
• (c) 1.1263

  Factus est conven∣tus Episcoporum & Abbatum pariter & Magnatum ad Ann. &c.
• (d) 1.1264

  Tum Episcoporum & Abbatum totius Cle∣ri Angliae; by which must be understood the great dignified Clergy. Sub Wifri∣do Abbate, p. 104.
• (e) 1.1265

  Remisit, libere con∣cessit, integre promisi••.
• (f) 1.1266

  Lib. rub. Scaccar. Twysden LL. Id. 1. p. 175.
• (g) 1.1267

  Ego respectu Dei & amore quem erg•• vos habeo. Matt. Paris fol. 292. num. 10. See the Explanation of this Charter, Bra∣dy's Argum. fol. 265. and Selden's Epino∣mis.
• (h) 1.1268

  Rex—auditis Con∣cilii gestis consensum praebuit. Authoritate Regia & potestate con∣cessit, & consirmavit statuta Concilii. Con∣tinuat. Florent. Wi∣gorn. p. 503.
• (a) 1.1269

  Coacto magno E∣piscoporum, Procerum, & Abbatum concilio. Fol. 92. b. num. 4.
• (b) 1.1270

  Juxta voluntatem & arbi••rium singulo∣rum. Fol. 62. num. 40.
• (c) 1.1271

  Malmsb. Hist. No∣vel. fol. 101. b. num. 16.
• (d) 1.1272

  Ego Stephanus Dei gratia assensu Cleri, &c. omnes exactiones, meschenningas, & in∣justitias sive per Vice∣comites vel per alios quoslibet male indu∣ctas funditus extirpo, bonas leges & anti∣quas & justas consue∣tudines, &c. observa∣bo, & observari prae∣cipio & constituo. Malmsb. Hist. No∣vel. p. 101. b. num. 20.
• (e) 1.1273

  Ric. Prior H••gu∣stald. col. 314. num. 6. Anno 1136. 1 Regni. The King grants his Charter with a Sal∣vo.
• (f) 1.1274

  Id. 313. num. 30. Note, That all Au∣thors think strange th•• Pope should ••••••firm and so coun∣tenance King Ste∣phen, an Usurper.
• (g) 1.1275

  Id. 315. num. 10.
• (h) 1.1276

  Flor Wigorn. An∣no 1138. fol. 668.
• (i) 1.1277

  Hen. Hunt. Anno 1151. fol. 226.
• (k) 1.1278

  Chron. Norm. An∣no 1152.
• (l) 1.1279

  Jo. Brompton, col. 1000. num. 50.
• (a) 1.1280

  Spelman. Concil. Tom. 2. fol. 54. Congregavit Concili∣um generale, & reno∣vavit pacem & leges & consuetudines per Angliam ab antiquis temporibus constitu∣tas.
• (b) 1.1281

  Answer to Petyt, fol. 31. ult. Edit. See Selden's Corre∣ction of Matt. Paris, in his Epinomis.
• (c) 1.1282

  Matt. Paris, fol. 84. num. 20. ult. E∣dit.
• * 1.1283

  Concerning the Laws of this King, see Selden's Epinomis.
• * 1.1284

  Proceres.
• (d) 1.1285

  Ben. Abb. p. 77. Anno Dom. 1176.
• (e) 1.1286

  Ben. Abbas, p. 86.
• (a) 1.1287

  Fol. 129. num. 16
• (b) 1.1288

  Hoved. fol. 376. a. num. 30.
• (c) 1.1289

  Fol. 155. num. 50.
• (d) 1.1290

  Hoved. fol, 418. b. num. 20.
• * 1.1291

  A Great Council called on a Days warning.
• (e) 1.1292

  Qui i•• crastino convocatis coram co Episcopis, Comitibus, & Baronibus Regni, ostendit eis literas Co∣mitis Johannis & ea∣rum tenuras, & statim per commune concili∣um Regni desinitum est quod Comes Jo∣hannes dissaisiretur. Idem.
• (f) 1.1293

  Idem, 419. ••. 30. A Great Council of four Days.
• (g) 1.1294

  Rex dissaisivit Gerardum de Canvil de Comitatu Linc. & Hug. Bardolf de Ca∣stro & Comitat. Ebor.
• (h) 1.1295

  Rex constituit sibi dari, &c. deinde prae∣cepit—exigit. Concerning the Form of Proceeding in the Pleas of the Crown, the Assize of the Forest, where∣in the Laws made in this King's time are set down, see Selden's Epinomis.
• * 1.1296

  Id. Hoved.
• * 1.1297

  Remarks upon these Great Councils.
• (a) 1.1298

  Matt. Paris, fol. 176. num. 30. ult. edit.
• (b) 1.1299

  Nec etiam Epi∣scopi et Abbates sive Ecclesiasticae personae sine promissione reces∣serunt. Idem.
• (c) 1.1300

  Hoveden, fol. 282. b. num. 10. Praecepit Rex Archie∣piscopis & Episcopis, ut Si••illa sua appone∣••en••, & cum cateri proni essent ad id sae∣ciendum, Archiepise. Cant. juravit quod nunquam scripto illi apponeret, nec leges consirmaret.
• (d) 1.1301

  Fol. 180. num. 30.
• * 1.1302

  The King imposeth Taxes.
• (e) 1.1303

  Cunctis murmu∣rantibus, sed contradi∣cere non audentibus. A Great Council held in the King's absence.
• (f) 1.1304

  Mat. Paris, fol. 201. num. 30. Ex parte Regis fir∣miter est praeceptum, sicut vitam & membra sua diligunt, ne a quo∣quam aliquid violen∣ter extorqueant, vel ali••ui injuriam irro∣gare praesumant.
• * 1.1305

  A Convention or Conspiracy against the King.
• (g) 1.1306

  Fol. 201. num. 50, 60.
• * 1.1307

  Observations on the foregoing Councils.
• (h) 1.1308

  Quare cum istis iniquis exactionibus Barones non postulant Regnum? Nunquam tales illis concederet libertates, unde ipse efficeretur servus. Matt. Paris, fol. 213. num. 60.
• (i) 1.1309

  Idem, fol. 215. num. 13.
• (k) 1.1310

  Idem, fol, 216. num. 30.
• * 1.1311

  The alteration of the Summoning the Members to the Great Council. Note. In this Charter the King grants, he will raise no Money on the Subject, with∣out Consent, but in three Cases; to re∣deem his Body, make his eldest Son Knight, and marry his eldest Daughter: And the like Power others •• had over their Liberi homines.
• * 1.1312

  He repents his granting the Char∣ter.
• (m) 1.1313

  Idem, 224.
• (n) 1.1314

  Id. 227. num. 20. The Pope absolves him.
• (o) 1.1315

  Animad. on Jan. Augl. fol. 167. The King's Grant by Charter, a good Law then.
• (p) 1.1316

  Fol. 255. num. 30, 50.
• (q) 1.1317

  Ibid. fol. 256. lin. 18.
• * 1.1318

  By Freemen here to be understood the Tenents in Capite.
• (a) 1.1319

  Matt. Paris fol. 266. num. 60.
• (b) 1.1320

  Juravit & tota Nobilitas cum eo, quod libertates praescriptas omnes observarent, & omnibus traderent ob∣servandas. Ibid.
• * 1.1321

  Liberties violently extorted from the King, not binding.
• (c) 1.1322

  Rex cum Archie∣piscopis, Episcopis, Co∣mitibus, Baronibus, & aliis multis de Regni negotiis tractaturus. Idem, fol. 269. num. 60. & 270.
• (d) 1.1323

  Idem, fol. 271. num. 20.
• * 1.1324

  The King grants the Tenents in Ca∣pite Scutage upon their Tenents.
• (e) 1.1325

  Idem, fol. 272. num. 20.
• * 1.1326

  Et al••••t universis.
• * 1.1327

  Magna Charta grant∣ed.
• (f) 1.1328

  Idem, num. 30.
• (g) 1.1329

  Ita quod chartae utrorumque Requm in nullo inv••niuntur dis∣similes.
• (h) 1.1330

  Idem, fol. 314. num. 20.17 H. 3.
• (i) 1.1331

  Ʋnde Regi de Jure auxilium non debe∣bant. Idem, num. 30. The Tenents in Ca∣pite having perso∣nally served accord∣ing to the Tenure of their Service, de∣ny the King Aid.
• (k) 1.1332

  Pul••on. Stat. p. 1. In one part it is said, Our Lord the King granted by the Con∣sent of his Magnates.
• (l) 1.1333

  Matt. Paris, fol. 367. num. 30. Misu, &c. scripta R••∣galia, pracipiens omni∣bus ad Regnum Ang∣liae spectantibus, &c. ut omnes sine omissi••ne∣—conveairent Regni negotia tractaturt to∣tum Regnum contin∣gentia.
• (m) 1.1334

  Insinita Nobilium multitudo, viz. Regni totalis universitas.
• (n) 1.1335

  Edicto Regio con∣vocata convenit ad Parliamentum gene∣rali ••••mum ••otius Reg∣ni Anglicani totalis Nobilitas. Idem, p. 609. num. 10.
• * 1.1336

  The word Parlia∣ment now used.
• (o) 1.1337

  Tota edicto Regio convocata Angliae No∣bilitas convenit de ar∣duis Regni Negotiis simul cum R••ge tra∣ctatura. Idem. fol. 745. num. 40.
• (p) 1.1338

  Pat. 37 H. 3. m. 13. Anno 1253.
• * 1.1339

  Praefatus Dominus Rex in prolatione prae∣fatae sententiae, omnes libertates, consuetudi∣nes Regni sui Angliae & usitatas dignitates & Jura Coronae suae ••re proprio specialiter sibi & Regno suo sal∣vavit & excepit.
• * 1.1340

  Such like Protestati∣on King Richard the Second made, 10 Reg. Rot. Parl. 10 R. 2. num. 32. See in King Stephen.
• (q) 1.1341

  His Majesty's Speeches, fol. 368. of the Basilica.
• (r) 1.1342

  Id. 435. num. 10.21 H. 3. Id. 693. num. 20.26 H. 3. Id. fol. 579. num. 40. Id. fol. 696. num. 30. Id. fol. 698. num. 40. Vide Brady's Appen∣dix, fol. 59, 60.
• (s) 1.1343

  M. Paris, fol. 397. num. 10.10 H. 3.
• (u) 1.1344

  Id. 629. Edit. ult num. 10. Archdeacons sum∣moned to Parlia∣ment.
• * 1.1345

  The new Constitu∣tion of Parliament by Representatives.
• * 1.1346

  Montfort's Rebelli∣on.
• (w) 1.1347

  Answer to Petyt, fol. 137, 138, 139.
• * 1.1348

  The Form of the Writ of Summons.
• (x) 1.1349

  Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 11. dorso schedulae.
• (y) 1.1350

  Brady against Pe∣tyt, fol. 143. Dugdale's Baronage, fol. 759. col. 3.
• * 1.1351

  The old Form again used.
• * 1.1352

  All the Barons not summoned, but the more discreet, and so of the lesser Barons.
• (z) 1.1353

  Britannia, fol. 122. Quibus ip•••• Rex dig∣na••us est brevia sum∣monitionis dirigere, venirent, &c. & non alii.
• (a) 1.1354

  Stat. Edit. 1576. p. 15.
• (b) 1.1355

  Fol. 14.
• * 1.1356

  The Use and Benefit of Laws.
• (a) 1.1357

  Ceux sont les esta∣blishments le Roy Ed. fitz Roy Hen. fait a Westminst. &c. par son Councel, & par Pas∣sentments des Arche∣vesques, Evesques, Ab∣bes, Priores, Countes, Barons, & tout le Commonalty de la terre illonques sum∣mons. Tottel. Stat. fol. 24. Pulton, p. 19.
• (b) 1.1358

  Brady against Pety••, fol. 147.
• (c) 1.1359

  Pulton's Stat. An. 1275.3 E. 1. f. 19.
• (d) 1.1360

  In prasentia vene∣rabilium purum qu••∣ru••dam Episcoporum Angliae & aliorum de Concilio R••gis ••••cita∣tae s••••erunt constituti∣ones ••ub ••riptae, & post∣mod••••m coram Domino Rege & Concilio s••o auditae & publicatae: Quia omnes de consi∣li•• ••am ••us••••••••arii quam alii concordave∣runt, &c. Tottel. p. 39. b.
• (e) 1.1361

  Answer to P••tyt, fol. 148.
• (f) 1.1362

  Prae••i••••ae autem constitutiones e••i•••• suerunt, &c. & ex••une l••••um habean••. Tottel. fol. 40.
• (g) 1.1363

  Pour amendment de son Roialm, & pur plus pleinir exhibition de droit si com•••••••• pr••∣sit d•• Office deman••, app••lles le plues dis∣cretes de son Roialme, au•••• bien des Gran∣ders com•• des Mein∣dres, establie est & concordantment ordine. Tottel. fol. 50.
• (h) 1.1364

  Tottel. p. 48.
• (i) 1.1365

  Pulton, fol. 35. Anno 1279. 14. Nov. 7 E. 1.
• (k) 1.1366

  Ce Roy per luy & per tout son Counsel ad ordain & establ••e. Tottel, fol. 49. & 82.
• (l) 1.1367

  A son Parliament qu••il ••••••••t a Acton-Burnel, &c.
• (m) 1.1368

  Pulton, fol. 36.
• (n) 1.1369

  R••t. Pat. 20 E. 1. m. 15.
• * 1.1370

  The Form of Sum∣mons of Knights, Ci∣tizens, and Burges∣ses, renewed at the Petition of the No∣bles. Two or three Knights to be cho∣sen.
• * 1.1371

  No Citizens and Burgesses, but only Knights for Coun∣ties.
• (o) 1.1372

  Tottel's Stat. p. 85.
• (p) 1.1373

  Answer to Petyt, fol. 151.
• (q) 1.1374

  Pulton, An. 1290. fol. 58.
• (r) 1.1375

  Idem, Anno 1293. fol. 61.
• (s) 1.1376

  Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso. Four Knights for a County.
• (t) 1.1377

  Fol. 241.
• * 1.1378

  Claus. 28 E. 1. m. 3. dorso.
• * 1.1379

  The Barons stay af∣ter the Commons dismissed.
• (u) 1.1380

  See Brady's An∣swer to Petyt, fol. 152.
• (w) 1.1381

  Sauve les Eves∣ques, Countes, & Ba∣rons, Justices, & au∣tres qui sont du Con∣seil nostre Seigneur le Roy, que ceux ne sen allient saunz especial conge du Roy. The King's Council prepare Laws.
• (x) 1.1382

  Pulton, An. 1304. fol. 72.
• (y) 1.1383

  Idem, Anno 1305.
• (z) 1.1384

  18 Sept. 33 E. 1.
• * 1.1385

  The King Ordains.
• (a) 1.1386

  Id. Anno 1306. fol. 73.
• (b) 1.1387

  Cl. 28 E. 1. m. 3. dorso.
• * 1.1388

  The Reason the King will determine nothing without ad∣vice in Parliament.
• (a) 1.1389

  Pulton, An. 1307. fol. 79.
• * 1.1390

  The same Knights, &c. to come that were before.
• (b) 1.1391

  Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 26. dorso. Vel alios ad h•••• ido∣neos loco ipsorum si ad hoc vacare non pos∣sunt.
• (c) 1.1392

  Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 27. dorso. A Form of Proroga∣tion.
• (d) 1.1393

  Pulton, An. 1315. fol. 80. The King with his Council revise Ar∣ticles after the Par∣liament ended.
• (e) 1.1394

  Id. 1316. fol. 83.
• (f) 1.1395

  Id. Anno 1323. 17 E. 2. fol. 91.
• * 1.1396

  The King's Council and Justices affirm.
• (g) 1.1397

  Claus. 20 E. 2. m. 4. dorso. A Prorogation be∣fore Meeting.
• (h) 1.1398

  Quia tamen qui∣busdam de causis ne∣cessariis & utilibus praedict. Parliamen∣tum & Tractatum us∣que in crast inum Epi∣phaniae prox. jam fu∣tur. &c. duximus pro∣rogandum.
• (a) 1.1399

  Pulton, An. 1327. fol. 93.
• * 1.1400

  Petition made by the Commonalty to the King and his Council.
• (b) 1.1401

  Idem, Anno 1329. fol. 97.
• * 1.1402

  Established and en∣acted by the King, Prelates, &c.
• (c) 1.1403

  Idem, Anno 1331. fol. 100.
• (d) 1.1404

  Idem, Anno 1335. fol. 103. Shewed by the Knights•• &c. for the Commons; assented to by the Lords, with the Advice of the King's Council.
• (e) 1.1405

  Idem, Anno 1336. p. 105.
• (f) 1.1406

  Idem, Anno 1541. 15 E. 3. fol. 115.
• * 1.1407

  Repeal of Law un∣duely pr••cured.
• * 1.1408

  Observations upon i••••••
• * 1.1409

  Kings not bound to consent to what Bills the Houses propose.
• (g) 1.1410

  Id. 1346. fol. 118.
• (h) 1.1411

  Idem, Anno 1349. fol. 120.
• * 1.1412

  So one Knight for a County, when two Burgesses, 27 E. 3. So the King names one Knight, one Ci∣tizen, and one Bur∣gess to be sent, 43 E. 3. m. 2.
• (i) 1.1413

  Cl. 24 E. 3. p. 2. m. 3.
• * 1.1414

  Qualification of Members to be elected.
• (k) 1.1415

  Pulton, An. 1350. fol. 121.25 E. 3. Idem, Anno 1350. fol. 125. Assent of the Com∣monalty.
• (l) 1.1416

  Idem, Anno 1350. fol. 122.
• * 1.1417

  By the Assent of his Parliament.
• (m) 1.1418

  Id. 1350. fol. 129.25 E. 3. The King bound by his Oath to remedy Mischiefs and Dama∣ge•• to his Realm, by accord of his People in Parliament.
• (n) 1.1419

  Id. 135••. fol. 131.
• (o) 1.1420

  Idem, Anno 1353. fol. 133.
• * 1.1421

  One Knight for a County, and so for Cities and Bur∣roughs.
• (p) 1.1422

  Idem, Anno 1362. fol. 152. The Request of the Commons.
• (q) 1.1423

  Idem, Anno 1368. fol. 159.
• (r) 1.1424

  Idem, Anno 1369. fol. 190.
• (s) 1.1425

  Idem, Anno 1376. fol. 191.
• (a) 1.1426

  Pulton, An. 1377. fol. 163.
• * 1.1427

  Special Instance and Request of the Com∣mons.
• (b) 1.1428

  Idem, Anno 1378. fol. 165.
• (c) 1.1429

  Anno 1379. fol. 167.
• (d) 1.1430

  Idem, Anno 1380. fol. 169.
• (e) 1.1431

  Idem, Anno 1382. fol. 175.
• (f) 1.1432

  Idem, An. 1384. fol. 179.
• * 1.1433

  Assent of Commons.
• (g) 1.1434

  Idem, Anno 1385. fol. 179.
• (h) 1.1435

  Idem, Anno 1386. fol. 180.
• * 1.1436

  Assent of the Lords and Commons.
• (i) 1.1437

  Idem, Anno 1387. fol. 181.
• (k) 1.1438

  Idem, Anno 1388. fol. 182.
• (l) 1.1439

  Anno 1389. fol. 189.
• * 1.1440

  Grievous Com∣plaints of the Com∣mons.
• * 1.1441

  The King will save his Liberty and Re∣gality.
• (m) 1.1442

  Idem, Anno 1396. fol. 199.
• (n) 1.1443

  Idem, Anno 1397. fol. 200.
• * 1.1444

  Repeal of Statutes made by Threats.
• (a) 1.1445

  Idem, Anno 1399. fol. 200.
• * 1.1446

  Instance and special Request of the Com∣mons.
• * 1.1447

  Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Tem∣poral.
• (a) 1.1448

  Idem, Anno 1413. fol. 224.
• (b) 1.1449

  Idem, Anno 1416. fol. 234.
• (a) 1.1450

  Idem, Anno 1422. fol. 239.
• * 1.1451

  Sovereign Lord the King.
• (b) 1.1452

  Idem, Anno 1433. fol. 261.
• * 1.1453

  By Authority of the said Parliament.
• (c) 1.1454

  Idem, Anno 1452. fol. 286.
• (a) 1.1455

  Idem, Anno 1461. fol. 291. King Edward by the Grace of God.
• (a) 1.1456

  Idem, Anno 1483. fol. 315.
• * 1.1457

  Advice and Assent of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Request of the Com∣mons.
• (a) 1.1458

  Idem, Anno 1485. fol. 324.
• (a) 1.1459

  Id. fol. 392.
• (b) 1.1460

  Id. fol. 435.
• * 1.1461

  The King our So∣vereign Lord.
• (c) 1.1462

  Id. fol. 465.
• (d) 1.1463

  Id. fol. 485.
• * 1.1464

  May it please the King, &c. it be en∣acted.
• (e) 1.1465

  Id. fol. 537. H. 8. Defender of the Faith, and in Earth Supreme Head, &c.
• * 1.1466

  Be it enacted, &c.
• (a) 1.1467

  Id. fol. 687.
• * 1.1468

  King's Excellent Majesty—Princely Serenity—High∣ness.
• (b) 1.1469

  Id. fol. 712.
• (a) 1.1470

  Id. fol. 817.
• * 1.1471

  Ordained and en∣acted by the Queen our Sovereign Lady, and Assent of Lords Spiritual and Tem∣poral, and Com∣mons.
• (b) 1.1472

  Id. fol. 831.
• (c) 1.1473

  Id. fol. 863.
• (a) 1.1474

  Id. fol. 873.
• * 1.1475

  Most humbly be∣seech Your most Ex∣cellent Majesty.
• (b) 1.1476

  Id. fol. 874.
• * 1.1477

  High Court of Par∣liament.
• (a) 1.1478

  Id. fol. 1085.
• * 1.1479

  In most humble and lowly manner do be∣seech.
• (b) 1.1480

  Id. fol. 1086.
• (a) 1.1481

  Id. fol. 1226.
• (b) 1.1482

  Id. fol. 1227. Be it enacted by the King, &c.
• (c) 1.1483

  Id. fol. 1229. Petition of Right.
• (d) 1.1484

  Id. fol. 1237.
• (a) 1.1485

  Id. fol. 1249.
• (b) 1.1486

  Id. fol. 1251.
• * 1.1487

  Supreme Liege-lord and Sovereign.
• (c) 1.1488

  Id. fol. 1300.
• * 1.1489

  Most humbly be∣seech Your most Ex∣cellent Majesty, &c.
• (a) 1.1490

  Daniel, cap. 6. v. 7, 8.
• * 1.1491

  Great Councils in Scripture.
• (b) 1.1492

  Legem praecepit nobis Moyses haeredi∣tatem multitudinis Jacob. Erit apud rectiss••••um Rex, congregatis Prin∣cipibus populi cum Tribubus Israel. De••••. cap. 33. v. 4, 5.
• (c) 1.1493

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.1494

  Necessary in all Go∣vernments.
• (d) 1.1495

  Vis consilii expers mole ruit sua. Horat. lib. 3. Od. 4.
• (e) 1.1496

  Plato de LL. In Democracy. Male cuncta ministrat impetus. Statius.
• * 1.1497

  In Aristocracy.
• * 1.1498

  In Monarchy.
• (f) 1.1499

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. Cyropaed. 8. Satisfactory to the Subject.
• * 1.1500

  The Prince thereby knows the Worthy Subjects.
• * 1.1501

  The Prince is skreen∣ed from Obloquy.
• (g) 1.1502

  —Tum caetera parit, Turba libens subit, propriis quia legi∣bus acta.
• (h) 1.1503

  MS. Speech, An. 1562. The general Bene∣fits of Parliaments.
• (i) 1.1504

  Lib. 3. de Repub•• p. 350.
• (k) 1.1505

  Commonwealth, part 1. c. 2. p. 37.
• * 1.1506

  See Prynne, part 1. Brief Register, p. 447.
• * 1.1507

  Of the word Parlia∣ment.
• (a) 1.1508

  Veniens coram con∣ventu, in nostro pub∣lico Parliamento, &c.
• (b) 1.1509

  Convenit ad Par∣liamentum Generalis∣simum totius Regni Angliae, &c. p. 674.
• (c) 1.1510

  Cl. 49 E. 3. d. 11.
• (d) 1.1511

  Cl. 3 E. 1.20. dorso.
• * 1.1512

  The Summons only from the King.
• (e) 1.1513

  Claus. 6 Joh. m. 3. dorso. The Summons in King John's time.
• (f) 1.1514

  Claus. 26 H. 3. m. 13. dorso.
• * 1.1515

  These Summons for Military Aid.
• (g) 1.1516

  Claus. 49 H. 3. dorso 11. in schedula. The first Summons to the Lords, when the Commons also were summoned.
• (h) 1.1517

  23 E. 1. m. 9. dorso.
• (i) 1.1518

  Cl. 24 E. 1. m. 4. dorso.
• * 1.1519

  The commanding part of the Sum∣mons to appear.
• (k) 1.1520

  Claus. 6 E. 3. m. 36. dorso.
• (l) 1.1521

  Propter ardui••a∣tem negotiorum prae∣d••ctorum.
• (m) 1.1522

  Fuerunt non abs∣que nostri, & Regni nostri incommodo, sae∣pius retardata.
• (n) 1.1523

  Claus. 12 E. 3. part 2. m. 32. dorso. & 13 E. 3. part 2. m. 1. dorso.
• (o) 1.1524

  Claus. 16 E. 3. part 1. m. 39. dorso. Scituri quod gratitu∣dinem, & ingratitudi∣n••m, quas nobis in ab∣sentia nostra jam os••en∣di contigerit, plus pon∣derabimus quam si ••••∣crant, dum praesentes essemus, & ea curabi∣mus juxta merita, seu demerita compensare.
• (p) 1.1525

  Communi Regni u••ili••at••. Cl. 6 Jo. m. 33. dorso. The Causes of Sum∣moning.
• (q) 1.1526

  Cl. 27 E. 1. m. 9. dorso.
• (r) 1.1527

  Cl. 4 E. 3. m. 13. dorso. General Causes of Summons.
• (s) 1.1528

  Cl. 22 E. 3. part 2. m. 9. dorso.
• (t) 1.1529

  Cl. 31 E. 3. m. 21. dorso.
• (u) 1.1530

  Cl. 3 H. 6. m. 9. dorso.
• (w) 1.1531

  Cl. 22 & 23 E. 4. m. 11. dorso.
• * 1.1532

  Special Causes of Summons.
• (x) 1.1533

  S••otis Inimi••is, & Rebellibus nos••ris, Claus. 2. E. 2. m. 20. dorso.
• (y) 1.1534

  Cl. 14 E. 3. part 2. m. 28. dorso. With the Advice of the King's Council.
• (z) 1.1535

  Vestrum expedit habere consilium. Cl. 6 Jo. m. 3. dorso. What the Summo∣ned were to do.
• (a) 1.1536

  Cl. 14 E. 3 par. 1. m. 33. dorso.
• (b) 1.1537

  Cl. 20 E. 3. par. 2. m. 22. dorso.
• * 1.1538

  Summons to the Lords Temporal like those to the Prelates, excepting in some few Parti∣culars.
• (c) 1.1539

  Part 1. Bri••f Re∣gister, p. 1••2, &c.
• (d) 1.1540

  Ibid. p. 160.
• (e) 1.1541

  Cl. 45 H. 3. m. 3. dorso.
• * 1.1542

  In Fide & Homagio vel Ligean••ia, proper to Temporal Lords.
• (f) 1.1543

  Cl. 25 E. 1. m. 25. dorso.
• (g) 1.1544

  Cl. 36 E. 3. m. 42. dorso.
• * 1.1545

  See Prynne's Brief Register, part 1. p. 207.
• (h) 1.1546

  Littleton, Cap. de Homagio, ••ect. 86.
• (i) 1.1547

  Par estre tant sole∣ment le home de Dieu.
• (k) 1.1548

  Post consecratio∣nem hom ••gium non fa∣ciunt, quiequid fece∣runt ante, sed tantum ••idelitat••m.
• (l) 1.1549

  Brief Register, part 1. fol. 196. to 206. p. 427, 657, 663.
• * 1.1550

  1. Observations up∣on the Writs to Temporal Lords. That it alone did not ennoble.
• (m) 1.1551

  Claus. 7 R. 2. m. 32. dorso.
• * 1.1552

  First and second•• Brief Register.
• (n) 1.1553

  Claus. 27 H. 6. m. 26. dorso.
• (o) 1.1554

  Prynne, part 1. Brief Register, p. 228.
• * 1.1555

  2. The use of Bar•• in Writs, how rare.
• (p) 1.1556

  Ibid. p. 218.
• * 1.1557

  3. Title of Dominus in Writs of Sum∣mons.
• (q) 1.1558

  Cl. 16 E. 3. par. 2. m. 13. dorso.
• (r) 1.1559

  Cl. 11 H. 4. m. 32. dorso.
• (s) 1.1560

  Cl. 4 H. 5. m. 16. dorso.
• (t) 1.1561

  Cl. 22 H. 6. m. 21. dorso.
• (u) 1.1562

  Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 5.
• * 1.1563

  4. Title of Cheva∣lier.
• (w) 1.1564

  Cl. 49 E. 3. n. 4.6. dorso. 50 E. 3. part 2. m. 6. dorso.
• * 1.1565

  5. Of Councils that were not Parlia∣ments.
• (x) 1.1566

  Brief Register, part 1. pag. 187. to 192.
• * 1.1567

  6. The Lords Judi∣cature.
• (y) 1.1568

  Annal. pars poster. p. 561. ad 566.
• (z) 1.1569

  Habet enim Rex Curiam suam in Con∣cilio suo in Parlia∣mentis suis, praesenti∣bus Pralatis, Comiti∣bus, Baronibus, Pro∣ceribus, & aliis viris peritis, ubi terminatae sunt dubitationes ju∣diciorum. Lib. 2. c. 2. p. 66.
• (a) 1.1570

  Ro••. Parl. 4 E. 3. m. 7. num 3. Judgment of Lords on John Mautravers.
• (b) 1.1571

  Rot. Par. 1 R. 2. m. 6. num. 38, 39.
• * 1.1572

  On John Lord of G••menys, and Willi∣am Weston, for deli∣vering up Forts to the Enemy.
• * 1.1573

  Antiquity of Judg∣ment by Pee••s.
• (c) 1.1574

  Plea for Lords, p. 203. Hist, lib. 4.
• (d) 1.1575

  Malmsb. de Gest is Reg. lib. 2. c. 6. p. 62. Spelman. Conc. Tom. 1. p. 407, 408. Anno 1043.
• (e) 1.1576

  vnde super hoc, pono me in conside∣ratione Curiae vestrae. Chron. Brompton. col. 937, 938.
• (f) 1.1577

  An. 1164. M. Pa∣ris 94. Sicut Barones caeteri debent interesse judiciis Curiae Regis cum Baronibus quous∣que perveniatur in ju∣dicio ad diminutionem membrorum, vel ad mortem. The House of Lords the King's Court of Barons.
• (g) 1.1578

  Dixit Baronibus su••s, Cito facite mihi judicium de illo, qui homo meus Ligeus est, & stare Juri in Cu∣ria mea recusat.
• (h) 1.1579

  Anno 10 Johan. Mat. Paris, p. 218.
• (i) 1.1580

  Graviter accusa∣tus coram Rege, & Cu∣ria tota. Lond. Mat. Westm. 153.
• (k) 1.1581

  Mat. Westm. Anno 1260. p. 295, 296.
• * 1.1582

  Who are Peers of Prince Edward.
• (l) 1.1583

  Omnes alios Baro∣nes & Comites, sibi de ••ure non esse Pares, nec s••••s in eum excercer•• dis••ussiones.
• * 1.1584

  An Objection, That after the House of Commons were ad∣mitted, the Juris∣diction of the Lords House was lessened; Answered.
• (m) 1.1585

  4 E. 3. num. 11.28 E. 3. num. 9, 10.
• (n) 1.1586

  De Event. Angliae, lib. 3. c. 16. col. 1556, 1557.
• (o) 1.1587

  Ad standum judi∣cio Regis, & Dominc∣rum. Wal••ingham, p. 334. Hist. Ang. & Hypodig. Neust. p. 141.
• (p) 1.1588

  Rot. Parl. 10 R. 2. num. 6. ad 18.
• (q) 1.1589

  Egerton, sect. 4.22, 23.
• * 1.1590

  How the Lords judge ministerially.
• (r) 1.1591

  Rot. Par. 1 H. 4. num. 79. Exact Abridgment, p. 392.
• (s) 1.1592

  Et que le Roy, & les Seigniours de tout temps, ont eues, & a∣veront de droit, les Juggement in Parlia∣ment, en manere come mesmes les Communes so••t monstres.
• (t) 1.1593

  Prynne's Brief Register, part 1. sect. 3. p. 240. The Judges and o∣ther Assistants of the House of Lords.
• (u) 1.1594

  Cl. 25 E. 1. m. 25. dorso.
• * 1.1595

  The difference in their Writs.
• (w) 1.1596

  Cl. 28 E. 1. m. 3. dorso.
• * 1.1597

  Persons skilful in the Law summoned from the Universi∣ties.
• (x) 1.1598

  An. 13••2. p. 419. to p. 438.
• (y) 1.1599

  Hist. Ang. p. 32. to 58.
• (z) 1.1600

  Cl. 9 E. 2. m. 20. dorso.
• (a) 1.1601

  Cl. 7 E. 2. m. 25•• dorso. Justices to leave the Ass••zes to attend the Parliament.
• * 1.1602

  Observations from these Writs.
• (b) 1.1603

  Brief Register, part 1. a p. 366. ad p. 394.
• * 1.1604

  The Employment of these Assistants.
• * 1.1605

  The Summons of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses.
• (c) 1.1606

  Second Part of Brief Register, a p. 1. ad 29.
• (d) 1.1607

  Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 11•• dorso.
• * 1.1608

  Observations on the first Writ to the Ba∣rons of the Cinque-Ports.
• (e) 1.1609

  Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.
• * 1.1610

  De di••••retioribus & ad laborandum poten∣tioribus—cum plena potestate pro se & tota communitate Com. praedicti, ad consulen∣dum, & cons••ntiendum pro se & communitate illa, Hiis quae Comi∣tes, Barones, & Pro∣ceres prae••icti concor∣diter ordinaverint in praemissis, &c.
• * 1.1611

  The Qualifications in the Writs.
• (f) 1.1612

  Cl. 25 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.
• (g) 1.1613

  Cl. 22 E. 3. m. 7. dorso.
• * 1.1614

  Cl. 24 E. 3. par. 2. m. 3. dorso.
• * 1.1615

  No Maintainers of S••its, &c. to be cho∣••••n.
• (h) 1.1616

  Cl. 26 E. 3. m. 14. dorso.
• (i) 1.1617

  Cl. 31 E. 3. m. 2. dorso.
• (k) 1.1618

  Cl. 36 E. 3. m. 16. dorso.
• (l) 1.1619

  Cl. 44 E. 3. m. 12. dorso.
• (m) 1.1620

  Nul home de Ley pursuont busoignes en la Courte de Roy, ne Viscount pur le Temps que il est Viscount, soient retournez, ne acceptez Chevalers des Countees, neque ves qui sont Gentz de Ley, & Vis••ounts ore retournez au Parle∣ment eient Gages. Rot. Parl. 46 E. 3. cum. 13.
• (n) 1.1621

  Cl. 47 E. 3 m. 13 dorso. To be Knights gi••t with Swords, and skilful in Arms.
• (o) 1.1622

  Cl. 7 R. 2. m. 32. dorso. No Banneret to be chosen.
• (p) 1.1623

  Cl. 11 R. 2. m. 24. dorso.
• * 1.1624

  A new Clause re∣called.
• (q) 1.1625

  Cl. 5 H. 4. par. 2. m. 4. dorso. No Lawyers to be chosen.
• (r) 1.1626

  4 Instit. p. 10.
• (s) 1.1627

  Second Part of Brief Register, 124. Hist. Ang. p. 414.
• (t) 1.1628

  Cl. 25 H. 6. m. 24. dorso. Only Knights, E∣squires, or Gentle∣men to be Knights of Shires.
• * 1.1629

  The Modern Quali∣fications.
• (u) 1.1630

  Du••s milit••s gla∣diis cinctos m••gis ido∣neos, & discretos—∣Cives & Burgen••es••de discretiorthus & magis sufficientibus. The Electors.
• (w) 1.1631

  Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.
• * 1.1632

  See below the Choice in Yorkshire.
• (x) 1.1633

  P. 33••34.
• (y) 1.1634

  Bundel num. 1.
• * 1.1635

  Manucaptors or Pledges, that Knights elected should meet in Par∣liament.
• (z) 1.1636

  Brief Register, part 2. p. 50.
• * 1.1637

  The Statutes for or∣dering Elections.
• (a) 1.1638

  Cl. 1 H. 5. m. 9. & 37.
• * 1.1639

  Free Choice.
• * 1.1640

  Return of Inden∣tures.
• * 1.1641

  Who were Chusers of Burgesses.
• (b) 1.1642

  Cl. 23 H. 6. m. 21. dorso. The Knights to be resident in the Coun∣ty, and the Electors to have at least 40 s. a year Lands.
• (c) 1.1643

  Proclamari & in∣hiberi facias, ne ali∣qua persona tunc ibi∣dem armata, seu modo guerrino arraiata, ad electionem illam acce∣dat. Rot. Parl. 8 H. 6. m. 13. num. 18. None to come in an Hostile manner to elect.
• (d) 1.1644

  Prynne's Brevia Parliamentaria Redi∣viva, p. 152, 153, 154. Atturneys of Noble∣men and Ladies in Yorkshire Electors.
• * 1.1645

  What the Knights, Citizens, and Bur∣gesses were summo∣ned for.
• (e) 1.1646

  Ad consulendum, & consentiendum, pro se, & communitate illa, hiis quae Comites, Barones, & Proceres praedicti concorditer ordinaverint in prae∣missis. Cl. 22. E. 1. m. 6. dorso.
• (f) 1.1647

  Cl. 25 e. 1. m. 6. dorso.
• (g) 1.1648

  Bundel. num. 1. Ad faci••ndum, quod tunc de Communi Con∣cili•• ordinabitur in praemissis.
• (h) 1.1649

  Cl. 17 E. 2. m. 27. dorso.
• (i) 1.1650

  Cl. 21 E. 3. m. 12. dorso.
• (k) 1.1651

  Cl. 36 E. 3. m. 16. dorso.
• (l) 1.1652

  Cl. 47 E. 3. m. 13. dorso.
• * 1.1653

  Kings not confined to two Knights, &c.
• (m) 1.1654

  Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.
• (n) 1.1655

  Cl. 26 E. 3. m 14. dorso. V•• h••mines ab ista oc∣cupa••••one autump••ali∣bus quo minus possumus retrahamus.
• (o) 1.1656

  Cl. 45 E. 3. m. 21. dorso. Ordinavimus ut laboribus par••atur, & expensis.
• * 1.1657

  One Citizen, and one Burgess.
• (p) 1.1658

  Brevia Parl. redi∣viva, p. 144. ad 147.
• (q) 1.1659

  These things are now reduced to a certainty by the Sta∣tutes 5 R. 2. c. 4. and others. Prynne's Brief Regis••. par. 2 p. 32.
• (r) 1.1660

  See Brief Regist. p. 118. ad 123.
• (s) 1.1661

  Cl. 28 E. 1. m. 7. dorso.
• (t) 1.1662

  Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 26. dorso.
• * 1.1663

  The King makes new Burroughs.
• (u) 1.1664

  Reports, p. 14, 15.
• (w) 1.1665

  Brief Register, par. 2. p. 170.
• (x) 1.1666

  P. 223. ad 297.
• * 1.1667

  Old Burroughs dis∣continued, for what reason.
• (y) 1.1668

  Id. p. 236.
• (z) 1.1669

  Pat. 42 E. 3. par. 1. m. 8.
• (a) 1.1670

  Selden's Titles of Honour, p. 730. ad 734. Coke 4. Instit. p. 44, 45.
• (b) 1.1671

  Brev. Parl. redi∣viva, p. 240.
• (c) 1.1672

  15 E. 3. Stat. 2. c. 6.
• (d) 1.1673

  5 R. 2. c. 4.23 H. 6. c. 15. See more at large for this, Prynne's A∣nimadversions on Sir E. Coke's Instit. p. 32.
• (e) 1.1674

  5 R. 2. Parl. 2. c. 5.
• * 1.1675

  Sheriffs punishable that om••t summon∣ing.
• (f) 1.1676

  C. 15.
• (g) 1.1677

  Brev. Parl. rediv. p. 241. Sheriffs formerly took liberty what Places to send Writs to.
• (h) 1.1678

  Membr. 4. dorso.
• * 1.1679

  Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses elect∣ed at the County-Court the same day.
• (i) 1.1680

  Brev. Parl. rediv. p. 176.
• (k) 1.1681

  Ibid. p. 223.
• * 1.1682

  How many Cities and Burroughs an∣ciently.
• * 1.1683

  New Burroughs ere∣cted in several Kings Reigns.
• (l) 1.1684

  Idem, 230.
• (m) 1.1685

  4. Instit. p. 12.1. Inst. p. 69.2. Inst. 7, 8. Preface to ninth Report.
• (n) 1.1686

  Archaion, p. 257.
• (o) 1.1687

  Doderidge of the Antiquity of Parlia∣ments.
• * 1.1688

  The Wages of Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses.
• (p) 1.1689

  Ac iidem Milites moram diuturniorem quam credebant traxe∣rint ibidem, propter quod non modicas fe∣cerint expensas. Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 10. dorso.
• (q) 1.1690

  Rot. Claus. 28 E. 1. m. 12. dorso.
• (r) 1.1691

  Brief Parliamen∣tary Writs, part 4. p. 4.
• (s) 1.1692

  P. 900. to 1072.
• (t) 1.1693

  8 E. 3.
• * 1.1694

  Why wages not now paid to Knights, Ci∣tizens, and Burges∣ses.
• * 1.1695

  Copy of VVrits of Summons now used to the Sheriffs.
• * 1.1696

  Advice of Privy Council.
• * 1.1697

  Conference with Prelates, &c.
• * 1.1698

  Proclamation at County-Court.
• * 1.1699

  Two Knights girt with Swords, &c.
• * 1.1700

  Two Citizens.
• * 1.1701

  Two Burgesses.
• * 1.1702

  Indifferently chosen by those present at the Proclamation, according to Sta∣tutes.
• * 1.1703

  Their Names in∣serted in Indentures betwixt the Sheriff and the Electors.
• * 1.1704

  To cause them to come at the Day and Place. The Knights from the County, the Ci∣tizens and Burgesses from their Cities & Burroughs, to have full power to do and consent.
• * 1.1705

  Lest for want of that Power, or improvi∣dent Election, the Business be undon••.
• * 1.1706

  No Sheriff to be chosen.
• * 1.1707

  Election to be in full County.
• * 1.1708

  The Indentures to be sealed by the She∣riff and Electors.
• * 1.1709

  A Counterpart tac∣ked to the VVrit, returned into the Chancery.
• * 1.1710

  My Design not to controvert the Pri∣vileges of the House of Commons, but to sh••w the gradual Alterations.
• * 1.1711

  The Solemnity at the Opening of the Parliament.
• * 1.1712

  See for this more fully, Elsyng's Me∣thod of holding Par∣liaments, p. 86.
• * 1.1713

  Leave given to the Commons to chuse their Speaker.
• (u) 1.1714

  Hackwel, p. 127.
• (w) 1.1715

  4. Instit. p. 8.
• * 1.1716

  Whether the two Houses sate toge∣ther.
• (x) 1.1717

  4. Instit. c. 1. sect. 2.
• (y) 1.1718

  P. 8, 9.
• (z) 1.1719

  Et les Chivalers des Countez, & Gents du Communs, par eux mesmes. Rot. Parl. 6 E. 3. num. 6.
• (a) 1.1720

  Freeholders Grand Inquest, p. 19.
• (b) 1.1721

  Rot. Parl. 50 E. 3. num. 8.
• (c) 1.1722

  Coke Instit. 4. p. 255.
• (d) 1.1723

  Ancient Place, saith Elsyng, p. 84.
• (e) 1.1724

  Id. p. 123.
• (f) 1.1725

  Lib. Sti. Albani Bibl. Cotton. fol. 207.
• (g) 1.1726

  It should be 42 H. 3. That Peter Mount∣fort was not Speaker of the Commons House.
• (h) 1.1727

  Additament. Math. Paris, 1132, 1133. Anno Dom. 1258. 42 H. 3. ult. Edit.
• * 1.1728

  Concerning the Commons first sum∣moning to Parlia∣ment.
• (i) 1.1729

  Et Praeterea facie∣mus submoneri in ge∣nerali per Vi••ecomi∣tes & Ballivos nostros, omnes alios qui in Ca∣pite tenent de nobis. Matt. Paris fol. 216. Edit. ult. num. 20.
• * 1.1730

  The Tenents in Ca∣pite in stead of the Representative Commons, as now.
• * 1.1731

  Some summoned from Cities and Burroughs before King John's time, but not as our Ci∣tizens and Burgesses now, by Represen∣tation.
• * 1.1732

  After King John's Charter, the Te∣nents in Capite so numerous, as might be reputed an House of Commons.
• * 1.1733

  Who properly Free∣holders in K•• John's time.
• * 1.1734

  As the Thegns in the Saxon-times, so the Praepositi, Reeves, &c. of Burroughs after.
• * 1.1735

  What the Tenents in Capite were sum∣moned for.
• * 1.1736

  That such great Numbers sate not with the Lords.
• (k) 1.1737

  Rot. Parl. 6 E. 3. num. 2. Cest assavoir, les Pre∣l••••z par eux me••mes, & les ditz Countes, Barouns, & autres Grantz, par eux mesmes, & auxint les Chivalers des Countes par eux mesmes. No mention of Ci∣tizens or Burgesses.
• (l) 1.1738

  Mod•••• tenendi, p. 200. Method of Parl. 124. The first Speaker upon Record.
• (m) 1.1739

  Prynne's Abridg∣ment, p. 151.
• (n) 1.1740

  Abridgment of Records, p. 174. Petition for Free∣dom of Speech.
• (o) 1.1741

  Id. p. 360.
• (p) 1.1742

  Hackwel Mo••us p. 202.
• (q) 1.1743

  Rot. Parl. 7 H. 4. num. 6.
• (r) 1.1744

  7 H. 4.
• (r) 1.1745

  7 H. 4.
• (s) 1.1746

  25 H. 1. num. 10. The Speakers of lat∣ter Times express the particular Privi∣lege of Freedom from Arrest.
• (t) 1.1747

  Rot. Parl. H. 4. num. 10.
• * 1.1748

  Sir Tho. Smith saith, The Speaker used to add a Promise in the Commons Names, That they shall not abuse these Privile∣ges, but have such regard, as most faith∣ful, true, and loving Subjects ought to have to their Prince. Commonwealth, p. 41.
• * 1.1749

  Why Liberty of Speech necessary to be allowed.
• (u) 1.1750

  Stat. 4 H. 8. c. 8. Strowde's Case.
• (w) 1.1751

  Lords Journal.
• (x) 1.1752

  Prynne's Plea for the Lords. Sir Sym. D' Ewe's Journ••l. How Queen Eliza∣beth curbed and pu∣nished those that made Motions in the House contrary to her Prohibitions, in Mr. Paul and Mr. Pet. Wentworth's Case.
• * 1.1753

  In Mr. Morrice's Case.
• * 1.1754

  Liberty of Speech in King Charles the First's time abused.
• (y) 1.1755

  MS. Speeches, 13 Eliz. 1571. Queen Elizabeth's Reprehension of some Members, for moving things she had forbid.
• (z) 1.1756

  Hackwell. Catal. 213, 215. Elsyng, p. 137, 138. This Privilege peti∣tioned for by the Speaker.
• (a) 1.1757

  4. Instit. p. 24.
• (b) 1.1758

  Petitiones coram Domino Rege ad Par∣liam. &c. 18 E. 1. Rot. 7. Thesaur. Re∣cept. S••accarii. The first Grant of Freedom from Ar∣rest.
• (c) 1.1759

  P. 478. ad 483.625. to 699.817. to 869.989.1213. to 1220. How Mr. Prynne qualifies this Privi∣lege.
• (d) 1.1760

  Memorial, p. 88. ad 116.
• * 1.1761

  How the King is ob∣liged to protect the Members from Ar∣rests.
• * 1.1762

  How grounded up∣on Edward the Con∣fessor's Law.
• (e) 1.1763

  Hoveden. Annal. pars poster. p. 601. Lambard. Archaion. Spelman. Conc. tom. 1. p. 689.
• (f) 1.1764

  Cod. ex Legum Antiq. p. 475.
• * 1.1765

  Fol. 60. This Privilege of the King's Grant.
• (g) 1.1766

  Et ti••l Privilege ad estre touts foits grant per le Roy, a ses Commoners, al Re∣quest del Prolocutor del Parlement, le pri∣mer jour.
• (h) 1.1767

  Hist. p. 1584.33 H. 8. Mr. Ferrers Case the first, when the Com∣mons had liberty to punish the Breakers of this Privilege.
• (i) 1.1768

  Brief Register, part 4. p. 860.
• (k) 1.1769

  Id. p. 862, 863.
• (l) 1.1770

  See Freeholders Grand Inquest, from p. 50. to 64.
• * 1.1771

  Application to be made to the King and Lords, for pu∣nishment of Viola∣tors of this Privi∣lege.
• (m) 1.1772

  Sect. 10. a p. 622. ad 870.
• * 1.1773

  Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 26. dorso.
• * 1.1774

  Vel alios, ad hoc ido∣neos, loco ipsorum, s•• ad hoc v••care non pos∣sunt, eligere.
• * 1.1775

  The King anciently only ordered new Elections.
• * 1.1776

  First Petition against undue Elections. Prynne's Brevia Parl. r••••iviva, p. 286. A nos••re tres excel∣l••nt, & tres gracious Seignior, nostre Seig∣nior le Roy, & les ••res nobles Seigniors, & S••ges Comuns, &c. pleignont les Major, &c.
• * 1.1777

  See Freeholders Grand Inquest, p. 15, 16.
• * 1.1778

  Prynne's Plea for Lords, p. 393.
• * 1.1779

  Id. 391. Rot. Parl. 5 H. 4. num. 38.
• * 1.1780

  The Commons pe∣tition the King and Lords to examine and order undue Returns.
• * 1.1781

  Id. p. 364, 365. Mr. Prynne's Opini∣on.
• * 1.1782

  Dyer, fol. 113, 168. Plowden, fol. 118. to 131. Old Book of Entries, fol. 446, 447.
• * 1.1783

  Rot. Parl. 8 H. 6. num. 391. Petitions from the Commons to the King and Lords, a∣bout Elections.
• * 1.1784

  Rot. Parl. 18 H. 6. m. 13. num. 18.
• * 1.1785

  Petition of Subjects to the King about Elections.
• * 1.1786

  A Sheriffs denying the Poll, petitioned against.
• * 1.1787

  Freeholders Grand Inquest, p. 60. D' Ewes's Journal, fol. 393.
• * 1.1788

  Memorials, c. 6. p. 20. The modern Use of Regulating Electi∣ons.
• * 1.1789

  Plea for the Lords, p. 413.
• * 1.1790

  Sir Simon D' Ewes's Journal, p. 494. In Queen Elizabeth's time Application made to the Chan∣cellor or L. Keeper.
• * 1.1791

  Lawyer out-lawed, p. 12.
• * 1.1792

  The Reasons for this Privilege.
• * 1.1793

  Stat. 4. H. 8. c. 8. Coke 4. Instit. p. 25. 31 H. 6. c. 26, 27.
• * 1.1794

  Coke, lib. 5. p. 64.
• * 1.1795

  Rot. Parl. 16. R. 2. num. 6.
• * 1.1796

  Members of the House of Commons punished for Misde∣meanour by the King and Lords.
• * 1.1797

  Exact Abridgment, p. 417.
• * 1.1798

  Plea for the Lords, p. 386, 387.
• * 1.1799

  Vide pag. 296, 297, 299, 344, 371, 372, 373.
• * 1.1800

  The first Precedent of the House of Commons secluding their Members.
• * 1.1801

  Id. p. 309. Mr. Prynne's Rea∣sons against this U∣sage.
• * 1.1802

  Littleton, sect. 212. Coke, ibid.
• * 1.1803

  Coke 4. Inst. p. 24.
• * 1.1804

  Plea for the Lords, p. 373.
• * 1.1805

  Id. p. 387.
• * 1.1806

  See Legal Vindica∣tion, p. 10.
• * 1.1807

  Id. p. 373.
• * 1.1808

  Exact Collections of Ordinances, p. 541. to 558.
• * 1.1809

  Plea for the Lords, p. 414, 415. How the House of Commons of the Parliament 1641. seduded their Mem∣bers, till there were not above 70 left.
• * 1.1810

  How this revived a∣gainst Abhorrers.
• * 1.1811

  The unquestioned Rights of the Com∣mons.
• * 1.1812

  4. Instit. p. 28. Whether the House of Commons be pro∣perly a Court.
• * 1.1813

  Lawyer outlawed. p. 18.
• * 1.1814

  4. Instit. p. 23.
• * 1.1815

  When the House of Commons had a Journal first.
• * 1.1816

  P. 17, 18, 19. Plowd. Com. fol. 319. Coke 1. Inst. fol. 260.
• * 1.1817

  Some Observations on the Privileges of the House of Com∣mons in general.
• * 1.1818

  All Privileges from the Crown.
• * 1.1819

  C. 29. None to be punish∣ed but by Legal Trial.
• * 1.1820

  Stat. 28 E. 3. c. 3.
• * 1.1821

  Nulla Curia quae Re∣cordum non habet, po∣test imponere finem, neque aliquem manda∣re carceri, quia isla tantummodo spectant ad Curias de Recor∣do. Mar. Sess. 3.
• * 1.1822

  P. 23
• * 1.1823

  Id. p. 16.
• * 1.1824

  Infoeliciter aegrotat, cui plus mali venit a Medico quam a Mor∣bo.
• * 1.1825

  The Law hath pro∣vided where the Breach of the great∣est Privileges are to be tried.
• * 1.1826

  Mich. 12. E. 4. Rot. 20. Excheq. Hil. 14. E. 4. Rot. 7. Dyer, fol. 59.
• * 1.1827

  The Proceeding of the Houses in Anno 1640. and 1680.
• * 1.1828

  That the Law and Custom of Parlia∣ment may be decla∣red.
• * 1.1829

  4. Inst it. p. 15. Illa lex ab omnibus quarenda, a multis ig∣norata, a paucis cog∣nita. Fleta, l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.1830

  Brief Register, part 4. p. 685. Mr. Prynne's Opini∣on concerning the great Privilege the Commons.
• * 1.1831

  Ibid. p. 1210.
• * 1.1832

  14 Feb. 18 Jac. fol. 24. b.
• * 1.1833

  Ibid. fol. 51. b. & fol. 137.
• * 1.1834

  See Stat. 2 E. 3. c. 6. 14 E. 3. c. 14.20 E. 3. c. 1, 2.
• * 1.1835

  Lawyer outlawed, p. 28.
• * 1.1836

  Mr. Sherridon's Case, who was denied the Benefit of the Ha∣beas Corpus Act.
• * 1.1837

  Sir William Jones a∣gainst any ones Re∣lease by Habeas Cor∣pus, if they were im∣prisoned by the House of Commons.
• * 1.1838

  See Debates of the House, p. 217.
• * 1.1839

  Baron Weston grants the Habeas Corpus.
• * 1.1840

  Brief Register, part 4. p. 846.
• * 1.1841

  Privilegia omnino a∣mittere meretur qui sibi abutitur concessa penestate. Ejus est interpretari cujus concedere. Sum∣ma Rosella. Privile∣gium 3.
• * 1.1842

  Nemini liceat Char∣tas Regias nisi ipsis Regibus judicare. Placita Parl. 18 E. 1. num. 19. p. 20.
• * 1.1843

  How the Breach of Privilege to be pu∣nished, according to Mr. Prynne. See the Authority, Brief Regist. part 2. p. 847.
• * 1.1844

  Ibid. p. 1206.
• * 1.1845

  The Chancellor or Lord Keeper to grant the Writ.
• * 1.1846

  The Judges of the Courts to which the Writ is directed, to judge of the validity of the Privilege.
• * 1.1847

  See also his Memo∣rials.
• * 1.1848

  Hackwell of Passing of Bills, p. 179. ad 182.
• * 1.1849

  The Royal Assent determines not the Session.
• * 1.1850

  Royal Assent by Pa∣tent.
• * 1.1851

  Royal Assent when the King present.
• * 1.1852

  Sir Th. Smith's Com∣monwealth, p. 45. Speeches used to be made there.
• * 1.1853

  Hackwell of Passing of Bills, p. 181, 182.
• * 1.1854

  The Clerk of the Crown pronounceth the Royal Assent or Dissent.
• * 1.1855

  P. 46.
• * 1.1856

  The various Accep∣tation of the word Parliament.
• * 1.1857

  Appropriated to the Lords House.
• (a) 1.1858

  Egerton, sect. 4. 22, 23.
• * 1.1859

  To both the Houses.
• * 1.1860

  How properly the High Court of Par∣liament.
• (b) 1.1861

  Freeholder's Grand Inquest, p. 34.
• * 1.1862

  The King is not one of the Three Estates.
• * 1.1863

  The Modus makes the Parliament to consist of six Parts.
• (c) 1.1864

  Ita non habet Pa∣rem in suo gradu.
• (d) 1.1865

  As queux Prelats, ou la Clargie par eux mesmes; & les Coun∣tes & Barons par eux mesmes; Chevalers & Gentz de Countez, & Gentz de la Commune par eux mesmes en∣treteront. Prynne A∣nimadv. p. 10.
• * 1.1866

  The Lords Spiritu∣al, Lords Temporal, and Commons make the Three Estates.
• (e) 1.1867

  Stat. 18. ••. 6. c. 1.
• (f) 1.1868

  8 Eliz. c. 1.
• (g) 1.1869

  P. 36.
• (h) 1.1870

  4. Instr. p. 1.
• (i) 1.1871

  Interpreter, tit. Parliament.
• (k) 1.1872

  Solenne collequi∣um omnium Ordinum Regni, Authoritate so∣lius Regis, ad consu∣lendum, statuendumque de negotiis Regni in∣dictum. Gloss. p. 449.
• * 1.1873

  Lib. 5. p. 253.
• ‖ 1.1874

  De Repul. lib. 6.
• * 1.1875

  Why in some of King Charles the First's Writings the King was called the Third Estate.
• (l) 1.1876

  Review of Ob∣servations.
• * 1.1877

  The Ballancing of the Powers in Par∣liament.
• (m) 1.1878

  King's Supre∣macy asserted, c. 9. p. 96. where the Reader may find a full Answer to the Deductions they make from the King's way of argu∣ing.
• (n) 1.1879

  Id possit quisquam quod jure possit.
• * 1.1880

  The not asserting of King Charles the First's Prerogative, disadvantagious.
• * 1.1881

  The Monarchy of England not mixed.
• (o) 1.1882

  King's Suprema∣cy asserted, p. 74.
• (p) 1.1883

  Declaration from N••wmarket, 9 March 1641.
• (q) 1.1884

  Besold. Synopsis Polit. Doct. l. 1. c. 6.
• * 1.1885

  How the two Houses concur in making Laws.
• (r) 1.1886

  King's Supre∣macy, p. 84. Objection, That the Mixture is in the Supremacy of Pow∣er.
• * 1.1887

  Answer, That is on∣ly in the Exercise of the Power.
• (s) 1.1888

  Panorm. cap. Gra∣vem de Sent. Excom.
• (t) 1.1889

  Bertol. in Lomnes Populi, sect. de Justi∣tia & Jure, q. 2.
• (u) 1.1890

  Suarez, lib. 1. de Leg. c. 8. n. 9.
• * 1.1891

  Besold. de Juribus Magist. c. 2.
• (w) 1.1892

  De Imperio Sum∣marum Potestatum cir∣ca sacra, c. 8. num. 11.
• (x) 1.1893

  Coke 5. part, tit. Cases de By-Laws & Ordinances.
• (y) 1.1894

  King's Suprema∣cy, p. 88. Of Architectonical and Preceptive Power.
• (z) 1.1895

  Idem, p. 91.
• * 1.1896

  Objection, The Three Estates to restrain the Excess of each other.
• * 1.1897

  Answer to it.
• * 1.1898

  Objection concern∣ing the Power of Representatives.
• * 1.1899

  Answer, What Ho∣nour is due to Re∣presentatives of the Subjects.
• * 1.1900

  Reasons against the Power of Represen∣tatives.
• (a) 1.1901

  England's Univer∣sal Distraction, p. 4.
• * 1.1902

  Why Reason and Law were not hearkned to by the Advocates of the Long Parliament.
• (b) 1.1903

  Answer to Ob∣server, p. 130, 131. How Passions, Affe∣ctions, Interests, and Factions may sway Representatives.
• * 1.1904

  The Ambition and Covetousness of Re∣presentatives.
• * 1.1905

  The Cruelty of the Long Parliament.
• * 1.1906

  The Partiality.
• * 1.1907

  The Corruptness of the Roman Senate.
• * 1.1908

  Of cunning and de∣signing Men.
• * 1.1909

  Fallit enim vitium specie virturis & um∣bra.
• * 1.1910

  The specious Pre∣tences of the Long Parliament.
• * 1.1911

  Their Hypocritical Promises.
• (c) 1.1912

  Aeneas Sylvius de diaetis Fred. Imp.
• * 1.1913

  Simulatio & dissimu∣latio.
• * 1.1914

  How many Coun∣sellors may mislead.
• * 1.1915

  The Elected like the Electors.
• * 1.1916

  Concerning the Ne∣gative Voice.
• * 1.1917

  Si vult is scire an ve∣lim, efficite us possim nolle. Seneca.
• * 1.1918

  Objection, That in Cases of Extraordi∣nary necessity, the Houses to have Power to secure the People from Ty∣ranny.
• * 1.1919

  Answer.
• * 1.1920

  The Houses have no Power to declare Law.
• (d) 1.1921

  Address, part 3. p. 121.
• * 1.1922

  Objection, That if the King have a Negative Voice, there will be no need of Parliaments.
• * 1.1923

  Answer.
• (e) 1.1924

  Answer to Ob∣servations, p. 56.
• * 1.1925

  Necesse est us Lancea in libra ponderibus im∣positis deprimi, sic ani∣mum perspicuis cedere.
• * 1.1926

  Concerning the Co∣ronation-Oaths of the King of England.
• (f) 1.1927

  Evagrius His••. Eccles. lib. 3. c. 32. Who first took a Coronation-Oath.
• (g) 1.1928

  Eutrop. lib. 24. p. 145, 146. Zonar. Annal. tom. 3. fol. 142, 143. Imperatorio Diade∣mate est ornatus, po∣stulato prius scripto quo promitteret se nul∣la Ecclesiae statuta vi∣olaturum.
• (h) 1.1929

  Onuphr.
• (i) 1.1930

  Dicens Imperato∣rem nemini jurari de∣bere, cum juramento∣rum sacramenta ab omnibus sint sibi ad∣hibenda. Hermold. Chron. Scl. l. 1. c. 40. Sim. Dunelm. 232, 237.
• (k) 1.1931

  Tit. Hon. part 1. c. 8. fol. 149.
• (l) 1.1932

  De Gestis Regum Agg. col. 173. Wigorn. Chro. 384.
• * 1.1933

  Quibus ille juravit, quod & secundum De∣um & secundum secu∣lum, fidelis esse vellet eis Dominus. King Canutus his Oath.
• (m) 1.1934

  Clitonem Ead∣mundum unanimo con∣sensu in Reg••m leva∣vere. Matt. Westm. p. 410. 411.
• (n) 1.1935

  Flor. Wigorn. Chro. p. 404. Edward the Confes∣sor's Oath.
• (o) 1.1936

  Nihil erat quod Edwardus pro necessi∣late temporis non pol∣liceretur. Ita utrinque fide datae quicquid pe∣tebatur, sacramento sir∣mavit.
• (p) 1.1937

  In Regem Angliae sublimatus prius ju∣ravit se Leges Canuti inviolabiliter serva∣turum. Spelm. Conc. tom. 2. p. 342.
• * 1.1938

  William the Conque∣ror's Oath.
• (r) 1.1939

  Elo. Wigorn. Chro. p. 412. Hoveden part. Annal. prior. p. 450. Stubs Acta Pontif. col. 1702. Coram Clero & Po∣pulo jurando promit∣tere se velle sanctas Ecclesias & Rectores earum defendere, nec∣non & cunctum popu∣lum sibi subjectum ju∣sta & Regali provi∣dentia regere, rectam Legem statuere & te∣nere, Rapinas injusta∣que judicia penitus a∣movere & interdicere. Sim. Dunelm. col. 195. num. 43.
• (r) 1.1940

  Man. Paris vita Fritherici Abbatis 13. St. Albani, p. 30.
• (s) 1.1941

  Modeste erga sub∣jectos ageret, & aequo jur•• Anglos quo Francos tractaret. De Gestis Pontif. lib. 3. fol. 154.
• (t) 1.1942

  Justitiam, aequita∣tem, & misericordiam se per totum Regnum, si Rex foret, in omni negotio servaturum, pace libertatem & se∣curitatem Ecclesiae contra omnes defensu∣rum. Eadmerus Hist. Novel. lib. 1. p. 13, 14.
• * 1.1943

  King William Rufus's Oath.
• (u) 1.1944

  Col. 214.
• (w) 1.1945

  R. Hoveden, part. 1. Annal. p. 264. b. num. 20.
• (x) 1.1946

  Lib. 7. fol. 213. b.
• * 1.1947

  King Henry the First's Oath.
• (y) 1.1948

  Ʋt animos corum in sui promotionem ac∣cenderet.
• * 1.1949

  Si animo volenti ip∣sis vellet concedere, & charta sua communire illas libertates & an∣tiquas consuetudines quae floruerunt in Regno tempore Sancti Regis Edwardi. Mat. Paris 250. n. 53. Hist. Novel. lob. 3. p. 55.
• (z) 1.1950

  Diademate insi••∣nitas has libertates subscriptas in Regno ad exaltationem Sanctae Ecclesiae & pacem Po∣pulo tenendam concel∣sit. Mat. Paris Hist. p. 46. num. 40. ult. Edit.
• (a) 1.1951

  Histor. Novel. p. 101. b. num. 40. Vide Mat. Paris. p. 62. num. 35.
• * 1.1952

  King Stephen's Oath.
• (b) 1.1953

  Chron. col. 1043. num. 67.
• * 1.1954

  King Henry the Second's Oath.
• (c) 1.1955

  Hist. 1080, 1081.
• (d) 1.1956

  Gul. Newbrigensis lib. 4. c. 25. Gerv. Dorob. Chron. col. 1413. Matt. Paris, p. 117.
• (e) 1.1957

  Ʋt Regni consuetu∣dines antiquas sub quibus dignitas peri∣cli••bitur Ecclesiae, illibatae debeant omni tempore observari. Hoveden. Annal. pars poster. p. 518, 519.
• (f) 1.1958

  Rectam Justiti∣am exercebit in populo sibi commisso, leges ma∣las & consuetudines perversas si aliqua sint in Regno suo delebit, & bonas custodies. Brompton, col 1158. num. 60.
• * 1.1959

  King Richard the First's Oath.
• * 1.1960

  King John's Oaths.
• (g) 1.1961

  Matt. Paris, fol. 165. ult. Edit. num. 27.
• (h) 1.1962

  Quod sanctam Ec∣clesiam & ejus ordina∣tos diligeret, & eam ab incursione malig∣nantium indemnem conservaret; & quod perversis legibus de∣structis, bonas substi∣tueret, & rectam Ju∣stitiam in Regno Aug∣liae exerceret. Idem, p. 166. num. 4. Promisit se per anxi∣lium Dei bona side ea quae juraverat ser∣vaturum.
• (i) 1.1963

  Mat. Paris, Hist. p. 229, 230.
• (k) 1.1964

  Idem, p. 243. num. 26.
• * 1.1965

  The Oath of King Henry the Third.
• (l) 1.1966

  1. I Ʋt Ecclesia Dei, & omni populo Chri∣stiano vera pax omni suo tempore observe∣tur. 2. Ʋt rapacita∣tem & omnes iniqui∣tates omnibus gradi∣bus interdicat. 3. Ʋt in omnibus judiciis ae∣quitatem praecipiat & misericordiam. Bract. lib. 3. de Actionibus, c. 9. fol. 107.
• * 1.1967

  King Edward the First's Oath not re∣corded.
• * 1.1968

  That he took an Oath.
• (m) 1.1969

  Prynne's Epist. Dedicat. to the chird Vol. of Legal Vin∣dication.
• * 1.1970

  The Oaths of King Edward the Second, and King Edward the Third.
• (n) 1.1971

  Cl. 1. E. 2. num. 10.
• * 1.1972

  Also Cl. 1 E. 3. m. 24. dorso.
• * 1.1973

  The Oath of King Richard the Second.
• (o) 1.1974

  Cl. 1. R. 2. m. 44.
• * 1.1975

  This is an additional Clause.
• (q) 1.1976

  Rot. Parl. 1 H. 4. num 16, & 17.
• * 1.1977

  King Henry the Fourth's Oath.
• (r) 1.1978

  Hist. Aug. fol. 194, 195. Juravit coraem Archi∣episcopo & Proceribus qui ibi aderant, quo∣niam ipsi solum ejus Juramentum audire potuerunt.
• (s) 1.1979

  Praecipue miseri∣cordiam observaret, si∣cut sibi suam indul∣geat misericordiam clemens & misericors Deus.
• (t) 1.1980

  Prynne's Treache∣ry and Disloyalty. Answer to the Ob∣jections about the Words Quas vulgus elegerit.
• (u) 1.1981

  Freeholders Grand Inquest, b. 46. What meant by Vul∣gus. according to the Opinion of some.
• * 1.1982

  Customs chosen by the Vulgar, or Com∣mon People.
• (w) 1.1983

  Glossary, p. 36.
• (x) 1.1984

  Id. p. 35.
• * 1.1985

  What meant by the Community.
• (y) 1.1986

  Walsingham, fol. 95. num. 20.
• (z) 1.1987

  Elossary, p. 24.
• (a) 1.1988

  Book of Oaths, fol. 1.
• * 1.1989

  The Oath of King Henry the Eighth. I find in the Heralds Office the words thus: Do ye grant the rightful Laws and Cusioms to be holden, and permit ye, after your Strength and Power, such Laws as to the Honour of God shall be chosen to the People, by you to be strengthned and de∣sensed? Vid in Coll. Arm. p. 60.
• * 1.1990

  Oath of Edward the Sixth.
• * 1.1991

  Oaths of Queen Ma∣ry and Queen Eliza∣beth not seen by the Author. The Oaths of King James the First, and King Charles the First. The Oath of King Charles the Second, Hist. Coronationis Caroli 2. in Colleg. Arm.
• * 1.1992

  The Oath of King James the Second.
• * 1.1993

  Considerations upon this Discourse of the Coronation Oaths.
• * 1.1994

  How the Long Par∣liament Writers would have the King part with his Prerogative in Ca∣ses of necessity only.
• (b) 1.1995

  Answer to Ob∣serv. b. 76.
• * 1.1996

  That the Houses should be Judges of this Necessity.
• (c) 1.1997

  Review of Ob∣servations.
• * 1.1998

  By the Arguments of the Parliamenta∣ry Writers, the So∣vereignty is not in the King, but in the People.
• (d) 1.1999

  Answ. to Observ. p. 72, 73.
• * 1.2000

  The King's Nega∣tive Voice Necessa∣ry.
• (e) 1.2001

  Idem, p. 136.
• * 1.2002

  That the King is not bound to con∣sent, where what is desired is more in∣convenient to the People than himself.
• * 1.2003

  The Writers for the Parliament af∣firm, That where the Houses think the Constitution of the Government is not agreeable to the Liberty of the Peo∣ple, they may alter it.
• * 1.2004

  How the Long Par∣liament voted all the Power into their own Hands.
• * 1.2005

  When Parliaments beneficial, when not.
• (f) 1.2006

  Answer to Ob∣serv. p. 150.
• (g) 1.2007

  10 Annal.
• * 1.2008

  Kings not to grant away their Preroga∣tives at the Impor∣tunity of Parlia∣ments.
• * 1.2009

  The fundamental Cause of Factious Members in Parlia∣ment.
• (h) 1.2010

  King's Speech, 6 March, 1678.
• * 1.2011

  The Artifices used by designing People, to get such as they desired, to be elect ed.
• * 1.2012

  The Characters they gave Men of the Court-party.
• (i) 1.2013

  Address, part 2. p. 2, 3.
• * 1.2014

  Papists in Masque∣rade.
• * 1.2015

  Excluding Loyal and Orthodox Gentle∣men.
• (k) 1.2016

  Idem, p. 5.
• * 1.2017

  French Pensioners.
• (l) 1.2018

  Address, part 3. p. 5.
• * 1.2019

  Pensioners to the King.
• (m) 1.2020

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 14.
• * 1.2021

  Kings never to yield what the Long Par∣liament were so ear∣nest for.
• * 1.2022

  The Care to be had in Elections.
• (n) 1.2023

  4. Instit. p. 35.
• * 1.2024

  Several Cases where Parliaments succeed not well, when the King is displeased with the Two Hou∣ses.
• (o) 1.2025

  Rot. Parl. 25 E. 3. num. 15. 43 E. 3. num. 1. 50 E. 3. num. 2.
• (p) 1.2026

  Rot. Parl. 3 H. 6. num. 18. When Variance a∣mong the Lords.
• * 1.2027

  When no good Cor∣respondence betwixt the Lords and Com∣mons.
• * 1.2028

  Sitis insuperabiles, si fuertis inseparabiles.
• * 1.2029

  When Disagreement in the House of Commons.
• * 1.2030

  When no Prepara∣tion for the Parlia∣ment.
• * 1.2031

  When Redress of Grievances are pre∣ferred to the Sup∣ply of the King.
• * 1.2032

  The happy Harmo∣ny in the last Session of Parliament, June 1685.
• * 1.2033

  Some not willing to hear of the Miscar∣riages of Parlia∣ments, think this Discourse needless.
• * 1.2034

  Because we have a most wise King, and good Parliament.
• * 1.2035

  Yet we are not se∣cure but that in af∣ter-Ages evil Mem∣bers of Parliament may be.
• * 1.2036

  The Design of the Author in writing against the Exorbi∣tances of some.
• * 1.2037

  Some love not to hear of their Di∣stempers.
• * 1.2038

  The Author's Apo∣logy for himself.
• * 1.2039

  What evil Principles taught during the Long Parliament.
• * 1.2040

  Four kinds of the King's Councils. The First.
• (a) 1.2041

  Lib. 1. c. 2.
• * 1.2042

  The Second.
• (b) 1.2043

  Per advice & as∣sent du Estates de son Realm de son Parlia∣ment (parensi que Parliament soit de∣vant le Feast de St. Lucy) ou autrement, per advice de son Grand Council, & autres Estates de son Realm que le Roy serra assemblez, devant le dit Feast, in case que le Parliament ne soit. Coke 1. Instit. lib. 2. c. 10. sect. 164.
• (c) 1.2044

  Rot. Claus. 16 E. 2. m. 5. dorso.
• * 1.2045

  The Privy Council properly so called. Lord President.
• (d) 1.2046

  4. Instit. c. 2. fol. 55. 1. par. Pat. num. 22. John Bishop of Nor∣wich is mentioned 7 Jo. by Matt. Paris, fol. 205.
• (e) 1.2047

  Animadv. p. 45. Pat. 13 E. 4. part 1. m. 3.
• * 1.2048

  Lord Privy-Seal.
• (f) 1.2049

  4. Instit. c. 2. fol. 56.
• (g) 1.2050

  P. 45.
• (h) 1.2051

  P. 108. to 116. fol. 29.
• (i) 1.2052

  In Placit. Parl. & Append. Those summoned to Parliaments as Assi∣stants, called the King's Council and in Parliament-time joyned with the King's Council in several Cases.
• (k) 1.2053

  A pag. 363. ad pag. 393.
• (l) 1.2054

  Idem, pag. 378.
• (m) 1.2055

  Idem, pag. 380.
• (n) 1.2056

  Idem, pag. 383. The Court of Star∣chamber was said to be coram Rege & Concilio suo. See Coke Inst. 4. c. 5.
• (o) 1.2057

  Plese a nostre Seigneur le Roy, & son bon Counsel, pur droyt Government de son Peuple, ordeigner.
• (p) 1.2058

  See 11 H. 4. num. 28. & 63. Respectua∣tur per Dom. Princi∣pem & Concilium. Pryn. Animadv. p. 39. 264, 265, 267, 296.
• * 1.2059

  The King's Council at Law.
• (q) 1.2060

  1. Instit. lib. 2. cap. 10. sect. 164.
• (r) 1.2061

  Nec unilts me ••••em, tant••e molis esse capa∣cem, Tacit. 1. Annal.
• (s) 1.2062

  magna negotia magnis egere admini∣culis. Velleius, l. 2.
• * 1.2063

  Principis labores queis orbem terrae ca∣pessit, egere adminicu lis, ut domestica cu∣ra vacuus, in commu∣ne consular. Tacitus 12. Annal.
• (t) 1.2064

  Rhetor. ad Alex.
• (u) 1.2065

  Animus qui ve∣rum seit, scit tuto ag∣gredi. Thucyd l. 1.
• (w) 1.2066

  Quod fieri debet tractato cum multis: quod facturus es, cum paucissimis & fidelissi∣mis. Lib. 3. de Re militari.
• (x) 1.2067

  St. Alban's Es∣says, p. 88.
• (y) 1.2068

  Idem, p. 87.
• (z) 1.2069

  Idem. Wisdom of the An∣cients. Princes to have the Honour of Councils.
• * 1.2070

  Choice of Persons.
• * 1.2071

  Princes not to open their Inclinations too much.
• (a) 1.2072

  In Gordiano Ju∣niore.
• * 1.2073

  Making use of Coun∣sellors of different Perswasions or Inte∣rests.
• (b) 1.2074

  Leo Imp. de Belli apparatu.
• * 1.2075

  The Qualifications of Counsellors.
• (c) 1.2076

  Taciturnitas opti∣mum ac tutissimum re∣rum administrandarum vinculum. Lib. 2. c. 21. 1. Secresie. 2. Ability.
• (d) 1.2077

  Eum primum esse virum qui ipse consu∣lit quod in rem sit; se∣cundum eum qui bene monenti obediat; qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere scit, eum extremi esse ingenii. Lib. 2.
• * 1.2078

  3. Skill in a Prince's Affairs.
• (e) 1.2079

  Ad concilium in Republica dandum ca∣put est nosse Rempub∣licam. Cic. de Orat.
• (f) 1.2080

  Tacitus vita A∣gricolae.
• * 1.2081

  4. Not to aim at Private Profit.
• (g) 1.2082

  Pessimum veri af∣fectus & judicii vene∣num sua cuique utili∣tas. 1. Hist.
• * 1.2083

  5. Uprightness and Faithfulness requi∣site.
• (h) 1.2084

  Optimum eum quemque, sideliss••mum. Panaegyr.
• (i) 1.2085

  Sapiens Non semper in uno gradu, sed in una via, nec se in ali∣quibus mutat, sed po∣tius aptat. 3. Histor.
• * 1.2086

  7. To leave the Prince the Honour of Counsels.
• (k) 1.2087

  Guntherus.
• * 1.2088

  8. Not to be too curious in prying into their Master's Secrets.
• (l) 1.2089

  Abditos Principis sensus, & si quid ex∣cultius parat, exqui∣rere inlicitum anceps. Tacit. lib. 6. Annal. c. 2.
• (m) 1.2090

  In Consiliario Principis tria maxime requiruntur, libertas, fides, & veritas: li∣bertas consilii est ejus vita, & essentia; qua erepta, consilium eva∣nescit. Panaegyr.
• * 1.2091

  9. Liberty, Faith, and Truth requi∣site in a Privy-Counsellor.
• (n) 1.2092

  Malum consilium consultori pessimum.
• (o) 1.2093

  Coke 4. Instit. c. 2. Four Properties of Counsellors.
• * 1.2094

  When quick, and when deliberate Counsels are best.
• (p) 1.2095

  In rebus asperis, & tenuis spei, fortissi∣ma quaeque consilia tutissima sunt. Lib. 22.
• (q) 1.2096

  Consilia calida & audacia prima specie laeta sunt, tractatu dura, eventu tristia. Idem, lib. 31.
• (a) 1.2097

  Lib. 3. Male cuncta ministrat impetus. Statius.
• (b) 1.2098

  Novan••is quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignca.
• (c) 1.2099

  Praepropera consi∣lia sunt raro prospera.
• (d) 1.2100

  Prinsquam incipi∣as consuli o, & ubi consulueris, mature fado opus est. Sallust.
• (e) 1.2101

  Coke Inst. 4. p. 57.
• (f) 1.2102

  Review of Ob∣servations, p. 10. The King's Prero∣gative to chuse his Privy-Council
• * 1.2103

  See Prynne's Brief Register, sect. 3. from p. 341. to the end, concerning the King's Council in Parliament, and out of it.
• (g) 1.2104

  Pulton, 37, & 56. 72.
• * 1.2105

  The necessity of a Privy-Council.
• (b) 1.2106

  Idem, p. 80.
• * 1.2107

  Privy-Counsellors responsible.
• * 1.2108

  The Votes of the Long Parliament to traduce the King, under the pretence of using Evil Coun∣sellors.
• * 1.2109

  That the two Hou∣ses should have the nominating of Pri∣vy-Counsellors. So in Henry the Third's time we find Mountfort's Mo∣del of Twenty four to redress the King∣dom, to chuse Coun∣sellors, &c.
• * 1.2110

  Their Design to re∣move some Privy-Counsellors, that some of their Party might be introdu∣ced.
• * 1.2111

  The Mischiefs that would follow upon the Parliaments no∣minating Privy-Counsellors.
• * 1.2112

  See Answer to Ob∣servations.
• (i) 1.2113

  17 Car. 1. c. 10. The Limitations of the Power of the Privy-Council.
• (k) 1.2114

  Rot. Pat. 5. H. 4. num. 14. Fleta, lib. 1. c. 17.
• * 1.2115

  First Particular of a Privy-Counsellor's Oath.
• * 1.2116

  Second Branch, up∣rightness.
• (l) 1.2117

  Instit. par. 4. fol. 53.
• * 1.2118

  Third Branch, Se∣cresie.
• (m) 1.2119

  Nihil magis op∣t••ndum quam ut re∣rum ger ••darum con∣sdia, qu 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ejus fieri poterit, quam maxime 〈…〉〈…〉. Lib. 4.
• (n) 1.2120

  Nulla sunt meli∣ora consilia quam quae ignoraverit ••dversa∣rius antequam facias. Consilia nisi sunt ab∣scondita, exitum raro prospiciunt. Lib. 3. de Re militari.
• (o) 1.2121

  Rot. Pat. 11 H 4. num. 28.
• (a) 1.2122

  St. Alban's Essays, tit. Honour and Re∣putation.
• * 1.2123

  The several Qualifi∣cations of Ministers of Princes.
• * 1.2124

  The Prince's Care in chusing his Mini∣sters.
• (b) 1.2125

  Ʋt Gubernator optimos quaerit Nau∣tas, Architecton doctis∣simos Ministros; ita Principes eos ascis∣cunt, qui ad Rempub∣licam administrandam sunt idonei.
• (c) 1.2126

  So Tacitus of Gal∣ba, lib. 1. Hist. Alie∣no Imperio felicior quam suo, vetus in familia nobilitas, magnae opes, ipsi me∣dium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam in virtutibus. P. 197. Edit. 5. Lips. Major privato visus, dum pri∣vatus fuit. 1. Hist. c. 11.
• (d) 1.2127

  Quo nemo validius otia dilexit, aut faci∣lius suffecit negotia, magisque quae agenda suntegit, sine ulla osten∣tatione agendi. Vel∣leius Paterc. Actu otioso simillimus.
• (e) 1.2128

  Annal. 13. Edit. Lips. 5. p. 138. Inte∣gre sancteque egit. pro∣cax otii, & potessa∣ti•• temperantior.
• (f) 1.2129

  St. Alban's Es∣says, p. 42. How Great Mini∣sters are Servants.
• * 1.2130

  The necessary Qua∣lifications of Mini∣sters of State.
• * 1.2131

  Nam occultat eorum semina Deus, & ple∣rumque bonorum ma∣lorumque causae sub diversa specie latent. Panaegyr.
• * 1.2132

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Arist •• Ethic. c. 8
• (i) 1.2133

  Sapiens dominabi∣tur 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.2134

  Their danger of be∣ing supplanted.
• * 1.2135

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (k) 1.2136

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (l) 1.2137

  Insita mortalibus natura recentem alic∣rum foelicitatem agris oculis introspicere. 2. Hist.
• (m) 1.2138

  Nunquam satis fida Potentia, ubi ni∣mia est. Ibid.
• (n) 1.2139

  Vestra vos, non Principis fortur: me∣tiamini. Panegyr. Nihil rerum mortali∣um tam instabile, & fluxum est, quam po∣tentia non sua vi nixa. Tacit. 13. Annal.
• (o) 1.2140

  Tanta illi comitas in socios, mansuetudo in hostes, visuque & auditu venerabilis, cum magnitudinem & gravitatem fortunae retineret, invidiam & arrogantiam essugerat. 2. Annal.
• (p) 1.2141

  Princip••s morta∣les, Rempublicam a∣ternam esse. Tacit. 3. Annal.
• (q) 1.2142

  Per cultum & munditias, copiaque & affluentia, luxu propi∣er: Suberat tam••n vi∣gor animi ingentil us negotiis par, eo acrior quo somnum & iner∣tiam magis ostentabat. Idem, lib. ••od.
• * 1.2143

  The Arts of the Long Parliament to remove Ministers of State.
• (r) 1.2144

  Non Exercitus, neque Thesauri, prae∣sidia Regni sunt, ve∣rum amiei. Sall. Jug.
• (s) 1.2145

  Praecipuum Prin∣cipis opus esse amicos parare. Panaegyr.
• (t) 1.2146

  Ego ita comperi, omnia Regna, Civita∣tes, Nationes, usque eo prosperum Imperi∣um habuisse, dum apud eos vera consilia va∣luerunt: Ʋbieunque gratia, timor, volup∣tas, ea corrupere, post paulo imminutae opes, deinde ademptum Im∣perium. Sallust. ad Caesarem.
• (u) 1.2147

  Pleraque ab eo vis, adulationibus a∣biorum in melius de∣flexit, nec tamen tem∣peramenti egebat, cum aequabili auctoritate & gratia apud Prin∣cipem viguerit. 6. An∣nal.
• * 1.2148

  4. Annal.
• * 1.2149

  The Method of at∣taining to be a Mini∣ster of State.
• * 1.2150

  Virg••l, lib. 6. v. 883.
• (a) 1.2151

  In Orat. The necessity of Ma∣gistrates, to supply the Prince's Unubi∣quitariness.
• (b) 1.2152

  Polit. lib. 3. c. 16. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• (c) 1.2153

  Cicero ad Fratrem.
• (d) 1.2154

  Praecept. Polit.
• (e) 1.2155

  Philo de Creatione Principis.
• (f) 1.2156

  Lib. 1. c. 10.
• (g) 1.2157

  Pag. 27. All Magistracy de∣rived from the So∣vereign.
• (h) 1.2158

  Dio.
• (i) 1.2159

  Arnis••us, cap. 11. p. 267.
• (k) 1.2160

  Intercidere Magi∣stratuum iniquitatem, infectumque reddere qui••quid fieri non e∣portuerit. Plin. Pa∣naegyr.
• (l) 1.2161

  Lampridius in A∣lexandro. Meliorem esse Rem∣publicam & prope tu∣tiorem, in qua Prin∣ceps malus sit, ea in qua mali Princip•• Ministri.
• (m) 1.2162

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plut. Polit. Pracept.
• (n) 1.2163

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Tiut. Polit. Pracept.
• * 1.2164

  Properti••s. lib 3. The use of various Magistrates for va∣rio••; Employments.
• (o) 1.2165

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Tiut. Polit. Pracept.
• (p) 1.2166

  Absque necessariis Magistratibus Civi∣tas ne consistere qui∣dem potest; absque its qui ad ornatum & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 linem pertinent, praclare adminislrari non potest. 6. Polit. c. 8.
• * 1.2167

  Young Nobility and Gentry to be so e∣ducated as they may be fitted for Magi∣stracy.
• (q) 1.2168

  6. Annal.
• (r) 1.2169

  Quod p••r negotiis ••eque ••upra erat.
• * 1.2170

  Princes not to give too great Powers to any.
• (s) 1.2171

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 5. c. 11.
• * 1.2172

  Great Ministers not to be long continued in the same Station.
• (t) 1.2173

  Qui parvo tempo∣re Magistratui prae∣sunt, non tam facile nocere possunt quam qui longo.
• (u) 1.2174

  Clapmarius de Ar∣canis Imperil, lib. 2. c. 18.
• (w) 1.2175

  Alii taedio novae curae, semel placita pro aeternis servavisse, quidam invidia, ne plures fruerentur; sunt qui existiment, ut callidum ejus inge∣nium, ita anxium ju∣dicium.
• (x) 1.2176

  Tacitus 1. Annal. cap. ult.
• * 1.2177

  The Sovereign's Power to change Magistrates.
• (y) 1.2178

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 2. Polit. c. 5.
• * 1.2179

  See more of this in the next Chapter.
• (z) 1.2180

  Smith de Repub. Angliae, lib. 2.
• (a) 1.2181

  MS. Speech, 1 Eliz. penes Rad. Thoresly de Leedes, Gen.
• * 1.2182

  The necessary Care of a Prince in chu∣sing Magistrates.
• (b) 1.2183

  MS. Speech Trim. Term. 1557.
• (c) 1.2184

  Laertius in vita Chilonis.
• (d) 1.2185

  Lib. 4. de LL.
• (e) 1.2186

  Praecipuum indi∣cium non magni Prin∣cipis, magni Liberti. Panaegyr.
• (f) 1.2187

  Melius officiis & administrationibus non peccaturos praefi∣cere, quam damnare cum pe••••arint. Vita Agricolae.
• * 1.2188

  The Author's Apo∣logy.
• * 1.2189

  King Edward the Elder's Law about Judges. Gerefa.
• (a) 1.2190

  Eadweard Cyning vyt thaem Gerefum eallum, that gede man swa ribte domas swa gerihtoste cunnon, & hit on thaere dombec stande; ne wandigeth for nanum thingum folcrihte to gerecanne, &c.
• * 1.2191

  The King is the Fountain of Justice.
• (b) 1.2192

  Lib. 3. cap. 9, 10. Rex & non alius debet judicare, si solas ad id sufficere possit, cum ad hoc per veritatem Sa∣cramenti teneatur a∣strictus, sicut Dei Vi∣cartus & Minister in terra.
• * 1.2193

  See Britton, fol. 1. Coke, 4. Inst. c. 7.
• (c) 1.2194

  Rex habet ordi∣nariam Jurisdictio∣nem, & omnia Jura manu sua, quae nec ita delegari possunt, quin ordinaria rema∣neant cum ipso Rege.
• (d) 1.2195

  Archaion.
• (e) 1.2196

  Tit. Discontinue de Proces, part 7. 30.
• * 1.2197

  The Judges repre∣sent the King's Per∣son.
• (f) 1.2198

  Id. 3. Instit. p. 18 & 140.
• (g) 1.2199

  Facies fieri in omnibus Justiciis tuis aequam & rectam Ju∣stitiam, & discretio∣nem in misericordia & veritate, secundum vires tuas.
• (h) 1.2200

  Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut differemus Justitiam vel Rectum. c. 29.
• (i) 1.2201

  Hist. p. 826, 827. Edit. prioris.
• * 1.2202

  The King loseth not his Authority, tho' he do not Justice.
• (k) 1.2203

  Cui Magister Ho∣spitalis respondit ala∣c••iter, vultu elevato, Quid est quod dici••, Domine Rex? Absit ut in ore tuo recitetur hoc verbum illepidum & absurdum. Quam∣dia Justitiam obser∣vas, Rex esse poteris: & quam cito bane in∣fregeris, Rex esse de∣sines.
• (l) 1.2204

  Dyer, fol. 56.
• (m) 1.2205

  Davis. 45.
• (n) 1.2206

  Coke 4. Inst. n. 4. 14. 114. 117.
• (o) 1.2207

  Bulstrod. 3. 296. 1 H. 7. c. 25.
• (p) 1.2208

  Sheppard's Grand Abridgment, part 3. p. 53.
• * 1.2209

  The King's placing and displacing all Great Officers.
• * 1.2210

  The Court of the High-Steward.
• (q) 1.2211

  Coke 4 Inst. c. 4.
• * 1.2212

  The Star-chamber Court.
• * 1.2213

  The King's-Bench.
• (r) 1.2214

  Rex illarum Cu∣riarum habet unam propriam sicut Aulam Regiam, & Justicia∣rios Capitales qui pro∣prias Causas Regias terminant.
• (s) 1.2215

  Justiciariorum quidam sunt Capita∣les, generales, perp••∣tui, & majores a la∣tere Regis resid••ates, qui emnium aliorum corrigere tenentur in∣jurias & errores. Lib. 3. c. 7. fol. 108 b.
• (t) 1.2216

  Coram quibus & non alibi nisi coram semetipso, & Concilio suo, vel A••ditoribus specialibus, falsa Ju∣dicia & Errores Ju∣sticiariorum re••ertun∣tur & corriguntur.
• * 1.2217

  The Kings of Eng∣land used to fit in this Court.
• (u) 1.2218

  Cap. 5.
• (w) 1.2219

  Pat. 52. H. 3. m. 24.
• (x) 1.2220

  Glossary.
• (y) 1.2221

  Sacred Laws. Sir Henry Spelman a∣bout the Office of the Chief-Justice of England.
• * 1.2222

  The Common-Pleas.
• (z) 1.2223

  Coke's Reports, part 8.
• (a) 1.2224

  Cognoscunt de omnibus Placitis de quibus Authoritatem habent cognoscendi, & sine Warranto Juris∣dictionem non habent nec Coercionem. Lib. 3. c. 10. fol. 105 b.
• * 1.2225

  This Court proper for Pleas betwixt Party and Party.
• * 1.2226

  Not to follow the King's Court.
• (b) 1.2227

  Articuli super Chartas, cap. 4.
• (c) 1.2228

  Liberat. 1 E. 1. m. 4.
• (d) 1.2229

  See Sir William Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales, p. 39 b. The number of the Justices varied.
• * 1.2230

  Co••rt of Chancery.
• (e) 1.2231

  Sir Edw. Coke's Arguments for the Antiquity of the Chancery.
• (f) 1.2232

  Spehran. Tom. 1. Concil. p. 631.
• (g) 1.2233

  Swyerg trius in Spelman.
• (h) 1.2234

  Glossary, fol. 106.
• * 1.2235

  Answer. Canceliarius qui vel Regum praecepta aut Acta Judicum scribit. Spelm. Gloss. fol. 104.
• (i) 1.2236

  Tom. 1. p. 486.
• (k) 1.2237

  Id. p. 489.
• * 1.2238

  See Spelman. Glossar. p. 106.
• (l) 1.2239

  Pur le Enrolments de Pardon de Roy in le Chancery en temps le Roy Alfred.
• (m) 1.2240

  Gless. p. 107 ••.
• (n) 1.2241

  Archaion, p. 62, 63.
• * 1.2242

  Sir William Dugdale's Origines Jurid. fol. 36. b.
• (o) 1.2243

  28 E. 1. c. 5.
• * 1.2244

  The Chancellor and Justices of the King's-Bench to fol∣low the King.
• (p) 1.2245

  Cap. 6.
• (q) 1.2246

  Cap. 3.
• * 1.2247

  When Causes in E∣quity determined in Chancery.
• (r) 1.2248

  Secundum Legen & Consuetudinem Angliae.
• (s) 1.2249

  4. Instit. c. 8.
• (t) 1.2250

  Cap. 18.
• * 1.2251

  The Lord Keeper equal to Lord Chan∣cellor.
• (u) 1.2252

  Rot. Parl. 10 R. 2. col. 8.
• * 1.2253

  The Oath of the Lord Chancellor.
• (w) 1.2254

  Fol. 2 b.
• * 1.2255

  The Lord Treasurer principal Officer of the Exchequer.
• (x) 1.2256

  4. Instit. fol. 106 107, 108.
• (y) 1.2257

  The Oath of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Barons of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 chequer.
• (z) 1.2258

  4. Instit. p. 103. & 110, 111.
• (a) 1.2259

  Codex niger, c. 1. —Nulli licet statu∣tum Scaccarii infrin∣gere vele is quavis te∣meritate resistere— Habet enim hoc com∣mune cum ipsa Dom. Regis Curia, in qua ipse in propria persona Jura decernit, quod nec Recordationi nec Sententia in eo latae liceat alicui contradi∣cere.
• (b) 1.2260

  Origines Juris••ic. fol. 50.
• (c) 1.2261

  Commun. Term. Mich. 35 H. 3. Rot. 2.
• (d) 1.2262

  Inquirant qualiter Magnates se gerunt erga homines suo••, si forte non possunt ple∣narie corrigere, tunc ostendant easdem trans∣gressiones Dom. Regi.
• (e) 1.2263

  Pat. 54 H. 3. m. 22. dorso. & Incep. 55. Rot. 3. dorso.
• (f) 1.2264

  Animadv. fol. 55, 56.
• * 1.2265

  Itinerant Justices.
• (g) 1.2266

  Regist. Ecclesiae Eliensis, fol. 24 b.
• (h) 1.2267

  Annal. pars post. p. 148, 149, 150.
• (i) 1.2268

  Idem, p. 590, 591. Et unicuique partium praefecit viros sapien∣tes ad faciendam Ju∣stitiam & ad audien∣dum clamorem populi.
• (k) 1.2269

  Cl. 3 H. 3. m. 13. dorso.
• (l) 1.2270

  4. Instit. p. 184.
• (m) 1.2271

  Notes on Heng∣ham, p. 143. Justices of Assize.
• (n) 1.2272

  Lib. 3. c. 10.
• (o) 1.2273

  Cl. 9 H. 3. m. 11. dorso.
• (p) 1.2274

  De qualibet Villa quatuor legales homi∣nes, & Praepositum, & de quolibet Burgo, vel Villa mercanda duo∣decim leg••les homines, & omnes Milites & libere Tenentes, &c.
• (q) 1.2275

  Placit. Parliam. 21 E. 1. num. 12.
• (r) 1.2276

  M••ltis vigiliis excegitata & inventa fuit recuperand••e pos∣sessionis gratia, ut per summariam cognitio∣nem absque magna Juris solennitate, qua∣si per compendium ne∣gotium terminetur. Lib. 4. sol 164 b.
• (s) 1.2277

  See the Patent Clause and Fine-Rolls from King John to Edw. 4.
• (t) 1.2278

  Ad exonerationem Juratorum, & ad ce•• lerem justitiam in ea parte exhibendum. Stat. de Finibus, 27 E. 1. c. 4.
• * 1.2279

  Justices of Nisi Pri∣us.
• (u) 1.2280

  Coke 4. Inst. fol. 162.
• (w) 1.2281

  Interfectionibus.
• (x) 1.2282

  Verborum prola∣tionibus.
• (y) 1.2283

  Cambipartiis.
• (z) 1.2284

  Nisi pro ••nermi transgressione, ubi ne∣cesse apponere festi∣num remedium. Cl. 14 E. 3. part 1. m. 41. dorso. Hil. 2 H. 4. Rot. 4. Mich. 1 H. 8.
• * 1.2285

  What new Courts the King may erect.
• (b) 1.2286

  11 H. 7. c. 3.
• (c) 1.2287

  1 H. 8. c. 6.
• (d) 1.2288

  C. 2.
• (e) 1.2289

  Discretio est di∣scernere per Legem quid sit justum. Coke Inst. 4. fol. 41.
• (f) 1.2290

  Whyte's Sacred Laws, p. 33.
• (g) 1.2291

  Miser servitus ubi jus vagum.
• * 1.2292

  The Court of Star∣chamber dissolved.
• (h) 1.2293

  3 H. 7. c. 1. 21 H. 8.
• (i) 1.2294

  17 Car. 1. c. 10.
• (k) 1.2295

  Ibid. cap. 9.
• (l) 1.2296

  Cap. 48.
• (m) 1.2297

  Cap. 49.
• (o) 1.2298

  Cap. 37.
• (p) 1.2299

  Animadv. on Coke's 4. Inst. fol. 38.
• (q) 1.2300

  7 May, 20 E. 3.
• (r) 1.2301

  Cl. 20 E. 3. part 1. m. 12, 13.
• (s) 1.2302

  Rot. Parl. 20 E. 3. num. 25.
• * 1.2303

  Abridgment of Re∣cords, p. 48.
• * 1.2304

  Observations on this Oath.
• (t) 1.2305

  Rot. Parl. 25 E. 3. Rot. 10.
• * 1.2306

  Judges punished for breaking their Oath.
• (u) 1.2307

  Exact Abridg∣ment, p. 74.
• (z) 1.2308

  Qui praedictum Sa∣cramentum fecerunt & fregerunt, & ha∣bent Leges Regales Augliae ad custodien∣das.
• (a) 1.2309

  MS. Speech, penes Rad. Thoresby de Leedes, Gen.
• (b) 1.2310

  Essays.
• (c) 1.2311

  E. of Clarendon's Survey, p. 125.
• * 1.2312

  The Long Parlia∣ments Impeachment of Judges.
• * 1.2313

  They would alter pro beneplacito.
• * 1.2314

  The Long Parlia∣ment endeavours to weaken the King's Prerogative.
• * 1.2315

  How Judges in their Judgments sustain the Person of the King.
• (d) 1.2316

  Case of our Af∣fairs, p. 4.
• * 1.2317

  Judges to apply themselves to the King.
• (e) 1.2318

  Postnati.
• (f) 1.2319

  Commonwealth, part 2. c. 10.
• * 1.2320

  Why the King only to appoint Judges.
• * 1.2321

  What Judges are to observe.
• (g) 1.2322

  Cap. 9.
• (h) 1.2323

  Cap. 4. Stat. 5.
• (i) 1.2324

  24 E. 3. c. 3.
• (k) 1.2325

  41 E. 5. c. 1.
• * 1.2326

  Impartiality requi∣site in a Judge.
• (l) 1.2327

  Neque inflecti gra∣tia, neque perfringi potentia, neque adul∣terari pecunia possit. Pro Cecinna.
• (m) 1.2328

  Exuit personam Judicis, quisquis Ami∣ci personam induit.
• * 1.2329

  P••ecipitancy to be avoided.
• (n) 1.2330

  Qui statui•• ali∣quid, par••e in••udita altera, 〈…〉〈…〉 siatuit, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tamen aequus est. Senec. Me∣daea.
• (o) 1.2331

  Holy Court, Tom. 1. lib. 3. p. 90. Delays in doing Ju∣stice mischievous.
• * 1.2332

  Court to redress Delays.
• (p) 1.2333

  14 E. 3. c. 5. Stat. 1. Rot. Parl. 2 ••. 2. num. 63. con∣firmed by Parlia∣ment.
• (q) 1.2334

  4. Instit. c. 6. fol. 67.
• (r) 1.2335

  Hwilcum scirmen oththe othrum d••man.
• (s) 1.2336

  Et tholige a his Thegnscipes, butan he aeft al thaem Cyng ge∣biege: swa he hin ge∣thasian wills.
• (t) 1.2337

  That man ribte laga upp araere, & aegh wylec unlaga georne assylle.
• (u) 1.2338

  Fole rihtes wyrthe & him man ribte domes deme.
• (w) 1.2339

  Swa it for Gode sy gebeolice & for woruld aberendlice: As in the Law of King Edgar.
• (x) 1.2340

  Et ne forspille man for litlum, Godes handgeweorce & his agenne ceap the he deorgevobt.
• (y) 1.2341

  His man fyrmest m••g raed aredian Theode to Thearfe & rib••ne Cristendom swy thort araeran & agh wilec unlaga georne assyllan.
• (z) 1.2342

  Dalton's Justice of Peace, c. 2.
• (a) 1.2343

  4. Instit. c. 31. fol. 170.
• * 1.2344

  Officers like our Ju∣stices of Peace anci∣ently in other Coun∣tries.
• (b) 1.2345

  Lib. 2. c. 16.
• (c) 1.2346

  Anno 1221. Ibid. p. 704. to 722. lob. 1. tit. 8.
• (d) 1.2347

  Ibid. tit. 41.
• (e) 1.2348

  See Fred. Linde∣brogus Codex Legum Antiq.
• (f) 1.2349

  See Prynne's Ire∣narch. Redivivus, p. 1. ad 5.
• (g) 1.2350

  Dalton's Justice of Peace, c. 1. Conservators of the Peace.
• (h) 1.2351

  Idem.
• * 1.2352

  The King the prin∣cipal Conservator of Peace.
• (i) 1.2353

  20 H. 7. c. 11.
• * 1.2354

  The Reasons why Justices of Peace made. The King's Care for right and easie Ad∣ministration of Ju∣stice.
• * 1.2355

  Other Conservator of the Peace.
• (k) 1.2356

  Term. Pasch. fol. 176. 4. Inst. Coram Rege prima fuit In∣stitutio Justiciario∣rum pro Pace conser∣vanda. Ad Pacem nostram conservandam.
• (l) 1.2357

  Ibid. 171.
• (m) 1.2358

  Mich. 32 & 33 Eliz.
• (n) 1.2359

  P. 443, 451, to 457, 433, 480. Prynne's Animadv. fol. 149.
• (o) 1.2360

  Sir Edw. Coke, 4 Inst. Ryley's Appendix, p. 521, &c. 537, 563.
• (p) 1.2361

  Dalton, c. 3.
• (q) 1.2362

  Sir Tho. Smith's Commonwealth, part 2. c. 22. Who are chosen to be Justices of Peace.
• * 1.2363

  At the King's Plea∣sure.
• * 1.2364

  Much increased in number.
• * 1.2365

  For the better di∣stributing of Justice.
• * 1.2366

  The Faults they may punish.
• * 1.2367

  at their Sections.
• * 1.2368

  Instructions given to Justices of the Peace.
• (r) 1.2369

  Part 2. tit. Jusli∣ces of Pearce.
• * 1.2370

  How beneficial the Institution of Justi∣ces of Peace.
• * 1.2371

  They are principal∣ly concerned in see∣ing to the Execution of several Laws.
• (s) 1.2372

  MS. Speech to the Justices Itine∣rant, Anno 1559. The Conservation of Peace their prin∣cipal Charge.
• (t) 1.2373

  MS. Speech at the end of the Parlia∣ment, Anno 1559. Justices of Peace to be active.
• * 1.2374

  The necessity of pu∣nishing evil Men.
• (u) 1.2375

  MS. Speech, se∣cond Parl. 1562.
• * 1.2376

  A Visitation of the Justices of Peace proposed.
• * 1.2377

  See something of this nature 2 H. 5. 8.
• (w) 1.2378

  MS. Speech, Star∣chamber, 1568.
• (x) 1.2379

  MS. Speech, se∣cond Session of Par∣liament, 1571.
• (y) 1.2380

  Idem.
• (z) 1.2381

  Cuninges hus.
• (a) 1.2382

  Mynster.
• (b) 1.2383

  Gefolgylden hus.
• (c) 1.2384

  Klothum.
• (d) 1.2385

  Herge.
• (e) 1.2386

  Theoffes onfeng.
• (f) 1.2387

  Burghbryce.
• (g) 1.2388

  Cyninges Thegnes.
• (h) 1.2389

  Land hebbendes.
• (i) 1.2390

  De gefeohtum.
• (k) 1.2391

  Mansliht mid blothe.
• (l) 1.2392

  Ae••hon be him ribtes bidde.
• (m) 1.2393

  Be gefeobte.
• (n) 1.2394

  Be wundum.
• (o) 1.2395

  The of th••at th••eb∣bendse thing stolen is found in the Thieves Hand; hand gefangen sy.
• (p) 1.2396

  Aef he on daed••ote ga: swa Bisceop him Tace, & his serift him wis••ge.
• (q) 1.2397

  Et us eallum tha unribtlican, & menig∣fealdan gefroh••e the betwux us svlsum syn∣don.
• (r) 1.2398

  Witan seylon faeb. the settan.
• (s) 1.2399

  That aele sreoman getreowne borb bebbe.
• (t) 1.2400

  Et we willath, that aele freoman beo on hundrede, & on Teothung gebrobt, viz. the Tything security.
• (u) 1.2401

  LL. Aethelstani, fol. 53.
• (w) 1.2402

  Ʋre sryth is wyrs gehealden thon••e we lyst.
• (a) 1.2403

  Et mine witan seig••h.
• (b) 1.2404

  That le hit to long forboren baebbe.
• (c) 1.2405

  Middum wintre.
• (d) 1.2406

  ••t tha ealle syn 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mid bire syl∣fum & midyfre(which I signifying Heritage; and though mis-pla∣ced in Lambard, is by him translated Children) & mid wife & mideallum thingum (by L••mbard transla∣ted properly all their Fortunes) to faerenne thider thider le thonne will.
• (e) 1.2407

  And gif hi mon afre af•• on thaem eorda gemit, that hi syn swa seildig, swa se the at hebbendra banda gefougen syn.
• (f) 1.2408

  Statuimus etiam & sirmiter praecipi∣mus, ut omnes liberi homines totius Regni noslri praedicli, sint fratres conjurati ad Monarchiam nostram, & ad Regnum nostrum pro viribus suis & facultatibus contra i∣nimicos pro posse suo defendendum, & vi∣riliter servandum; & Facem & Dignitatem Coronae noslrae inte∣gram observandam; & ad Judicium rectum, & Justiciam constan∣ter omnibus modis pro posse suo sine dolo & sine dilatiene facien∣dam. LL. Gul. 1. 59. fol. 171. Edit. Whee∣loch.
• (a) 1.2409

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 3. Polit. c. 7.
• (b) 1.2410

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 12. de LL. Power of making War and Peace the greatest Badge of Sovereignty.
• (c) 1.2411

  Clapmarius de Ju∣re Maj••statis, lib. 1. c. 10.
• * 1.2412

  Reasons why this Power should be in the Sovereign alone to make War and Peace.
• (d) 1.2413

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Polyb. O.
• (e) 1.2414

  Ordo naturalis mortalium paci ac∣commodatus, hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas, atque con∣silium penes Principes sit. Augustinus con∣tra Faustum.
• * 1.2415

  Burghote & Brighote beonon forth & scip forthunga aginne man georne & frythunga eac swa a thone thearf sy for ••e men licre neode. LL. Canute 10.
• * 1.2416

  i.e. forbid.
• (f) 1.2417

  Cap. 2.
• (g) 1.2418

  11 H. 7. c. 18.
• * 1.2419

  3 Instit. c. 9.
• (k) 1.2420

  13 Car. 2. c. 6. 14 Car. 2. c. 3.
• (l) 1.2421

  Coke 7. 25.
• (m) 1.2422

  Jenkins Cent. 6. Case 14.26.89.
• (n) 1.2423

  Coke 7.8.
• (o) 1.2424

  I e. 3. Stat. 1. 2 Eliz. c. 2.
• * 1.2425

  Some Standing For∣ces necessary.
• (p) 1.2426

  Timor inde Patres incessit, ac si dimissus exercitus foret, rursus c••tus, occultaeque con∣jurationes fierent. Lib. 6. The Long Parlia∣ments Claim of the Militia.
• * 1.2427

  The Claims of any Right of the Two Houses to the Mili∣tia, totally vacated.
• * 1.2428

  The necessity of Tri∣butes and Aids.
• (a) 1.2429

  Nec enim quies gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipen∣diis, nec stipendia sine tributis. 4. Hist.
• * 1.2430

  As the Subject is protected, so he ought to support the Government.
• * 1.2431

  Civil War.
• (b) 1.2432

  27 E. 1. c. 5. Anno 1299.
• (c) 1.2433

  Cap. 6.
• * 1.2434

  See for this the Charter of King John.
• (d) 1.2435

  MS. Speech, se∣cond Parl. El••z. an. 1562. Inducements to sup∣ply the Sovereign.
• (e) 1.2436

  Coke Instit. 1.90.
• (f) 1.2437

  States of France. Objection.
• (g) 1.2438

  Coke 1. Insiit. p. 161.
• * 1.2439

  Concerning Ship-Money.
• * 1.2440

  The Advantages to Prince and People, when the Crown is liberally provided for.
• * 1.2441

  Decemb. 17.1680. The Care of some Parliaments to keep the King poor.
• (h) 1.2442

  Address, part 3.
• (i) 1.2443

  Nec juv••ntam ar∣mis civilibus aut do∣mesticis discordiis im∣butam, nulla odia, nul∣las injuri is nec cupi∣dinis ultionem afferre. 13. Annal. c. 1.
• (k) 1.2444

  An cuncta vectiga∣lia omitti juberet: Idque pulcherrimum donum generl mortali∣um daret, Sed impe∣tum ejus, multum pri∣us laudata animi mag∣nitudine, attenuere Se∣natores, dissolutionem Imperii docendo, si fru∣ctus quibus Respublica sustineretur; diminue∣rentur. Lib. 13. c. 12.
• * 1.2445

  The King's Speech, 30 May, 1685.
• (a) 1.2446

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Polit. l 4. c. 4.
• * 1.2447

  Several kinds of No∣bility.
• * 1.2448

  A Character of the Nobility.
• * 1.2449

  Necssity of a No∣bility.
• (b) 1.2450

  St. Alban's Essays, c. 14.
• * 1.2451

  Of Ancient Nobili∣ty.
• (c) 1.2452

  —miserum est a∣liorum incumbere fa∣mae, Ne collapsa ruant sub∣duct is tecta columnis, Juv. Sat. 8. v. 77, 78.
• * 1.2453

  The Use of Nobili∣ty.
• (d) 1.2454

  St. Alban's Essays, Of Honour and Re∣putation.
• (e) 1.2455

  Idem Essays, c. 14.
• * 1.2456

  Concerning nume∣rous Nobility.
• * 1.2457

  Kings to counte∣nance their Nobi∣lity.
• * 1.2458

  Honours not to be too common.
• (f) 1.2459

  Honores non ess•• remere pervulgandos aut essuse dandos, ali∣oquin eos obsoleseere; raros enim honores & tenues esse gloriosos, effusos & pervulgatos esse obsoletos & con∣temptos. Giphanii Com. in cap. 3. lib. 5. olit. Arist.
• * 1.2460

  St. Alban's Essays. Of Greatness of Kingdoms.
• * 1.2461

  Great Retinues of the Nobility useful.
• * 1.2462

  The Nobility not to Desert the Crown.
• * 1.2463

  The old Nobility not to envy the new ones.
• (g) 1.2464

  Fato quodam aut sorte nascendi, ut cae∣tera, ita Principum in∣clination in hos, ossensio in illos. Annal. lib 4.
• * 1.2465

  Not to repine at the Prince's Favours be∣stowed on others.
• (a) 1.2466

  Lucan, 1.2. v. 557.
• * 1.2467

  How the Nobility may honourably ac∣quaint their Prince with Grievances.
• * 1.2468

  How Common∣wealths depress the Nobility.
• * 1.2469

  How the Nobility had greater Power anciently than now.
• (a) 1.2470

  Titles of Ho∣nour, P. 861, 862. Whence the Name.
• (b) 1.2471

  In Topicis.
• (c) 1.2472

  Gentilis dicitur ex eodem genere ortus: & is qui simili nomine appellatur. Festus ad Verbum.
• (d) 1.2473

  Polit. lib. 4. c. 8. lib. 5. c. 1.
• (e) 1.2474

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Rhetor. ad Theod, lib, 2. c. 5.
• (f) 1.2475

  Tiles of Ho∣nour, p. 852.
• * 1.2476

  The use of the word Nobilis.
• (g) 1.2477

  〈…〉〈…〉 1. cap. 19.
• (h) 1.2478

  〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.2479

  Gentlemen without coats of Arms.
• * 1.2480

  Advice to the Gen∣try.
• (i) 1.2481

  Hand facile emer∣gunt, quorum virtu∣tibus obstat Res angust a domi—
• (k) 1.2482

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Dio, lib. 2.
• (l) 1.2483

  M••gis alii 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nes qu••m alii mores. Ta••it. 1. Histo••.
• * 1.2484

  The Common Peo∣ples Duty.
• (a) 1.2485

  Cornwallis's Es. says, 46.
• * 1.2486

  The Miseries of In∣surrections.
• * 1.2487

  Their Obligations to their Prince.
• * 1.2488

  Their Privileges.
• * 1.2489

  The Calamities they sustained in the late War.
• * 1.2490

  Advice to the Com∣monalty.
• (a) 1.2491

  Vulgus metu aut spe nimium, Lib. 23. Nihil in vulgo mo∣dicum. The var••ous Dispo∣sition of the Com∣mon People.
• (b) 1.2492

  Aut servit humili∣ter aut sup•• be domi∣n••••••. 〈…〉〈…〉 Annal.
• (c) 1.2493

  Vul•••••• ingenio 〈…〉〈…〉 & discordiosum, cupidum novaum rerum, qui∣eti & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 adversum. Sail. in Jugurtha.
• (d) 1.2494

  Or••••. pro Cluent.
• (e) 1.2495

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 primum & 〈…〉〈…〉 Hist. P. ••.
• (f) 1.2496

  〈…〉〈…〉 Ta••it. ib. P. 5.
• * 1.2497

  How they were 〈…〉〈…〉 upon in 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.2498

  How of later thm••.
• * 1.2499

  A••vice to them.
• (g) 1.2500

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈…〉〈…〉
• (h) 1.2501

  1. Histor, Impe∣raturus es hominibus qui nec totam servi∣tutem pati pessunt, nec totam libertatem.
• (i) 1.2502

  Libertas juxta bo∣nis & malis, strenui & ignavis optabilis est. Sallust, ad Caesarem.
• (k) 1.2503

  Vires Imperii in consensu obedientium sunt. Lib. 2.
• (l) 1.2504

  1. Histor. p. 193. Edit. 5. Lips. fol.
• (a) 1.2505

  Ingenita quibus∣dam Gentibus erga Reges suos veneratio. Lib. 3.
• (b) 1.2506

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• (c) 1.2507

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 In lib••de Jo∣sepho.
• (d) 1.2508

  Plutarch, in Prae∣ceptis.
• (e) 1.2509

  Xenoph. Cyvopaed. lib. 8.
• (f) 1.2510

  3. de LL.
• (g) 1.2511

  Qui tamen jussa Ducum interpretari, quam exequi mallent. 2. Hist.
• (h) 1.2512

  Si ubi jubeantur singulis quaerere lice∣at; pereunte obsequio etiam Imperium inter∣cidit. 1. Hist.
• (i) 1.2513

  Apud Stobaeum, Serm. 1.
• (k) 1.2514

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Dio, lib. 41.
• (l) 1.2515

  Epist. 61.
• (m) 1.2516

  Tibisummum Ju∣dicium Dii dedere, no∣bis obsequii gloria re∣licta. Tacit. 6. Annal.
• (n) 1.2517

  Ea enim quae ob∣sequi non eportet, le∣niter ac ver••cunde, ac sine derestatione ••imia sineque opp••obration acerba reprehensionis, declinanda sensim, & relinquenda potius ••sse qu••m respuend••. No∣ctes Atticae, c. 13.
• (o) 1.2518

  Haec unitas & hic m••ximi Imp••cii con∣textus in partes mul∣tas dissilier. Senec. de Clem. lib. 1. c. 4.
• (p) 1.2519

  Olim enim it •• se induit Reipublicae Cae∣sar, ut diduci alterum non possit sine utrius∣que pernicie.
• (q) 1.2520

  Bonos Principes voto excipere, quales∣cunque tolerare. Ta∣cit. 4. Histor.
• (r) 1.2521

  Quomodo sterilita∣tem aut nimios imbres, & caetera naturae ma∣la, ita luxum vel ava∣ritiam dominantium tolerare. Ibid.
• (s) 1.2522

  Civil Wars, p. 51.
• (t) 1.2523

  Plut. Canvio. 7. Sapient.
• (u) 1.2524

  De Institutione Principis.
• (a) 1.2525

  Nec priva••os fo∣cos, n••c publicas le∣ges, nec libertatis ju∣ra, cara babere potest, quem discordie, quem cades civium, quem belium civile delectat: Ideo ex numero homi∣num ejiciendum, ex si∣nibus humanae naturae extermin ••ndum puto.
• * 1.2526

  1. The debauched Persons apt to be seditious.
• (b) 1.2527

  Cum raptci••••mo cuique & perditi••mo, non Agri, non Fanus, sed sol I Insirumenta vitiorum manerent. 1. Histor.
• * 1.2528

  2. Vain and light∣headed Persons.
• (c) 1.2529

  Pro certis & ••lim partis, nov••, ambigua, ancipitia malu••. Ta∣cit. 11. Histor.
• * 1.2530

  3. The Indigent.
• (d) 1.2531

  Lucan, lib. 1.
• (e) 1.2532

  In Jugurtha. Semper. in civitate, quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invident: vetera odere, nova expetunt; odio suarum rerum, omnia mutori s••udent.
• (f) 1.2533

  Afflict•• sidei in pace, & rebus turbatis alacres, per incerta tutissimi. Tac. 1. Hist.
• (g) 1.2534

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lib. 5. Polit. c. 6.
• (h) 1.2535

  Homini potentiam quarenti, egentissimus quisque opportunis••∣mus; cui neque sua chara, quippe quae nal∣la sunt; omnia cum pretio honesia viden∣tur.
• (i) 1.2536

  Nemo non Roma, sed non in ullo Italiae angulo are aliquo oppressus fuit, quem non ad hoc scelus fae∣dere assumerent, &c. In Catilinam.
• (k) 1.2537

  Lib. 4. de Rep••.
• (l) 1.2538

  Compositis rebus nulla spes, omne in turbi•• consilium; lux. uria etiam Principi onerosa, incpia vix privuo toleranda. 1. Hist.
• (m) 1.2539

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.2540

  4. The Ambitious.
• (n) 1.2541

  Honores quos qui∣eta Republica despe∣rant, perturata conse∣qui se posse arburan∣tur.
• (o) 1.2542

  Address, •• 1. P. 30.
• (p) 1.2543

  Aut me amor sus∣cepti negotii fallit, aut nulla unquam Res∣publica, nec major, nec sanctior, nec bonis ex∣emplis ditior fuit, nec in qua tam sero ava∣ritia, luxuriaque im∣migraveri••; nec ubi tantus, ac tam diu par∣simoniae & paupert uis honos fuerit. Livius Prooemio.
• (q) 1.2544

  Gregorias in Re∣gistro.
• (r) 1.2545

  Non cura•• prodesse, sed gloriatur praesse.
• (s) 1.2546

  Senec. Tragaed.
• * 1.2547

  5. The envious.
• (t) 1.2548

  Essay, c. 8. fol. 35.
• (u) 1.2549

  Non est curiosus, quin idem est malevo∣lus.
• (w) 1.2550

  Inviso semel Prin∣cipe seu bene seu male, facta premunt. Tacit. 1. Histor.
• (x) 1.2551

  Virtutem incolu∣mem odimzs, sublatam ex oculis quaerimus invidi. Horat. lib. 3. Od. 14.
• (y) 1.2552

  Invidia festos dies non agit. 6. The discontented.
• (a) 1.2553

  Address, pars 1. p. 35.
• * 1.2554

  7. The emulous.
• (b) 1.2555

  Aegre p••ssus, mis∣cere cuncta, & priva∣ta vulnera Reipublicae malis operi••e statuit. Tacitus 1. Histor.
• * 1.2556

  8. Popular Men.
• (c) 1.2557

  Causa a••que origo furoris penes Autores, reliqui contagione in∣saniunt. Livius. 1.28.
• (d) 1.2558

  Nec deerat Otho, protendens m••nus, a∣dorare vulgum, jacere oscula & omnia servi∣liter pro dominatione. Tacit. 1. Histor.
• (e) 1.2559

  Ʋni Antoni•• aper∣tae militum aures, nam & facundia aderat, mulcendique vulgum Artes & Auctorit as. Tacitus 1. Hist.
• * 1.2560

  9. Cunning close Men.
• (f) 1.2561

  Pulckra loquen∣tes, iidem in pectore prava struant. Odyss. 5.
• (g) 1.2562

  Fraus in parvis, fidem sibipraestant, ut cum operae pretium sit, cum m••rcede fallant. Liv. lib. 28.
• * 1.2563

  10. Innovators in Religion.
• (h) 1.2564

  Address, part I p. 10.
• (i) 1.2565

  Polit. lib. 5. c. 3. Giphanii Comment.
• (k) 1.2566

  Lilert••s 〈…〉〈…〉 Tacit. 1. Histor.
• (l) 1.2567

  〈…〉〈…〉 & suturi improvid••s spe vana 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Id.
• * 1.2568

  The Nu••••ries of S••dition.
• (m) 1.2569

  Giph••. 〈…〉〈…〉 in c. 15. lib. 4. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Arist.
• (n) 1.2570

  Alii Principum partibus, alii Patrici∣orum & Factionibus student. Tacitus.
• (o) 1.2571

  Monstrelate, lib. 1
• (p) 1.2572

  Humane Pru∣dence.
• (a) 1.2573

  Apud Japonios Campana est, quae quo∣ties Regno magnae in∣stant Seditiones Tu∣multusque, suapte spon∣te pulsatur. Phonarg. lib. 2. sect. 3. c. 14.
• (b) 1.2574

  Lib. 2. de Fasci∣natione, cap. 14.
• (c) 1.2575

  Essays. Descriptions of the Signs particularly.
• * 1.2576

  Hatred.
• (d) 1.2577

  Neseis qu••ta ra∣b••es oriatur, ••hi supra modum olia crev••∣runt. De Clementia.
• (e) 1.2578

  Quem quisque odit, p••riisse expetit. Cic. de Officiis, 2.
• * 1.2579

  Contempt.
• (f) 1.2580

  Pleb•• Reveren∣tiam omnem excuti∣unt, & licenti•••• pr••∣bent peccandi, Arist. Polit lib. 6. c. 4.
• (g) 1.2581

  Augetur & crescit quicquid in honore est, desi••it & minuit quie∣quid in contemptu. Dio in Nerva.
• * 1.2582

  Greedy after News.
• (h) 1.2583

  Cuncta in m••jus credita, mul••i prasen∣tium odio & cupidine muationis suis quo∣que periculis ••ata∣bantur. 3. Annal.
• * 1.2584

  Libels.
• (l) 1.2585

  Address, Part. 3.
• (m) 1.2586

  Occultis primum s••rmonibus, ut vetita solent; mox vago ru∣more apud imperiti••i∣mi cujusque promptas a••es, aut rursum a∣p••d tur••idos, eoqu•• nova cvpientes. Tac••. 2. Anna••.
• * 1.2587

  Clubs and Consults.
• (n) 1.2588

  Per conciliabula & caetus seditiosa dis∣serebant. Lib. 3. An∣nal.
• (o) 1.2589

  Nocturnis collo∣quiis, aut flexo ad ve∣sp••um die, delapsis me∣lioribus, deterrimum quemque congregan∣tes. Idem, 1. Annal.
• (p) 1.2590

  Studi•• militum affectaverat, contu∣bernales appellando, a∣lios agnoscere, quosdam requirere, pecunia aut gratia juvare: inse∣rendo querel••s & am∣biguos de Galba ser∣mones, quaeque alia turbamenta vulgi. Lib. 1. Histor.
• * 1.2591

  Calumnies.
• * 1.2592

  Calculating a Princes Nativity.
• (q) 1.2593

  Cui opus est per∣scrutari super Caesaris salute nisi a quo ali∣quid adversus eum co∣gitatur, vel optatur, aut. Apologia 35. Sueton, in Domitiano.
• (r) 1.2594

  Genus hominum p••∣tentibus insidum, sp••∣rantibus fallax, quod in Civitate nostra, & vetabitur semper, & retinebitur. 1. Hist.
• (s) 1.2595

  2. Annal. ad Chal∣daeorum promissa. Magorum sacra, som∣niorum etiam Inter∣preres impulit, &c. plenam imaginibus do∣mum ostentat, horta∣turque ad luxum & as alienum, &c. Infernas umbr••s car∣minibus eliceret.
• * 1.2596

  Facts & de Mathe∣maticis, Magisque, I∣talia pellendis Senatus consulta.
• * 1.2597

  The Method the Long Parliament u∣sed.
• (t) 1.2598

  Address.
• (u) 1.2599

  Culpae vel gloriae socii. Tacit. 3. Hist.
• (w) 1.2600

  Quanto quis au∣dacia promptior, tan∣to magis sidus, rebus∣que motis potior babe∣tur. Idem, 1. Histor.
• * 1.2601

  The Act against Tu∣multuous Petitions.
• * 1.2602

  See the Votes.
• * 1.2603

  Of Tumults.
• (x) 1.2604

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 c. 4.
• (y) 1.2605

  V••••ibus truculen∣tis strepere, rursum viso Casare trepidare. Murmur incertum, a∣trox clamor & repente quies, diversis animo∣rum moribus, pavebaret & terreba••••. 1. Annal.
• (a) 1.2606

  Seditio semel ac∣cunsa, quasi scantilla, impetu populari re∣pente agitatur, ac to∣tum prius inflammari solet, quam extingui possit. De Repub. c. 4.
• (b) 1.2607

  Vbi Respublica ae∣gra, quave vix cica∣trices, clade intestina acceptas, obduxerit. Clapm. de Arcanis dominationis, lib. 3. c. 16. When Danger less.
• (c) 1.2608

  Essays.
• * 1.2609

  When Princes not to make themselves Parties.
• (d) 1.2610

  In caducam pari••∣tem ne inclinet.
• (e) 1.2611

  Cujus r••ina se quoque tradura est. Tacitus de Moribus Germ.
• * 1.2612

  When Princes to support one Party.
• (f) 1.2613

  Manifestum est neque perire nos, ne∣que salvos esse nisi una posse. Tacit. 10. Hist. P. 195. Edit. Lips. 5.
• * 1.2614

  Unanimity a dange∣rous Sign.
• (g) 1.2615

  Id militares ani∣mos altius conj••••••an∣tibus, praecipuum in∣dicium magni atque implacabilis motus, quod neque disjecti, nil paucorum instinctu, sed pariter ardescerent, pariter silerent; tan∣ta aequalitate & con∣stantia, ut regi crede∣res. 1. Annal.
• (h) 1.2616

  Ad tuendam ple∣bem Tribunitio Ju••e ••tentum; militem do••is, populum Anne∣na, cun••los dulcedine o••ii pellexit. Insurge∣re pa••tatim, munia Sena••us, Magistratu∣um, Legum, in se tra∣here, nullo adversante. lbid.
• * 1.2617

  The Methods of De∣signers.
• (i) 1.2618

  Opportunos magnis conatibus transitus re∣rum. 1. Histor.
• (k) 1.2619

  Primas dominandi spes in arduo, ubi sis ingressus, adesse studia & ministros. Lib. 4. Annal.
• * 1.2620

  Speedy Suppression most necessary.
• (l) 1.2621

  Nibil in civilibus discordiis festinatione tutius, ubi facto ma∣gis quam consilio opus. 1. Hist.
• * 1.2622

  The Mischiefs of Faction.
• (m) 1.2623

  Inter victores vi∣ctosque nunquam solida sides coalescit. Idem, 2. Hist.
• (n) 1.2624

  Quem paenitet pec∣casse, pene est innocens.
• (a) 1.2625

  Omne recens ma∣lum facile opprimitur, inveteratum fit ple∣rumque robustius. Ci∣cero Philip.
• (b) 1.2626

  Incipiens, & non∣dum adulta seditio me∣lioribus conciliis fle∣ctitur.
• * 1.2627

  1. The Debauched.
• (c) 1.2628

  Hac conditio Prin∣cipum, ut quicquid fa∣ciam, pr••ipere 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Quintil. De∣clam. 2.
• * 1.2629

  2. Light-Headed.
• (d) 1.2630

  Pontefract.

  • Mr. Wakefield
  • Mr. Hitchin
  • Mr. Skipton

  Ald.
• * 1.2631

  3. The Indigent.
• (e) 1.2632

  Essays.
• * 1.2633

  L••vissimus quisque & fauri improvidus sp•• vana tumet.
• * 1.2634

  4. The Ambitious.
• (f) 1.2635

  St. Alban's E•• says, c. 36.
• (g) 1.2636

  Idem.
• (h) 1.2637

  Percandam posthac modestiam ut conten∣tius esset. Tacit. 4. Annal.
• (i) 1.2638

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 2.
• (k) 1.2639

  History of Hun∣gary
• (l) 1.2640

  Inauditi atque in∣defensi tanquam inno. centes ••erierunt. 1. Histor.
• * 1.2641

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 5. Polit. c. 11.
• (m) 1.2642

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• (n) 1.2643

  Semper periculo∣sum, privati hominis nomen supra nomen Principis attolli. Vita Agricolae.
• (o) 1.2644

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lib. 2.
• (p) 1.2645

  Magna libertatis (ac Principatus) cu∣stodia, si magna impe∣ria, diuturna esse non sinas. Lib. 4.
• (q) 1.2646

  Corpus illi labo∣rem tolerans, animus audax, sui obtegens; in alios criminator, juxta a••••l••tor & su∣perbus; palam compe∣situs pudor, intus sum∣ma apiscendi libido, & ejusque causa modo largitus, & luxus, sae∣p••us industria ac vi∣gilantia haud minus noxiae, quotiens paran∣do Regno finguntur. 1. Annal.
• (r) 1.2647

  Tiberium variis artibus devinxit, adeo ut obscurum adversum, alios, sibi uni incau∣tum intectumque assi∣ceret. Id.
• (s) 1.2648

  Satyra 10.
• * 1.2649

  5. The Envious.
• (t) 1.2650

  St. Alban's Es∣says, c. 1. p. 33.
• * 1.2651

  Id.
• * 1.2652

  Id.
• * 1.2653

  Id.
• * 1.2654

  Id.
• (u) 1.2655

  Dolendi modus, ti mendi non item.
• * 1.2656

  6. The Discontented.
• (w) 1.2657

  St. Albans, tit. Sedition.
• (x) 1.2658

  Da malorum poe∣nitentiae, honorum con∣sensui spacium. Tacit. 1. Histor.
• (y) 1.2659

  Ipse inutili conta∣tione agendi, tempus consultando consumpsit; mox utrumque conci∣lium aspernatus, quod inter ancipitia deter∣rimum est, dum media sequitur nec ausus est satis, nec praevidit. Id. 3. Hist.
• (a) 1.2660

  Nec contatione opus, ubi perniciosior fit quies, quam teme∣ritas. Idem, 1. Hist.
• * 1.2661

  7. The Emulous.
• (b) 1.2662

  Aequatus inter duos beneficiorum numerus, & mixtis utriusque mandatis, discordia quaesita, auctaque pra∣vo certamine, legato∣rum jus adolevit, diu∣turnitate officii, vel quia minoribus major mulandi cura. 4. Hist.
• * 1.2663

  8. Popularity.
• (d) 1.2664

  Operae pretium est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nere litium ani∣mos e••sque tanquam suspectos notare, qui nimium populariter student: ••i enim fa∣cile plebis animos qua∣quaversum torquent, adrapiunt quodlib er∣tatis avidi praesentem Rempublicam contem∣nua••. Lipsius Polit. Praefat.
• * 1.2665

  9. Cunning men.
• (c) 1.2666

  Privati pertinacia in publicum exitium. Tacit. 10. Hist.
• (d) 1.2667

  Imperium cupien∣ribus, nihil medium inter summa aut prae∣cipitia. Tacit. 2. Hist.
• * 1.2668

  Tenthly, Innova∣tors in Religion. A nulla re majus peri∣culum Imperiis & Sceptris, quam ab in∣novata, & insidiose si∣mulata Religione. lib. de una Religione.
• * 1.2669

  Of Libels.
• (f) 1.2670

  Ipse divus Juli∣us, ipse divus Augu∣stus & tulere ista, & reliqu••re, haud facile dixerim moderatione magis an sapientia: namque spreta exo∣lescunt, si irascare a∣gnita videntur.
• * 1.2671

  In the twenty eighth Law of King Alfred, entituled, Be fole leasungum gewyr••∣tum, Of false Rumors or Lies done or told to the People, the Punishment was, That his Tongue should be cut out, bim mon accors tha Tungan of, unless he redeemed it at the price of his Head.
• (g) 1.2672

  In civitate dis∣cordi, & ob crebras Principum mutatio∣nes, inter libertatem & licentiam incerta, parvae quoque res mag∣nis motibus ageban∣tur. Tacit. 2. Hist.
• * 1.2673

  Concerning Corpo∣rations.
• (h) 1.2674

  Crebrescebat enim Graecas per urbes li∣centia atque impuni∣tas asyla statuendi; complebantur ••••mpla pessimis servitia••um, eodem subsidio obaera••i adversus creditores, suspectique capitalium criminum receptaban∣tur: nec ullum satis validum Imperium e∣rat coercendis seditio∣nibus populi; flagitia hominum, ut Caeremo∣nias Deum prot••en∣tes. Igitur placitum ut mitterent civitates Jura, atque Legauos, &c. Magnaque ejus diei species fuit, quo Senatus majorum be∣neficia, sociorum p••∣cta, Regum etiam qui ante vim Romanam valuerant, decreta: Ipsorum numinum Re∣ligiones introspexit li∣bero ut quondam, quod firmaret mutare••ve, Tacit. 3. Annal.
• * 1.2675

  A Prince's Vertue.
• (a) 1.2676

  Nihil virtute a∣mabilior, quam qui adeptus est, ubicunque erit gentium a nobis diligetur. Cicero l. 1. de Natura Deorum.
• (b) 1.2677

  Stobaeus, Serm. 1.
• (c) 1.2678

  Plutarc. in Lacon.
• (d) 1.2679

  Intaminatis fulget honoribus; Nec sumit nec ponit secures, Ar∣bitrio popularis aurae. Horat. Carm. Lib. 5. Od. 2.
• (e) 1.2680

  Discimus experi∣mento sidissimam esse custodiam Prineipis ipsius innocentiam. Panaegyr.
• * 1.2681

  A Prince's Pru∣dence.
• (f) 1.2682

  Praeterita cogita, praesentia ordina, fu∣tura provide. Senec. de Benefic••s.
• * 1.2683

  Tanquam oculus men∣tis undiquaque luci∣dissimus.
• (g) 1.2684

  Facta praeterita, certa documenta dant futuris.
• (h) 1.2685

  Stobaeus de Pru∣dentia.
• (i) 1.2686

  Plut. in Lacon.
• (k) 1.2687

  Tutissimum mu∣rum esse prudentiam, nec collabitur, nec pro∣ditur. Machinis aut suffossionibus, aut val∣lorum proditione ca∣piuntur; prudentis autem decreta sunt in∣expugnabilia. Laert. lib. 6. c. 1.
• (l) 1.2688

  Ʋtque evenit in consiliis infoelicibus, optima viderentur quo∣rum tempus essugerit. Tacitus 1. Hist. A Prince's Justice.
• (m) 1.2689

  Remota Justitia, quid sunt Regna, nisi magna latrocinia? Aug. 4. de Civ. Dei.
• (n) 1.2690

  Justitiae consors, tacitumque in pectore Numen. Silius Ital.
• (o) 1.2691

  Sanctissimum hu∣mani generis bonum. Senec. Epist.
• * 1.2692

  A Prince's Provi∣dence.
• (p) 1.2693

  In animos homi∣num illabitur admira∣tionis praetextu vela∣ta. Valer. lib. 2. c. 1.
• (q) 1.2694

  Cunctator natura, & cui cauta consilia cum ratione, quam foelicia ex casu pla∣cent.
• (r) 1.2695

  Sapientis nihil esse vovum, aut subitum, ut nunquam dicat non putaram. Laertius, lib. 6. c. 1.
• (s) 1.2696

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Cyropaed. lib. 1.
• (t) 1.2697

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 1.
• (u) 1.2698

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A Prince's Political Capacity.
• * 1.2699

  A Prince's Wealth.
• (w) 1.2700

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Co••icus Vetus.
• (x) 1.2701

  Quisquis h••bet nummos secura navi∣gat aura, Fortunamque suo temperat arbitrio. Petronius.
• (y) 1.2702

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 2. Polit. c. 7.
• * 1.2703

  The necessity of a Standing Force.
• (z) 1.2704

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Li. 42.
• (a) 1.2705

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. lib. 2. c. 7.
• (b) 1.2706

  Neque sibi vitam tauti ut armis tegenda fo••e••. 6. Annal.
• (c) 1.2707

  Non ignavia mag∣na Imperia contineri, sed virorum armorum∣que faciendum certa∣men. Si foris bostem non habet, domi inveniet.
• (d) 1.2708

  Is habirus ani∣morum suit, ut pessi∣mum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. 1. Histor.
• (e) 1.2709

  Tumultuari••e. Bel∣garum Cobortes, Pa∣ganorum lixarumque ignava sed procax ante periculum manus. Subito delectu supple∣t•• Legiones augeban∣tur. 4. Hist.
• (f) 1.2710

  Ignavissimus quis∣que & in periculo mi∣nimum ausurus, nimii verbis, linguae feroces. Id. 1. Histor.
• (g) 1.2711

  Pro Muraena.
• (h) 1.2712

  Nihil neque sir∣mius, neque felicius, neque laudabilius est Republica in qua a∣bundant milites. Plu∣rimum enim terroris armorum splendor im∣portat. 2. de Re Mi∣lit.
• (i) 1.2713

  St. Alban's Es∣says.
• (k) 1.2714

  Fluxa militum si∣des & periculum a singulis.
• * 1.2715

  A Prince's Fortu∣nateness.
• (l) 1.2716

  Ad amplitudinem & gloriam & ad res magnas gerendas divi∣nitus adjuncta fortu∣na — dormientibus dii omnia consiciunt, & in sinum iis de coelo victoria devolat. Pro Leg. Manl. Sed ••e — Nos facimus for∣tuna deam, coeloque lo∣camus.
• (m) 1.2717

  Plut. de Fortu∣na Rom.
• (n) 1.2718

  Lib. 36. c. 5.
• (o) 1.2719

  Prosperis tuis re∣bus certaturi ad obse∣quium; Fortunam ad∣vers••m omnes ex aequo detrect abunt. Tacit. 2. Histor. Lib. 1. Od. 35.
• * 1.2720

  Of a Prince's Fame.
• (p) 1.2721

  Magis sama quam vi stare res suas. 6. Annal.
• (q) 1.2722

  Caeteris mortali∣um in eo stare consi∣lia quid sibi conducere arbitrentur: Princi∣pum diversam esse sor∣tem, quibus, praecipu•• rerum ad famam di∣rigenda. 4. Annal.
• (r) 1.2723

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Lib. 3.
• (a) 1.2724

  A••ma aperta pa∣lam vites; fraus, & dolus occulta, eaque in••vitabilia. 2. Hist.
• (b) 1.2725

  Multa pericula neque evitare, neque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in promptu est. Sallust. ad Caesarem.
• (c) 1.2726

  Quibu•• de conju∣••••tione comperta non creditur, nisi occisis. Lib. 40.
• (d) 1.2727

  Contempsit omnes ille, qui mortem prius. Octav.
• * 1.2728

  Quisquis vitam suam contempsit, tui domi∣nus. Epist. 4.
• (e) 1.2729

  Multae illis manus, tibi una cervix.
• (f) 1.2730

  Magni fortunam populi in ruinas agat.
• (g) 1.2731

  Omnia summa ra∣tione gest••••etiam for∣tuna sequitur.
• (h) 1.2732

  Solum sape insi∣diarum remedium esse, si non intelligantur. 1. Annal.
• (i) 1.2733

  Conari ne te la∣teat quid quisque sub∣ditorum f••cit. 5. Po∣lit. c. 11.
• * 1.2734

  Fas est ab hoste do∣ceri.
• (k) 1.2735

  Impia proditio celeri poena vindican∣da est. Valer. Lib. 3. c. 6.
• * 1.2736

  Insidiatori, & latroni, quae potest inferri in∣justa nex?
• (l) 1.2737

  Securitati consules antequam vindictae. 12. Annal.
• (m) 1.2738

  Crebro vulgi ru∣more laceraberis, tan∣quam viros intontes, ob invidiam aut me∣tum, extinxeris. 15. Annal.
• (n) 1.2739

  Est mos vulgo mu∣tabili, subita, & tam prono in misericordiam quam immodicum saevitia fuerit•• 1. Hist.
• (o) 1.2740

  Melius sanare vi∣tiosas partes, quam ex∣secare. 2. ad Attic. Ep. 5.
• (p) 1.2741

  Omnis animadver∣sio, non ad ejus qui punit aliquem, sed ad Reipublicae utilitatem referenda. 2. de Offic.
• (q) 1.2742

  Non tam ut ipsi percant, quam ut alios a pereundo deterreant. 1. de Ira.
• (r) 1.2743

  Qui puniendi cau∣sam habent, modum non habent. 2. de Clem.
• (s) 1.2744

  Parentes liberique eorum qui interfecti sunt, & prepinqui, & ami••i in locum singu∣lorum succedunt. 2. de Clementia.
• (t) 1.2745

  Poenam, si tuto po∣teris, donabis; sin m••∣nus, temp. rabis. 〈…〉〈…〉 Clem.
• (u) 1.2746

  Facile studia vul∣gi ad se trabunt, vel inviti.
• (w) 1.2747

  Ʋt consuleret sibi, & turbis, seque prave defam••tibus subtra∣beret. Esse illi per A∣siam agros, in quibus & tuta & inturbida juventa frueretur. Tacit. 14. Annal.
• (x) 1.2748

  Maxima illece∣bra peccandi impuni∣tatis spes. Pro Mi∣lone.
• (y) 1.2749

  Apud quem condi∣tum, imo constrictum est ferrum. Seneca.
• (z) 1.2750

  Corruptus simul, & corruptor, aeger & flagrans animus, haud lenioribus remediis re∣stinguendus est, quam libidinibus ardescit. 3. Annal.
• (a) 1.2751

  Ʋnius improbi supplicio, muliorum improbitates coercere. 3. in Verrem.
• (b) 1.2752

  Neque aliud glis∣centis discordiae reme∣dium, quam si unus alterve, maxime prom∣pti, subverterentur. Tacit. 4. Annal.
• (c) 1.2753

  Rerum atro••ium ministros, veluti pla∣culares publici odii.
• (d) 1.2754

  Ne sanguinem no∣stram largeas, dum P••aucis sceleratis par∣cis, bonos omnes pro∣ditum eas. Sallust. in Catilinam.
• (e) 1.2755

  Tanquam ad cla∣rum & beneficum sidus certatim advolare, ob∣jicere pro illo mucro∣nibus insidiatorum p••∣ratiss••mi. De Clem. lib. 1. c. 3.
• (f) 1.2756

  10 Ed. 6. c. 12.
• (g) 1.2757

  1 Mar. c. 8.
• (h) 1.2758

  Transcendent and multiplied Re∣bellion, p. 25. See Sir. Tho. Wyat's Speech, at his Exe∣cution, in Holling∣shead, well worth perusing by all con∣cerned.
• (i) 1.2759

  Quippe in turb•• & discordias pessimo cuique plurima vis: pax & quies bonis Ar∣tibus indigent. 4. Hist. initio.
• (a) 1.2760

  Arist. Pol. l. 3. c. 10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 The Advantage of Hereditary Successi∣on in Private Fami∣lies. Aristotle's Opinion.
• (b) 1.2761

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 De Repub. l. 3. c. 11.
• (c) 1.2762

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 p••ly. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 6. p. 455. D. Edit. Wickl. 1509. Several Reasons why Succession is to be preferr'd before Election.
• * 1.2763

  Polybius his Opini∣on.
• (c) 1.2764

  Dr. Nalson's Com∣mon Interest, p. 113.
• * 1.2765

  The Inconveniences that happen where Right Succession is not observed.
• (d) 1.2766

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lib. 5. Polit. c. 10. Giphanii Comment.
• (e) 1.2767

  In vita Cleomenis & Aegidis.
• (f) 1.2768

  Nalson's Com∣mon Interest, p. 118.
• (g) 1.2769

  10. Annal.
• (h) 1.2770

  Right of Succes∣sion, p. 149.
• * 1.2771

  Hereditary Successi∣on agreeable to the Law of Nature.
• (i) 1.2772

  Cum ratio natura∣lis. ff. de bonis dam∣nati.
• (k) 1.2773

  Matth. 21.
• (l) 1.2774

  Et Sect. emancipati. Institut. de Haered. quae ab Intestato.
• (m) 1.2775

  L. hac parte. ff. unde cognati.
• * 1.2776

  Agreeable to the law of God.
• (n) 1.2777

  Numb. 27. v. 9, 10.
• (o) 1.2778

  Numb. 36.
• (p) 1.2779

  2 Chron. 22.1.
• * 1.2780

  Agreeable to the Law of Nations.
• (q) 1.2781

  De Repub. lib. 6. c. 5.
• (r) 1.2782

  In c. grand. de supplenda neglig. Pra∣lat.
• (s) 1.2783

  Jus Regium p. 158.
• * 1.2784

  The British Monar∣chy Hereditary.
• (t) 1.2785

  Of the States and their Powers, p. 68.
• (u) 1.2786

  Majestas Inteme∣rata.
• (w) 1.2787

  Finch, p. 83.
• (x) 1.2788

  Coke 4. Report. Praef.
• (y) 1.2789

  Interregnum aut tituli suspensionem ••ae∣ges Regni non per∣mittere. Hist. H. 7. p. 26.
• (z) 1.2790

  Potius media via institit, simplicis sta∣bilimenti. Ideo verbis tectis & utrinque nu∣tantibus his, ut haere∣ditas Coronae resideres, remaneret & continu∣aretur in Rege.
• (a) 1.2791

  Report 7, 8, 10, 11. Calvin's Case, Watson and Clark's Case, 1 Jac. 1.
• (b) 1.2792

  3. Instit. 8.
• (c) 1.2793

  Cap. 2.
• * 1.2794

  The Recognition of King James the First.
• * 1.2795

  How to understand the Act made by Queen Elizabeth a∣gainst the Claims of Mary Queen of Scots.
• (d) 1.2796

  Jus Regium, p. 181.
• (e) 1.2797

  Id. p. 183.
• * 1.2798

  The Injustice in de∣posing Kings.
• * 1.2799

  When Acts of Par∣liament to be less esteemed.
• (f) 1.2800

  Cap. 22.
• * 1.2801

  Concerning the se∣veral Entailings of the Crown by King Henry the Eighth.
• (g) 1.2802

  Cap. 2.
• (h) 1.2803

  Cap. 7.
• (i) 1.2804

  Cap. 1.
• (k) 1.2805

  25 H. 8. c. 22.
• (l) 1.2806

  Jus Regium, p. 178, 179.
• (m) 1.2807

  P. 45.
• * 1.2808

  Jus Regium, p. 179.
• * 1.2809

  Fundamentals in Government not to be altered.
• (n) 1.2810

  Cap. 2.
• * 1.2811

  See Commission for Union, 16••4.
• * 1.2812

  The Hereditary Suc∣cession is a Funda∣mental.
• (o) 1.2813

  Craig.
• (p) 1.2814

  Jus Reg. p. 169.
• (q) 1.2815

  St. Alban's Hist H. 7. p. 29.
• * 1.2816

  Coronam ipsam omnes sanguinis oppilationes quae descensum Coronae ullatenus impediunt, deobstruere.— Vt Regi opera Parlia∣mentaria non fuisset opus.
• * 1.2817

  The Oaths of Alle∣giance and Supre∣macy against alter∣ing Succession.
• (r) 1.2818

  Address, part 3. p. 64.
• (s) 1.2819

  Coke on Littleton, p. 8.
• * 1.2820

  Objection.
• * 1.2821

  Answered.
• (t) 1.2822

  See 18 E. 3.
• * 1.2823

  Acts of Parliament cannot alter Lineal Succession.
• (u) 1.2824

  Jus Reg. p. 153.
• (w) 1.2825

  Sect. sed naturale. Institut. de Jure na∣turali.
• (x) 1.2826

  Voet. de Statutis sect. 5. c. 1, Accursius in L. Prin∣ceps F. de Leg. Cle∣mentina pasturalis de re Judicata.
• (y) 1.2827

  Jus Reg. p. 154.
• (z) 1.2828

  Nulla clausula Successori Jus auferri potest, modo succedat ille Jure Regni. Ari∣staeus c. 7. num. 5.
• (a) 1.2829

  Pausanias, lib. 1.
• (b) 1.2830

  Jus Regium, p. 163.
• * 1.2831

  Fab. Cod. 9. ti••. 28.
• (d) 1.2832

  Liberty of Sub∣ject, p. 25.
• (e) 1.2833

  Jus Regium, p. 167.
• (f) 1.2834

  Jus Regium, p. 166.
• * 1.2835

  The Miseries which Kingdoms have su∣stained where the Succession hath been interrupted.