The most excellent Hugo Grotius, his three books treating of the rights of war & peace in the first is handled, whether any war be just : in the second is shewed, the causes of war, both just and unjust : in the third is declared, what in war is lawful, that is, unpunishable : with the annotations digested into the body of every chapter / translated into English by William Evats ...

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Title
The most excellent Hugo Grotius, his three books treating of the rights of war & peace in the first is handled, whether any war be just : in the second is shewed, the causes of war, both just and unjust : in the third is declared, what in war is lawful, that is, unpunishable : with the annotations digested into the body of every chapter / translated into English by William Evats ...
Author
Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645.
Publication
London :: Printed by M.W. for Thomas Basset ... and Ralph Smith ...,
1682.
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Subject terms
International law.
War (International law)
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A42237.0001.001
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"The most excellent Hugo Grotius, his three books treating of the rights of war & peace in the first is handled, whether any war be just : in the second is shewed, the causes of war, both just and unjust : in the third is declared, what in war is lawful, that is, unpunishable : with the annotations digested into the body of every chapter / translated into English by William Evats ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A42237.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 2, 2024.

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XX. A conjecture offering it self either ex∣tends the sig∣nification, and when.

There is also another way of interpreting by conjectures beyond the signification of the words wherein the Promise is contained: And this also is two-fold, either by ex∣tending them farther than the words signifie, or by restraining them. But that Inter∣pretation which restrains the signification of words is easie, but that which enlargeth them, more difficult. For as in all humane things, the want of any one cause is enough to make all the rest ineffectual: But to produce an effect, all the causes must concur; so also in this case of obligation, that conjecture that shall extend the Obligation is not rashly to be admitted: But with much more caution than in the case before mentioned, where we admit of words in their largest signification, though not much in use. For here we raise our conjectures without regard had to the words promising, which cannot intro∣duce an obligation, unless the Conjectures be very certain; for here a parity of Reason is not sufficient, unless it be the very same: Neither is the same Reason at all times sufficient; because, as I said before, Reason doth often so move us, that to shew our own freedome, our will is of it self a sufficient cause of our Promises, without any other Reason. Now to justifie such an extended conjecture beyond the words of the Promise, it is necessary that it should plainly appear, That the Reason under which that case which we would comprehend falls, was the only and most efficacious cause which moved the Promiser; and that that Reason was in its generality so considered by him, because otherwise the Promise would prove either unjust or unprofitable. As for Example, An agreement that such a place should not be surrounded with walls, being made at such a time when no other Fortifications were in use, should doubtless extend to all Muniments, though but of Earth, in case it do appear, that the only reason why Walls were prohibited, was, That that place should not be fortified. Another Example is usually brought of a man, who believing his Wife to be with Child, disposeth his Estate to such a man in case that Child should dye, which by all probable conjectures should be extended to this sense, Or if such a Child should not be born: For certain it is, That the Will of the Testator was moved with this only consideration, That then he should have no Child of his own to inherit it: This case we shall find, not among the Lawyers only,* 1.1 but in Cicero, and in Valerius Maximus. Cicero in his Oration for Caecina, pleads this case thus, What? Is this sufficiently provided for in words? No. What then was of force to do it? The Will: Which if it could be understood by silence, we should have no need of Words: But because that cannot be, therefore were words invented, but such as should not hinder the Will, but declare it. And a little after, in the same Oration, he adds, Idem jus esse, ubi perspicitur una atque eadem causa aequitatis; Where there manifestly appeared but one and the same cause of Equity, (i. e.) where there was the same solitary cause moving, It may be presumed there is also one and the same Right. Thus Philo in his Special Laws proves that it is Adultery to lye with a woman that is betrothed to another, and he adds this reason, Quia idem valent sponsalia quod Nuptiae; Because, saith he, such Espousals are equal to Marriages.* 1.2 (So likewise in the Mosaical Law, under the name of Oxen, are all gentle Beasts comprehended; so is every Pool or Pond under the name of a Well:) So like∣wise an Injunction, though it run in this form, Ʋnde me vi dejeceris hominibus coactis, arma∣tisve; Whence thou hast thrust me out by force and arms, takes place also against all manner of force that threatens our life and limbs. For that which is usually done by armed men, if by any other counsels or means we are brought into the same danger, the Law affords us the same Right and Remedy. Quintilian the Father, in one of his Declamations brings in this Example, Murther doth usually signifie the effusion of humane blood by the Sword: But if a man be killed by

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any other means we have recourse to the same Law: For if a man shall fall among Thieves, or if he be thrown into a River, and there drowned, or if he be tumbled headlong from an high Pre∣cipice, his death shall be revenged by the same Law as if he had been killed by the Sword. The like Argument we find used by Isaeus, concerning the Inheritance of Pyrrhus, where be∣cause by the Laws of Athens, a Father having no Son could not make his Testament if his Daughter were unwilling; he infers, that neither had he, without her consent, the power of adopting one.

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