The excellency of monarchical government, especially of the English monarchy wherein is largely treated of the several benefits of kingly government, and the inconvenience of commonwealths : also of the several badges of sovereignty in general, and particularly according to the constitutions of our laws : likewise of the duty of subjects, and mischiefs of faction, sedition and rebellion : in all which the principles and practices of our late commonwealths-men are considered / by Nathaniel Johnston ...

CHAP. XXIX. Of Factious Combinations in Parliaments.

I Hope in the foregoing Chapters, I have so explained the Constitution of Parliaments, and the Legislative Power, that unbiassed and unprejudiced Persons will no more be mis∣led by the Sophisms, and plausible pretences, which to ag∣grandize the Power of the two Houses at first, and after of the Commons House only, the Penmen of the long Parlia∣ment made use of; yet because many of late were furbishing the rusty Armour of their Demagogues, and trimming their Helmets with fresh Plumes, I conceive it necessary to take notice of some of their chiefest Arguments, and examine those which had greatest Influence upon the People.

The great and venerable name of Parliament, and its Autho∣rity, was constantly used as Shield and Buckler, to ward off all the Force of the Loyal Assaults; and Mr. Prynne writ a large Volume, which he stiled, The Soveraign Power of Par∣liaments: and when the very Lees and Dregs of the Commons House was put in Ferment, that very Kilderkin would admit no lower Stile, than the supreme Authority of the Nation to be pearched on its Bunghole.

Therefore to disabuse the less considerate,* 1.1 and to detect the Frauds of those, which under that great Name applyed what∣ever they met with in the Laws, or History, to the House of Commons; I think it necessary in the first place to clear the acceptation of the Word.* 1.2

Sometimes the word Parliament is used for the House of(a) 1.3 Lords only; as when upon Writ of Error, any Judgment in the King's-Bench is examined in the House of Lords, the Judgment is said to be affirmed or reversed by Parliament.

The Appellation of Parliament is likewise used for the two Houses,* 1.4 in regard they are the gross Body, whereof the Parli∣ament consists, there only wanting the Sovereign Head to com∣pleat it. But they are so far from being the High Court of Parliament, that they cannot co-unite to be an entire Court, either of Sovereign or Ministerial Justice, but only in concurring in Votes in their several Houses, for preparing of matters, in

order to an act of all the Body; which when they have done, their Votes are so far from having any legal Authority in the State, as in Law there is no Stile or Form of their joynt Acts, further than Bills, nor doth the Law so much as take no∣tice of them, till they have Royal Assent; without which, the Votes of the two Houses dye in the Womb, like an Embryo.

So that the proper use of the word Parliament,* 1.5 (as Au∣thority of Law-making is annexed to the name) is only when the King and the two Houses concurr in one Act, and in that sence only is the Parliament the Supream Court, the highest Judica∣tory, and the most Sovereign Power: Not for any Soveraignty in the two Houses, and from them transferred to the King by their joining and consenting with him; but because every com∣pleat and perfect Act of it, is the Act of the personal Will and Power of the Sovereign himself, standing in his highest Estate Royal.

Therefore whoever reads the Authors that writ in defence of the Parliament, must consider this Fallacy they frequent∣ly used, that he do not apply the Authoritative Act of the King, with the Consent of the two Houses, to the Houses without the King.

From the Co-operation of the two Houses in preparing Laws,(b) 1.6 the late 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (since King Charles the First's time) of the words,* 1.7 Be it end••ed by the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons (as if they were all Fellow-Commissioners) and the unwariness of some of the Penners of the King's Answers to some of the Papers of the two Houses, wherein they stiled the King the third Estate; the Commonwealths-Men have taken the advantage to reckon the King but as a third Legislator.

Therefore I think it necessary to remove this Rub e're I pro∣ceed further. Although the Author of the Imposture,* 1.8 called the modus tenendi Parliamentum, makes six degrees of constituent Members of the Parliament, viz. The King first, then Secondly, the Archbishops; Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and other Clerks, who held Baronies. Thirdly, the Proctors of the Clergy. Fourth∣ly, the Earls, Barons, and other great Men, who held to the value of a County or Barony. Fifthly, the Knights of Shires. Sixthly, the Citizens and Burgesses, to which he might have added the Barons of the Cinque-Ports; yet he saith the King is the Head, Beginning and End of the Parliament, and so hath no(c) 1.9 Peer in his degree. Yet it plainly appears, that these we now call the two Houses, were by reason of their distinct Orders, most frequently divided into three. For in(d) 1.10 6 E. 3. at his Parliament at York, the Record saith, That on the Fri∣day before the Feast of St. Michael, the Prelates, or the Clergy by themselves; the Earls and Barons by themselves; the Knights of the Counties, and the Commons by themselves treat∣ed, &c. Othertimes we find the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and great Men, and the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, to have sepa∣rate Consultations by themselves; and to give their several an∣swers

to Articles, and business propounded to them in Parlia∣ment, as Mr. Prynne out of the Abridgment of the Records of the Tower, hath given us above twenty instances.

At the making of the Statute of Praemunire, 16 R. 2. the Commons pray,* 1.11 That the Lords, as well Spiritual as Tempo∣ral, severally, and all the Estates of Parliament might be exa∣mined, how they thought of that matter; and the Lords Spi∣ritual answered by themselves, and the Lords Temporal by themselves; and the King was Petitioned to make this Exa∣mination. So in 40 E. 3. the King asking the Houses, Whether King John could have subjected the Realm, as he did; the Pre∣lates by themselves, and the Dukes, Earls, and Barons by them∣selves, gave their Answer. Besides, we find (as at large I have before instanced in the last Chapter) the Writs of Summons of the Bishops and Clergy, were only, in side & dilectione; and the Barons generally,(e) 1.12 in fide & homagio, or Ligeancia; and the Clergy granted their Subsidies apart, and distinct from the Nobles.

Besides, that the Bishops are to be esteemed the Third Estate, is clear by Act of Parliament: for it being questioned(f) 1.13, whether the making Bishops had been duly and orderly done according to Law; the Statute saith, That the questioning of it is much tending to the slander of all the Clergy, being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the greatest States of the Realm.

So Sir(g) 1.14 Thomas Smith (as in the last Chapter I have noted) distinguisheth the two Houses into three Estates, and Sir Ed∣ward(h) 1.15 Coke saith expresly, That the High Court of Parlia∣ment consisteth of the Kings Majesty sitting in his Royal Poli∣tick Capacity, and the three States of the Realm, viz. the Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons; the like the learned(i) 1.16 Cowel affirms.

Sir Henry Spelman(k) 1.17 calls it a Colloquy of all the Orders of the Kingdom, convened by the sole Authority of the King, to consult and appoint in the Affairs of the Kingdom.

This was also known to Foreigners, uninteressed Persons; for the Lord Argenton speaking how Subsidies were granted in England, saith* 1.18, Convocatis primis Ordinibus, Clericis & Laicis, & assentiente Populo: And Bodin‖ 1.19 whenever he speaks of the Constitution of our Parliament, calls it the King and the three Estates of the Realm.

But to put all out of doubt, in King Charles the Second's Reign, it is determined in the Act for the Form of Prayers for the Fifth of November, For the Preservation of the King, and the Three Estates.

Now the reason why in King Charles the First's answer,* 1.20 we meet with the expressions of making the King the third Estate, was, because at that time, the Bishops being voted out of the House of Lords, and the two Houses setting themselves in all the points of Controversie in opposition to the King, the notion of a Triumvirate was more intelligible (as it may be thought)

to the People, and those who were so bitter Enemies to the King, and had such a Rebellious force, would have still in∣creased the Peoples aversion, if the King had asserted his Roy∣al Prerogative otherwise. Whether this were the true reason, or the oversight of the Penners of his Majesties Answers, I will not undertake to determine; but I am induced to believe the first, because, I find the King, and those that writ in de∣fence of his Cause, using frequently this way of Argument.

In every State there are three Parts (saith(l) 1.21 one, the King or∣dered to write for him) capable of just or unjust Soveraignty, viz. the Prince, Nobles and People. Now through the Piety of our Lawgiving Princes, a just and regular course of Government being obtained, the stability of which being found to be more concerned in the Power of making Laws, than in any other Pow∣er belonging to the Soveraign; for preventing of Innovations, that might subvert that setled regularity, the frame and state of Government was in such a sort established, as that the Prince should be limited from using the legislative Power, without con∣current assent of the Peers and Commons. By which means the constitution of our Parliaments, is so equal and geometrical, and all parts so equally contribute their Offices, that no part can have an extream predominance over other: Therefore to pre∣vent any evil that might come by the admission of two such Bodies, to a participation of Power, in this particular of making Laws (if they should combine against the Soveraign) the Law gives them an equal Power to assent or dissent;* 1.22 so that opposing the single Power of every one of them, to the Votes of every o∣ther two, there might be so secure a balancing of the Power of one against the other, that no practice of any two of them, should do any prejudice and diminution to the third, without the third Party it self did give consent unto it: otherwise the King and Peers might oppress the Commons, the King and Com∣mons oppress the Peers, or the Peers and Commons oppose the King; and the Peers being easily oppressed by the Commons (as we saw in our late calamitous Times) an Appian Decemvirate, or the 30 or 300 Tyrants might get the Power into their own hands.

In another place he saith, Though properly Laws be the Acts of the King in Parliament, yet are they also truly the Acts of the whole Parliament; because every of the Estates contribute their Power according to the diversity of their Office and Inte∣rest, and so as from a sacred Tripos, the civil Oracles of the Law are delivered.

It is therefore to be considered (saith a Judicious(m) 1.23 Au∣thor, in answer to some other passages of his Majesty that the Parliamentarians wrested) That if his Majesty, out of a desire to save the effusion of Blood, used such gracious Expressions as were most likely to prevail with the People, and consolidate their Minds, they ought not in Equity to prejudice the Rights of the Crown, although he had abdicated therein, some parts of

his Authority, and granted things destructive to his own Prero∣gative. From his Majesties saying, That the Power, legally pla∣ced in both Houses, is more than sufficient to prevent, and re∣strain the Power of Tyranny, they infer, This cannot be made good without a Power of Resistance; for that Tyranny cannot otherwise be restrained. Which is easily answered. For it cannot be understood, that the King means by this, a forceable resistance or restraint,(n) 1.24 but a legal one, so far as Humane Prudence can by lawful and just ways provide. The Power they have by Law, being to inflict punishments on evil Instruments, whereby others may be afraid to take upon them such Imployments; and they may refuse to give the King Subsidies, and other necessa∣ry Assistance, if he refuseth to moderate excesses, which are Powers more efficacious than resistance; the success of the one being more probable and likely than the other.

However,* 1.25 in my poor opinion, it had been more honourable, and probably more efficacious, to have spent less time in this kind of defending the Kings Interest by the Pen, and have im∣ployed it in asserting the true Prerogative of the King, and his undoubted Rights, to have let the People, as well as the Houses know, what he would reform, and out of Princely Clemency grant, for his Peoples ease, and at their earnest Petition; but neither to have depreciated, or descended so much below the Majesty and Dignity of his place, to enter into Reply and Du∣ply, Altercation, and Apologies with his Subjects. But that King, composed all of Mercy, Justice, and Tenderness to his Sub∣jects, judging others by his own Royal Standard of Integrity, let the Houses seize his Ships, Magazines, and left them the Ci∣ty of London's Purse, while he retired to the North, and plied the Houses with Declarations and Messages, to have reduced them to their Duties: and though his condescensions were great, and the way of Argument such as before I have instan∣ced in; yet I cannot find (except in that particular of making himself one of the three Estates) that he yielded any part of his Royal Prerogative, till he was made Prisoner; that in his re∣straint he condescended to a temporary divesting himself of the Militia, and other things, which all sorts of Subjects (except the very chief of those in Rebellion against him) found infinite∣ly more tending to the enslaving, and utter ruine of the People, than ever they could have been, if the King had ma∣naged all by his absolute Will, and the direction of those they accounted his worst Instruments.

I having in several places cleared the Kings Soveraignty, shall only on this Head endeavour to answer the principal of those popular Reasons the Writers for the Parliament used, not grounded upon any Law or Constitution of the Government, but only upon the false supposition, That the Wisdom of the two Houses was to be valued above the Wisdom of the King and Council, in proposing matters for the Royal Assent, which were conducible to the Liberty of the Subject, which they pre∣tended

was their whole design, and that they would establish the Kings Throne in more Glory and Splendor than had ever been in any Ages.

The first and principal Topick they used, was,* 1.26 That the Mo∣narchy of England was in its Constitution allayed, and the Pow∣er of the two Houses, in making Laws, had such a Copartner∣ship, and radical mixture, that they had something more than a Consultive and Assenting part; and that the King was oblig'd in the duty of his Office, and by his Coronation Oath, to grant what they desired.

Mr. Sherringham(o) 1.27 hath culled out the prime Arguments of the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, The fuller Answerer, and others upon this Head, and so fully answer'd them, that I must re∣fer the Reader to him for satisfaction, and shall only select some of the chiefest of these Arguments, more for the orderly continu∣ance of this Discourse, than for any need of repeating them.

First, They say, That King Charles the First owned the Law(p) 1.28 to be the Measure of his Power, and if so, it is limited. But this concludes no more, than that his Power is of such a size and bigness as the Law hath ordained; and if the Law give the King absolute, full, and entire Power, and limits him only in the exercise of it, this is a restraint, and limitation ac∣cording to such Laws as the Soveraign hath established in that particular alone, and is the happiness of the English Subject, that Kings act not Arbitrarily: but this gives no Power to the two Houses, to be any checks upon the King, who by the same Laws hath the Power of putting in execution, and suspending the execution of the Laws in many Cases; or that Aristocracy, or Democracy have any such mixture with the Monarchy, as they can impose their Laws upon him. For to suppose a mixed Monarchy, consisting of Three Estates, independent for their Authority upon one another, and to have several shares in the Rights of Sovereignty, and to say, The Government of three Estates, is the Government of one Monarch, is perfect non∣sence: for when(q) 1.29 Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy are melted and allayed together, that which resulteth can take its name from none of the simple species, or kinds of Govern∣ment, but must have some other Appellation.

Whoever will consider aright of the concurrence of the two Houses, in preparing Bills, will find,* 1.30 That though the Houses be as the Causa sine qua non; yet the efficient, procatarctick Cause, and the Authoritative Power in passing these into Laws, is the King only; and what the two Houses do without his As∣sent, is but as the Counsellor at Law's framing a Deed, and the Clerks Ingrossing the Indenture of Conveyance; but till the Seal be set to it, and delivery made, as the Act and Deed of Donor or Conveyor, it is of no force and virtue; neither do we call it the Act and Deed of the Counsellor or Clerk, but of the Person that seals it.

Another Objection those Champions for the two Houses

made great noise with, was,(r) 1.31 That the Power where the Le∣gislative is in all Three, is in the very Root and Essence of it compounded and mixed of those three: so that where this height of Power resideth in a mixed Subject, that is, in three concurrent Estates, the consent and concursus of all being most free, and none depending on the Will of the other, that Monarchy is in the most proper sence, and in the very model of it, a mixed Constitution. And that such is the State of the Monarchy of England, the Objector thinks clear, because the House of Peers are an Aristocracy, and the Commons a Demo∣cracy; and this mixture of Interests and Powers being in the ve∣ry Legislative Power, he concludes the mixture is in the Root and Supremacy of Power, and not in the exercise alone.

In answer to which it must be considered,* 1.32 That though the concurrence of both the Estates with the Monarch in the ma∣king and promulgation of Laws, be such as our Laws describe; yet it is no otherwise than in the precedent Chapters, by unde∣niable proofs, I have made it out, That what participation so∣ever the two Houses have with the King in the Legislature, it is only derivative from the Crown by the King's Summons, and the restriction of those Summons to do and consent.

It is known to be the common Assertion of(s) 1.33 Canonists,(t) 1.34 Civilians, and(u) 1.35 Schoolmen, That the Legislative Power is communicable by the Princes allowance, and that such a con∣currence as our Kings have allowed, is no Argument of Supre∣macy; such a mixture of the three Estates hath been in other Monarchies,* 1.36 which every where are owned to be absolute in re∣spect of Power. For as they are summoned by the Princes single Authority, and dissolved at his own pleasure, they can claim no sort of Right, during their Session, further than to consult about, and prepare Bills for the Royal Assent. There∣fore(w) 1.37 Grotius saith, Istam Legislationem, quae aliis quam Sum∣mae Potestati competit, nihil imminuere de jure Summae Potestatis, quod in Scholis dicunt, cumulative datum censeri non privative. So in our Kingdom, every Corporation hath Authority to make Ordinances and Constitutions within their own Liberties, for the good Order and Government of the Body; and the Inhabi∣tants(x) 1.38 of every Parish, to make By-Laws and Ordinances among themselves for their own profit, where they have Custom for it, and for the Publick Good, where they have no Custom: Surely this is a sort of Legislative Power; yet thereby it can∣not be inferred, that they have any Co-ordinate Power with the King in the Rights of Soveraignty.

So that allowing the Power of the two Houses as large as can be proved by the Laws (for the stretch that the Parliamentarians would make, is by the Tenters they only have set up,) the whole latitude of the Nomothetical Power is not jointly in the two Houses; for none but Strangers to our Laws can deny, That the King hath sole Power to dispense with the Statutes, and abate their Rigour, where a mischief would other∣wise

insue, he alone hath Power by Edicts and Proclamations, to order all Affairs for which there is no order taken by certain and perpetual Laws.

The Legislative Power is either(y) 1.39 Architectonical, or Pre∣ceptive. The Architectonical is that which layeth Materials of Law, and consisteth in two things; First, in determining what is just, convenient, or necessary: Secondly, in declaring, and promulgating that to be actually made a Law, and Enact∣ed, which upon consultation is thought to be just, conveni∣ent, or necessary. The first shews no Jurisdiction in the Per∣sons who have it, but only an Office and Imployment to delibe∣rate and consult. But whoever hath the Second Power, hath a Jurisdiction to define Authoritatively what shall be Law; and this Preceptive Power is that which makes the Law sacred and inviolable, and which giveth it force to oblige the Conscience.

Now it is evident by undeniable Testimony and Authority, that the exercise of the Architectonical Power is only commit∣ted to the two Houses, who have votum consultivum & decisi∣vum, but it is derived from the King, who hath only the Pre∣ceptive Power. So that the Writers for the two Houses, ge∣nerally did use a Sophistical way of arguing, not discovering what they could not but know, the difference betwixt the King's, and the two Houses Powers in the making of Laws. For subordinate Agents, that are but Instruments of another, and work by a derived Power, when they concur with the Principal and supream Agent, have their causality in producing the Effect; yet this doth not prove the Authority to be radically in them. As in an Estate of Lands (saith(z) 1.40 Mr. Sherringham,) wherein a Man hath a perpetual Right in Fee, his Right is distinguished from the King's Right, of whom he holds; the King having the demean of the Land, and the other the demean of the Fee.

So it is in an Estate of Power and Authority; If the King grant∣eth an Estate of Power, Authority and Jurisdiction in Fee-simple, or in Fee-tail, for term, longer or shorter, the King hath the demean of Power, and the other the demean of Use; the King hath Dominium directum, the other Dominium utile; which he ap∣plies to the two Houses: but it must be likewise considered, that this distinct Authority they have, is wholly derivative, and so much the more depending on the Sovereign, as he can at his Pleasure totally deprive them of the Exercise of it by Pro∣rogation, or totally annihilate it by Dissolution.

Another Objection they made,* 1.41 was from the Answer the King authorized a Gentleman to make to the Observer, That the three Estates are constituted to the End that the Power of the one should moderate and restrain the excess of the Power in the other. From which he infers, That this is an Allay and mixture in the Root and essence of the Constitution.

To this it may be answered,* 1.42 That there is no such Power in the two Houses; they are called to consult, and to consent. All they can do is, that they have the opportunity of ha∣ving

grievances redressed, because they may otherwise deny the King the assistance he desires. But they have no Authority of themselves, to redress them, or to restrain and moderate his Excesses by Force, nor can they moderate the Excesses of one another by any Act of their own singly, further than the exor∣bitant Estate shall be willing to be moderated.

It is a most absurd thing to imagine, that when the Law hath placed the Sovereign Power in the King, it should again for a space of time, during the Session of Parliament, unsovereign Him, and place in the two Houses the same Sovereign Trust, and with a second absurdity, leave in the King's Hands the sum∣moning and dissolving, the Power by which himself should be constrained; and to make up all, should by Authority of that Power constrain all the Heads of the People, and even the Re∣presentative Body of that Power, by Solemn Oath, to declare that the King is not only supreme Governour, but that he is only supreme Governour.

Besides the Arguments they sued upon this Head of a deba∣sed Monarch, that was not only to admit some of his Subjects into the Participation of his Burthen, but of his Soveraignty (whereby they pleaded for both the Houses being joynt-Sove∣reigns for the time) they used other Arguments singly for the House of Commons, which they endeavoured to aggrandize, and raise to a strange over-towring heighth, above both King and Lords; and they grounded all their Arguments upon the immense Power of their being the Peoples Representatives.

The Observer saith,* 1.43 That the vertue of Representation, is the great Privilege of Privileges, that unalterable Basis of all Honour and Power, whereby the House of Commons claims the entire Right of all the Gentry and People; and that there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing of God, which can be more perfidious, and more pernicious to the People, than the withdrawing from them; and doth acknowledge that the Arbitrary Rule was once most safe for the World: But now, since most Countries have found out an Art, and peace∣able Order for publick Assemblies (he means by Representa∣tives) whereby the People may assume its own Power, and do it self Right, without the disturbance of it self, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and Order.

In answer to which it ought to be considered, That the Re∣presentative Body deserves the highest Honour and Observance that can be given to the Body Represented;* 1.44 but this Honour will depend upon two things: First the quality and condition of the Body represented, and Secondly, on the quality of the Representative it self. If therefore the Body at large were an absolute Sovereign (as in Republicks,) the true Representative of that Body were to be observed with all Sovereign Honour, and due Subjection: But when the Body at large it self is but a Subject (as it is in Monarchy) the Honour and Authority of the Representative, cannot exceed the Honour and Authority

of a Subject; for none can make the Image more than the Ori∣ginal, or, without Adulterating Arts, appear so. Therefore however abhorrent a Crime he makes it, in such as concurr not in their Judgment with their Representatives that exceed their Authority and Commission: yet all sober and just Persons ought to consider that the Subjects by giving Authority to some of their own Order, to represent them, and advise, and consent for them, gave them no such Power above that of Subjects; yea so much above the condition of their Sovereigns, that neither breach of Faith, nor the Oaths of Allegiance and Su∣premacy (which they never took to them) or any other Duty to their King, was comparable to the withdrawing from the Vote, or Act of their Representators: as if the Rights of the Crown and Kingdom, and the Laws made by the King, with the assent of the three Estates in Parliament, did not so much concern the Commons of the Land; but that against all these they stood solely bound to the Representatives, as the only Sovereign of their Obedience. I shall now offer some Reasons against this dangerous Opinion.

First, It is to be considered,* 1.45 That in our Kingdom the Repre∣sentors are not equally chosen (as in the united Provinces, and other Commonwealths) but it lies in the Power of the Sove∣reign here to make a Town equal in number of Burgesses to a County: which doth vehemently demonstrate, That the first In∣stitution and end of such Representatives was rather to mini∣ster Information of the State and Condition of that particular place, and advise and assist the Sovereign, and to consent with him, and not to determine Sovereignly.

Secondly, The cockering the People in that Opinion, that the Soveraignty lies in Materia prima in them, and by their Re∣presentatives, that they may exert it, is the certain way to ruin not only Monarchy, but all government: as was evident in the case of the Rebellious House of Commons, in King Charles the First's time, who prided themselves so much with the Ti∣tle of Representatives; and by pretext of that and the Assi∣stance of their Army, having unyoked themselves from all Subjection to their Lawful King, and disengaged themselves from their dangerous and useless Collegues, the Lords (as they then voted them) after some while they lost their Honour and Reverence with their own Army, who then would be the People, and pulled them out of their House; justly charging them with a design to perpetuate themselves. And so the Tyran∣nical Supremacy was exercised by Cromwell, and his Council of Officers a while, and after by himself, and his mock-Repre∣sentatives, by Councils of State and Safety, and such new Names and Powers, as our Laws never heard of; and all this under pretence that they Acted by the Peoples Authority and suffrage; and all the sad Devastations of that Age resul∣ted from the confiding so much in the pretended Represen∣tatives of the People. Which(a) 1.46 one some Years before the

sad Catastrophe, plainly foretold; tho' like belief was given to him, as of old to Cassandra. His Words are, That the so much exalting the Power of the Representatives, was first to de∣stroy the King by the Parliament, and next the Parliament and Kingdom by the People. Thus ignorant Politicians that build upon such Quick-sands, soon live to see their Insanae Structurae ruinously fall about their Ears.

Thirdly, Whereas the Advocates for the Representatives, would gladly have possessed the People that they could rely upon none so securely and safely, as upon those they had themselves chosen; they being less subject to private ends and affections, than any particular man, such a Body being not likely to coun∣sel or consent to any thing, but what is publickly advantage∣ous.

It is to be considered, that it is a false Postulatum: Such a Bo∣dy being but an Aggregate of particulars, may have as many private ends as any other number of Subjects; it being well known, that Communities themselves are subject to dange∣rous Inclinations from private Incitements; and I the Represen∣tatives subject to misleading Factions, and Ambitions of private Men; and by coalition of Parties (when they fall into designs) they are most dangerous and fatally violent: and tho' it may, at first View, seem to be repugnant, that an Universality should have private ends; yet seeing it is not the number of Agents, but the capacity in which they act, and the quality of the A∣ctors, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue (with the publick end and weal) which makes the Actions of men public or private: It must needs follow, That if without Authority, or out of the way of Public Ordinances, men pur∣sue any thing, though the whole Community concur in the pur∣suit; yet it is all of the nature of a private Action, and done to a corrupt and private end.

Because the Author of some Observations upon some of K. Charles the 1st. Messages, was reputed the great Champion of the two Houses, I shall content my self with culling out some of the daringest assertions,* 1.47 he and some other of their Triarii used, and apply such of those Answers and Reasonings, as the Learned and Loyal offered then against them, though they could not be heard, while the Torrent bore all down the stream. The hide∣ous noise of Tumults, and after of Drums, Trumpets, Cannons and Fire-Arms hushed and silenced all the still voice of Law and Reason: But now it is to be hoped, when Mens Eyes are unsealed, the Mask and Vizard dropped or pulled off, the fa∣tal Consequences of such pernicious Principles throughly mani∣fested, and the loud Thunder of the Two Houses Ordinance al∣layed, mens Spirits will be better fitted to hear them refuted.

Besides what I have endeavoured to answer before, concern∣ing the Authority of the Representative, which they would make an Assembly; in which the People, in underived Majesty, are by these Proxies convened to affirm an Imaginary Power,

supposed to be theirs originally, and in such a convention to be put in execution: I say besides this, which in several places I have refuted, That filled all their Declarations, Messages and Treatises, when they were contriving the setting up the Com∣mons House Topmost, to prove, That they were a Body that was not easily corrupted, byassed, tempted, or prevailed upon, to Act any thing but what was the best for the Peoples advan∣tage. Therefore I think fit in many particulars to shew, how such Bodies may be warped to sinister ends, and especially how that House not only deceived, but tyrannized over, the whole Nation.

Private(b) 1.48 Quarrels and the memory of former Sufferings may work upon some; discontent and envy at other mens pre∣ferment may transport others; the fear of the lash, and desire to secure themselves have forced some to personate a part; great Offices and Honours have been a Pearl in some Mens Eyes to hinder their Fight; others have been like Organ Pipes, to whom the wind of popular Applause hath only given a sound; others who have premeditated their Parts before their design was dis∣covered, have upon some pretences or other (suppose of an un∣lawful Election, being Monopolists, Abhorrers, or such like) got those excluded by Vote, whom they conceived to be likely to oppose their designs. The bewitching Power of Oratory pre∣vails upon many. In others there is a Speechless Humour of fol∣lowing the Drove.* 1.49 Can we not easily conceive several of this Body may be ambitious, which would prompt them to alter the old way of bestowing Offices, and collating of Honours? so by disservice as well as service in Parliaments, some Men have ob∣tained Honours, Offices and Estates, finding it a good way to get preferment, by putting the King upon necessity of granting. Good Woodmen say, That some have used Deer-stealing as an Introduction to a Keepers place. So we have seen a Non-con∣formist's mouth stopped (I might instance in other Professions) with a good Benefice; whereas, before he was satisfied, he could gape as wide as his Neighbours. Others by more only ways slip into Preferment; for Covetousness and Ambition will sail with any Wind. The Covetousness of the Members of the long Parliament by woful experience was found insati∣able; witness their Voting for one anothers Offices, Govern∣ments, satisfaction for their losses out of Delinquents Estates, sharing the Kings Lands and Revenue, the Bishops, Deans and Chapters Lands, and the Estates of the Royal Party: hence together with the itch of Arbitrary rule, they drew the deter∣mination of Causes out of the ordinary Courts of Justice, be∣fore their Houses and Committees of them, and in every Coun∣ty had their Sub-committees to Tyrannize over the People and fleece them.

Their cruelty appeared in their erecting High Courts of Justice, Major Generals, and other Arbitrary Courts,* 1.50 where many a Loyal and brave man, for serving his King, against such

Rebels, either lost his Life or his Liberty and Estate; and when they were the gentlest, yet they could show hatred enough, by Imprisoning, upon I know not what suspicion, and at leasure prosecuting such as they had a pique against.

The partiality of Members in such Conventions are very frequent,* 1.51 in shielding their friends from being questioned, though their Corruptions were notorious to all the World. So in the fatal Parliament of 1641. A Monopolist, if a Loyal man, was sure to be expelled the House; but if a favourer of the Cause, he was never recriminated with that or any other by-past or present ill disposition.

In such Assemblies there often happen one sort of People, who are always representing grievances, complaining of Male-administration, troubling the Church and State, shaking up the Lees and Dregs in the richest Vessel of Wine, these have learned to catch Eels.

Tacitus notes the corruptions of the Roman Senate,* 1.52 which ne∣cessitated the change of that State into a Monarchy under Augu∣stus, fully, significantly, and concisely after his manner, Suspecto Senatus Populique imperio ob certamen Potentium, avaritiam Magi∣stratuum, invalido legum auxilio, qua vi, ambitu, postremo pecuniaturba∣bantur. The Provinces observing in this Supremacy of the Senate and People, the contests of the most Powerful, the Covetousness of the Magistrates, the feeble help the Laws afforded (by the Ar∣bitrariness of the Senate, we may presume) by what force and moyen; and lastly, how all things were distracted by Bribery, they were the more easily induced to admit of one Soveraign. These particulars were most obvious in the fatal House of Commons.

Besides these things I have hinted at,* 1.53 in such a body as we are speaking of (where there cannot want men designing some dangerous Revolutions, for the establishing their own greatness) though some few wise men may be apprehensive of their de∣signs, yet we know maxima est pars artis celare artem. Such contrivers will be sure by all imaginable Arts to conceal their intentions, and obtain an Ascendent over the Judgment of the gross Body, who either are not so quick-sighted, or aiming at no such things themselves, judge others candor by their own, and so by their helps the designers may carry the Vote against even such as penetrate further into the aims of the Contrivers, than the Ma∣jority do; so that those that have good ends may be hood wink∣ed by others whose ends are worse,* 1.54 and private ends will steal upon well affected: for all grand Conspiracies are veiled un∣der the Mask of Reformation, of removing Grievances and evil Counsellors. Gallant and vertuous actions do not more often ingratiate men with such a mixed body, than a rolling Tongue, a precipitate Head, vain-glorious profusion, oyly insinuations, feigned devotions, sufferings (though deserved) from Superiours, and above all, opposition to the present State.

So the memorable long Parliament of 1641. by the specious pretences of redressing Grievances,* 1.55 taking care of the Public,

and particularly of the Liberty of the Subject and their Privi∣leges, together with vehement Expressions of their Resolutions of Establishing the Kings Throne, upon more firm foundations of the peoples Hearts and Affections; by insensible Screws wound themselves into the credit of Patriots, and being there∣by able to carry a numerous party with them in all their Votes, by little and little made such encroachments upon the Soveraignty, that having undermined it, past support, they took the advantage of its fall and ruine (out of the same specious pretence, that the Commonwealth might suffer no detriment) to propose their long designed Model of Government, not as by them forethought on, but as a necessary expedient to ac∣complish the end (as they pretended) they had all this while been aiming at, viz. the Peoples prosperity, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they endeavoured to make the World believe they were most Zealous for: when God knows, the upshot of all was the total dissolu∣tion of the best constituted Government, and the Establishing themselves a fattened Commonwealth out of the rich spoils of Monarchy.

Yet these very men were they who some years before pos∣sessed as many as they could delude, with an opinion,* 1.56 that none knew better, nor affected more the sweetness of so well ballan∣ced a Monarchy, than they; and that the Kings just Authority was Sacred to them that they would make him more rich and glo∣rious than any of his Predecessors. The Observer told the World, That it had been often in the Power of former Par∣liaments, to load the Government with greater Fetters and Clogs, but they would not; and that change of Government could not be in their desires, because the advantage of the Lords and Commons in the State was so great, that no change of Government could better them, except each one could ob∣tain an hereditary Crown. But these were but vain flourishes and empty aiery offers: success altered their Principles, and they were ill troubled to find out excuses and evasions after the Murther of the Blessed King, and change of Government, for these their so hypocritical Declarations. From all which I shall only desire that Posterity may be cautious how they credit the truth of those, who in such Conventions are the most active for any Innovation, if they see that they zealousliest pretend some greater happiness to the People, by lessening the Authority of the Crown. It is reported of Frederick the Emperour,(c) 1.57 that in the Speech to the Senators, he desired them before they en∣tred into the House of their Assembly, they would leave two things behind them, and then they would give right Judgment; and being asked what those were, he told them,* 1.58 Counterfeiting and Dissembling.

Another of their Arguments,* 1.59 for the preference of the Houses Counsel before all other Councils, was, that many Eyes of so many choice Gentlemen from all parts, see more than fewer; which Sophism easily midwived in the conclusion,

that then the two Houses judgment of Affairs was to be pre∣ferred before the King and his Privy Councils, and the Com∣mons before the Peers; and by a parity of Reason (though they desired not it should be urged so far home) that the body of the People was to be preferred before the Commons House, which might be urged upon as common a Proverb, That By∣standers see more than Gamesters.

But who are so blind as those that will not see? Those very Seers if they would have made use of their Eyes, to have peru∣sed the Histories of former Ages, on what specious pretensions Rebellions had begun, and how the Laws had settled the Go∣vernment in an unparallel'd security of the Peoples Rights, as well as the Prerogative of the Crown, or by serious considera∣tion foreseen the certain and inevitable miseries that would fol∣low the weakning of the Crown, and the necessitating the King for his defence to take up Arms: these quick-sighted Commo∣ners might have prevented all those Calamities that ensued.* 1.60

Whoever considers how easie it is to possess a People with preju∣dices against the Government (of which elsewhere I must enlarge) will soon find that it is no difficult matter to have such Elections of Members as were like to be of the same perswasion with the E∣lectors; So that in such cases, it is not to be wondred at, that a majority of Votes might be opposite to more judicious and fore∣seeing Members judgments; neither is the Maxim universally true, for it must be caeteris paribus, if all things be alike. For it is not sufficient for an Adviser to see, unless he can let another see by the light of Reason. A man ought not implicitely to ground his Actions upon the Authority of other mens Eyes, whether many or few, but of his own. One Physician may see more into the state of a mans body than many Empiricks. One ex∣perienced Commander may know more in Military Affairs than ten fresh-water Souldiers. One old States-man in his own Ele∣ment is worth many new Practitioners. One man upon a Hill may see more than an Hundred in a Valley. And who will de∣ny but among an Hundred, one of them may have a stronger Eye, and see clearer and further than all the Ninety Nine? So one Paphnutius in the Council of Nice, saw more than many greater Clerks. And it is no new thing to find one or two men in the Parliament change the Votes of the House. Therefore nothing is got by this way of arguing, though it be one of the plausiblest, and most improveable of any of the Topicks they choose. And if we could be sure that all the Members of such Assemblies were free from all the imperfecti∣ons such are liable to, much might be yielded to it.

All these Arguments were used for that sole end, that they might possess their Party with the reasonableness of their desires to the King, that he would implicitly yield up his reason to the guidance of their Councils.

They were not so frontless at first,* 1.61 as positively to deny the Kings negative Vote in Parliament, that had never been

doubted, and there is good reason it should be a most sure Fundamental of the Government, since nothing can be Statute∣law but that to which the King assents, Le Roy le veult. For who can be said to will that hath not the Power to deny?* 1.62 But they affirmed that in Cases extraordinary, when the King∣dom was to be saved from ruine, the King seduced, and preferring dangerous men, it was necessary for them to take care of the Publick. And then the Kings denying to pass their Bills, was a deserting of them;* 1.63 Otherwise they alledged Parliaments had not sufficient Power to restrain Tyranny, and so they boldly affirmed they had an absolute indispu∣table Power in declaring Law; and (as their Observer words it) they are not bound to Precedents, since Statutes cannot bind them, there being no obligation stronger than the Ju∣stice and Honour of Parliaments. And to summ up all, he tells us, if the Parliament (meaning the two Houses) be not ver∣tually the whole Kingdom it self; if it be not the supreme Judicature, as well in matters of State as matters of Law; if it be not the great Council of the Kingdom as well as of the King to whom it belongeth, by the consent of all Na∣tions, to provide in all extraordinary cases, ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: let the brand of Treason, saith he, stick upon it. Indeed because by all these most false, and impious as∣sertions, and those horrid Acts built upon them, they brought so great a ruine to the Kingdom, they are and ever will be (u••less a Platonick year return again) branded with Rebellion in the highest degree.

To answer this Accumulation of Treasonable Positions (for such I hope I may call, in some sence,* 1.64 what is against the Kings Crown and Dignity) is no ways difficult from the discourse of right constituted Parliaments: For those of them that carry any shew of Reason, are such only as may be under∣stood of Acts of Parliament compleated by the Royal As∣sent; but being spoken of either or both Houses in opposi∣tion to the King, they are most false, as I shall shew in par∣ticular.

For First, If the two Houses are not bound to keep any Law, no man can accuse them of breach of any: What ob∣ligation can Justice lay on them who by a strange vertue of Representation are not capable of doing wrong? But it is well known that Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses, as being not void till repealed by a joynt consent of the King and the two Houses. It would be much for the credit of the Observers desperate Cause, if he were able to shew one such Precedent of an Ordinance made by Parliament without the Kings assent, that was binding to the Kingdom in nature of a Law. Our Kings can repeal no Laws by their own Prerogative, though they may suspend the Execution. It seems the Houses would have Power to do both; and our Au∣thor in another place, thinks it strange that the King should

assume or challenge such a share in the Legislative Power to himself, as without his concurrence the Lords and Com∣mons should have no right to make Temporary Orders, for putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence. These were strange Phrases never heard before by English Ears. Our Laws give this Honour to the King, That he can joyn or be sharer with no man. The King like Solomon's true Mother, challeng∣eth the whole Child, not a divisible share, but the very life of the Legislative Power. The Commons present and pray, the Lords advise and consent, the King Enacts.

Secondly,* 1.65 As to their claiming an absolute Power in decla∣ring Law, it is as bold and false an Assertion as the other, when spoken of the two Houses. They may vote in order to a new Bill, the explaining or repeal of any Law formerly made, or prepare a Bill for any New Law, and that is all they can do; but authoritatively to declare any Law, is most contrary to the Constitution of the Houses, and never was adjudged one of their Privileges.

Thirdly, As to the Justice and Honour of a Parliament, when the State is in quiet, and the Conventions only for making wholsome Laws for the Publick weal, there are no Factions in Court or Country, no private Intriegues to be managed, the People neither uneasie nor discontented; then it is to be ex∣pected, That none but the wisest, and wealthiest of the Gen∣try will be chosen Members of that August Assembly, and their Justice and Honour will be conspicuous in all their Actions. But have we not known Houses of Commons composed of other kinds of Persons, who have voted their own Justice and Honour to be, to imprison their fellow Members, and fellow Subjects in an Arbitrary way? How(d) 1.66 could a generous Soul, conscious to himself he had transgressed no Law, kneel at the Bar of such a House with the same submission, as if he believed the Speaker infallible, and every Member an An∣gel!

But the Observer,* 1.67 and his Pewfellows urge, That if the Houses can do no Act for publick good without the King's con∣sent, and if the King may reject their Counsels and Advice; it were needless to put the Country to the charge of choosing Members of Parliament. And if the King may prefer other opinions before Parliamentary Motives, then Parliaments are vain and useless helps, Princes are unlimited, and the People miserable.

These Objections are of such an odious nature,* 1.68 That no good Subject can take delight in them, whose duty is to pray for the like consent among the several Orders of the Kingdom, as is supposed to be among the several Orbs of Heaven: The King undoubtedly the Primum movens; the Great and Privy Council the lower Spheres.

The usual (but not the only) form of the Kings Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to pass, Le Roy s'avisera,

proves,(e) 1.69 That after the advice of this his Great Council, he is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions, as his own Wisdom shall think meet. But these Authors will by no means take notice, That the use of Council is to perswade, not to compel; as if a Man in business of great concernment might not very prudently consult with many Friends, and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one, if it appear more proportio∣nable to the end he aims at.

If it were because they are a more numerous body, there∣fore their Counsel is upon that account to be yielded to; then the liberty of dissenting may be denied to the House of Peers, in comparison of the House of Commons; and to that House too in comparison of the People: and so both King, Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament.

Besides Natural Wisdom and Fidelity, there is a thing called Experience, of high concernment in the managery of Publick Affairs. He that will steer one Kingdom aright, must know the right Constitution of all others, their Strength, their Af∣fections, their Counsels and Resolutions, that upon each diffe∣rent Face of the Skie, he may alter his Rudder. The best Governments have more Councils than one: One for the Publick Interest of the Kingdom, another for the Affairs of State, a Council for War, and a Council for Peace.

Let them be as wise and faithful Counsellors as the Observer pleaseth, only let them be but Counsellors.* 1.70 Let their conlusions have as much credit as the premisses deserve; and if they can necessitate the Prince by weight of Reason, and convincing Evidence of experience, let them do it on Gods name. But it is not to be done upon the Authority of a bare Vote, as I think all uninterested persons are satisfied in the Votes of the Houses in 1641. about the Militia, Church-Government, and the voted Nineteen Propositions, or the late Votes about the Bill of Se∣clusion, the Repealing of the branch of the Statute of Queen Elizabeth against Protestant Dissenters, and the Loans upon the Kings Revenue. There are other ends besides Counsel, for which Parliaments are called, as consenting to new Laws, fur∣nishing the Public with Moneys, and maintaining the Interest of the Government and liberty of the Subject: from the removing one social end, to inferr that an Action is superfluous, deserves no answer but silence and contempt.

This should teach the Electors Wisdom not to chuse such as have Factious Bents, or are not truly qualified in their Allegi∣ance to their Prince; or Malecontents, who render such Con∣ventions useless to the Publick Ends of Government, and the Peace, Tranquillity, and Prosperity of both Prince and People.

Because the Long Parliament Writers would have no Stone unturned, nor any specious Argument uninforced,* 1.71 that might bring the King to their Lure, to consent to what they propo∣sed; they endeavoured to make the World believe, that the King was bound by his Coronation Oath to pass all such Bills

as they presented, or tendered to him, grounding, as Mr. Prynne, and others alledged, on a promise of the Kings at his Coronati∣on, to grant and keep the Laws and Customs which the Com∣monalty shall chuse. Before I come to give the particular An∣swer, I think it not unfit to take this opportunity to give a full account of the Coronation Oaths of our Kings, and how the same from Age to Age were varied, by which the Ingenious Reader will find, what the respective Kings by their Oaths did promise.

That I may deduce, as high as I have yet found, the Origi∣nal of Soveraign Princes taking Oaths at their Coronations; it may be noted, that the first Emperor that was Crowned, and had any Coronation Oath prescribed, was(f) 1.72 Anastasius the Greek Emperor, who being elected by the Senate and Soldiers about Ann. 486. Euphemius, Patriarch of Constantinople, (suspect∣ing him to be addicted to the Heresy of Eutychius and the Ma∣nichees,) would not consent to his Coronation, till he should de∣liver him a Writing under his Hand, ratified with his Oath, wherein he should plainly declare, That if he were Crowned Emperour, he would maintain the true Faith, and Synod of Chalcedon during his Reign, and bring in no Novelty to the Church of God. This Writing, ratified with his Oath, Ma∣cedonius the Treasurer was to keep; and after he was made Pa∣triarch, the Emperor demanded it, and said, It was a great discredit unto his Subjects, that his Hand-writing should be kept to testifie against him, or that he should be tied to Pen and Paper.

There is no mention of any Coronation Oath used from thence, to the Year 804. that(g) 1.73 Stauratius, (Son to Nicephorus, slain in his Wars against the Bulgarians) being declared Em∣peror by some: Michael Curopolata was adorned by the Patri∣arch, with the Diadem, a Writing before being desired, in which he promised to violate none of the Statutes of the Church, &c. Which is the first Precedent of a Promise, not an Oath, demanded from, or given by any Roman King for confirming the Laws of the Church, &c.

The first Emperor Crowned at Rome by any Pope,(h) 1.74 was Charles the Great, Anno 800. but without an Oath; and Henry the Fifth(i) 1.75 refused to take any Corporal Oath, saying, That an Emperor ought to Swear to none: for that Oath, i. e. of Fealty, ought to be made to him from all.

I shall not with Mr. Prynne (in his Epistle Dedicatory to his third Tome of Chronological Vindication,) meddle with the dis∣pute, how the Canonists argue from the Popes Crowning of Emperors and Kings, that they acquire a Spiritual and Tempo∣ral Monarchy over them, as their Sovereign Lords. For that however some may hold the Doctrine, yet it is exploded by most.

As to the Crowning and Anointing of some British and Saxon Kings, I must refer the Reader to Mr. Selden(k) 1.76, and Mr. Prynne in the forecited Epistle.

The first of our Kings that is recorded in History to have ta∣ken an Oath at his Coronation, was Can••tus; of whom Sim.(l) 1.77 Dunelmensis, and others give this account, That after the death of Aethelred, the Bishops, Abbats, Dukes, and the No∣bles of England, and the most part of the men of the King∣dom, as well of the Clergy as Laity, met together with one consent at Southampton, and chose Canutus for their King, and swore Fealty to him: to whom he also swore,* 1.78 that according to God and the World, (that is the Laws of God and the King∣dom) he would be a faithful Lord unto them. Mr. Prynne here no••es, that Usurpers more frequently used to take such Oaths than lawful hereditary Kings. So when the Citizens of London, and some few Noblemen, with unanimous consent, chose(m) 1.79 Edmond, called Ironside, the eldest Son of Aethelred, who was right Heir, there is no mention of an Oath. So when Harold reputed Son of Cnute was Crowned, there is no Oath recorded, nor of any taken by Hardicnute, right Heir of Cnute.

So, Anno 1041.(n) 1.80 Edward the Confessor, annuente Cleno & Po∣pulo, Londoniis in Regem eligitur, and was Crowned, Anoint∣ed, and Consecrated; yet not any of our Historians, besides William of Malmsbury de gestis Regum, Lib. 2. c. 13. p. 80. speaks of an Oath, who saith, that he being sent for by the Nobles, upon terms proposed to him by Earl Godwyn, there was(o) 1.81 nothing that King Edward did not promise, by reason of the necessity of the time; so that Faith was given by either Party, and what was desired, he confirmed by Oath: but this was in their private Consultation. Yet Archbishop(p) 1.82 Stratford in his Epistle to King Edward the First, saith, that St. Edward be∣ing raised to be King of England, first Swore inviolably to keep the Laws of Canutus.

We find no Coronation Oath of Harold mentioned. Matt. Westm. Flor. Hist. p. 433 saith, that extorta fide a Majoribus, Capiti proprio imposuit Diadema; that having exacted Fealty of the great Men, he put the Crown on his own Head: and after when Crowned by Archbishop Alfred,* 1.83 he took no Coronation Oath; but as my Author saith, Leges aequas coepit condere.(r) 1.84

As to King (q) William the Conqueror; Aldred Archbishop of York Crowned him, and imposed on him an Oath. The words of the Authors are, Ipsa nativitatis die ab Aldredo Ebor. Archiepis∣copo, apud Westmon. in Regem totius Angliae sublimiter Coron••um inunxit, & consecravit honorifice: Having before (as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Archbishop required from him) before the Altar of St. Peter the Apostle, before the Clergy and People, by Oath promised, That he would defend Holy Church, and the Governours of it (which Clause occurs not before) and likewise govern all the People subjected to him, with a Just and Regal Providence, and appoint and hold right Law, and wholly remove and inter∣dict all Rapines, and unjust Judgments.

The Oath which he took to observe St. Edward's Laws, was afterwards, Anno 1072. when he entring into a Parly with the English Nobility (who intended to have set up Edgar Atheling, because King William had violated their ancient Laws, and in∣troduced new ones) he, by the Advice of Archbishop(r) 1.85 Lan∣frank, Swore that bonas & antiquas Leges Regni, sc. Leges quas Sancti & pii Angliae Reges, & maxime Rex Edwardus statuit, in∣violabiliter observare. Only William of Malmsbury(s) 1.86 saith, that Aldred the Archbishop would not consecrate him, before he had exacted from him, before all the People, this Oath, That he would modestly deport himself towards all his Subjects, and with an equal Law treat the English as he did the French.

William Rufus promised to Lanfranck,(t) 1.87 If he were King,* 1.88 in all his Affairs, through all his Kingdom, to preserve Ju∣stice, Equity, and Mercy, and to defend the Liberty and Se∣curity of the Church in Peace, against all. H. Huntingdon, Lib. 7. fol. 213. b. and Hoveden, Anno 1088. fol. 264. b. say, That when he needed the help of the English, he promised them such desirable Laws, or better than they would chuse. But Malmsbury and others say, he kept them not; for Usurpers (such as he was) rarely observe the Laws, or their Promises, further than they serve their own Interest. Therefore Mr. Prynne notes that the Promise Eadmerus, and(u) 1.89 Simeom Du∣nelm. mention, was before he was King; and the other Promise was, when most of the Norman Nobility, except the Arch∣bishop Lanfranck, designed to make Robert his Brother King; and then he called them together, and then told them, If they would be Faithful to him,(w) 1.90 Meliorem Legem quam vellent eligere, eis concederet, & omne injustum Scottum interdixit.(x) 1.91 Huntingdon saith the promised them exoptabiles leges, and that they should have their Woods and Hunting free.

It is recorded of Henry the First,* 1.92 that having gathered to London the Clergy of England and all the People, he pro∣mised them an amendment of the Laws, with which they were oppressed in the time of his Father, and his Brother lately de∣ceased, that he might obtain their(y) 1.93 good Wills to his Pro∣motion, and that they might receive him for their King and Fa∣ther: to which the Clergy and all the Nobility answered,* 1.94 That if with a willing Mind he would grant them, and with his Charter confirm all the Liberties, and ancient Customs, which fl••rished in the Kingdom, in the time of the Holy King Ed∣ward, they would consent to him, and unanimously consecrate him King; and he freely yielding to his, and affirming by his Oath that he would do it, he was consecrated King, the Cler∣gy and People favouring it.

Eadmerus saith, That in ipso consecrationis die, bonas & Sanctas omni Populo Leges se servaturum, & omnes oppressiones & iniqui∣tates, quae sub fratre suo emerserunt, in omni sua dominatione tam Dei Lege, quam in secularibus negotiis prohibiturum, & subver∣surum, sposponderat; & haec omnia Jurisjurandi Interjectione formula

per totum Regnum divulgata ire praeceperat, and when he was Crown∣ed, he granted the Laws recited by(z) 1.95 Matthew Paris, to be held in his Kingdom, for the exalting of the Holy Church, and Peace of his People: which Laws being at large recited by Matt. Paris, may be perused by the Inquisitive, wherein he will find how far the old Laws were confirmed, and what a Foundation there was laid for Magna Charta.

Concerning King Stephen,(a) 1.96 Malmsbury saith,* 1.97 That Henry his Brother, Bishop of Winchester, was a great help to his ob∣taining the Crown, having great hopes that he would follow his Grandfather, King William's Steps, in the Government of his Kingdom, especially in matters of Ecclesiastical Discipline; therefore he saith, William, Archbishop of Canterbury, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 exacted a solemn Oath from him, of granting and preserving the Liberty of the Church: the Oath it self is long, and the Im∣munities to the Church many; those to the Laity are conceiv∣ed in these words, Omnes Exactiones, & Mescheningas, & In∣justitias, sive per Vicecomites, vel per alios quoslibet male inductas, funditus extirpo. Bonas Leges, & Antiquas, & justas Consue∣tudines, in Murdris, & Placitis, & aliis Causis observabo, & ob∣servari praecipio & constituo. Malmsbury saith, That the King swore according to the tenor of the Writing he there produceth, Dated at Oxford, Anno Dom. 1136. 1 Regni.

I find no mention of an Oath taken by K. H. 2. at his Co∣ronation; but(b) 1.98 Brompton saith, that he confirmed the Charter of his Grandfather King Henry the First,* 1.99 and that he was sollicitous, ut Lex quae extincta videbatur, paulatim exsur∣geret: and Matt. Paris(c) 1.100 saith, That Anno 1172. he swore before the Cardinals, that he would abrogate all the evil Customs in∣troduced in his time against the Church.

We find that Pope Alexander(d) 1.101 the Third Excommunicated several Bishops, and suspended the Archbishop of York, for his rash Presumption in the Coronation of a new King, in con∣tempt of the Archbishop of Canterbury, to whose Office of an∣cient Right it was known to belong; and for that in the Coro∣nation, according to Custom, there was no sworn Caution offered or exacted by them for the keeping of the Liberties of the Church: but afterwards(e) 1.102 it is said to be confirmed by Oath, that the ancient Customs of the Kingdom (from which the dignity of the Church was in danger) should invio∣lably be kept in all time to come.

The Solemnities of King Richard the First's Coronation are fully described by the Abbat of Jorval:(f) 1.103 and as to his Oath,* 1.104 he saith that he swore and vowed (the Holy Evangelists, and the Reliques of many Saints being set before him) that he would bear Peace, Honour, and Reverence, all his Life, to God and the Holy Church, and its Ministers; and then he swore that he would exercise right Justice to the People committed to him: and after he swore that he would blot out, or abolish evil Laws, and perverse Customs, if any were in his Kingdom, and he would keep good Laws.

I find that King John took an Oath as Duke of Normandy,* 1.105 that he would defend Holy Church and its Dignities in good Faith, without evil Intention, and would honour all the Or∣dained, and that he would destroy all evil Laws, if any were, and substitute good ones; the words(g) 1.106 are, quod ipse Sanctam Ecclesiam & ejus dignitates bona fide, & sine malo Ingenio defende∣ret, & ordinatos honoraret, & quod Leges iniquas, si quae essent, destrueret, & bonas surrogaret.

At his Coronation(h) 1.107 he took another Oath, that he would love Holy Church, and the ordained of it, and would preserve it indempnified from the Incursions of the Malignant; and that the perverse Laws being destroyed, he would substi∣•• good ones, and would exercise right Justice in England. Besides these, Matth. Paris, p. 189. of the Old Edition, saith, That he was sworn by the said Archbishop ex parte Dei & di∣stricte prohibitus, ne honorem hunc accipere praesumeret, nisi in mente habeat opere quod juraverat adimplere; that is, On the part of God, by the Archbishop, he was strictly forbid, that he pre∣sume not to take this Honour, unless he had a resolution to ful∣fil in work, what he had sworn: To which the King promised, That, by the help of God, he would in good faith observe what he had sworn.

In the Fifteenth of his Reign he was forced by the Barons to take another Oath,(i) 1.108 Quod sanctam Ecclesiam ejusque ordi∣natos diligeret & manuteneret, contra omnes adversarios suos pro posse suo: quodque bonas Leges Antecessorum suorum, & praecipue Leges Edwardi Regis revocaret, & iniquas destrueret, & omnes homines suos, secundum justa Curiae suae judicia, judicaret: quod∣que singulis redderet jura sua. Juravit praeterea Innocentio Papae, ejusque Catholicis Successoribus, fidelitatem & obedientiam: And that he would make restitution of those things he had taken away by reason of the Interdict. This Clause of restoring King Edward's Laws (which had been disused from the time of the Conquest) being thus inserted in King John's Oath, was after inserted into the Coronation-Oath of Edward the Third, and so continued.

The best Account of the Coronation-Oath of King Henry the Third, is in(k) 1.109 Matthew Paris, That he swore before the Clergy and People,* 1.110 the Holy Evangelists and the Reliques of several Saints being laid before him, and Joceline Bishop of Bath reading the Oath, which was very little different from that which King John took, Quod honorem, pacem & reverentiam prae∣stabit Deo, & sanctae Ecclesiae, & ejus ordinatis omnibus diebus vitae suae; and so word for word as in King John's: only for perversas consuetudines, here is iniquas consuetudines.

It was in relation to the preceding Oaths, that(l) 1.111 Bracton saith, The King ought at his Coronation, in the Name of Je∣sus Christ being sworn, to promise these three things to the Peo∣ple being his Subjects: First, To command, and to his power see it performed, that the Peace shall be kept to the Church,

and all Christian People in all his time. Secondly, That all Ravages and all Iniquities, in all degrees, shall be by him for∣bidden. Thirdly, That in all his Judgments he shall command Equity and Mercy, and that by his Justice all may enjoy firm Peace, & per Justitiam suam firma gaudeant Pace universi.

None of our Historians mention the Oath of Edward the First, that I have met with,* 1.112 nor Mr. Prynne: Therefore I think it very probable that it was conceived in the same Form, as that of his Fathers and Grandfathers;* 1.113 for it is most certain that he took one, by the Expressions in sundry of his Prohibitions, to the Legates of Popes, to Bishops, and others in these Words: Torpescere non possumus, quia exhaeredationem quae statum Coronae nostrae contigit, sicut ex Sacramenti vinculo adstringimur, pro viri∣bus evitemus, ne Coronae & dignitatis nostrae Jura depereant, stu∣diosam(m) 1.114 nos debet operam adbibere; & ad ea manutenenda & conservanda, eo potius debemus esse solliciti, quoad hoc vinculo ju∣ramenti teneri dignoscimus & adstringi; that is, We cannot be slothful, because we should avoid to our power, our dis-inhe∣riting, which appertains to the State of our Crown, as we are tied by the Bond of our Oath; which to maintain and pre∣serve, we ought to afford our studious help, lest the Rights of our Crown and Dignity perish; and we ought the more to be solicitous in this, as that we know our selves to be held and bound by the bond of the Oath.

Hitherto we find nothing of the Vulgus elegerit, besides what is mentioned in King William Rufus his promise, That he would grant his Subjects a more desirable Law, and better than they could chuse; which is no ways to be interpreted of such a choice as the Republicans would have understood.

Our Historians are generally silent what the Oath was that Edward the Second took,* 1.115 but it is to be found in the Clause Rolls of the Tower(n) 1.116, 1 E. 2. in French thus, which I shall ren∣der into English as well as I can.* 1.117

SIRE, Volez vous granter, & garder, & per vestre serement confirmer, au People d' Engleter, les Leys, & les Cu∣stumes a eux grantes per les An∣ciens Rois d' Engleter, voz Pre∣decessours droitas, & devotz a Dieu; & nomement, les Leys, les Custumes, & Franchises grantz au Clergie, & au People, par le glorieus Roy Seint Ed∣ward, votre Predecessure?

Respons.

Jeo les grants & prometts.

Sire, Garderez vous a Dieu & a Seint Eglise, & au Clergie, & au Poeple, Pece, & accord en Dieu entirement selons vostre Poair?

Respons.

Jeo les garderez.

Sire, Freez (or perhaps fe∣res) vous faire, en tous voz Juge∣ments, ovels & droit Justice, & discretion en misericorde, & ve∣rite a vostre Poair?

Respons.

Jeo les fray.

Sire, Grantez vous a tenir & garder des Leys & les Custumes droitureles, le quels la Commu∣nate de votre Roiaume auras eslu, & les defenderz & inforciers al honeur de Dieu, a votre Poair?

Respons.

Jeo les grants & prometts.

SIR, Will you grant and keep, and by your Oath confirm, to your People of Eng∣land, the Laws and Customs granted to them by the Anci∣ent Kings of England, your pre∣decessors righteous, and de∣vout to God, and namely, the Laws, and Customs, and Fran∣chises granted to the Clergy, and the People, by the glori∣ous King St. Edward your Pre∣decessor?

Answer.

I do grant and promise this.

Sir, Do you keep to God, and his Holy Church, and to the Clergy, and to the Peo∣ple Peace, and accord in God entirely, according to your Power?

Answer.

I shall keep these.

Sir, Will you suffer to be done in all your Judgments, e∣qual and right Justice, and Discretion, with Mercy and Truth according to your Pow∣er?

Answer.

I will do it.

Sir, Do you grant to hold, and keep the Laws, and the Customs that are lawful, which the Community of your Realm shall have chosen, and defend, and enforce these to the Honour of God, to your Power?

Answer.

I grant and promise them.

Several Answers have been given to the Objection raised from this last Clause,* 1.118 as they found it in the Latin(o) 1.119 Records; therefore, before I apply those, it is needful to note the Latin, which, as we find it 1 R. 2. was this, Capto per Archiepiscopum Cantuar. Sacramento Dom. Regis Corporali, de concedendo, & ser∣vando cum sucra confirmatione, Leges & consuetudines ab antiquis, justis, & Deo devotis Regibus Angliae, Progenitoribus, Plebi Regni Angliae concessas, & praesortim leges & consuetudines, & li∣bertates a gloriosissimo & sanctissimo Rege Edwardo, Clero Populo∣que Regni praedicti concessas, & servando Deo & Ecclesiae Sanctae Domini, Cleroque & Populo pacem, & concordiam integre in Deo juxta vires suas, & de faciendo fieri in omnibus judiciis suis, aequam & rectam Justitiam & discretionem in misericordia, & veritate; & otiam de tenendo & custodiendo justas Leges & Con∣suetudines Ecclesiae, & de faciendo per ipsum Dom. Regem, eas esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas, quas vulgus juste & rationabiliter elegerit juxta vires ejusdem Dom. Regis.* 1.120

This is verbatim the Latin for the preceding French, except in the additional Clause, and the Conclusion which makes the just Laws and Customs both to relate to those of the Church,

and those that the Vulgar shall have justly and reasonably chosen.

The like we find,(q) 1.121 1 H. 4. and in the Pontificale of the Archbishops and Bishops; and it is added, after the King hath,* 1.122 as before expressed, answered to the Proposals, Pronunciatis omnibus, confirmat Rex se omnia servaturum, Sacramento super Attari praestito coram cunctis; i. e. that the King by his Oath, ta∣ken upon the Altar before all present, to observe these, con∣firms them.

The Solemnities and Ceremonies used at the Coronation of King Richard the Second, may be perused at large in Tho.(r) 1.123 Walsingham, and he saith, he swore before the Bishops and Nobles there present, for they only could hear his Oath, that he would permit the Church to enjoy its Liberties, and would honour it and its Ministers, that he would hold right Faith, and would forbid Rapines, and all Iniquities in all their De∣grees. 2ly. That he would make to be kept, every where, the good Laws of the Land, and especially, the Laws of St. Edward King and Confessor, who was buried in that Church, and would make all evil Laws to be abrogated. 3ly. That he would not be an accepter of Persons, but would make right Judgment betwixt man and man, that especially he(s) 1.124 would observe Mercy, as the Clement and Merciful God might grant Mercy to him.

Having thus given an account of these Coronation Oaths, I come to the Objections. First, They(t) 1.125 say, that the word Vulgus doth signifie the two Houses, and the word elegerit is to be taken in the Future Tense; so that the King is obliged to consent to such Laws as the two Houses, especially the Com∣mons do chuse.

It is a wonder to me, how men that pretended to any read∣ing or learning in Antiquities, or in the Constitution of the Go∣vernment, could defend their Cause with such pitiful Reason∣ings, especially against King Charles the First, who neither had taken such an Oath, nor many of his Predecessors before him.

The Latin Translation of two French words gave all the oc∣casion of dispute; for that which is called Communate, is ren∣dered Plebs and Vulgus, and aura eslu is translated elegerit; whereas, were it to have been understood in the Future Tense, it should have been eslira: and agreeable to that in all the Au∣thentick Records of the Exchequer, the word elegerit is Eng∣lished in the Preterperfect Tense. Thus much may suffice as to the word elegerit. Dr. Brady's Glossary will satisfie the Curious about the import of the word it self.

Concerning the word Vulgus, one solid(u) 1.126 Author saith, That we may be confident, that neither the Bishops, Privy Council, Parliament, or any other whosoever they were, that framed or penned this Oath, ever intended in this word the Commons in Parliament, much less the Lords: they would ne∣ver so much disparage the Members of Parliament, as to dis∣grace

them with a Title both base and false. It had been enough, if not too much, to have called them Populus, the Peo∣ple; but Vulgus, the Vulgar, the rude multitude (which hath the Epithete of ignobile vulgus) is a word as dishonourable to the Composers of the Oath to give, or for the King to use, as for the Members of the Parliament to receive; therefore he judg∣eth, that by Vulgus must be meant the Common People, not the Lords and Commons.

But then, saith the same Author, the doubt will be, what the Common People, or Vulgus, out of Parliament have to do to chuse Laws. In answer to which, the preceding word is to be considered; Consuetudines quas Vulgus elegerit, the Customs which the Common People have chosen. If we observe the nature of Custom,* 1.127 it is the Vulgus, or Common People only who chuse Customs. Common usage, time out of mind, cre∣ates a Custom; and the commoner the usage is, the stronger and the better is the Custom. No where can so common an usage be found, as among the Vulgar, who are still the far greatest part of every multitude. If a Custom be common through the whole Kingdom with us, it is all one with the Com∣mon Law of England, which is often called Common Custom; so that to protect the Customs which the Vulgar chuse, is to swear to protect the Common Laws of England.

Agreeable to this, is what the learned Dr. Brady(w) 1.128 notes, That upon the whole, it signifies no more than that the Com∣munity had chosen, that is owned, submitted to, and desired still to use their Old Customs, which by use, time out of mind, they had enjoyed for the better management of Affairs, and Conveniency betwixt Man and Man, all the Nation over, or in any particular County, Hundred, Town, City or Burrough, such long practices being the foundation of all Customs: but these are to be just, which intrench not upon the Govern∣ment or Laws, and by permission and sufferance only become Laws.

But the same(x) 1.129 Author judiciously affirms, That the Commu∣nity here intended was the Community of the Bishops,* 1.130 Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, Great Men, and the whole body of the Te∣nents in Capite, expressed by those words, in the former Questions, Clergy and People; for by them these demands were made, and no doubt they would first ask for themselves, for the Vulgar or Rabble could not come near to make their Demands at such a Solemnity as this was, so(y) 1.131 great and splendid; there being at it, Charles and Lewis, Earls of Clermont, two of the King of France's Brothers, the D. of Brabant, the Earl of Fens, and the other great Men, both of France and England, with the Countess of Artois.

Whoever desires further satisfaction, may consult the same learned(z) 1.132 Author, who makes it clear, That the word Plebs, Vulgus & Populus in the Writers of that Age was used for the Laity in way of contradistinction from the Clergy.

I shall at present leave this, and note, that for any thing ap∣pears to the contrary, the same Interrogations, Oath, &c. pre∣sented to Edward the Second and Third, (without the additions of King Richard's) continued without any alteration to Henry the Eighth's(a) 1.133 time, and in that we find the King promiseth he shall keep and maintain the Liberties of the Holy Church of old time granted by their Righteous Kings of England;* 1.134 and that he shall keep all the Lands, Honours, and Dignities righteous and free of the Church of England, in all manner Holy, without any manner of minishments; and the rights of the Crown hurt, decay, or loss, to his Power shall call again into the ancient estate; and that he shall keep the Peace of Holy Church, and of the Clergy, and of the People with good ac∣cord; and that he shall do in his Judgment, Equity and right Justice, with Discretion and Mercy; and that he shall grant to hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm, and to his Power keep them, and affirm them, which the People and Flock have chosen; and the evil Laws and Customs wholly to put out, and stedfast and stable Peace to the People of this Realm keep, and cause to be kept to his Power. In this Oath King Henry the Eighth interlined, for the right explication of it, instead of People and Flock, these Words, which the Nobles and People have chosen with my Consent.

The Oath of King Edward the Sixth,* 1.135 so far as relates to my purpose was this, Do you grant to make no new Laws, but such as shall be to the honour and glory of God, and to the good of the Commonwealth, and that the same shall be made by the consent of the People as hath been accustomed?* 1.136

I have not seen any Transcripts of the Oaths of Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth, those which King James and King Charles the First took, run thus; Will you grant to hold and keep the Laws and Rightful Customs which the Commonalty of this King∣dom have; and will you defend and uphold them to the Ho∣nour of God, so much as in you lyeth?

That Branch of the Oath which relates to my purpose, taken by King Charles the Second, runs thus: Sir, Will you grant to keep the rightful Customs which the Commonalty of your Kingdom have, &c.

The Oath that our present King James the Second took at his Coronation,* 1.137 was in the same Words as that of his Royal Brother; wherein the Word Customs is to be taken in the lar∣gest extent, to include Laws also.

Now upon the whole we must consider First,* 1.138 That in the Eye of the Law the King never dyes, so that he is King before any Solemnity of Coronation. Secondly, The variety of Forms and Precedents, seem to prove that one precise form is not simply necessary; so the interlining of Henry the Eighth upon Record also shews. And if it had been of consequence to have retained the old form, we should have heard of it ei∣ther then or in some succeeding Parliaments. Lastly, it cannot be

denied, that if the King be bound by a lawful Oath to pass all Bills, it is not the form of denying it, but the not doing of it which makes the Perjury. And so when the King is tender of a flat denial, and attributing so much to the judgment of his great Council, that he only useth the words avisera; it would be a strange Doctrine, that all the Kings of England who have gi∣ven this Answer, have been forsworn, and neither Parliament nor Convocation taken notice of it in so many Ages.

But when by dint of Argument the Parliament Champions were driven from these Holds, they fled to their last Burrow. So one of them confesses, that in Acts of Grace the King is not bound to assent, nor in Acts wherein he is to depart from the particular right and interest of his Crown; and lastly that if he do not consent (however bound by Oath) yet they are not binding Laws to the Subject.* 1.139 But then comes the handful of Gourds which spoils the Pottage: Except in cases of necessity; If the safety of the People be concerned; If it may prove dangerous or inconvenient to them, then an extraordinary course may be taken.

This was the plausible Plea of 1641. to get the Militia into their hands: for they urged that in case of apparent and imminent danger, the Peoples safety was not to be neglected; They might not be exposed as a prey to their Enemies, there∣fore must be put into a posture of defence. This was grateful to the People, out of that real love they bare to themselves, they must favour that side which pretends to take care of their safety. Give to any Person or Society a Legislative Power with∣out the King in case of necessity,(b) 1.140 permit them withal to be sole Judges of necessity, when it is, and how long it lasts: and then it is more than probable, the necessity will not determine, till they have their utmost desires, which is the same in effect as if they had the Legislative Power.

Further it must be considered that necessity upon that sup∣position must be very evident, there needs no such great stir who shall be Judge of it; when it comes indeed, it will shew it self; when extream necessity is disputable, it is a sign it is not real. Secondly, The Agent must be proper, otherwise it cuts in sunder the very Sinews of Government, to make two su∣premes in a Society, and to subject the People to contrary com∣mands.

But to claim such a Power over the King in extraordinary cases alone,* 1.141 doth not much vary the case: for at the same time they voted themselves the proper Judges of such necessities, and the erecting of any superintending Power in the circum∣stances of those times, and in all parallel cases, would not on∣ly unsoveraign the King (by making this Power the Soveraign) but the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous ex∣travagances than Regal Power is, and yet less capable of Re∣gulation than it. For the Law knowing there is none but God, qui custodiat ipsos custodes, concludes from the weakness and

imperfection of every other form of Government, that the So∣veraignty of Law-making was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, than in a Popular or Aristocratical hand; and that a positive known Law without any coercive Superintend∣ent was a sufficient, and the best boundary of Regal Power: For the Law and the Transgression of it, being both at once made manifest and notorious, it will be so sufficient(c) 1.142 security of the future observance of the Law, that Princes will not offer to violate it. Now if such a Supreme Power, as these would have in the two Houses, in what case soever, be once enacted, that must either be boundless or circumscribed by a Laws; and if that be circumscribed with a Law, then must that Law also have a Superiour Power to enforce it: and so there must be a Superiour Power over Superiour Power in infinitum, and yet at last leave the most Superiour Power in that liberty which the Ob∣server calleth boundless, Arbitrary and Tyrannical.

If this Principle were true,* 1.143 all is but misleading formality of Law, the Soveraignty is not in the King but in the People; the King is the only Subject and but a common Voucher, whose concurrence is unavoidably implied; his Will, his Understand∣ing and his Power are all subject to the Body of the very Sub∣ject that in Parliament doth swear subjection to him: and these pretended Rights being hid ever since the beginning of the Kingdom, the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hath by the injury of our Laws been most impiously mis-sworn in their Allegiance. And whereas the trust is irrevocably commit∣ted to the King and his Heirs for ever, how can it be con∣ceived it should sleep during the sitting of a Parliament, unless that jocular saying of King James were to be understood real∣ly, That during the Sessions of a House of Commons there were five hundred Kings? And if any such Power were in the Houses, it was a strange oversight to leave it to the Kings dis∣posal, when to call the Body together, and when to dissolve it (as before I have touched) whereby the King might solely de∣termin where, and how long he would be over-ruled, and when King again: whereas by the false suggestion of the Observer (that it was fit the Houses should have a Superintendent Power, in case of extraordinary danger, and they only to be Judges of that danger) he cunningly turns the Tables, and makes the Houses to be Soveraigns as long as they pleased; and when they were weary of reigning, the Kingdom should be out of danger, and then it should be the Kings turn to command a∣gain.

But to draw to a conclusion on this subject, which cost so much Blood and Treasure: There(d) 1.144 neither is nor can be the same necessity of observing an old Law, to which a King is obliged by his Charter and his Oath, and of a new Law to which he hath not given his Royal Assent. If Magna Char∣ta extended to this, it were Charta Maxima, the greatest Charter that ever was granted. To be be denied nothing, is a

Privilege indeed as good as Fortunatus his Purse; or as that old Law which one found out for the Kings of Persia, That he might do what he would.* 1.145 The taking away the Kings Nega∣tive Voice, may indeed secure us against Tyranny, which ne∣ver can come in upon us, as long as the two Houses(e) 1.146 Negatives ballance it; but it leaves us open and stark naked to all those Popular evils and Epidemical diseases, which flow from Popu∣lar Government, as Tumults, Seditions, Civil Wars, and the Ilias of Evils which attends them; the Negative Voice being the Soveraignest remedy against such great Mischiefs.

One Wheedle I find more they used, since the King was so tender of violating his Coronation Oath, in giving Assent to their new Bills, which were diametrically opposite to the old fundamental Laws, made in defence of Episcopacy, and the Kings Prerogative in the Militia, &c. they quit their Title of Parliament men,* 1.147 and would be Casuists to resolve his Consci∣ence, telling him that where the People by Publick Authority, will seek inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it was more inconvenience and injustice in the King to deny than to grant it.

Thus the Houses would have granted the King a Dispensation to have acted against the dictates of his Reason, Conscience, and the fundamental Laws. And because he would not own their Commission for it, they persecuted him to the Scaffold. This was an unheard of Villany to be offered to so Pious and Religious a Prince, that as Father of his People, would not give them a Stone instead of Bread, or a Scorpion instead of a Fish. The Heathen was much honester, who prayed Jupiter to give him good things, though he never opened his Mouth for them; and to withhold bad and prejudicial things, though he petitioned never so earnestly for them. This was a strange Principle, that the King should be bound by Law to destroy his People, or not preserve their Right, unless he not only violate his own Conscience, but their very Liberties. Can a man ima∣gine those People, of whom Juvenal speaks,

—evertere domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles—

if they had understood their own Prayers, would have accused the Gods for denying them.

As they thus sought to hush the Kings Conscience, so that endeavoured to find a quaint salvo for their own more brawny ones: For when it was urged, that to deny the Kings Nega∣tive Voice, was to dissolve the excellent constitution of Parlia∣ments, and was directly against the settlement of it upon the true basis of the Ballance, and the mutual stipulation of the King and his People, as they loved to phrase it they answer by their Prolocutor, that those who contract to their own ruin, or esteem such Contracts before their own preservation, are

felonious to themselves, and rebellious to Nature. Inferring from thence, That if the legal Constitution of Government,* 1.148 be not agreeable to the Liberties the House conceives needful for them, they are obliged to contend to alter them: which is no more nor less, than if a Criminal being condemned to be hanged, should be guilty of another Felony and Treason a∣gainst Nature to yield to the Sentence, but that he ought in his own defence to kill as many as he could, that he might there∣by save his life by escape.

Thus I hope I have made apparent the falshood of the Posi∣tions ranged in defence of that dismal Parliament,* 1.149 who made use of them as Platforms upon which to plant the Artillery of their Acts and Ordinances. For under the pretext of their obligation to preserve the Kingdom, they voted to put it in a posture of defence; and they voted from the King his Navies, Officers, Privy Counsellors, and Revenues, pretending the Navies were still reserved for the King, in better hands than he would put them, and for the other they would furnish him with better principled Ministers. Whereas by the same Prece∣dent, the Subjects were bound to give up their Estates to their ordering, as often as they pretended they could dispose of them more wisely. For they might alledge, the State (which they reputed themselves) had an interest paramount in them in case of publick extremity: so that as they pretended the Head without the Body was the State before, so now it was fit the Body should be without the Head; whereas the Law hath provided against either exorbitances: and if there was necessity we must fall into one, we ought in reason to chuse the former, because being better acquainted with that, we could better digest it; and it would be less burthensom to our Estates to satisfie one than five hundred, nay ten thousand, as it appeared when the greedy Commonwealths men with their Committees, Armies, &c. was that flat Vermine in the Bowels, which (how true soever it is of the lumbricus latus) was certain∣ly true of this Monster, That it was every where Head and Mouth.

It is to be well weighed,* 1.150 that as Parliaments are in the highest degree beneficial, when they keep within the bounds of duty and sobriety; so when they will have their Ordi∣nances to have the force of Laws, and not govern themselves by known Laws, they are the cause of many Distempers in a Kingdom, and the Subjects condition is most unhappy in the Multitude of Physicians: for extraordinary Remedies, such as they always pretend to use, are, saith Sir Henry Wotton, like hot Waters which may help at a pang, but being too often used spoil the Stomach.

A Compleat Parliament is that(f) 1.151 Panchreston or Soveraign Salve for all Sores; but some would make the name of Parli∣ament a Medusa's Head to transform reasonable men into Stones, and subordinate Monarchy to the two Houses, who

must be denied nothing; but with their good will would claim for them a paramount interest with the Soveraign, whom they would advance only to the height and mighty Dignity of a Doge of Venice, or a Roman Consul, whilest they must be the Tribunes of the People their Supervisors. So that we cannot be content to gather the blessed fruits right con∣stituted Parliaments would afford us, but we must rend away the top Branch, yea stub up the Tree that we may scramble for the Fruit.

Tacitus(g) 1.152 gives a Caution how a Prince may support his Au∣thority, that he do not vim Principatus resolvere, cuncta ad Sena∣tum revocando.* 1.153 It is fit a Prince should have the Glory of performing those things himself which are his Prerogatives, and not to refer such things to Conventions of Parliament, which properly belong not to their Cognizance. Since there∣fore by the condescensions of our Wise and Gracious Princes, there are several things in England, the King cannot by Law do alone, it is a most requisite Wisdom in Princes, that as they observe the Laws in securing the Peoples Liberties and Privileges; so by no Arbitrary Assumption of either or both Houses, to let their Prerogatives be invaded: for those are now no more than are rationally and politically necessary for orderly and established Government.

The Encroachments of the never to be forgotten long Par∣liament, (several of which I have in this and the foregoing Chapter hinted) may be sufficient documents to Princes, not to yield such a body too much Power: for if the ballance once decline, a little weight will sink it.

Therefore though Princes are not to enlarge their Prero∣gatives, nova siti ad alia aliaque properare; yet they ought to preserve those that remain. For any Raveling once yielded, will make the Royal Cittadel defenceless. Testudo ubi collecta est in suum tegmen, tuta est ad omnes ictus; ubi exerit partes ali∣quas, quodcunque nudavit, obnoxium & infirmum est: The Tor∣toise as long as it keeps within its shell and coverture is safe; but if it unbare any part, it is obnoxious to danger.

Above all things a Prince should he careful never to part with the Prerogative of Summoning and Dissolving Parlia∣ments. For we cannot forget that the Houses of 1641. not content with a Bill for Triennial Parliaments, got an Act for perpetuating themselves; and that would not satisfie, but they prepared a Bill for the certainty of future Parliaments, whe∣ther the King had occasion for them or not: so that if the King omitted the sending out of Writs and Summons, the Chancellor might, and for failure the Sheriff, and I know not what inferiour Officers; of which the Blessed King com∣plains.

I cannot dismiss this Subject without taking notice of the Fundamental cause of Factious Members of Parliament.* 1.154 In England there is no such powerful Engine to make Faction and

Sedition formidable and dangerous to Government, as when the Majority of the Freeholders are wrought upon (by the Arts I have in some measure hinted before, and shall more largely in the Chapter of Faction) to chuse Members of the House of Commons of their own Temper: for such a Num∣ber being imbodied in that House, give and receive mutual strength from one another. For when such are met, they do not take care to unite the minds of the Subjects to their Prince, or one to another, or imploy their time upon the great concerns of the Nation; but are drawn to promote private Animosities under(h) 1.155 pretence of the Publick; and are so far from proceeding calmly and peaceably to curb the motions of unruly Spirits that endeavour to disturb them, that they expose the King to the Calumny and danger of those worst of men, who endeavour to render him and his Government odious to the People. I shall now touch upon some of the Artifices used to bring in such Members in the Parliament of 1678. and some succeeding ones whereby their Conventions were rendred useless for the King and People, and inglorious to themselves, though they pretended to as much Loy∣alty and Publick good as those in 1641. did at their first sitting.

The King having dissolved the long Parliament and sum∣moned this to sit the 6th of March, 1678.* 1.156 the industry of the Dissenters, Male-contents, and we may suppose Common∣wealths men, was extraordinary great, as now hoping they should be able to chuse such Members as would be more favourable to them.

They had been long instilling into the Peoples Heads,* 1.157 that in the former House there had been a Court and Country Party, the former were for Arbitrary Government, fleecing the People, Persecution, and such as gave no great credit to the Tragical representation of the Popish Plot: The latter were moderate men, and not so much for Ceremonies as the purity of Religion, would stand for the Peoples Liberties and Pro∣perties, by riding night and day about the Villages, and trudging about Corporations, and the weekly Conventicles, they spread this Character abroad, and with all the Arts ima∣ginable, endeavoured to proselyte(i) 1.158 all that were not sharp-sighted enough to pierce into their designs. If any seemed not to believe those Characters, or declared himself for the Government, Civil or Ecclesiastical, established by Law, and neither for Popery or Arbitrary Government, nor yet for a Commonwealth or Dissenters, they run them down with noise, traduced them behind their backs as Papists in Masquerade and men of Arbitrary Principles.* 1.159 And if any were so bold as to scruple the coherence of the Narratives of the Popish Plot, he was vilified as a Defamer of the Kings Evidence, as stifler of the Plot; and from hence they concluded to insinu∣ate into the Populace, that those Loyal Gentlemen who had been Members of the late long Parliament, had joyned with

the Court to hinder the Discovery of the Plot; and if any gainsaid them, they used such questions, What, Are you for Popery? Will you give your Voice for a Papist? Are you willing to have your Throat cut? Are you for Arbitrary Go∣vernment? By which means they won over too many to joyn with them,* 1.160 to exclude many Loyal and Orthodox Gentle∣men from being chosen Members of Parliament.

Their design was advantaged because some were their friends of old, others had come the half way over to gain the reputation of moderate men, others had been disgusted by the Government. The Conventicle Teachers rallied up their Flocks, and they all joyned to slander the Clergy as if they had a kindness for Popery in their hearts, though they durst not discover it for the present: And generally blasted all the Loyal Gentry as Popishly affected, the Court-Party Pensioners, &c. So that if any one bore any Publick Office Military or Civil, he was eo nomine to be rejected. The Per∣sons they recommended to the People to be chosen, were first all those Gentlemen, who called themselves the Country(k) 1.161 Party, who had appeared most zealous against his present Majesty, the Queen Dowager, and Ministers of State. To these they added as many as they could of the reliques of the old Rebellion, or their Children, and made up the num∣ber out of the moderate and discontented Gentlemen, Bur∣gesses and Tradesmen. It was sufficient recommendation if the Government had displaced any, for these were looked upon as not to be corrupted or bought off: and here and there they took in an honest Gentleman, in hopes to win him to their side by this kindness.

After the dissolution of this Parliament, when his late Majesty issued out his Writs for another to convene, 17 Oct. 1679. they added to their former Arts the loud clamours against French Pensioners,* 1.162 Popery, Arbitrariness, and all those who voted against the Bill of Exclusion, as Popishly affected, or downright Papists; traducing his Majesty, the Court, the Ministers of State, and almost all the Loyal Gentry and Clergy for endeavouring to have those men chosen. The second advantage they made was the pretended discovery of(l) 1.163 Sir Stephen Fox of the Pensioners of the late long Parliament: which discovery being hastily made, and no Record of it be∣ing entred,* 1.164 they took the confidence to add to it whomso∣ever they pleased to have so thought; They made the Peo∣ple believe they knew who would be Pensioners likewise, and led the diffidence to that height, as to exclude as far as they could possibly, not only all the Courtiers and other Per∣sons who had any places of profit and advantage under his Majesty, but their Relations too, and wanted not much that they had excluded all those who bore any Honorary Imploy∣ment. So that nothing recommended a man so effectually for a Parliament man, as that he had not been thought fit

to be trusted in the least by his then Majesty, or their Neighbour Gentry, these they cried up as true Friends to the Protestant Religion, and the Country; and he was an hard∣hearted Man in their Dialect, who called the Sincerity of their Loyal Intentions in question: However by their Actings, many of them have been discovered to be but cold Friends to the Government.

But Intending to discourse more fully of the several Arts us'd by designing Men in the Chapter of Factions, I shall at present quit this Subject, and only desire Kings to consider, that they can condescend no lower to gratifie Importunities of Parlia∣ment or People, in yielding up any of their Privileges.

The Philosopher of old hath noted, how Kingly Authority was lessened among the Grecians, which was no ways profita∣ble to them. He speaking of Kings. in the Heroick times,(m) 1.165 That then they had the Government and Administration of Matters in the Cities, and the adjoyning Territories within their Dominions, and what extended without the Limits of the Empire (viz. to preserve and protect their Subjects against their Enemies, make War and Peace, &c.) But after, partly by the spontaneous Concessions of the Princes, and partly by the En∣croachment of the People, they came to be lessened in Power, and in some Cities had only the Power of Sacrificing left, in others the Command of their Armies. This, as well as other Reasons, must needs demonstrate, That if ever any two Hou∣ses of Parliament should by Arts of Insinuation (as that of 1641. did, That unless the King would grant they might not be dis∣solved without their Consents,* 1.166 they could not have time to settle his Throne, and redress Grievances) or by denying ne∣cessary Supplies, force a King to grant them a Power of pro∣longing their own Sitting, or meeting at stated times without his Writ, or yielding to their Bills implicitly, (as the Black Par∣liament of 41. endeavoured) and then to have the Power of nominating the Great Ministers of State, and the Officers of the Militia, an end would be soon put to Monarchy.

Therefore every one that loves their Country,* 1.167 the continu∣ance of that most excellent Frame of Government, for the Subjects security, as no other Country enjoys; those who would avoid the sad Ravages of Civil War, who would make their Prince Glorious, their Country Renowned, themselves and their Posterities Happy: let them be careful to elect Loyal and Judicious Members, neither tainted with Faction, Ambition, or Self-ends; and if any such be elected, let the Wise and Loyal, when they meet in that Great Assembly, watch over the De∣signs of such ill Members, discover their Intriegues, be careful not to be circumvented by their Artifices, stick close to the Fundamentals of Government; and then all things will be pro∣sperous, and they will have the honour of being stiled True Patriots of their Country.

Sir(n) 1.168 Edward Coke hath noted, That Parliaments succeed not

well in five Cases.* 1.169 First, when the King hath been in displeasure with his Lords or Commons; therefore it was one of the Peti∣tions of the Commons to Edw. 3. That he would require the Archbishop, and all other of the Clergy, to pray for his Estate, for the Peace and good Government of the Land, and for the con∣tinuance of the King's Good-will towards the Commons; to which the(o) 1.170 King replied, The same prayeth the King. The like Petition he saith, many times the Lords have made, and further adds, That the King in all his weighty affairs, had used the ad∣vice of his Lords and Commons, always provided, that both Lords and Commons keep within the Circle of the Law, and Custom of Parliament.

The second is when any of the great Lords are at variance among themselves, as he instanceth in the third(p) 1.171 of H. 6. in the Controversy betwixt John Earl Marshal, and Richard Earl of Warwick, and 4 H. 6. betwixt the Duke of Gloucester and Bishop of Winchester, whereby little was done in any Par∣liamentary Court, and that little of no moment.

The third,* 1.172 when there is no good Correspondence betwixt the Lords and Commons; which happens, when some People out of design to render the meeting of the two Houses in∣effectual, do project some matters, whereby the Houses may clash about Privileges, as was lately in Shirley's Case, about the Mony-Bill from the House of Lords, and many other Par∣ticulars might be instanced in; therefore Sir Edward Coke saith, That when it was demanded by the Lords and Commons, what might be a principal Motive for them to have good success in Parliaments,* 1.173 it was answered, They should be insuperable, if inseparable, Cum radix & vertex Imperii in Obedientium con∣sensu rata sunt. The very root and top of Government con∣sists in the consent of the Obedient, and the Subjects Happiness is in that Harmony, when it is betwixt the two Houses, and a∣mong themselves: but much more happy, when it is likewise betwixt the Sovereign, and the two Houses. It is that which compleats their own, and the Peoples Felicity. But when the two Houses, or one of them, are for wresting the Sovereigns Prerogative from him, as in Forty one, then it is the most fatal and ill-boding sign of any other.

The fourth is,* 1.174 when there wants Unity in the House of Com∣mons, as we had not long since Experience, when within those Walls (from whence wholesome Counsels are expected, and all things tending to the preservation of the King's Peace, Crown, and Dignity;) such Heats were amongst the Members, that if one Sword, that was half drawn, had been wholly unsheathed, it was thought a very bloody Battel had been fought.

The last he makes,* 1.175 is when there is no preparation for the Par∣liament before it begin; for which purpose the Summons of Par∣liament is forty Days or more before the Sitting, to the end that Preparations might be had for the considering the arduous and urgent affairs of the Realm. And Sir Edward saith it was

an ancient custom in Parliament, in the beginning thereof, to appoint a select Committee to consider of the Bills in the two preceding last Parliaments that passed both Houses, or either of them, and such as had been preferred, read, or committed, and to take out of them such as were most profitable for the Commonwealth.

To these may be added a most material one,* 1.176 that makes un∣fortunate Congresses of Parliaments, viz. When the Members come up, with strong Resolutions to provide Remedies for some Grievances, either real or surmised, and at the same time the Sovereign is in great Straights, for supplies for the safety, repute, or necessary occasions of the Government; for then (as in most of the Parliaments of King Charles the First) the Houses are for redress of Grievances, before supply, how pressing and urgent soever, and do not credit the King that he will give them time to redress them, after he is supplied; and they from design, rather than this diffidence, will not suffer sup∣ply and grievances to go pari passu, Hand in Hand, as we may remember in those Parliaments, wherein the popular Men made such Harangues, that they would know whether they were Free∣men, or Slaves, or had any thing to give before they entred up∣on the giving part: The like we saw in King Charles the Second's Reign, in some of his last Parliaments, whereby all their Con∣sultations were abortive; and both the Kings had no other Ex∣pedient but Prorogation, or Dissolution; and disuse of Parlia∣ments for some Years followed.

How much happier have we been in the last Session of the Parliament, under our most Wise,* 1.177 Magnanimous and Gracious King, wherein no strife or contention was, but who should be forwardest to supply the necessities of the Crown, to shew all Loyal Dutifulness to their Sovereign, whereby a most dange∣rous Rebellion in both Kingdoms was the easilier crushed; and which endears them to the King, that there can be no danger, but whatever good and wholsome Laws they shall propose for the general good of the Kingdom, will find a chearful allowance by him.

How happy had our Forefathers been if King Charles the First had met with such considerate Parliaments, who by a seasona∣ble supply and compliance, might have had (without that vast effusion of Blood and Treasure) all their Grievances redressed, and the flourishing State of the Kingdom preserved, and the Memories of a great many Noblemen and Gentlemen had been transmitted without stain to their remote Nephews.

But to draw towards a Conclusion of this Discourse,* 1.178 Some that may not be willing to hear of the Miscarriages of some Par∣liaments, wherein probably they were concerned, may say, what need is there now, to bring again upon the Stage the rigorous Proceedings of the two Houses of Parliament, or more proper∣ly of the leading and designing Men in the House of Com∣mons, in the Years 1640, and 1680. since we are now happi∣ly

past these Rocks, Quicksands, and treacherous Shores.

All the World indeed must acknowledg we have a Royal, wise Pilot,* 1.179 who knows full well to steer the Soveraignty of the Commonweal. He hath weathered out high going Seas; so that neither their over-whelming liquid Mountains, nor the terrible Shot from the floating Castles have daunted him; mag∣nanimity, unparallel'd Courage, and an Experience be∣yond most Crowned Heads, have raised him great Trophies of his Victorious toils: He is served with sage Councils, both private and National. So that all must confess we have less cause to fear any more dangers of Hurricanes and Shipwracks.

But though we now enjoy Halcyon days,* 1.180 under a Sovereign, enriched with Royal abilities to the heighth of our Wishes; though he is blessed with a Parliament, as Loyal as can be de∣sired, betwixt whom there is no other Strife, but who shall out-pass the other in mutual Obligations: Yet are we secure, that no ill Exhalations may be gathered in after-Ages?

Can we expect always temperate Weather, pleasing Sunshine, and fruitful Showres? No, in small revolutions of Years we find Epidemical Diseases return; excesses of Drought, Rains, or Frosts, are often marked in our Annals, even after promising Configurations of the Coelestial Bodies.

I write not an Almanack for a Year,* 1.181 or Pamphlet for a time, my Design is not Infandum renovare Dolorem out of any Pique; but as much as in me lies to show from the by-past Irregulari∣ties, and Exorbitances of some Men, how Loyal, good, and Just Men may measure things by the Golden Standard of the Laws; how mischievous Practices and Principles may be ob∣viated; how every one may see what the upshot of rebellious Principles will be; how to detect, and how to avoid the same kind of Rocks and Sands in after-Ages.

I know some Persons recovered from a valitudinary Condi∣tion,* 1.182 love not to hear of the Torments they have undergone, nor of the Extravagances of their delirous State: Yet this should not hinder but the Healthful, and those that would a∣void the Calenture, should patiently endure to hear a Descrip∣tion of the Causes and Symptoms.

In this Discourse I have only culled out such Particulars,* 1.183 as I find Judicious Authors have insisted upon, against the unpre∣cedented Proceedings of some late Houses of Commons; which I think all Loyal Persons disapprove; and I believe a great many as well as my self, have heard many of the then sitting Members dislike, when things were carried with an impetu∣ous Torrent, that it was more dangerous to speak against their proceedings, or question the unlimited Power assumed by that House, than it was to speak Seditious (I had almost said Trea∣sonable) Words against the King.

Therefore I hope none of this present Honourable House of Commons (who have so signalized their Loyalty in the last Ses∣sion) will take offence at what, from such judicious Persons as

I have met with, I have delivered the Sentiments of. My inten∣tion is no ways to lessen the Rights, or necessary Privileges of that venerable Assembly; which never can be unbeneficial to the King, or People, but when Discontent, Faction, and Se∣dition hath too spreadingly infected the Electors.

The continuance of that worst of Parliaments of 1641.* 1.184 in their disloyal Practices so long, by the overgrowing of the Tares, which were only suffered to thrive, occasioned so much corrupt seed to be sown, as in twenty years there was no wholesom grain left. We saw too late, how by some evil Seedsmen, a fertile, but dangerous Crop was shooting up apace. It is not a little Labour, nor small diligence, will howe and weed out the Briars, Thistles, and destructive Shrubs, and poysonous Weeds, that shoot their spreading Roots so far: But I hope the great Wisdom of this Loyal Parliament, will find out ways and me∣thods to prevent the danger of their thriving in a Soil, worthy of better Plants, than any will be set by Republican Hands.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The various Accep∣tation of the word Parliament.
• * 1.2

  Appropriated to the Lords House.
• (a) 1.3

  Egerton, sect. 4. 22, 23.
• * 1.4

  To both the Houses.
• * 1.5

  How properly the High Court of Par∣liament.
• (b) 1.6

  Freeholder's Grand Inquest, p. 34.
• * 1.7

  The King is not one of the Three Estates.
• * 1.8

  The Modus makes the Parliament to consist of six Parts.
• (c) 1.9

  Ita non habet Pa∣rem in suo gradu.
• (d) 1.10

  As queux Prelats, ou la Clargie par eux mesmes; & les Coun∣tes & Barons par eux mesmes; Chevalers & Gentz de Countez, & Gentz de la Commune par eux mesmes en∣treteront. Prynne A∣nimadv. p. 10.
• * 1.11

  The Lords Spiritu∣al, Lords Temporal, and Commons make the Three Estates.
• (e) 1.12

  Stat. 18. ••. 6. c. 1.
• (f) 1.13

  8 Eliz. c. 1.
• (g) 1.14

  P. 36.
• (h) 1.15

  4. Instr. p. 1.
• (i) 1.16

  Interpreter, tit. Parliament.
• (k) 1.17

  Solenne collequi∣um omnium Ordinum Regni, Authoritate so∣lius Regis, ad consu∣lendum, statuendumque de negotiis Regni in∣dictum. Gloss. p. 449.
• * 1.18

  Lib. 5. p. 253.
• ‖ 1.19

  De Repul. lib. 6.
• * 1.20

  Why in some of King Charles the First's Writings the King was called the Third Estate.
• (l) 1.21

  Review of Ob∣servations.
• * 1.22

  The Ballancing of the Powers in Par∣liament.
• (m) 1.23

  King's Supre∣macy asserted, c. 9. p. 96. where the Reader may find a full Answer to the Deductions they make from the King's way of argu∣ing.
• (n) 1.24

  Id possit quisquam quod jure possit.
• * 1.25

  The not asserting of King Charles the First's Prerogative, disadvantagious.
• * 1.26

  The Monarchy of England not mixed.
• (o) 1.27

  King's Suprema∣cy asserted, p. 74.
• (p) 1.28

  Declaration from N••wmarket, 9 March 1641.
• (q) 1.29

  Besold. Synopsis Polit. Doct. l. 1. c. 6.
• * 1.30

  How the two Houses concur in making Laws.
• (r) 1.31

  King's Supre∣macy, p. 84. Objection, That the Mixture is in the Supremacy of Pow∣er.
• * 1.32

  Answer, That is on∣ly in the Exercise of the Power.
• (s) 1.33

  Panorm. cap. Gra∣vem de Sent. Excom.
• (t) 1.34

  Bertol. in Lomnes Populi, sect. de Justi∣tia & Jure, q. 2.
• (u) 1.35

  Suarez, lib. 1. de Leg. c. 8. n. 9.
• * 1.36

  Besold. de Juribus Magist. c. 2.
• (w) 1.37

  De Imperio Sum∣marum Potestatum cir∣ca sacra, c. 8. num. 11.
• (x) 1.38

  Coke 5. part, tit. Cases de By-Laws & Ordinances.
• (y) 1.39

  King's Suprema∣cy, p. 88. Of Architectonical and Preceptive Power.
• (z) 1.40

  Idem, p. 91.
• * 1.41

  Objection, The Three Estates to restrain the Excess of each other.
• * 1.42

  Answer to it.
• * 1.43

  Objection concern∣ing the Power of Representatives.
• * 1.44

  Answer, What Ho∣nour is due to Re∣presentatives of the Subjects.
• * 1.45

  Reasons against the Power of Represen∣tatives.
• (a) 1.46

  England's Univer∣sal Distraction, p. 4.
• * 1.47

  Why Reason and Law were not hearkned to by the Advocates of the Long Parliament.
• (b) 1.48

  Answer to Ob∣server, p. 130, 131. How Passions, Affe∣ctions, Interests, and Factions may sway Representatives.
• * 1.49

  The Ambition and Covetousness of Re∣presentatives.
• * 1.50

  The Cruelty of the Long Parliament.
• * 1.51

  The Partiality.
• * 1.52

  The Corruptness of the Roman Senate.
• * 1.53

  Of cunning and de∣signing Men.
• * 1.54

  Fallit enim vitium specie virturis & um∣bra.
• * 1.55

  The specious Pre∣tences of the Long Parliament.
• * 1.56

  Their Hypocritical Promises.
• (c) 1.57

  Aeneas Sylvius de diaetis Fred. Imp.
• * 1.58

  Simulatio & dissimu∣latio.
• * 1.59

  How many Coun∣sellors may mislead.
• * 1.60

  The Elected like the Electors.
• * 1.61

  Concerning the Ne∣gative Voice.
• * 1.62

  Si vult is scire an ve∣lim, efficite us possim nolle. Seneca.
• * 1.63

  Objection, That in Cases of Extraordi∣nary necessity, the Houses to have Power to secure the People from Ty∣ranny.
• * 1.64

  Answer.
• * 1.65

  The Houses have no Power to declare Law.
• (d) 1.66

  Address, part 3. p. 121.
• * 1.67

  Objection, That if the King have a Negative Voice, there will be no need of Parliaments.
• * 1.68

  Answer.
• (e) 1.69

  Answer to Ob∣servations, p. 56.
• * 1.70

  Necesse est us Lancea in libra ponderibus im∣positis deprimi, sic ani∣mum perspicuis cedere.
• * 1.71

  Concerning the Co∣ronation-Oaths of the King of England.
• (f) 1.72

  Evagrius His••. Eccles. lib. 3. c. 32. Who first took a Coronation-Oath.
• (g) 1.73

  Eutrop. lib. 24. p. 145, 146. Zonar. Annal. tom. 3. fol. 142, 143. Imperatorio Diade∣mate est ornatus, po∣stulato prius scripto quo promitteret se nul∣la Ecclesiae statuta vi∣olaturum.
• (h) 1.74

  Onuphr.
• (i) 1.75

  Dicens Imperato∣rem nemini jurari de∣bere, cum juramento∣rum sacramenta ab omnibus sint sibi ad∣hibenda. Hermold. Chron. Scl. l. 1. c. 40. Sim. Dunelm. 232, 237.
• (k) 1.76

  Tit. Hon. part 1. c. 8. fol. 149.
• (l) 1.77

  De Gestis Regum Agg. col. 173. Wigorn. Chro. 384.
• * 1.78

  Quibus ille juravit, quod & secundum De∣um & secundum secu∣lum, fidelis esse vellet eis Dominus. King Canutus his Oath.
• (m) 1.79

  Clitonem Ead∣mundum unanimo con∣sensu in Reg••m leva∣vere. Matt. Westm. p. 410. 411.
• (n) 1.80

  Flor. Wigorn. Chro. p. 404. Edward the Confes∣sor's Oath.
• (o) 1.81

  Nihil erat quod Edwardus pro necessi∣late temporis non pol∣liceretur. Ita utrinque fide datae quicquid pe∣tebatur, sacramento sir∣mavit.
• (p) 1.82

  In Regem Angliae sublimatus prius ju∣ravit se Leges Canuti inviolabiliter serva∣turum. Spelm. Conc. tom. 2. p. 342.
• * 1.83

  William the Conque∣ror's Oath.
• (r) 1.84

  Elo. Wigorn. Chro. p. 412. Hoveden part. Annal. prior. p. 450. Stubs Acta Pontif. col. 1702. Coram Clero & Po∣pulo jurando promit∣tere se velle sanctas Ecclesias & Rectores earum defendere, nec∣non & cunctum popu∣lum sibi subjectum ju∣sta & Regali provi∣dentia regere, rectam Legem statuere & te∣nere, Rapinas injusta∣que judicia penitus a∣movere & interdicere. Sim. Dunelm. col. 195. num. 43.
• (r) 1.85

  Man. Paris vita Fritherici Abbatis 13. St. Albani, p. 30.
• (s) 1.86

  Modeste erga sub∣jectos ageret, & aequo jur•• Anglos quo Francos tractaret. De Gestis Pontif. lib. 3. fol. 154.
• (t) 1.87

  Justitiam, aequita∣tem, & misericordiam se per totum Regnum, si Rex foret, in omni negotio servaturum, pace libertatem & se∣curitatem Ecclesiae contra omnes defensu∣rum. Eadmerus Hist. Novel. lib. 1. p. 13, 14.
• * 1.88

  King William Rufus's Oath.
• (u) 1.89

  Col. 214.
• (w) 1.90

  R. Hoveden, part. 1. Annal. p. 264. b. num. 20.
• (x) 1.91

  Lib. 7. fol. 213. b.
• * 1.92

  King Henry the First's Oath.
• (y) 1.93

  Ʋt animos corum in sui promotionem ac∣cenderet.
• * 1.94

  Si animo volenti ip∣sis vellet concedere, & charta sua communire illas libertates & an∣tiquas consuetudines quae floruerunt in Regno tempore Sancti Regis Edwardi. Mat. Paris 250. n. 53. Hist. Novel. lob. 3. p. 55.
• (z) 1.95

  Diademate insi••∣nitas has libertates subscriptas in Regno ad exaltationem Sanctae Ecclesiae & pacem Po∣pulo tenendam concel∣sit. Mat. Paris Hist. p. 46. num. 40. ult. Edit.
• (a) 1.96

  Histor. Novel. p. 101. b. num. 40. Vide Mat. Paris. p. 62. num. 35.
• * 1.97

  King Stephen's Oath.
• (b) 1.98

  Chron. col. 1043. num. 67.
• * 1.99

  King Henry the Second's Oath.
• (c) 1.100

  Hist. 1080, 1081.
• (d) 1.101

  Gul. Newbrigensis lib. 4. c. 25. Gerv. Dorob. Chron. col. 1413. Matt. Paris, p. 117.
• (e) 1.102

  Ʋt Regni consuetu∣dines antiquas sub quibus dignitas peri∣cli••bitur Ecclesiae, illibatae debeant omni tempore observari. Hoveden. Annal. pars poster. p. 518, 519.
• (f) 1.103

  Rectam Justiti∣am exercebit in populo sibi commisso, leges ma∣las & consuetudines perversas si aliqua sint in Regno suo delebit, & bonas custodies. Brompton, col 1158. num. 60.
• * 1.104

  King Richard the First's Oath.
• * 1.105

  King John's Oaths.
• (g) 1.106

  Matt. Paris, fol. 165. ult. Edit. num. 27.
• (h) 1.107

  Quod sanctam Ec∣clesiam & ejus ordina∣tos diligeret, & eam ab incursione malig∣nantium indemnem conservaret; & quod perversis legibus de∣structis, bonas substi∣tueret, & rectam Ju∣stitiam in Regno Aug∣liae exerceret. Idem, p. 166. num. 4. Promisit se per anxi∣lium Dei bona side ea quae juraverat ser∣vaturum.
• (i) 1.108

  Mat. Paris, Hist. p. 229, 230.
• (k) 1.109

  Idem, p. 243. num. 26.
• * 1.110

  The Oath of King Henry the Third.
• (l) 1.111

  1. I Ʋt Ecclesia Dei, & omni populo Chri∣stiano vera pax omni suo tempore observe∣tur. 2. Ʋt rapacita∣tem & omnes iniqui∣tates omnibus gradi∣bus interdicat. 3. Ʋt in omnibus judiciis ae∣quitatem praecipiat & misericordiam. Bract. lib. 3. de Actionibus, c. 9. fol. 107.
• * 1.112

  King Edward the First's Oath not re∣corded.
• * 1.113

  That he took an Oath.
• (m) 1.114

  Prynne's Epist. Dedicat. to the chird Vol. of Legal Vin∣dication.
• * 1.115

  The Oaths of King Edward the Second, and King Edward the Third.
• (n) 1.116

  Cl. 1. E. 2. num. 10.
• * 1.117

  Also Cl. 1 E. 3. m. 24. dorso.
• * 1.118

  The Oath of King Richard the Second.
• (o) 1.119

  Cl. 1. R. 2. m. 44.
• * 1.120

  This is an additional Clause.
• (q) 1.121

  Rot. Parl. 1 H. 4. num 16, & 17.
• * 1.122

  King Henry the Fourth's Oath.
• (r) 1.123

  Hist. Aug. fol. 194, 195. Juravit coraem Archi∣episcopo & Proceribus qui ibi aderant, quo∣niam ipsi solum ejus Juramentum audire potuerunt.
• (s) 1.124

  Praecipue miseri∣cordiam observaret, si∣cut sibi suam indul∣geat misericordiam clemens & misericors Deus.
• (t) 1.125

  Prynne's Treache∣ry and Disloyalty. Answer to the Ob∣jections about the Words Quas vulgus elegerit.
• (u) 1.126

  Freeholders Grand Inquest, b. 46. What meant by Vul∣gus. according to the Opinion of some.
• * 1.127

  Customs chosen by the Vulgar, or Com∣mon People.
• (w) 1.128

  Glossary, p. 36.
• (x) 1.129

  Id. p. 35.
• * 1.130

  What meant by the Community.
• (y) 1.131

  Walsingham, fol. 95. num. 20.
• (z) 1.132

  Elossary, p. 24.
• (a) 1.133

  Book of Oaths, fol. 1.
• * 1.134

  The Oath of King Henry the Eighth. I find in the Heralds Office the words thus: Do ye grant the rightful Laws and Cusioms to be holden, and permit ye, after your Strength and Power, such Laws as to the Honour of God shall be chosen to the People, by you to be strengthned and de∣sensed? Vid in Coll. Arm. p. 60.
• * 1.135

  Oath of Edward the Sixth.
• * 1.136

  Oaths of Queen Ma∣ry and Queen Eliza∣beth not seen by the Author. The Oaths of King James the First, and King Charles the First. The Oath of King Charles the Second, Hist. Coronationis Caroli 2. in Colleg. Arm.
• * 1.137

  The Oath of King James the Second.
• * 1.138

  Considerations upon this Discourse of the Coronation Oaths.
• * 1.139

  How the Long Par∣liament Writers would have the King part with his Prerogative in Ca∣ses of necessity only.
• (b) 1.140

  Answer to Ob∣serv. b. 76.
• * 1.141

  That the Houses should be Judges of this Necessity.
• (c) 1.142

  Review of Ob∣servations.
• * 1.143

  By the Arguments of the Parliamenta∣ry Writers, the So∣vereignty is not in the King, but in the People.
• (d) 1.144

  Answ. to Observ. p. 72, 73.
• * 1.145

  The King's Nega∣tive Voice Necessa∣ry.
• (e) 1.146

  Idem, p. 136.
• * 1.147

  That the King is not bound to con∣sent, where what is desired is more in∣convenient to the People than himself.
• * 1.148

  The Writers for the Parliament af∣firm, That where the Houses think the Constitution of the Government is not agreeable to the Liberty of the Peo∣ple, they may alter it.
• * 1.149

  How the Long Par∣liament voted all the Power into their own Hands.
• * 1.150

  When Parliaments beneficial, when not.
• (f) 1.151

  Answer to Ob∣serv. p. 150.
• (g) 1.152

  10 Annal.
• * 1.153

  Kings not to grant away their Preroga∣tives at the Impor∣tunity of Parlia∣ments.
• * 1.154

  The fundamental Cause of Factious Members in Parlia∣ment.
• (h) 1.155

  King's Speech, 6 March, 1678.
• * 1.156

  The Artifices used by designing People, to get such as they desired, to be elect ed.
• * 1.157

  The Characters they gave Men of the Court-party.
• (i) 1.158

  Address, part 2. p. 2, 3.
• * 1.159

  Papists in Masque∣rade.
• * 1.160

  Excluding Loyal and Orthodox Gentle∣men.
• (k) 1.161

  Idem, p. 5.
• * 1.162

  French Pensioners.
• (l) 1.163

  Address, part 3. p. 5.
• * 1.164

  Pensioners to the King.
• (m) 1.165

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 14.
• * 1.166

  Kings never to yield what the Long Par∣liament were so ear∣nest for.
• * 1.167

  The Care to be had in Elections.
• (n) 1.168

  4. Instit. p. 35.
• * 1.169

  Several Cases where Parliaments succeed not well, when the King is displeased with the Two Hou∣ses.
• (o) 1.170

  Rot. Parl. 25 E. 3. num. 15. 43 E. 3. num. 1. 50 E. 3. num. 2.
• (p) 1.171

  Rot. Parl. 3 H. 6. num. 18. When Variance a∣mong the Lords.
• * 1.172

  When no good Cor∣respondence betwixt the Lords and Com∣mons.
• * 1.173

  Sitis insuperabiles, si fuertis inseparabiles.
• * 1.174

  When Disagreement in the House of Commons.
• * 1.175

  When no Prepara∣tion for the Parlia∣ment.
• * 1.176

  When Redress of Grievances are pre∣ferred to the Sup∣ply of the King.
• * 1.177

  The happy Harmo∣ny in the last Session of Parliament, June 1685.
• * 1.178

  Some not willing to hear of the Miscar∣riages of Parlia∣ments, think this Discourse needless.
• * 1.179

  Because we have a most wise King, and good Parliament.
• * 1.180

  Yet we are not se∣cure but that in af∣ter-Ages evil Mem∣bers of Parliament may be.
• * 1.181

  The Design of the Author in writing against the Exorbi∣tances of some.
• * 1.182

  Some love not to hear of their Di∣stempers.
• * 1.183

  The Author's Apo∣logy for himself.
• * 1.184

  What evil Principles taught during the Long Parliament.