Page 36
Dr. Taylor.
For suppose I had not prosperously enough expressed my meaning, yet you, who are a man of wit and parts, could easily have discerned my purpose and my design: You could not but know, and consider too, that my great design was to say, That sin could not be natural, that it is so far from being essential, that it is not so much as subjected in our common natures, but in our persons onely.
1. Whether what you say of my wit and parts, be not a seem, I shall not trou∣ble myself to inquire, but leave it unto your conscience: However, I suppose, you think your self far superior unto my poor self in wit and parts, and I also readily acknowledge as much: Now I wonder why you should think that I should so easily finde out what is your meaning, seeing you (whose abilities so far transcend mine) be so unprosperous, not onely in the expression, but in the after interpretation of your meaning, as that you dissent in a latter Letter, from your self in a former Letter: How can you reasonably expect that I, who am not (as one of your Profelites late∣ly said) worthy to be named the same day with you, (I shall not deny the truth of the comparison, nor envy you the honor thereof) should (as the Pro verb is) see further into a Mill-stone then you, who are so Eagle and quick sighted.
Secondly, Whereas you say, That sin is not so much as subjected in our common na∣ture, but in our persons onely; I doubt that I understand you not, for to me it seems very evident, that sin, (so far as a privation can be inherent) is truly inherent in our natures; for it hath all the Requisites of inherence, that Aristotle layeth down (Ca∣tegor: cap. 2.)
1. It is in our nature.
2. Not as a part of our nature.
3. Neither can it exist sever'd and apart from our natures: Sin is seated in all in∣dividuals of our nature, whilest living here upon earth, Christ his humanity alone excepted; and therefore why may not we say, that 'tis subjected in our common nature? Seeing those accidents are seated secundarily, and mediately in second sub∣stances, which are primarily and immediately placed in their respective first substances; substantiae secundae substant accidentibus gratiâ primarum.
Yea, but you will (perhaps) say, it is subjected in our persons onely, therefore not in our nature: But this is a very sorry Objection': For who knows not the di∣stinction of subjectum, in subjectum quo, & quod; our persons onely are subjectum quod of fin, our natures notwithstanding may be subjectum quo of it; and we may say the same of other accidents. I finde you (pag. 494.) quoting that usual Axi∣ome, actiones sunt suppositorum; but, if you had considered the limitations that are usually given thereof, you would have spared the urging of it: actio est suppositi (saith Scotus) ultimatè denominati ab actione, sed non ut solius denominati ab ipsâ: But you may have some deep meaning, which I fathome not; fair leave may you take to explain your self.