VII. Yet it may be omitted, if either it en∣danger our selves, or take away the inva∣ders life.
Here also it may be questioned, whether for one man to defend another, or for one People or Nation to protect another from violence and wrong, be a debt whereunto we stand bound. Plato in the fourth of his Laws affirms, That he that doth not repel violence offered to another (if he can do it) deserves to be punished. The like provision was made, both by the Hebrew and Aegyptian Laws* 1.1; but this general will admit of some exceptions: for in case we cannot do this, without incurring some manifest danger unto our selves, it is most agreeable to nature that we abstain from attempting it; for every man may prefer his own before the welfare of another. And in this sense doth that of Cicero hold true, He that doth not defend another, nor resist an injury when he can, is as much to blame, as he that deserts his Parents, his Country, or his Friends; if he can, that is, with safety to himself: For he himself in another place admits, That some, haply, may he left unprotected without blame. Salust in his History gives this wholesome advice, Let them, saith he, who being in prospe∣rity, are about to engage themselves in a social War, seriously consider, First, Whether they may then live in peace; Next, Whether the War they engage in be just, safe, honourable; or otherwise, inconvenient.* 1.2 Succuram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream; I will defend him (saith Seneca) that is ready to perish; but so, that I thereby perish not my self, unless it be to rescue from death some person of great honour; or to purchase some very great advantage unto either my self, or my relations:* 1.3 Bonum etiam impendio sanguinis mei tuebor; A good man, saith he, though with the hazard of my life, I shall defend; and if I can rescue a bad man from Thieves, by my clamour and outcry, I shall willingly strain my voice to do him good. But yet if that good man be so oppressed, that he cannot be relieved without the death of the oppressor, I am not