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BRother Eucheres, I am glad I have found you at home at this time in which I have leisure to recei•••••• those kind Offices, which I could not admit at 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time of your first Invitation: And I have a•••••• ••∣nother design in this Visit; that we may Revi•••• and Reflect upon the matter of our last Conference
for though you seemed then, to pinch me somewhat hard; yet having since imparted your Arguments to my Friends, and Consulted their Judgment upon them; I find them not so Herculean as you fancy them, but very feeble and nerveles, when under∣taken by abler Masters.
You are doubly welcome on your dou∣ble Errand; but have you examined among you, the whole web, or only some shreds or fragments of that Discourse?
Though it be not worth my while to ransack it in every part of it, yet I do not intend to omit any thing very considerable; and I will use my best en∣deavour not to mistake your Sense, &c. T. B's. 2d. Lett. p. 6.
Be sure now be as good as your word; and withal take care not to pervert, as well as not to mistake, my Sense; for otherwise, you will ex∣pose both your Understanding and Integrity: and I am not yet so dull, but I may soon discover you, how involved soever your Frauds may be: And now upon this Premonition, I desire you to sit down, and enter upon the Debate.
When I told you nothing but truth, that the Present State is worse than a Deluge of Popery, for that now the Daughter of Sion is become an Harlot, the generailty of her Children, Apostate and Ʋn-churched, and that the Faith and Communion is with the few, &c. You question, Whether Submission to the Present Consti∣tution. can be proved a Sin? As if breaking Lawful, and taking Ʋnlawful Oaths, withholding ones Right and giving it to another, the overthrowing the constitution of the Kingdom, and violating the Laws of God, were no Sin. Then you further say, That admit it to be a cry∣ing Sin; every such Sin, doth not unchurch single Per∣sons or Societies: But yet however, you ought to Re∣pent, and not persevere in your Sin; since it is one of those Sins that shuts out of the true Chuch of God: For if it were necessary, I could prove, that its Principles destroy
the Churches Fundamentals and Structure; if such Prin∣ciples which destroy all Morals, and all Faith and Truth among men, can be said to do so; by which men may exclude themselves, as well as be thrown out by o∣thers, without an Authentick Act of an Ecclesiastick Judic tory; and your instance in the Roman Church is Insignificant, for we do not communicate with it; but that of the Eastern Churches is still less to the purpose; for I am not satisfied, that either they have condemned us, or we them, as Schismaticks; and Dr. Basier, was desired by some of the Greek Clergy, to Communicate and Minister among them, neither did he refuse it. T. B.'s 2d. Lett. p. 10, 11.
But, Brother, it is not enough to call things by hard Names; but it is necessary to shew, wherein the iniquity consists, and by what Law. For submission to a Civil Constitution after its settle∣ment is no Perjury, Robbery, Rebellion nor Impi∣ety, if men contribute no antecedent Evil to the Change; and it is this meer Submission which I un∣dertook to defend, as being the only thing that can be charged on the Ecclesiastick Body. And tho you pretend it unnecessary, yet you can never car∣ry your cause, that we are Self Excommunicate upon the malignity of our Principles, except you prove it, and shew that our Maxims destroy all Morals, and all Faith and Truth among Men; since you load us with such an heinous and general charge; and I know not to what purpose you dis∣coursed me last, or discourse me now, except it be to convince me of the Reality, and Anathematiz∣ing guilt of our Sin in this Submission. Here then you must to the Law, and to the Testimony, and make up a very exact proof in order to Conviction; for Men are not to be harangued into condemnati∣on, by meer unproved and general clamour, but by very articulate evidence only, which therefore I shall expect from you in the course of this Confe∣rence. In the mean time, when I alledged, that
we own the Roman and Greek Churches, to be Churches, notwithstanding their far greater Pollu∣tions and Confusions than can be imagined in our present Ecclesiastical Change (that hence I might evince us not to be Unchurched; i. e. cut off from being Members of the Church Catholick, as not having been condemned out of it by any Ecclesiasti∣cal Sentence) 'tis strange you should censure this instance for impertinent, upon these pretensions, that we refuse the Roman, but admit the Greek Communion: for by your favour, in order to Un∣churching (which very intelligibly is the making us no Church of Christ) you must have proved our Change more censurable, than all the Pollutions of the Roman and Greek Churches. And since you accuse us as Self-Excommunicate, and therefore un∣capable of your Communion, which yet you deny not to the Greeks, as being with you no Schisma∣ticks, the instance of that Churches. Corruptions was not less, but far more pertinent to our Cause; for if their Corruptions are far greater than ours, and yet cut them not off from the Right of Catho∣lick Communion; I think we are as much entituled to that Communion, who have far less and fewer Irregularities: So that except you can prove our Change more Irregular than the State of the Greek Church, you cannot out us of that Communion you assert to them. Here indeed you saw your self pinched, and so shift off the matter with a piff, as if I would be shaken off with an empty Scoff of Impertinence: No, no, I will sit a little closer on your Skirts; and though I shall not exagitate, or upbraid all the known disorders in that distressed Church; yet will I object to you the many Arbitra∣ry Changes of their Patriarchs, made by a Mahome∣tan Emperor, and admitted by them toties quoties, whensoever the Grand Seignior has a mind to ease their Purses of that money, which the new Patri∣arch is to tax on the Church as the price of his Ad∣vancement,
without any other Provocation or Inducement whatsoever. Is not this a greater cor∣ruption than any can be imagined in our Change? This you know was what I intended, and yet you condemn not them as Schismaticks; though here are frequent Deprivations, and New Advance∣ments admitted by the Greek Church to the Will of an Infidel Prince, without any other crime of the Deposed, and only for Monys sake?
I did indeed in our last Conference* 1.1 censure this Blemish in the Greek Church. But here I will give you the answer of one of our most puissant Advo∣cates concerning this disorder in the Greek Church, with his Apology fo•• the like frequent Deposi∣tions of the Jewis•• High-Priests.* 1.2 In these alledged State-deprivations of the Jewish High-Priests, either of Abia∣thar by Solomon, or after they came under Roman subjection, of the Chief Priests by the Roman Procurators, there was only a Change of Persons, but matters of Religion went on every thing the same, in Doctrines, Practices, Prayers, Sacrifices and Services of the Temple, and the Synagogues; and when these are not corrupted, Gods▪ faithful Mini∣sters may yield their personal claims to State-Depriva∣tions, to secure Protection, and Civil Benefits to the Church. This also clears the instance of the Submis∣sion of the Greeks on the frequent Deprivations of their Patriarchs by the Turkish Governors. The bene∣fits of Incorporation, which they propose to secure thereby, are not the most tempting, lying not so much in being priviledged and beneficed by the State, as in not being persecuted, but tolerated under it. And their submission for keeping on this State-benefit, such as it is, is not without detriment to the Church, (tho' their breaking with the State they fear would be more
detrimental) the Turks making their new Advance∣ments for Mony to be levied on the Church by the new Patriarch, to the countenance and growth of great Corruption, and to the bringing of the Church in debt. But as to the course of Religious Ministrations, they are the same under both Patriarchs, in the same Do∣ctrines of Faith and Manners, Prayers and Publick Offices. But now you know with us here is a change in all these parts of our Religion, in teach∣ing men to swear falsly, to rob our King, Bishops and Priests, and to pray for Robbers and Usurpers against the just and true Proprietors.
But all this Charge of Alteration in Re∣ligion is downright Calumny, uncapable of any proof in any one particular. For we preach only Submission to a Legal Change of Governors, and pray for them that are set over us by Legal Rules of Constitution. Therefore tho' Governors, like the state of all things temporal, are liable to changes, yet the Rules and Forms of our Religion and Morals are still permanent and unaltered. And here, I think, I may seasonably tell you, that the alteration of our Sovereigns was more legal than the change of the Theocracy to Chaldaean, Per∣sian, Graecian and Roman Sovereigns; yet even for these the Jews were to offer Prayers and Sacrifices; and so is the Greek Church, to pray for the new Grand Seigniors brought into the Sovereignty, up∣on the rebellious expulsion of the former, yet sur∣viving in Bonds and Prison, without any scruple of Allegiance to their new Master hereupon. Now if they ought to make an Ecclesiastical Opposition to such an Imperial Change, then their ready confor∣mity thereto, puts them into that same state of sin∣ful Religion, which you charge upon us; and how then are they in, and we out of Right to Ecclesi∣cal Communion? But to speak truth, I could not have thought, that men of such Primitive Rigour and Purity could Ligitimate that great corruption
in the Greek Church, which, tho' of it self it doth not actually and totally Unchurch them, yet it is a most deplorable profanation of the supreamest Order in their Hierarchy, and such as a General Council, upon the perpetual Sense and Principles of the Church Catholick, cannot but condemn for impious and irregular. But now I am under a pas∣sionate concern for this Author, lest this Principle of his bring him under that Heresie, which your learned Vindicator of the deprived Bishops, if he keeps up an impregnable impartiality against all Errors, will be apt to find in it. Sure I am here is laid a Rule for our Church to admit from the State even the most arbitrary removes and changes of Bishops, for no cause at all, but on∣ly to humour the State in Tyranny, or Simony, according to Doct. Hody's Doctrine: and here is conceded far more than was by the subscription of a Popish Convocation for fear of a Premunire, and more than the Pope, or Henry VIII. ever arrogated to their Headship, or Supremacy; and to use your former words,* 1.3 a blemish not to be endured in any Church, whatsoever it in∣curs for the Opposition. But so it is, and so it will be, when men are pressed too hard in point of Argument, that to avoid one absurdity they run into another, which is many times worse, and more notoriously offensive.
Well then, we'll let alone the Greek Church herein to Gods Judgment. But as for you, that think to shelter your selves under their shade, you are not capable of that their Plea; For I do not know that we want an Ecclesiastical Judge. Our Metropolitan, with his Suffragans, are a sufficient and proper Judge; And if they have not lata senten∣tia, (which there may be great Reason to forbear) yet in Praxi their Judgments are sufficiently declared, T. B's. 2d. Lett. p. ••1.
That the deprived Metropolitan and Fathers are a proper Court, or Council of Eccle∣siastical Judges upon all conforming Bishops, Cler∣gy and Laity of the Realm, I do utterly deny for many Reasons. In the Province of York they have no jurisdiction; nor can they make a distinct Synod from the rest of their Colleagues within the Province of Canterbury. So that had a Synod of meer Bishops been called therein before any Bishops made by King William, this had been a Synod, against which no Uncanonical Ordination or Enthronement could have been objected, and yet the Majority of these would have condemned their Recusancy, if we may judge of their Sen∣tence by their Conformity.
But further by our Constitution, the Body of the Clergy are concerned in our Synods; and which way think you would your Cause have gone in a full and Canonical Convocation? This your wife Author of Christian Communion well saw, and therefore would not ad∣venture the issue* 1.4 to a Syno∣dical Determination. But yet neither have these Fathers given a definitive Sentence of Excision upon us, which yet is neces∣sary, where the actual Excision passes not meerly on the uncontested notoriety and malignity of the Crime, which we suppose at present not to be our State. And let the Reasons of their forbear∣ing Sentence be what they will, yet as long as we are not self-condemned, but stand upon our Defence, we are not yet actually excommu∣nicate by any effectual judgment of these Fathers: Nor can their practice amount to so much, either Legally, or intentionally. Time was, and yet is, I believe, when several of these Fathers would not censure our Submission to the present Civil Go∣vernment as criminal and heinous. And one of those Prelates in a publick Oration to his Clergy,
strictly charged them to abstain from all oblique Reflections on each other, for refusing, or admit∣ting the Oath of New Allegiance, but to retain Charitable Opinions each toward the other; which being a publick act of that Father's at the head of his Diocess, will not (I hope) be denyed as a Lye; nor may I be condemned for uncovering a secret, since this was not such, nor transacted in a corner; nor need that Reverend Father be ashamed or unwilling to own it; since it was a most Illustri∣ous Indication of his Excellent Piety and Modera∣tion, but withal a clear confutation of that pretend∣ed censure, which you place in their Practice. For the Practice of not Swearing, may in several Men have several causes; some may condemn the Allegiance; some may doubt only; some may have aspects on another Revolution; others to the reproach of our, and to the esteem of another Party; some to their former Writings or Pretensions, points of honour, or the Fatigues of a Publick Station. So that except one unanimous Sentence against the Allegiance be judi∣cially given, the argument from practice is very unconcluding: But besides, the Practice of the Ma∣jority, will as much condemn them, as theirs can us, if this be of any such importance toward a Ju∣dicial Excommunication: So silly it is for Men to hunt after such feeble Cavils, on purpose that they may seem to have somewhat to say, and not be born down by that Truth against which they have formed a Faction.
Well, However I told you, that there is danger in your Communion; and I should have added, that the sin is unavoidable in it, because the Secession was on your side from us and Righteousness, we still con∣tinuing as we were: but see I pray, what answer you made me hereupon, that I may take off the vizor, and lay open your Hypocrisie. You say,* 1.5 that though our Church Justly and Absolutely rejects the
Roman Monarchy, yet she will not refuse any Lawful Communion, or correspondence with it in any good Eccle∣siastical Negotiations, consistent with Integrity; saving still a Publick Remonstrance to all her Pollutions. What can be the meaning of this, but that your Church is ready and willing to joyn in Communion with the Church of Rome, as many of your Brethren take the Oath, with a Declaration.— This, and no other can be your meaning, else your Argument and Parallel is sensless and insignificant: for thus it follows, so should you com∣municate with us in all that is Lawful: Now it is actual Communion in all publick Offices and Worship, which you require from us, and the reason you give, why we should pay it, is in the words before cited, the sence of which must be, that your Church is ready with a Remon∣strance to afford the same Communion to the Church of Rome, that is, Actual Communion in Publick Wor∣ship. — So with an insignificant Remonstrance, you can go to Mass, and are willing to do it. See this and a great deal more such stuff in T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 12, 13.
This is indeed a notable fetch, that I should excite you to rejoyce with us for Redempti∣on from Popery, and yet profess a readiness and de∣sire to communicate in it; and in that very commu∣nion to remonstrate against it. This no doubt, would be a very pleasant way of accordance with the Roman Forms; and yet at last, when I invited you to Communicate with us, in all that is Lawful, I meant only, what you think Lawful, what is by us both confessed Lawful, not to what we only think Lawful against your opinion; and to this end* 1.6 that you might the bet∣ter heal what you think we do amiss; and so much agree∣ment I confess we owe to all that is good in the Church of Rome, and by us acknowledged for such as well by them. But that I invited you not to any actual Communion in any thing you judge Unlaw∣ful, while you judge it so, appears in that I required
not your presence to* 1.7 that Prayer of New Allegiance on the 29th of May, while you are under the perswasions of its Impiety. But in truth, having (as I thought) proved us not to be actually Unchurched; I willed that you should yield us so much Communion, as may signifie your acknowledgement, that we are yet of the Church of Christ, viz. in all those Offices, which you can Judge Good and Lawful, in order to an easier ac∣commodation; for so I presume of this Church, and of you too, that you would not refuse any good Ecclesiastical Negotiations (which import some, though not a plenary Communion) with the Church of Rome, in order to a Restitution of the Churches of Christendom to a Primitive Frame, were the Church of Rome disposeable thereto. And they that will deny this to any corrupt Church∣es, I think are not real Christians, nor so much as externally qualified Members of the Church Ca∣tholick; and to this innocent purpose and conse∣quence only were my words so exactly ordered, with a design to stave off all Catches herein, that nothing but an inexcusably wretched spite and bitterness could have hewn out of them so perverse and undesigned a construction.
I am not satisfied, that you will allow our Deprivation to be a Persecution, only on supposition, that it be for adherence to the Doctrines of the Church, or the Laws of God. What if neither the Laws of God nor the Church had been concerned, and they had had only occa∣sion to stand to the Laws and Constitutions of the Land, which forbid force against, and Deposition of Kings, and exclusion of the Heir? I think this had been no ill Cause, &c. T. B's. 2d. Lett.
I did not mention the Laws of the Land; because till they are Authentically Vacated, the Laws of God, and the Doctrines of our Church, do assert their obligation on our obedience, so far as
it is in our power to perform it; and a voluntary violation of the Laws and Constitutions of Civil Government, is a violation of the Laws of God, which the Church Preaches in her Doctrine. There∣fore I allow you, that adherence to the permanent obligation of the standing laws of the Land is a good Cause, for the maintenance whereof, all Sufferings are Persecutions, and all the voluntary Agents in them, Persecutors. But if the reason or obligation of any Law ceaseth, or if you mis-understand Laws, and will oppose your private Judgment on them, against the received and constant Judgment and Practice of the Nation on our Laws, then your Sufferings upon such Prejudices cannot come under that black Character; which is a thing enquireable between you and me.
Then I take it for a very odd demand, that we must give in a very clear proof, that we are Ejected for adhereing to the Laws of God. I pray, who are they that ought to bring this clear proof? I have heard some say, that it is an Axiom in Law, that they who expect the benefit, ought to make the Proof: Now you get all into your hands, and would you give no Reason for it? And yet it would be but to little pur∣pose to prove to a Thief, that he has stolen my Goods. T. B's. 2d. Lett. p. 14.
But do you not consider, that in Law and Reason, whoever accuses any man before a Judge, ought to prove his Bill, if the Accused plead, Not Guilty? And you by complaining to the World of the wrong done to K. James, and the Deprived; Appeal not to them, whom you ac∣count Thieves, but to all others, to avoid their Communion: Now to draw off all People from their Communion, it is necessary to prove their actions Illegal according to the Laws of Tenure in the Crown, and the Ecclesiastical Promotions; since they whom you implead, challenge those Laws for their Justification. And further, by
your leave, he that is out of Possession; but lays a claim of Right, and expects the benefit of it, ought to prove his Claim, and the Possession of the Adversary injurious. For they that are in peaceable, or legal form of Possession, have no need to make, nor consequently to prove a Claim, if not disproved. Beside, your Case is not con∣cerned meerly in your own personal Right, but in the Consciences and Salvation of other mens Souls, even of those whom you call Thieves; and therefore you are obliged to convince them of the unlawfulness of such Changes, which they think lawful, and not only so, but in the present circumstances necessary.
But I will further examin your own Proposals and Concessions herein:* 1.8 An untainted Loy∣alty you approve, while the Ob∣ligation lasts, and we desire no more. But then you think the Obligation may cease, not only by Death, or Resignation, but also by Cession: Nor do I think it worth while to dispute this with you, provided it be real, not forced, not falsly imputed. For so any man that is driven out of his House, or takes a Journey from Home, may be interpreted to have quit∣ted his Estate by Cession. But when Cession is real, it can only affect the Party who makes it, and ought to be no injury to the next Heir. — But has that person made a Cession, who, tho' to preserve his Life, he fly from fraud and irresistible force, yet all the while claims his right, calls on all persons to do him justice, and useth all honest means that may be to re∣cover his Right. T. B. 2d. Lett. p. 15.
I will freely allow you, that to a legal and effectual Cession, there must be some volun∣tary Act of the Cedent, on which a Title in any Estate, Office or Authority is vacated. But then such Act shall have effect against the desires of re∣tention in the Agent; as in two Benefices taken
to be illegally held without a Dispensation. Nor is it a pure unmixed Act of Will, free and dis∣charged from fear and terror, or trouble, that alone can make a Cession; but receding from ne∣cessary Government for fear of Life, makes a real Cession; as appears in mens quitting of Garisons to an Enemy, (for fear of storm) either before or after he sits down before them. Upon which Cession, and the Entry of the Enemy, the Dependents on that Fortress are discharged from the actual Bond of their old, upon the Enemies demand of a New Allegiance, to which they may lawfully and ho∣nestly submit for the time being. And this holds Due on the present Title of the new Possessior in the Dominion of such Place, tho' the Cedent still 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 a claim of Right to it, and endeavours a 〈…〉〈…〉 which tho' he has Right to recover, yet 〈…〉〈…〉 present Right in the actual Allegi∣ance of the Dependents so legally transferred, till he d•••••• again recover the place. Else, if you will not allow this Doctrine, you will be but mean Favourites in the French Court, whose new Con∣quests have all this form of Establishment. And I must remark to you, that a mans leaving his Estate upon going a Journey is not a matter pa∣rallel to leaving of Kingdoms dissolved thereby into Anarchy and Confusion. For an Estate may lie still, and unoccupied, without harm, or dan∣ger, and so a Rectoral Presence, or Actual Ad∣ministration not be necessary to the Tenure; but the Civil State of Nations requires a continual Course of Government, and he that leaves it dis∣solved, permits it to another by a proper Cessi∣on. And whereas you say, that such Cession, if it be real, shall not prejudice the next Heir, this does not allways, and universally hold true, as in the instance of deserted Garrisons, and the dependent Territories. But in other cases, if they, that have a plenipotentiary Right of acting
for an Heir in Minority, make a Cession for him, or bring him also thereinto, then the Subject peo∣ple are discharged from adhering to such Heir also, were his Title to the Inheritance otherwise indubitate beyond all suspicion of imposture.
But let us see what a kind of Cession you fix upon your King.* 1.9 This was, say you, such a Cession, that the Estates in Convention judged it a virtual Abdication of the Sovereignty; and of† 1.10 this, you add, they were the most Competent, Au∣thentick, and Final Judges. And this, you tell us,* 1.11 we are to submit to, because the Kingdom hath ratified those proceedings in a second Parlia∣ment. — But Competent they could not be, who, for the prevailing part of them, were, either actually in the Conspiracy against him, or joyned with the Con∣spirators, and refused so much as to read his Letters, or hear any Message from him. Nor could they be Authentick Judges, who had no Law to authorize them, or their proceedings. Nor did I ever hear, that the natural Subjects of a Sovereign Monarch could be his Authentick Judges, unless from President Brad∣shaw, the Regicides, and their Adherents. And if upon this score you will have the Proceedings valid against the Son, you must also justifie the Barbarous Murther of the Father. And then they could not be final Judges, because being neither Competent nor Au∣thentick, they were no proper Judges at all. Nor doth it at all help the matter, that you call these your Judges the Estates; and further, to countenance the matter, place them in Convention. For how are they Estates, but with respect to the King, and Constituti∣on? Which if they overthrow, what becomes of their Estateships? It is the King made them such, and they
are so in subordination to him. Nor is their Conven∣tion any thing without him; they cannot convene with∣out his Writ. You may remember, that your Oracle Dr. B — tells you, that a single Defect makes an essential nullity. So they must act under him; and all they resolve is nothing without his assent: And by our Law, if they act against him, they are Rebels, and so unfit for Competent, Authentick and Final Judges. T. B's. 2d. Lett. p. 15, 16.
Here is an hideous Out-cry, as if the whole Machine of the World were breaking into ruines. But yet methinks it should be no hard task to stay the Convulsion. First then, The Ob∣jection against the Competency is never to be proved, and 'tis almost, if not altogether mani∣festly false. For the prevailing part must be the major number in both Houses, all which I suppose cannot be charged as parties to the Conspiracy, or the Conspirers. The Prince in his march did not pass thro' above ten Counties, and touched but little of several of them, he saw not twenty Parliamentary Buroughs, nor sent any Agents to concert with them; not many Peers joyned him till King James disbanded, and fled. The in∣surrections in the North, tho' unopposed, were far from general, and the far greater part of En∣gland, and all Wales saw nothing of it, and con∣tributed nothing to that Commotion. How then can the Majority be all concluded into a Conspi∣racy against King James before their Conventi∣on, that thereby they should become incompe∣tent? Besides, no man is to be taxed as a Crimi∣nal, in order to forfeiture, or punishment, till judicially convict, or confessed. Otherwise, if he stands upon his innocency and Capacities, his Claim is to be admitted, and his Civil Privi∣ledges secured, against which in our Convention no man found. Objection upon such surmise, or imputation, which yet ought to have been made
by the Innocent against the Guilty to the eviction of their incompetency. Let us see then, whether the refusal of his Letters, or Message renders them Judges incompetent. Now this I think ra∣ther appertains to the Question of actual Justice in their Proceedings than to their Competency, or Qualification for sitting in Judgment. For a Judge duly authorised may act unjustly, and yet his judgment (till reversed) shall be authorita∣tive and effectual, which it could not have been, if the Judge had thereby become incompetent. But even in this, which, till well considered, seems the hardest case, it was necessary first to resolve the Question of Abdication before all others; which if carried in the Negative, then his Letters must in Law and Duty have been re∣ceived as from their present King; but till that point were determined, 'twas necessary to deny the Letters; for the Reception of them as from their then actual King had prejudged against all the Argument for Abdication, and had been a virtual Sentence, that he had not abdicated. And they could not well have resumed that debate, without rejecting his Letters after reading, and censuring their own admission of them, which would more justly have exposed their Wisdom, and offended you, than the measures which they observed. But after judgment past for the Ab∣dication they could not admit his Letters under the Royal Style, because they had judged, that he was not our then King; and so the Admission of his Letters, as their Kings, had been a virtual Reverse of that their Judgment in the same Sessi∣on, and Breath; by which they had rendred themselves, if not altogether incompetent, yet very injudicious Judges. And if after Judgment against his then Sovereignty they had sent to him under the style and salutation of late King, and have made him King a-new, had it not been a
wise Transaction, much to their Credit, Thanks, and the Nations Interest? So much then for the Conspiracy. Next for the Authority, which you say was none, since no National Subjects of a So∣vereign Monarch can be his Judges. And by Mr. Johnson's leave, I will say so too, and did say so* 1.12 most expresly, tho' you in great sincerity take no notice of it, because it it seems it was not considerable enough. But is it not a very considerable Assertion, That when a King is fled from his Throne into foreign Dominions, and doth not exert any Royal Power, or presence to his People, the Estates of this Land are the Supreme Domestick Judges upon the Tenure of the Sovereignty, which is not to make them Judges of the Kings Per∣son, but in the want of his Person, of the State of the Kingdom, and the Rights of the Nation in Order to Settlement? And can you either disprove this saying, or charge it, or me with Regicide Prin∣ciples? Clamat Melicerta periisse frontem de rebus— may well deserve your remembrance here; espe∣cially since I told you,* 1.13 that King James was never in Law subject to them, or un∣der their Power. But as to the Authority of the Estates to convene, when there is no King actually regnant, you may learn, if you please, that, tho' the Estates were created by Kings, yet their Rights and Charters are perpetual, and con∣stituted for a fundamental Council to the Land, under the King, while we have one governing, but when we have none, authoritative of them∣selves to resettle the Nation the best manner they in their judgment may, or can: And this right they have in common with all the like Orders of Estates in all other Kingdoms; otherwise the Nation would not have been so earnest for a Free Parliament, when that li∣berty
was opened to them by General Monks Conduct.
I shall talk with you about that Par∣liament by and by. And when I have told you, That your second Parliament hath no more Authority than your Hocus Pocus transubstantiating Convention, that riotous Assembly, (all whose Acts were contra∣ry to Law, and censurable by Law) and so cannot con∣firm them: I will examin your grave Position, That when a King is fled from his Throne into foreign Do∣minions, or doth not exert any Royal Power, or Pre∣sence to his People, the Estates of this Land are the Supream Domestick Judges upon the Tenure of the So∣vereignty. — But am I bound to follow their Judgment against manifest Right, and my known Duty? T. B's 2d. Lett.
No, no, by no means; but in such a Crisis you have no other known Duty toward any Settlement, but to abide by that which they esta∣blish in the Land for the time being; for that all Rights and Duties then debatable are in such jun∣ctures determinable by them to all Civil Effects and Obligations; and therefore their Judgments ought not to be opposed by any slanders or facti∣ons whatsoever, even tho' King James from abroad condemns them. Por a Foreign Censure is no Ci∣vil Judgement, and by consequence of no legal va∣lidity, or virtue. Kings sometimes suffer wrong; but whensoever by these sufferings they are remo∣ved from their People, the Estates must provide for the Nation as they can, and as they do, we must be content; nor has the suffering King any Right to engage us from abroad to the contrary. And this Authority even without a King is so full in it self, that it needs no Ratification on the post-fact to make its Acts obliging or effectual; tho' such a declarative sort of Ratification, as our second Parliament made, be of use to satisfie un∣setled minds, and second a former Obligati∣on
which was what I had respect to, when I said, We are the more to submit to the proceedings of the Con∣vention and first Parliament, since the Kingdom hath ratified their proceedings in a second, viz. by a De∣clarative Recognition, and reinforcement of their legality and virtue.
After all, your considerable Assertions are but a malicious insinuation against your suffer∣ing King, as if he ran away thro' wantonness, and would have nothing to do with us. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 17.
And herein Mr. Johnson seems more sincere in his wickedness than your Dawbers. For he tells your Parliament, that there was no Desertion;* 1.14 For King James must needs go, and leaves us to understand the rest of the Proverb by an Aposiopesis; that he was Devil driven. And so far speaks plain as to say, That he was as much driven from England, as Ne∣buchadnezzar was driven to Grass, and he claimed as he fled by the Rochester Letter. And he fur∣ther shews,* 1.15 That no advan∣tage could be taken of a Kings withdrawing himself from the Government, (if it had been voluntary, as all the World knows it was not) without a Summons sent after him to return again in forty days. And therefore he roundly professes that the people abrogated their King after his Expulsion. And whence is it then that he exerts not his power? You know he exerts all the power he can, that he doth not more is not his fault, but yours; you may have both his Power and Presence among you too, if you please. But will you contrary to your Duty and Oaths keep him out by force of Arms, and then plead your own wickedness in your Defence? T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 17.
Mr. Johnson falsly owns the fact you charge upon the Nation for the sake of his Princi∣ple which his spite to all Kings and Kingly Power, has cast him into, viz. That the People may De∣pose their Kings as often as they judge them Pec∣cant, which is almost as often as they please. But 'tis notorious, that the Estates judged the Throne made Vacant not by their Act of Abrogation, but the Kings own Abdication; which if so, all the world knows it must be in some degree Voluntary. Now here will I challenge Mr. Johnson to say out; Does that claim of the then uncertain Rochester Let∣ter, make the Abdication manifestly false, since he says it makes the Disertion so? Here I doubt his Cou∣rage will fail him, lest his Argument, and his De∣dication follow the fate of the Pastoral Letter. And yet it is manifest, that though K. James made many large and previous steps to the Subverting our Constitution, yet the Final Abdication of the whole Government, consisted in his Desertion, from whence the Vacancy Commenced. and if this were no otherwise manifest, we have Mr. Johnson's own Averment, who tells us,* 1.16 That we have an Act of Parliament, which declares the Realm of England to have been Sovereign during that time, (of Vacancy between K. James's second flight, and K. William's Admission) by ordering all Indictments, from the time of K. James's withdrawing, till the 13th of February, to run in their Name. 'Tis true indeed, that meer Local Desertion of the Land, of which there may be many Causes, does not ipso facto extinguish the Sovereignty, except it be judicially interpretable to an Abdication from other concurrent Circumstances and Indications, on want of which a demand of Return becomes rea∣sonable, and the neglect thereof, interprets the Recession to an Abdication; but when there are evident tokens of yielding up a Government in the
form, manner, causes, and circumstances of such Local Desertion, then a summons of Return is not necessary in point of Law, or National Duty, upon the antecedent forms of Virtual Abdication, appa∣rent in such Departure: If therefore his Act of Di∣sertion in its own form, made a Legal and Effectu∣al Abdication; his Rochester Letter imports no more, than that his words and actions are contra∣dictory, in quitting by deed, and claiming by word, the same Right at the same time. Upon this Abdi∣cation therefore the Throne becoming actually Vacant, was by the Act of the Nation, filled up with their Majesties: And here upon whatsoe∣ver powers K. James endeavours to Exert, as they do not reach us, nor send out their vertue by legal ways of course, so are they too late and out of season; not to mention, that his late ways of Exertion under French Conduct, how honest soe∣ver you may call them, look not very natural or smiling upon English Men: If we sum up the mat∣ter, he was ruining all the Laws and Liberties, with the Religion of the Lands he Ruled, and they were just on the Precipice under his Exertions; so that the Nation needed and gasped for relief un∣der them: Upon this the Prince of Orange having Great Interests and Legal Expectations here, comes over with a declared Intention to set all things at Right, in such order as the English Parliament should adjust, which was a fair and most equal de∣sign; this then was the time for K. James to have Exerted his Royal Power, & Justice too, in calling a Parliament for such purposes, according to the sense of the whole Nation, earnestly recommended to him by his Prelates, Nobles and Counsellors, for a long time, by sundry Addresses, even to the last: and he having sent out some writs thereunto, seemed a while enclined, but upon Romish Advice recalls that purpose, and instead of doing us that Justice, was resolved to contest it with the Sword: Here∣upon
his Army, which, had he called a Parliament to have healed the Nation, would have secured him against all Forreign and Domestick Violence, sunk their Affections, as having no maw to Fight for him against their Native Country, Liberties and Religion, disperse by degrees, and great part go over to that which they knew to be the Juster Cause; and he, being thus daily weakned, retires & disbands the rest; and even not then calling a Par∣liament to help himself and us out of the Confusion, he flies away to the Grand Enemy and Terrour of this Nation, and leaves us to shift for our selves under those Aspects and apprehensions of dangers that lay before us: If then, he would not exert a Legal Power when he might, 'tis too late to offer at any Forreign ways of Exertion after a New Set∣tlement; or 'tis at least unreasonable, to demand our Reception of them to the destroying of our Redeemer after a National Allegiance given him, for his sake, who ever pursued our general Ruine a∣gainst the Laws; his Oath, the ties of Natural Af∣fection, and the Sighs, Groans and Requests of his Loyal People. And whereas you say, we may have his Power and Presence too, if we will, as lovely as that may be fancied, 'tis more than you can war∣rant. For, if we were disposed to accept your offers, if he should come with a French force, are you secured, that the French would permit him to be as free and independent a Monarch as before? 'Tis possible they might erect him for a Vassal ti∣tularly Royal, till their strength were fixed, and then upon demand of Expences, or other pre∣texts, pick a quarrel with him to annihilate him for their Masters Glory. Or supposing the French King, for once a true Friend to King James, would not his Forces make King James an Arbitrary Mo∣narch here, to exert more than a legal Power over all the Bodies, and Souls, Estates, Coffers, and Purses of the Nation? If we had had any
maw for such Power, we might easily have had it, while he was here, and not have been beholden to the French for the Commodity. But if King James should concert privately with us to return without any French measures, or services, can you assure us to keep this secret from the French King? Or if you fail in point of secrecy, are you sure he will let King James go, or treat with us in neglect of his Interests, and Pleasure? Or would he not rather Bastile him for Ingratitude, and treat him hereupon after his usual methods of hu∣manity? Thus pretty are your Projects to expose the Fate and Fortunes of Nations upon, and disco∣ver such a distemper in the Brain, as requires the Law of Bedlam rather than any other consi∣deration.
When we deny the Authority by which your Estates sate, you ask us by what Au∣thority was that Free Parliament called, or sate, that voted in King Charles the Second? Sir, if you please, let another be called, and vote in King James the Second. When things are out of Order, and good men set them to Rights again, I do not think any man will oppose it upon the score of some small nice∣ties; but when subjects rebel against their Prince, and drive him away, and make that the ground of their going on, and doing farther wickedness, I cannot un∣derstand the Authority of this. There is certainly in every man an innate natural Power and Authority to wish well to, and vote for Right. By virtue of this, when things were in confusion, the Subjects of King Charles the Second, returning to their Wits and Al∣legiance, send a convenient number to act for the whole, who recall their rightful King, and if you should do so likewise, I should not be very quarrelsom with you. But whatever name they might give it, to put a bet∣ter gloss upon the thing, they were no Parliament, till King Charles made them so; for he, their lawful King, by an Act in Legal Parliament, might stamp
on them that Character and give them that Authori∣ty, and Force, which they had not before; and thus several of their Acts might become Laws by virtue of that after Ratification, not by any force of their own. But as for calling back the King, that was not making any new Law, but enforcing the old, and was not so much an Act of Authority, as Obedience and Duty. And if you could find out the same way, you would be the best Friends to your Country, and your selves. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 17, 18.
To answer according to the way and order you lead me, as I have before told you, we are now under no obligation to call in King James, so being under another settlement, things are not out of Order, and Unsettled, as they were upon the convening of that Free Parliament; and as there is no occasion, so there is no oppor∣tunity to attempt it. But whereas you charge the Subjects in general with Rebellion, and Ex∣pulsion of their King, 'tis a broad slander and falshood; for beside the far greater numbers of the people that never moved, it seems that very few, that actually went over to the Prince, ever designed the expulsion of King James, but only the secure reduction of him and his exorbitant claims of omnipotent Prerogative to the just li∣mits of Law and Reason by Parliamentary ways of Composure. Which, tho' they could not pro∣cure, yet did they not expel him, but he went off himself, either for fear of Life, or obstinacy against a Parliamentary Discussion, or because of the fatigues of an unsuitable Government. But as to the Convention it self, it rebelled not against him; for had he continued his Presence, they would have desired to meet by his Call, and then I believe not an Hair of his Head had fallen to the Ground, whatsoever his too conscious fears and apprehensions were, since the only Argument for the Vacancy of the Throne was founded in his
Abdication, and that in his Departure from us, and leaving us in a state of Anarchy; upon which it was not possible that they could rebel against him without his Presence. As for your innate Authority to wish and vote for Right, I allow your meaning, tho' not the impropriety of your words; for an inward Right of wishing well is no proper Authority, which imports a Superiority over Inferiors, nor are private wishes formal votes in Civil Matters, in which an Authority to vote is not a natural Right of every man, but a positive Power of constituting Orders. And in Civil Negotiations all private wishes must con∣cede to publick Suffrages, and Determinations, And the Land sent up that Free Parliament, not on their Natural Rights, but Civil Capacities of voting, and doing the best Right they could. And tho' they did well in bringing back the King de jure, having no other King de facto established, nor any impediment to the Reduction of the Heir Lineal, yet if there had appeared to them any such obstacle, as would have rendred his Redu∣ction destructive to the Nation, and its Funda∣mental Liberties and Constitutions, according to the Aspects of our Case, they would have made some other provision for the time being, with which the Nation would then, and ought to have acquiesced, and so would a good Prince too; but there being no difficulty in that Juncture, they did their Duty in restoring the King. And as for the Name and Character of Parliament, when∣soever de jure enstamped on them, it matters not; for they were in that Juncture, and those Cir∣cumstances a Legal and Authentick Council of the Land, tho' extraordinary; and whatsoever Set∣tlement they had made for the time being, had been valid from their Authority, as well as what they did had also authority both from their Du∣ty, and the Kings consequent Ratifications; for
single Acts may have sometimes plural Authori∣ties, and Confirmations. But to convince you, that Conventions of Estates in such Junctures and Confusions are by themselves authoritative to re∣settle, I will discuss it with you, and I pray an∣swer me fairly.
Pray try your skill.
First then in such a State of Confusion, as that in which King James left us, has the Nati∣on any Right or Reason to consult for some secu∣rity, order and settlement?
It seems reasonable that this be al∣lowed.
By whom then should a National Con∣sultation be transacted? Or who should, or can be so regularly and efficaciously entrusted, as the old standing Council of the Land?
I must confess I cannot assign any Coun∣cil so proper as that, and none else, that can be pretended legal.
Must the Determination of this Coun∣cil be allowed any publick Efficacy, or Virtue to oblige?
Yes, if it pass according to Right.
But if they judge their Determination to be right, must their Judgment take place to all Civil Effects, against all private and extrajudicial Objections, or no?
Yes, except the prevarication is noto∣rious.
Notorious! To whom notorious?
To all men, to the whole Nation, to their own Consciences, as the Exclusion of King James was.
Then no Notoriety less than National shall justifie a Recusancy to such publick Deci∣sion?
I were as good as allow it, for it seems so.
But how shall we discern such a gene∣ral Notoriety?
By the general and unanimous Censure of all Orders of Men, that adhere to the ancient Laws of the Government, and fundamental Prin∣ciples of our Constitution.
This will become such an intricate and endless debate, whose are the Legal Principles that it will create an intestine War in order to a Decision. You must therefore admit a notorious generality, or majority of the People, or all Or∣ders in it comprehensively, or else we shall never get out of the brake, or be relieved by any Nati∣onal Consultation, if such indeterminate Surmises, or Pretensions shall interrupt its Obligation.
Be it so, what then?
Then I think I have fairly gained my Points; for these Concessions admit, in a State of Anarchy, upon an Abdicant Desertion, a Con∣vention of Estates to be Lawful and Authoritative without a Kings Commission, or Presence. Se∣condly, That the Acts of our Covention were, and are valid, as not being censured for other, but admitted as such by the generality, or noto∣rious majority of the Nation, which is sensibly apparent by comparing the numbers conforming with the Recusant; Conformity and Recusancy being the only proper and legal Tests of Mens Senses hereupon: Tho' the Authority of our Na∣tional Council is such, as needs no after Ratifi∣cation from the disfusive Multitude, or the origi∣nal Freeholders, or Burgers of the Land; because, as the Lords are primitively Councellors for them∣selves, so the Trust signed to the Representative House is total and absolute, without need of any subsequent Ratification, or Power of Revocation by their Principals.
But notwithstanding all pretences, they ought to have recalled King James; and it
being in their Pawer to do it, 'twas piacular wicked∣ness to omit it, and erect his Adversary; this is ob∣vious to common Sense, and the first simple No∣tions of Right and Wrong, against which no ci∣vil forms, or combinations can oblige.
You are no competent Judge upon them or us, what Right required them to do in their then exigencies; and if in truth they could not do what you would have had them, nor well and safely do otherwise than they did, then all this black Charge turns to a blanck, and comes to nothing. Now 'tis true, the Prince had no setled, or proper Jurisdiction, or legal Authori∣ty (strictly taken) to enforce a Convention, or any thing upon it; nay, they had liberty be∣fore the judgment of Abdication to have voted King James's Revocation. But if they had done so, and the Prince in bar thereto had pleaded the Desertion to have been an Abdication devolving the Title to his Princess according to the ordina∣ry and legal course, and so had required them to dissolve; if they had dissolved, what could such vote have effected? If they had not dissol∣ved, the refusal might have opened a Scene of War between the Prince and the two Houses. And considering how great the even minor num∣ber in the Houses, which might have sided with the Prince, would have been, and the vast and zealous Army which he had about him, with all the formed advantages and preparations of War, to∣gether with the hearts of at least the general multitude, are you sure that the naked Majority of the Convention could have safely adventured the dispute with cold Iron? Or if upon a casual adventure they had been conquered, how could they have evaded the Prince's Arbitrary Power? Or if, during the War, King James, or the French had supervened, and carried it, had not all the Laws and Liberties of the Nation, dipt and sunk
under Absolute and Popish Power, and that most probably French, or a la mode de France? All this is obvious to common Sense, and was undoubted∣ly much more so to that National Assembly, which otherwise wisely composed all Domestick Riots, as well as secured us from foreign Inrodes, and little deserve the reproach of Riotous, or Juglers; which manners to your own deprived Fa∣thers, and other your Friends that sate there, should have taught you to forbear.
Whereas you tell us, 'tis a prodigious peevishness to require a Kings Presence, or Commissi∣on, when he is gone, and hath left all in Anarchy; I hope, Sir, you do not think I require a King to be present, when he is absent; and then, with your good leave, I think it no such peevishness to act by his Commission in his absence, but that it is a thing which (if it can be had) ought rather to be done. Rich∣ard the First was engaged in the Holy War, when his Father died;* 1.17 so that he was far enough from his Throne, and unable to exert any Royal Power, or Pre∣sence to his People: And to make the matter worse, in his return he was taken Prisoner, and detained in Germany. In this Case, had you been one of the Estates, you would have been for setting up another King, that would exert his Royal Power, and Presence to his People; but they had another sense of their Duty; they mourn∣ed under the common Calamity, caused all proceedings to pass under his Nane, and stretched their Purses to redeem him, &c. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 18.
But here, currente Rotâ, you have omitted something considerable, and inconsiderately offer∣ed what is not so. For I only state the Case, when a King, that was actually in the Throne, goes off from it, and resigns all to Anarchy, which is
justly interpretable to an Abdication of Govern∣ment; which was not Richard's Case, which is therefore instanced altogether impertinently. Yet in that* 1.18 very Case, whatsoever had been the pro∣cedures of the then Estates for the time being, the sub∣ject people must have acquiesced in their judicial determinations, and presumed them Legal till re∣versed in as Legal and Authentick Forms of Judg∣ment, tho' Richard had lain for ever unredeemed; because the multitude are uncapable of judging our National Laws, Rights and Capacities, and cannot act regularly to the recovery of Right, or performance of a National Duty: Yet it is bold in you to say, that my Vote would have passed against Richard's restitution, since I, that have well known the motions and sympathies of my own Soul thro' all this Revolution, should certainly have been carried by my Bowels for that unfortunate King James against the wiser and major part of that Assembly you traduce. But besides your insince∣rity in this parallel, and your Censoriousness on me, you seem to pervert, or misunderstand my meaning, when I said, it is prodigious peevish∣ness to require a Kings Presence, or Commission, when he is gone, and hath left all in Anarchy. For tho' it is then only proper to require a King, or any person, to restore his Presence, when he is absent, when during his Absence his presence is needed; yet I never was so silly as to think Pre∣sence, and Absence competible, and connecessary at once, or that a Commission in time of Absence was improper to supply the desect of personal Presence, according to that ridiculous guise you clap upon my words; but my apparent palpable intention was, that it is prodigious peevishness to require a Kings Presence or Commission, as ne∣cessary to make the Session of Estates Authentick,
when he affords neither Presence, nor Commissi∣on; for want of which all is left in supine and gasping Anarchy, which were my express words, on purpose set to obviate this, and other like Ca∣vils, tho' honestly omitted by you for inconside∣rable, tho' therein lies the main force and form of my Argument, which is like to stand unmoved, notwithstanding all the impotent flurts of un∣manly peevishness.
At last you say, the Estates of any Na∣tion being* 1.19 invited by a victo∣rious and unresisted Power, may come together, and treat with him that thus calls them, tho' he hath no antecedent Authority (strictly taken) to call them. Here is a pretty fetch in the word [unresisted Power;] for ir∣resistible you knew it was not; and if it was unresisted, whose fault was that? May they refuse to resist an invading Power, when they are able? And may they make that disobedience the reason of their Compliance with him, and casting off their own Sovereign? But if, without dawbing, you had put the Case as it was, it ought to run thus; The Estates of any Nation, or the natural Subjects of any Sovereign Prince may combine with, and invite in a foreign Prince, and when he comes, tho' with a contemptible force, they may forsake their lawful Prince; and then by their Treachery having left him helpless, and hopeless, may treat with a Foreigner, drive away their own King, give his Crown to the Foreigner, and maintain it with their Swords and Purses, without which he could not keep his illgotten Goods. T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 18.
It confessedly seems, as I stated the Proposition, you cannot deny the perspicuity of its Truth, and therefore you invert it to an invi∣dious Paraphrase, which in many parts of it is not truly applicable to that which was the Sub∣ject of my Apology, viz. the Authority of the Convention. For all your aggravated Invitations,
Combinations, Revolts, Treacheries, and Dere∣lictions, allowing, or supposing them to be no other than you describe them, are not chargea∣ble on the whole Estates of the Land, especially when in Convention. And even thus I will re∣new my Position, That by the Laws of Nations, if a foreign Prince procure the Revolt of a vast part of another Princes Subjects, thro' the terror of which the helpless Prince leaves his Kingdoms in Anarchy under the Army of the foreign Po∣tentate, who thereupon calls the Estates of such, deserted Nation to treat for a Settlement, they may convene, and treat with him upon such in∣vitation. For it is the necessity, the subject Na∣tion stands in for a Settlement, that warrants and legitimates such Treaties, by what means soever those exigencies are introduced, whether by foreign Force, or intestine Commotions, joint∣ly, or severally, throwing all into Anarchy, and Disorder. But if the charge of the Revolt pre∣clude the legality of any mans Session, that inca∣pacity ought to have been objected, and if over∣ruled, protested against in Convention, as I have already told you; which not being done, they were all in Law, Reason, and Civil Construction, lawful Agents, and Councellors. As to the word [Unresisted Power] I confess I used care indeed, but no trick; for it was too hard for me to judge whether the Prince's Power were irresistible or no; and so it is in many cases, in which Parties yield rather than run the hazard of a Battle. But every one can tell when it is, or is not actually re∣sisted; and the Proposition is as true of an un∣resisted, as well as irresistible Power. Tho' take you all the Forces foreign and domestick, joyned to the Prince when the Convention was called, you will think it hard for any Subjects to have resisted them, when the King himself long before durst not, but disbanded, and quitted thereby all pretensible Duties in the Subjects to take Arms.
And the Conventioners deserve to be your hum∣ble Servants, for putting them upon such an Essay. But if you will require, where the fault of this non-resistance really lies, I think you may find it in him, that neither could be induced to call a Parliament, nor to fight it out. After which double miscarriage, and flight out of the Kingdom, I think no man was obliged to resist, or take up Arms, but to desire such a Settlement as the State of Affairs would admit. As for the Wars we maintain with our Purses against all the Enemies of our present Settlement, they are just according to all the Rules and Forms of Civil Laws, to which you your selves contribute as well as we, only with more Crime, as doing that against your Consciences, which we admit upon Princi∣ples to us appearing good. But if you think your Exigencies legitimate, your payment of Taxes to prevent new danger, so we think the general Exigencies of the Nation did legitimate this Settlement, and do still justifie our plenary Submission thereunto, according to the Sense, Laws, and Usages of all Nations. As for those you call Revolters, they were not the Subject of my Discourse, whom I therefore leave to God, who, as he saw the provocations, so did he also every mans purposes, and trains of thought in that In∣surrection, according to which at the last day they shall each man be judged. But for those that lay still, I know no legal summons they had from King James to rise in Arms, to make that quiet∣ness a breach of Allegiance, in which certainly you Jacobites are as culpable as the others, and in one degree more, in that when you might, and upon your Principles ought to have taken Arms for him, you would not, and now when you neither can, nor ought, clamour for new Se∣ditions and Commotions, by which we must ine∣vitably fall a prey to France, and a Burnt-Sacri∣fice to Rome.
I will now for the present intermit the Remarks I collected at Gilman's Coffee-House, and bestow some other impartial Reflexions on your Grand State-Principle, on which you raise your other Arguments. Here then I must tell you, That you set up new Principles, which the Church of England hath always declared to be erroncous, and grounds of Rebellion; viz. you set up the Parliament above the King, and that we must take our measures of obedience only from the Par∣liament,* 1.20 to whose Judgment, say you, in all Civils, all Sub∣jects must submit. And upon this you Ground all your Superstructure, as that King James's* 1.21 Tenure has been publickly judged by this Nati∣tion to be extinct;* 1.22 and that this Nation hath justified King William's Cause, which is to conclude upon us. Be∣yond this you allow no no man to look, or enquire; The whole Body of the Church are to be taught by the Parliament, and to have an implicit faith in them against the King in all Cases whatsoever, so that* 1.23 the Churches Loyalty is to follow the Civil Judgment concerning the Object of our Allegi∣ance, and the Tenure of Sovereignty. And by this Rule, if a Parliament change a King every day, the Church is bound to swear to every one; the Parlia∣ment can solve their Oaths. But there was a time, when the Church thought it their Duty to be Teachers, and particularly as to Loyalty, as being a principal part of Religion, and even [a∣gainst a Parliament;* 1.24 and their Doctrine was owned by all true Sons] of the Church of England, I mean the Old Church of Eng∣land in the Reign of King Charles II. This was their Do∣ctrine and Practice, and generally
of the whole Church of England ever since the Refor∣mation, as is plain in her Homilies, Articles and Ca∣nons, &c. And you do not attempt to disprove these, but only assert the contrary, and so leave it as a thing settled, and sure. MS. Reflections. That the Chur∣ches Loyalty, as to the Object, is to be guided by the true Constitution of the State, I deny not; but I shall never yield, what you would thence slur upon us, that it is to follow every. Civil Judgment, much less the Ʋncivil Judgment of any Sett of Conspirators, and Traitors, into whose hand you so liberally and piously dispose it. T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 19.
I am resolved, that no calumnious usage shall storm or transport me into any indecent, or uncharitable passion. But tho', for my own part, I might reject your imputations of disloyalty with scorn and silence; yet for your conviction I will calmly remind you, that I ever told you, that the Estates of this Land are not Judges of the Kings Person, who is not under their Power; nor in Law subject to them. And all that I any where said of their Judgment about the Throne, amounts to no more than this, that in a state of Anarchy on a King's Desertion, or in Arbitration between two, or more Competitors, the Estates of this Land are the Supream Domestick Judges, and Ar∣biters upon the Tenure of the Sovereignty, and the Rights of the Nation in order to Settlement. And that in case an irresistible, or unresisted Poten∣tate* 1.25 enforce himself upon the Nation for a new King, and the Subject people cannot help it, our Laws in this concur with the Laws and Practice of all Nations, in allowing (our Estates to determine for us in such Exigencies;* 1.26 that in extra-ordinary inter∣ruptions, and convulsions of State, our Laws, and Constitutions allow the Estates) such a King, as can actually be had for the time be∣ing, for which* 1.27 I refer to
our Histories, Acts of Parliament, and Judgments of Law, under hereditary Kings, since the Refor∣mation, without any Remonstrance of King, Church or State to the contrary, and at last to Bishop Overals Convocation Book. So that if a Question arise in the disordered Kingdom, who is my King, to whom my Allegiance is legally pay∣able, I refer to their Judgment as the then Su∣pream in all our Civils; and if you can assign any Superior, or more Legal Judgment, to decide, and determine such national Questions, and Con∣troversies, I am content to give up fairly to you. And if you can produce any Homilies, Articles, Canons or Monuments of this Church contrary to these my Positions, then I will yield, that the Churches Authority, as far as that can go upon Civil Questions, will lie against me. But a mans Eyes shall sooner drop out of his Head, than dis∣cover any such counter-principles in the publick constitutions of our Church, which you would have quoted, if you could, particularly, but since that could not be done, 'twas very feeble to make such an hollow and causeless noise about it. And yet, if the Church in Civils had interpreted the Laws contrary to the Judgments of the State, she had given a null and incompetent Judgment, since we are no Authentick Doctors in these matters, nor the Church a Court of Civil Judicature, pro∣hibitions always justly lying on her, whensoever she admits the Pleas, and assumes the Judgment of Civil Causes. As to the Rebellion against King Charles the First, it comes not near our Case, for there was a King actually Regnant, who in Parli∣ament had redressed all their Grievances, and whose Tenure was indisputable, and undisputed, the very Rebels owning their Arms to be for King and Parliament. But neither was that Rebellion a judicial form of proceeding of both Houses, (of which only I spake as Authentick in the Actual
Vacancy of the Throne, and a state of Anarchy) but a military one, by a divided part of the Houses, assuming the Style and Title of the whole Parliament, against a King actually Regnant, which I had no occasion to mention, much less to justi∣fie, the Nation having since condemned it by Act of Parliament. Nor had it been entred into by the unanimous Vote of both Houses, had it obli∣ged as a Law, as wanting the Royal Assent of the King then Regnant. And the Rights of the Crown, and Duties of our Allegiance are still the same, tho' Milton will still have Successors to his Villanies arise, when their Sovereigns are invol∣ved, to tamper with popular and seditious hu∣mours and ambitions, in order to new projected commotions. But they who make the Conventi∣on to have proceeded on principles of Rebellion contrary to their enacted Judgments, that hence they may draw Arguments to whiten the Old, and to enflame New Rebellions, deserve they, and their incendiary Pamphlets to be burnt together. Nor need you fear any such consequence from any my Positions, as if upon these the Parliaments may change their Kings every Day, and thereup∣on our Oaths; For I have asserted no Conventi∣on of Estates to be in Name, or Thing a Parlia∣ment, if they mect contrary to the Fundamental Laws of their Constitution. And while a King is actually Regnant, they* 1.28 yet meet, sit, are proro∣gued, and dissolved at the Kings Order only. And this being yet the form of our State, no Votes, or Bills of the Houses can pass into an Act, or Law without the Assent of the King Regnant, at whose pleasure they immediately are, and are not, and so can make no Legal Assembly, or publick Change, without, or against him, over whose Person they are neither Lords, nor Judges. For
tho' Causes of the King may come before the Lords, and be overruled in Justice to the Sub∣jects Right, against which they are brought thi∣ther, yet this is no more than what we see in o∣ther Courts, which yet pretend no Sovereignty over the Kings Person, by whose Commission they sit in Judgment. So far am I from such wicked Principles, as Plat-thorns in the Crowns of Kings, and set them in the most unsupportable Bondage, that Art, or Ill-nature can contrive, but withal provoke great spirited and designing Princes to seek avenues to an Arbitrary Power, who would have gladly been contented with a regular and equal Sovereignty, if they could have been secured in it from the fears, and incentives of popular insolence. But to return from this Digression, if a King thro' any fear, or cause whatsoever, ut∣terly deserts his Kingdoms, and leaves all in Anar∣chy, and Confusion, that the Estates of the Land, if they can, should then Convene, and settle the Nation the best way they can, is so far from Rebel∣lion, that it is most certainly both their Priviledge, and their Duty And if they are first to determin our Settlement, I am sure the Churches Loyalty is to follow their Judgment, except we challenge an Appeal from them to the Church, to ratifie, or vacate our Civil Constitutions. And if you call this Duty of Submission to their Civil Settlements im∣plicit Faith in the Parliament, it will be prone to retort, that you challenge an implicit Faith in the Church, and that in matters not Ecclesi∣astical, in a latitude more Exorbitant than any Pre∣tensions of the Church of Rome. But the Truth is, our Duty to any such established Settlements is not founded in an implicit Faith, whose pro∣per Objects are things not seen, Heb. 11.1. but in an apparent, explicit, and authentick Determina∣tion, as all other Duties pursuant to Laws and Publick Judgments are, and no otherwise. And
you that will allow the Churches Loyalty, as to the Object, to be guided by the true Constituti∣on of the State, but not by every Civil Judgment, have need to explain your self, what shall he the Supream Civil Judgment for you concerning the Laws and Constitutions of our State in rare, un∣usual and dangerous Cases of Desertion, and Anar∣chy. For if you assert to every man a practical Judgment upon our Laws and Rights in such Cases, and that even against a National Judgment, the Confusions must be eternal; If there must be a Civil Council, I pray assign me any other like that of the Estates in Convention, who indeed, as of∣ten as such Cases call upon them, are the Supream Judges of the Constitutions and Rights of the Na∣tion, and Arbiters of our Settlement concluded thereupon. And if you will not yield to every such Civil Judgment, you may as well say, you will yield to none, excepe it comports with your private Humours, or Persuasions, which is the true and plain English of your Answer herein, if I may use the freedom you take with me, of be∣ing your Paraphrast, or Interpreter, and is a won∣derful Expedient to settle us by eternal and un∣reconcilable discords in Opinion and Practice.
Let us now see, what a fine account you give us of the Laws and Rules of our Succession; and hereon you tell us,* 1.29 That the general and ordinary Rule of Succession to this Crown is He∣reditary, but in extraordinary Interruptions and Con∣vulsions of State against the ordinary Course, our Laws and Constitutions do allow the Estates such a King, as can be actually had for the time being, till the ordinary Rule can be fairly recovered. Now if a man were to speak this in plain English, it would be thus; By our Laws and Constitutions the Crown is Hereditary; but if any Ʋsurper, or Traytor will not suffer it to be so, but puts by the Right Heir, and
gets possession himself, the Laws and Constitutions al∣low him to be King; yes marry, and a Lawful King too; i. e. the Crown goes in a Lineal Succession, while people are peaceable and Obedient; but if they be trou∣blesome and rebellious, it is catch as catch can, and he had Right and Law on his side, who gets Possession, and so will another, and another without end, who can suc∣cessively wrest the Possession from those, who had the Right whilst they could keep Possession. Did ever any Body hear of such a Constitution as this? Or was any thing better fitted to produce eternal Confusions? Cer∣tainly you have a mind to persuade us, that our Con∣stitutions were made by the Wise Men of Goatham, or the Wiser Men of Bedlam. T. B's. 2d. Lett. p. 19.
You frequently use a suspicious Artifice of travesteering, what cannot be plainly answer∣ed, into farce and mishapen figures, and then ex∣pose it in Ridicule. By which however you call upon you the Sentence of the Psalmist, What shall be done unto thee thou false Tongue? Mighty and sharp Arrows, with hot burning Coals. For if I may be my own Paraphrast, my Sense is, that all Estates and Subjects are to their utmost obliged to pre∣serve together the Sovereign and the Sovereignty, and the established forms of Government, ac∣cording to the precise constitution of the Laws; but if these be irresistibly overborn, or the So∣vereign abdicates all to Anarchy, then it is Law∣ful for the Estates to settle under such Sovereigns, as can be actually had for the time being, till the old Rules can be fairly recovered; which being positive, must give place to a temporal necessity. But did I ever say that Tyrants or Traytors, getting into Possession by meer Force, had Right, and Law on their side? No sure; for they may break all Law, Right, and antecedent Rules of Ob∣ligation, and yet the oppressed Estates may law∣fully admit the Oppressive Power, when it appears
too formidable under prospects of further inevi∣table Ruins. This I expresly and cautiously told you in these words;* 1.30 And even an unjust Potentate, tho' he cannot according to Legal Justice out a King, against whom he hath no Legal Cause, or right of War, yet if he doth do so, and the subject People cannot help it, and he enforce himself on the People for a new King, our Laws in this con∣cur with the Laws and Practice of all Nations, in al∣lowing our Estates to determine for us in such Exi∣gencies, — and the sin shall lie only on the injurious, and not on them that submitted to an inevitable fate of things; and again,* 1.31 Wars and victories are many times unjust, yet they, that suffer the wrong, lawfully submit to the unlawful and injurious demand of Submission, as in Piracies, and other like Tyrannies. And could such a Confessor for Con∣science, Truth and Piety put lying Senses on my words without any remorses or touches of Consci∣ence? More integrity was due and becoming such starched or sacred pretensions. But I have well learned, that Faction leavens the Soul, not only with sowerness, but with insincerity also. But as I truly stated, and have now explained the Na∣ture and Duties of our Constitution, I assert it a Fundamental Law to all Civil Societies, except perhaps that pair of dissyllable Seigniories, which you mention, where the Politcks, Logicks, and Ethicks suit with your, and where, unless you'll to the Antyceryae, I must leave you. And since all Kingdoms, and Empires are by the just and adorable Counsels of Gods Providence subject to such various Turns of Fate, all Princes, that take Crowns upon them, take them with the Laws of their fortune, and a concession to the regular con∣sequences of such Change, under which they ac∣quit the innocent Subjects under new submissions,
tho' they condemn, and (being reduced) prose∣cuted all those that enforced the Change. But as long as the Duties of Subjection are such as I have described, intestine changes and disorders cannot arise from them. And while Princes minister Justice and Judgment to their People, and make their Prosperity the Royal Care, they are seldom threatned with Commotions. But yet it some∣times happens, that for unsearchable, tho' Just Reasons, the Judgment of God permits the most innocent Princes to intestine as well as foreign troubles, which yet however they that promote, shall not escape Divine Vengeance. And yet af∣ter the determination of such Wars, it can be no sin to acquiesce under those forms of Settlement, which our Estates can procure for the time being, tho' different from the ordinary Course. And there is no other Rule to recover the Civil Felici∣ty of Nations but by these Principles, which eve∣ry Princely Spirit must be presumed to allow, in equity and compassion to all his good Subjects, to rescue them from utter extirpation, or perpetual misery.
At last you are willing to qualifie the matter, and to suffer this only, till the ordinary Rule can be fairly recovered. If this be so, why is it not recovered? Sure you will not plead that in justifica∣tion of a People, which is notoriously their Fault, and such a Fault, as is in their Power to mend, when they please. Let them unanimosly, as they ought, return to their Duty and Loyalty, and the thing will do it self, and without any great pains, trouble or danger. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 19, 20.
But I thought I had long before strangled the life and force of this Objection, having abun∣dantly proved our Submission to this National Set∣tlement faultless. And so a breach of National Contract is no fair way to a recovery; for an op∣portunity only of doing a thing legally can put us
into a fair capacity of recovering the ordinary Course, which is not, as you ••ancy, the business of a moment, but an expectation of years and pro∣per Conjunctures at the hands of God, whose lei∣sure we are to wait for without our own too vio∣lent anticipations. Thus the Nation behaved it self thro-out all the Reigns of Henry IV, V. and VI. whom you would have challenged for Rebels, in lingring too long in the restitution of the Right Line. But whereas you propose to us an univer∣sal unanimity in reversing this Constitution, I will dare undertake the Affair for you sub poena. Capitis, when you can find me out an effectual Ex∣pedient of making us all unanimous. Otherwise what shall the unanimous do, that are the far less numbers, unarmed, and in no publick Capacity of acting for the Kingdom, against those settled and formed Powers, that can easily squeeze all our little unanimities to pieces? Shall there be no end of strife? No yielding to legal forms of Determina∣tion? And when there is but little hope or ••wist∣ing the Sand-rope, can your thing do it self, and that with little trouble, pains or danger? And yet if King James Abdicated by a real Cession, as the Nation judged, and I have proved, your pro∣ject would violate, not only this extraordinary Settlement, but your ordinary Rule also, by which in the moment of Cession it devolves on the next Heir Lineal; and the Course cannot turn retro∣grade, without the Consent of all the Heirs in be∣ing, or their proper Curators for them.
But I see you relapse again, and become a zealous Advocate for your extraordinary Kings, in whose behalf you plead Acts of Parliament made by Extra-lineal Kings, which were confirmed (submitted to, you subtily phrase it) by the Lineal Heirs, and these were approved by Lawyers, nor did the Church ever remonstrate against them. And what of all this? Let the Ʋsurpations and Confusions be what they will,
still men will eat, and drink, buy and sell, and such like Acts. Nor do I think such a State doth acquit men from the Obligation to do (what in them lies) such things as seem absolutely necessary for the pre∣servation of the Society, and the real good of Mankind. And if any such things, as are necessary for the main∣tenance of human Affairs, and which are accompanied with common Justice in themselves, should now be done, or enacred, and hereafter be confirmed by King James, I know no reason to remonstrate against this; but I think the need of such a confirmation is a de∣monstration where the Right and Authority lies. T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 20.
Since I am bound to follow the way you lead me, the first thing I am to observe, is your mistake, or per••••••••ion of my words about the submission of Heirs Lineal, by which you say I subtilly mean their confirmation of the Statutes of Extra-lineal Kings, which is no part or glance of my meaning, and no man carefully heeding the Order of my words could think it to be so. For I mention their submission to somewhat mention∣ed before those Statutes. And I truly meant the long and frequent submissions of the Heirs Lineal as Subjects ••o Kings Extra-lineal actually Regnant, particularly under the Lancastrian Reigns. And even your Edward the IVth Father Duke of York swore Allegiance to King Henry the VIth, and kept it, till new ••••a••ses of Rupture arose between them. So that it is a very impertinent importu∣nity to clam••••r a••or•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subsequent confirmati∣ons, which I ••ever ••••••tioned; And instead of subtil, it had beer too silly in me, to have called a Confirmation of an invalid Act, a submission to that feeble thing, which is thereby enlivened. And yet, by your leave, all After-confirmations do not suppose always an antecedent Nullity in the Act confirmed, for they sometimes secure, sometimes continue, and sometimes double an an∣tecedent
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validity, which all the Statutes under Extralineals had in themselves for the time be∣ing, before there could be room for those subse∣quent Ratifications, and the perpetuity of their Virtue stands not in those Ratifications, but in the Non-repeal of them. And yet however had it been otherwise, by parity of Reason all our Acts obliged the Subject now during this present Reign, and we are thereby acquitted in our pre∣sent submission, whatsoever nullities it may fall under in your next Revolution. But there is a Famous Act, viz. the 11th of Henry the VIIth Chap. 1. made in an Extra-lineal Reign, that de∣clares it for Law and Equity, that Subjects pay their Allegiance to the King for the time being, and indemnifies them herein against after punish∣ments. This Law was never since confirmed, cen∣sured or repealed by any succeeding Prince, or Parliament, and yet stands firm in the Body of our Statutes to all Civil Effects and Judgments, which pass ever since according to the importance and tenour thereof. And you your self grant me enough for the time being, that the Estates may sit in Parliament under Extra-lineal Kings, to do, and enact things necessary for the preservation of the Society, and the real good of Mankind, and are not acquitted from an obligation to do so thro' the disorder in the Succession, and such Acts in this Reign, when hereafter confirmed by King James, you will not condemn. Sir, your hum∣ble Servant. But can you tell, how such Acts could, or can pass in such Parliaments, without an Oath of Allegiance taken to such Extra-lineal Kings by all the Members? I doubt this will put you out of your good humour again; and that is a great pity, because you are so seldom in it. But however these honest Acts must be valid, for the time being, upon us, till King James returns, or else the Obligation of the present State to preserve
the Society, or promote the real Good of Man∣kind by them, will be but of little Virtue, or Use.
But, pray Sir, upon such extraordinary interruptions, did all men ever think themselves bound to approve them? Did not they still, as opportunity served, assist Right? Did not such proceedings cost a world of Blood and Treasure, to none, or very ill purpose, while no Peace, or Ease could be had, till things were brought to rights again? When matters are in trouble, or confusion, wise and good Men think it the best way to put an end to them, as soon as can be; But you cast out that Right that only can restore our Peace; and when you have conjured up most hor∣rid confusions, plead for their continuance. I know not what could be done more by an Advocate for the Prince of Darkness. As for what you say concerning Bishop Overals's Convocation Book, I am sorry, that a pretender to so much modesty should be guilty of such an impudent Assertion, when that matter hath been fully cleared by so many learned and judicious Pens. T. B. 2d. Lett. p. 20.
This is a very paronymous Caress in∣deed, but such as convinces me no more than your Arguments. But I know who has taught me to give place unto wrath, while I encounter your Reasons. First then, Is it not a Question profound∣ly wise, whether all Men did ever think them∣selves bound to approve Extra-lineal interrupti∣ons? For did you ever know all men in the same Opinion, that they ought to approve any one State of things? But this is not your only Lapse of Sense. It is not the Interruptions and Con∣vulsions of State that I would have you approve, for no good man can approve Interruptions in set∣led Government, as such. But I require you on∣ly to submit to such National Settlements as close up our Confusions, and so far only to approve them, as they are Ends of Strife and War, it
there appear no other Good in them. As wise also is your second Question, Did they not still, as opportunity served, assist Right? I pray, who are these They, but your All men just before men∣tioned as the Antecedent to this Relative? But did all men, as opportunity served, assist Right? How then came there any to be in the Wrong? Or how came all men together to want an opportunity to do Right? Or how came there in any Disorders, and such a general Expence of Blood and Trea∣sure to very ill purposes? But what think you of those, that enforced these fatal Expences? Were they of the All men, or no? Or did they act aright in breaking down the Settlements of the Nation, in order to what you call Restituti∣on of Right? For my part I would not vindicate an Inheritance by the slaughters of poor harmless people in the prostration of their Civil Settlement, to gain the most absolute Empire in the whole World; For I think no one mans mear personal interest in any external priviledge is worth one innocent mans life, whatsoever your, or other Martial Opinions may be in these Matters. But if you justifie those Sanguinary Commotions, and Barbarities against the Publick Settlements here∣tofore for the reduction of the Heirs Lineal, and can tell us, that we can have no Peace in our present State, I hope henceforth your Party will not say, that I enrage the present Powers against them, since you openly proclaim an irreconcilable War against the Established Constitution, and blow the Trumpet for your own destruction, if the Government were not gentle, and compassio∣nate to your very Ravings. But whereas you charge us for having conjured up Confusions, and pleading for the continuance of them, I shall reply, that all the Evil, that hath been done against our Constitutions, from the time that King James be∣gan to vacate our Laws, and to embroil us in
discords, in order to an Arbitrary and Popish Government, until the day of the new Settle∣ment under their present Majesties, contributed to our Confusions, and every Party to those Evils, of what Character soever, must account to God for it, who will admit no Plea for those Evil Actions, or Confusions. But on the Day, in which the Prince became King, our Confusions ended in an orderly, peaceable, and (were it not for your unquietness) an entirely happy Settlement, for the continuance of which we plead against those un∣supportable Confusions, to which your bitterness would reduce us. And now (as ill luck would have it) we are fallen in on Bishop Overal's Con∣vocation, who can have no ease neither, because of our Confusions. But now, I pray, what have I said of that Monument they have left behind them? No more than this; And Bishop Overal's Convocation Book comes up to it. To what? Why to this, that a full Settlement under Extra-lineal Kings must be submitted to both by the Clergy and the People. And doth it not come up full to this in their First Book and 28th Chapter and Ca∣non? Where it assigns this Obedience to the full Settlement even of ambitious Princes, and Rebels, procuring that thro' Settlement by wicked means. And in the 27th Canon of the same Book it is resolved, If any man therefore shall affirm; — that any person, born a Subject, and affirming by all the Arguments, that Wit or Learning could devise, that God had called him to murther the King do facto, under which he lived, yea, tho' he should have first, procured himself to be proclaimed, or anointed King, as Adonijah did, &c. — he doth greatly err. Now a King de facto with this Synod is one that is in by full and legal Forms of Settlement, as by Submission or Continuance, Lib. 1. Cap. 30, tho' attaining thereto by unjust means. And such Submission to such thro' Settlement is what alone
I quoted this Book for; and whatsoever fate other mens Theories hereupon have incurred, sure I am I have not declined the least from the Sense of that Synod, who in those passages had an undoubt∣ed aspect on our several Revolutions, and actual Set∣tlements under those Extra-lineals, whom the Lawyers have styled Kings de facto, by a Distin∣ction from those that are de jure, whose terms herein the Convocation used. Otherwise their Determinations herein could be of no use to ra∣tifie any Settlements past, nor to direct us in time to come, how to end our Confusions, or when to be at peace.
At last you very gravely give us your Opinion, that in the late Oath of Allegiance the word [Successors] was added after [Heirs] on this very self same Ground, that tho' Heirs by the Ordinary Course are the Legal Successors, yet others legally may succeed in Cases extra-ordinary. This it is for men to give their Opinions without Book, and without any other consideration than to pervert the State of the Case. Had you given your self the small Trouble to read over the Oath, you could not for shame have put this interpretation upon it, for the express words of it are [Lawful Successors] which follow the word [Heirs] by way of Limitation, or Restraint, to shew that none shall succeed but the Legal Heir. And thus, Sir, the words of the Oath, instead of ad∣mitting, plainly and peremptorily exclude your extra-ordinary Successors, and extra-lineal Kings. Thus your new invention hath added a fresh absurdity, in∣stead of being a remedy to those many others, which your Party run into upon Discourses of this Matter. And tho' you mince the matter, yet you might have been so bold to say, the Oath requires Allegiance to unlawful Successors, as what you have said; for while there is one in being, and claiming, to whom the Right really belongs, what can your extra-ordinary Successors be but Tyrants, and Ʋsurpers? T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 20, 21.
This, I confess, is an amazing Circum∣vention, if my Memory hath in truth beguiled me. And 'tis a challenge enough to shock a greater confidence than mine. To prove this therefore we must recur to the Form Enacted by the Statute, Anno Tertio Jacobi Regis, &c. Also I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any Sentence of Ex∣communication, or Deprivation, made, or granted, or to be made, or granted by the Pope, or his Successors, or by any Authority derived, or pretended to be deri∣ved from him, or his See, against the said King, his Heirs, or Successors, or any absolution of the said Sub∣jects from their obedience, I will bear Faith, and true. Allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, and him and them will defend to the utmost of my Power, against all attempts whatsoever, that shall be made against his, or their Persons, their Crown, and Dignity, by Reason, and Colour of any such Sentence, or Declaration, or otherwise; and will do my best en∣deavour, to disclose and make known unto his Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors, all Treasons and Traiterous Conspiracies which I shall know, or hear of to be against him, or any of them. These are all the times the words Heirs, and Successors are mentioned in the Oath, and in these here is no Character of Law∣ful set at all. So that here you fall under the same fault you charge upon me, of not reading the Oath, and another added in a bold interpo∣lation thereof at all adventure; or if you have read it, 'tis the greatest of all prevarications con∣sciously to misrender it; but whether it were the one, or the other, it is the most frontless, and unparallel'd impudence to down-face an obvious Truth with notorious Falshood. And yet have a little patience to see what you had gained by this remark, if it had been true. You had said,* 1.32 That the Oath of Allegiance binds to the King, his Heirs and [Lawful] Successors; and I taking it
for granted, that you interjected the word [law∣ful], not as a part, but an interpretation of the Oath, denied it not, but without any cavil candidly admitted it; but because I formed an Inference from that Oath, that you like not, you interpolate the Text of the Oath by foisting in the word [lawful], that hence you might draw a pretence, that Lawful Succes∣sors limitedly denote the Lineal Heirs. But nei∣ther would this have held; For had the word [lawful] been found in the Oath, my Argument had still been good,* 1.33 That in the late Oath of Allegiance, af∣ter the words [Heirs] the words [Lawful Successors] were added on this very self same ground, that tho' Heirs by the ordinary Course are the Legal Successors, yet others legally may succeed in Cases extraordinary. Nay this legality of such extra-lineals had been more fully acknow∣ledged, had the word [Lawful] been inserted, than now it is. For now if a man would be per∣verse, and were there no other Reason upon other Bottoms, he might argue, that this Oath simply setting all Successors, without any express Quali∣fication of Lawful to exclude unlawful, requires Allegiance to all Actual Successors indiscriminate∣ly, without any reserved respect to any legality, or illegality. But whether we suppose the Qua∣lity of Lawful as intended by the Sense, or no, the addition of [Successors] after [Heirs] de∣notes, that their may be Successors, to whom our Allegiance is by Oath secured, that are not Heirs in the strict sense of Lineal Descent; or else after [Heirs] no word of that Importance ought to have been added. But as I was at first candid in the Concession of the Legality, so will I here give you the reason of that Candor. Having then ob∣served, that all Duties respect Laws, and that what is not Legal, can have no Legal Obligation,
and withal that the Oath obliges to the Successors of the very same Legal Sovereignty established here, it appeared to me, that he that comes into any other form of Sovereignty over us, hath no right to our Allegiance by virtue of that Oath, or the old standing Laws, whatsoever Title thereto he may acquire by virtue of New Laws and Con∣stitutions. But if he assumes a Sovereignty that is in no wise Legal, 'tis Tyranny in Form and Na∣ture, and while it is barely such, the man is an Enemy, and no Allegiance can be due to him. Now the Legal Forms, by which Extra lineal Kings are invested with the English Sovereignty, stand in Admission and Recognition of our Estates, when insuparable Exigencies, or just Causes inca∣pacitate the Heirs Lineal to reign over us, or us to be reigned over by them; of which Obstacles in a state of Anarchy the Estates are our Su∣preamest and Final Judges.
But what have you to say to an Impartial Reflection, which I shall here offer you from ano∣ther hand, viz. that you maintain,* 1.34 That by our Oath to King James we are bound to pay Allegiance to King Willi∣am, which seems so strange a Paradox, that the de∣fending of it must serve only to let the World see, that there are no Words, nor Oaths possible to be fra∣med, for which men may not find Distinctions and Salvo's, to turn them which way they think fit, even directly opposite to what they were at first intended. MS. Reflect.
Truly, Brother, this looks rather like whining under an Argument, than an Answer to it; for men seldom make a moan under any Ob∣jection they can solve. Yet is your Reflecters Complaint herein as little sincere, as manly. For I said not that our Oath to King James alone ob∣liges our Allegiance to King William, as you from
him represent me, but that* 1.35 putting all together, that I had said, my concluding Opi∣nion was, that our Old oath of Allegiance (supposing it still in force) to the King, his Heirs, and Successors, binds us to pay Allegiance to King William and Queen Mary, as the present actual recognized Successors to King James upon ex∣tinction (though not of his Life, yet) of his Sove∣reignty. And this you can never disprove, except you either shew, that in that Oath the word [Successors] so distinctly set after [Heirs] three times in the same Paragraph, was purposely set to exclude all Extra-lineal Kings for the time be∣ing, whereby all the Statutes, and former ties of Allegiance actually owned under the past Extra-lineals will be repealed by this Enacted Oath, and all Judgments ever since past accordingly vaca∣ted; or else that King William and Queen Mary are not actual Successors to King James in this So∣vereignty, by the same, or as legal forms of Con∣stitutions, as other Extra-lineals were before them, by a National Admission and Recognition; tho' somewhat more than Extralineal Forms may be challenged to Queen Mary upon her Fathers Ab∣dication. Now when you, or your Prompters perform either of these Exploits, then use your in∣vective Powers even unto hoarsness; but till then 'twill not be prudent at the same time to be cen∣sorious, rude, and insincere too. But I will not discourage you from going on; I pray proceed in your Charge.
When you had asserted, that Extra-lineal Successors may in extra-ordinary Cases be Legal,* 1.36 I pressed you to shew, how he can be Legal, that thrusts out the Legal King, or Legal Successor? And you strained a point to make him so.—But let us see your fine Art of
proving Right Wrong, and Wrong Right. Your Dis∣course of Kings thrusting out Kings is a direct thrust∣ing out Right, and encouraging, and justifying Am∣bitious Persons in embroyling the World in perpetual Wars and Confusions. But I shall not expose it as it deserves, because it is nothing to the purpose of a plain known Right, and no Right. T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 21.
Sir, I think my self obliged to scrape a Leg once or twice to you for your eminent tenderness in exposing my designs in inverting the Characters of Right and Wrong. But, I pray, what fouler exposition had you behind the Veil, than this, that I thrust out Right, and animate men to embroil the World in Blood and Ruins? If your Razor be tender, yet you have a pretty close Hand, which yet I am willing to bear, con∣sidering that your Cause is in ipsâ acie novaculae. But if I may expound your word [Expose] in your true sense, it will signifie [Answer], and then on my Conscience you were in the Right of it. For to answer it as it deserves, is either to confute, or confess it; but you are not ingeni∣ous enough to do one, and less ingenuous than to do the other. But perhaps it was an inconside∣rable piece of Impiety. Let us see then what was this Draconick Incendiary Mormo of mine? Why this verily;* 1.37 One King by a Legal War may thrust out him, that, till he was thrust out, was Legal King of his own People. For the first offending Prince loses not his Sovereignty to the offend∣ed, meerly by the offence, till actually thrust out by the offended. This, I think, is the general Law of the Trumpet, and allowed for valid among all Nations. But if you doubt, let us refer the point to the French King, whom You cannot suspect of Unfaithfulness to You, or Your Cause. But if the War be altogether Legal, upon Offences that will
warrant all the process of it, till the Offender leaves his Dominions in the hands of the injured Conqueror, a Just Change may follow here with∣out justifying Illegal Wars and Rapins of unpro∣voked and injurious Powers. Which tho' it be a Truth most clearly innocent, yet a calumny was necessary to keep up the Ball, and use a Talent. But let this be. I pray, Sir, how shew you, that this is nothing to our purpose?
If you would make a fair answer here, you ought to give a direct Answer to this Question; If a Person, having really no Right, doth disclaim any Right to a thing, and by publick Declarations doth profess, that he makes no Pretentions to it, nor hath any Design to disturb another in his Right, I say, if this Person shall by ill Arts seize it, doth this, notwithstanding all his Protestations and Declarations to the contrary, even against all Right and Reason, create him a Right, whether he will, or no? &c. T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 21.
Here, I confess, you have taken a se∣cure way to enclose my Answer to your side. And as you have set the Question in learned light, I answer to your Hearts content, that such a Per∣son shall hereby have no Right, either with, or against his will. And to all such Questions I had given you a round and comprehensive Answer be∣fore to the same purpose, tho' it so often escapes your notice, belike for its inconsiderableness. Yet it being a right Answer, you shall have it in both Ears, whether you will, or no. And it was such;* 1.38 And even an unjust Potentate, tho' he cannot according to Legal Justice out a King, against whom he hath no Legal Cause, or Right of War, yet if he doth so, and the subject People cannot help it, and he enforce himself upon the People for a new King, our Laws in this concur with the Laws and Practices of all Nations, in allowing our
Estates to determin for us in such Exigences, as is manifest in the long Contentions, and many Turns be∣tween the Houses of York and Lancaster; and the sin shall lie only on the injurious, and not them that submitted to an inevitable fate of things. And again,* 1.39 Wars and Victories are many times unjust, yet they, that suffer the injury, lawfully submit to the unlawful and injurious demand of Sub∣mission. So that taking Right for a Title found∣ed in real Justice, no man really can have Right in the sight of God by a meer unjust Act, or Ac∣quisition. And yet, tho' the preparations to ac∣quire new Kingdoms or Dominions be unjust, if that very constituent Act, which transfers the Possession, does at the same time infringe no mans present and permanent Right, such possession be∣comes Rightful. But all this is nothing to the purpose. For our Question is only of who, or what is formally legal, not what is in real hone∣sty morally Rightful. For all Possession, which a man obtains by legal forms of Process, either in War, or Peace, is formally and apparently Le∣gal to all Civil Purposes and Constitutions, tho' the Cause obtaining be far from being really and morally right. And a man by legal Judgment may de facto be put into possession of what ano∣ther man hath a real Right to, so that the pos∣sessor shall have the Legal Form of Title in what is really anothers Due. And in all such Cases all Affairs belonging to such Estate follow the Legal Tenure of the Possessor, who is therefore in Law taken as bonae fidei possessor. And even antece∣dently to Judgement quiet possession in a private Estate, tho' slipt into by cunning Frauds and Ar∣tifices, against which there is no Civil Law, is ta∣ken by the Law for formally Legal, till the Oc∣cupant loses it, either by Art, or Judgment. Now all independent Persons, and Princes, that are
subject to no Judicial Tribunal, contend by War, not Law, and what they settle themselves in by the forms consequent upon War, they have such a formal Title to as the Laws of War and Revo∣lutions yield them, and no other; tho' whether Cause is just, and consequently thereupon whose Possession is honestly rightful, none can effectually judge but God amidst so many pretensions. And in such Turns the Subject People must, or may lawfully yield to the formal Titles, or Fates of War, since they are not authoritative Judges on the Causes, or Rights of the Quarrel, of which mens private Opinions are most times very con∣trary, but can hardly ever be sure, or unanimous. And by this Rule all Nations go, and there is no better; tho' God forbid, that any man should be obliged to think all the Spoils of War and Law to be really honest, and morally rightful. Now according to these Rules and Distinctions I asserted that Extra-lineal Kings may be Lawful Successors in Cases Extra-ordinary; and I will add, upon Causes really Just, Rightful Successors too. And lest you should quarrel at this Distinction, as of private Invention, but no publick Character, I refer you to the late Oath of Allegiance in the first Paragraph, where our late Sovereign Lord K. J. is declared Lawful and Rightful King of this Realm, &c. that he might be taken for not only de facto, but de jure, King. But amidst all this Dust, of what use is a General Question or Position, except it properly affects our parti∣cular Cases? So that in order to the Censure you design upon King William, you ought to have charged all the Facts in your stated Question, di∣rectly upon him in the Course of the Revolution, with exact congruity and accuracy; that you might have evinced his Illegality, or Incapacity of Right in the Possession of this Crown. But this you perhaps fancy every body can do. But I will
in truth try, whether it can be done, or no. I allow you then in the foundation, that the Prince of Orange at his Descent, as he had no Right, so he pretended none to this Crown, and declared his Intentions not to injure King James in any his Personal, or Royal Rights whatsoever; but then I deny that the Prince seized the Crown by ill Arts, or any breach of publick Protestations. For when he came in the Head of an armed Force, he declared, that he came not for the Crown, but a Decision of his Cause in Parliament, to which end he sent the King fair Articles of Truce and Treaty during the Session. But the King refuses, or neglects the Proposals, and leaves the Kingdom in Anarchy. Now all such Declarations in War have this natural, obvious, and perpetual inten∣tion, that if the matters in Controversie be adjust∣ed as demanded, the Prince demandant will be fully satisfied, as having no design to seize his Adversaries Dominions, if he will right the Causes of Hostility in the manner claimed; but other∣wise the very form, and Face of War, and Arms is in Fact an open Declaration to vanquish, out, dethrone, and crush the Adversary by all Martial and Hostile Methods whatsoever. So that King James nglecting his Demands in not calling a Par∣liament to satisfie the Prince, cannot complain, that he has broken his Faith, or Declaration in taking his Crown. And further, when the King was gone, there appeared no Force, or Fraud in the Prince's Actions with the Convention, to whose Judgment he fairly left the whole Cause and State of Affairs; and they, having maturely and peaceably debated all things, judge King James's Desertion, with respect to all antecedent passages, to be an Abdication of the Government; and withal they judge the Prince's Succours to have merited the Crown, which, with the amica∣ble Concession of the two next Heirs, they cheer∣fully
offer up to him, which he then accepted, when a fair Capacity and title was thus legally opened to him. So that tho' at first he had no form of Title, Pretentions, or Designs for this Crown during King James his Right, yet when this de∣termined, and no other Legal Obstacles interposed, there was a fair Reason to accept that then, which it was not lawful in Conscience for him be∣fore to covet, or design.
Your instance in the Houses of York and Lancaster comes not up to so plain a Case as this. Where things are obscure and dark, (as that Title was, and perhaps still is to most men) great allowance is to be made. Lancaster had the more obvious, York the better Ti∣tle.* 1.40 — But what means this preaching up Confusion? The Nation then weltered in Blood and Gore, till an undoubt∣ed Title put an End to that quarrel. But you would have us obstinately maintain a bad Title, that our Miseries might have no End. A rare Example of Justice, and Love to your Country. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 21, 22.
It seems then, it was lawful for the Nation to admit the House of Lancaster against the better Title in the House of York, or else what al∣lowances do you make upon the Obscurities of the Title? But does it follow, that the House of Lan∣caster had a real Right? If so, then an extra-lineal King may be Rightful; If not, then Allegiance may be lawfully yielded by the Nation to extra∣lineals, who are in by legal Forms of Settlement and Recognition, tho not really Rightful, or Li∣neal Heirs. For so upon your great allowances the House of Lancaster, when enthroned, was visibly Legal tho not lineally Rightful; and does not this then come full up to all the purpose I designed?
For it was not meer obscurity of the Descent, tho' much involved before the common World by con∣trary Pretensions, that warranted the People in these Submissions, but the necessity of ending Spoils, Rapines and effusions of Blood. For if the compe∣titor Houses would have acquiesced in the judg∣ment of the Estates, they could well have deter∣mined for the better title upon a fair Heraldry, or production of Descents. But the Families, as op∣portunities offered themselves, were generally restless under the Superiour House; but those stirs were legally ended toties quoties by Parliamentary Recognitions. But the final end was not procured by the clearness of an undoubted Title, but by the Marriage of the Lancastrian King Henry VII. with the Lineal Heiress of the House of York, by which all competitions closed; but Henry stood upon his own bottom in the National Recognition through all his Reign, and neither yielded subjection to, nor derived his Title from his Queen. But yet let us see in dubitable cases how great your allowan∣ces would be, and particularly in the Lancastrian Reigns? Supposing then the Title between the two Houses dubitable, or doubted only with one part of the Nation, but certain to the rest, shall both these Parts swear one Allegiance to the Title, which is doubted by one Part, against that Title which the other Part is certain of? If so, then you allow one Part of the Nation to swear against a Title, which they know to be certainly Right; Or must the doubting Part concede to the Title, which others know to be Right? If so, then the Lancastrian Line cannot be admitted, or capa∣ble of any your allowances. Or must there, in this Case, be two Kings for the two Parties, and two Al∣legiances in this one Realm? Or what if the Com∣petitors, and Doubts multiply, where shall these, and their Divisions end? But suppose the whole Nation to doubt of the Lineal Right, will you
require them to swear Allegiance to a doubted Title? If not, then what allowances do you con∣cede under these doubted Lancastrian Reigns? Or what Judgment pass you on the Allegiance then al∣ways given? For so there must have been none sworn at all. But if you will require a Nation to swear to a doubted Title, does that Oath import an as∣sertion of Right, or no? If it does, then you will require a Nation to affirm that upon Oath, of which confessedly they are not certain, and that is one degree of Perjury. If such Oath does not (implicitly at least) assert Right, then it is no acknowledgment of Right, nor founded on the presumption of it, which yet however you all contend for, to render our present Allegiance in this point perjurious. But it is hardly possi∣ble to suppose a whole Nation in doubt, when there are Competitions; For the Competitors, and their Complices, or Parties use absolutely to assert their Right without any doubt, or pretence of doubting, and then they that doubt, tho' the generality, must either suspend, or go over up∣on uncertain Trust, whereby they may exclude the Right unawares. But if you will make al∣lowances in doubtful Cases, then what think you of the Questions arising upon King James's De∣sertion? Did they afford any possible occasion, or ground for disputation, and scrutiny? If so, then it ministred doubts to be discussed, and the Case was dubitable; But 'tis a vanity for you to say, that it gave no possibility of disputation, for they that disputed it thought otherwise, and between their and your Opinions doubts must arise herein among the multitude, to whom there∣fore your great allowances are to be made in their present Allegiance. But to deal plainly with you, I think no Man, or Nation is to swear upon what is to them dubitable, as what is ho∣nestly rightful may be; but what is visibly, for∣mally,
and judicially Legal cannot be, as coming home to the Senses of the Subject by publick ways of notice, and operation; and therefore all sus∣pences and personal doubts must herein concede to such judicial Determinations, to put an End to all those Miseries, with which you unjustly charge us, and maliciously threaten us.
As for the Cession you mention, you would do well to prove it a little better, before you thus run away with it for granted. You know we deny it, and have given our Reasons for it, to which I know no Answer returned, unless it be Goals, Fines, and Pillories, and threatnings to help it with Hemp. T.B's 2d. Lett. p. 22.
I think upon recollection you may find very full proof of the Cession already made; but at your demand I will offer you another, which, tho' not better in it self, yet will be better for you, because it is of your own approbation.
I pray, what is that?
Do you not excuse the Desertion from being a Cession, because he went away to save his Life?
Yes, I do. See T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 15.
Did you not tell me at our last Con∣ference* 1.41 that Abiathar at Solomons command went of to Anathoth to save his Life thereby? And yet that his Priesthood determined by his own voluntary Cession herein?
I have indeed owned,* 1.42 that it was a ma∣nifest Cession on Abiathar's part, and I think it was well proved; but then Abiathar did not oppose a claim, as King James does?
If you mean a verbal owning the Right of the High-Priesthood, 'tis a hard matter to judge what Abiathar might say hereupon at Ana∣thoth. Yet admitting his silence under Solomon's Sentence, and his Recession to Anathoth, to be a real Cession from his Office, in Law, this being once effectually past, and after claim could not have nulled this Cession, any more than he* 1.43 that quitted his See by leaving the Omo∣phorion, could null that Act of Resignation by a verbal Protestation to the contrary. For such Cession, being a positive Act, consists in quitting an Office thereby vacant, and when that is filled with another Officer, 'tis too late for the Cedent, or Deserter to renew a Claim, and say his Desertion was no Cession, which is nothing else but a vain Protestation against manifest fact, which is perfectly King James's Case.
He had need of a Case-hardned Face, that will undertake to defend what you say, that* 1.44 the Hereditary Succession was not violently broken, but alte∣red by the Consent of the next Heirs. Sir, it was broken with a witness, for there were four before your Idol; and now there are six; and will you say, there was no violence, when our Native Prince was close confined in his own King∣dom? — But now you will needs persuade us, that this was done with consent. Now you would have done well to have produced the consent of King James, and the Prince of Wales, who ought to be served in the first place. And then as for the two Princesses, whom certainly you mean by those, whom you fasly call the next Heirs, they may dispose of their own, as they please; but they ought not, can∣not give away anothers Right. Only as to the Prin∣cess Ann of Denmark, if she have given up her
Right, it will concern her for her safety, to make it as publick as she can; but if she have not given it away, it then perhaps may concern her to make as much haste after her Father as may be, and to carry her Son with her out of Herod's Clutches; for if her Sister should die, 'tis ten to one it comes too late, T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 22.
I thought, when you and I began Con∣ferences on this Subject, we should have only talked of Casuistical Points in order to the in∣formation and conduct of our Consciences, and not have deviated into such an Unchristian and Seditious Railings▪ And it grieves me on your behalf to the very bottom of my Soul, to ex∣perience so much disingenuous bitterness in a man of your Character. But since you are so unhap∣py as to know no bounds of moderation, I must touch your miscarriages a little lightly. After the Cession of King James, I said the Succession was not violently broken. And in answer to this you mentioned the Dutch Guards assigned by the Prince to attend King James before his Ces∣sion; And this you falsly call a close confine∣ment, for had it been such, how had he so easie liberty of going off? But whatever this was, it was before the Cession, and then what is this to the after proceedings of the Convention, of which alone I was speaking as not violent? Then you as improperly require the Consent of King James, and your Prince of Wales, who must be served first, as antecedent in the Course of De∣scent. Now I must tell you, that there are a∣mong us, some, who, thro' joy of our Delive∣rance, having forgotten that Compassion, which I deeply have for all Royal Tragedies, would be apt to make a jest of this, and reply upon you, that they have been served well enough in the first place, before the Prince and Princess
of Orange, who are well enough served too, and all as they deserve. But I shall only observe your inconsiderateness of discourse in bringing in King James into the Catalogue of his own Heirs after his Cession, upon which I said the Succession was not violently broken, but altered by the consent of the next Heirs. And this, I think, I may still defend without breach of modesty, even tho' I should allow the proceedings of the Convention to have been violations of his Right. For a vi∣olent Expulsion of a Possessor may consist with the true Succession of the next Reversioners. But admitting the Cession, or Abdication for real, what need was there to solicit his further con∣sent to our Establishments? And for your Prince of Wales, beside the doubt of the Nation concern∣ing his Descent, the late Queen brought him in∣to a Cession before the Cession and Abdication of the King, nor were there any Claims entred for him before the Convention, and so he might be legally neglected for want of Claimer. I know this has been charged on the Prince, and the Convention for not admitting the Discussion of that Descent. But, I think, no Law could ob∣lige them to move it ex officio, when he was ab∣sent, and no Promoter appeared on his behalf. But further, to enquire into the Equity hereof, if King James at the Prince's demand had called a Parliament, that had been one of the Princi∣pal Articles to have been judicially determined by the Parliament between them. But King James not calling a Parliament, nor allowing the Convention power of Judgment herein, there was no reason such a Question should be admit∣ted there, which, if determined against King James, and his Prince of Wales, should not have concluded them, but, if given against the Princess of Orange, should have confined and excluded
her. As to your politick stroke upon the Prin∣cess of Denmark, I shall reflect no more than this, that if she will permit you to the Conduct of her Counsels, she is like to thrive mightily by it. For you will advise her either to present flight, or sedition, only to make way for I know not what, or how many new Princes of another Ven∣ter, whose real Descent no one should ever know but the Men of the Mysteries. Perhaps your Agents have laid the Seeds of Discontent between the two Princely Ladies already, in order to form your other Projects; but I hope that God, that has hitherto preserved them in their natu∣ral Rights, against all the Arts of those who would have illegitimated, or intercepted their Sucession, will still preserve her Royal Highness from the Snares you lay for her. And since you have blurted out the Secret to the Publick, she, and the whole Kingdom have reason to take close notice of it.
When we object the immoralities of these proceedings, you tell us,* 1.45 That the internal immora∣lity of all Actions must be care∣fully distinguished from the Civil Consequences of them. — A Son, say you, by fraudulent Arts gets judgment in Law, and seizes his Fathers Estate, and Body by Execution, and starves his Father in Prison; this mans immorality is damnable;—Yet the Judges, Sheriffs, and other Officers are innocent. It may be so, while they act as Officers of Law, and according to the directions of Law. But if your Judges, Sheriffs, or other Officers join with, and assist such a wicked Son, or Daughter, to effect such an Evil Act, or do applaud and approve it, when they know it be done by such wicked and unlawful Acts, then their being Officers of Law will rather increase than diminish their Guilt. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 23.
Now all this I allow too, whether done judicially, or in forms of Law, or no. But if it be done in private, and not in Legal Forms, it is nothing to our purpose, or my ob∣jection. But if the Judges sit in Judgment be∣tween the Father and the Son, and very wick∣edly cast the Father in his Cause, yet it being done in form of Law, the Judgment will pass into such Execution, as will be taken for for∣mally legal, tho' the Judgment be morally un∣just, and contract an heinous Guilt on the Con∣science of the Judge. So that still the Subject People are innocent in admitting the Acts of the Convention as Legal, tho' really before God they had been Unrighteous Judges. Yet because you herein sharpen a Dart against the King and Queen, tho' I never intended my Objection to such a Reflection, the Case you set is not parallel to ours. For the Convention sate not in Judgment between the Father, and Son, and Daughter, the Father not being subject in Law, nor submitting his Cause to them; but when the Father had left his Royal Estate, the Prince calls them to∣gether to settle the forsaken State of the King∣dom, which they did as it now stands. And as this Judgment was in Form, Legal, and Au∣thoritative, so you cannot prove it immoral, or injurious. For as the Estates were not con∣cerned to enquire into the temper of Spirit in the Contest between the Father and the Chil∣dren toward each other, which was not of Ci∣vil Cognizance, so they debated only the Civil Purposes of King James's Actions, and how the state of this Land might be legally and securely fixed after his Desertion, in which they acted as Legal Judges, and no otherwise. What was done before, or out of Convention by any of the Members, and the inner motions, and aims
of particular mens minds there sitting during these agitations, these are extrajudicial, and so not chargeable on the whole Court as a Council of State, as being no parts of their formal De∣terminations.
So for your Robbers, and Pirates; a man may lawfully suffer by them, tho' it were bet∣ter, if he could escape it. But if you will plead, that their Robberies and Piracies are lawful; if you say, they acquire a just Right to what they get by such wicked means, or if you actually joyn with them, and rob, and share in their Booties, you will be as very a Rogue as they; and which is most like the Case, I leave others to judge. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 24.
This, it seems, is your reply to what I said,* 1.46 That Wars and Victories are many times un∣just, yet they that suffer the injury, lawfully submit to the unlawful and injurious demand of Submission, as in Piracies, and other like Tyrannies. And is not this a pretty Refutati∣on of that Assertion, to say, that all that assert, assist, and share in Wrong, are Rogues? The rea∣son of my instance was, that such Pirates, and Tyrants often seize on such as they have no Right of Dominion over, and may perhaps threa∣ten to torture, or destroy them, except they submit, and contract a perpetual Servitude by Oath, or other forms of engagement, which they under such Exigences may lawfully yield to. And proportionably the Estates of any Nation may be thus pressed by an irresistible Prince, and there∣upon lawfully submit to that injurious Demand of such Prince. Nay, if any Prince and the fiduciary Council of any Nation concert to oppress the Subject People by an unjust demand of Submission, they, being, not only in Fact, but Legal Consti∣tion,
uncapable to resist, may for the same rea∣son contract Submission, or Legal Allegiance, when their former Lord hath left them without order, to shift for themselves, and acts not with∣in his Sphere as heretofore. For herein you do not injure him, but save your self, which he has no right in such cases to deny you. And this at least is the Case of all those, who have taken the Oath of New Allegiance, without doing any thing else in the Revolution, tho' the Prince and our Convention had really done King James and us wrong. For we could neither in Right, nor Fact, oppose it; for our Representatives, and the Lords having determined upon the Nation, we were inhabil to censure their Judgement, and conse∣quently to oppose or subvert, what we had no Authority to condemn.
Much such ano∣ther instance is* 1.47 your Lord of a Mannor. Let him look how he came to be so. I may treat with him as Lord of the Mannor, whom the Law de∣clares to be so. But if the Lords Tenants conspire against their lawful Landlord, and dispossess him of his Mannor, and invite a Stranger, and say, and swear he shall be Lord of the Mannor, and according∣ly pay Homage and Fealty to him, Sir, you may de∣termine for their swearing and lying too, if you please, but I shall have nothing the better opinion of your ho∣nesty for it. T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 24.
I observe two grand defects in this Reply; One, that 'tis not supposably legal, that all the Tenants in the Mannor can by Legal Forms of Judgment dispossess a Lawful, and possess a wrong Person into the Lordship of a Mannor, be∣cause these Tenants are not Judges in Law. And any other violent and illegal Forms of Expulsion, and Admission quadrate not with our Case.
But Secondly, 'Tis a very silly supposition, and never any where exemplified in Fact, that all the Tenants (under a state of National Govern∣ment) should violently out a true, and put in a wrong Landlord vi & armis, and swear, and pay the wrong Possessor all the Duties of the Ho∣mage accustomed, when the Lord that is in by Law, will bring the strength of the Country to reduce them.
And Thirdly, You cannot duly apply this to our present Case of Allegiance. For all King James's Subjects did not concur to out him, ei∣ther violently, or judicially, nor consequently to bring in the Stranger, which is the form in which you state the Case of Rebellious Tenants. Other∣wise however my parallel holds good, that if a great many of the Tenants conspire with a Stranger, and bribe the Judges to a corrupt Judg∣ment against the old true Landlord, who being thereby ejected, the Stranger comes in by forms of Law, I say still, the rest innocent Tenants, tho' conscious of the Wrong, may swear Homage, and Fealty to the New, de facto, Landlord. And so here put the Case, as you would have it, at the worst, that never so great a part of King James's Subjects had with the Prince of Orange actually conspired against him, and made him fly, and thereupon a National Court assembling to sit upon the Tenure of his Estate, had been corrupted to give wrong Judgment against him for the Prince, yet the form of Process being le∣gal, the innocent Subjects may, or must take him for their Royal Landlord, that is in by Forms of Law, and swear him the customary Homage, and Fealty. But for the justice of that Judgment I have fully advocated already, and so in this place shall have no need to make re∣petition.
But let the Fifth Commandment look to it self; for it was never so hardly beset. You say,* 1.48 That from the Fifth Com∣mandment we cannot charge King William with subjection to King James, &c. — But does a Nephew, or a Son in Law owe no Duty, if he owe not that which is properly called Subjection? Or may a Man, because he is not his Subject, spoil another of all he has? And must all persons applaud, and approve the Act, and swear he is in the Right? T. B's 2d Lett. p. 25.
Since I must bear the penance of an∣swering your loose and impertinent Questions so often inculcated, know you then, that as to the point of Duty, a Nephew owes an Uncle, and a Son in Law owes his Father in Law, Reve∣rence on the account of those Relations, if the Superior Relation loses not his Title to that Reverence by ill usage, For if an Uncle shall misuse a Nephew, or a Father in Law the Son in Law, without Cause, and will not fairly ad∣just, or refer their differences upon demand, the Nephew, and Son in Law owe no respect at all, for that such Uncle, and Father in Law is worse than a stranger, and a most unnatural Enemy; And therefore the Nephew, and Son in Law ha∣ving not derived their Being, Maintenance nor Education from the Uncle, and Father in Law, and being under no present dependence on them, are free to vindicate their Gauses against such Uncle, and Father in Law, by those ways of de∣fence, that they are legally capable of, either by Law, Arbitration or War. As for injustice, you know I am no Advocate for it, and there∣fore your Interrogation hereupon, with your Re∣flection upon his Majesty, is as invidious toward me, as injurious towards his Majesty, as I have be∣fore abundantly shewed.
The Case of an own Daughter is still more severe; but for that you say,* 1.49 she is in Duty bound to follow her Husbands Fortune, Order, and Authority, even against the Will of her Father, and that with a more plenary consent, if she judges her Husbands Cause to be just in it self.—But, Sir, I am not satisfi∣ed with your bare word, that a Woman is thus bound to follow her Husband thro' thick and thin;—let her have a care how she becomes partner in his sins. — But doth the Duty of a Wife take away the Relation of a Child? They may indeed limit each other, so that the Father may not command the Daughter any thing inconsistent with the Duty of a Wife; nor the Husband the Wife any thing incon∣sistent with the Duty of a Child to a Parent. But yet the great end of these Relations is to strengthen, and support, and not to destroy each other.—Be∣sides your Reason is a mistake in it self as to this Case; for could you with all your tricks of Leger∣demain remove both King James and the Prince of Wales out of the way, then there would arise ano∣ther Relation, and then he in these Dominions must follow her Fortunes, not she his.—But to let this pass, all that has been done is contrary to the Du∣ties of those Relations, which they were, and are under by the Fifth Commandment. T.B's 2d Lett. p. 25.
But all this is but noise and shuffle. For why had you not openly denied, or yield∣ed the truth of my Proposition, that a Wife is to follow her Husbands Fortune, Order and Au∣thority, against the will of her Father, if she thinks her Husbands Case to be just? For tho' you will say,* 1.50 This Judg∣ment is not worth a Far∣thing, except the Cause be
just in it self; Yet be it just or unjust, she must act upon her own judgment of it. And to what purpose have you such a care that she follow him not thro' thick and thin in his sins? Did I ever assert that liberty to a Wife, or to the Princess of Orange? Do not I expresly except out of this Case,* 1.51 all violations of all those Decencies, that are yet, notwithstanding her Marriage, due by the Fifth Commandment to her Father, which are consistent with her Husbands Rights and Interests, and in her Rightful Power to perform? But this was another inconsiderable, which you in great sin∣cerity have omitted, that it might not justifie my piety to the Fifth Commandment, and prevent all occasion of reproach. But I think you are a very loose Casuist for a Wife between the Au∣thorities of Husband and Father, if you think that the Husbands Power limits the Wife only in those Commands of the Father, that are in themselves inconsistent with the Duties of a Wife, whether the Husbands prohibition intervene or no; (for except this be your meaning, 'tis no∣thing to the purpose, nor against me.) For it is not the Husbands Power, but the Law of God, that binds the Wife from the violation of her Duties to her Husband, as it does bind her to keep her Duties to her Parents, and all other per∣sons, even Subjects, that have no power over her. But by your favour, if a Father commands a Married Daughter in any indifferent thing, im∣porting in it self no ill to her. Husband, she has no absolute Authority to promise, or do it, but on grant, or just presumption of her Hus∣bands leave; for if he forbid it at any time before it is done, the Wives hands are in duty bound up from the performance, and how faulty soever the Son in Law be in his perverse and
needless inhibitions, the Daughter is discharged of all Guilt in the non-compliance to her Fa-Father. So that, strictly speaking, all Imperial Power, meerly human, is in things, that in themselves are left at liberty by the Laws of God. And now whether I have said any thing more, or worse than this, speak out without wrigling, and subterfuge. And yet to deal openly with you, and piously (I hope) with the Laws of my Creator, I think there is a great latitude of equity in this Fifth Com∣mandment, and that it consists not in a meer indivisible point, nor is founded meerly in the Relation, but the Causes and Designs of it by the Ordinance of God and Nature. For Parents being Vice-Gods to their Children, while under their Family and Dominion, the more they Re∣semble God in their Offices of Piety, especially toward God and their Children, the more their Children are bound to honour them, even when they are sent off from the House of their Pa∣rents, to found new Families, and to subsist freely by themselves. For tho' the ties of pro∣per subjection are then loosed, yet the Duties of Honour still remain uncancelled. But if the Pa∣rents recede from their Piety toward God, the common and Supreamest Father of all, the greater this impiety of Parents is, the less Ho∣nour is due to them even from their own Chil∣dren. And I truly am of Opinion, that if such Impiety grow up to perfect Atheism, or Defi∣ance of God, from which all the long and ten∣der Supplications of the Children cannot reduce them, the Chidren are discharged from all the Offices of Personal Honour toward them, tho' not of Pity and Compassion for them. And upon this ground the Law of Moses does not exempt Enticers to Idolatry from the Ven∣geance
even of the nearest Relations, Deut. 13.6, to 11. If thy Brother, the Son of thy Mother, or thy Son, or thy Daughter, or the Wife of thy Bosom, or thy Friend, which is as thine own Soul, entice thee, saying, Let us go, and serve other Gods — Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him, neither shall thine Eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou con∣ceal him; But thou shalt surely kill him; thine Hand shall be first upon him, to put him to death, and afterward the Hand of all the People. And thou shalt stone him with Stones, that he die, because he sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God, &c. So that all such Persons were by the Law of God looked on as a common Pestilence, not to be honoured, loved, or cherished, but destroyed by the nearest Relations.
But Parents here being omitted out of this exact Catalogue of other Relations, it shews them to be not within this Law; and therefore that this Law does not derogate from the Honour due to Parents by the Fifth Com∣mandment, tho' they entice their Children to Idolatry; the Reason being grounded on the Authority of Parents over Children, which would be nulled, if Children might prosecute this Law upon their Parents. And for this Cause also by this Law the Wife is not required to de∣stroy her Idolatrous Husband.
If you will literally interpret this Law only of the very Relations that are expressed, than all other, even less Relations, will be ex∣empt, which is unreasonable. But if you will argue a majori ad minus, that if none of these Relations are exempt, surely no less Relations ought to be judged discharged; then the relati∣on of Parents to Children being less than that of the Wife to the Husband, and no greater
than that of Children to Parents, will be con∣cluded within this Law. Nor could their Na∣tural Authority indemnifie them, for all that was from, and under God, and was ipso facto forfeit, whensoever they rejected God for Idols. Otherwise such an exempted Authority of Pa∣rents must have been a Snare to the Children, to draw them from the Lord their God, or at least to restrain them from asserting their God impartially against all his Enemies. And in the same Chapter, Idolatrous Cities were to be ut∣terly destroyed by all the rest of the People, without regard to any Relations dwelling in them; for when the Judgment of God was past upon them, all Natural Relation and Authority ceased as to all consequent offices of Respect, Love, or Honour, when the impious Apostates were convict, and doomed to excision. 'Tis true indeed, that Law, being in its penal sanction but positive, local, and judicial, does not oblige us, but the natural reason substrate thereto sup∣poses, and indicates all obligations of Duty from all Relations whatsoever forfeited by Atheism, and avowed Irreligion. And accordingly Asa dishonoured his Mother in devesting her of her Royal Dignity, because she had made an Idol in a Grove, 1 King. 15.13. 2 Chron. 15.16. Nor is this any breach of the Law of Nature, but the observation of it, for the Law of Nature being nothing else but pure Abstract Reason and Equity, whatsoever is conso∣nant to this Equity, comports with the Laws of our Nature. By these Laws the sins of Men-rescind their Rights in many benefits, which had been due to them in a state of Innocen∣cy. The Law of God requires us simply to honour all men, it being the natural due of our beings framed after the Image of God; and yet
wicked and ungodly men are to be shunned as spots and blemishes by the Law of Nature, and to be made Anathema by the Censure of the Church. For the Foundation of all Authority whatsoever is God, and all Obligations to all Duties, Civil, Moral, and Religious, are found∣ed in him; so that an avowed rejection of God, puts men out of all claims of Authority, which alone is originally Gods, for a renunciation of God is an effectual renunciation of all just and real Authority whatsoever. The Fifth Com∣mandment therefore being not a meer positive Precept, but a dictate of Natural Equity, is in∣terpretable to particular Acts according to the Rules of Equity, and must concede to su∣periour and more important Obligations, which will sometimes require us to hate Father and Mother (that is, to disregard their Commands, and forsake their Persons) to keep Gods Commandments, Luke 14.26. If a Son be a King, and the Father a Subject, he must deal with his own Father as a Subject in Civil Causes, nay as a Malefactor, if necessity requires. A Son is bound to defend (even by the Sword, if there be no other way) his Wife and Chil∣dren from the Sword of his Father, and to save his Country by the Detection of his Fathers Treasons. And many such Cases more there may be, wherein intolerable wickedness on one hand, and greater Obligations on the other, cut off the Ties of Honour and Union, between Parents and Children, Husbands and Wives, and all other Temporal Relations; since what sepa∣rates men from God, may well disengage them one from another. And to put a particular Case, if a Prince marry a Kings Daughter and Heiress, and the King after becomes suspected of an Imposture, to pervert that Daughters
inheritance, and upon demand will not refer that doubt to the Arbitration of his own Senate, but to elude the Hopes, and just Expectations of his Son in Law, Daughter, and his own Peo∣ple, in this, and other momentous Concern∣ments, he puts all the Laws, Liberties and Re∣ligion of his Kingdoms in a Course of Subver∣sion and ruin under Arbitrary and Foreign Powers, may not such a Son in Law endeavour to put a stop to these Measures, and to force such a King to do right? And is such Prince's Wife bound to oppose her Husband in these just Causes, to abet her Fathers injustice and unnatural Impiety? And if the Father being thus pressed by the Son in Law, rather than do the justice demanded, will fly for the succour of his injustice to another unjust King, the Enemy of his People, and in the mean time leave his Kingdom in Confusion, which shall subject it more effectually to his Scourge upon his return with Foreign Forces, may not such Prince, and such Kings Daughter, and a con∣fused Nation unite, and settle it against the ruins otherwise inevitable to them all? For if Natural Ties sometimes give place to Civils of greater weight, here surely is as fair, and just an instance for it, as well can be imagined, or alledged out of History. And that Civil Obli∣gations of greater moment do preponderate a∣gainst Natural, you your self confess, when you rightly say, had not the constitution been for the time being lawfully altered, the Crown coming to the Princess of Orange by meer Des∣cent, the Prince here must have been her Sub∣ject, tho' by the Matrimonial Laws of Nature he is her Lord. It is indeed a melancholy Spe∣culation, when the impieties of such near Re∣lations break off all the Natural Links of Duty and
Union, which must never be receded from as long as the Union is tolerable, and consistent with Superior Obligations; but of two Evils the least is always to be chosen, and where two Offices are incompetible, the more important is to be prosecuted. And yet, tho' this be lawful and necessary, 'tis sometimes a Tragical Scene, under which even the Righteous Parties are to mourn, and lament their infelicity in falling in∣to such Straits and Temptations, and are inces∣santly to pray, that God would put a just and good End to the Disaster, and in the mean time to make necessary Justice and Piety the on∣ly Rule and Reason of their Actions in such a State of Division, and inevitable Contention. And such being the form of the present Affairs, if you needs will censure the Morals of your Sovereigns, you ought to allow their Measures all the Charity the Case will bear, which hi∣therto seems the Care of Gods Especial Provi∣dence for us; And if it be so; it is a dangerous thing to Curse whom the Lord hath Blessed. But I have told you, these things concern not us in our Civils, and it is therefore best to leave things secret, and above us, unto God, the Lord and Judge of all men. But as to the Change it self, it is an apparent delivery and blessing to the Nation in the best manner at∣tainable by any means less than supernatural. For a deliverance it is plain we needed, which could never have been secured, had King James continued undisturbed in his Reign. Now if an unrelated Prince had desired to help us, yet he had had no Civil Interests to have grounded a defence, or rescue us from any Civil Laws, or Laws of War. Then the Sovereignty given to a Stranger had been a cutting off the Line Royal, which neither Atwood, or Johnson have
* 1.52 yet asserted lawful by our Rules: It would also have been a punishing the sins of the Father upon the Chil∣dren, and inevitably have involved us in inte∣stine Wars. Then again, if the Princess of O∣range had invaded her Fathers Kingdom and Crown by any Hostile Forms, this would have looked more violent and unnatural, and seems more than the Princely Lady in Temper or Du∣ty could well or easily have attempted. Time was, before a calm and thorow consideration of things, that matters seemed hard; but I am now convinced, that no other Person under Heaven could in human prospect be so proper a Re∣deemer as his present Majesty, nor any Form of Settlement devised to fore-fend the Ruin of this Nation, upon whose Strength the Security of all Christendom at this day principally seemeth to depend. And this, and all that I have said to you, I speak with all sincerity, which if it persuade not you, I cannot help that, but I think it is a reasonable ground for that Allegi∣ance, which I have not carelesly or inconside∣rately given.
You do us manifest injustice, when you suppose, or feign, that we admit no Settlement under Powers procured by the breach of Gods Com∣mandments. And this in all reason you must do knowingly, and wilfully; because I think there is not one, who on our behalf hath concerned himself in the matter of the Convocation-Book, but hath stated this Question, and always admitted a thorow Settle∣ment whatever were the means whereby it was pro∣cured. 'Tis true, we neither commend, nor encou∣rage such wicked doings; but on the other hand we do not think Dominion to be founded in Grace, and that a man cannot have a good Title, unless he be
a good Christian. We can mourn over the bad man, whilst we submit to the good Title. But we com∣plain, that we have no Settlement, nor any thing like a good Title, to which we may submit. For who can own that to be a good Title, against which there are prior, and better Titles in being, contest∣ing, and claiming? Or who can take that for a Settlement, where a bad Title by bad means is maintained against a just and good Title?* 1.53 — We say, that a full Settlement in one, while another, who has Right, claims, and endavours to recover his Right, is contradictory nonsense. T.B. ibid. p. 40.
I very well know, and freely own, that all your Disputations upon the Convocati∣on-Book do in terms allow a full Settlement, however procured, tho' you contradict the Con∣vocation in your notions of a thorow Settlement. But it does not therefore follow, that all of your Party think so. The most, that I have orally discoursed, stand upon the breach of the Moral Laws, as the grand exception against the Right, on which only they can swear Allegiance; since, say they, Allegiance follows Right, and Right cannot be founded in Acts morally Evil,* 1.54 and essenti∣ally injurious, and conse∣quently by such there be be no full, or thorow form of Settlement. And if you will give me leave to deliver my Opinion, I think, if Gods Providence had not so disposed of things, as to bring that absolutely No, but what if I
Book into publick Light by the hand of my Lord Arch-Bishop Sancroft in this very Juncture, all your Pleas would have chiefly stuck in the Laws of God, whose violation with you should have been alone sufficient to have nulled all Rights, and Titles. But now as it is, you are pinched by the Au∣thority and the Edition of that Book, and forced against your wills to own it, and have no re∣lief but in forced Arts of Evasion. Such is that demure Protestation, that you do not think Dominion founded in Grace, which you know was, and is a pretence toto coelo distant from our matter, as claiming all Secular Rights by virtue of their Religious Character, or Election. But will you allow, that a full and legal form of Settlement can be founded in any Act really in∣jurious? I would have you speak out without boggling, or clouting your Tongue. If not, then the Defect of Plenitude in such Settlements stands in the iniquity, and breach of moral Ju∣stice, and Gods Commandments. And in truth this at last is the true English of all those Rea∣sons, on which you complain, that we have no Settlement, nor any thing like a good Title, tho' those Reasons are wrapped up in forms of words chiefly relating to Civil Laws. For the sum of all is; the Possession of another mans Right is no full Settlement, because it has no good Ti∣tle, as being a violation of Right, and Gods Commandments. Of which I shall have occasi∣on perhaps to discourse more anon. In the mean time, as I have already given you part of my sense herein, so will I now deliver and settle it as full; viz. That when several per∣sons claim Right, then pendente lite, either in Law, or War, the Legal Presumption of Right must be for the quiet Possessor; but after judgment given to be in the person to whom
it is adjudged, till reverse of judgement, and all other antecedent Titles and Pretensions are to be deemed null and cessant to all Civil Effects and Constructions, whatsoever the Errors, or mens private Senses herein may be; and the con∣demned Titles must not be taken to be good, and still in being, tho' new claims and contesta∣tions may be promoted by the outed Party. Which being premised, I can easily yield you, that that can be no good Title, against which there are prior or better Titles [apparently] in being, contesting, and claiming, and that it is no full and Legal Settlement, where an [apparently] bad Title is by bad means [ap∣parently] maintained against a Title [appa∣rently] just and good. But this is not to be taken in a judged Cause. But who was Judge between King James and King William, while the former disputed the new Possession of the later with the Sword, to determine the Civil Practice of the Nation? If none, then were we to abide by King Williams quiet form of pos∣session; If there were any Judge, it was foreign, or domestick; Now there neither was, nor could be a foreign Judge to oblige us; if do∣mestick, it was either private, or publick; if private, that cannot oblige the whole Nation; if publick, then it was in the Estates conve∣ned; but they have judged King James's Title void and Cessant, and not in being, and so, tho' extrajudicially claimed, neither just, nor good. But if you will neither allow quiet Pos∣session, nor publick Judgment as a Rule to State Titles Legally, but will throw up all to pri∣vate Opinions, or Humours, you dissolve all the ties of Civil Society into Eternal Wars, and Commotions. But because you clamour that we have no Settlement, I will make further Ad∣vances,
and prove the Admission of their Ma∣jesties by the Estates of this Land to be a full and proper Settlement, tho' against King James's claim and contest, from the Laws of this Land, the universal Usage of all Nations, natural Rea∣son and Holy Scripture.
This is a teeming Promise; have a care lest the Production be ridiculous.
First then I begin with the common Laws of this Nation, which are nothing else but the constant and general Customs of England, which Lawyers justifie for good and binding upon a fair presumption of their Descent to us from some immemorial Compositions Real and National made by our Fore-fathers; whose Acts and Contracts for future Ages do by the Laws of all Nations bind their Posterities, (that are yet in their Loins, as in the lowest degree of minority) till they are validly vacated. And such Obligations are justified by sacred Instances, as in the Oath of Jacob's Children to carry Jo∣seph's Bones out of Egypt, in the Covenants be∣tween God and Noah, Abraham, Moses, in the League of Israel with Gibcon, and all other their National Contracts, and the Laws of Jonadab on the Rechabites, &c. So that fidelity to the Contracts, Ordinances, and Compositions Real of our Fathers, and Ancestors obliges us to the Customs, that yet continue as the Common Laws of England from that supposed Original; And thus their Legal Obligation is founded not in Force, but in Truth and Honesty. Which being premised, I add, that our Nation in these two last Parliaments, after a full Debate hath judged their Admission of King William and Queen Mary according to our Laws, Legal, and the second Parliament hath moreover recogni∣zed them King and Queen of Right according to
those Laws. And the first Parliament upon this Constitution fixed on them the full Allegi∣ance of the Subject to be secured by Oath as much as to any other Kings whatsoever, that so they might thro'ly make this present Settle∣ment full and entire, which therefore they judged to be such according to our Laws, with∣out any concurrence, and notwithstanding the opposition of the Late King, which on his Ces∣sion, or Abdication could in their Judgment create no defect in this present Settlement, since the Confusion and Anarchy, we were put into thereby, did in their Judgments give them a Legal Right to resettle as they could under the then Exigences for the Common Preserva∣tion; nor did they judge us tied to a State of continued Anarchy during King James's pleasure, that while he provided for himself in France, by his own private Counsels, without the con∣sent of the Nation, we should be at no liber∣ty at home to provide for our selves against a Ruin otherwise impendent and inevitable. And if we look back to all the Changes in the Succession ever since there have been two Houses of Parliament, the full and final Settle∣ment after all Ruptures, Disorders, and Dis∣putes hath determined in the Recognitions, and Allegiances enacted by these Parliaments, even without the consent, and against the presumed claim of the outed Competitors, tho' these were sometimes Lineal Heirs, and present in the Land. Much less then is such consent, or cessation of pretence, or claim in the relinquish∣ing and absent Competitors necessary to the fulness, and validity of such Settlements. And tho' the Dispossessed afterward moved Stirs and Wars against those past Settlements, that be∣comes no Argument against their real plenitude
for the time being in form of Law; for by those new Commotions they designed to reduce themselves into such a full form of Settlement by Parliamentary Recognitions, out of which, by present Wars they designed to eject their settled Adversaries; for to a fuller Advance∣ment they could never raise themselves by the greatest force and successes whatsoever. Thus all the precedent Usages in such cases lay be∣fore our Estates, first in Convention, and since that in Parliament, and according to these have they made this Settlement as legally full and Obligatory as 'twas possible, as judging it to be so full in its own Nature and Reason, with∣out any present Defects, or Capacities of addi∣tion.
I wonder you cannot observe here, what you readily can, when it makes for you, that the first Constituting Parliament did not recognize King William and Queen Mary to be de jure, but excluded that Assertion out of the Oath. But the second Parliament recognized their Right, tho' hereby, as you will say, they added nothing of that intention to the Oath. Now then the first Settlement, to which those be∣ing tacked, bears proportion, going no further than a Constitution de facto, was not at the full, because it came not up to the fuller Recogniti∣on de jure; which being judicially apparent is with you the Legal Form of Title, and Ground of Allegiance. And so the Oath being requi∣red to a Settlement that was not thro'ly full, cannot by Bishop Overals Convocation Book be proved due from both Clergy and Laity, for that the Settlement to be sworn to was herein defective. And herein even Mr. Johnson is more sincere and honest than you, who scorns
to pay* 1.55 Allegiance upon any kind of Success, or forms of Settlement, except they are really founded upon Legal Right.
It will be as easie for you to observe, as for me to remark, that the Recognition is but a Declaration, not a Constitution of Right; and so adds nothing of Right, that before was really wanting; but more fully declares the Right, that stands and is founded in the first Constitution, which actually was at full be∣fore, tho' not so fully declared; this Recogni∣tion being designed not only to repress the Contradictions of their Majesties Right and Ti∣tle, but to compose, as much as might be, mens Doubts and Surmises, and perhaps this your very Objection hereupon. But whatsoe∣ver be the Rights, Titles, or Pretensions of Princes to Crowns antecedent to the actual Settlement, they may be fair preparations, and grounds of claim, but they enter not into the essential form, and constituent Reason of a full actual Settlement, which commences and consists purely in a Legal Form of Admission by the Estates of this Realm judging for them∣selves, that they may lawfully admit this, or that Pretender or Sollicitor, even when they are not permitted to judge any thing on the Right of his demand of such Admission, which belongs to the Question de jure. And to those that are thus de facto settled, whether they had any real antecedent Right of claiming, or no, the National Allegiance is by publick Contract always given to the full, without any distin∣guishing Measures, Forms, or Abatements. And this is not only otherwise evident, but is made more so by this present Recognition. For this
second Parliament, that enacted this declara∣tive Recognition of Right, gave, and could give no further Allegiance than had been be∣fore given on the meer Legal Form of Actual Settlement, which they in their zeal would have done undoubtedly, had they judged the first Set∣tlement any wise deficient in it self, or its Obliga∣tions to a plenary Allegiance, which yet however is of no other form, or virtue than that Allegiance which is always given even to meer Kings de facto. Which shews the sense of our Nation to be, that by our Law Allegiance is given to Kings, not on the account of an antecedent real Title to the Crown, but on the account of the Le∣gal Form of Settlement into the Actual Possessi∣on thereof, upon which there is no superiour Judge to hear, nor determin Quarrels, and Claims of Titles. And you that require more to the nature of a full Settlement, require more than the Convocation has done, which as∣signs your Allegiance to the* 1.56 King de facto,* 1.57 tho' he come into the full Settle∣ment by wrong and injuri∣ous means, and requires only a National Sub∣mission, or a continuance of quiet possession to the form of* 1.58 a full and thorow Settlement, owning the original wickedness of the seizure to be no Legal Bar or impeachment to the Authority of their Government, into which they are formally and fully settled. And such was the State of the Caesars in the Empire, when the two great Apostles required Christian Subjection to them, not on the moral justice of their Titles, of which they could be no Judges, but on their actual settlement in the Concession and Submission of the Senate, and
other popular Powers. And such also was the reason of subjection in those instanced Changes, on which that Convocation wisely grounded this their now celebrious Determination. But since you have again upbraided me with Mr. Johnson, I cannot choose but observe how na∣turally men, that run into contrary extreams, do meet in the other side of the Sphere, as you and your greatest. Adversaries do in this present Controversie; And you both therefore fall into the same absurdities. Now here Mr. Johnson either understands not the formal Na∣ture of a full Settlement, of if he does, he is inconsistent with himself. For if (as I have proved) a National Admission constitutes a Set∣tlement, how can Mr. Johnson explode Settle∣ment, when he places the Right of Kings in the Admission of the People? But if he requires any moral justice, to make the Act of the Peo∣ple Rightful, then if the People fail in that moral Justice, how can their Constitution be re∣ally Right, by which Justice it self is violated? And such failure in a People is no impossibili∣ty, except you will entitle them to an infalli∣ble Sanctity in all popular Actions. As for example; Mr. Johnson produces but one Autho∣rity* 1.59 out of Knyghton, to prove, that Kings acting perversly against the Laws may be deposed, and some one of the Royal Race advanced by the Peers, and People. I will not now strive to weaken the Authority and Credit of the Author herein, nor the Truth of that Power, which the then Lords and Commons claimed against their King, nei∣ther will I alledge the many Changes and Sta∣tutes since, that seem to have abrogated the popular right of Abrogation; but suppose that
this still is the Right of the Nation against their Kings, yet if the People should on false pretences and imputations abrogate their King, this Act could not be morally Just and Right, tho' it were in form legal; and if the Subjects, that are innocent, are not to admit what is thus externally Legal, except it be also altoge∣ther Rightful, then are they not bound to stand by any Popular Abrogations, which they know, or judge to be morally faulty, and consequent∣ly may oppose all new Titles, if they are found∣ed in the real Right of such Abrogations. And to come close home to the Case, if King James were not really guilty of every one of those Enormities to a Title, upon which such Statute did legitimate the Abrogation, and the Conven∣tion had really abrogated their King without ac∣curate conviction of all those guilts recited by that lost or undiscoverable Statute quoted by Knyghton, then had their Abrogation been a nullity, as not being Rightful. But further, if men shall object, that Knyghtons relation of a Statute, not seen by himself, but only said to be objected by the Peers and the Commons, is not a Record, nor a valid Testimony to any Civil Consequences, as being not upon Oath, liable to Error, and uncapable of judicial forms of Discussion, besides its singularity, where shall we find a bottom to authorize King James's abrogation? For 'tis not enough to a Judicial Conviction, or effect or surmise, that Richard destroyed that Statute in the Tower, upon such a general crimination that he defaced Statutes, of which there is no particular form of Con∣viction extant, no not in Knyghton, who yet is the only Traditor of this Transaction; but you must bring us legal proof for what must legal∣ly concern us. And yet nothing else that Mr.
Johnson hath cited out of Law Books, nor King John's Charter in the Pastoral Letter, doth amount to a Popular Right of Abrogation, but only to a limited power of resisting Kings on their oppression of the Laws and Constituti∣ons. So that whatsoever has in fact been done toward our several Changes, must not all be taken, or sworn to as Right, but the conse∣quent Settlements, by National Acts must be taken for formally Legal for the time being, and submitted to under that Notion, leaving the real Right of the procedures to Gods judgment, because there is none other under Heaven to ad∣just it above the National Sanctions.
I did not interject the mention of Mr. Johnson to justifie all his Principles, but only to alledge for our Cause those Right Con∣cessions of our greatest Enemies, as more can∣did and clear from jugling than you, even in his greatest bitterness. I will now dismiss him, and produce you what a Friend of mine im∣partially reflected on this pretended Authority in the Judicial Opinions of Parliaments, viz. that you cannot but know, that this Power of Par∣liaments is absolutely denied by that Party, against whom you dispute; and we do not think it reason∣able to be convinced without proof, viz. that what is thus done is agreeable to the Laws of England. MS. Reflect.
If you are not inwardly convinced of the truth of their Judgment upon their Power, and of the lawfulness of their Constitution found∣ed thereupon, I cannot help that. Neither is the Care of the State so much concerned to enforce such an inward conviction, tho' it is to perswade it, and to silence Contradictions. But, as I have often told you, Judicial Opini∣ons must overbear all private ones to the con∣trary
as to all Civil Consequences. This the peace of mankind, the necessity of ending Con∣troversies, and the fundamental Reasons of Go∣vernment do universally require; so that you must assign some Superior Court, or Judge with∣in the Kingdom to be determined by, if you will not stand to their Judgment, or expose all to private judgments; the first of which is impossible to be sworn, and the later impra∣cticable in a Society. And to turn the dull point of this Objection on your self; the Parli∣ament doth not think it reasonable to be de∣termined by Private Judgments, especially those of the professed Enemies of their long-settled and immemorial Authority. And what if I oppose the general Trust of the Nation in Ci∣vils to the publick Judgment of our Parlia∣ments, rather than the contrary Decisions of some private Zealots and Casuists, whose Senses are seldom uniform, often impracticable, and always inauthoritative? Will you here set your Private Judgments in battle array against the Authority and Judgment of the whole Nation, and the Publick Estates thereof? Or whether Opinion must concede in order to Publick Peace? So that here your imprudent Zeal on false Notions of Loyalty hurries you into Prin∣ciples absolutely Seditious and Destructive to the Legal Constitution of all Governments, and par∣ticularly that, which the Kings of England have themselves established.
Well, to put an End to this Dis∣quisition upon our own Laws, what have you to say for the Legality, or fulness of your Set∣tlement from the Usages, or customary Pra∣ctice of Nations?
I hope you do not require me to corrade a vast heap of Historical Instances, Na∣tional Decrees, and Determinations of Civilians hereupon. This would be to repeat whole Li∣braries to an evidence of one particular Custom. But your own reading will inform you, that under the pressing exigences of Anarchy and Ruin, the Superiors, or Agents of all People have ever authentically contracted a change of Government, and Governours, as to them then appeared necessary to the Common Preserva∣tion.
'Tis so indeed upon Conquests, which some have pretended here to the shame, reproach, and forfeiture of their Country, as well as in contradiction to common Sense, the pretences of your King, and the Sense of your Parliament. But where there are no Conquests, 'tis not so easie to adduce such Custom of Na∣tions.
That the Nation was not conquered is most evident, yet that King William in the Military Course grew stronger than King James, who disbanded all his Forces, and stooped to the prevailing Prince, is as evident; nor was this any False Doctrine in the sense of the Na∣tion. But to assert, that hereby alone the Right of the Crown accrued to King William, even without the consequent Admission and Con∣tract of the Nation, had he pleased to have ta∣ken it on the meer Right of the Sword, is what is indeed contrary to all Law and Rea∣son. For the meer force, or victory of the Sword gives no Right, or Authority even over a vanquished People, till they federally resign to the Conqueror, and then much less doth it so in a Nation not conquered. But to omit the Laws of pure Conquests, there are instances
enough of Abdications, Cessions, and Deserti∣ons (as many, I believe, and more than of simple and proper Victories) to set out the sense of all Nations by. For upon all such the places quitted admitted such consequent Settle∣ments, as the straits, they were cast into, would permit, as is manifest in the leaving of Garri∣sons, Holds, or Countries. And the truth is, there is the same reason upon all proper Con∣quests, and other Surrendries, that legitimates the admission of a Change, viz. the necessity of preserving the Publick Body from ruins and de∣vastations.
I do not remember indeed any in∣instance to the contrary in the practices of Na∣tions; for they perhaps have been, and are as bad as we, ready to for shift themselves upon any pinch, but generally careless of, and perfidious to their unfortunate Princes Interests. But what Reason can you shew for it in our Case, which is so very plain and obvious, that we were at liberty to have preserved our Sovereign, and our selves together, and if so, how can this Settlement be admitted for legal, or be repu∣ted full against the so just Claims of our real Sovereign?
Here again you transgress the pro∣per limits of a private Judgment, when you take upon you to say, that we, (i. e. our Con∣vention) could have secured King James in his Throne, and this Nation in its Rights, and Properties. But in the main point, where you stick, viz. the Consent of King James, and your Prince of Wales, you are very unreasonable. For shall he, who at last put all his Subjects into confusion by his leaving the Government, hin∣der us from settling, till he give us his Con∣sent? Or must the Consent of a Infant be waited,
who, if he ever was, or yet is, is in the custo∣dy and disposal of an Enemy King, who would settle him, and us too with a witness, if he had but a lucky Wind, and a fair Opportu∣nity? It is possible, that an offended Prince may meditate revenge on a People, that will not yield up all to the insatiable claims of boundless Prerogative. And Desertion would be the cheapest, surest, and severest way of re∣venge, if they must never settle again till he please to authorize them; and this truly would be the strangest of all Prerogatives. There are also that say, that King James's Priests coun∣selled, and his Queen engaged him to go off, on this very account, that we might fall into such Plagues thro' our Divisions, and unsettled Looseness, as should enable him to return with an absolute plenitude of Arbitrary Power. But not to depend on uncertain fames with their oblique constructions, what can the legal language of that Cession speak to his Loyal People but this? I have disbanded my Army, and will not contest it with the Sword. I shift for my self, and must leave you to shift for your selves and settlement as you can. Since I yield to my fears and necessities, so may you. If even a Natural Parent, to save his own life, leaves his Son to the mercy of his Enemies. the Son may contract Peace, and sub∣jection to that his Fathers Enemy for his own preservation, nor can the meer Natural Relati∣on and Interest of the Father in the Son va∣cate moral Obligation of such Contract, till that power of his Enemy over his Son be otherwise legally dissolved by the Laws of War, Redem∣ption, or otherwise. So that, tho' we should allow you, that all King James's Enemies sinned in procuring this new Settlement upon us all,
yet his most Loyal Subjects may most innocent∣ly submit, from the reason of the thing, and the virtual Concession hereunto in the voice of his Desertion, which must be supposed as made to his faithful Adherents, tho' not to his Enemies. So that should he ever return again, he could not in any justice punish the meer submission to this new Settlement in those, who contributed nothing to it. And you that refuse it, refuse that liberty, which his Desertion legally gave you by all Civil Interpretations. All which put together should be of great might with you to admit the pre∣sent submission as Legal. Nor ought his re∣sumed Contests to be taken as Legal, or just bars to the contrary. For if there were such a Virtual and Legal Concession in his Deserti∣on, the Estates of his People, taking the be∣nefit of it, have provided for us a Settlement upon that Concession, which being passed and confirmed, the supposed revocation of that Concession, by a new War, or Inauthorita∣tive Declarations, is null, void and unoblig∣ing. And so here was, tho' not a Verbal, yet a Legal Censent of King James, which is as much as you your selves can in reason re∣quire to the justifying our present Submission, and to the plenitude of our present Settle∣ment.
* 1.60 These are pretty tricks to catch Dot∣terils. But above all your most amazing pretence for your Cause is that, which you promise me from the
Scriptures. I pray out with that too, that I may either reply to it, or send it to the Cen∣sure of Gilman's Coffee-House, or the Impar∣tial Reflections of a Private Friend.
I cannot be sullen to you, to whose Felicity and sound Judgment I wish with all my Soul I could contribute. And you being men of Religion, that can dare to suffer for what you think right and sacred, will be like to have greater respect to good and clever Ar∣guments from the Holy Oracles. We will therefore consider the several Settlements of the Children of Israel under Civil Forms of Government; and try whether their actual plenitude consisted in a National Contract, or any other bottom. And in order hereunto I shall observe two sorts of Settlements among them, one Consequent to an Antecedent Right and Title, the other constituent of the Title to, and in the Sovereignty. And according to this Order I begin with the former.
First, Then God, upon a good original and antecedent Title, actually settles himself in the political Royalty, and Government of that People, (hence by Divines usually called the Theocracy) by that Covenant at Sinai, by which he properly and peculiarly became their God and King also, and they his peculiar Peo∣ple, not only under a Religious and Ecclesi∣astical, but also a Civil Relation, Exod. 19. Exod. 24. & alib. passim. When God himself, and Samuel the Prophet in God's Name, had entitled Saul to the Throne of Israel by a sa∣cred
Unction, yet was he afterwards actually, and fully settled therein by the Popular En∣gagement of true Allegiance to him, and was hence said to be made, and chosen King, as well by the People, as by God and Samuel, 1 Sam. chap. 9. Chap. 10. Chap. 11. Chap. 12. Thus tho' David's Title to that Succession was divinely originated in the Unction of Samuel, 1 Sam. 16. yet his full and actual Settlement over Judah consisting in his Unction by the People in Hebron, 2 Sam. 2. and after the death of Ishbo∣sheth he was thro'ly and actually settled over the other Tribes by their Covenant and Un∣ction transacted by their Elders, 2 Sam. 5. And Solomon, tho' designed by God, and ad∣vanced by David, and anointed by Zadock in∣to the full Title unto that Sovereignty, was yet finally and compleatly settled in that Throne of the Lord by the consequent Acts and Unction of that People, as an Inducti∣on on an antecedent Presentation, and Insti∣tution, 1 Kings 1. 1 Chron. Chap. 24. Chap. 25. And thus to Rehoboams Paternal Title, the People were to add their Actual Consumma∣tion of his Settlement in like manner, 1 King. 11. 2 Chron. 10. And last of all Jehu, who by a Prophetick Unction, and Gods Designati∣on had a Divine Right and Title to the So∣vereignty of the Ten Tribes, and began to make way to his Actual Settlement by the slaughter of Joram, Ahaziah, and Jezabel, yet sends to the Council at the Royal City Sama∣ria, and bids them settle the best and meetest of their Masters Sons on the Throne of their
Father Ahab, as knowing that that had been the usual Office of the Senate. But they, not daring to oppose Jehu, tho' perhaps they knew nothing of his Prophetick Unction, reply, that they would not make any King, i. e. any but himself; but they contract a total submission to him, and sealed that Contract in the Blood of Ahab's Sons, and so actually admitted him into the full Settlement and Possession of that Sovereignty, 2 Kings Chap. 9. Chap. 10. So that tho' these Titles to the Sovereignty were not founded in the Grant of the People, but of God, yet the full Settlement of all these New Kings, consequent to their Titles, did consist in the Publick Contract and Recogniti∣on of the People.
Secondly, The Peoples Concurrence was sometimes constituent of a Title meerly hu∣man, as well as a full and formal Settlement.
Thus the People would have given Gideon an hereditary Monarchy, Judges 8. as the El∣ders of Gilead made Jephthah their Captain, Judges 11. and as the Shechemites did, what in them lay, entitle Abimelech, Judges 9. The Ten Tribes made Jeroboam King, which God, that had preingaged it by his Prophet, rati∣fied by an inhibition against Rehoboams recove∣ry, 2 Kings 12. 2 Chron. Chap. 10. Chap. 11. But Zimri, who reigned but seven days in Tirzah, without the full consent of the whole People, wanted a good Title, as well as a full Settlement thereupon, and so was opposed by the Camp at Gibbethon, who set up Omri against him, and so he perished in a Fire of his own
kindling, 1 Kings 16. And this was that per∣haps which Jezabel objects to Jehu, 2 Kings 9. Had Zimri peace, who slew his Master. Did the people permit him a full and peaceable Settle∣ment in the Throne, who slow his own Sovereign? Which Omri however obtained after the ex∣tinction of Tibni his Competitor, 1 Kings 16.22, 23. Thus in the Kingdom of Judah, after Josiah's death, the People of the Land took Jehoahaz: (probably the younger Brother to Eliakim) and made him King, And in that Act of the People the fulness of his Title, as well as his Actual Settlement, seems to have consisted, 2 Kings 23. 2 Chron. 36. So that in short, the Regular Constitution of their Na∣tive Kings was, that subordinately to Gods Election the People should settle each New Line according to the direction of the Law, Deut. 17.14, 15. When thou shalt say, I will set a King over me, thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, &c. But in the degeneracy of the Ten Tribes they set up Kings by their own Act alone without waiting, or consulting the Will of God, as he complains, Osee 8.4. They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made them Princes, but I knew it not. Yet God's permission hereof made the usage valid to a Title meerly human, tho' done contrary to the Law. And therefore to Baa∣sha, who came in this way, God says, 1 Kings 16.2. I have exalted thee out of the Dust, and made thee Prince over my People Israel. Now these things in fact were done as well in in∣jury
to the Heirs-Royal, as to God; and yet the full and actual Settlement by the People, according to their modes, gave them a form of human Title, which was civily valid, tho' not, otherwise, and especially Sacred. And to conclude, since it is recorded, that God at first granted them Kings at their request after the manner of the Nations, 1 Sam. 8. it intimates, that this was then the Formal Rule of New Settlements, at least among all the bordering Nations. However this Of∣fice of the People, being always the final Act, must needs give the last plenitude to the Settlement; and God surely, in the ad∣mission of these Forms, must be granted to know, and judge them to be full, and fi∣nal, whatsoever else was, or might be some∣times constituent of an antecedent Title, which the Convocation-Book does not make essentially ingredient to a full Settlement, or the Obligations to Allegiance founded thereupon. For if a Nations Settlement be not full under New Powers, till all the former lineal Heirs be Extinct, or cease making their claims from Forreign Do∣minions, I know not how many Ages may some∣times be necessary to fill the Settlement; and it will be very hard, if submission thereto, for want of such a ground of plenitude, should be Treason, and all Sanguinary Commotions against it Pious and Loyal, till the claim of all the Succeeding Heirs Lineal shall surcease for ever. Or if you will allow a term for Prescription against all after claims, then you must allow that a Settlement attaining to Prescription may exclude a Native
Right, or that a Native Right ceases by such a Tract of Continuance. If it excludes Right only, then you are no more to comport with it, than with present Settlements exclusive; if the Right ceases, I pray shew me by what equity mere time can de∣stroy a right in me Anno. 93. which was whole and within Memory Anno. 92. especially since the Regestries of Lines Royal usually endure as just Records, that will out-live the longest ocular Te∣stimonies, and personal Memories whatsoever? For the reason why Prescription passes Title is, when there is no Authentick Evidence, or memo∣rial to the contrary. And I will further note, that the same Laws of Nations, which admit prescrip∣tions as a form of Title, do not therefore assert the Title really right in the original means of procur∣ing it, but only externally Legal for want of better Evidence; Prescription in it self being the weakest form of Title, that must give place to all others, if verified in foro; and its ground, or reason is only a supposed Composition Real, I say supposed only, not Asserted. And those very Laws of Nations do not always suppose those Compositions every way right, but only Legally Authoritative, and Settling, and do indeed allow such present Settle∣ments within memory to be as Legal and Valid as those, which being out of record and beyond memory, can but be supposed Legal, and this with more reason, because men can better judge of what is present, than of what is past into a Tohu, an Age in which all things are forgotten.
You are very long, and I am al∣most tired, considering the Zeal that is in me.
I have kept you so long under the Fatigue, because what I ever thought has lately appeared in your Prints, that the total ground of the Schism between us, lies in this point of Right. For you all say, that Allegiance fol∣lows a thorow Settlement, but a thorow Set∣tlement is founded in the Right of him that Reigneth. So that if admit the wrong, then immediately all our Prayers for him are Immo∣ral, Polluted; and Abominable, as conteining Imprecations against the right and justice of him that is wronged, and giving God Praise for the Advancement of the Usurper, which we blas∣phemously attribute to God. Whence there follows a necessity, that all good Bishops, Priests, and People renounce Communion in these Li∣turgies, and with all that use them; and that, if hereupon they be deprived by the Usurpers of all the Publick Advantages of their Ministry, they must keep up holy Ministrations among themselves; for so the Rule is set, and agreed for with most prodigious Zeal, and no less Ac∣curacy and Learning, by your admirable Author of Christian Communion. But I wonder this great Man did not see, how Tottering and Ca∣sual the visible State of Religion then must be upon every turn of the secular State, and the various Competitions for the Sovereingty. For how is it possible that Godly Pastors, and their Flocks, can be all unanimously certain at all times whore the real Right and Justice lies, when matters of Fact and Law are so remote from their Cognisance? Nor will your evasion of doubtful Cases, which you allow much to,
heal the matter. For in all such cases some will assert an indubitable Right, others a dubitable one, and that on both sides at the same time: And thus your indubitable Men must fall into a state of Schism or Separation from each other, upon their contrariant confidences in the Right of the op∣posite Claimers: And your dubitable men must either be neuter to all Communion, or choose a Communion with one, or other of the indubita∣bles at all adventure, which to do with a doubt∣ing mind is a Sin and Snare. And so it is in our present case. Some says, 'tis indubitable, that K. James is King de jure, and that K. William is not King at all; others say as indubitably, that K. James is not King at all, but K. William is King de jure; others own K. William to be King only de facto, and K. James de jure; others that are indubitably for his being de facto, doubt his being de jure King. And a great number through igno∣rance confide, or doubt, more, or less, in all these points, which they cannot reach. Now since Practice must follow Principles, and rules of Con∣science, how shall we settle all these under one Re∣ligious Communion on that Authors Maxims? There is no possible way, but by following the direction of the Convocation Book in Obeying the thorow Settlement of the King de facto, made by publick Submission, or continuance, the form of which being a point of Law, not Religion, must be determined, and defined by the Suprem∣est Domestick Judgment we have in Civils, which Certainly is that of Parliament, after whose De∣cisions we need no further Torment our selves in vain about Antecendent questions, but consider
the Right we have, as well as Duty, to Live quiet under Publick, Formal, and Judicial Settlements, which we are to take as Gods Ordinance for the time being. By which Rule we shall secure our selves from both Extreams, either of owning forcible Entry for Legal Title, or proper Set∣tlements, or of Asserting all Change of Govern∣ment to be Invalid and unobliging, as Contrary to the Law of God, who, we know, changeth Times, and Seasons, and all the Kingdoms of the Earth, and Dissolves, and Resettles all the States of Men under proper Laws of Consti∣tions, according to the Just and Unsearchable Counsels of his Will. And now I will only ap∣ply your Rules of Communion to our Case, and so dismiss this Theorie. If this present Settle∣ment be full, and the Judgment of the Nation herein against your Right, then all your Prayers and Execrations against the present State are Irreligious, Immoral, Polluted, and Abominable, and under an ipso facto Anathema, upon which all Christians must abhor your Communion, even without any Ecclesiastical Sentence, as being self-condemned, and cut off. And if all these Dangers and Snares await us upon every Civil Change, upon Mens Private Cross Opinions about Right, and Plenitude of Settlement; Christian Religion, Ecclesiastical Union could not have continued a Twelve-Month under the Changes of the Empire from Nero to Vespasian, but must have Expired, before it had been Exposed to the World. And I desire the Learned Casuist to Suit his Principles, if he can, with the Conditions, and Capacities of Human Life, and after Good endeavours this
way he will find, that these Civil Questions are not of Private Determination. But if there be such Dreadful Dangers of Immoral Devotions on such Contested Rights of Government, they Naturally ly on them, who in Civil matters Oppose their Private Conceptions and Practices to Publick and Judicial Constitutions, which is a Course in its own Nature formally Seditious, and for that cause Un-Christian, and may too truly and sadly Corrupt their Communion, and Defile their Devotions, who will not know the ways of Peace.
You will needs suppose, that if it be the Life of King James, then it is not the Breach of Gods Commandments, that Incapacitates the Prince of this Crown. But why may not both do it? For because the Lawful King is Living and Claiming, therefore the Commandments of God require of all his Subjects, that they Pay him their Dutiful and Loyal Obedience. They ought by all means to Support him in his Throne, or Restore him to it, as his Condition requires. T. B. 2d. Let. p. 20.
In the Murther of a Parent King by his Son and Heir* 1.61 I proved, that the sin did not Incapa∣citate the Parricide, but that our Constitutions admit him to the Crown, which you not being able to deny, I conclude, that Breach of Gods Commandments Nulls not a Title procured thereby. And then you Assign the cause hereof, that the Parent, and all his Rights are Extinct by his Death, but King James's Life, and Contestation Diversifies his Case. Then I rejoyn, that it is not the Breach of Gods Com∣mandments,
that Incapacitates the Princes of this Crown, but the Life, and Contention of King James. And is not this an Accurate, and an undeniable Observation? For if Breach of Gods Commandments, either alone creates, or with other Causes concurs to a Civil Incapacity, then such Breach doth, either partially, or solely, ob∣struct such capacity. And if so, the Murther of a Royal Father must be some Bar to the Succession of the Parricide: But if it be none at all in that Case, why should a less Sin against God Preclude a Title in another Case in Conjunction with ano∣ther Cause, which yet your selves will not dare deny to be alone Enclusive of King Williams Ti∣tle? Here then I will sift you upon this Point. Would the continued being, and Claim of King James Incapacitate King William of the Royal Title, if King William had never broken any Commandment of God, or No? If you say, Yea, then the Breach of Gods Commandments Con∣tributes nothing to King Williams Incapacity, which alone ariseth by it self from the Life and Claim of King James, it being Naturally im∣possible for two Men to be Total and Separate Proprietors of the same Right at one time; a truth not at all belonging to Ethic's, or Divinity. If you say, No, then you yield, that King Wil∣liam may be Entitled to King James's his Throne without breaking Gods Commandments, even during the permanency of King James his Life and Right. And han't you hereby well amended the matter? But such are the results of affected Sophistries, especially when they are Impertinent also. Now that yours are so, will be hence Ma∣nifest;
For our Question last was whether no Set∣tlements procured by Breach of Gods Command∣ments must be Submitted to, and particularly such, as follow the Extinction of the former Pro∣prietors Tenure, and Title, through such ill means? And now you Answer me, that Gods Commandments do Incapacitate King William of King James's Crown, because King James's Title is not Extinct, but Lives with him. Which if it had been true, I should also have denied King William a capacity to the Title, not from the Moral Law, but from Natural and Legal Impos∣sibility. And therefore I suppose King James's Tenure first Extinct, when I say,* 1.62 But if His Tenure be Extinct, as it hath been Publickly judged by this Nation, our Oath to him Ceases, tho' be contend never so much for the Recovery. And there I take it for necessary, that the Judgment of the Nation must overballance all your contrary private Opinions as to all our publick Duties and Obligations. Now when your words are disin∣volved, they amount to no more than this, that the Law of God forbids one Man to seize on ano∣ther Mans Permanent Right, and Title, in which as it is nothing to the Rhombus, so you have no adversary. But this is not your second, or single Failure, but here appears a third point of Igno∣rance, for our Question was not, what Gods Com∣ments do forbid, but whether the doing what God forbids, in order to the procuring formal Titles, and Tenures in Law, by the real, or Judicial Ex∣tinction of another Mans Tenures, does Create a Civil Incapacity or Nullity in the Tenure so ac∣quired
This is what I deny, and I defie you to Prove. The instance of a Royal Heir upon the Murther of his Father is an unmovable Argument for me; for tho' the Laws of God forbid him to procure the Crown that way, yet if he violates those Duties, the Laws of God do not null the Tenure acquired by forbidden Wickedness. The Law of God forbad David to Usurp Ʋriah's wife, while the Hittite's Title in her continued with his Life, and the King might actually keep her, but by no Legal form of Tenure. The same Law of God for∣bad the King to Murther Ʋriah with the Sword of the Children of Ammon in order to a Matri∣monial Tenure of his wife; Yet when that wicked∣ness was compleated, the Title of the King in Bathsheba was Legal, and valid, even by the Judg∣ment and Ratification of God himself. Nay, when Ahab had slain Naboth by Judicial Condem∣nation for falsly imputed Blasphemy, the form of Title, by which he after enjoyed Naboths Vine yard, was Legal by Judicial Forfeiture, tho' it were Morally unjust in the sight of God; for had there been a Civil Nullity therein, it had been necessary for him to have compassed Naboths Death by Ca∣pital Sentence in order to a Civil Title, which Jezebel procured for him this way, to avoid the Odium of open, and formal Un-entitled Usurpation. So that had your Loud Obloquies against their Majesties morals been never so true, Yet, King James's Tenure, being Extinct, doth not preclude a Civil Title in their present Majesties, which we are now to abide by, and defend by the greatest
Suffrage of Gods Laws, Reason, and the Laws of Nations; at which expression I have heard, that your Friend T. B. winds up his Mouth, and* 1.63 thanks God he hath not so Learned Jesus Christ; And it is like to be true; for he seems to have Learn'd but little of him, at least in his Doctrine, Learn of me, for I am Meek, and Lowly of heart, and ye shall find rest to your Souls.
To the Objection, that Allegiance seemeth to imply Right, which is a Tender Point to be Sworn to, You answer,* 1.64 that the Oath expresses no form of Af∣firmation concerning Right. But what if it doth not, as long as it expresses what manifestly includes Right? And this Allegiance directly, and manifestly doth. For it is the proper duty of a Subject to his Lawful So∣vereign, and contains an Obligation to the Performance of all those Acts, which are required from every Subject, as he stands Related to his Rightful Sovereign; It is the immediate Result of that Relation, So that where you deny your Allegiance due, you in consequence deny the Right of the Prince; where you Pay your Allegiance, it is as owning him to be your Prince. And therefore when you swear Allegiance, you Tacitly swear a Right. For tho' there is a sort of Obedience, or Observances which may be paid to Ʋsurpers, Robbers, and Pirates, yet Allegience may not be paid to them, as being the Na∣tural duty of the Subject, which The Laws and Con∣stitutions have Appropriated to their Legal Prince, and made Inseparable from him; And now I hope you will
not tell us, that the Oath doth not express Allegiance. T. B's. 2d. Let. p. 26.
The giddy ramblings in your forms of expression Create in me a just suspition of ei∣ther your Ignorance, or Insincerity, or both. For First you Confound the Terms Lawful and Right∣ful as Synonymous, even thereby to equivocate. Se∣condly, You say, that Allegiance manifestly In∣cludes Right; and yet that he that swears Alle∣giance, doth but Tacitly swear that Right, that is manifestly Included in Allegiance. But if we manifestly swear a manifest Allegiance, it is manifest that we manifestly (not Tacitly) swear all that is manifestly Included in it. But if we do Ta∣citly swear the Right, then is that Right but Ta∣citly Included, and prehaps so Tacitly, that the Swearers themselves do not perceive it. But as to the distinction between Lawful and Rightful, I have but just now explained it at Large, and* 1.65 offered it to you in our first Conference; which makes your Neglect of its Observation so much the more Disingenuous, and Cul∣pable, as proceeding from a design to Ensnare.
So again you Prevaricate when You say, Where I deny Allegiance due, I in consequence deny the Right of the Prince. For there may be two sorts of Right, immediate and mediate; the former without, the latter upon an intermediate and
qualifying Condition. Again, an immediate Right to a Crown to be enjoyed, must be distinguished from an immediate Right to Allegiance founded in the actual possession of the Crown. Now he, that hath a just immediate Right to a Crown not possessed, hath no immediate Right to my Allegi∣ance; and no more at the most can be assigned him than this, that he, having a real Right to the unenjoyed Crown, hath a real, but mediate Right to the Allegiance on the condition of Possession, for want of which he cannot as yet claim the Alle∣giance of the Subject; for whatsoever materials Right he has, the legal Title to Allegiance consists imme∣diately in the legal State and Forms of Possession. Wherefore I do not deny alwaies a real Right to a Crown, where I deny may Allegiance legally and immediately due; for this denial of Allegiance so due, denies only a formal Title thereto, consist∣ing in a legal actual Settlement in the Sovereignty; except I declare, that the Reason, why I deny a Prince Allegiance due, is, because he in my Judg∣ment, has no just and real Right to the Crown he has; but then that Reason is my own private, not the publick Reason of the Law, or of legal denial of Allegiance due, which is the want of legal Set∣tlement. So when you go on, and say,
where you pay your Allegiance, it is owning him to be your Prince;'Tis true indeed, it is always own∣ing him to be my Prince formally Legal, but not alwaies Morally and Honestly Rightful. So that it is not in your Sense alwaies true, that when we Swear Allegiance, we tacitly Swear a Right. But I doubt, here you forgot the dubitable Case of the Lancastrian Reigns, to which the Nation oft, and long Swore Allegiance, and to which you have given great allowances. But did they all Swear the
Lineal Right of that House to that Crown, which it enjoyed? Or was not such a Sense of the Oath perjurious? And if it be so, will you vouchsafe it your great and gracious allowances, and dispensa∣tions? You have need here of a new Rubbing-brush to cleanse your Senses, and clear up your Memory.
But for all this you are certain, no such thing [as Right] was intended [in the Oath.] For, say you,* 1.66 your Estates in Parliament rejected the Motions made for an As∣sertion of Right. And yet you imme∣diately add, that they, and the ensuing Parliament judged their admission of King William and Queen Mary, rebus sic stantibus, to be in their Lawful Right, yet they bound not us to Swear so; T. B Sect. Lett. Pag. 26. What! if we are bound to Swear according to their Intention, and they, as appears by the Act of Recognition, intend, and de∣clare them to be de Jure; and so have put the distin∣ction of de facto, and de Jure out of doors? Which if it be so hard for you to apprehend, I will put it into this fair Syllogism; The Sense of the King and Parliament (the Imposers of the Oath) is, that King William is King de Jure; But we must take the Oath in the Sense of the Imposers; Ergo, we must take the Oath in this Sense, that King William is King de Jure. Do you think, that King William and Queen Mary did intend, that you should esteem them as a King and Queen, that had no Right? If not, then all are perjur'd, who Swear to them only as King and Queen de facto, (i.e. all, that acknow∣ledge that Rule of Swearing according to the Intention of the Imposers.) For the Oath was chiefly made for the satisfaction of King William and Queen Mary; and they were the Supream, at least the
chief part of the Imposers; but if they were only a part, (as none deny them to be in an Act of Parlia∣ment) then their Sense is included in the Sense of the Imposers, and consequently we must take the Oath in their Sense, or not take it according to the Sense of the Imposers. M. S. Reflex. Or did your Conven∣tioners, or those that followed them, intend to bind you to any thing? If they intended to bind you to nothing, they laid their wise Heads together to such a purpose, as never yet any Men did. But if they did intend to bind you to your New Governours in any thing, what can that reasonably be supposed to be, other than what they admitted them in? And that, you say, was in their Lawful Right. They were indeed ashamed at that time to put it into the body of the Oath; and besides, they knew it would have made many Persons abhor it; but it is plain, this they designed, and tricked upon you. Hence you may perceive, that your slippery Remark will not deliver you from the Intention of the Imposer. T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 27.
This Discourse is so involved, and you talk of an Imposer so like an Imposer, that it is somewhat difficult to trace out your Sense. Yet this I will endeavour, and if I can be lucky, I will give you my Sense of it. Here then we are to con∣sider the Intentions, first, of the Constituting Par∣liament, or Convention; secondly, of the Recog∣nizing Parliament; and thirdly, of their Maje∣sties, in the Imposition of the Oath. First then,* 1.67 I acknowledged, that the Constituting (as well as ensuing) Parliament did judge it in their Lawful Right, rebus sic stantibus, to admit King William and Queen Mary. And so they always judge▪
that they for their part, act Lawfully and of Right, when they admit only a King de facto, either when unlawfully forced, or otherwise necessitated thereunto, by insuperable Exigencies. And so Men may Honestly for their part, contract faithful Obe∣dience to their Piratick Masters to preserve them∣selves, tho' unlawfully brought into that Necessity. This being done by the first Parliament, and that in their Judgment on their part lawfully, and just∣ly, they consider for an Oath of Allegiance, al∣ways usual upon such new Constitutions. And hereupon a Motion was made for an Assertion of Right to be inserted into the Oath, but it was re∣jected. This must therefore in legal construction evince, that their intention in the Enacted Oath, did not imply an Assertion of Right. For, tho' you can, according to the Temper you are of, op∣probriously tax the Wisdom and Gravity of that Great Assembly, yet we are obliged only to an open and sincere Intention, not a tricked one, especially that, which you would trick upon them, and us too, that you might blacken and reproach our In∣nocency; tho' yet how we could be tricked out of our Senses, if Allegiance manifestly includes Right, as you say, I cannot divine. However, herein are two points of Right observable, one in their Ma∣jesties taking the Crown, and another, in the Con∣vention, in the admission of them thereto. And in both these, they obliged us to Swear no Assertion, but only, as* 1.68 I told you, to pro∣mise that Allegiance due by our Laws to Kings thus actually ad∣mitted, without any other charge upon us to Swear the Justice and Rectitude of their Proceedings, of which there is no competent or superiour Judge, or Witness, but God. Secondly,
After the Constituting, comes the Recognizing Parliament, who added a Declaration of their Ma∣jesties Right, in taking and possessing the Crown, as well as of the Rectitude of our Admission; for this makes up the Title de Jure in their Majesties. This might be the mental intention of the first Parliament, but it was not by them promulgate, or recognized, which omission was therefore supplied by the second Parliament. But notwithstanding this Recognition of Right, they neither added, nor altered any thing as to the Oath, but that still stood, and yet stands in its first Intention, which it received wholly and solely from the first Parliament. So that the first Parliament discharging us from an Assertion of Right, in their and their Majesties Proceedings and Settlement in that Oath, and the second Par∣liament doing nothing to the Oath, it does not by its Recognition charge us to Swear more, or other∣wise than the first had done. So that all the Right, that can fairly be supposed, owned, and imported, in taking and imposing that Oath, is, that private Subjects have a Right to Swear, and pay that Alle∣giance, which the Estates have thus fixed: And here also we must distinguish between the Intenti∣ons of Judgments, and Acts of Parliaments in all those Parts, Points, and Articles, which the Sub∣ject Swears nothing to, and those particular words, or points, which are directly set in the Oath, and so proposed to common Observation. For the former only oblige the Conscience of the Subject to exteriour and civil Duties, without involving any interiour Censure, or Sense, upon the Moral Inte∣grity, and Conscience of our Masters. But an Oath, asserting the Moral Justice of Humane Inten∣tions, or Procedures, is a dangerous snare in all Cases above a Man's understanding, liable to de∣bate,
doubt, or question, as all publick Politicks generally are, especially with the Vulgar. And if a Man may be allowed with Modesty to guess at the Piety of his Superiours, it seems it is such a snare, as the Parliament never intended to lay for themselves, and therefore not for us, for whom they must have began the Example. For 'tis ra∣tional to believe, that most of the Members, that really were of, and for the Opinion de Jure, as well on their Majesties Measures, as their own in this Settlement, would not willingly have Sworn that Right absolutely, tho' they would have Sworn their belief of it. For Matters of Fact, of which alone, we can be certainly conscious, either by our outer, or inner Senses, are the only proper Matter of As∣sertions, and especially legal Depositions. But Points of Law and Right, concerning Matters of Fact, are more remote from that evidence and clearness of Sense and Perception, than to be given upon Oath; and are delivered by Courts as Judi∣cial Opinions only, that pass into a Civil Effect, tho' the Judges (if put to it) would not always (not any time willingly) Swear the Infallibility of such Judgments, especially the doubtful, or dissenting Judges, against their own private and personal ap∣prehensions. Thus then in Parliament the Mat∣ters of Fact appeared evident enough to the Hou∣ses; but the Points of Law, arising upon the Facts, underwent much and long discussion, upon which at last the Judgment for Abdication, and an actual vacancy passed; so that in their Opinion they for their part, might in that State of Affairs, proceed to this Settlement, and upon these Opini∣ons they acted, as taking them for True, Legal, and Right. Yet, considering that most of both Houses were not Lawyers, it is not imaginable,
that they could willingly have Sworn the certain and absolute Rectitude of these Opinions, especial∣ly they, who were of contrary Sentiments, but over-ruled by the majority. And hence the Asser∣tion of Right was rejected from the Oath. And I wish all Projectors of Oaths in points of Law, Title, and matters without our reach or power, would follow, and reverence the Exemplary Wis∣dom, and Tenderness of our Parliaments herein, that no tricks, nor traps may be laid for Consci∣ences in a State, and Age, in which we have given them so profuse a liberty. But to return from this Progression; the alteration from the old, or last Form, made in this Oath by the designed omission of asserted Right, argues an intentional discharge of that difficulty, or doubt, in this present Oath, which has nothing in it Testimonially affirmative of other Mens Morals, but only promissory of each Man's legal Subjection, which implies no positive Assent to the Moral Justice of the Constitution. For Allegiance is not only personal, but local also, due in great measure, as well from Foreign Sojourners, as from Natives, and what may be as well required upon Oath of Strangers during there abode here, who yet however, are not engaged to maintain the real Rectitude of our Establishments. And tho' a Na∣tive Allegiance be a closer, and more perpetual Tie to several especial Offices and Duties, yet while the Form of its Engagement is purely promissory, it obliges us to look back to no further dark Origi∣nals, than the legal Forms of actual Settlement, and Recognition. So Sheriffs by their Oath, are obliged to Execute Royal and Judicial Orders and Decrees of State, and Courts in legal Forms directed to them, yet do they not Swear the Rectitude of all such Mandates, or Judgments, (which they
Swear to Execute) tho' declared right by the Su∣periour Authorities. So a Tenant, Swearing Ho∣mage and Fealty to a new Landlord obtaining by Law, doth not assert the reality of his Right, tho' the Jury in Verdict Swear it to be his in their Judg∣ment, and the Judges give Judgment accordingly upon sworn Engagements to Justice. For the Te∣nant may justly suspect the Errors or Injustice of the Process, even while he Swears the Fealty, be∣cause his Oath is not concerned in, or depends on the Original Merits of the Cause, but the legal Forms of Judicial Assignation. But if you will take Rightful and Lawful, for meer Civil and Regular forms of Introduction, I will grant you, that an Oath of Native Allegiance, imports an acknowledgment of such a kind of Rightful and Lawful Settlement, and Form of Title. To con∣clude this Discourse, since Intentions do not explain the words they utter, but words intentions; especi∣ally in obliging and legal Formularies of Contracts, we are obliged to no more by them, than their ex∣press words do openly propose to our apprehensions, and so pass all Judgments in Law, upon Pleas of Contract, according to this Rule of expounding Words, Oral, or Written, in Bargains, Testimo∣nies, and Covenants. If then a Recognition, or Assertion of Right, be not expresly tendred in the very words of the Oath, or jointly with it, by some determinate Rule of Explication, we are not con∣cluded in such Oath, to such an Assertion, much less, if such Assertion be openly excluded from the Oath, to prevent suspicion. But let us see, whe∣ther the Assertion of Right, so manifestly precluded, be yet tricked into the Oath by any surreptitious Implication: Now if it be so, it must be involved, either in the Stile of King and Queen, or in the
Terms of Faith and Allegiance; but neither can be justly pleaded, since the known Judicial distin∣ction of Kings de facto, and de jure, shews the Ti∣tle to be in common given both to those, who come in without any violation of our Laws, and so are in Right, and to others, who have injuriously got, without any antecedent legal Capacity, into the legal Forms of Settlement, and so are in Fact only Kings. And true Faith and Allegiance, is by our Laws always given in the same, or like promissory Forms of Oath to the meer Kings in Fact, as well as others: But this is not all; I will further ex abundanti shew you, that this closeness to the meer Sense of express words, is the inter∣pretative Rule of obligation in Oaths, and Con∣tracts, not only by the Laws and Reason of Man∣kind in common, but is particularly justified by precedents in the Divine History on the sacred Judg∣ment of God's own People. The Case I refer to, is mentioned, Judges 21. There the Israelites in Mizpeth make this Oath, There is not any of us shall give his Daughter unto Benjamin to wife. Here by the word Us, they intend all the People beside the Benjamites, as presuming all the rest engaged there against Benjamin, and really intending that Benjamin henceforth, should never have one Wife from among the rest of Israel. After this, it ap∣peared, that the Men of Jabesh Gilead, had not concurred in that Expedition, and therefore they destroyed all the Jabesites, except the Virgins, and these they gave for Wives, to Benjamin con∣trary to their real Intention in the making that Oath. Now what shall be said hereupon? Did they violate the Oath of God, or take upon them in their Sanhedrin, to dispense with it on a reserved Right of the Imposers? No, there was yet no Po∣pery,
nor such dispensing Power under that Pontifi∣cate. For it appears by their Care in a second in∣stance, that they were very tenderly sensible of their indissoluble obligation by the Oath, nor does the Scripture Censure them for any such prevarication. How shall we then untie this Knot? Thus, whereas they had sworn None of us, it was literally inter∣pretable to a valid Obligation on those only, (and their Daughters) who were actually present, or en∣gaged in that War; so that the Jabesites, tho' at first comprised in the general design and intention, on presumption of their Concurrence, yet in fact not be∣ing engaged, were easily judged not actually includ∣ed in the Oath, as not really being within the ex∣press term of the Us in Mizp••h. Moreover the Ja∣besites did not give their own Daughters, as being all before 〈…〉〈…〉 the Elders gave them; and here∣in they, that gave them, gave not their own parti∣cular Daughters; and they were given, tho not as the Daughters of mere Heathens, yet as Daughters of Men aliened by the publick Anathema and ex∣cession from God's People, and so not of the Us, collectively taken for the united Community or So∣ciety of the Children of Israel. Thus not all inten∣tions had in the conception of this Oath did oblige, but only what the Words thereof did expresly in∣clude. Again, when this Expedient was found in∣sufficient for the surviving Benjamites, a further Consultation arises in the Sanhedrin, how to furnish them with Wives consistently with their Oath. And at length they find this lawful Evasion from, and contrary to their first intention. They direct the Benjamites to surprize their Daughters in the Dances of Shiloh, and promise to pacifie the Parents and Kindred of the surprized Damosels. And herein they judged themselves free from Perjury, because
the natural Parents did not give their respective Daughters, nor did the Sanhedrin manually deliver them as the Daughters of the People, but only con∣triv'd, directed, consented to, and after confirmed the Surprize. Which shews, that in the sense of that sacred Court, Oaths do not tie the Conscience beyond the necessary Sense of the Words, tho' more be actually intended by the Persons instituting, and taking the Oath in their first Conception. And then the Rule holds much more clear, when the Swearer intends no more than the words simply signifie, and is directed by the very Imposers to use that freedom, and discharged from all other collateral, or conse∣quential Constructions as we are by the rejection of the Proposals for an Assertion of Right. But I pre∣sage, that all this procedure of the Sanhedrin, or my Accounts of it, will pass with you for pretty jug∣gling, who are so dextrous and hardy to reproach whole Nations, as if you had been another Elias; tho' herein I would advise you to premit your Rea∣sons to your Censure. In the Interim we will in the third place ascend to their Majesties intention here∣in. Of which I shall in general say, that no Man can evince, that they intended any more in their im∣position of the Oath than the Estates; but if they did, those personal intentions came not into the Act, or Oath, and so can be of no publick cognisance, or obligation, the Oath being made to satisfie their Majesties intentions indeed, as far as they were uni∣form with the intention of the Estates, but no fur∣ther, or otherwise. And the Estates did indeed de∣sire to satisfy their Majesties as far as justly they could without crucifying the Conscience of the Sub∣ject which could contribute nothing to the interest of their Majesties, nor to the Honour of their Ten∣derness and Clemency. So that the Question pro∣perly
is, whether the joint and complex intention of their Majesties, and the Parliament in the Oath was, That we should judge them to be a King and Queen that had no Right? And here I answer, that they never intended, that we should deny the Right of their Title in Thought, Word, or Deed. Nay, I add, that in the Recognition they designed to cre∣ate an Opinion, and Belief in us of their Majesties Right, as far as the publick Judgment of a Nation can morally conduce thereunto; and also to silence all Tongues, and Pens to the contrary; but of what they gently willed Men to believe, they did not pre∣sume to require a peremptory Oath, thro' their ex∣cessive Tenderness for liberty of Conscience. Now the intention we are upon, by the good leave of the Syllogism, is not the inclining will to perswade us to a Belief, nor the authoritative will of silencing con∣tradictions, but that will which imposes the Oath, i. e. what they willed, and intended peremptorily to be sworn? And this does not import so much as an assent, or Belief, much less an absolute assertion de Jure, tho' King William is de Jure in the publick Judgment of the Nation. And what ground have you to fancy that this is not satisfactory to their Ma∣jesties? Their Right is publickly recognized, a full Allegiance of the Subject upon Oath given, with sufficient Laws for the Coercion of Recusants, and all that is necessary to secure them in the Throne; and can you dare to say, they are not hereby satisfi∣ed, because every Man is not bound to swear the Jus, which many feeble Senses may not understand? I hope you never heard of any Complaint made here∣upon by their Majesties, and if not, 'tis a bold and in∣decent Suggestion to object, or surmise it; but the most frontless rudeness of all is, to say, that the Na∣tion was Tricked, and open Nonsense to assert this
of a project of concealing an intention of Right, in words, which you say manifestly include it.
No doubt both Parliaments had the same intention; and the Recognition was but a fuller De∣claration of the Sense of the former Parliament in the Constitution. And for such Bodies to ensnare us to a Belief of K. William's Right, while we are ta∣king Oaths to him, is, if not to command, yet to insinuate Perjury; since they, that are hereby trick∣ed into that Opinion, intend the assertion of it in the Oath; and the Opinion of Right being the Pub∣lick Doctrine, the publick taking of the Oath, with∣out an express Denial of the Right, doth either real∣ly, or seemingly, at least import an Assertion of Right, and so gives a just Scandal to all Men of In∣tegrity, as looking like an Exemplary consent to, and Profession of the Right, and is as Exemplary a Snare to the Consciences of the Ignorant.* 1.69 For has not William ravished away the Rights of all the Royal Heirs in Be∣ing? Has he not violated the standing Laws of our Succession in seizing the Crown before his time?
To humour you for once, let us suppose, that K. William and Q. Mary had violated the Laws of Succession, and so were not every way de Jure Sovereign; yet the Assertion of Right being reject∣ed at the framing of the Oath, a little Care will re∣move all prejudices in our selves, and others, by ob∣serving that we swear no more than was expresly im∣posed in the form of the Oath, with an explicit exclu∣sion of that Assertion of Right; and that other points, and Acts consequent fall not under our intention, by the will of the imposers against their Will. But 'tis
in truth a bold thing, but like you, to take it for evident, that their Majesties have broken the Laws of Succession, when the whole Kingdom hath judici∣ally determined otherwise. 'Tis indeed possible for a publick Opinion to be Erroneous, and a private one on the contrary true; yet nothing but an unde∣niable (as it were Meridian) Evidence must practi∣cally confront a publick Opinion against its Civil efficacy, which I suppose you have not gotten a∣gainst the Civil Judgment de Jure. I will not here proceed on such Originals of Royal Title, as will justifie Changes of Kings every day; I will not cast in my Lot, nor mix my Counsels with those sediti∣ous Men, who by cajoling the Subjects into false No∣tions and aims of Power, cokes them thereby into endless Ruins and Commotions. I will only follow the good, Ancient, and constant Rules of Order, Peace and Righteousness, which alone can make us an happy People, and Advocate for their Majesties Innocency toward these. The ordinary Rule of Succession I still grant you to be Lineal, or properly Hereditary; so that if a Prince's Tenure be extinct by Death, or otherwise, the next Heir of ordinary Course should succeed. But if a Question arise upon the Tenure, whether permanent, or cessant in a state of Anarchy and actual vacancy in the Throne, or who is the next Heir, this is most properly determi∣nable by the Estates of the Kingdom, as being our Masters and Trustees, to oblige, and direct our Al∣legiance. Here then they judged King James's Te∣nure cessant by a virtual Abdication, and the Prin∣cess of Orange the next Heir. But considering the then state of Affairs, they judged it absolutely lawful and necessary for the time being, with the smooth concession of the two next Heirs apparent, to invest the Order during the Prince's Life. It was there∣fore
changed but not violated, and a temporary Change in the Course was admitted to secure the true Descent in a just Line for ever, as appears by the settled and determined Series of Successors.
Very well; I see you and your Estates make nothing of the Prince of Wales. But your Prince of Orange had before not only assaulted our Law, but overturned the Government, and the So∣vereign too; and can you say, that he violated not our Laws in his way to the Crown?
The Prince of Orange being no Subject of England, the process of his Expedition was in him no violation of Duty by him owing to our Laws, which is the only form of Guilt that could have at∣tainted his Right. If then he cannot be charged with the breach of Civil Duties incumbent on him, he is not incapacitated of Rights by any passages in that Expedition. But moreover he came to preserve our Laws and Forms, Liberties, and Religion, when they were all in a fervent Course of subversion. And therefore, tho' during his Marches, the Execution of the Laws for the time being was interrupted in par∣ticular Cases, and Military Officers were by him constituted in the Countries, thro' which he passed, all this was necessary, as methods of Medicine for the time to recover the diseased state of the Patient, to the Antient vigour of its Laws, and soundness of Constitution. But when King James left the lan∣guishing Nation unhealed, the Prince left all to be legally Cured, and firmly setled to the great Council of the Land; that so no Man might have a Colour for Complaint; that he affected our Conquest, Vas∣salage, or Suppression in our Civil Rights by any Arbitrary Power. For which great Service they
found out a fair way, without Violence to any ones Right, to gratify, and honour him with the Crown, or rather to secure all we had by such a Constituti∣on. If then the Prince of Orange was no Subject, nor Enemy to the Nation, but Friend, and Patron to us, and our Laws, how can he be charged with an injurious violation of them? And her present Majesty, tho' more obliged to her Husband than her Father by the ties of Nature, being a Native of England (and so the King's Subject in this Land) never appeared here to disturb her Fa∣ther, or break her Native Allegiance. But when her Father had fled out of the Kingdom from before her Husband, as not daring to abide a Parliamentary discussion of their Causes, and the Estates of the Nation determined to settle her High∣ness with her Husband in this Sovereignty, she, being thereupon sent to, comes over, and accepts that Settlement, which the Nation thought so just and necessary, and to which (as such) the Princess Ann conceded without any Remonstrance. So that neither can her present Majesty, be charged with a∣ny breach of our Constitutions herein, which might obstruct her Civil Title of being Queen de Jure, upon the Cession of her Father, and her next Place in the Succession. Which is I think so fair a Plea for the Recognition de Jure, that if it cannot an∣nihilate all prejudices to the contrary in all Persons, yet is a just Reason to inhibit Contradictions in private Men, who have very little Authority to Censure Publick Counsels and Determinations. But tho' we have thus defended the Title de Jure, yet, as I said before, we were not obliged to Swear it. Nor did I ever hear of any Courts, that loaded the Oath with such an Assertion of Right, when their directive Judgments were required thereupon.
This last is a lucky Hit. I am glad you have awakened my Memory of some of your form∣er Passages upon Interpretations of Courts, for which you ought to be a little chastised. For you say,* 1.70 That if they took not the Oath as the Parliament intended, they took it as directed by their Majesties Judg∣es. What? did their Majesties Judg∣es direct the Oath to be taken otherwise than as the Parliament intended? I desire that may be made out. Did they do it judicially in Court? I think that will not be so much as pretended. If it be, I desire to know when, where, and how. If you say, that a Judge did only discourse it privately, that is no more than if any private Man had said so. But to take off the pretence of this Salvo, the Judges are not, nor do pretend to be the Imposers. And the Impo∣sers (King William and Queen Mary and both Houses of Parliament) have declared what their Sense of the Oath is, viz. that King William and Queen Mary, are King and Queen de Jure. M. S. Reflex.
This is no fairer in one respect, than it is convincing in any. For you repeat me, as if I had asserted some general Sense of the Judges, given to the Nation, plainly contrary to the Sense of the Parliament, according to which Judicial con∣trary Sense, all Conformists had Sworn; and so require me to make this out. But my Senses are not so easy to be imposed on in my own Senti∣ments. My Discourse therefore, was* 1.71 of the Senses of some particular Courts, given, or admitted to par∣ticular Persons upon occasional Con∣sultations.
And I alledge, that these Persons, who were allowed an innocent Sense to Swear to, did not prevaricate with the State, tho' the Courts per∣haps had really misinterpreted the Law. But so far am I from the positive Charge of any Court herewith, that I profess, I neither know, nor be∣lieve any Court to have incurred such a failure, tho' this I have heard some of them burthened with, by some of your greatest Wo••••hies. And upon supposition of Truth in that impu••••tion, I yet assumed the Cause of the Swearers, notwithstand∣ing such supposed Error in such Courts, according to whose Interpretation of the Oath if they Swore, they could not be perjured, or prevaricate. For tho' the Judges of those Courts, be not the Legisla∣tive, yet are they Ministerial, and Executive Impo∣sers, Judges, and Interpreters for the Legisla∣tive, to particular Persons, on all emergent Que∣stions in Law; and what they herein do is valid to all Civil Constructions, and Effects, and to be taken as their Majesties own legal determinations, of whom you too unwarily, as well as untruly, say, that they and the Parliament have declared the Assertion, or sense de Jure to be in the Oath; for tho' that be the recognized Sense of their Title, yet it is not their declared Sense of the Oath. Which be∣ing cleared, I need no Succour from the private O∣pinions of any Judges out of Court, of which I made no mention; which can indeed have no judicial ob∣ligations; tho' by your Favour they may be of great weight to the satisfaction, or Ease of a doubt∣ing Conscience towards its Conformity with the Laws.
Indeed if the real Sense of the Imposer could be avoided, and what Sense others please, im∣posed,
the Oath might be taken in a thousand several Senses, and not one come up with the Sense, and de∣sign of the Imposers, which in this Case always is the security of the Government. Besides a thousand other Mischiefs would follow vacating all Oaths, and de∣structive to all Governments, and Human Society. For if Oaths may be thus eluded, Promises and Con∣tracts would soon follow their Fortune, as being less Sacred. Now Sir, you would do well to answer these, and the like Reasons, before you so peremptori∣ly assert any inferiour Courts to be the Authentick In∣terpreters of Publick Oaths. You had best have a care that you be not followed with a Cry of Priviledge of Parliament. And indeed that Legislative power is little better than Ridiculous, which may be authen∣tically evaded, and be made quite another thing by the inferiour Ministers of it. And after all, the Inter∣pretations of those Courts will not excuse you from in∣sincerity, and prevaricating with the State, as you seem to fear. For if those Courts did give a lower, and more easie Sense than could reasonably be thought was in ended by the Imposers, you ought not to catch at that for an Advantage, which they had no power to give. Nor ought you to join with them in eluding the Oath, but to take care of your selves, that they neither cosen you, nor you others. For an Oath ought to be taken in Judgment, Truth, and Righteousness, in all which points you will fail, if you take this Course. T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 27.
One would think by this clamour, that I had laid Gun-powder for the ruin of the whole World, to which however I dare appeal for my Innocency. First then, if the Sense of the Imposer be in all Cases uncapable of ambiguity with even the meanest, or unskilled People, then I confess my
self on the wrong side of the Hedge. But you were best have a care of asserting this, lest you draw up∣on you the general Cry of Westminster-Hall. If then some words in any enacted Formulary happen to become ambiguous to particular private Subjects, which are clear enough in themselves, to Men of Judgment in such matters, must the inferiour Court, where these Forms are administred, resolve the Sense of the Law upon Questions therein moved, or no? If not, they are no Court of Justice to direct the Subject in his Civil Duties, Rights or Obligations. If it must determine such Questions, then that re∣solution must pass for Law to all Civil Effects upon that particular Case, 'till reversed. But whereas all Courts are subject to a possibility of Error, especial∣ly where the Case is rare, or intricate, or the Courts through haste or heedlesness, take not the matter in∣to sufficient Consideration, if such mistake judicially pass, yet is it formally valid in Law. But such Ca∣ses rarely happen, and the ambiguities of formed Words in short Oaths, Contracts, or Declarations cannot be many, or manifold, except we fancy them made on purpose to puzzle our Faculties, and Con∣sciences both together. And now I would fain have you produce any such short Oath liable to your thou∣sand wrong Senses. In our Oath the only Question is, what it is to bear true Faith and Allegiance? This Courts generally interpret faithful performance of all those Duties, which the Laws of our Subjecti∣on require to our actual Sovereigns, the particulars of which are determined by our Common, and Sta∣tute Laws. Now to exercise your Skill, I pray make a brisk Essay of fixing one half thousand Sen∣ses of these words alien from this Explication, which has been given by several Courts. Or if your Cou∣rage lowers herein, I pray shew this very interpre∣tation
to be either insidious, or erroneous. But whereas you think the Errors of Inferiour Courts may vacate all Contracts, and Authorities; I had provided an Atlas to support them against this Ruin, had you thought it considerable, when I offer'd you this Maxim,* 1.72 that in such emergent Cases, What such particular Courts determin, must be ta∣ken for Law 'till condemned by a Superiour Court, or nulled by the Legislative, which will secure our Law∣givers from the Ridicule, and leave that Character to its own Proprietors. As dismal a Speculation is that, which you raise about Courts, and Swearers Clubbing together to elude the Oath, which a∣mounts to this importance, viz. If a Knave ask a whole Court of Knaves, to play the Knave, in in∣terpreting the Oath, and the authoriz'd Knaves have no more Wit, nor Honesty but to do so, then the suborning or Consulting Knave, finding their Judi∣cial Knavery, must be converted to Honest of a sudden, and take no advantage of their Knavery, but tell them they are arrant Knaves, ay, that they are. For such I dare swear is the Judicial Interpreta∣tion of your Mystery. But a plain unintriguing Head would have thought, that I had spoken of Honest Men of tender Conscience, consulting the Sense of Courts, from the just Information and Direction thereof, upon their doubts concerning the intenti∣on of the Oath. And as such a Man would use no Arts to Corrupt a Court, so could he not easily conceive their Opinion fallacious. And after all, if he judged it good, he would approve it, if naught, reject it; if probable, accept it as legal: But if a Man knew the Sense before, he had no need to try, or tempt the Judgment of a Court, nor ought he to follow it into Immorality, if he knows it false. And
I surely never told you, that a Man, conscious of Errour, or Prevarication in a Court, might have an Advantage to elude, but in doubtful Senses to follow that, which the Court has given to honest and innocent purposes. And all my* 1.73 Discourse ran up∣on the supposed tenderness and innocency of the Swear∣ers in such Consultations. Next I took care also for the Innocency and Reputa∣tion of* 1.74 the Courts too, against all Calumnies upon their Judgments in such Ca∣ses given. And yet all this was purposely over-look't by you, that so you might revile the innocent tender∣ness of Men, and Courts, with the imputations of Fraud and Villany. And yet after all this Rant, you your self seem to grant, that Men might admit a probable Interpretation, when you say, If the Court give a lower and more easier Sense of the Oaths, than could reasonably be thought was intended by the Impo∣sers, you ought not to catch at that for an Advan∣tage. So then what Interpretation the Swearer thinks reasonably given, he may Swear to, if the Subject matter of the Oath so interpreted to him, seem lawful. Nay, if a Man doubts the exactness of an Interpretation, may he not tell the Court his sus∣picion
of their Error, but let them know that since their Opinion is authentick, and the Oath which they accept for their Majesties, under that Interpre∣tation, contracts no Evil, he thereupon takes in their Sense, as judicially Legal and no other? This I think is no Cozening of the State in the Swearer, but a fair sincerity before God, and the World, and answerable at any Tribunal whatsoever. Have you any thing more to say upon this Point?
My Friend T. B. suggested no more matter of Arguments to me hereupon; but only huffed and laid about him, what that innocent Sense might be, and the double boil'd Crambe of Swear∣ing to Usurpers to maintain their Usurpations, that while you make such a Pother about Senses, your Conscience lies snarling within, as he does without, when he scorns your Pity, and stiles you meek For-swearers, meek Rebels, meek Traitors, meek Turks, meek Jews, meek Renegadoes, and taxes your Mer∣ciless High-Priest for want of Bowels to a poor Boy, whom, it seems, some of his Party had imployed in carrying Seditious Libels. I will not tell you the manner of his Fury, but it so startled me, that I thought verily I must have sent for the Doctor. Ser. J. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 27, 28.
But what say you to the danger of the Law, even when King James returns, if you treasonably break your Allegiance to King Wil∣liam?
In this I find you are a Man tam Marti, quam Mercurio, otherwise called an Ambo∣dexter. For if you cannot perswade us, you will affright us into the Oath, or any thing else. For
you endeavour to possess us with an Opinion, that King James (if ever he returns) will hang all them that do not Swear and pay Allegiance to William. An hard Case, that a Man can't be Wise and Ho∣nest without Hanging! But why this extreme Seve∣rity? Why? Because the Lineal Heir may hang a Man as a Traytor for breach of Allegiance to an extralineal King. Well but if King James should hang up all that did not pay Allegiance to Willi∣am, one would think he should not spare those, who would not pay Allegiance to himself, and this would make clear Work. When Edward the Fourth first joined Battle against Henry the Sixth, did not you think this would have made a powerful Speech for him to his Souldiers; Gentlemen, go on couragiou∣sly, your Cause is good, the Crown is evidently my Right; and if I can recover it by your assistance, I will certainly hang you up every Man for fighting against the extralineal King, Henry Sixth, who here appears in the Field against us, and keeps me from it?—Sir I do not believe there is any Law to hang a Man for Loyalty, and of all Men living I least fear it from King James, T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 30. And I appeal to your self, whether you can believe that Interpretation you put upon our Laws,* 1.75 viz. That King James may Hang Men as Traitors for breaking their Allegiance to King Wil∣liam? This is the same, as if King Charles the Se∣cond should have Hanged Men as Traitors to the Com∣mon-Wealth of England, who restored him to his Crown. M. S. Reflex. But in Truth, all this Hang∣ing stuff seems to have another Design, not to tell what K. James may do, but what you would have others to do, as if they were excusable for any seve∣rity towards those, who deny them that, for which
even King James himself may punish them. It is a pious hint to your Government, and your Mob. T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 30.
I was willing to have saved you, if it had been possible, out of Error, that so I might have kept you out of Danger. But if there be no such Danger, I am very glad of it. What King James will do I am no Arbiter, nor did I ever as∣sume upon me to discover his Intentions. I only minded you what by our Laws he may do, if you are guilty of Treason against Allegiance required by our Laws to the present Sovereign. But you, according to the sincerity of a Zealot, repeat me to have said, that King James may hang you for not taking the present Oath, that I may stir up the Pow∣ers, and Mobb to do so presently. But I thank God for your sake, that tho' the Laws are severe upon unhappy Clergy-Men, that cannot conform to the Oath, yet such Recusancy does not by any Law make Men Traitors, as not being made Trea∣son. If you live otherwise quietly, and contrive no Seditions, neither I, nor the Laws can touch your Lives, either now, or hereafter in any Revolution. But if you will incur Treason against extralineal Kings, the Law since Henry the Seventh may be in force against you, under the recover'd Reign of the Lineal, however they stood in the Days of Hen∣ry the Sixth. 'Tis true, Heirs Lineal, that pro∣mote such Treasons, may, and no doubt always do stake Faith and Troth, not only to indemnify, but prefer their Adherents. But in Edward the Fourth's Age and Army, the Souldiers were not Lollards and Hereticks, with whom the most Holy See, and the more Holy Society will keep no Faith, especial∣ly to succour and secure their Heresie. He that
hath seen what has been, may easily see what will be, if he will not shut his Eyes.* 1.76 But if the Old prudent C••ution 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 will produce no faith in you, I leave you to your own Paradise Dreams, and Dotages; since the sagacious Observation of the Poets never quadrated so well to any person, or purpose as me and mine upon this oc∣casion, invitum qui servat, idem facit occidenti. And yet for all my good will, the sport you make with me, in your Edward the Fourths Martial Oration, exposes your Principles perhaps more than my Law. For by the strai••s you have made upon the Duties of Christian subjection, which Custom has named Passive Obedience, Edward the Fourth's Souldiers had been bound to have fought for him, tho' he had made them such an Oration, which could not have been imprudent upon your Principles of Chri∣stian Loyalty. But if such an Oration would have justified the consequent Revolt, or recession of his Army, then is this Nation, and all the Protestants of King James's Army justified in their leaving him, and going over to the Prince, since his assumed Dispensing Power, and superlative Prerogatives, the Obedience contracted to the Sec of Rome, and the Society of Jesus, and all his hasty steps he made to the dissolution of our Laws, Liberties, and Religion, were a Proclamation as fatal to this Kingdom, and his Protestant Souldiers, as the Speech you have framed for King Edward. And
they took the Language and intention of his Acti∣ons accordingly, as if he had said; My Protestant Nobles, Clergy, Magistrates, Officers, and Souldi∣ers, do you actually fight for me, execute all my Commands, be passive under all my Contrivances against your Religion, Laws, and Liberties, and when I have gained my ends, I'll make you all sworn Slaves, and Papists, or else I••le melt your Grease for you. But to return from this perti∣nent Sally; as to the Law, that I set it rightly, as it stands at this Day from a long Descent, is notorious to the World, from the Judicial and received Determinations in Parliament, and the King's Courts, so often pleaded, and alledged by the Advocates for our present Allegiance, to whom, and to whose Originals I therefore refer you. Only I think fit here to relate the yet unpublish∣ed sense of a most judicious and excellent Person, sent me before any Prints appeared on this Sub∣ject. His words are these; What I principally in∣sist on is, That our Law requires Subjection, and Obedience to the Powers in being. To prove this, I shall here set down the words of Sir Edward Coke, and in the Margin note the Authorities to which he refers. Sir Edward Coke, speaking of the Sta∣tute of the 25th of Edward the Third concerning Treason, saith, that this Statute is to be understood of a King in Possession of the Crown and Kingdom.* 1.77 For if there be a King Regnant in possession, altho' he be Rex de Facto, & non de Jure, yet is he Seignior le Roy,* 1.78 within the Purview of this Statute. And the other, that hath Right, and is out of Possession, is not within
this Act. Nay, if Treason be committed against a King de Facto, & non de Jure, and after the King de Jure cometh to the Crown, he shall punish the Treason done to the King de Facto; and a Pardon granted by a King de Jure, that is not also de Facto (mark this, for it concerns the Nation against wheed∣ling Declarations) is void. So to the same effect, Judge Hales his Pleas of the Crown. pag. 11. This Argument (saith my invaluable Friend) I take to be of great force; because the measures of Sub∣jection are not the same in all Countreys, but must be taken from the Laws and Customs of every Countrey. Thus he. And if you will impartially reflect upon your own Words, in which you blame me for inferring, that King James, when he re∣turns, may punish Men for breaking Allegiance to King William, these words concede it. For if you admit unto me a breach of Allegiance in facts committed against King William, you then pre∣suppose an Obligation for Allegiance to him so broken; and to break a Duty is punishable by the penal Sanction, or virtue of that Law that makes it a Duty; and therefore if not punished, nor par∣doned before the return of the King de Jure, he may punish it as a Crime against his Laws. And your taking the instance of the Oliverian Common-wealth to this your concession, impudently admits Allegiance due thereunto, and makes the Opposers thereof Traitors, and Legally punishable by King Charles the Second for High Treason. But in Truth, no Laws had engaged Allegiance to O. C., or his Common-wealth, as they have to Kings de facto. And moreover if the Estates themselves in free and (at that time, and case extraordinary) legal Par∣liament upon the antecedent Expiration, and in utter Renunciation of that Common-wealth, and
all other Forms of Democracy recalled him, it had been Treason to have opposed, and Loyalty to have concurred in that their Restitution. But I stated the Case of O. C. so clearly in our last Conference, that I fancy it beyond the power of T. B. himself, as spiteful as he is, to paral∣lel the Tenure of O. C. with that of King William, whatsoever he may without Argument rant and rave to the contrary. As for the Reproach of stirring up the Powers, or the Mob against you, I reply, that you prevent me in that In∣trigue your selves; and I will give you any Form of Security, either Sacred, or Secular, upon Soul, or Body, or Goods, that I will never provoke them against you, as much as your selves have done, and still, for ought I see, perse∣vere to do.
We are very luckily fallen in again, upon the mention of O. C.'s Authority and Settle∣ment over us. I pray let us review that Article. For tho' T. B. for want of Argument, cries out stark shame upon you, and is once (oh wonder!) ashamed for you (in such a sort of Civility as he never vouchsafes himself, how much soever he needs it) because you will not be confuted by his Brass and Impudence, and our Learned Pens, I will see what Grace may be wrought in you by some Impartial Reflections of a softer Metal, but of great weight. You make a pretty sort of dis∣parity between the Tenure and Settlement of King William and O. C.* 1.79 Because O. C. was not King; as if the Charm lay in a word. Call him Hospador, if you will, for me. Is not the Duke of Muscovie King of that Countrey, because he is called Duke? It is the Authority and
Power we are speaking of, not by what Names it is called M. S. Reflex.
I took my self for a Conjurer, nor will I endeavour to enchant you with words instead of things, since your Temper will not hearken to the voice of the Charmer, charm he never so wisely. And therefore without troubling the Peace of that great Duke, you may please to remember, that there is an old, received, and approved distinction between the Titles, and Characters of King, and Tyrant. The former, is he that Reigns accord∣ing to the Laws, and Forms of Civil Constituti∣ons, and his Character, and Authority, is Grateful, and Honourable. The latter, Rules by meer force, oppression, and bondage, without any Civil Form of Tenure, or Settlement, by a power only potential, not potestative, and therefore without a proper Authority. And this Character is in most especial manner given to Usurping Rebels, as well as to Foreign Invaders; to destroy which Tyrants, the Universal Sense of Nations ever judged it law∣ful, because they have no Form of Title, but that of the Sword, Violence, and forcible Entry. Now King William holds this Sovereignty by the former legal way of National Contract, and Civil Establishment; but O. C. had no other Mode of Profession, but Tyrannical; and so had no legal (which is the only Form of) Authority. And yet beside, perhaps the very Style of King is necessary to the real Sovereigns of England, in order to their Claims of Allegiance, by virtue of the old Oath and Laws; tho' when new Laws and Constituti∣ons extinguish the old, a new Allegiance may be due to a new Sovereign under any other Titular Style. But if this Style be thus necessary to oblige
our Allegiance by the old Laws, then for want of that very Character, no Allegiance was due to O. C. by our old Laws, which was the first thing in question. But then I proceeded further, and shewed,* 1.80 that he had no legal Form of Settlement in the Sove∣reignty by any other Laws, to which I refer your Memory and Consideration. For the improvement of which I will further demonstrate, that he was no King, either in Name, or Thing. For first, he was Created even by his own Faction, not Sovereign, but Protector only of the People. And that Office was not Royal, as appears by the third and fourth Articles of the In∣strument of his Government, instituted by his Offi∣cers first, and after again pretendedly confirmed by his pretended House of Commons, which he had first purged of all suspected Persons, and this, after he had refused the Style of King, which he saw would not pass Muster in his Army. Tho' there∣fore he Ruled by the force of his Confederacy, yet not as legal Sovereign, nor according to any Law, or lawful ••orm of Constitution, even in that false Authority. But if you will allow meer Force to be sufficient to a Settlement and Constitution, then all the little Elves and Goblins of Power, that after him pretended to sit at Helm in the whole course of those Changes, till the Return of the Royal Family, were all worshipful Mushroom So∣vereigns forsooth. And what I have heard a Per∣son of great Parts, Honour, and Authority, some∣times say, that tho he is no very Old Man, yet he hath seen five and twenty Governments in Eng∣land, was perhaps as severely true, as it seemed pleasantly spoken. Have you any more Straws to
pick in this Matter, or will you dismiss me in peace?
No, no, Friend; you must not think to slip your Collar so. You say, that O. C. did not, and could not pretend a National Contract, as having no House of Lords, nor free House of Commons. Whatever he might do, I am sure, that he did pretend, that he was advanced to the Government, by the Consent and even Grant of the People of England. What was it else he did pre∣tend? M. S. Reflex.
Tho' I mentioned his Non-pretension, as well as incapacity to pretend a National Con∣tract, to argue thence, that really he had none, yet the intended force of my Reasoning, lies in his real want of such Contract, of which his Non-pretension, in his Case, and care for Pretensions, is a Moral Argument. For had he really had it, the Civil effect had been the same without a Pre∣tension, which alone can have no Civil Efficacie, or Obligation. But however, that I may not seem to neglect your Pretences, let us examine his. I allow therefore, that he made some Pretence, but none to the Lord's House, which he utterly cashier'd, which yet however had been, and still is, necessary to a National Contract. I allow you also, that he pretended his Advancement by the People, as the word restrainedly signifies the Com∣mons of England; and he had a small Colour for this, in the acknowledgment of the Usurping Pack, that pretended to sit for the Common Peo∣ple of England, against all the Laws and Rights of the People. And yet, had these been a free, fair, and full Representative, they could not have
given O. C. a Legal Dominion over the superi∣or Estate of Peers, because the Commons never had it themselves. But as the word People pro∣perly comprehends all subject Orders, Estates, or Persons of the Realm, so neither did, nor could he pretend an Advancement by the People. But the main point we are concerned in, and which you can say nothing for, pertinent to our Debate, is, to what State, Stile, or Character he was advanced, or pretended to be advanced by them, whom he called the People? Was it to a real Royal Soveraignty? No, no; his Mouth Wa∣tered, his Bowels hanker'd at it, but he was how∣ever forc'd to sit down, and pretend only to a Protectory Trust for the Commons of Eng∣land.
This, I confess, reduces me to some difficulty and unexpected Surprize. Yet will I repeat to you the remainder of what my refle∣cting Friend remarked, that, in the next place for the justice of his pretence, that he had no House of Lords, I suppose he made that no pretence a∣gainst himself, as you would have me believe. MS. Reflex.
Truly I never perswaded, or tempted you to believe that O. C. made any pretence against himself: I only told you, that he neither did, nor could pretend the Contract of the Lords House; and can you prove the contrary?
But he did not think a Lords House necessary to make a National Representation. It could not be so originally. And therefore they as Lords are no Parties in the Original Contract.
We know an* 1.81 House of Com∣mons hath Voted them useless. And at this Day the Lords do not pretend to the Right of granting away the Money of the People; And I suppose it is upon this Account, that they do not look upon themselves as the Representatives of the People. MS. Reflex.
Here I think my self obliged to do your Party right, that these are not their common Sentiments. This was a singular Nostrum of your assuming Emperick, to heal a diseased Cause. But by the good leave of the Lords and Commons, whom I have no mind to set at variance, we will sift these odd Politicks. Is it then first of all like∣ly, that O. C. did not think a Lords House ne∣cessary to a National Contract? If he did, it's no matter, if he did not think them National Re∣presentatives. The Language of Men herein is various; many Men commonly assert the whole Parliament to represent the Nation, since what is Enacted by them and the King altogether is ta∣ken for the Act of the Nation. But strictly speak∣ing, the Lords are no formal Representatives, nor did I ever say they were, tho' you would trump the term of Representation upon me, to ensnare me to a concession that the Lords repre∣sent. But I am not so to be tricked. I know the Lords to be an Estate Originally Principal, acting Personally for themselves in their own Right, and Name, not in the Name, or on the Mission of o∣thers; and under the King they are the upper part of the Parliament and People in the most comprehensive Sense of this word. But the lower
House only are the Representatives of their Respe∣ctive Counties, Cities, and Burroughs, in whose Name, and Right they Act for all the Commons of England. But if O. C. knew the Lords House necessary to the King himself to Enact the Bills e∣ven of the Commons into Laws, could he think them needless to the legitimating his Order, or his Acts? Surely he could not, except upon this one only supposition, that he thought nothing could legitimate it, which is indeed not impro∣bable; but then that exauctorates the Commons also of that Power, by which he pretended him∣self advanced. But could O. C. otherwise think the Lords needless to his Legitimation, upon this emp∣ty and impertinent Speculation, that there could be no Lords in the Original Contract? Which can be true neither in any other sense but this, that in the first Constitution of Civil Govern∣ment in this Land, there could be no House of Lords. No, verily; for before, or till then, they were in a mere rustic, Pastoral, and agricolarian Habit, Quality, and Condition. But since that there have been many Changes of Governments, and in them of Sovereigns, by National Con∣tract. And hence, I say, ever since there have been Baronies, and Peerage in England, in every settled Change of Government, and Sovereigns, made by National Contract, the Lords were in those Acts that originated those Settlements, Titles, and Sovereigns, and so would have been originally necessary to an Original Contract for O. C's Constitution, tho once in a state of Rebel∣lion, a seditious Party of the Commons voted them useless. But I ask you fairly; Was that Vote of theirs Truth, or Law? If so, why have the Kings and Commons ever since admit∣ted
their Use, as well as Right? If not, why did you alledge it in Bar to the Rights of Peer rage? But supposing that wicked Vote had been at that time true; yet who had made them so use∣less but they by seditious Violences? Now would you think it reasonable to cut off a Man's Hands, and then reproach him, and cast him out as use∣less? But I will beat back this dull Weapon on your own Head, and mind you, that these Coun∣ty, City, and Burrough-Charters of sending Re∣presentatives, could not be in the first Original Contract for Civil Government, as being also of later Extraction. So that upon your Theory, O. C. must think them also needless in order to his Constitution, who pleasantly new named Magna Charta, Magna F—ta. And so at last the Truth will come about unawares, that O. C. had no form of Title from King, Lords, or Commons of England. Again, if the Lords House should upon a critical Juncture turn De∣magogue, and rabble the Commons out of Heart, and House, would it be fair for the Lords here∣upon to vote them off as useless? 'Tis scanda∣lous therefore to draw Arguments from Confes∣sed and notorious Violences to justifie a wrong Cause; and therefore henceforward give us in Truth, what you seem to Challenge and glory in, just Weights and Measures; at least be not so shamefully disloyal, as to dry up in the King that Fountain of Honour by which he Creates the Peerage, and who is the original Founder of all Charters. As for the Lords not assuming to give away the Peoples Money, as not being their Representatives, 'tis nothing to the purpose against their concurring Interest in Contracting for new Constitutions; tho' neither House can separately
give away the Peoples Money, altho' those Bills are by regular custom prepared in the Lower House. Nor are these Rights of the Peerage so alien from the good of the general Body, but that we and the better part of the lower House have sensibly owed our Peace, and Preservation to the Integrity, Care, Wisdom, and Honour of that Upper House, when many of our own over-heat∣ed Charioteers have been furiously driving on all to the Precipice.
We will then dismiss the Lords in peace, and come to the Commons, on whom O. C. relyed, and Whereas you say, O. C. had no free House of Commons, I answer first, he did not pre∣tend that, which is a sufficient Answer thereto. MS. Reflex.
Are you awaked in good sober sad∣ness, or have you almost talked your self into sleep, and Dreams? For tho' your Answer be sufficient to some purpose, yet 'tis so to mine, not yours. For not having a just freedom, as well as Title to act for the Interest and Sense of the People, their Acts were not the Acts of the People, but either private Acts of Cowardise, or rather the Acts of him that forced or managed them to his own Counsels, and had no more le∣gal validity, than what meer Force and Fraud could give them.
All that I will further say to this point, is, that they called themselves free, and no Man durst say the contrary. While they had the Power, O. C. owned them, and they owned him; and he had as Universal and seeming a Consent
of the Nation, as can well be imagined; he was obeyed at home, and owned abroad, if not in all, yet in most of the Courts in Christendome.
How your Discourse consents to it self, I do not well understand. Just now you said O. C. did not pretend to have a free House of Commons; now in the same Breath you say, they called themselves free, and no Man durst say the contrary, and O. C. owned them. Now did he own them to be free, as they called themselves? If so, then he pretended to have a free House of Commons contrary to what you say. If he did not own them as free as they owned themselves, he must then either not own them at all, or only as Vassals, and I leave it to your Choice to take either of those Handles, for there is no way to extricate you from the ties of Contra∣diction. But whatsoever freedom this knot of Men had, it could amount to no more than the freedom of Banditi, or Rapparees, or any un∣suppressible Rout, which is but a mere impunity to do Evil, and wrong the innocent. But the freedom we are speaking of is Civil, consisting in the Popular liberty of Election, Session, De∣bates, and Votes. Yet the very House, that Constituted him Protector, was first purged of all suspected Members, and upon their after ad∣mission, his Constitution began to be questioned as much, and for this O. C. dissolved them in most sacred Rage. And for the truth hereof also I call in Testimony the Sense of the whole Na∣tion, who, as soon as opportunity offer'd it self by Monk, declared for, and after met in a free Parliament, which before they had long wanted. And hence it appears also the Sense of the Na∣tion,
that neither the Rights of Peerage, nor the Freedom of Corporations had been Legally va∣cated by the former Tyranny. As for the Nego∣tiations of Foreign Courts, they are no Demon∣strations of a National Contract, or Form of Legal Settlement here. For as Foreigners are no Judges of our Tenures, so they meddle not with them, but only treat with the actual pre∣vailing Powers, whether Legal or Usurpant, Ty∣rants or Rebels, its almost all one to Strangers. They give them all good words to serve them∣selves of them, but if disgusted, they then change the Tune into all the juster Names and Titles of Oppression and Villany, if they can do it safely. So that there is no concludency in this sort of Reasoning, tho' yet at the best, his Com∣plices and Strangers owned him no otherwise than he stiled himself, not the Sovereign, but the Protector only of the People. But the boldest stroke of all is, that he had as univer∣sal Obedience, and seeming a Consent of the whole Nation as can well be imagined. For the formal consent of both Houses, sitting free from terrour, may easily seem, and be imagined much more properly, formally, and validly Na∣tional, than meer enforced silence, and patience under irresistible domination. Nay, we as yet have no other way of National Consent but the Par∣liamentary, without which all Personal Contracts, or Engagements to intruding Powers are null, and not legally interpretable to any Civil Form, or Obligation, and so not to be drawn into a pretence for a National Consent. But now at last see, I pray you, the Issue of this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and eager desire of Contention. For to make King William's Title no better, but worse
than O. C's, to the end that the then legal and Loyal Recusancy may legalize this of yours, (which is the one and raging Clamour of you all) you forsooth outpitch your self, and would prove O. C. fully settled by a N••tional Consent, as great as can well be supposed, and by the general ac∣knowledgments of Foreign Courts to his real So∣veraignty, tho' not nominally Regal. Now were this true, all the Loyal Worthies Recusant to O. C. are Condemned for Rebels by the Con∣vocation Book. And then if O. C. were through∣ly setled upon such Acknowledgments at home and Abroad, much more is King William so, and consequently by the Rules of that Convoca∣tion, you must yield him your Allegiance. Thus Brother, in Politics, as well as Poetics,
In vitium ducit culpae, fuga, si caret arte.
Upon which let T. B. blush for you as well as for me, and then we shall be even.
Well then, let us pass from these De∣bates about the Oath to the Office of Prayers for your King William and Queen Mary against all their Enemies. Of which you tell us,* 1.82 That the Prayers were consented to by all the Recusant Bishops, and by them (* 1.83 or their Officers without a∣ny Prohibition) sent to the Clergy of every Diocese, and by them general∣ly received. The Bishops were pre∣sent at them, directed their Clergy upon Consulta∣tion to use them; and thus things stood till the Day of their Suspension, and no blowing of the Trum∣pet against Perjury. Now if this were true, yet
if the Prayers are truly chargeable with something unlawful, and wicked; that is such a daring af∣front to God Almighty, that neither any Act, or Neglect of theirs can justify either your or my Concurrence in them. And therefore I wonder why you should make such a Lye, when it will not serve you for a Reason. For it is well known to all, who frequented their Communion, that they never read or used those Prayers, and that is no improbable Argument, that they neither con∣sented to them, nor sent them abroad. But the truth is, that they were so far from either con∣senting to them, or sending them to their Clergy, that they had no opportunity of the thing, 'till it was done and past. And whether some Body told you this Lye, or you made it your self, if you please to consult the Printer in the Savoy,—he can tell you how they were sent, and who sent them, and that those whom you call Recu∣sant Bishops, were purposely kept ignorant, that they might not be able to give any obstructions to the business. And now, Sir, do not you think, that you have acted a very mannerly Part to our Re∣verend Fathers, in exclaiming against them, and comparing them to winking Watch-men, and dumb Dogs, because they do not get up o'th' top of the Monument, and baul out against a thing, which they knew nothing of? It could not be done before, and since it hath been cried out a∣gainst sufficiently. T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 31, 32.
If what I said of the Bishops, or Cler∣gy herein be a Lie, I own it to be as Villanous a Calumny as ever your malevolent Tongue, or Pen framed; but if it be true, I think it a just Plea, not to Reproach those excellent Fa∣thers,
God forbid! but on an undoubted pre∣sumption of their Sincerity, to infer, that they then as well as we, did not judge those Prayers un∣lawful. And it is a fair Argument in Moral Charges, used and allowed by all Orators, that we had the Consent of those, who now dissent from us, if at least those Fathers do yet dissent from us. But now I am brought in upon an uneasie Stage, upon which we are not so much to Argue, as to give and take the Lye; and not only so, but to be under Provocation to discover Secrets against Moral Inclination, or otherwise to undergo the Censure of a Lyar. Whether of the two Evils I shall choose I wot not well. Yet, let whatsoever Opinion fall up∣on me, I will never discover Persons, nor the tenth part of what I know in fact to be true herein, to prevent all Obliquities of Censure, and Reflection. But yet notwithstanding this necessary Civility, I think my self obliged to vindicate the Truth of what I have asserted. Im∣mediately upon admission of their Majesties to the Throne, an Order of Council passed for set∣ting their Names and Royal Character in the Liturgy instead of King James, and this Order was sent down to every See, and from thence to every Parish in all the Dioceses of England. Now can any Man think, that all this was done in Corners, and managed in the Dark, to keep the dissenting Bishops ignorant hereof, when it was impossible to conceal the Design from the Sense and expectation of the meanest Idiot, who must know, that the change of Sovereigns draws after it such a certain change in the Prayers? I can∣not say this Order was sent directly to the Bi∣shops by Name, but if not, it was to their
Officers and Registers. And were they also so much in the Secret, as to keep their Watchful Lords in ignorance, and so closely to send the Form to the Cathedrals, and Parishes, that these deluded Fathers should know nothing of it? But when however these surprized Fathers were a∣larmed in their Cathedrals with these new wick∣ed Prayers, why did they continue to frequent them, without sending the Classick to their Prohibition; 'till the Day of their Suspension in Aug. 89? And in that interval, administer the Sacrament at the Cathedral Altars, where these Sovereigns were then prayed for? Why here∣upon had there not been some publick Remon∣strance to the Dioceses, or Rural Deanries, that the Bishops knew nothing of that Order being sent them, and that they did not allow, but for∣bid it by a firm Injunction? None of this was done to undeceive the Clergy, who received the Order as sent them by their Bishops. And I could produce you Instances of Recusant Clergy-Men, who then read those Prayers on that presumption, and alledge it for their Apology, when Taxed hereof upon their present inconformity. Here was half a Years time to have repressed, or at least to have condemned this Service, yet all past in si∣lence, and in their visible Communion. During this Tract of time can any Man think, that no Clergy Men had any Conferences with their Dis∣senting Bishops hereupon? And in those Confe∣rences did those Fathers Condemn, and forbid these Prayers, at which themselves were daily present? No, I believe no where; and somewhere in seve∣ral instances I know the contrary, that directions have been given to use our present Forms. But one thing I will further tell you, that these inno∣cent
Fathers were not so gulled, as you pretend, in the first motions. For upon the Enthroning of their present Majesties, and the Change of the Prayers, and Oath of new Allegiance; the Recu∣sant Bishops met together in Consultation, how to act in these Affairs, and after all Debates a∣gitated, they came to this Resolution, that they would not oppose the Prayers, for that it would seem too invidious and uncharitable, to deny their Majesties our Devotions, but determined only to stick at the Oath. This I presume those Fathers will not deny; and if any of them should hereaf∣ter challenge me for this Report, I will give them my Author, whom I presume no Man can Im∣peach of falsehood, or Detraction. But I would not have mentioned this, had not you reproached me with the Lye, even while you endeavour to cover the most evident Truths with Clouds and Darkness. Nor do I mention this to cast a ble∣mish on them. For did not their Deprivati∣ons seem to them Schismatical, I believe they would not have repudiated our Communion up∣on the mere account of our Prayers, as neither did your great Coryphaeus till the Deprivation of the Primate. All which is open Truth, tho' these Fathers never read these Prayers, which I never charged on them, since 'tis otherwise very rare to hear Bishops reading the Prayers in any Church whatsoever. And this Concession to these Prayers being past on their most serious conside∣rations, there was no Cause why they should blow the Trumpet against what they judged lawful. But had they really judged the contra∣ry, this concurrence had been worse than the neglect of winking Watch-Men, or the silence of dumb Dogs, to which I never compared them,
tho' your Censorious Rigours must brand this mo∣deration with more infamous Characters, as is e∣vident from this Discourse of yours, and the se∣cond Chapter of the first Part of your Treatise of Christian Communion. And having thus vindi∣cated their Equity and my Reverence thereof, me∣thinks such a Man of Manners, as you have ap∣proved your self hitherto to be, should have be∣sprinkled our Fathers also a little more decently, and not (as generally you do) with Tinctures drawn from the Lake of Sodom. But to leave you to the felicity of your own good Humours, I shall only observe, what a silly innuendo you flurt up∣on the Secretaries, or Council of State, that they were in great fear, what stirs these Bishops would make, had they not concerted with Mr. Jones at the Savoy, to carry on this Religious Intrigue in the Blind, whereas these Fathers expected their de∣termined Fate with all imaginable calmness, and serenity, as Men that well understood the pati∣ence of Saints. And in that exemplary Patience they were impatient at those, who thro' too great bitterness, called our Conformity, the Apostacy of the Church of England; for the truth of which, if you will not believe me, I hope you will Mr. Dodwell, to whom I therefore refer you for sa∣tisfaction. And therefore you, that would raise you a Monument out of those Flames you kindle, by reproaching us with infamous Imputations, recede from the pattern, and act without the di∣rection of your Fathers.
Another Reason why we may law∣fully join in those Prayers, is because (as you would Perswade us)
King James and your King William are very good Friends.* 1.84 And you prove it, for that the Prayers express him not; — and that you rank him not a∣mong the number of King William and Queen Mrry's E∣nemies. For an Enemy is one that designeth to injure a Man, and we are not sure that King James doth so design against King William.—* 1.85 But supposing he will do no Wrong, yet sure he may demand and endeavour to recover his Right. And I am apt to think, that your little ambitious Dutch Sa∣viour would think no Man in the World so much his Enemy, as he that demands three Kingdoms from him. Nor do we call only those Enemies, who design Inju∣ries, but even all, who a∣ctually oppose each other, or between whom there is any Contest, let their De∣signs be what they will, or their Cause right or wrong. And after all your daubing, he certainly is accounted the greatest E∣nemy, for whose sake all others are judged Enemies. Now tho' the King of France be such an abomi∣nable
Enemy, he should soon he esteemed the best Friend, if he would but renounce the Interest of K. James, and suport the U∣surpation of the Prince of Orange. T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 32, 33.
In this Triumphant and fastidious Harangue, these things severally offer them∣selves to our Consideration.
1. Then the strength of our Cause lies not herein, nor fails in the Defects of this Ac∣count. For in blunt Truth, if King William and Queen Mary be our Sovereign Lord and Lady, the same Prayers in the same full Sense, are to be used for them, in which they were used for all their Predecessors. So that if King James comes into the Number of their Enemies, against whom the perpetual Sense of those Prayers lies, we cannot help that, while we innocently perform our Duties. The greatest Objection against this that I 〈1 page missing〉〈1 page missing〉
know is, what your great Author of the Christi∣an Communion herein offers, that they that look upon new Sovereigns only as Kings de facto, do herein pray for the Subversion of Right, and him that has it, and these make up a great Number of the present Conformists. But that question properly comes under dispute upon the Notion of Enemies, and Victory in our Prayers, and on that Head it shall be considered. The only question here is, if a King de facto can be our So∣vereign Lord? This I know you deny, and if your denial be good, it presses our Prayers much, if offered for a King by us taken for de facto only. But if the Nation hath a lawful Right upon great Exigences to admit a Person into the Sovereign∣ty, who had no Right to enforce them thereto, then as to the Nations part they have lawfully admitted him to be their Sovereign Lord, and have yielded him all that Authority over us, that the Laws of the Land in such Necessity allow us to concede. And such is the Case in all Submis∣sions upon new Conquests, tho' injuriously got∣ten. For in such Cases the submitting People, be∣ing no Authentic Judges upon the Cause of the new Potentate, can only judge for themselves what they may lawfully do, and leave his Cause to God, whether he on his Part takes the Crown de jure, or no. Thus before the Recognition this Nation had de facto admitted K. William, and every Person was bound to receive him at least for such, and had there never been any Recogniti∣on de jure, no Man was an habil Judge to have condemned the jus, whatsoever Mens various O∣pinions in private might have been, on which they ought to have laid no stress, but to have received him as their actually settled and con∣stituted Sovereign Lord, and required no more; since no more was determinately required of them. If a Captive in Algiers, &c. be required
to pray for his Lord and Master, that is so only de facto, he may certainly do so under those Ti∣tles, and is bound to do so upon command, if he has contracted Service. I know you will here say, this Contract gives the Tyrant Right; But then you must grant, that the Submission of a Nation passes Right ipso facto, and then you put the Nation de facto only clear out of doors. Here you will reply, that such Submission can∣not be de jure, as being injurious to the present Right of another; But then so will I say, the Captives Submission and Contract is against the permanent Right of his Parents, or former Master, who thereby may lawfully rescue him by force of Arms. And yet notwithstanding this the poor Slave, may thus pray for the Captivant as his Lord; nay, even that he may vanquish and overcome all his Enemies, even while the former Proprietors are fighting for his Rescue, in the same Sense we intend in our Prayers for our most rightful Sovereigns, as shall clearly ap∣pear on the fifth Head of this Answer. King William therefore being actually our Sovereign Lord, even by our own warrantable Contract, we may lawfully use these Prayers for him, and on his Command are bound to do so, even tho' he were only King de facto in the legal Sense of this Term, and not altogether, as we have owned him, de pleno jure; because it will appear, that these Prayers are not levelled against any Man's Right, tho' they are against all his Enemies. Now the truth is, the Relation, we lately stood in to K. James as our then Sovereign, makes ten∣der hearted Men pity his whole personal Histo∣ry, and consequently unwilling to pray against him, if there be any fair, or lawful way to avoid it, which there is not, if he comes not into the Number of those Enemies, which we are to pray against. Such also is the Temper of poor People
under new Conquests toward their former Sove∣reigns, when obliged to pray for the new (that appear no otherwise than de facto such) against all their Enemies. Yet this is only an Operati∣on of Bowels and good Nature, but not of strict and impartial Reason, (tho' it influences much upon Men's Spirits) but is to be guided, and corrected in its Excesses thereby. Hence upon the beginning of this Change an excellent Per∣son, that was easily satisfied in owning their Majesties Title Sovereign in the Prayers, yet stumbled at the Passages about Enemies, till he receiv'd with much pleasure this very Answer, for which you deride me. But, as I have now said, the only material Question here is, if K. William and Q. Mary actually are our Sovereigns? for this being granted, all the rest follows of due Course without respect of Persons, whosoever be their Enemies without exception. But I con∣fess I was willing to give you as healing a Le∣nitive as I could, that I might not widen the Wound, nor exasperate the Division; but, it seems, while I labour for Peace, you make you ready for Battel.
Secondly, This seemeth to be the Sense of ma∣ny learned Jacobites, without which I see not how their Practices can be justified. For, not to re∣peat the Consent and Communion of the De∣prived Fathers in these Prayers before the Day of their Suspension, there are yet many mode∣rate Men among you, that read these Prayers, tho' deprived for filing the Oath. Now do you think, that these Men direct their Prayers against K. James? If they do, then upon your Principles they break their Allegiance and Oath to him, which they judge oblige them to this very Day. Which methinks should make you less lavish of your perjurious Imputations upon others, whose Principles acquit them from wilful and intended
Perjury. Yet there is no way for these Men of yours to avoid this Charge upon your Principles, but by such a Sense of Enemies, in which it is possible K. James may not be included. But if they intend not their Prayers at K. James, how are we charged for praying against him, when we and these Jacobites in the same Words may sincerely use the same Sense? so that in good truth, the Account I gave of these Prayers be∣comes a Plea necessary, not so much to us, as to your own more moderate and equal Brethren, against whom therefore for the future you must turn your Style, and Acrimony.
Thirdly, I will now proceed to justifie my Sense to be the only allowable Sense of our Prayers under any the justest Reign whatsoever, and not mere∣ly accommodated by me to the present Juncture. This will first require me more fully to open the principal Notions of the word Enemy, than for reasons private to my self I did in my last Con∣ference. The word Enemy therefore has two known principal Acceptations, moral, and mili∣tary. Morally an Enemy is one that intendeth Injury, or Hurt; and so this Sense carries Malice in it. Militarily an Enemy is an opposite of War, which innocent Princes, People, and Persons may be forced to be, who have no Malice, or moral Enmity; as in Self-defences against Op∣pression, in which it is possible, that the Defen∣dents would not willingly hurt any of the Op∣pressors, nor engage even in an advantageous Battel, if it could be avoided, but gladly close up the War. And yet both the injurious Aggres∣sour, and all Neuters in the Cause by custom call these just Defendents Enemies to the other Opposite, not charging them with moral Injury, but respecting their military Opposition. The Greeks and Latines have two proper distinctive Names for these two sorts of Enemies, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
and inimicus for the Moral; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and hostis for the military Enemy. Other Opponents are most properly called Adversaries, as a Term of a more comprehensive Latitude, reaching to the general Nature of all sorts of Contention, seri∣ous, or sportive, good, or bad.
Fourthly, We are to examin the importance of Vanquishing, and Victory. For this indeed seems to admit a far greater, and benigner La∣titude of signification, than you in your Reflexi∣on seem to allow. For you seem to apprehend no Victory but in Butcheries, Ruines, and Deso∣lations. Whereas many successful Expeditions, (as that of General Monk) have been victorious without Hurt; since simply, and in general to overcome is no more than to prevail against any Opponents, or Oppositions, whatsoever fort they are of, even where there is no Enmity, as in Games, Wagers, Votes, and Competitions. And there is one sort of Victory more noble than any other, the overcoming Evil with Good, which is God's especial way of vanquishing the Powers of Evil. And even in War those Victories are most noble, where least Hurt is done, and most Mercy shewed; and thereupon the best and most noble Desires of Victory are those, whereby we wish to prevail against our Enemy, if it be possible, without hurting him, or his Party at all, and more than this we are not absolutely to wish, or pray for, even against the greatest Enemies, by the Laws of our most compassionate and ho∣ly Religion, which allows Wars only to be waged against our Will, not with delight and bloody Affectations.
Fifthly, We are to consider against what Ene∣mies it is lawful to pray for even the gentlest Victories. First, then it is not lawful to pray for any Victory against the Innocent, in the Inno∣cency of his Cause; no, tho' when he stan•• 〈…〉〈…〉
in his own Defence, the Custom of milita∣ry Language calls him Enemy. For if I regard Iniquity in my Heart, the Lord will not hear me. Thus 'tis not lawful for Pirates to pray for success against innocent Merchants standing on their own Defence; because here Victory in the Pirates side doth not import the Defeat of an Injurious Intention, but an Injury. It was not lawful for K. Saul to pray for Victory over his Subject David, tho' at the Head of an armed Band for Self-preservation, for the same reason. Whence it follows, that no injurious Prince may † 1.87 pray for success against the Innocent, whom he designs to oppress. And if so, nei∣ther may his Subjects pray for his Victory over the Innocent, for that they may not petition more for him, than he may for him∣self. Otherwise Prayers as directly contrary as just and unjust, would be allowable and accep∣table with God. And here indeed starts up a doubt, how the opposite Devotions of warring Nations against their respective Princes Enemies, can at the same time on both sides be justified for lawful and religious, since one at least of the Princes must be unjust, and for the Success of such a Prince in his Injustice all Prayers are unjust? To the solution of which doubt it is ne∣cessary to observe, that no religious or lawful Prayers for Temporal benefits are, tho' never so earnest, simply absolute, and peremptory, but always conceived with a deference and resignation to God's Will, either expresly, or implicitly, after our Saviour's Example in his most earnest Prayers at the Approach of his Passion, Father, if it be possible, let this Cup pass from me, yet not my Will, but thy Will be done.
So then our Prayers for victory to our Prince im∣port a reservation to God's will, if he sees fit to admit them; but we knowing that all injustice is contrariant to the will of God, refer our Princes cause to God's judgments, and will, against which we intend no Prayers, but ground them all on a tacit and presuming supposition, that our Cause is right. For it would be a very impious form of Prayer to say, give success, O Lord, to our Prince in all his designs of ravage and oppression. So that, tho' the supposition of Justice at the bottom of all such Prayers be not usually expressed to prevent common jealousie in the Subject, yet it is reserved by decent presumption as the proper duty of the Subject toward his Sovereign, over whose Coun∣sels he has no judgment. And accordingly all our public Prayers in time of War propose the malice, pride, and oppression of our Enemies as the just causes of our supplication, and ground of our zeal, and object of God's Indignation, acording to the standing Forms of such devotions in the holy Scri∣ptures. And so a moral enmity supposed in our military Enemies, with our own presuming inno∣cency, with a virtual or open appeal and reference to God the Judge of all, is the only Foundation of such Prayers, and the only Reason, that can re∣concile such opposite Liturgies of warring Nations with Religion and Innocency. And if you think this too disloyal and cold a form of Devotion, I pray think again, what an odd sort of Loyalty it is to your King, to contend even with God for his injustice, and to offer him your Sacrifices after the impious manner of the Heathen, to accept and promote the abominations of yo•••• Prince. But now upon the Rules by me 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a Captive may pray for his Masters Victory ••••er all his enemies, and yet not execrate those that are in just arms against him, as being guilty of no moral Enmity, or injury in their wars against ••••m. And so ac∣cordingly
the Case of all people under new Con∣quests is to be resolved as to the like changes in their publick Services, on the change of Sove∣reigns.
Sixthly, it is to be considered; why Princes are so particularly named above other Orders in these national Prayers against Enemies? And the reason is obvious, because the interest of the whole Na∣tions is summed up in the Felicity of their Kings. So that they that are his Enemies, are taken for the Nations Enemies also in these Prayers. In praying therefore against K. William's Enemies, we consider him not merely as a single solitary Person, but as our Sovereign Head, on whose welfare our own also depends, and so in his E∣nemies we pray against our own also.
Seventhly, we must enquire whether K. James must in our Prayers inevitably come into the number of K. William's enemies, and so by civil Construction the Nations enemies? Now when these Prayers were first ordered and received, K. James was in no part of his old Dominions, nor in any actual sensible military Hostility against K. William any where. For tho' the Irish were in Commotion, yet K. James was not there, nor does it appear that they acted on his Commission, but mere presumption, and that not against K. William, till his Armies came thither, but their domestic Protestants only. It seemed a while as if K. James had sat down, and yielded up to his fate, and state of desertion. After the settled course of these Prayers re-animated by the French King he enters ••••••land, and K. William follows. In the mean time ••he course and sense of the Prayers was still the same, r••••ning in generals, and not altering by those changes b••yond the Irish Channel, as there was no reason they should. And so K. James was no more particularized after than before this in our Prayers. Yet if his personal behaviour to∣ward
K. William at the Boyne doth not evince the contrary, I will allow you, that then he was a military enemy. But still the grand question is, whether also he was a moral enemy (and so within the intention of our Prayers) by his then present breaking it off from England, and his designs there∣by to recover England? And plain it is, that the sence of our Nation, which is valid and cogent to all Civil obligations, doth conclude him an inju∣rious, and moral enemy to K. William, and this Realm. For Ireland belonging thro' a long fixed Right to the Crown of England, it must appear injurious, after an effectual Abdication of this Crown, and a Settlement of a Title therein upon K. William, to invade Ireland, and so to reduce us here under war for a recovery thereof, and a defence of our own land from his illegal claims, and pretensions. And whereas without any sense of modesty you say, that I assert K. James and K. William not to be enemies, but good friends, viz. that K. James is so friendly to K. William, for that he intends K. William no injury, you may resume your forehead, and remember, that I only said, we are not sure that K. James designs K. William injury. But what we are not infallibly sure of, we may verily believe, and presume from all the Rules of humane Judgment upon acts of Hostility. And in all humane opinion his Invasion of Ireland was injurious, but since all judicial Determinati∣ons must be left and referred to God's Judgment, we, not mentioning K. James in the number of K. Williams Enemies, do not pass our internal and personal Censure on the Conscience of K. James before our God, but remit that to God the Judge of all Kings and Nations. But if private Persons will intermix their own personal opinions upon such superiour Causes where they need not, then they, who think K. James a moral Enemy to K. William, do use our forms against him on that pre∣sumption
of his injury; they that do not think so of K. James, do not in this form of Liturgy pray against him. And the Liturgy, not compelling us in the acts of our Religion to condemn K. James as morally injurious, does not oblige any man determinately to involve him under any of our imprecations. And whereas our Prayers are upbraided in the second Chapter of your first Book of Christian Communion as directed against Right for the maintenance of wrong, it hereby appears, how much mistaken that great Author was; for whosoever can but comport with the Sovereign Style of their present Majesties, may use these Prayers without prejudice to any real Rights of K. James, or his own private opinions concerning it. As to K. James's Personal hurt, or injury, let them, that can feed an evil, wish it for me. God hath disabled him from overturning our Constitu∣tions, and hath settled us under good and equal Governours, and that is enough; and if K. James be elsewhere happy, as long as he hurts not us, we need no further trouble our selves, or him. And I do verily believe, their present Majesties as little require my Prayers for his hurt, as you do. For time was, when he was in the hands of K. William, who, had he designed to hurt him, might have done it, and thereby have prevented all the preten∣sions, that have cost so much Blood and Treasure in Ireland. But 'twas piously done to abstain his hands from Royal Blood, and leave the Issues of his undertakings to the Rules of innocency, on which only he could dare to pray for, and expect God's blessing. But further you have forgotten one Argument, perhaps because it was inconside∣rable, whereby it appears, that our prayers are not pointed against any Rights of K. James, or to any hurt of his Person, for that we pray for all Christian Kings, Princes and Governours, even th••se, against whom we wage open war. And out of these
Prayers we do not except even the most Christian King, but pray for the preservation of him also in all his Rights, our war not obstructing this pra∣ctice of Piety even to our greatest enemies, which we observe from the precept and example of our most blessed Saviour. And therefore, though it were true what you would seem to prove in form of Argument, that K. James is accounted a greater Enemy (and if you please, add a greater King too) than the French King, yet no Enmity ought to be great enough to overcome our Religion and Cha∣rity in praying for our very greatest Enemies, even while we pray against their Enmities. But let us however see, whether K. William and his Subjects do take K. James for a greater Enemy than the French King, who it seems to you is accounted an Enemy only for asserting K. James's Cause. First then, if we take the moral notion of Enemy, no man can judge, whether K. James or K. Lewis has the greater internal enmity against K. William. If we go upon the military notion it is apparently false that K. James either is, or is accounted a greater Enemy than he, that is the greatest in Arms of all the Christian Monarchs. So that your axiom, from whence you form your Argument, Propter quod unumquod{que} est tale, id magis est tale, tho' true in Physical Causalities and Operations, yet fails in moral Influences, and Inducements, such as are the reasons of humane Confederacies. And truly if K. William himself would, upon reference made, deliver his sense, he would declare K. Lewis more injurious than K. James in this war; for K. James seems to have some colour for pro∣vocation; but K. Lewis had none to engage in K. James's quarrels. But if he engages on other Reasons, then he is not an enemy on K. James's account, but his own. And if K. James and K. Lewis should ever happen to come into K. Williams hands, there would be so sensible a difference in
his respects toward them, as would discover his resentments of French injuries as greater than K. James's, tho' unquestionably he would shew a Royal compassion to them both.
And now I am provided with a Reason, why I dislike your Prayers for victory to the late K. James against K. William. First, because your Prayers assert the late K. James to be our present King, and import K. William to be the Nations Enemy, whereby you condemn, and pray against the present Constitution, of which by our Law, and consequently God's Law, you are subjects, not Judges, nor de jure Adversaries. Again, you confess you pray absolutely against K. William, as K. James's Enemy. And this you must judge of him either in the moral, or military sense. If in the moral, you must then do it, either of in∣fallible certainty, or opinion only. The former the matter is not capable of, because of the darkness of men's interiour passions, and the dis∣putable nature of Civil Titles. But upon mere opinions you ought not to pass absolute Censure upon any mans Conscience, and become his utter Enemy by your own choice. And yet were K. William infallibly and certainly injurious to K. James, yet since K. James's Cessation of war to pray for such victories of blood, which you alone account victory, is to pray for a return of a Cessant War in order to a sanguinary Vi∣ctory, and its Consequences. If you take K. William only as a military Enemy, he was then innocent, and so your Prayers then aimed at the ruine of the innocent, and his Cause. But now he is no military Enemy to K. James, 'tis more impious to pray for his Ruine, which K. James himself does not now attempt. Upon which even K. James himself has opened our Church-Doors to you to joyn with us in our Prayers for King William and Queen Mary. But if you take the
French War to be K. James's, we have all reason to thank you kindly for your Prayers, in a time of such a dangerous War, as not only affects all our Temporals, but our very Church, and Re∣ligion, the noblest Structure, and Bulwark of the Reformation; Of which God in mercy make you truly sensible, and even in this respect turn the hearts of the Fathers to the Children, and the disobedient to the Wisdom of the Just. Amen.
Yet I find you are not so confident for all your forms of Devotion. For † 1.88 You think there is one Prayer on the 29th. of May so dangerous, that you graciously give us leave to for∣bear to be present at it. But, Sir, who gave you Authority to dispense with terms of Communion? You have done more, I fear, than you will re∣ceive any thanks for. None you are like to have from us, who have no ••eed of your License; and you ought not to expect it from those, who will think their Authority hereby invaded. T. B. See Lett. pag. 33.
This I confess is a dangerous foyl. Nor was I well aware of that nasute quickness, which appears in this Stricture. But as argute as you are, was it I that thought this Prayer dan∣gerous, or my brother Dyscheres? Was it not you, that complained, that in that Prayer, there is a vow of Allegiance to K. William and Queen Mary, which upon your Principles you cannot be present at, or concede? Well then, this was so; and what said I? Then forbear to be present at it. But must this presently be interpreted to an Act, or Power dispensing with the Duty? Truly I in∣tended no more but to yield, that therein you must be left to act according to your own Prin∣ciples, and Convictions, and adventure the Displeasure of the Powers, and legal Conse∣quences thereupon; whom, and which I believe
you would not much more exasperate by this one omission once a year, if you constantly joyned in all our other daily Prayers, and otherwise live inoffensively. So it is ordinary to use the Imperative in a bare permissive, without a con∣cessive Sense; as, Do if you will; since you cannot be perswaded, take your own Course, run your own risks, play your own game, take your own fortune, counsels, &c. And tho I confess this is form of permission, that merits no thanks, so neither did I court any thanks herein, either from you, or the Public. For as for you, in this hard time you are not very li∣beral in point of gratitude, as I have found by my own experience. And I pray God you fail not in this Duty towards God for his mercies to the Nation, as you do towards those that wish you well, because they run not with you into your unaccountable excesses. But as to our Governours, if I have not hereby arrogated the dispensing Power, I hope I have not much offen∣ded them; If I have for your ungrateful sakes, I will endeavour to atone for this one offence, and have a Care how I ensnare my self again upon your Score.
But yet you think we need not be so very coy as to this Prayer. For you say, that you have been assured by a good Author, that the Re∣cusant Bishops did not all stick at it; but that some gave directions, and consent to the use of it; and also before their Suspension deputed Persons to administer the Oath in the Execution of the Au∣thorities and Offices Episcopal. Sir, If I should say your good Author was an arrant lying knave, I hope you would not only pardon my bluntness, but also be more careful for the future, how you gave any credit to such Persons. T. B. Sec. Lett. pag. 33.
Indeed, Sir, if you prove that ex∣cellent
Person, whom you know not, to have deceived me with a lye, I am your humble ser∣vant. But I cannot but smile within my self, to think how, when this your treatment comes to his knowledge, that religious and prudent person will entertain the blunt Character, considering his most tender Compassions to the Condition of the Deprived. But in truth the reasons of his discovering this advice and consent were not ca∣lumnious, but conscientious, as exhibiting matter in a religious Conference for consideration and practice in these various turns of things, humors, and sentiments. But I have been told, that in Law negatives cannot be proved but by inference from positives, which I doubt will hold you a tugg, tho' your tongue be all teeth and jawbones.
As for this pretended Deputation, I will set before you the true story; and then you, and all men may judge, how candidly our suffering Fa∣thers are dealt with. On the 28 of January 1689 the Bishop of London, and St. Asaph, and some others presented themselves before your mighty K. William with a mournful address in the behalf of our Reverend Fathers then drawing neer to a Civil Suspension, and since more than uncivilly deprived. This was the pretence; but it is reasonable to think, that it was a complotted thing, and that the design was to get their Authorities deputed in such sure hands, as might effectually promote perjury, and the thrusting good men out of their Estates, &c. and so the Addressers got themselves into their se∣veral jurisdictions, &c. This is the real truth of the matter; and is so far from being a deputation of their Authorities, that it doth not imply any Consent, more than what is always unavoidably extorted from every man in the like Circumstances, &c. T. B. pag. 33, 34, 35, &c. Vide.
I wonder why a man should raise
such a tempest about what is nothing to the purpose of my discourse, and, besides the green∣ness of the spite, discovers much ignorance. For the day of suspension was past neer half an year before your 28th. of January 89, viz. on the beginning of the precedent August; and the time neer drawing on your 28th. of January was the Day of Deprivation in the beginning of the fol∣lowing February. But the time, that I was speaking of from the admission of their Majesties in Feb. 88, till the day of suspension in the August fol∣lowing, during which interval these Bishops were in full unsuspended jurisdiction. But in that time upon all incidental occasions of colla∣tions, and institutions to Ecclesiastical Promo∣tions, the Oath of present Allegiance was to be ministred by the ordinary and primary Officer of the Bishops, and by no others, while they were present at their Sees, except by their especial Deputation. So that were there no particular instance producible for me, the truth, which I Spake, is self-evident and notorious, that the Oath was administred in all such Cases by the Bishops, or their Deputies. For no person, or power could herein impose any officer upon them, while all the Course of Ecclesiastical affairs pro∣ceeded yet in their names. But I know where deputations were then given, and the Oath ad∣ministred by those Deputies by virtue of that Deputation. And is it not a very pertinent ac∣count to the contrary, to tell me, what was done just before, and then after the day of De∣privation, to disprove what I had said was done by the Bishops before their actual Suspension? And was it not very accurate to mistake the days of Suspension and Deprivation for one and the same, between which there was half a year distance? But there had been no occasion for your reproa∣ching Talent against the Reverend Fathers of
London and St. Asaph, notwithstanding their great merits against Popery in the last Reign, if you had not fool'd in this impertinence for a shew of Contradiction. But when you pervert the kind intentions of that Address to so horrid and calumnious surmises, you ought with grief and repentance to remember, that he that rewardeth evil for good, evil shall never depart from his House.
I see one fire kindles another, by the heat my freedom hath cast you into; to cool which I know no present expedient, but inter∣mission of discourse for this time. And besides, the day is at an End, and I must retire to my lodging, and respite the remainder of our de∣bate till to morrow, when with your leave we will renew our Conference, and examine the Case of the Ecclesiastical Change.
I would not have you take my seldom ardours for uncharitable, nor withdraw upon any such surmise; if you please to repose your self and your passions under my roof this night, you shall be truly and heartily welcome to a thrifty, but friendly Hospitality.
I thank you, Sir, but as I am not otherwise very flexible, so my business requires me to take leave, and wish you good Night.
Sol. & Ab. p. 24, 29.
Christ. Commun. Part 2. cap. 3. p. 32.
Sol. & Ab. p. 29.
Part 2. Ch. 4.
Sol. & Ab. p. 6.
Sol. & Ab. p. 3.
Ibid. page 15.
Sol. & Ab. p. 4.
Sol. & Ab. p. 3.
My Words are, —of this (being a point of Law) they were to us, at that time, and in that jun∣cture, the most com∣petent, &c.
Ibid. My Words are, We are the more to submit to, &c.
Sol. & Ab. p. 4.
Ibid. p. 9.
Pres. to the Com∣mons before his Argu∣ment. p. 16.
Ibid. p. 19.
ibid page 29.
This is false, for he was King before he went, and deputed the Bishop of Ely Chief Governor: It was Ed∣ward the First that was proclaimed King while in the Holy Land, but he was never Prisoner.
See Sir Richard Ba∣kers Reign of Richard the First.
Sol. & Ab. p. 4.
Sol. & Ab. p. 31.
Ibid. p. 8.
p. 9.
Ibid. p. 4.
Here unfortunately four or five lines were broken off the MS. Re∣flections, but, as I well remember, the sense was such as is in∣cluded within these brackers [].
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
Ibid. p. 4.
Ibid. p. 5.
The Triennial Act was not pasied when this was written.
Sol. & Ab. p. 4.
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
Ibid. p. 6.
Sol. & Ab. p. 3.
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
See Sol. & Ab. p. 6.
Sol. & Ab. p. 4. to p. 6.
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
Sol. & Ab. p. 6.
Here T. B. very charitably makes the excellent Bishop of Worc••ster to deserve a Gallows instead of a Bishoprick. p. 22.
Sol. & Ab. p. 22.
T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 36.
Vindic. of Depr. Bish. p. 70.
Sol. & Ab. p. 5.
Sol. & Ab. p. 6.
Sol. & Ab. p. 6.
Sol. & Ab. p. 6, 7.
Sol. & Ab. p. 7.
Sol. & Ab. p. 7.
These words I unawares omitted in the last Citation of T.B.
Sol. & Ab. p. 7.
Since Johnson will give Richard Rich a Right.
T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 25.
Note, That in Sol. & Ab. p. 8. I did not make Dyscheres positively to de∣ny Submission to all Set∣tlements procured by breach of Gods Com∣mandments, because I know they do not all de∣ny it; but because it is the common Objection with most of them in point of Conscience, I made Dyscheres reply, not should say No?
Pres. to the Argu∣ment, p. 12, 13, 14.
Lib. 1. Can. 27.
Ibid. Chap. 28.
Ibid. Chap. 30.
Arg. 1. p. 50, 51.
T. B's 2d Lett. p. 21.
Sol. & Ab. p. 8.
Sol. & Ab. p. 8.
T. B's 2d. Lett. p. 26.
Sol. & Ab. p. 9.
Sol & Ab. p. 7. The Actual Land∣lord who is visibly Legal tho' not Ho∣nestly Rightful.
Sol & Ab. pag. 9.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 9.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 9.
T. B. Sec. Lett. p. 22.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 10.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 9, 10.
Sol. & Ab pag. 10.
Sol. & Ab. pag. pag. 9, 10. Several Courts have given, and admitted such Senses, as the most tender Recusant might have sworn to. What prevarication is there in these tender Consci∣ences, that Religiously took care to have an innocent Sense authoritatively admit∣ted, on which and no others they would take the Oath? If these Men had made re∣servations in the Oath they took, Insincerity might have been justly chargeable on them. If their Majesties by their Courts declared their Sense, in passing the Act, in favour to all inno∣cent and tender Consciences, I hope it was no insincerity to accept that lenity and Ease.
Ibid. Whether Courts prevaricate in their judg∣ments, or no, private Per∣sons cannot judge to any Ci∣vil effect, or Obligation.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 12.
See the state of the Protestants in Ireland un∣der the late King James. And in England, among all other advances, remem∣ber the Fanatick Commis∣sions for enquiry into past, tho' legal, Prosecutions a∣gainst Conventicles, on pur∣pose to enrage them to join their Skeems with the Pa∣pists, to cut our Throats, who had but just before sa∣ved the Kings own Throat from the same Hands.
Vid. 11. Hen. 7. c. 1.
4 Edw. 4.1 Instit. part. 3. fol. 7.
Sol. & Ab. g. 12, 13.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 12, 13.
This is false, for there were near 200 exclu∣ded Members that could not sit to make it an entire House.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 14.
[For their Officers] was a misprint.
That King James is not among the number of King William and Queen Mary's Enemies. MS. Reflex.
But do you not veri∣ly believe, that K. James would wil∣lingly regain his Crown, if he could, and consequently dis∣possess King Willi∣am? Or do you think this no Injury to K. William? And no more say you, can be intended in those Prayers (of the Li∣turgy for King Wil∣liam) than to defeat him (King James) in that Injurious in∣tention. For we pray for no Mans, nor Kings Destruction, or hurt. These are ** 1.86 your rea∣sons why no Jacobite ought to Scruple to join with you in the Common-Prayers for King William, viz. To strengthen him, that he may Vanquish and overcome all his Enemies, because King James intends him no Injury. Transubstantiation is easie to this. This is perswading us out of all our Sen∣ses at once. King James and King William appear upon the Head of two Ar∣mies, [* 1.86.1 and Fight] and each calls those Rebels that adhere to the other; and yet they are not Enemies. It is no hurt to the one, if the other get the Victory, and therefore you may Pray for Victory to King William, without meaning any hurt to King James. Why then are you offended at those that Pray for Victory to King James against King William? Here is no Injury intended to King William, only that King James may have a Victory, that is all. Is this the Argument to perswade Mens Consciences to join in your Common Prayers? Is this the strength of your Cause? The strong and solid Conviction of the sincerity and plainness of your Dealing? MS. Reflex.
Sol. & Ab. pag. 14.
These two words might well have been spared, to cover, &c.
So the fifth Senior bids Ptolemy Philadel∣phus to expect Victory, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ap. Arist. Edit. Oxon.
Sol. and Ab. pag. 15.