III. A Right in War may arise from some sub∣sequent Cause in its prosecu∣tion.
Secondly, we must know, that what is our Right is not to be adjudged by the first cause of the War only, but from other emergent causes which arise in the prosecution of it; so we have seen in our Courts of Justice, after a Cause hath been well argued, a new Right hath often arose to a Party which was not before thought on. Thus they that shall asso∣ciate with him that invades me, be they either Associates, or Subjects, do give me a Right to defend my self against them. So also they that shall joyn themselves with others in a War that is unjust, especially if they may or ought to know it to be so, do oblige them∣selves to repair the damage, and to pay the charges of the War, because they have cau∣sed it by their own default. So likewise they that rashly thrust themselves into a War undertaken without any probable Reason, deserve to be punished according to the inju∣stice of their actions: For so long doth Plato approve of the War, Donec hi qui sontes sunt cogantur insontibus male affectis, poenas dare; Ʋntil the guilty party be compelled to give satis∣faction to those who being innocent, have been injured by them.