Keimåelia 'ekklåesiastika, The historical and miscellaneous tracts of the Reverend and learned Peter Heylyn, D.D. now collected into one volume ... : and an account of the life of the author, never before published : with an exact table to the whole.

CHAP. II. Of the Authority of the Ephori in the State of Sparta; and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin.

• 1. The Kings of Sparta absolute Monarchs at the first.
• 2. Of the declining of the Regal power, and the condition of that State, when Lycur∣gus undertook to change the Government.
• 3. What power Lycurgus gave the Senate; and what was left unto the Kings.
• 4. The Ephori appointed by the Kings of Sparta to ease themselves, and curb the Senate.
• 5. The blundering and mistakes of Joseph Scaliger about the first Institution of the Ephori.
• 6. The Ephori from mean beginnings grew to great Authority; and by what advan∣tages.
• 7. The power and influence which they had in the publick Government.
• 8. By what degrees the Ephori encroached on the Spartan Kings.
• 9. The insolencies of the Ephori towards their Kings altered the State into a Ty∣ranny.
• 10. The Spartan Kings stomach the inso∣lency of the Ephori, and at last utterly destroy them.
• 11. An application of the former passages to the point in hand.

I Know it is conceived by some that the Kings of Sparta were but titular, [unspec I] that they were little more than Subjects, at best of no more power and influence in the pub∣lick Government, than the Duke of Venice at this day in that Republick. And to say truth, they were but little better in the latter times, (though not altogether so restrained) after Lycurgus first, and the Ephori afterwards, had by their power and practices intrenched upon them; and pared away so many of the fairest Jewels in the Regal Diadem. But ab initio non fuit sic, it was not so from the beginning: the Spartan Kings being at first as absolute Monarchs as any other of those times, ubi addictius reg∣nabantur, when men were most devoted to the will of Princes. For if we look into the ancient stories of the States of Greece, it will there be found, that at the return of the Heraclidae into Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Temenus, Ctesiphon, and Aristo∣demus, the sons of Aristomachus of the race of Hercules; Temenus possessed himself of Argos, Ctesiphon of Messene, and Aristodemus conquered the City and Dominion of Sparta; which, dying very shortly after, he left unto his two sons Eurysthenes, and Procles, with the authority and name of Kings. So that acquiring the Estate by Conquest, and claiming by no other Title than by that of Arms, there is no question to be made but that they governed in the way of absolute Monarchs: it being not the guise of such as come in by Conquest to covenant and capitulate with their Subjects, but to impose their will, for a Law, upon them; In the first times, and in Dominion so acquired, Arbitria Principum pro legibus erant, as we read in Justin. 'Tis true, the Royal Family was divided from the very first, into two Regal Stems or Branches, both honoured with the name of Kings, both ruling the Estate in common by their mutual Councils; of which the eldest House was that of Agidae, so called from Agis, son and Successor unto Eurysthenes; the second that of the Eurypontidae, denominated from Eurypon, the third from Procles. It was appointed so to be by Aristodemus, con∣firmed by the Oracle of Apollo, and so continued till the subjugating of all Greece to Macedon. But this concludes no more against absolute Monarchie, than if it should be said on the like occasion, that the Roman Emperors were no Monarchs, or that State to Monarchy, because Carus and Numerianus, Diocletian and Maximianus, Constantius and Maximinus ruled the same together; as after Valentinian and his Brother Valens, and the two sons of Valentinian and Theodosius did by their Example. And so it seems it was conceived by Cleomenes, who having rooted out the Ephori, and being grown almost as absolute in the State of Sparta, as any of his Predecessors, caused his Brother Euclidas (upon the expiration of the Eurypontidae) to be made King with him: which certainly he would not have done, had he believed that the assuming of a partner would have made him less. For that the Spartan Kings were as absolute Monarchs as any others of those times (when there was almost no Form of Government in the World but that) doth appear by Plutarch, where speaking

of the condition of that Government in the time of Eurypon (whom he calls Eurytion) he saith that it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sufficiently Montarchical, if it were not more. And hereto Aristotle doth agree, who stiles the Government of Sparta under Charilaus, before whose times (by reason of the negligence and connivence of some former Kings) the People were become too head-strong to be kept in order, by the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Tyranny or absolute command of Charilaus in the State of Sparta.

But whatsoever it was in the first foundation, [unspec II] it held not very long in so good con∣dition. For Eurypon the Nephew of Procles, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, affecting to be plausible and gracious with the common people, improvidently let loose the reins of Government, and was the first that laid aside that sole and absolute power of a King; whereupon followed great disorder and distraction, which conti∣nued long. For the People finding themselves at liberty, became very bold and dis∣obedient; some of the Kings which did succeed being hated to the very death, be∣cause they did indeavour the recovery of their old authority; others being forced to dissemble and wink at any thing, either in hope thereby to gain the love of the People, or because indeed they were not strong enough to rule them. And this did so in∣crease the stomach of the dissolute and rebellious multitude, that Eunomus the Father of Lycurgus, being the fifth King from Procles, and the third from Eurypon, was slain amongst them in a tumult. As such a dear and costly rate did Eurypon procure the fa∣vour and good will of the rascal rabble; by which he purchased nothing but the loss of Royalty, besides the empty honour of having the second house of the Royal Family to be called by his name, the Eurypontidae. Things growing thus from bad to worse, and both the Kings and People waxing weary of that disorder and confusion which did reign amongst them; both parties cast their eyes upon Lycurgus, of whose inte∣grity and wisdom they had conceived a great opinion. For the People finding that their Kings had nothing but the name and title, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and nothing else whereby they differed from the rest, sent many a several message to him to require his counsel: And on the other side, the Kings were as de∣sirous that he should return (being then gone abroad to travel) in hope that the au∣thority of his presence would bridle and restrain the People from their insolency and disobedience towards them. But herein they were both deceived. For Lycurgus see∣ing how things stood, resolved to apply himself to neither party; but presently began to project, and cast how he might change and alter the whole frame of Government: which to effect, he armed himself and his Associates, and possessed the market-place, and so proceeded to the alteration which he meant to make. Charilaus who was then King, being forced to flie for sanctuary to the Temple of Juno. But Plato saith there was another motive which induced him to attempt this change, which was the ill suc∣cess the other Kings his kindred of the house of Hercules had found at Argos and Messene; where by degrees degenerating from a Monarchy unto a Tyranny, they were in a fair way 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to overthrow themselves, their subjects, and their whole estates. To prevent this at Sparta, which he dearly loved, and to pre∣serve his Family and the State together, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he set up the authority of the Senate as the only medicine, to cure the miserable distemper which the State was in. So far, and somewhat further Plato; of which more anon.

What the authority and power of this Senate was, we see best from Plutarch. [unspec III] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. In this change of State (saith he) which Lycurgus made, his chiefest alteration was in the constitution of a Senate, which he made to have a Regal power, and equal authority with the Kings in matters of the greatest weight and impor∣tance; and was to be the healthful counterpoise of the whole body of the Common-wealth. The other State before was ever wavering, sometimes inclining to Tyranny, when the Kings were too mighty, and sometimes to confusion, when the People did usurp Authority; between which two, the Senate was ordained as the fittest medium to keep even the scale, and fortifie the State of the Common-wealth. For taking sometimes the Kings part, when it was needful to pull down the fury of the People; and sometimes holding with the People against the Kings, to bridle their Tyrannical Government, they were the means that neither of the two did oppress the other. This Court or Senate had the supream direction and command in all things of moment, which did concern the Common-wealth, both for peace and war; and had the highest jurisdiction and dernier resort, from which there could be no appeal; in which regard Pausanias calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the sovereign

Court of the Republick. It consisted of 28 Senators, all chosen out of the Nobility and chief men of the City; who together with the two Kings (who were allowed their voices in it) made up thirty in all; and unto these it did belong to call the assemblies of the People, to propound that to them which they thought convenient, and to dis∣solve them too when they saw occasion. But for the People so assembled, it was not lawful for them to propund any thing to be debated or determined, nor to deliver their opinion in the point proposed; there being nothing left to them, but to testifie their assent to the propositions, which either by the Senate or the two Kings had been made unto them. So that whatever the Kings lost, the People got little by the altera∣tion, being left out of all imployment in affairs of State, and forced to yield obedi∣ence unto thirty Masters, whereas before they had but two. And as for the Authority which remained unto the Kings, it consisted especially in the conducting of the Ar∣mies, and the Supremacy in matters that concerned Religion (for this hath always gone along with the Kingly office.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. &c. For it was or∣dered by Lycurgus, that the King should offer sacrifice for the prosperity of the Com∣mon-wealth, when the necessity of their affairs did require the same, as one descended from the gods, that they should participate of the thing sacrificed when the gods were served, and have a Pig of every litter, that they might never want a facrifice, if upon any sudden accident the gods were to be advised withal. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. It also appertained to them to command the Armies, as oft as they were sent abroad on any military imployment; and had a Pavillion allowed them at the publick charge, for entertainment of such company as repaired unto them. In these two points the honour and authority of the Kings consisted principally, which Aristotle also hath observed. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Supremacy in Divine, command in Military matters, was all in which they differed from the other Senators; and this command (I mean in military matters) was both perpetual and hereditary, as the same Author tells us there, and in other places. For matters which were meerly honorary, they had some prerogatives; the Kings being allowed a double Mess in all their Ordi∣naries, the Senators and all the People arising from their seats to do him reverence, when he came amongst them, yielding him more than humane honours when he was deceased as to a Demi-god at least. And for their maintenance and support when they were alive, there was allotted to them a proportion of the richest Lands in many of the Villages and Fields adjoyning, enough to keep them out of want, though not sufficient to make them either rich or powerful.

The Royalty and Power of the Kings being thus impaired, [unspec IV] the People absolutely discharged from having any hand at all in the publick Government, and the authority of the Senate growing every day more insolent and predominant than at first it was, by reason that they held their place for term of life, as we find in Plutarch; the Kings re∣solved upon a course of putting the People into such a condition as might inable them to curb and control the Senators. To this end Theopompus, the ninth King of the second house, with the consent of Polydorus his Associate, ordained certain Officers, being five in number, and chosen out of the body of the common people, and annually renewed or changed, as occasion was; to whom authority was given, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, even in the highest points, and of most importance, as we are told by Aristotle, and shall see anon. These Officers he caused to be called by the name of Ephori, that is to say, the Overseers and Superintendents of the State, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because they had the charge and oversight of the Common-wealth. And as amongst the Archontes in the State of Athens, which were nine in number, one of them was called the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. or the Archon in the way of excellency, after whose name the year was called, and their reckonings made (as Titio & Sempronio Coss. in the State of Rome;) so had the Ephori their Eponymus, one who by way of eminency was called the Ephorus. But for this first reason of their institution, take it thus from Plutarch, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.

Lycurgus having thus tem∣pered the form of his Common-wealth, it seem'd notwithstanding unto those which came after him, that this small number of thirty persons which made the Senate, was yet too mighty, and of too great authority. Wherefore to bridle them a little, they gave them (as he cites from Plato) a bit in their mouths, which was the Authority of the Ephori, erected in the time of King Theopompus, about 130 years after the death of Lycurgus.

A second reason which induced those Kings to ordain these Ephori, was to ease themselves, and delegate upon them that remainder of the Royal power, which

could not be exercised but within the City. For the Kings having little or no com∣mand but in Wars abroad, cared not for being much at home, and thereupon or∣dained these Officers to supply their places. Concerning which Cleomenes thus dis∣courseth to the Spartans, after they had destroyed the Ephori, and suppressed the Office:

informing them that Lycurgus had joyned the Senators with the Kings, by whom the Common-wealth was a long time governed, without help of any other Officers; that afterwards the City having great Wars with the Messenians, the Kings were al∣ways so imployed in that War that they could not attend the affairs of the State at home, and thereupon made choice of certain of their friends to sit in judgment in their stead, whom they called the Ephori, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and for a long time did govern only as the Kings Ministers, though afterwards by little and little they took unto themselves the supreme Authority.

Ano∣ther reason hath been given of the institution, which is, that if a difference grew be∣tween the two Kings in a point of judgment, there might be some to arbitrate between them, and to have the casting voice amongst them when the difference could not be agreed. And this is that which Lisander and Mandroclidas (two that had been Ephori) suggested unto Agis and Cleombrotus the two Kings of Sparta; declaring,

That the Office of the Ephori was erected for no other reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. But because they should give their voices unto that King who had the best reason on his side, when the other would wilfully withstand both right and reason; and therefore that they two agreeing might lawfully do what they would without controlment; that to re∣sist the Kings was a breach of Law, considering that the Ephori, by Law, had no power nor priviledge, but only to arbitrate between them, when there was any cause of jar or controversie.

And this was so received at Sparta for an undoubted truth, that Cleomenes being sole King upon the death of Agis of the other house, recalled Archidamus the Brother of Agis, from his place of Banishment, with an intent to make him King, not doubting but they two should agree together, and thereby make the Ephori of no power nor use. So then we have three reasons of the institution, (and more than these I cannot find) of which there is not one that favoureth the device of Calvin; or intimateth that the Authority of the Ephori was set up, to pull down the Kings. And to say truth, it is a most unlikely matter that the Kings of Sparta having so little power remaining, should need more Officers to restrain them than they had before; that they should make a new rod for their own poor backs, and add five Ma∣sters more to those eight and twenty, which Lycurgus had imposed upon them. Which makes me wonder much at Tully, who doth acknowledge that the Ephori were ordained by Theopompus, (as both Aristotle and Plutarch do affirm) and yet will have them in∣stituted for no other cause, nisi ut oppositi sint Regibus, but to oppose and curb the Kings: but more that Plato (who had so much advantage of him both in time and place) should ascribe the institution to Lycurgus; and tell us that he did not only ordain the Senate, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but that he did also constitute the Ephorate for the strength and preservation of the Regal power.

For out of doubt it is affirmed by Plutarch, confirmed by Scaliger, [unspec V] and may be ga∣thered from some passages in Eusebius Chronicon, and the Authority of Aristotle, who refers the same to Theopompus, as before was shewed, that the first Institution was no less than 130 years after the death of Lycurgus. Who was the first that bore this Office, hath been made a question, but never till these later times, when men are grown such Sceptics as to doubt of every thing. Plutarch affirms for certain, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the first Ephorus (that is to say, the first 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who had the name of Ephorus by way of excellency, for otherwise there were five in all) was called Elatus: and hereto Scaliger did once agree, as appears expresly, pag. 67. of his Annotations on Eusebius, where he declares it in these words, Primus Elatus re∣nunciatur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But after having a desire to control Eusebius, he takes occasion by some words in Diogenes Laertius, to cry up Chilo for the man: first posi∣tively, Primus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 fuit Chilon, and next exclusively of Elatus, Quibus animad∣versis non fuerit Elatus primus Ephorus sed Chilon. To make this good being a fancy of his own (and as his own most dearly cherished) he produceth first the testimony of Laertius, and afterwards confirms the same by a new emendatio temporum, a Calculation and accompt of his own inventing. The words produced from Laertius are these verbatim, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Which is thus rendred in the Latine; and I think exactly. Fuit autem Ephorus circa quinquagessimam & quintam Olympiada. Porro Pamphila circa sextam ait, primumque Ephorum fuisse sub Euthydemo, autore Sosicrate: primum{que} instituisse ut Regibus Ephori adjungerentur, Satyrus Lycurgum dixit. If it be granted in the first place, that Chilo was not made Ephorus until the 55. Olympiad, as 'tis plain it was not, and Scaliger affirms as much, it must needs follow upon true account, that either Chilo was not the first Ephorus, or that the Ephori were not instituted in more than twice an hun∣dred and thirty years, after Lycurgus had new molded the Common-wealth, contrary unto that which is said by Plutarch, and out of him repeated by Joseph Scaliger. For from the time wherein Lycurgus made his Laws, which was in the 25 year of Ar∣chelaus, the eighth King of the Elder House. unto the death of Alcamenes, which was the year before the first Olympiad, were 112 years just, none under. From thence unto the last year of the 55. 220 years compleat; which put together make no fewer than 332 years full, a large misreckoning. Whereas the second year of the fifth O∣lympiad, in which Eusebius puts the Institution of the Ephori, both in the Greek and Latine Copies set out by Scaliger himself; that second year I say being added to the 112 before-remembred, in which King Alcamenes died, makes up the full number of 130, which we find in Plutarch; and agrees punctually with the time of Theopompus, who as it is confessed by Scaliger, did first ordain them. Nor doth Laertius say, if you mark him well, either that Chilo was the first that was ever Ephorus, or the first that joyned the Ephori to the Kings of Sparta, both which absurdities are by Scaliger imposed upon him. For unto any one who looks upon Laertius with a careful eye, it may be easily discerned, that he speaks no otherwise of the Ephorate, than of an Office instituted a long time before; with the condition of the which Chilo was well ac∣quainted, and therefore thought himself more fit to undergo it than his Brother was, who very earnestly desired it. All that Laertius saith, is no more but this, that Chilo was made Ephorus first, (not the first Ephorus which was made, as Scaliger would have it) under Euthydemus; and that as Satyrus affirmed (who therein questionless was misled by Plato) Lycurgus was the first who joyned the Ephori to the Spartan Kings; which words, viz. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he hath left out of purpose to abuse his Author, and make him speak the thing which he never meant. His other blun∣derings and mistakes to make good this business, first laying the dissolution of the E∣phorate by Cleomenes, non multo ante vel post initium Philippi, either not long before or shortly after the beginning of the reign of Philip the last King of Macedon, but one (which indeed is true) and within nine Lines, no more, laying it in the 13. year of the self-same King Philip, (most extreamly false) the changing of his Authors words from Fuit autem sub Regibus Lacedaemon annis 350, as they occur in the Translation of S. Hierom, printed at Basil, into Fuit sub Regibus Lacedaemoniorum Annis 350. against the Authors mind and the Rules of Grammar, only to bring about his device of Chilo, and blind his Readers eyes with a new Chronology; and others I could point to if my leisure served, I purpose to forbear at the present time. Nor had I been so bold with Scaliger at all, or at least not now, but that the proud man is more bold with the Antient Fathers, whom he is pleased to look on with con∣tempt, and scorn, as often as they come before him: for which see pag. 255. of his Annotations. And so I leave him with that Censure which he gives Eusebius, as learned and industrious an Antiquary, as any Scaliger of them all, (no man dis∣praised): Erratis hujus Autoris enumerandis charta non suffecerit; and so sare him well.

But to proceed, [unspec VI] the Ephori being thus ordained by Theopompus, became not pre∣sently of such authority and power, as by degrees they did attain to: For being chosen by the Kings as their proper Ministers as before was said, and many times 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, even from their very nearest Friends, as we read in Plutarch; they were hard thrust at by the Senate, and forced to put up many an affront from that mightier Body. And this was it that Chilo aimed at, when he told his Brother who at the same time desired the Office, and seemed offended that he lost it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that he was better skilled in bearing injuries and affronts, than his Brother was. But this continued for no longer than whilest the Kings served their turns upon them to oppose the Senate, and kept the nomination of them in their own hands. For afterwards the Kings relinquishing the Election to the common people, upon a forlorn hope, of gaining their affections by so great a benefit; they be∣gan

to set up for themselves, and in a very little time gained all the custom of the City. And of this new Election I am apt to think that Chilo, whom before we spake of, was the first 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Which I propose not so much out of a de∣sire to comply with Scaliger, who for ought I can see, aimed at no such mat∣ter; as on the credit of Eusebius, whom he so much lighteth. For in Euebius Chronicon of Josephus Scaligers own Edition, after he hath put down the institution of the Ephori in the second of the fifth Olympiad, as before I told you; he gives this Item in the third of the five and fiftieth (which is the very same that Laertius speaks of) Chilo qui de Septem Sapientibus fuit, Lacedaemone Ephorus constituitur, dispositione com∣munis gentis, that Chilo one of the seven wise Masters was ordained Ephorus at Sparta, by the general consent of all the people. But whether this were so, or not, I am not able to determine absolutely. All I observe from hence is this, that it is past all que∣stion, that from this time they took upon them more than they had done formerly, and were intent on all advantages to improve their power. For whereas at the first they were appointed by the Kings to sit in Judgment in their steads, as before was said, by little and little 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they drew that power unto them∣selves, and exercised it in their own name, by their own authority: not as the Mini∣sters of the Kings, they would none of that, but as the Officers of the Common∣wealth. And to that end they did erect a Court of Judicature, which for power and greatness of authority was little inferiour to the Senate; drawing unto them all such businesses as were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, most worthy of care and consideration. By means whereof, as they drew many of the people to depend upon them, whose businesses and suits of Law were brought to be determined by them; so they encreased that dependance, by husbanding such difference as did oft arise between the Senate and the Kings, to their own advantage. For it is well observed by Aristotle, that as long as the Senate and the Kings did agree together, they kept all the power in their own hands: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but when they jarred amongst themslves, they gave the people opportunity to become their Masters. But that which raised them to the height, and made them terrible at last both to King and Senate, was the mutual tie and correspondence which was between them and the people: by whom they were not only chosen, and therefore cherished by them as their own dear Crea∣tures: but for the most part chosen 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, out of the body of the people, and sometime 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: out of the very meanest and neediest of them; which made them on the other side to court the people, and to apply themselves unto them upon all occasions. And though it happened many times, that some of them being indigent and needy men, where easily wrought upon by money, and apt to sell as well the justice as the honour of the Common-wealth, to enrich themselves and raise their Families; whereof Aristotle much complains, and that deservedly: yet this cor∣ruption served to advance their power, and put them into a condition to be the bet∣ter able to oblige the people. So that the common sort of people doing all they could to advance the power and reputation of the Ephori, whom they accounted for their own, as indeed they were; and the Ephori striving by all possible means to gratifie the people, by obtaining new Laws and large immunities to be enacted for them, as they saw occasion: they altered the whole frame of Government, and made it of an Aristocrasie to become an Ogligarchie, and in conclusion a plain Popular Ty∣ranny.

For trusting to the power and interess whic they had in the Commonalty, [unspec VII] and the support they were assured from them, if the case required it; they drew unto themselves the managery of the State-affairs; and grew so powerful at the last, that if they did not all things of their own authority, yet they had such an hand on the Kings and Senate, that nothing could be done without them. Were any Laws to be Enacted, who but the Ephori must propound them? Or any Taxes to be levied for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth, who but the Ephori must impose them? When Lysander had reduced the City of Athens unto such extremities, that they were glad to yield unto such conditions as the Conquerors were pleased to impose upon them: from whom must the Capitulations come, but from the Ephori? It was the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the final resolution of the Ephori, from which they were to expect ei∣ther bonds or liberty. Cynado is accused of Treason against Agesilaus and the State of Sparta, the Ephori must take the information and proceed accordingly: and if Pausanias be accused of holding correspondence with the King of Persia, the Ephori send out their commands, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and commit him presently

to Prison. When any Ambassadors were sent forth on the publick service, from whom must they receive their power, from whom be furnished with instructions, but from the Ephori alone? and who but they must appoint Comminders for the Wars, require account of their employments, and either punish or reward them as they haved served? When Cleonymus was displeased because Areus was preferred be∣fore him in his pretensions to the Kingdom: the Ephori did not only take upon them to sweeten and demulce the man by great gifts and presents, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but also to confer upon him the command of the Army, though of right belonging to the Kings. When Mindarus the Admiral of their Navy was mise∣rably beat by the Athenians in the straight of Hellespont, an Express is presently dis∣patched to Sparta, to give unto the Ephori an account thereof: Lysander had no sooner revenged this quarrel, and beat the Fleet of the athenians near the self same place, but he acquaints the Ephori with his good success, with all speed that might be. And if the Wars prove fortunate, and the spoil so great, that part thereof be sent to Sparta, to be laid up in the publick Treasury; the Ephori, and none but they must have the fingering of the money. Finally there was no Commander of the Armies, or other Officer employed by the Common-wealth, whom they called not to an ac∣compt as their stomachs served; not staying till the Office was expired, and the Com∣mander or the Officer become a private man again, as in other States; but even in the midst of their Command and Magistracy whatsoever it was: and whom they did not punish when they come before them, either by imprisonment or death, as to them seem'd best. Thus have we brought them to their height, and seen them absolutely possessed of the Supream Power, in making peace or war as they thought conve∣nient; and in disposing of the goods, the liberties, yea and the lives too of the Spar∣tan subject. It had been a strange temper in them had they tarried there, and not encroached as much (whilest the Tide went with them) upon the persons and the power of the Kings themselves.

For howsoever at the first they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Ministers of the Kings, [unspec VIII] as before was told you, and accomptable to none but them: yet after they were reckoned for the Officers of the Common-wealth, they cast off all relation to the Kings, their Masters, and thought themselves their Equals at the best, and at last their betters. A point which Theopompus did but little dream of, when first he set them up to oppose the Senate, although his Queen a wise and understanding Lady did evidently see, and tell him, what would follow on it. Of which we find this story in the works of Aristotle, and from him borrowed by Plutarch if I guess aright, that his Wife seeing what design he was bent upon, and how unluckily he was car∣ried on to effect the same, advised him to take heed that by erecting this new Magi∣stracy, he did not leave the Kingdom in a worse condition to his Heirs and Successors, than he received the same from his I redecessors; and that he answered thereunto, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that by this means he hoped to leave it stronger and more durable than it was before. But the event declared unto all the World that the Woman was the better Prophet, and had the greater insight into things to come. The power of Sovereignty when once communicated to the common people, or otherwise usurped by such popular Officers, as depend wholly on the people for their place and being, is seldom time recovered into Regal hands. And though some Kings may be persuaded by some subtle Artifices (as it seems Theopompus was) that by this means the Chair of State will stand the faster; yet the proceedings of the Ephori in the State of Sparta will inform us otherwise, and easily lay open the appa∣rent danger of such weak surmises. For being made Officers of State, one of the first points they obtained, was that the Kings made Oath unto them once in every month, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that they would govern the E∣state according to the Laws established in the Common-wealth, and that they would preserve the Kingdom in the best condition that they could: the Ephori making Oath to them in the name of the City, whose Officers they were, and by whom intrusted. Next they attempt to place such Counsellors about the Kings, as they might confide in, beginning with such Kings as were under Age; and the first trial which they made was in appointing one Cleandrides to be about King Plastonax, the 19. of the elder House, as his chief Counsellor and Director, without whose approbation nothing must be done. Another of their usurpations and incroachments was to restrain their Kings in the point of Marriage, and to impose some fine or disgrace upon them, if they presumed to marry against their liking. Anaxandrides the 15. of the elder

House, had married a Lady of brave parts, but it was her ill fortune to be barren a long time together. The Ephori command him without more ado 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to give her a Bill of divorce, and send her going. Archidamus the 17. of the second House married a Wife which brought him Children: But fault was found she was too little, and thereupon the Ephori condemned him in a sum of money; saying 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that she would not bring them Kings, but demy-Kings. And that you may perceive how difficult a thing it was to please them in this point, Leonidas had married one that was neither barren, nor too little; and yet was quarrelled by the Ephori, and in fine condemned, for marrying with a Woman of another Nation. The fundamental Laws of Sparta conferred upon the Kings the Supream command over the Military men in all Wars abroad. The Ephori did not only dispose it otherwise, and gave it unto such whom they desired to oblige unto them, as you heard before: but kept the Kings at such a bay, that they neither could lead forth the Armies without their consent, nor tarry longer in the Camp than they list to let them; and if the action did miscarry, the Kings were either fined or im∣prisoned for it. Agesilaus being a verry stirring Prince, and desirous to get honour in the Wars, was not permitted to set forwards till he had bought the Ephori with a sum of money: and yet being in the height of his good success was called back again, and glad to be conformable to the said Commands. And so it fared with Agis and Clcomenes both, on the like occasions. And for the fining of their Kings, besides what we have seen before in the former instances, Plistonax being betrayed by Clean∣drides, (whom the Ephori themselves had placed about him) and his Army forced to disband and turn home again; is presently condemned in so great a sum, that he was not able to discharge it. By means whereof the Kings were brought at last unto that condition, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Aristotle truly noteth, that they were forced to court and bribe the Ephori upon all occasions, to the great disservice of the State, and sometimes to the fatal overthrow of their chief designs. So that it is no marvel, if considered rightly, either that the Ephori kept their state and rose not up to reverence their King, when he came before them, though all the re∣sidue of the people and the Senate did it, as we read in Xenophon; or that Agesilaus used to rise up to them, as often as they came unto him about any business, as we find in Plutarch; or that the Kings esteemed it such a point of Sovereignty, that when they were commanded to attend the Ephori, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they did refuse to go upon the first and second summons, and stirred not till the third command, as Cleomenes bragged in the said Historian. Which trust me was a point of no small importance.

And yet they staid not here, they went furrher still. [unspec IX] They thought it not enough to condemn their Kings in vast and unproportionable sums of money, unless they laid restraints on their persons also, and had command upon their bodies. And there∣fore it is noted by Thucydides not without good reason, that they did not only punish with imprisonment their great and principal Commanders; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but that it was lawful for the Ephori to do the like unto their Kings. Which to avoid, Pausanias was inforced to retire himself, and live a volun∣tary exile in another Countrey. Nothing remains but they take authority to depose, and in fine to murther them; and if they gain not this, all the rest is nothing. And this they are resolved to gain, or be foully foiled; nor did they fail in the attempt when they went about it. They quarrelled at Leonidas as before I told you, for mar∣rying with a Woman of another Countrey, without so much as seeking for their ap∣probation. And that they may be sure to effect their business, Religion is pretended, and a star must fall, only to warrant their proceedings. Which preparations bring past they cite him to appear before them, and on default of his appearance they de∣posed him instantly, and conferred the Kingdom on Cleombrotus. But these men being out of Office, he came out of Sanctuary, and was restored again by the next years Ephori. Who to make proof that their Authority was as great as their Predecessors, thought it not argument enough to restore one King, except they did depose and destroy another. And thereupon laid hands on Agis of the other House, and inhumanly haled him to the common Prison, and there most barbarously murdered him with his Mother and Grand-mother. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And this saith Plutarch was the first time, that ever the Ephori put a King to death. And so perhaps it was the first, but the last it was not. For Archidamus the Brother of Agis being recalled from banishment by Cleomenes, to the end he might

enjoy the Kingdom which did by right belong unto him; was presently seised on by the murtherers, and dispatched in private, for fear he should revenge the death of his slaughtered Brother. By which it is most evident without further proof, that the Spartan Aristocracie was become a Tyranny, and of all Tyrannies the most insup∣portable, because meerly popular. Or if more proof should be desired, both Ari∣stotle, and his Master Plato will not stick to say it; though they both died, before these two last Tragedies were acted on the stage of Sparta. For Plato being to declare what he conceived of the Government of that Common-wealth resolves that it did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, approach more near to Tyranny than to any other Form whatever; the Power and Empire of the Ephori being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, plainly Ty∣rannical, and no otherwise. And Aristotle who had studied the condition of that State exactly, though at the first he seemed to think that it was very well compounded of the three good Forms, yet upon full debate thereof, he concludes at last, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Dominion of the Ephori was an absolute Tyranny. Assu∣redly had they lived to have seen that day, wherein the Ephori embrued their hands in the blood of their Princes, under pretence of safety to the Common-wealth, they would have voted it to have been a Tyranny in the highest degree; and then the most unsufferable Tyrants that ever wretched State groaned under. For though the Kings of Sparta were so lessened by Lycurgus Laws, that little more was left unto them than the name and Title; yet they were Kings, and held so sacred by their Neigh∣bours, even their very Enemies, that none did ever offer to lay hands upon them in the heat and fury of their fights, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, out of the re∣verence they did bear to those beams of Majesty, which most apparently shined in them.

The Ephori being grown to this height of Tyranny, [unspec X] were the more ready for their fall; which followed not long after that most barbarous fact, upon the persons of their Princes. The Kings had long since stomached them and their high pro∣ceedings, bearing 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a kind of Heritable grudge betwixt them (as my Author calls it) ever since they took upon them to controul their Masters: but either wanted opportunity or spirit, to attempt any thing to their prejudice; and therefore thought it safer to procure their favours, than run them∣selves upon a hazardous Experiment. Pausanias, the 20. of the Elder House, was the first that ever did attempt either by force or practice to subvert the Office; the insolencies of the which were then grown so great, that being a stout and active Prince, he was not able to endure them. That he had entertained such thoughts is affirmed by Aristotle, where he informs us that Lysander had a purpose to take away the Kingly Government (or rather to acquire it to himself, as we find in Plutarch,) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and that Pausanias had the like to destroy the Ephorate. But what he failed to bring about, his Successors did at last accomplish. Of which Cleombrotus and Agis, joyning their hands and heads together did proceed so far, that going into the Market place well attended by their Friends and followers, they plucked the Ephori from their seats, and substituted others in their rooms, whom they conceived would be more pliant to their prefent Enterprises: which was the first actual attempt, that ever had been made against them by the Kings of Sparta. But evulgato imperii Arcano, when so great a mystery of State was once discovered, that the Ephori were but mortal men, and might as easily be displaced and deposed as any of the other Magistrates; Leonidas immediately upon his restitution to the King∣dom, made the like removal, and displaced those who had taken part against him with the former Kings. So that the ice being broken, and the way made open, Cleomenes son unto Leonidas had the fairer way to abrogate the Office utterly, which at last he did. For being a brave and gallant Prince, and seeing that the project he was bent upon for the reduction of the Common-wealth to its primitive honour, could not be brought about but by their destruction; he fell upon them with his Souldiers as they sat at supper, and killed four of them in the place, the fifth escaping shrewdly hurt to the nearest Sanctuary. That done he went into the Market place, and overthrew all the Chairs of the Ephori saving only one, which he reserved for himself as his Chair of State, and sitting in the same in the sight of the people, gave them an account of his proceedings, and the reasons which induced him to it: Declaring how the Ephori were at first appointed by the Kings themselves; that for long time they governed only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as the Kings Ministers, and no otherwise; that many years after this, Asteropus one of the Ephori, building upon a new foundation, and being the first Author

of that dangerous change, they took the Government unto themselves, and exercised the same in their own names only; that though they had usurped a power which belonged not to them, yet had they managed it discreetly, the might perhaps have held it longer, and with better liking; but that licentiously abusing the authority which they had usurped by suppressing the lawful Governors ordained of old, by taking upon them to banish some of the Citizens, and to put some to death without law and justice, and finally by threatning those who were de∣sirous to restore the Government to its antient Form, they were no longer to be suffered: that for his part he should have thought himself the happiest King that ever was, if possibly he could have cured his Countrey of that foul affection withou grief or sorrow; but being it was not to be done that way, he thought it better that some should be put to death, than the whole Common-wealth run on to a swift destruction. This said, he presently dissolved the Assembly, and seriously betook himself to the Reformation which formerly he had projected, and in short time reduced the people to the antient Discipline, the staee and reputation of the Common-wealth to its ancient height.

Thus have we made a brief discovery of the Spartan Ephori, [unspec XI] upon what grounds first instituted, and on what destroyed; by what foul practices and unlawful means they gained the Sovereignty of the State, and by what they lost it: how, and by what degrees they came from low and mean beginnings to so strange a Tyranny, and with what suddenness they lost their power and their lives together. But in all this there is not any shew or colour for that which is affirmed by CALVIN, no ground for, nor verity at all in that Assertion, that the Ephori were at first ordained to oppose the Kings, to regulate their proceedings, and restrain their power: but rather that they were ordained (as indeed they were) to curb the Senate, to be the Ministers of the Kings, and subservient to them; to sit in Judgment for them, and discharge such Offices, as the Kings pleased to trust them with, in their times of absence. If Calvins popular Magistrates have no more Authority, than the Spartan Ephori, accord∣ing to the rules of their Institution, they will have little colour to controul their Princes, and less for putting a restraint on the Regal power. The most they can pre∣tend to must be usurpation, and that will hold no longer, if it hold so long, than they have power to make it good by blood and violence, which I hope Calvin did not aim at. And if they have no other ground than an unjust Title, prescription will not serve the turn, (for nullum tempus occurrit Regi, as our Lawyers tell us) when a couragious Prince is concerned in it, and oppressed by it. If any Popular spirits en∣tertain such hopes, if nothing else will satisfie their vast ambitions but to be equal with their Kings and Supream Governours, and at last above them: let them remem∣ber what became of the Spartan Ephori, and that there was a Cleomenes which called them to a sad account for all those insolencies and affronts which they had put upon himself and his Predecessors. And let all Kings and Supream Governors take heed by the example of these Spartan Princes, how they let loose the reins of Government, and lay them on the necks of the common people: which if unbridled once, and left at liberty, will not be easily induced to receive that Bit into their mouths which before they champed on: and that they give no way to such popular Magistrates as Calvin hath presented to us, who whatsoever colour and pretence they make, aim at no other mark than the Royal power, though out of too much modesty they disclaim the Title, and must be either Kings or nothing. Of which invasions and encroachments on the Supream Power, our Author gives another hint in the Roman Tribunes; the truth and fitness of which supposition must be looked on next.

Notes

• Unlawfulness of resistance, p 90.
• Tacit. Annal.
• Pausanias in Lacon. l. 3.
• Justin. hist. l. 1.
• Pausanius l. 3.
• ••••••tarch in Agis & Clee∣me••.
• Plutarch. in Lycurgo.
• Aristot. Polit. lib. 5. cap. 12.
• Plutarch. in Lycurg.
• Id. ibid.
• Id ibid. et in Agis & Cleo∣men.
• Plat. Epist. 8.
• In Lycurge.
• Pausanias in Lacon. l. 3.
• Plutarch. ibid.
• Nenophon de Repub. Lace∣daemon.
• Aristot. Po∣litic. l. 3. c. 10.
• Id. ibid. & l. 2. c. 7. & l. 3. d. 11.
• Nenophon in Repub. Lace∣daemon.
• Plutarch in Agesilao.
• Aristot. Pol. l. 2.8.
• Id. Polit. l. 2. c. 7.
• Plutarch in Agesilao.
• Aristot. Poli∣tic. l. 2. c. 7. Suidas.
• Pa••san. lib. 3. in Lacon. Plutarch in Lycurgo.
• Id in Agis & Cleomenes.
• Id. ibid.
• Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 11. Cicero de legi∣bus, l. 3.
• Plato Ep. 8. edit. gr. lat. To. 3.
• Plut. in Ly∣curgo. Scalig. ani∣madvers. in Euseb. Chron.
• Plutarch. in Lycurgo.
• Diogen. Lat. 1. l. 1. in Chilo.
• Euseb. Chron. lib. post. p. 114. of Scaligers edit.
• Pag. 117. of the Latin, and 35 of the Greek Edition.
• Laertius in vi∣ta Chilon.
• Pag. 67 of the Animadvers.
• Animadvers. in Euseb. p. 255.
• Plutarch. in Agis & Cleo∣men.
• Laertius in vita Chilon.
• Euseb. Chronic. lib. poster. p. 127.
• Plutarch in Agis & Cleom.
• Pausan. l. 3. in Laconicis. Aristot. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 1.
• Id. ibid. l. 2. c. 9.
• Aristot. Polit. l. 2. cap. 7.
• Id. ibid. &c. 8.
• Plutarch in Agis & Cleo∣men.
• Id. in Lysan∣dro.
• Xenophon. in vita Agesilai. Thucydides. l. 1.
• Plut. in Nici∣as.
• Pausan. l. 3. in Lacon.
• Plutarch. in Alcibiades. Idem in Lysan∣dro.
• Id. ibid.
• Xenophon de Rep••b. Lace∣daem.
• Apistot. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.
• Xenophon. de Kepub. Laced.
• Plutarch. in Pericles.
• Pausan. lib. 3. in Lacon.
• Plutarch. in Agesilao.
• Id. in Agis & Cleomenes.
• Id. in Agesi∣lao.
• Id. in Pericles. Aristot. Polit. l. 2. cap. 7.
• De Repub. La∣cedaem. Plut. in Age∣silao.
• Id. in Agis & Cleomen.
• Thucydid. hist. l. 1.
• Plutarch in Lysander.
• Id. in agis & Cleomenes.
• Id. ibid.
• Id. ibid.
• Plato de legi∣bus l. 4.
• Aristot. Polit. l. 2. c. 4.
• Plutarch. in A∣gis & Cleom.
• Id. in Agesil.
• Id. in Lysan∣d••o. Aristot. Polit. lib. 5. c. 1.
• Plutarch in A∣gis & Cleom.
• Id. ibid.
• Id. ibid.