Certaine letters of Henry Jeanes minister of Gods word at Chedzoy and Dr. Jeremy Taylor concerning a passage of his, in his further explication of originall sin.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet because you are pleased not to understand what I did, and must mean there, I will point it out to you: To be inclined to evil, is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin properly, viz. of nature; for that is the subject of the question, whether inclination unto evil be an effect of nature, or an inherent principle of evil; a sin natural and ne∣cessary? Now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued, competent, viz. it is not a natural, or necessary sin, not a sin of our nature, because it is accidental to nature, not intrinsecal, not essential.

Jeanes.

To rescue your second reason from that which I charge it with, you are fain to make an additional supply unto the Proposition; unto which, you say, your second reason is competent. To be inclined to evil, &c. is no sin properly, no natural and necessary sin, no inherent Principle of evil. Now unto this addition I shall apply your words that you have concerning Binius and Baronius in the like case; whe∣ther it may be allowed you by any license, less then Poetical, let Criticks judge: Surely, Sir, if the most of your Writings be thus elliptical, they will be unintelligible un∣to me without a Commentary, and if you must be indulged the liberty of making such interpolations, all the Vniversities in Christendom are no match to dispute with you.

But to insist a little upon the examination of this Interpolation.

1. You seem to make equivalent these two propositions; Inclination to evil, is an inherent principle of evil; Inclination to evil, is a sin naturall and necessary: But I am utterly unsatisfied touching this their equivalency, and shall desire you to clear it up unto me.

Nay further, I very much question the truth of the first Proposition; this inclina∣tion to evil, is not as inherent principle of evil; and shall intreat you to inform me, whether you deny it to be a principle of evil, or an inherent principle, and think it onely adherent, circumstant, or the like: but I believe you will tell me of some Ellip∣sis in your words, that I ought to understand, and supply something to make out your sense: What it is, I will not adventure to guess at, but leave it to you to express it your self.

Secondly, The conclusion that is confirmed by your second Reason, is the same with that which is proved by your first Reason; and that was, that inclination to e∣vil was no sin, without the additional Epithets of natural and necessary. It is no sin, say you, properly; because, that which is unavoidable, is no sin: and indeed, the un∣avoidableness of our inclination to evil, may be a probable argument that it is no

sin, and require an answer; but no competent reason at all to prove it not to be natural and necessary: But seeing you say, it must be your meaning that these Epi∣thets should be interposed, we will for once suppose it, for Disputation sake, and see whether we can understand by any means what you would have.

1. You say, your meaning in your conclusion is, that Inclination to evil is no sin, viz. of nature, which I shall consider anon, when I shall come to examine that subtilty of yours, That sin is not so much as subjected in our common nature.

2. Let us inquire what you mean by natural and necessary.

1. What you mean by natural: There be divers significations of the word natu∣ral, which are impertinent to our present Discourse, and therefore I shall omit them. I suppose that you take natural, either for that, which is so termed, in regard of con∣nexion with our nature; or else in respect of Physical, and necessary resultancy from our nature.

If you take it for that, which is so termed, in regard of connexion with our nature, which is coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Nativity and Conception of our nature, then your second Reason is Tautological, a most pitifull and miser∣able begging of the question, for you tell us afterward, that by essential, you mean that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being; and then, there will be no more difference betwixt essential and natural, in this acception of it, then there is betwixt ensis and gladius, and so your Argument explained will stand thus.

Inclination to evil is not connexed with our nature; because it is not connexed with our nature: it is not coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Conception and Nativity of our nature; because it is after our nature, and not together with it in real being.

2. If you take natural, in regard of necessary resultancy from our nature; then your Argument is impertinent, and concerns not those whom you oppose; for they deny, as well as you, that inclination unto evil is natural in such a sense: Let two speak for all.

First, Bishop Davenant in his Determinations, where his determination of the sixteenth Question, is, Pro••itas ad malum non fluit ex principiis naturae integrae.

The second is Dr. Baro in his Metaphysicks, pag. 256. Theologi nostri asserunt, concupiscentiam nul'o modo esse quid necessario consequens naturam humanam in se spe∣ctatam; & ideo dicu••t eam esse quid superadditum, & adventitium, in animo homi∣nis existens post ••apsum.

But perhaps you may pitch upon some other acception of natural; if you doe, I shall beseech you not to chide me, but to certifie my mistake by explication of your meaning; for I have done my best to bolt it out, and must needs profess, that I can∣not guess at any other signification of natural, which you can here in this place with any probability pretend unto: But if you can acquaint me with any other, when I know it, I shall be ready to examine it.

But to proceed unto the next Epithete necessary: When you said, that an incli∣nation to evil was not properly a sin, your meaning was (you say) that it was not a necessary sin.

But then I desire to know how your first Reason will be suited unto this conclusion, for your first Reason stands thus, because that which is unavoidable, is not sin; and I would intreat you also to inform us, what is the difference here betwixt necessary and unavoidable; for if there be no difference, I shall shrewdly suspect your argu∣ments sick of that infirmity, called petitio principii.

But perhaps we must here make the like supply, and understand you thus, because that which is unavoidable is not a necessary sin; if so, your Argument reduced un∣to form, will run thus.

Nothing that is unavoidable can be a necessary sin: But an inclination to evil is unavoidable: Therefore it is not a necessary sin.

Vnto your major I say, that though unavoidableness, in one sense, may carry a repugnancy unto sin, yet not to necessary; it may prove a thing not to be a sin, but it makes nothing against its being necessary; for that which is unavoidable, may be, and is necessary; it is probable therefore, that necessary was never in your first thoughts, but put in, to secure your second Reason from mine Objections a∣gainst it.

However, yet I shall here propound and apply a distinction of necessary, usuall among your Antagonists: * 1.1 A thing, say they, may be said to be necessary, in re∣gard of either primitive and created, or consequent and contracted necessity.

If you speak of that, which is necessary with that necessity, which is primitive and created, then indeed I grant your conclusion true, and your second reason compe∣tent unto it: Inclination unto evil is not a necessary sin, in regard of a Primitive and Created necessity.

But now this were utterly besides the main of your intention, for here you would sight with nothing but your own shadow, because your adversaries do not avouch such a necessity in our inclination to evil, but defie and abhor it more then your self; and you cannot affix any such thing unto them, unless you grosly calumni∣ate them.

If you speak of that which is necessary, with a consequent and contracted necessi∣ty; then your conclusion is false, and your second reason no confirmation thereof; if it be put into form, it will make up two Syllogisms.

The first Syllogisin.

• Nothing that is accidental, can be a sin necessary, with a consequent and contra∣cted necessity.
• But our inclination to evil is accidental.
• Therefore it is not a necessary sin in respect of a consequent and contracted ne∣cessity.

The second Syllogism.

• Every thing that is necessary in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity, is intrinsecal and essential.
• But inclination to evil is not intrinsecal and essential.
• Therefore it is not necessary, in regard of a consequent and contracted ne∣cessity.

The major in both Syllogisms is evidently false, as will appear, when you attempt the proof of them: and I am very confident, you never will own them, if you can any other way shift off my objections.

In the next place, we have a strange Paradox of yours, which I understand not, I shall propound it, and briefly consider it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Dr. Edw: Reynolds 3 Treatises, pag: 209.